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## PREFACE

This volume displays the range of concerns, the variety of disciplines and specialties, and the warring requirements—in both philosophical and empirical terms—of rampant urbanization. Herein many facets of urban growth dynamics and the role of planning are examined. The papers reflect diverse approaches to one or another of these concerns which have reached, or threaten to reach, crisis proportions.

A reading of these somewhat heterogeneous articles makes clear that the planning role must be directed not simply toward *how* to do, but also, *what* to do. In the past, our American approach to abundance and the new technology produced its own momentum; and *how* was the watchword. Now, our man-nature society has entered on a plateau, and the planner is obliged to decide *what* ameliorative or innovative measures will keep the system moving and viable for all.

So, although planning for change might be considered to be *the* approach, those of us involved in planning know that our role takes many forms before it makes much headway in dealing with the amalgam of the planning syndrome. As its name suggests, the concurrent aggregate of symptoms which face the planner in urban growth and the simultaneous cultural accommodation of diverse lifestyles are more atypical than typical. Therefore, in planning at least, professional choices will always be conditioned by the value judgments of those who participate in the planning and in the governance of a community, state, or nation. The majority may not be right, but it governs. Hence, despite turbulences that grow out of a community's or a nation's lifestyles, the planner must be ready with both new objectives and new methods. This is the planning syndrome.

Apart from establishing the thrust and organization of the volume, the special editor has spent an appreciable amount of time and energy in assembling a task force of contributors who represent a cross-section of scholars, practitioners, and observers. They have spent their lives neither eternally among the book stacks of great libraries, nor exclusively behind mahogany desks on a certain size of green carpet. Each author, whether senior in years and personal distinction, or junior in experience and still to be honored, has been designated so as to provide the reader of this volume with information upon which to reach his own decisions. Those authors are included who survived the test of articulate expression of their best thinking.

My special editor's task has been a rewarding experience. I wish to express public thanks to all, including a frequent associate, D. Robert Scherer, for his notable staff assistance, and the distinguished editor and most able staff of the Academy.

And, finally, perhaps this is the place to say—

Many years ago I became convinced that conflict is inevitable. Not too long after, I was equally certain that change is related to conflict, and that both are continuing and necessary to progress. The third and final step was my recognition that—whether dealing with conflict or change—the important thing is how one resolves the continuing manifestations of both. In consequence, when I accepted

the task of assembling this volume, I felt the most important thing to put on display was how thinking men view one of the most critical issues of our society. I discovered that they view it hopefully, or without hope; progressively, or from a status quo position; they view it broadly, and they view it narrowly; they fight the problem, or they quarrel with the other experts in the field. Taken as a whole, the following papers prove, in some measure, at least, my thesis.

GEORGE FOX MOTT

VOLUME 406



MARCH 1973

# THE ANNALS

*of The American Academy of Political  
and Social Science*

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Editor*

ALAN W. HESTON, *Assistant Editor*



## THE MILITARY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

*Special Editor of This Volume*

ADAM YARMOLINSKY

*Ralph Waldo Emerson Professor of the University  
University of Massachusetts  
Boston, Massachusetts*

PHILADELPHIA

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-93251

The articles appearing in *THE ANNALS* are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, the *Book Review Index*, the *Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin*, and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social, and Management Sciences*. They are also abstracted and indexed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*.

*Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17604. Cost per year for individuals: \$12.00 paperbound; \$16.00 clothbound. Institutions: \$15.00 paperbound; \$20.00 clothbound. Add \$1.00 to above rates for membership outside U.S.A. Second-class postage paid at Lancaster and at additional mailing offices.*

*Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.*



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VOLUME 407



MAY 1973

# THE ANNALS

*of The American Academy of Political  
and Social Science*

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Editor*

ALAN W. HESTON, *Assistant Editor*



## BLACKS AND THE LAW

*Special Editor of This Volume*

JACK GREENBERG

*Director-Counsel*

*NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.  
New York, New York*

PHILADELPHIA

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-93252

The articles appearing in *THE ANNALS* are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, the *Book Review Index*, the *Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin*, and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social, and Management Sciences*. They are also abstracted and indexed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*.

*Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17604. Cost per year for individuals: \$12.00 paperbound; \$16.00 clothbound. Institutions: \$15.00 paperbound; \$20.00 clothbound. Add \$1.00 to above rates for membership outside U.S.A. Second-class postage paid at Lancaster and at additional mailing offices.*

*Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.*



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# An Overview: Sensitivities of Compulsive and Planned Change

By GEORGE FOX MOTT

ABSTRACT: Although the correlation between change and planning is often negative, the subjects of planning and change command a growing public awareness. In consequence, planning as a professional activity has gained increased status. The social planner—the urban, regional, systems planner—is finding it necessary to become familiar with many disciplines. The successful planner must see the broad picture, and in addition to his own area of specialization, he must reach out to synthesize all available data on human social processes. The routine departmentalized approach to planning for change has not worked and will not work in designing for better man-nature relationships and manageable institutions. In the end, the planning syndrome, that is, the accretion of many kinds of knowledge to the objective of socio-economic and political planning, may solve our urban and other human crises.

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**M**ENU Planning Requires Some Juggling," says a headline on the Woman's Page of a local newspaper. A blurb for charter subscription to a new magazine reads: "... you are caught up in an ever-tightening time spiral where cycles of change are measured in days instead of centuries." The theme of the headline article seems to be that you cook twice as much as immediately needed and put to rest in the deep freeze—which is certainly planning reduced to its simplest. The implication of the ad-urge exhortation is that forewarned is forearmed, and that with the help of their new magazine, you can come out of the change spiral alive and still in your right mind.

Writings proliferate about planned change which has failed. A recent article titled "Chandigarh was planned by experts but something has gone wrong" is one of dozens noted in the last few months in the lay press.<sup>1</sup> The reading public has finally made the connection between change and planning, and the idea is seeping through that often the correlation between them is negative.

The increasing appearance in the media of the subjects of planning and change, both separate and together, reflects a growing public awareness. Among professionals, the nature of the crisis is recognized by an experienced observer who writes:

Not only are suggested solutions few, but the general ability to think through the intricate maze of political, technical and geographic interrelationships is almost totally lacking. Often the most expert in one problem area find it impossible to compensate for difficulties totally alien to their field of expertise.

More evident every day is the unalterable fact that the problems of a contemporary city do not end at the city boundaries; that adjacent urban areas, usually part of a

county, are suffering from an extension of the same crises. Therefore the problems must be attacked by all levels of government and all portions of the private sector. They are of such magnitude that they can only be conquered by a concerted effort, and the most serious error that we make is to continue to think of them simply as "the problems of the cities."<sup>2</sup>

The subject of these paragraphs is, of course, urban planning, but this phase has become so critical that "planner" is used for everyone engaged in city, regional, social, or master planning—as "media" is jargon for the modern complex of communications processes.

A paradox of today is that the more specialization is forced upon one, the more of a pantologist one must become. The more impossible it is for a man to master even one professional field, the more essential it is for him to know what is going on in other areas of activity related—or sometimes apparently unrelated—to his core knowledge.

Relatively few men overcome this hurdle, and this is one of the root causes of our difficulty. Those who deal with the total concern through the employment of many disciplines should be our most valuable men. They may—decrying the complexities of our society—retreat into pessimism; or they may be stimulated thereby to recognize that, with a view over the whole landscape, something can be done.

Indeed, this is not a time for pessimism. It is rather a time for reflection. One can make a case for saying that the most important task today is not to resolve the housing shortage, or to reduce violent crime, or to diminish air and water pollution; nor is it even to develop a system for supplying everyone in the world with enough to eat. In

2. Spiro T. Agnew, "Foreword," in Donald Canty, ed., *The New City*, published for Urban America Inc. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 7.

1. Brent C. Brolin, in *Smithsonian* (June 1972), p. 56 et seq.

fact, if every one of these problems were miraculously solved, our crises would be compounded. The most vital and immediate chore we face is to engage our own unprogrammed abilities and our own singular, nonrepetitive experience in the job of deciding where we go now.

This awakening must not take the high road of "discipline" sky-writing, nor join the search for a Sir Thomas More to produce a master plan for a "year 2000" utopia. The call rather is for men who understand that the chief worth of civilization lies in the opportunity to muster coordinated intellectual effort so as to make our complexities manageable and our lives more meaningful.

#### BARRIERS AND CORRIDORS

Planners of the remote or recent past were not the foolish or selfish men that the new literature often makes them out to be; they were for the most part competent men, if not always of great vision, who projected from inadequate and inaccurate premises as to the nature of the dynamics of human society.

Leaders and pedagogues in all ages have admonished their generation to "think," to define the problem, to identify the parameters. But the admonition has rarely been followed because we have been involved constantly with compulsive change. There have always been simpler, less taxing jobs to do. We were obliged to invent the wheel, gunpowder, the printing press, internal combustion engines, electricity, the Western Hemisphere, the assembly belt, the corporate image, the hydrogen bomb, and nonbiodegradable substances—all more fun to figure out, much easier and less taxing to our sensitivities than to sit down and plan what we are going to do with all these preparations for the good life in the man-nature relationship of our time.

While I do not subscribe to the pessimist's view that we have built our tower of blocks to the point where one more will bring the whole structure crashing down, it is well to keep this view in mind. In fact, it may be one minute to midnight, unless we recognize the need to plan.

Planning, with all its limitations, is at last winning a measure of both public and private respect. For the first time, it is right and proper that we sit down and reflect. We have now accumulated much more pertinent data than we have yet assimilated. Of course, all planning must start from some premise, evolve through a set of assumptions, a consideration of selective approaches, the give and take of mature sensitivity to the socio-historic consequences of earlier efforts, and still end with a plan having a pragmatic thrust. In sum, it is our duty to take a load off our feet, figuratively speaking, and, considering the results of our human labors up to this time, thus—"facing the total concern through the employment of many disciplines"—make some plans that work.

Compulsive change is sensitive. It is reaction of a process or substance to another. One invention leads to another. Wind and rain break down rock into sand. Men are born and they die. Planned change is also sensitive; but it involves giving a shove to inevitability to try to make it go the way we want it to. This is very tricky, as any golfer or billiards player knows. And nothing is as sensitive, in another sense, as a planner. This is partly because his profession is newly received into the pantheon of accepted disciplines; it is partly because he must parry and thrust with other experts to be heard at all; and it is partly because he can show few proven successes in our present crises. Whatever he says or puts on the drawing board will be objected to by someone. To be specific, if a "new city" planner



survives his developers, the planning commission, and the county supervisors, the people who live in his "new town" may refuse to adopt or adapt to the life-style variations he has incorporated.

Perhaps we must narrow our definition a bit. It is the social planner who has little to show for his efforts. Other planners fare better. The physicist planning his next experiment; the chef preparing to create a new blue-ribbon dish; the engineer-architect drafting something unique in town houses—they expect to succeed, and often do. The social planners are the sad ones whose efforts, so far, have resulted largely in disaster, or in the meager and costly achievement which seems worse than failure.

Even the ground the planner walks on is unstable beneath his feet. Neighborhood demolition has the same harsh scorched-earth results as the great city fires of the seventeenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Modern London, Chicago, and San Francisco rose from their ashes better but not different cities than they were before; but urban renewal has so far been largely a record of destroying without restoring the social and economic life that existed.<sup>3</sup> Public housing, in the way it has so far been done, can hardly be acclaimed a success story. New communities—even though carefully and fully planned—are not the answer, or not for long. Massive health, education, and welfare programs seem not to produce value in any relation to the cost in dollars, frustration, and controversy.

Indeed, more and more, as the last frontier of Earth is reached and overpassed, it is seen that our attempts to regulate people, their living conditions, and their systems, for their own good—

whether tried by totalitarian governments or by democracies, whether by a combination of the public and private sectors or by combining public and private agencies; or indeed by evoking the total cooperation of all conceivable human institutions and organizations—seem to do little except reveal all the cooperators, coordinators, planners, authorities, and specialists falling over their own feet and becoming entangled in their own data tape.

#### INTERACTING CONCERNS AND TECHNIQUES

It is perfectly clear to the most casual observer that in the field of urban and social planning these frenzied and costly efforts have been largely unavailing. Even those individuals directly involved in one or another branch of such endeavor eventually come to a moment of truth. The smart young planner working in government or private industry feels bitterly that the whole world is a mess and that everything he does makes it worse. The hardened civil servant or private consultant is learning more and more to keep his eyes turned carefully in the direction of his own interest, to do the job he is hired to do, utilizing Plan A, B, or C, out of Drawer 1, 2, or 3.

Why do these urban improvement schemes not work? Alibis fill shelf after shelf of government and professional bookshelves. The suspicion is growing that they have not worked because they are founded on insufficient understanding of human motivations and instincts, and incomplete data concerning the human social process.

This is perhaps the reason why ecology has become such a catch concept. Here is something that seems soundly scientific, a matter of fact, and also fact which may be described by the media in dramatic terms predicting Chaos and old Night. Nobody can agree just what it is or just what to do about it except

3. See Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961); also her *The Economy of Cities* (London: Random House, 1970).

the ecologists who have been, for the last one hundred years—until recently quietly—going about their business. But the public welcomes it as an understandable “cause.” Nature has none of the irritating overtones of human nature, of the irrationality which makes lifestyle planning so difficult. It is true that the idea of environment protection can be and is in the process of producing a cult group fully as wall-eyed as the despoilers of natural resources whom they deplore. Nevertheless, this one-sided irrationality, whether emotional or commercial, is one of the parameters of the planning syndrome and must be programmed into our solutions.

#### SENSITIVITIES AND SOLUTIONS

What is of great promise for the future is that our understanding of social forces is deepening and our data in all areas are increasing, as well as our discernment in evaluating and applying such knowledge. A considerable number of current statements suggest that reflection has produced some results. To mention just a few, such maverick minds as C. Northcote Parkinson, Marshall McLuhan, William Bradford Shockley, and Robert Ardrey have done much to stir the cold porridge. Ignored or repudiated in one or all of their spheres of inquiry by their academic colleagues, they, and others in various disciplines, are increasing the interdisciplinary capacities of our planning community. Other daring ones who reflect on psychology, sociology, economics, and indeed all the sciences dealing with the human condition are breaking new ground in the “proper study of mankind.” These men, like pearls in oysters, though irritating, are of great value.

In evaluating the men who may be able to solve the complexities of social planning, we observe that they combine the qualities of sensitivity (to all perti-

nent factors), memory (of things past), and organization (of things present) with outstanding gifts of synthesis. They are innovators who can redesign without tearing down the house. Let us not weigh them down with the pejorative title or obligation to be policymakers. We must, rather, let them write freely on sand, producing a better statement or solution with each outgoing tide.

The policymaker, however high on the totem pole, is a middleman too. Think of each—planner, policymaker, manager, coordinator—as one whose ultimate mission is to help others achieve goals. As such, he may also be a change agent. When he is, he is subject to the planning syndrome in all its manifestations.

As usual, the poets and philosophers have the final word. I quote Eric Hoffer, tramp, migrant worker, self-educated scholar, light-hearted heaver of loads, and diviner of the inner hearts of men:

... Archimedes' bathtub and Newton's apple suggest that momentous trains of thought may have their inception in idle musing. The original insight is most likely to come when elements stored in different compartments of the mind coalesce to form new combinations. It is doubtful whether a mind that is pinned down and cannot drift elsewhere is capable of formulating new questions. . . . On the whole it seems to be true that the creative periods in history were buoyant and even frivolous . . . Periclean Athens, the Renaissance, the Elizabethan Age. . . . One suspects that much of the praise of seriousness comes from people who have a vital need for a facade of weight and dignity. . . . The fits of deadly seriousness we know as mass movements, which come bearing a message of serious purpose and weighty ideals, are usually set in motion by sterile pedants possessed of a murderous hatred for festive creativeness . . . it is only when these movements have spent themselves, and

their pattern of austere boredom begins to crack, and the despised present dares assert its claims to trivial joys, that the creative impulse begins to stir amidst the grayness and desolation.<sup>4</sup>

The twin forces of change and planning condition all aspects of urban growth and the dynamics of our cities

4. Eric Hoffer, *The Ordeal of Change* (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), pp. 113-16.

and towns. Always, the socio-economic as well as the political and cultural circumstances compound the complexities. Still, I suspect the problems and the crises they generate will not be solved in "fits of deadly seriousness," but when various disciplines engaged in the planning effort "coalesce to form new combinations." The planning syndrome may still be our hope.

# A Critical View of the Urban Crisis

By EDWARD C. BANFIELD

ABSTRACT: The accounts usually given of the causes of the "urban crisis" are not satisfactory: congestion is decreasing, not increasing; the flight to the suburbs has not left the central cities on the verge of bankruptcy; the urban housing supply is on the whole much better than ever; "white racism" has long been on the wane, and blacks are making rapid income and other gains; and the fragmentation of local government does not account for its ineffectiveness. Changes in the state of the public mind are the main cause of the "crisis." Set in motion mainly by the ideas of philosophers, these are reflected in the attitudes of elites and of the middle class with respect to authority, the self, rational egotism, hedonism, egalitarianism, and consumerism. It follows that the "crisis" will not be ended by either government programs or by exhortation.

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FROM the farmhouse in Vermont where this is written, it is several miles to the nearest city, the population of which is about ten thousand, but one can find here most of the "big problems" that together are usually thought of as constituting "the urban crisis." There are multi-problem families; welfare mothers—some of them visited, it is alleged, by mates; sub-standard housing; functional illiteracy—some of it on the part of high school graduates; hardcore unemployment—meaning able-bodied men who will not work; sexual promiscuity; drug abuse—a helicopter hovers overhead as this is written, searching for plantings of marijuana; pornography—this evening, a local movie advertises, one may take an "unforgettable journey into a new erotic world" of "way out German sex practices"; venereal disease—Operation Venus has recently been locally organized; and crime—mostly vandalism and stealing by juveniles, but occasionally violence by adults.

How is all this to be reconciled with the account usually given of the causes of the "urban crisis?" The problems of the cities, it is commonly held, arise principally from the following causes: the mass movement of a rapidly increasing population into metropolitan areas, producing congestion; the flight of the middle class, as well as of much manufacturing and commerce, to the suburbs, resulting in a financial crisis for the cities; the spread in the central cities and in the older, larger suburbs of slums and blight and, more generally, the prevalence of poverty and a physical environment that makes a decent style of life impossible for many people; "white racism," which keeps Negroes and some other minority groups—notably Puerto Ricans in New York and in a few other cities—subject to various all-but-insuperable handicaps; and, finally, a local governmental structure so chaotic and

fragmented as to render it ineffective if not entirely futile.

It is obvious that these cannot be the causes of the problems—the *same* problems—that manifest themselves in rural Vermont. The density of population in my township is sixty persons to the square mile; there is only one Negro family—referred to politely by its neighbor as "complexed"—and if the local government is ineffective, it is not because of fragmentation, although, to be sure, the Board of Selectmen, the Board of Listers (tax assessors), the Road Commissioner, the School Board, and the Volunteer Fire Department are all separate and independent.

Two putative causes of the "urban crisis" *do* exist there: there are some houses that would be called "slums" in the city, and the income of some families is certainly low. It must be added, however, that the correlation between poverty and the social problems to which it is supposed to give rise is very weak if it exists at all.

Enough has been said, perhaps, to prepare the way for my main contention, which is that urban problems, so-called, arise in the main not so much from environmental conditions—certainly not from ones peculiar to cities—as from ideas, or to put it more generally, from states of the public mind. This argument will be developed by a critical examination of the several factors widely held to be the principal causes of the "urban crisis."

#### METROPOLITAN GROWTH

No one has produced evidence supporting the notion that "overcrowding" in cities is harmful. Nevertheless, much discussion proceeds on the assumption that it is and also that it is widespread and increasing. These assumptions seem to get support from figures constantly being issued in official reports—figures that, taken out of context and

read hastily, appear to justify alarm: for example, the recent estimate that by the year 2000 some 85 percent of all Americans will live in metropolitan areas.<sup>1</sup>

Unlike a country or a continent, a metropolitan area is merely a statistical convenience. The Bureau of the Budget tried—apparently with little success—to alert the unwary to this by terming its contrivance “Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area” (SMSA). An SMSA is—to simplify slightly—a central city of fifty thousand or more inhabitants—or two or more contiguous cities having that population in total—together with such adjacent counties as are “functionally integrated” with the central city. That SMSA does not mean metropolis—a word found in dictionaries—is evident from the fact that the Meriden, Connecticut, area, population fifty-six thousand, is an SMSA. That measures of “metropolitanization” are artifacts of the definition is evident from the fact that some six million persons became “metropolitan” in 1970 without—so far as anyone knows—anything having changed except some details of the definition.

If the Census and other suppliers and users of data used words like “metropolis,” “city,” and “urban” in the senses in which they are commonly understood,

1. Most of the figures in this section are to be found in three recent official publications, none of which is open to the criticisms made here of the frequent misuse of such figures. They are: The White House, *Report on National Growth 1972* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972); Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population and the American Future* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972); and Allen R. Bird, “Migration and its Effect on Agriculture and Rural Development Potential” (Paper presented at a national symposium at Muscle Shoals, Ala., June 22–23, 1972), mimeographed by the Economic Development Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.

there might be a good deal less concern about “congestion.” By many measures it is decreasing. The percentage of the population living in cities of one hundred thousand or more—incidentally, these figures have also been affected by redefinitions, the reader should be warned—reached a peak of 30 percent in 1930 and has dropped gradually ever since. Of those who live outside of central cities—but within SMSAs—two-thirds live in places of less than five thousand. To be sure, the definition assures that these little places are within counties adjacent to and “functionally integrated” with central cities, but it should not be assumed from this that all or even most who live in them have much contact with the city. That the most recent New York State Development Plan sets as a goal for 1990 that no “urban citizen” shall have to travel more than fifteen miles to reach an “urban center” is indicative.

It is an error to assume, as many do, that practically all economic and other growth is occurring within SMSAs. Patterns differ by region. In the South the same percentage of places in each size class increased in population whether they were more or less than fifty miles from a central city. In Pennsylvania, manufacturing employment grew faster between 1960 and 1966 in towns of less than twenty-five thousand than in SMSAs. Small, relatively isolated places may have more of a future than sweeping generalizations based upon aggregate data would lead one to expect.

The problems of the core areas of the large cities cannot be caused by increasing densities; these have been declining since at least the turn of the century, and they are still doing so. In the past decade, more central cities in every size class lost population than gained it and—leaving out of account changes due to annexations—the aggre-

gate gain in population by central cities amounted to only about one percentage point.

Taking the SMSAs as a whole, there has apparently been a continuing decline in densities:

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|------|-------------------------------|
| 1950 | 5,408 persons per square mile |
| 1960 | 3,752                         |
| 1970 | 3,376                         |

("Apparently" is used because changes of definition, as well as of income and technology, make such comparisons hazardous. Income and technology are relevant because presumably density is measured as an indicator of accessibility; more and better transportation may actually have increased accessibility despite the drop in density.)

The only sort of congestion that common sense tells us may plausibly have a direct bearing upon health and psychic well-being—not to mention convenience—is that which can be measured in persons per room. This, too, has been decreasing. In 1950 nearly 17 percent of units were occupied at more than one person per room, but in 1970 the figure was less than 7 percent.

#### THE "FLIGHT" TO THE SUBURBS

If congestion is not a principal cause of the "urban crisis," neither is "the flight of the middle class to the suburbs." Families have always tended to move, when they could afford to, from the relatively old and crowded inner parts of the cities to newer and less crowded neighborhoods at the outskirts of the city or beyond them. They have done so—and do so still—because they can get more of what they want for their money by building on vacant land which, because it is not close to centers of accessibility, is not in great demand for competing uses and is therefore relatively cheap. What such families want is more spacious and up-to-date housing, easy parking, better schools, and a

"nicer" neighborhood. Factories and offices have followed them partly because they depend upon their labor, but also because of the inducement of cheap land and easy access to (heavily subsidized) truck and air routes.

To speak of those who move to the suburbs as "fleeing" the central city makes about as much sense as it would to say of one who trades an old Chevrolet for a new Buick that he is "fleeing" used cars. Of course there are districts in all large cities from which many people move, out of fears—perhaps not entirely justified by the facts—of violence or of the loss of lifetime savings from a sudden drop in property values. Such moves are properly called flights. They are not, however, typical in most cities.

The argument, so often heard, that the departure of the well-off from the central cities has created a "financial crisis" for them by reducing their tax bases is unsound. In the first place, very few central cities face anything that can reasonably be called a financial crisis. With few exceptions, the credit ratings of the large cities are as high or higher than they were thirty years ago; what the central cities have lost in tax base has been partly made up for in state and federal grants—state and federal aid to local governments increased from \$8.8 billion in 1963 to an estimated \$43.5 billion in fiscal 1973, and most, but not all, central cities get a larger per capita share of this than do their suburbs;<sup>2</sup> suburbanites viewed collectively are not escaping financial responsibility for central cities, though the individual—who would have to pay the state and federal taxes if he remained in

2. Charles L. Schultze et al., *Setting National Priorities, the 1973 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 291 and Table 9-1, pp. 294-95. For documentation of other statements in this paragraph see E. C. Banfield, "Revenue Sharing in Theory and Practice," *The Public Interest*, no. 23 (Spring 1971), pp. 33-45.

the central city—does have a tax incentive to move. In any event, we have the authority of Richard Musgrave for asserting that under the circumstances that are likely to obtain, cities will come within \$5 billion of meeting their revenue needs in 1975, an amount well within their capacity to raise by tax increases.

#### THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Twenty years ago there were those who thought that a wide array of social problems could be solved, or much relieved, simply by providing “a proper environment.” The Pruitt-Igoe Public Housing Project in St. Louis, designed by some of the world’s most gifted architects, represented such an effort on a grand scale—twenty-eight thousand units on fifty-seven acres built in 1954 at a cost to the government of \$36 million. Today, having been for years the nation’s most conspicuous slum—one to which respectable people could not be attracted even by rents of \$20 a month—only six hundred units are occupied, and about \$39 million is being spent to tear down two buildings, lower others, and in general re-design the project.

The contemporary expression of the idea underlying Pruitt-Igoe is the “new town”—a city built from the ground up as a technologically advanced “life support system” for a large and diverse population. “You are what you live in” could have been the slogan of public housing; it would serve as well today for the new town. The ills of the cities cannot be understood in such terms, however.

The material requisites of a wholesome and satisfying life are within the reach of almost all. It would cost little—in relation to welfare costs—to make the elements of a nutritionally adequate diet as free as air; the trouble with the idea is, of course, that powdered milk, dried peas and beans, cereals, and the

like, would not be acceptable to most of the twenty million Americans who are said to go to bed hungry. Studies of the effects of housing quality on family health have shown them to be minimal.<sup>3</sup> In any event, the amount and quality of housing in American cities is, on the whole, good and getting better. From 1950 to 1970, real per capita consumption of housing in the United States more than doubled, and we are now producing about two units of housing for every new household.<sup>4</sup> The poor and the black have shared in this progress; between 1960 and 1968, the percentage of housing occupied by Negroes in central cities and described by the Census as “not meeting specified conditions” fell from 25 percent to 9 percent. Air pollution, although a health problem in all large and some not-large cities, is not specifically an *urban* problem—a study of death certificates in New York State showed more deaths from emphysema, the leading respiratory disease, in rural than in urban areas.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, as far as anyone knows, it is not a contributing cause of the other problems that are generally thought of as constituting the “urban crisis.”

#### “WHITE RACISM”

The essential basis of urban problems today, some assert, is that the high visibility of the Negro has marked him inescapably as a victim of “white racism.” This, they think, makes the present situation fundamentally different from any earlier one. Whereas other disadvantaged groups coming to the city could expect to be assimilated into the

3. D. M. Wilner, *The Housing Environment and Family Life* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962).

4. Henry J. Aaron, *Shelter and Subsidies* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 28. See also the address by George Romney on March 27, 1972, reprinted in *HUD News* (Housing and Urban Development).

5. *New York Times*, October 30, 1970, p. 32.



"mainstream," the Negro, because he is indelibly marked, cannot.

It is of course impossible to disprove such statements. In evaluating them, however, several things should be kept in mind. One is that physical characteristics making for high visibility have not prevented Orientals from moving close to the top of the income distribution and from being accepted socially.

Another is that the attitudes and the behavior of whites toward blacks have changed dramatically since the Second World War. This is shown by numerous public opinion polls—notably those taken between 1940 and 1970 by the National Opinion Research Center, the most recent of which found that "... the trend has been distinctly toward increasing approval of integration"<sup>6</sup>—and more persuasively (since actions speak louder than words) by the gains Negroes have made in the past decade in schooling, income, and health and by the successes of many at the polls. The indications are that—if present trends continue—Negroes, despite their initial handicap, will overtake whites in income, schooling, and other crucial respects much sooner than one would have thought possible a decade or two ago.<sup>7</sup>

Much of what is perceived as the effect of *presently* existing white prejudice is, in fact, largely or even entirely the effect of factors that owe their existence to prejudice *in the past*. Differences in arrest rates and in earnings, for example, either disappear or are sharply reduced when account is taken of such factors as age, education, place of origin—whether urban or rural,

Southern or non-Southern—and class culture.<sup>8</sup>

It is to be expected that, as their incomes rise, Negroes will leave the central cities in increasing numbers for the newer suburbs. In the 1960s the black suburban population grew by 762,000, or 42 percent, a significant increase over the previous decade. In the decade to come, the increases will be larger still. Despite these movements, huge areas of the largest cities, and also many of the suburbs into which Negroes are moving, will be predominantly or even exclusively black. In and of itself this need not be a problem. What matters is not segregation as such, but *involuntary* segregation, something that, strange as it may seem, no one has attempted to measure.

#### METROPOLITAN ORGANIZATION

The average SMSA has within it about a hundred local governments, and no SMSA has a general purpose government with jurisdiction over the whole area. Both circumstances, but especially the latter, are frequently listed among the principal causes of the "urban crisis," the theory being that since proper governmental organization would solve, or at least alleviate, problems, the want of it must itself be counted as a major problem. Thus on this view, the continued concentration of the poor and the black in the central cities results largely from the absence of a metropolitan government which could sweep aside local zoning and other barriers.

This reasoning would be valid if it

6. Andrew M. Greeley and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Racial Integration," *Scientific American* 225, no. 6 (December 1971), p. 13.

7. See Michael J. Flax, *Study in Comparative Urban Indicators: Conditions in 18 Large Metropolitan Areas* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1972).

8. Edward Green, "Race, Social Status, and Criminal Arrest," *American Sociological Review* 35, no. 3 (June 1970); James Gwartney, "Discrimination and Income Differentials," *The American Economic Review* 60, no. 3 (June 1970); and Nathan Glazer, "Blacks and Ethnic Groups: The Difference and the Political Difference It Makes," *Social Problems* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1971).

could be assumed that a metropolitan area government would indeed exercise its powers in these ways. But this amounts to assuming that the local political forces now pressing in the contrary directions would disappear or lose their influence. The implausibility of such an assumption can be seen from the example of a large city—London—which *does* have a metropolitan government, but which nevertheless has been signally unsuccessful in moving the working poor from the inner city to the outlying suburbs.<sup>9</sup> It can also be seen—at much closer range—in the recent decision of the New York State Urban Development Corporation, a body amply endowed with authority and funds to enable it to ignore local zoning ordinances, to defer the building of low-income housing in rural Westchester County.<sup>10</sup>

#### THE STATE OF THE PUBLIC MIND

If these are not principal causes of the "urban crisis," what are? My answer is that they are mainly changes in the way things are perceived, judged, and valued, and in the expectations that are formed accordingly—in a phrase, changes in the states of the public mind.

Changes in the world of physical things and of technology—for example, population density or techniques for making poisonous substances—influence the public mind, of course. In the main, however, changes occur in other ways: partially by the gradual unfolding of potentialities immanent in the culture—that is, in the collective experience that is passed from one generation to the next; partially by the influence of one

group upon another—culture, or sub-culture, contact; and partially (in the long run most importantly) by the ideas of philosophers—of whom there may be two or three in the world per century. Philosophical ideas somehow make their way directly and via the intuitions of great literary and other artists to lesser lights—professors, journalists, and others—whose writings convey them to politicians, lawyers, businessmen, and other managers of affairs, until finally the ideas—by this time much diluted and otherwise altered—become widely, even generally, accepted as the views and standards—when verbalized, the cant—of the middle class.

This is not the place to try to describe the changes that have been occurring in the state of the public mind. The best that can be done is to incorporate by reference—as lawyers say—some writings that *do* describe them.<sup>11</sup> These stress: (a) decline of authority in all its forms and manifestations; (b) preoccupation with Self and its Fulfillment; (c) rationalism which justifies any act expected to benefit *ego* without perceptible injury to *alter*; (d) hedonism which takes plentitude rather than scarcity to be the fundamental fact; (e) egalitarianism which asserts not that equals should be treated equally, but that all should be treated as if they were the same; and, finally, (f) moral fervor directed not against the sins of individuals, but against those of institutions—business firms, churches, and governments ("consumerism").

11. Particularly apposite are: Robert A. Nisbet, "The Twilight of Authority," *The Public Interest* 15 (Spring 1969), pp. 3-9; Marvin Zetterbaum, "Self and Political Order," *Interpretation* 2 (Winter 1970), pp. 233-46; Edward A. Shils, "Plentitude and Scarcity," *Encounter* (May 1969); John Passmore, "Paradise Now, the Logic of the New Mysticism," *Encounter* (November 1970); and a brief letter from Paul Craig Roberts in *Science* 169, no. 3948 (August 28, 1970), p. 816.

9. See "London Fight With Suburbs Predicted," news story by Malcolm Stuart, *The Manchester Guardian*, January 5, 1972.

10. *New York Times*, August 5, 1972, p. 38. For an account of tactics used to foil a Massachusetts law designed to open the suburbs to the poor, see *Wall Street Journal*, October 17, 1972, p. 1.

How these changes in the state of the public mind cause the social problems that have been under discussion cannot be explained here for lack of space, but an illustration may be useful.<sup>12</sup> Jurors in at least one large city are said to tend to take for granted the "unfairness," even the untruth, of whatever the prosecution charges. If this is the case, the attitude would seem to reflect: (a) loss of respect for authority; (b) belief that it is the juror's right as a "person" to ignore the rules of judicial procedure if he "feels like it"; (c) awareness that adherence to or violation of a rule in a particular case will not in certain circumstances contribute perceptibly, let alone decisively, either to the maintenance or to the undermining of the principle that rules must be obeyed; (d) faith that the crime could be controlled without inflicting punishment if only we "work to find the way"; (e) belief that it is inequitable that only jurors and not, say, courtroom spectators as well, render verdicts; and (f) feeling that whatever the accused may have done, he is a "victim," and "society," which is "really" to blame, should be put on trial.

These changes in states of mind proceed from the city—from one or two of the largest, in fact. Operation Venus came into being in rural Vermont because two high school girls read in a national magazine that it was a way of "helping others." Very likely some of

the others needed this help because of things that *they* had read in national magazines or had seen in the movies—"way out German sex practices" perhaps. That the city is the place from which the changed standards are disseminated is, however, an incidental circumstance, not a cause of the changes.

#### THE FUTILITY OF PLANNING

If the view taken here is correct, the "urban crisis" is not to be solved or alleviated by government programs, however massive. Planners and other managers may put their fingers in dikes, but their doing so will not make any perceptible difference in the long run. Nor, unfortunately, will suggestions such as those recently made with hesitation—for fear of "horrifying many readers"—by a professor of political science writing in the *New York Times* that educators teach the values of honesty and truthfulness, trustworthiness, work well done, kindness and compassion, the courage to admit mistakes, racial tolerance, respect for law, nonviolence in pursuit of one's goals, and respect for democratic rights.<sup>13</sup> If teachers *would* teach these values and pupils *would* learn them, a professor would not find it necessary to make such a suggestion hesitantly or otherwise. That these values are no longer valued is the *cause* of the problem; his "solution" assumes away the very fact with which we must cope.

12. The point could be as well illustrated by describing effects that are socially desirable—for example, increased concern about racial and other injustice. This article, however, happens to deal with "problems."

13. Reo M. Christenson, "The Old Values are the Best Values," *New York Times*, June 3, 1972.

# The Planning Imperative in America's Future \*

By LOUIS K. LOEWENSTEIN AND DORN C. McGRATH, JR.

ABSTRACT: City planning in the United States has gone through a number of changes in the past six decades and is likely to continue to change in the forthcoming years. This movement began with an interest in the City Beautiful, went on to be concerned with the City Efficient, and then with the City Social in the thirties. The postwar era produced a period of interest in the city as a system, while the sixties saw a spate of federal legislation which both institutionalized the city planning process and broadened its scope. In the future, planning should become concerned with matters of pollution, population distribution through a forceful urban growth policy, and enhancement of the quality of urban life.

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\*Parts of this article have appeared previously in "Population Growth and Change: Implications for Growth and the American Future," prepared for the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, Washington, D.C., December 1971, by Dorn C. McGrath, Jr., and in "A Brief Summary of Recent Developments in Urban Planning and Practice in the United States," presented at Economic Commission for Europe Committee on Housing, Building and Planning, Stockholm, April 1968, by Chester Rapkin. We are grateful to Dr. Rapkin for permitting us to include this material which appears with his knowledge and consent.

THE nature of city planning in the United States has altered materially since it first emerged in that decade which is now ironically called the Gay Nineties. These changes have been evolutionary in character, as the scope of planning has changed from an exclusive interest in urban design to a strategy of dealing with change in a pluralistic society. In so doing, planning has melded into the political process. This has enabled planning to become more effective, since it now receives support through such built-in mechanisms as programming, performance, and budget systems. On the other hand, this dependence on the political system has a number of inherent limitations. One of these is that planning may lose its objectivity and become the handmaiden of a particular political perspective. Another shortcoming is that politicians typically take a short-range point of view—generally coterminous with their length of office. Consequently, long-range value-free planning is apt to be given short shrift as the politicians rely on the programs of expediency and necessity to help them muddle through their daily tasks.

This dilemma was not always present. In its early stages urban planning in the United States was concerned primarily with the design and aesthetic nature of municipal artifacts. The street patterns were dominated by the location of broad avenues and boulevards which were designed primarily for beauty rather than for traffic flow. Public construction was focused on civic centers to transmit impressions of monumentality and not necessarily to facilitate the daily operations of government. Private buildings were considered and public facilities located in accordance with architectural principles governing such matters of visual experience as skyline, facade, and scale. This concept of the City Beautiful was taken directly from

the European planning of the nineteenth century and is to be found in the early twentieth century plans for Washington, Cleveland, and San Francisco.

#### PLANNING AS A TOOL OF CONSERVATION AND EFFICIENCY

The greatest of the City Beautiful plans and the first plan of general scope for any of the half-dozen cities in the Western world with a population of some two million or more was Daniel Burnham's plan for the city of Chicago, which he prepared in 1908. Although city planning today bears the mantle of reform and is generally conceded to be a liberal institution, it is interesting to note that this first plan was commissioned by the Commercial Club of Chicago, whose interest lay in the pragmatic side of urban development. Hence there was an emphasis on improving transit and transportation routes, and on the city as a convenient place in which to transact business. Its residential neighborhoods were designed to be comfortable so that workers could be efficient and content. Open space was provided so that land prices would remain high. These values were embodied in the plan which glossed over many of the more humanitarian considerations we have come to expect from planning efforts today.

The next step in the development of American urban planning added the dimension of efficiency, one of the major principles of the good government movement emerging at the time. City planning was thought of as an exact science. Street systems were designed functionally for the rapid and safe passage of vehicles; the concept of the neighborhood as an organic unit centered on the primary school was developed; and zoning was introduced to enhance land values by excluding incompatible land uses and preserving good neighborhoods. The early conservative

nature of planning thus lasted into the 1920s as the philosophic rationale of the movement was directed toward the preservation of the status quo and the general tidying up of unsightly areas. The comprehensive nature of city planning had not yet emerged, since each of the component parts of the plan was organized in terms of its own necessities with little cohesion or inter-relatedness evidenced for the plan as a whole.

#### PLANNING THE SOCIAL CITY

City planning turned from being influenced by the age of technocracy and scientific management to being concerned about the quality of housing and the deleterious influence of slums on their occupants as the worldwide depression of the 1930s injected a social welfare component into the movement. But the emphasis was still primarily on the physical—on the state of repair and presence of facilities, on light, air, windows, size of room, and overcrowding. One major exception was the early recognition of the gap between the costs of adequate housing and the rent-paying ability of a large proportion of the population. Another exception was the rising federal involvement in the planning processes. This was most evident with the formation of the National Planning Board in 1933, whose initial activities included the planning and programming of public works, a research program for the development of the social and economic aspects of public policy, coordination of federal planning activities, and stimulation of regional, state, and local planning.

As housing quality standards rose, as the importance of the journey to work became recognized in transportation planning, and as it became evident that housing and streets were the major uses of land in the city, the scope of the plan moved from concern only with slums and the prevention of blight to incorpo-

rate all residential land. From this it was only a step to the so-called comprehensive plan, which included the components of housing, public facilities, transportation, and industrial and commercial location, into a desired future arrangement of land uses. Certain accepted principles were typical of the plan—neighborhoods organized around elementary schools, coherent shopping centers rather than string commercial developments, separation of industry and residence, and ring roads around the central business district and the outer city. The plan became a map of desired land uses of a future time—comprehensive, physical in orientation, and static.

#### THE ROADBLOCKS TO PLANNING

But no sooner had American planners come to grapple with the effectuation of such a plan through the development of roads and highways, the construction of public buildings, and the redevelopment of slum areas, when several major problems of implementation became evident. First, while picture planning might be satisfactory for short-run objectives, it was not satisfactory for a community that was developing rapidly—changing its economic and social composition and its values as well as its size and form. Some citizens began to question the right of the planner with his traditional and contemporary middle-class value system to plan for the unborn children of tomorrow. Second, different groups in the urban community pursued different goals and espoused programs that were not simultaneously attainable. Other citizens questioned the value systems of the planner directly and wondered how reflective their values were of the disparate elements of the community. Further, they questioned whether the plan should reflect these differing viewpoints—on busing, for example—or

should it ignore such issues. Third, an increasing body of evidence showed that there was no direct relationship between the physical well-being of the city and the pathology of its citizens. That is to say, urban blight could be removed and antiseptic housing could replace the slum, but the problems of the inhabitants—their poverty, hunger, inability to retain work, and so forth—would persist. Thus, by concentrating on the purely physical elements of the city, planning appeared to have avoided dealing with the more difficult issues that created the slums in the first place—namely, lack of motivation, lack of job skills and training, lack of education, lack of information about job opportunities, and the presence of prejudice, all of which lead to economic deprivation. Finally, planning through public action and control has had limited influence because the basic forces in the economy of the United States are a reflection of an enormous number of private investment and consumption decisions, and because the nation has been reluctant to curb the rights of property ownership.

The change in emphasis shifted planning in the 1960s into different techniques and into different arenas. Planning became a process, and the city was viewed as a system of competing elements. The presence, absence, or change in one of these elements—say unemployed persons—would affect every other element in the system—for example, the demand for housing or recreation facilities. Social planning, with its concern for the needs of the inhabitants and its recognition of the dynamic nature of the city and its adjacent region, became increasingly popular. To a much greater extent than ever before, local people began to put forth their own demands for housing, education, transportation, and other public facilities designed to enlarge their oppor-

tunities in the urban community. Federal highways, once considered sacrosanct, were rejected by communities as it became recognized that these roads could cleave as well as join communities. The sacred cow of planning—the separation of residence and industry—was challenged as people became aware that such fixed patterns might impair the employment opportunities of one group, while enhancing the environment of another. The cornerstone of physical planning practice, that is, the neighborhood-centered school, was criticized as a device to maintain the status quo in the face of the new educational parks and other methods devised to make educational opportunities more equalitarian.

#### THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

In the latter part of the 1960s, it became increasingly clear that the cities did not have the financial resources that they needed to deal adequately with their problems. The federal government not only had the funds with which to ameliorate what was heralded as the "urban crisis," but it also had the legislative tools to create "carrot and stick" incentives for local communities. In most cases, these legislative actions raised expectations among the citizenry, and sometimes the gap between anticipation and realization was widened to a greater extent than was the case before the expenditure of funds and attention. When this cleavage became intolerable, the civil disturbances of the late sixties erupted. Today these riots appear to be a thing of the past, but sadly, so do the rising expectations.

As might be expected, the emergent interest in urban problems by the federal government did not happen swiftly nor in a rational fashion. The Urban Planning Assistance Program created by Title VII of the Housing Act of 1954 must be regarded as the cornerstone of

the youthful institutionalization of urban planning in the United States. This legislation provided a crucial stimulus to planning for urban growth and institutionalized the provisions of urban planning assistance to localities as a federal program. Through the extension of federal assistance for urban planning, initially to small localities, the "701 program" encouraged hundreds of communities throughout the country to undertake their first organized assessment of a comprehensive range of community conditions and development opportunities, and thereby to initiate a planning process. Federal assistance provided under this program resulted in a local reawakening of interest in urban plans and planning activities which had lain dormant since the national depression of the 1930s.

The adoption of the "workable program" concept by Congress in the same Housing Act of 1954 reinforced the basic surge of interest in planning which the 701 program of matching grants helped to create. This legislative provision gave further encouragement to comprehensive planning by requiring that each local workable program include:

an official plan of action . . . for effectively dealing with the problem of urban slums and blight within the community and for the establishment and preservation of a well-planned community . . . and for utilizing appropriate private and public resources to eliminate and prevent the development and spread of slum and blight. . . .

The workable program requirement was intended to secure evidence that a community seeking to engage in urban renewal with urban funds was sufficiently organized and equipped with appropriate legal tools and other resources to undertake and carry out an urban renewal project. One of the specific requirements detailed for each workable

program by the administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency was a general plan for which land use, transportation, and public facilities elements were specified as minimum components. Although not oriented specifically to metropolitan area considerations, these requirements for a general plan provided many localities with a precise definition of the federal interest in urban planning, and many of the studies undertaken to fulfill this general plan requirement helped to reveal to individual localities their metropolitan and regional destinies.

It is likely that some communities were motivated to prepare comprehensive plans primarily to satisfy the workable program requirement—and thereby to qualify for urban renewal or other housing programs—rather than by a sudden realization of the manifold benefits of comprehensive community planning. Regardless of basic motivation, however, the fact remains that under the stimulus of this program requirement, many individual communities, through their official planning agencies, undertook a variety of systematic planning activities oriented toward analyzing local conditions and ultimately toward the formulation of alterations for planned growth and change. In the first six years of the Urban Planning Assistance Program, for example, a total of \$13,400,000 was disbursed by the Housing and Home Finance Agency for 493 planning projects extending through more than 300 localities, 12 states, and 161 metropolitan areas.

#### PLANNING LEGISLATION IN THE SIXTIES

In 1961, the Eighty-Seventh Congress took note of the new dynamism of urban areas and its environmental implications. Section 703 of the Housing Act of 1961 was a landmark provision in providing the first of the area-wide planning requirements to be satisfied



under federal policy as a condition for obtaining a federal grant for a local functional facility. The act authorized a program of federal grants to localities for the purpose of acquiring "open-space land" in order to provide parks, to help curb urban sprawl and to prevent the spread of urban blight and deterioration, to encourage more economic and desirable urban development, and to help provide necessary recreational, conservation, and scenic areas.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 was especially significant in providing a major stimulus to both urban planning in metropolitan areas and the articulation of federal planning policy. The act provided that after July 1, 1965, the secretary—then of Commerce, now of Transportation—would not approve programs for highway construction in any urban areas of more than fifty thousand population without a finding that proposed highway projects "are based on a continuing comprehensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively by State and local communities." Lacking qualified planning agencies and often the basic arrangements among governments to mount such a transportation planning process in many metropolitan areas, the Department of Commerce and highway interests throughout the country began to invest in the creation of planning agencies and the organizations capable of initiating and carrying on the planning process.

With the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, the Congress provided another important building block in the institutional base for local and metropolitan urban planning. The essential task of the urban mass transportation program created by the act was "to encourage the planning and establishment of area-wide mass transportation systems needed for economical and desirable urban development." The act required that federal assistance be pro-

vided for only such transit facilities and equipment necessary to carry out a program for a unified or officially coordinated mass transportation system, as part of the "comprehensively planned development of the entire urban area."

A profound change in the organization of the urban planning function in the United States was accomplished in 1965 with the addition of Section 701 (g) to the basic Urban Planning Assistance Program established by the Housing Act of 1954. The provision of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 authorized the administrator to:

make grants to organizations composed of public officials whom he finds to be representative of the political jurisdictions within a metropolitan area or urban region for the purpose of assisting such organizations to undertake studies, collect data, develop regional plans and programs, and engage in such other activities as the administrator finds necessary or desirable for the solution of the metropolitan or regional problem in such areas or regions.

This provision enabled the council of governments, as an emergent metropolitan political forum, to receive assistance to carry on substantive urban planning functions. Another important provision in the Housing Act of 1965 was the authorization of a grant-in-aid program for basic water and sewer facilities and the extension of the principle of requiring conformance with area-wide planning as a prerequisite for each such grant.

The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 was particularly significant in assisting the federal interest in improving the process of coordinating major public facility construction projects to obtain maximum effectiveness in federal spending and to relate such projects to area-wide development plans and programs. Section 204 of the act provided that all

applications for federal assistance for the planning and construction of hospitals, airports, libraries, water supply and distribution facilities, and water development and land conservation projects within any metropolitan area be submitted to an area-wide planning agency for review and comment. This provision had the major benefits of (1) providing a systematic basis for consideration of important projects for functional systems in metropolitan areas by the designated planning agencies, and (2) stimulating agencies with narrow responsibilities for important functional systems to examine the relationships of their projects to area-wide plans and urban growth and development, and to other traditionally separate functions of facilities.

The 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act qualifies as a major benchmark in evolving federal policy affecting metropolitan planning in three respects: first, the definition of comprehensive planning was broadened significantly to include planning for the provision of governmental services and for the development and authorization of human and natural resources; second, a housing element would be required as part of the preparation of comprehensive land-use plans prepared with assistance provided under the section; and third, the original thrust of the urban planning assistance program created in 1954 was extensively revised to authorize planning grants to state planning agencies for the provision of assistance to "district planning agencies" for rural and other non-metropolitan areas. Moreover, the revision authorized grants to cities within metropolitan areas for planning which is part of metropolitan planning, and to official government planning agencies for areas where rapid urbanization is expected as a result of "new town" development assisted by other federal programs.

Significant reinforcement for the emerging institution of urban planning was provided by the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968. This legislation, in providing a charge to the President to "establish rules and regulations governing the formulation, evaluation, and review of federal programs and projects having a significant impact on area and community developments . . ." asserted the national interest in an organized and continuing review of reliable development projects. Maintaining such a review and creating a perspective for evaluating the past consequences of such projects and projecting their potential effects is one of the fundamental requirements for an effective urban planning process. The early warning system of project-planning monitoring established as a result of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act has provided a vehicle for applying, in advance of actual project approval in most cases, evaluative judgments on more than a hundred different types of public projects having some potential to affect the quality of social and physical environments in both urban and rural areas.

Each of the aforementioned laws enacted has embodied provisions reflecting the nation's gathering concern about a widening variety of urban problems. Each enactment reflects the apparent determination of the Congress to bring urban planning more strongly to bear as a tool for urban problem-solving. The cumulative effects of these federal responses to local urban problems since 1950 have included the formation of over 200 metropolitan planning agencies and regional councils, nearly all of which have specific planning capability; an investment of more than \$230 million in Urban Planning Assistance Program funds to conduct planning studies and analyses and to assist in plan implementation in every state and metropolitan area in the nation; the preparation of

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more than 4,000 local comprehensive development plans by separate municipalities, expenditures of more than \$18 million for comprehensive transportation planning and coordination among metropolitan area municipalities; an investment of \$12 million in fellowship grants provided to prepare new professionals for careers in urban planning; the establishment of a network of 132 depository libraries for plans, planning studies, and reports throughout the country; the formation of at least 55 professional consulting firms engaged exclusively in the practice of urban planning—as distinct from economics, architecture, or engineering; the growth in the number of recognized graduate schools of urban and regional planning from 12 to 42; and the growth of the urban planning profession from 248 to more than 6,200 active members.

#### THE CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE

In spite of this progress, there are several mitigating factors in the planning movement which must be mentioned. First, although there is a considerable amount of remedial legislation on the books, many, if not most, of these laws are inadequately funded. This leads to the gap between expectations and reality mentioned above. Second, much of the legislation has been piecemeal. At present there is no effective urban policy in the sense that we have an established and articulated foreign policy. This absence is particularly acute in the area of population growth and redistribution. Finally, in this connection, urban planning to date has failed to come to grips with three of the more pressing problems of our time: pollution, the matter of population explosion and implosion, and maintenance of the quality of life in the face of declining resources. If there is a planning imperative in America's future, these

topics can no longer be ignored in the forthcoming years.

#### THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL URBAN GROWTH POLICY

Centralized planning is an anathema to the American way of life. Although it was tried briefly in the thirties, national planning with direct controls and mandates is not a commonly accepted practice. Rather, indirect controls and means of persuasion through subsidies and incentives are the more palatable instruments. This reluctance to adopt centralized planning, however, may change in the future just as our attitudes toward national hospital insurance, national welfare programs, and even national railroad passenger service have changed in response to the needs of our times.

If this change is forthcoming, we might well expect a national urban growth policy. Such a policy should indicate not only how much growth there should be, but also where growth is to be encouraged and discouraged. New communities are presently assisted by federal mortgage insurance and other governmental instruments of credit. Their location at present near Minneapolis, outside Washington, on the eastern slopes of Colorado, in southern California, and so forth, appears to be unrelated to any coordinated efforts of regional growth, such as the Appalachian Regional Commission or the Tennessee Valley Authority might espouse. Concentration versus dispersion of persons is a basic issue which is affected in no small measure by the transportation patterns of this country. By subsidizing, for example, the transportation system through the northeast corridor, the federal government appears to be supporting a policy of concentration. On the other hand, the planned decentralization of the federal government office

buildings not only around Washington, but throughout the country—witness the spate of regional Housing and Urban Development offices which have been created—would suggest that the government is encouraging a program of dispersion.

Not only would such a policy indicate where growth should be channeled, but also the manner in which it should be situated. "The urban growth problem," as Carson has observed,

is neither the large number of people to be settled, nor the pattern of national distribution of the settlements, but rather how to settle the people. It is more important to gain a measure of effective control over urban development where it occurs than to decide the national pattern of future . . . development. . . . At present, there is no real public pressure in the urban development process, either in guiding development or in development itself. There is [only] reaction to diverse activities and to unexpected or unconsidered effects of these activities.<sup>1</sup>

Currently, only a handful of states have enacted or have proposed to enact land-use laws which either direct where subdivisions may occur, shape the level of permissible residential densities, or prohibit real estate speculation. Until such state laws become more common, or until a national policy is formulated, we may well expect a continuance of urban sprawl, a string town development in unincorporated areas, and a haphazard approach toward the patterns of settlement.

#### THE SPECTER OF POLLUTION

Other articles in this volume are concerned with ecology and the preservation of the environment. It is sufficient for our purpose to indicate that no master plan prepared in the sixties for

any major American city dealt with any aspect of air, water, or noise pollution. Similarly, interest in the disposal of liquid and solid waste matter was equally nonexistent. Yet one need only visit for a day any major metropolitan area to realize that urban pollution is making our cities unlivable. One imperative for urban planning, then, in the seventies is to develop plans which will eradicate these unwholesome aspects of our environment.

#### FACTORS FOR IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE THROUGH PLANNING

The concern manifested about various types of pollution, about the continuing deterioration of the environment, about the rampant urban blight and deserted housing in the inner city, as well as the sprawl of tract housing in the outer city, are symptomatic of the reduction of quality of life in urban America. Mail service is unreliable; telephone service is inadequate; and street cleaning and garbage removal are tenuous at best. City planning cannot solve, much less serve, all of these masters; yet, by definition, planners are trained to take a comprehensive view—perhaps they are the only ones to do so. If they are to meet these responsibilities in the seventies and eighties, planners must not only plan realistically and secure the necessary funding from federal and state sources, but also build in solutions to sprawl, pollution, and questions of growth versus no-growth for their selected areas.

A potentially favorable climate of public opinion for the growth and development of environmental planning is evidenced on the national level by the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the President's Domestic Affairs Council. The need for environmental impact statements is another indicator of our increasing interest

1. John Carson, "A National Urban Growth Policy," *Urban Land* (February 1972), p. 8.

in upgrading our physical environment. It would seem that the critical threshold of public concern has been reached and that we are now in a position to put into practice our plans. Whether or not we have sufficient time in terms of the critical lead time that is necessary between planning and implementation, however, is another matter.

Like Virginia Slims, planning has come a long way since the turn of the century. There is now recognition of the diversity of characteristics, goals, and needs of different groups which has led to a heightened awareness of the fact that our urban areas are constantly altering in economic and social composition as well as in physical form. These complex processes respond to different strains in our society and move

at different rates of speed. Planning under these circumstances requires an understanding of the nature of these changes, the underlying forces that influence them, the kinds of changes that are consistent with one another, and the policy choices that can be made. The planning process in this context is an effort to mold the direction and rate of change by accelerating the desirable trends and inhibiting or suppressing those that are in conflict with public purpose. This approach to urban planning depends on knowledge of the structure and dynamics of the local community. Planning now, as well as in the future, has come to appreciate that knowledge without direction is futile and that direction without knowledge is dangerous.

# Urban Violence—The Pattern of Disorder

By JOSEPH F. COATES

ABSTRACT: This paper presents some general background information on the present status of violence and its impacts on the criminal justice system, giving particular emphasis to day-to-day crime and mass behavior. The paper emphasizes structural factors in our society with regard to the generation and control of violence and the implications they have for structural rather than short-term palliative or counterforce solutions. The need for an experimental approach and the development of new knowledge is emphasized. Among the long-term structural changes in the U.S. society influencing urban crime are the homogenization of U.S. society; the pervasiveness of inexpensive transportation and communication facilities; continuing urbanization; and the general trend toward middle-class status and attitudes for all citizens. Economic prosperity and the related growth of knowledge-based industries have strong implications for long-term patterns of crime and disorder. Institutional barriers to effective change within and outside the criminal justice community are touched on. Responses within that system are discussed.

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VIOLENCE has always been prominent, often significant, and sometimes of major importance in American history and culture. This paper is concerned with the limited violence of single individuals, small groups, or masses interacting with the criminal justice system. It will consider neither the new pornography of violence, so successfully commercialized by Hollywood, nor the violence of war, which marshalls the nation to a collective effort. The interest in individual and collective domestic violence has become newly prominent in the last decade. The four recent national commissions having to do with crime and violence mark its move from an academic cottage industry to a major intellectual enterprise.<sup>1</sup> The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, responding to general public and legislative concern with crime, provided massive federal funding for the criminal justice system. That system, which now employs roughly 1 percent of the labor force (774,754), expended \$8,571 million in fiscal year 1969-70. Numerous polls show growing public concern about reported rises in crime rates over the last decade as well as ambivalent shifting attitudes toward demonstrations, protests, and mass disorders which became commonplace in the '60s.

1. Katzenbach Commission, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); Kerner Commission, *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968); Scranton Commission, *Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1970); and Eisenhower Commission, *To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility*, Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, 1970).

#### TAXONOMY OF VIOLENCE

Within the framework of this paper it is convenient to consider violence to be any act perpetrated with the aid of or the implicit or explicit threat of the use of physical force against an individual. This includes:

1. day-to-day activities, each involving one or a few individuals, such as assault, mugging, rape, robbery, murder;
2. mass activities involving large numbers of people, either in confrontation with other large masses of civilians or with law enforcement authorities. This vague category may run all the way from civil rights marches, demonstrations, and protests, to anti-war activities, student protests, and sit-ins.

Other socially important violence will not be given general consideration here except insofar as it illustrates one or another general point. These include:

3. the violent activities of organized crime, organized crime itself being characterized as an illegal business enterprise, involving the cooperative activities of a substantial number of people to provide an illegal service or commodity;
4. bizarre crimes such as the recent wave of hijackings or mass murders by the "Manson family";
5. suicides and deadly accidents;
6. directly politically motivated violence directed at major changes in the regime or form of government and basically violent revolutionary activities; and
7. finally, violence by law enforcement agents and agencies.

#### TWO DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

An overt act of physical violence is clear enough, but "a threat of violence" creates major conceptual problems at

both the personal and the mass levels. For example, many of the leaders of the black and Hispano-American communities make a major point that verbal abuse by the police is as much a form of violence as is physical abuse—the argument running roughly as follows:

If the police officer is able to indirectly or directly cast an insult or racial aspersion at an individual and evoke no response, he has established his superior position. Thereby he has achieved the virtual equivalent of the physical blow or a direct physical threat.

The evidence is overwhelming that verbal abuse occurs continuously and pervasively throughout large urban communities. Its continuous day-to-day, round-the-clock nature has effects far disproportionate to the small percentage of abusive men on the force. Abuse builds up a pervasive hostility among the victims, their friends, relations, and others with whom they speak: a hostility toward the police and toward the system which encourages a general disregard for the laws, subverts confidence in the police, and eventually builds up pressure to take some alternative retributive action like a riot. Police officials generally tended to downgrade the importance of abuse and therefore have been ineffective in managing verbal abuse in spite of its being the functional equivalent of fouling one's own nest.<sup>2</sup>

The second definitional problem relates to threats of violence in mass actions. By their very nature, with the exception of a few major cities such as New York or Washington, D.C., mass activities—parades, demonstrations, or riots—are relatively unusual events. Consequently they are open to divergent on-the-spot interpretation. Demonstra-

tions scheduled in advance encourage the press, public officials, and concerned citizens to express off-the-cuff, uninformed, or self-serving opinions and judgments. That often gives circulation to extreme views and generates an attitude of foreboding and threat, a potential self-fulfilling prophecy.

The purpose of this paper is not to recapitulate the enormous amount of knowledge which has been accumulated with regard to violence and its role in society, but rather to do the following:

1. To emphasize the role of structural factors in our society with regard to the generation and control of violence. Structural factors are those customs, habits, institutions, and practices built into our social system which pervade and influence more than just an immediate event; for example, the forty-hour week, high school education for all, and private property.

2. To emphasize that insofar as violence has substantial structural origins, that implies structural solutions, the reorganization of the way society functions. It also implies a systematic approach to the problem which goes beyond immediate features of the violence and searches out influences and determinants that are more remote in time and space, but perhaps more influential on outcomes.

3. To suggest reasons why violence has both in fact and appearance become more important in our society.

4. To point out that the interpretation of violence has a strong influence on public policy responses to violence; not all those responses are equally effective, and some of them contain substantial risks to the long-term health of our political and economic system.

5. To point out the diversity of explanations of violence and the unusual circumstance that, while we know a great deal about violence, we know far


2. S. B. Hirshfeld, "Abuses of Police Authority: A Literature Review," Report no. 3, Legal Action Support Project, Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C., November 1970.



TABLE 1—NATIONAL CRIME, RATE, AND PERCENT CHANGE

| CRIME INDEX OFFENSES    | ESTIMATED CRIME<br>1971 |                                         | PERCENT CHANGE<br>OVER 1970 |      | PERCENT CHANGE<br>OVER 1966 |        | PERCENT CHANGE<br>OVER 1960 |        |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------|-----------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|--------|
|                         | Number                  | Rate per<br>100,000<br>Inhabi-<br>tants | Number                      | Rate | Number                      | Rate   | Number                      | Rate   |
| Total.....              | 5,995,200               | 2,906.7                                 | +7.4                        | +5.8 | +83.2                       | +74.0  | +196.9                      | +158.1 |
| Violent.....            | 810,020                 | 392.7                                   | +10.5                       | +8.9 | +89.9                       | +80.4  | +183.2                      | +146.2 |
| Property.....           | 5,185,200               | 2,514.0                                 | +6.9                        | +5.4 | +82.2                       | +73.0  | +199.1                      | +160.1 |
| Murder.....             | 17,630                  | 8.5                                     | +11.1                       | +9.0 | +61.0                       | +51.8  | +95.2                       | +70.0  |
| Forcible rape.....      | 41,890                  | 20.3                                    | +11.3                       | +9.7 | +63.7                       | +55.0  | +146.0                      | +113.7 |
| Robbery.....            | 385,910                 | 187.1                                   | +10.8                       | +9.2 | +145.4                      | +133.0 | +259.5                      | +212.4 |
| Aggravated assault....  | 364,600                 | 176.8                                   | +10.1                       | +8.5 | +56.7                       | +48.8  | +139.0                      | +107.8 |
| Burglary.....           | 2,368,400               | 1,148.3                                 | +8.8                        | +7.2 | +70.2                       | +61.6  | +163.0                      | +128.7 |
| Larceny \$50 and over.. | 1,875,200               | 909.2                                   | +7.2                        | +5.6 | +109.2                      | +98.6  | +269.6                      | +221.4 |
| Auto theft.....         | 941,600                 | 456.5                                   | +2.1                        | +0.6 | +69.0                       | +60.5  | +188.9                      | +151.2 |

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), *Crime in the United States*, Uniform Crime Reports—1971 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. GPO, 1972), stock no. 2701-0009, p. 6.

FIGURE 1—CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, 1966–1971, SHOWING PERCENT CHANGE OVER 1966<sup>a</sup>

SOURCE: FBI, *Crime in the United States*, p. 3.

<sup>a</sup> Limited to murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

TABLE 2—CRIME RATE BY AREA, 1971  
(RATE PER 100,000 INHABITANTS)

| CRIME INDEX OFFENSES       | AREA       |                     |          |        |
|----------------------------|------------|---------------------|----------|--------|
|                            | Total U.S. | Cities over 250,000 | Suburban | Rural  |
| <i>Total</i> .....         | 2906.7     | 5413.5              | 2410.8   | 1032.3 |
| <i>Violent</i> .....       | 392.7      | 1047.5              | 205.7    | 133.4  |
| <i>Property</i> .....      | 2514.0     | 4366.0              | 2205.1   | 898.9  |
| Murder.....                | 8.5        | 19.2                | 4.2      | 6.9    |
| Forcible rape.....         | 20.3       | 43.6                | 14.4     | 11.1   |
| Robbery.....               | 187.1      | 633.4               | 69.7     | 14.9   |
| Aggravated assault.....    | 176.8      | 351.4               | 117.4    | 100.5  |
| Burglary.....              | 1148.3     | 2026.1              | 974.5    | 484.9  |
| Larceny \$50 and over..... | 909.2      | 1240.8              | 924.4    | 344.4  |
| Auto theft.....            | 456.5      | 1099.1              | 306.3    | 69.6   |

SOURCE: Same as Table 1.

less than is necessary for regulating, controlling, and influencing it.

6. To highlight two needs based on that broad knowledge of violence: (1) the need for experiments with new approaches to undercutting, regulating, and controlling crime; and (2) the need for more salient studies of the factors influencing violent crime from the point of view of generating and testing better public policy.

7. Finally, to emphasize the need to make better use of the knowledge already at hand in controlling and regulating criminal violence.

#### VIOLENCE AND ITS VICTIMS

Some six million serious crimes at the rate of 2,907 per 100,000 inhabitants occurred in 1971—see Table 1. Figure 1 shows the statistically dramatic increase in violent crime both in the total number of crimes and in the rates per 100,000 since 1966. These crimes largely occur in municipal areas—rates shown in Table 2. Nearly a third of the crime occurs in cities of over a quarter million people. Only 5 percent occur in rural areas, which hold about 10 percent of the population. The age distribution of the serious or index crime is

particularly important in understanding the long-term structural aspects of crime in our society. Table 3 displays the violent and property crimes by category and by age distribution for cities. Some 46 percent of crime is perpetrated by those between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four. In part, the objective increase in crime is attributable to a structural change: The post-World War II baby boom is coming to a full flower; consequently one should expect an increase in crime if for no other reason than that. Whereas youth from the age of fourteen to twenty-four comprise 19.4 percent of the population today, they comprised only 14.9 percent in 1960.

#### VICTIMS OF CRIME

The most detailed study of victimization of crime was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) for the Commission on Law Enforcement in the Administration of Justice. Those data, published for 1966, show that the rates for rape, robbery, and aggravated assault are, overall, substantially higher than reported in official statistics—see Table 4. Moreover, those earning less than \$6,000

TABLE 3—CITY ARRESTS  
(4,124 CITIES OVER 2,500; 1971)

| OFFENSE CHARGED                           | GRAND<br>TOTAL<br>ALL<br>AGES | AGES<br>UNDER<br>15 | AGES<br>UNDER<br>18 | AGES 18<br>AND<br>OVER | AGE             |         |
|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------|---------|
|                                           |                               |                     |                     |                        | 12 AND<br>UNDER | 13-15   |
| <i>Total</i> .....                        | 5,896,686                     | 574,559             | 1,516,532           | 4,380,154              | 201,741         | 672,987 |
| Percent distribution.....                 | 100.0                         | 9.7                 | 25.7                | 74.3                   | 3.4             | 11.4    |
| Criminal homicide.....                    |                               |                     |                     |                        |                 |         |
| Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter..... | 12,199                        | 160                 | 1,305               | 10,894                 | 19              | 372     |
| Manslaughter by negligence.....           | 1,908                         | 30                  | 174                 | 1,734                  | 12              | 38      |
| Forcible rape.....                        | 13,226                        | 594                 | 2,929               | 10,297                 | 105             | 1,063   |
| Robbery.....                              | 92,391                        | 10,008              | 30,530              | 61,861                 | 2,941           | 12,985  |
| Aggravated assault.....                   | 114,824                       | 7,182               | 21,089              | 93,735                 | 2,344           | 8,850   |
| Burglary—breaking or entering.....        | 250,080                       | 56,331              | 127,758             | 122,322                | 21,513          | 59,905  |
| Larceny—theft.....                        | 592,211                       | 152,068             | 304,561             | 287,650                | 62,204          | 146,866 |
| Auto theft.....                           | 110,496                       | 15,262              | 58,512              | 51,984                 | 2,136           | 28,312  |
| Violent crime.....                        | 232,640                       | 17,944              | 55,853              | 176,787                | 5,409           | 23,270  |
| Percent distribution.....                 | 100.0                         | 7.7                 | 24.0                | 76.0                   | 2.3             | 10.0    |
| Property crime.....                       | 952,787                       | 223,661             | 490,831             | 461,956                | 85,853          | 235,083 |
| Percent distribution.....                 | 100.0                         | 23.5                | 51.5                | 48.5                   | 9.0             | 24.7    |
| Subtotal for above offences.....          | 1,187,335                     | 241,635             | 546,858             | 640,477                | 91,274          | 258,391 |
| Percent distribution.....                 | 100.0                         | 20.4                | 46.1                | 54.0                   | 7.7             | 21.8    |

SOURCE: FBI, *Crime in the United States*, pp. 131-32.

a year, compared to those earning more than that, are especially victimized, as are blacks. The victims of violence, excluding homicides, shown in Table 5, are overwhelmingly likely to be Negroes in crimes committed by Negroes. The rates of crimes by Negro males against Negro males are eight times higher than the rates of crimes by white males against white males. The rate of Negro male crimes against Negro females is twenty-five times higher than the rate of Negro males against white females. Unfortunately, neither public authority nor general public attitudes reflect the overwhelmingly high rate of crime against the ghetto dweller. Public response and public concern more nearly reflect a mythical situation of the ghetto dweller, the black, and the poor stalking and striking out against the middle class and the prosperous.

The importance of crime compared to other natural causes of injuries or death, for example, is gravely distorted. In 1965 the likelihood of death by willful homicide was roughly equivalent to the likelihood of death by drowning or fire;

only half as likely as death by suicide or nonautomotive accidents; and only one-fifth as high as death by automobile accident. The general adverse effects on society of these misperceptions, however, may be quite substantial. Unbalanced fear generates a major concern, perhaps out of proportion to its intrinsic significance. Fear darkens the lives of many city dwellers, particularly inner-city dwellers. Fear generates a suspicion of strangers and limits social contacts between people. It heightens the ambivalence in ghetto communities between the residents and the police and political systems. Fear may promote racist views and actions. Victimization in ghettos creates a demand for service, but the police have been most hostile to the poor and are received hostilely particularly by ghetto youth. Finally, the misperception of the significance of violence draws public attention away from the need for long-term structural changes and tends to focus policy on fighting fire with fire, on tactics of violence and containment without longer-term social amelioration.

BY AGE, 1971

ESTIMATED POPULATION 113,513,000)

| AGE                                                                  |                                                                        |                                                                         |                                                                      |                                                                        |                                                                       |                                                                      |                                                                   |                                                        |                                                       |                                              |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| 16-17                                                                | 18-19                                                                  | 20-22                                                                   | 23-24                                                                | 25-29                                                                  | 30-34                                                                 | 35-44                                                                | 45-54                                                             | 55-64                                                  | 65 AND OVER                                           | NOT KNOWN                                    |
| 641,804<br>10.9                                                      | 555,916<br>9.4                                                         | 680,257<br>11.5                                                         | 366,497<br>6.3                                                       | 582,182<br>9.9                                                         | 429,287<br>7.3                                                        | 769,921<br>13.1                                                      | 608,661<br>10.3                                                   | 287,779<br>4.9                                         | 94,433<br>1.6                                         | 5,221<br>0.1                                 |
| 914<br>124<br>1,761<br>14,604<br>9,895<br>46,340<br>95,491<br>28,064 | 1,218<br>213<br>1,881<br>14,515<br>9,781<br>33,542<br>67,522<br>15,373 | 1,857<br>287<br>2,388<br>17,877<br>14,835<br>31,609<br>62,970<br>13,132 | 1,123<br>189<br>1,326<br>8,500<br>9,402<br>14,476<br>28,544<br>6,026 | 1,935<br>259<br>2,130<br>10,574<br>16,794<br>19,141<br>39,379<br>7,745 | 1,366<br>201<br>1,058<br>10,574<br>12,245<br>9,583<br>23,371<br>3,903 | 1,758<br>265<br>1,057<br>4,818<br>17,065<br>9,330<br>31,417<br>3,858 | 1,031<br>188<br>334<br>1,207<br>9,230<br>3,419<br>19,603<br>1,462 | 433<br>81<br>93<br>246<br>3,187<br>948<br>9,890<br>359 | 173<br>49<br>26<br>66<br>1,171<br>228<br>4,816<br>115 | ...<br>2<br>4<br>30<br>25<br>46<br>138<br>11 |
| 27,174<br>11.7<br>169,895<br>17.9                                    | 27,395<br>11.7<br>116,437<br>12.3                                      | 36,957<br>15.9<br>107,711<br>11.3                                       | 20,351<br>8.8<br>49,046<br>5.2                                       | 31,433<br>13.5<br>66,265<br>7.0                                        | 19,487<br>8.4<br>36,857<br>3.9                                        | 23,908<br>10.2<br>44,605<br>4.6                                      | 11,802<br>5.1<br>24,484<br>2.6                                    | 3,959<br>1.7<br>11,197<br>1.2                          | 1,436<br>0.6<br>5,159<br>0.5                          | 59<br>...<br>195<br>...                      |
| 197,193<br>16.6                                                      | 144,045<br>12.2                                                        | 144,955<br>12.2                                                         | 69,586<br>5.8                                                        | 97,957<br>8.3                                                          | 56,545<br>4.8                                                         | 68,778<br>5.8                                                        | 36,474<br>3.0                                                     | 15,237<br>1.3                                          | 6,644<br>0.6                                          | 256<br>...                                   |

### STRUCTURAL FACTORS INFLUENCING INDIVIDUAL AND MASS VIOLENCE<sup>3</sup>

Many major changes have occurred in U.S. society, particularly in the last generation, which influence society at large and are a salient influence on criminal, quasi-criminal, antisocial, and new social behavior. The most pervasive of these long-term trends in U.S. society is the movement toward one culture. While the United States has not achieved a classless society, and probably never could, we have moved substantially toward geographically homogeneous values, institutions, outlooks, interests, and tastes—the marks of one culture. The Sears, Safeways, RKO Theaters, and General Motors showrooms offer basically the same material from coast to coast and

border to border. While there are major differences in problems of violence between the cities and the countrysides, cities are more alike than ever before. Consequently, circumstances promoting violence tend to be similar across the country, and the general methods of dealing with them could also be similar.

Cheap transportation and a pervasiveness of radio, television, and magazines and a newspaper network supported by a few news services have had a profound effect on violence. This is most keenly illustrated by bizarre activities. Cheap transportation and the ease of formal and informal communication permitted that mad group, the Manson family, to assemble and congeal into a transient ephemeral band and perpetrate its foul violence. The impact of communication is neatly shown by the wave of hijackings for profit, initiated by D. B. Cooper when he carried off the first major ransom of an airplane on Thanksgiving eve 1971. The wave of hijackings shows the profound effect of telecommunications in propagating concepts and stimulating independent activities of the same sort. The Cooper

3. Harvey S. Perloff, *The Future of the U.S. Government: Toward the Year 2000* (New York: George Braziller, 1972), 388 pp.—a report from the Commission on the Year 2000 of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. (Note especially Bell's preface for a summary of the long-term structural changes.) Joseph F. Coates, "The Future of Crime in the United States from Now to the Year 2000," *Policy Sciences* 3 (1972), pp. 27-45.

TABLE 4—COMPARISON OF SURVEY AND UCR RATES  
(PER 100,000 POPULATION)<sup>a</sup>

| INDEX CRIMES            | NORC SURVEY<br>1965-1966 | UCR RATE FOR<br>INDIVIDUALS<br>1965 <sup>b</sup> | UCR RATE FOR<br>INDIVIDUALS AND<br>ORGANIZATIONS<br>1965 <sup>b</sup> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Willful homicide        | 3.0                      | 5.1                                              | 5.1                                                                   |
| Forcible rape           | 42.5                     | 11.6                                             | 11.6                                                                  |
| Robbery                 | 94.0                     | 61.4                                             | 61.4                                                                  |
| Aggravated assault      | 218.3                    | 106.6                                            | 106.6                                                                 |
| Burglary                | 949.1                    | 299.6                                            | 605.3                                                                 |
| Larceny (\$50 and over) | 606.5                    | 267.4                                            | 393.3                                                                 |
| Motor vehicle theft     | 206.2                    | 226.0                                            | 251.0                                                                 |
| Total violence          | 357.8                    | 184.7                                            | 184.7                                                                 |
| Total property          | 1,761.8                  | 793.0                                            | 1,249.6                                                               |

<sup>a</sup> National Crime Commission Survey published as Table 1 in Albert D. Biderman, "Surveys of Population Samples for Estimating Crime Incidence," *THE ANNALS* 374 (November 1967), p. 17.

<sup>b</sup> U. S., Department of Justice, FBI, *Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. GPO, 1965), p. 51. The UCR national totals do not distinguish crimes committed against individuals or households from those committed against businesses or other organizations. The UCR rate for individuals is the published national rate adjusted to eliminate burglaries, larcenies, and vehicle thefts not committed against individuals or households. No adjustment was made for robbery.

capers also suggests that we may anticipate new waves of off-beat fads as innovations in criminal activity grab the public's imagination. There are other historical examples. The reader will recall the wave of baby deaths following the early reports of children smothered in plastic dry-cleaning bags. Those stories eventually wore thin, and that

phase of private violence passed. Another significant lesson from Mr. Cooper's innovation is that with only a slight change of circumstance, one could easily have misinterpreted the propagation of the concept as a conspiracy.

The influence of rapid, if not instant, communication can be shown again with regard to the wave of some two hun-

TABLE 5—VICTIM-OFFENDER RELATIONSHIPS BY RACE AND SEX IN  
ASSAULTIVE CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON (EXCEPT HOMICIDE)

| OFFENSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO:               |        |                 |        |                        |       |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|-----------------|--------|------------------------|-------|
| White Offenders                         |        | Negro Offenders |        | All Types of Offenders |       |
| Male                                    | Female | Male            | Female |                        |       |
| Victim rate for each 100,000            |        |                 |        |                        |       |
| White males . . . . .                   | 201    | 9               | 129    | 4                      | 342   |
| White females . . . . .                 | 108    | 14              | 46     | 6                      | 175   |
| Negro males . . . . .                   | 58     | 3               | 1,636  | 256                    | 1,953 |
| Negro females . . . . .                 | 21     | 3               | 1,202  | 157                    | 1,382 |
| Total population <sup>a</sup> . . . . . | 130    | 10              | 350    | 45                     | 535   |

SOURCE: Special report in Albert J. Reiss, Jr., ed., *Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas*, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Field Survey III (Washington, D. C.: U.S. GPO, 1967), vol. 1, section 1, Table 6, pp. 35-36.

<sup>a</sup> The rates are based only on persons fourteen years of age or older.

dred riots in the three months following the assassination of Martin Luther King. It is just beyond belief that the riots that followed his death, particularly those immediately following his death, could have had any conspiratorial base. They rather strongly argue for a triggering effect of information on latent and dormant hostilities. The impact of communications is further illustrated in two steps of violence following the announcement April 30, 1970, of U.S. movement into Cambodia. A substantial number of university campuses were disrupted by news of the Cambodian venture. When the disaster occurred at Kent State on May 4, the students across the nation responded with one will in shutting down campuses at the rate of a hundred per day. Four hundred forty-eight closed by May 11, and eight hundred had protests by May 30. To the best of my knowledge, this is the most dramatic example of the impact of communications on initiating mass disorder. I recall standing at the front of the student union at George Washington University at a student rally which was interrupted periodically by reports over the radio and by telephone as to what was happening at other campuses around the country. Models were instantly developing as to what was or was not appropriate and effective behavior. Techniques were being displayed, and normal social restraints, social controls, were being relaxed by that information.

#### MIDDLE CLASSIFICATION

Another major structural change in the U.S. society influencing crime is the general movement toward middle classification. As more people move into middle-class society or adopt middle-class outlooks, several things will happen with regard to both individuals and mass disorders:

The middle class uses institutional mechanisms for dealing with many

grievances. Rather than taking one's knocks, more and more people will turn to the police to report crimes and to seek police and court services in redressing criminal activity. As the hidden figure of crime becomes exposed, see Table 4, the demand for services will increase. One would also expect, if nothing else changes, to see an apparent increase in crime rate. It is worth noting that the Department of Justice is now institutionalizing the surveys of crime based on direct sampling of citizen populations. This should provide a more reliable estimate of crimes than can now be garnered from the Uniform Crime Reports.

Growing awareness of, and a much more effective insistence on, civil rights of the individual, both *de jure* and *de facto*, is another consequence of the general movement toward middle classification. As a practical matter, the dispensation of justice in the street by the police is being curtailed, and the courts are more even-handed and equitable in the treatment of the poor and the other minority groups. This movement could create a transitional crisis. The courts are overloaded; incredible delays occur in bringing people to trial. Yet little is known about the specific influence of the prosecution and court delays on crime.

The police are officially more restrained in their behavior, but still need major reorientation and reinforcement to operate within their new restraints, new opportunities, and new roles.

Middle classification increases the pervasiveness and insistence on demands for social justice and fair treatment, and seems to engender a tendency in some toward toleration, if not glamorization, of mass protests. One tendency is to grace all protests and mass actions with an egalitarian, freedom fighting, democratic motive, which they sometimes, if not often, lack.

Two instructive examples of the assimilation of protest and direct action by the middle class occurred in the same week in New York. In one case a group of white mothers of school-aged children conducted a sit-in to protest the busing of black ghetto children from Brownsville, a distant slum. In the other example commuters, whose scheduled train broke down, blocked the tracks on the Penn Central until another train stopped and let them on. The acceptability of direct action as a new middle-class value is moving both down into the working class, in the school sit-in, and into the upper middle class, in the commuter "hijacking." If one interprets these as legitimate if illegal desperate moves against an intransigent system, one must by analogy entertain the same interpretations of the mass action in black ghettos, on behalf of civil rights, and on the campuses in the last decade.

#### *A medical problem*

Closely related to middle classification is the tendency to interpret much violent criminal behavior as a medical problem rather than as a moral-legal problem. There are presently substantial shifts in the auspices of some crimes—notably the nonviolent crime of alcoholism, which has come to be officially recognized as a medical rather than a criminal problem.

The extent to which violence is a medical problem, and most significantly, the practical implications for shifting the institutional auspices from law to medicine, are obscure. Assuming that most violent behavior came to be recognized as having a biomedical or social basis, or a basis that mitigates individual freedom and responsibility, the question remains: how can society deal with such problems, in the short and long term?

Urbanization, as a continuing phenomenon in our society, will draw the rural impoverished into the cities and thereby provide a source of individual low-level street crime. It is unlikely that we will find a rapidly effective panacea for intergenerational gaps and the social-cultural dislocations of moving from a relatively stable rural environment to the disruptive environments of the urban poor. The continual movement toward urbanization may also influence mass actions inasmuch as it will draw together those against whom there is prejudice to provide the numerical basis and mutual awareness for effective collective action.

Economic prosperity has marked American society for the last thirty years. Coupled with the other long-term trends, it has bred a younger middle-class generation remote enough from the direct or vicarious memories of economic depression to approach the world with a relaxed perspective on work which influences their behavior. The youthful children of the upper middle-class families find in this new prosperity the opportunity to attempt to fulfill the unmet dreams of their parents. Prosperity and less urgent pressures to work allow this group to comprise the backbone of the mass protests on and off campuses. Prosperity is also associated with growth of the service industries, particularly industries based on special knowledge and the ability to handle, manipulate, and utilize information and data. The trend toward a knowledge-based society, coupled with continuing prosperity, may create a relatively permanent under-class—the ghettoized poor—locked into poverty because they neither appreciate the need for academic credentials nor have the social, hence personal, bases for garnering such credentials. A permanent under-class implies not only unabated individual vio-

lent crime in cities, but also continued mass actions for fun and profit.<sup>4</sup>

Institutional barriers to learning, either directly or through the experience of others, seem to be as commonplace with regard to the management of violence and disorders as they are in other sectors of our society. Most surprising has been the sluggishness with which universities have adopted the academically based understanding of the causes of mass unrest on campuses. During the period of the Berkeley free speech movement and the years immediately following, universities remained intransigent and chose to break rather than bend under the relatively legitimate pressures of students for institutional and organizational change and their participation in its formulation. The later growth of the student movement related less to internal university affairs and more to external affairs, such as university support of the Vietnam War and its institutional indifference to social causes and injustice. Resistance to institutional learning has been very high at institutes of higher learning.

While the student movements can claim major successes in reducing constraints on student behavior and increasing participation in university affairs, the drive to a greater university institutional involvement on larger social issues is less clearly successful. Black and other ethnic studies, as well as women's studies, have arrived. But the waning concern for the war has made it a less urgent campus issue. The least one can say about campus disorder is that it has sensitized the universities to the urgency and earnestness of student concerns and has made the universities more responsive on a variety of levels to less dramatic, but more

persistent, pressures for curricula and course content modification.

### *Etiquette of disruption*

The police have also been slow to learn, although under the stimulus of urban riots a massive program was initiated by the federal government for training in handling mass action. The growing familiarity with mass actions and disorders, coupled with the extensive training techniques, has reduced the violence associated with such activities. This trend to benign handling also reflects a more deep-seated factor, namely the development of an etiquette of disruption and protest, as part of a more general pattern of new etiquettes toward previously labeled antisocial activity. In the same way that the hurly-burly about the use of recreational drugs such as marijuana is falling into balance, demonstrations are being received with more equanimity.

Shifts in values that come about in part as the result of changing educational levels are well documented. But even within and across educational levels, more general shifts in values are occurring, such as the movement away from the work ethic; the movement toward a sensate or more hedonistic society; a more general slackening of the traditional sexual morality; a broadening attitude of live-and-let live; and an appreciation of civil rights. However, all sectors of society do not move ahead with an equal speed or necessarily on the same course. One group caught in a whiplash in regard to these value changes is the police, who are likely to come from working-class backgrounds and have a puritanical rigidity which catches them in a double bind.

First is the perception of the inability to appreciate ne'r-do-well behavior of the poor in the ghettos, or devil-may-care incongruous behavior and procla-

4. Edward C. Banfield, "Rioting Mainly for Fun and Profit," *The Unheavenly City* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968).



mations of the middle-class collegians. Class commitments may prevent the policemen from having the intellectual attitude or spiritual generosity to assimilate and accommodate to these differences, without external help.<sup>5</sup> The impact on behavior of structural factors beyond the police is illustrated by the waves of violence associated with the migration of southern European and Turkish workers into the more prosperous northern countries. These problems are seen even in England, which for years has enjoyed the reputation of even-handed dispensation of justice. The migrations of black and other colored people from the Empire has spawned such discontent that one now finds monographs being published such as that by Derek Humphrey, *Police Power and Black People* (London: Panther Books, 1972).

#### THE RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 injected large amounts of money into the criminal justice system. At all levels of government in fiscal year 1969-70, some \$8,571 million was directly expended on criminal justice: \$5,080 million for police and the rest for the judiciary, prosecutions, indigent defense, and corrections.<sup>6</sup> The bulk of those expenditures, some \$5,454 million, were at local government levels, with \$2,139 million at state levels. The Act required the formation of state criminal justice planning

5. Egon Bittner, *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society*, Crime and Delinquency Issues: A Monograph Series; National Institute of Mental Health; Center for the Study of Crime and Delinquency; Rockville, Maryland, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Publication no. HSM-72-9103 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1970).

6. U.S. Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, "Criminal Justice Expenditure and Employment, 1969-70," February 1972, Advance Report.

authorities which, in the long run, should put the allocation of resources on a more rational basis. The large share of this new money went to increase the capability of the police to deal with violence and crime by meeting their immediate felt needs for weapons and for communication and transportation equipment.

As a result of the concern for civil disturbance, particularly following the black riots of 1965 and 1967, federal funds have gone into the development of training materials and equipment for riot control for the police, the National Guard, and the military. Now that the first wave of more or less pressing, if not superficial, needs of the police have been met, a more leisurely, deliberative, and effective approach to future resource requirements and allocations can be taken. Against the general background, it is important to note that there are numerous and promising developments in day-to-day policing activities throughout the country which will undoubtedly put police in a better and more effective relationship with their clientele and their community. For example, in the city of Oakland a program is underway to identify and rehabilitate violence-prone policemen. In the past, in many departments the only options were to ignore the violence or, when the situation got totally out of hand, to dismiss the man.

In New York City the special family units, trained in dealing with domestic disputes, a particularly troublesome and dangerous role for the police, have met with some success. In Dayton, Ohio, an exciting new program has been undertaken in the selection and training of rookies to orient them toward the role of community service officers and away from the traditional one of guardian of public virtue, the avenging angel, the stalwart against a rising sea of crime. In Covina, California, each member of

the police department spent a day and a night out on the streets masquerading as a derelict. Each experienced, first hand, being avoided by the world and being intimidated by every encounter. On a larger system scale, there are numerous efforts at citizen participation in the operation of police at local levels. Other exemplary activities are the attempts to recruit from minorities for police departments. Although reflecting a certain degree of formal institutionalized good will, they have not been particularly successful.

The programs cited above are exemplary rather than exhaustive of the many exciting innovations in police operations around the country. Another point to be noted with some substantial enthusiasm is that the police are becoming more and more the subject of academic research and are slowly coming to embrace research as a useful tool in spite of the hard knocks usually associated with it. For example, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Academy, on the basis of three years' research, has dropped its stress-oriented training for a more demonstrably effective supportive program.

The court's sluggish ability to discharge its minimum obligation of trying the accused has received a great deal of public and professional notoriety. The general theme underlying the complaint about this situation is that justice delayed is justice denied. That is not in the traditional sense of that old saw, but in the sense that criminals are put out on the street by bail and virtually driven, encouraged, or at least permitted to commit new crimes while waiting to be heard for old ones. Relatively little research has been undertaken on the effects on criminal behavior of various time schedulings in court responses.

The courts have also operated, as have the police and corrections, as a disjointed unit in the criminal justice system, or as some people have chosen

to describe it, the non-system of criminal justice. New information delivery channels and receptacles are required in the criminal justice system to make it a totality, effectively responsible for the people who are processed by it. There are very real questions as to the efficiency and the effectiveness of the management of court operations and whether technology and reform together could substantially improve that. One study conducted several years ago under the auspices of the Katzenbach Commission highlighted the enormous potential that modern management and systems analysis could bring to court operation.<sup>7</sup> The Chief Justice's new annual state of the judiciary address to the American Bar Association suggests the growing internal concern for reform.

The potential for overall improvement in the total criminal justice system is keenly revealed in some systems analyses conducted for the President's Crime Commission. Of the estimated 2,780,000 index crimes in 1965, some 727,000 offenders were apprehended. Only 177,000 actually faced formal accusation and detention. Ultimately only 80,000 of those apprehended served time in either prisons or jails following sentencing.<sup>8</sup>

Corrections is that component of the criminal justice system which seems to be least capable of discharging its obligations and most in need of dramatic

7. See the Katzenbach Commission Report, *The Challenge*; and J. G. Taylor, J. A. Navarro, and R. H. Cohen, "Data Analyses and Simulation of the District of Columbia Trial Court System for the Processing of Felony Defendants," Research Paper P-415, Institute for Defense Analyses, Science and Technology Division, Arlington, Virginia, June 1968.

8. Institute for Defense Analyses, *Task Force Report: Science and Technology*, a report to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1967), pp. 60-61.

overhaul, infusion of new ideas, and exercise of new concepts. Much of the data strongly suggest that jails and penitentiaries are schools for crime, rather than centers for rehabilitation. My own judgment is that in the next decade penology and corrections will enjoy the concern and hopefully the imagination and funding that juvenile delinquency enjoyed in the previous decades.

#### SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO MASS VIOLENCE

The systems response to mass violence lies, to some extent, both within and outside the criminal justice system. Within the criminal justice system, as already mentioned, there is a growing understanding of the etiquette of mass disorders and mass behavior. The recognition is dawning on police authorities that they have the obligation not only to enforce the law, but to preserve the peace and that any particular circumstance involving mass behavior is likely to call for the exercise of judgment rather than the mindless enforcement of the law. The second long-term response is the frank and overt cooperation between demonstrators and public officials to be sure that auspices for mass demonstrations are as satisfactory as can be and compatible with demonstrator objectives and relatively elastic public constraints. Where mass disorders have been planned and public officials cooperative, violence has generally been incidental and inconsequential. As police officials have become more skilled in crowd control, they have come to recognize that this span of control and discipline over their men is essential to maintaining order. Long-range planning and the marshalling of large forces helps preserve the public order. However, running alongside this benign development is a much more serious development. In many cases the police have succumbed to the temp-

tation to restrain legal or legitimate protest, and as many would argue, they have consciously and systematically infringed upon the rights of a substantial number of citizens. A most conspicuous example of this was the Mayday disturbances in Washington, D.C., in 1971, which is now rather carefully documented in a report by the Washington Capital Area American Civil Liberties Union.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, the police riot—to use the term coined by Adam Yar-molinsky to describe what occurred at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago—has been a lesson assimilated by public authority. The two conventions of 1972 were conducted with much more effective, even-handed, mutual planning. It is worth noting that the Walker report, the account of that 1968 convention riot prepared under the auspices of the Violence Commission, in outlining the details of the unfolding events, carries the implicit accusation that individual policemen bear the principal responsibility for their outbursts.<sup>10</sup> The Commission itself came to a more convincing and constructive judgment in recognizing that the fundamental responsibility is less with the individual policeman than in the chain of command and the organization of public authority. In the exercise of responsibility, superiors and elected appointed public officials enjoy the blame for the structural failure to exercise responsibility.

The systemic responses on university campuses have been quite interesting. While many universities, often those most prominent in the United States,

9. American Civil Liberties Union, National Capital Area, "Mayday 1971: Order Without Law, An ACLU Study of the Largest Sweep Arrests in American History," July 1972.

10. *Rights in Conflict*, a report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, The Walker Report (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 70-76.

have been forced by student protest to reverse initially intransigent positions on many issues, many other universities have taken these lessons to heart and without direct, much less violent, action on their campuses, have given students more responsibility. The new etiquette of mass disorder has also facilitated the growth of a variety of relatively minor, but nevertheless important, protest movements such as Gay Liberation which can now have relatively safe demonstrations, parades, and protests. They are safe in the sense that public authority will protect them from hostile civilians and also facilitate the expression of their protests. Protests and demonstrations have declined substantially in number, frequency, verve, and drama in the last two years. In part, this is a result of a cooling down of the Vietnam War and the relatively diminished concern among our youthful citizens regarding the long-term consequences of that war for themselves and society. But perhaps more significant is the fact that young people, who comprise the bulk of the protest movement, have relatively limited staying power and become discouraged with the efficacy of any approach when immediate results are not forthcoming. On the other hand, one sees the stamina for protests of groups such as blacks and women as likely to be more enduring and continuing—perhaps in the longer range having more substantial impacts, not only because the groups span a wider age range, but because the issues are more structurally deep-seated and pervasive.

#### GHETTO RIOTS

The ghetto riots began as a major phenomenon in 1964, crested in 1965, 1967, and 1968, and then declined rapidly after the Martin Luther King riots. Their interpretation is most complex,

well beyond the scope of this paper, but it may be worth noting that substantial changes in American society have opened many doors to blacks; and while redress of fifty to a hundred to four hundred years of oppression cannot be overcome overnight, the opportunities for blacks are there and are being used.<sup>11</sup> Thus, while both drawing the nerve and the need for violent outbursts, the new opportunities make clear the value of those outbursts.

#### SUMMARY

In spite of the continuing increases in the reported rates, there are substantial bases for optimism with regard to the future of crime and violence in the United States.

Examination of the structural factors underlying statistical increases suggests that a large portion of the increase is due less to increasing turpitude and moral decay than it is to better reporting schemes, general movement toward middle-class values, and demographic shifts in age patterns.

The criminal justice system is coming to be seen as a total system. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, with its infusion of mass amounts of money, has eased immediate concerns and encouraged the flourishing of more deliberative planning and evaluation.

Under that same Act, each of the states now has a centralized criminal justice planning authority which is simultaneously building up cadres of skilled professionals needed to move that system to new degrees of humane effectiveness. Simultaneously they are countering two perceived risks; first, that of centralized control from Washington;

11. Allen D. Grimshaw, ed., *Racial Violence in the United States* (Chicago, Ill.: Aldine, 1969). (This is a useful review of various interpretations of race-related violence in the United States.)

and second, dispersal of large funds to uncoordinated programs at the local level.

The several recent major commissions as well as the recent availability of ample funding have made the police and the criminal justice system a substantial area of academic studies and research. There are major innovations going on within the criminal justice system. Experimental methods are being embraced with cautious vigor. Evaluation of the programs and operational effectiveness is moving apace.

There is growing recognition of the relatively limited role of the police in fighting crime. This is coupled with a growing awareness of the more general public service role for the police now being reinforced through retraining and reorientation.

New social, psychological, and medical knowledge of factors relating to crime are slowly but inevitably moving new institutional arrangements into conceptual and operational prominence.

The police handling of urban mass violence from 1965 to the present is

dramatically improved. Based on experience, knowledge, equipment, and training, the management of mass actions, demonstrations, and even full-blown riots is now more balanced, even-handed, and socially useful.

Major difficulties still remain which may persist into the distant future. First, crime is a politically profitable subject for exploitation and personal aggrandizement. Second, relatively little has been done to effectively involve the citizens in crime-fighting, particularly in the most crime-ridden areas, the urban ghettos. Third, courts and the legal profession have generally been sluggish in responding to the public demands as well as to the constitutional requirements for speedy justice. Generally they have not embraced the new experimental and research attitudes in criminal justice as generously as have others. Finally, the major new innovations and initiatives in experimental approaches to prevention, penology, and corrections have yet to be conceived and launched on a scale commensurate with the problem.

## Legal and Political Forums for Urban Change

By DANIEL R. MANDELKER

ABSTRACT: American legal institutions, and especially the judicial process, have been accustomed to dealing with an urban economic order characterized primarily by small units of economic power. As our economy has been increasingly dominated by larger aggregates of economic concentration, however, the judicial process has found it increasingly difficult to deal with the policy issues in urban resource management which these larger aggregates of economic power have raised. Policy issues of this kind are best resolved in the political rather than in the judicial forum. The law can assist the political decision-maker who must deal with these issues, but it cannot do so without redefining its traditional role.

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This paper is a revised version of an article which appeared under the title, "The Role of Law in Social Change," in *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 8 (1970), p. 355.

WE are in a period of social stress in which the political institutions that make major resource decisions in our urban areas are increasingly under attack. Much of this challenge has come through the judicial process. As lawyers, we are more comfortable with our traditional adversary role than any other, and we have looked primarily to the courts as the appropriate forum to hear our pleas for social reconstruction. I will argue, however, that the role that courts can play in major social reform is limited. Effective judicial intervention in social controversy requires agreement on the goals and objectives of social change. We have not achieved this agreement, and our failure to do so has limited the impact which courts can have on the underlying causes of social unrest.

#### ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

We should begin with an analysis of the legal system we have known, and when we do so, we are struck by the influence that earlier and less complex economic forms have had on the development of our legal institutions. An example drawn from the field of air pollution control will illustrate the point. In cases brought under what is known as nuisance doctrine, an attempt was sometimes made to prohibit an operator of an industrial plant from fouling the air. The courts in these cases would always look at the legal issues as they were presented by the immediate parties to the litigation. A nuisance would then be found if the defendant's operations had sufficiently impaired the quality of the plaintiff's immediate environment.

This kind of case illustrates some important points about the early structure of our economic order and how it came to be reflected in our legal institutions. Until recently, courts dealt with small

institutions and small aggregates of economic power, at least when they adjudicated conflicts over the management of urban resources. As a result, the legal controversies which arose from the conduct of these small power aggregates were concentrated at the scale of the individual, or at best clusters of individuals or small groups. Our air pollution nuisance case is typical of the conventional judicial controversy which arose out of simple two-party relationships and which concentrated on the narrowly defined interests around which these relationships revolved. Within so limited a context, the legal system could not deal with the larger policy problems which such a case might raise, as distinguished from the narrower issues surrounding allocation of responsibility for damage which the court considered in the context of a nuisance lawsuit. That is, the court in our air pollution nuisance case could not decide such larger policy questions as (a) what the level of ambient air quality in any area should be; (b) how responsibility for the improvement of air quality levels should be apportioned; and (c) how the cost of bringing about this improvement should be borne.

As the courts in these urban resource cases dealt with individual litigants claiming economic damage, they also structured their analysis of the issues presented around a narrowly defined concept of property ownership which was compatible with the interest asserted. Thus, the defendant in our air pollution case was only responsible for what his "property" contributed to air quality. As property concepts were increasingly applied to areas of social conflict, however, disadvantaged groups, who often had the most at stake, often had no property interest to assert and were excluded from the litigation process. Poor, transient tenants living in a rooming house next to a heavy indus-

trial plant, for example, own no property and have no basis for bringing the owner of that plant into court to stop the damage he does to the quality of air.

#### ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR LEGAL REFORM

The ability of the law to structure legal relationships on the basis of narrowly defined property interests asserted by small-scale enterprise has been gradually eroded as concentrations of economic power have grown in size. Massive power plants have often replaced the small entrepreneur in air pollution litigation, and while an individual plant might injure the quality of the air in one neighborhood, air pollution from a large power plant may affect an entire region. As the impact of resource decisions by these larger units of economic power has widened, groups previously excluded from the judicial process have sought entry to that process in order to force a greater social accountability on the offenders.

But this drive for legal reform did not ask for judicial concentration on the policy issues of resource distribution. Instead, legal reform worked from the older model of the legal order. Efforts at change have been in the direction of reforming that model to make it work better within the assumptions and limitations it accepted, by giving a hearing to those groups that previously did not have the leverage to enforce their demands. My response to this kind of reforming effort is cautionary. I do not suggest that granting entry to the weak in our legal system is not an essential component in any effort at social change; but in the long run, it may not achieve all that we expect in the solution of more fundamental social problems.

Let me go back to my earlier observation about the role of the property concept in the settlement of controversies

over resource distribution. We have used air pollution as our example, but urban renewal can provide an equally useful illustration. Quite early in the history of urban renewal, disadvantaged groups who were displaced from their homes by urban renewal projects brought lawsuits challenging the right of the renewal agency to eject them without providing adequate replacement housing. The question was whether they had enough leverage on the legal system to demand their day in court, and initially the response was unfavorable, partly for reasons we have already indicated. As many of these displaced litigants were only transitory renters, they had no property interest to protect that the law was willing to recognize.

In recent years, however, the courts have given these litigants a hearing. In doing so, they have recognized the interests these litigants represent, even though they are not founded on the protection of property. These judicial developments in urban renewal illustrate the modern thrust of judicial intervention in the name of reform. It accepts the economic and social policies that the urban renewal program contains. The only difference is that previously excluded groups are now allowed to challenge the sufficiency with which these policies are implemented.

As a result of this change in judicial viewpoint, decisions made by large aggregates of economic power on the urban scene, such as urban renewal agencies with comprehensive powers over urban slum clearance, are increasingly under attack by previously unrepresented interests. But the impact of this new intervention is not clear, because these groups have not gained entry to a legal system in which goals and policies are fixed and certain. Quite the contrary, our goals and policies in urban programs are not only uncertain, but in many cases are con-



flicting. Under extreme conditions of goal uncertainty, recognizing new litigants in the judicial process introduces new protagonists with new values which that process has so far chosen not to accept. They make demands on accepted policies which courts, at least, find difficult to handle.

#### RACE, RENEWAL, AND REFORM

We can get an insight into some of these complexities by returning to our urban renewal displacement cases. One of the more famous of these cases is *Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency*,<sup>1</sup> a case decided by a United States Federal Court of Appeal. Let us first note that the *Norwalk* case, like most of the other recent cases on this issue, was brought by minority groups who alleged racial discrimination as the basis of their complaint. It is no accident that courts have been asked to seize hold of the renewal process in the name of racial claims. The protection the Constitution gives to minority groups opens an avenue for judicial entry which avoids the more difficult problems presented by an assault through the more conventional property interest approach.

Unfortunately, while it is the racial side of the case which triggers the court's intervention, it is in this area of concern that public policy is not only unformulated, but unsure. We can see these difficulties if we inspect more closely the factual basis of the *Norwalk* lawsuit. The facts were many-sided, but what strikes us in a careful reading of the decision is a reference two or three times to the fact that Negroes were forced to leave Norwalk after they were displaced from the urban renewal project. Whites were not. For this and other reasons, the court found that Negroes in Norwalk had been the vic-

tims of an unconstitutional discrimination in the urban renewal program.

Let us now look at this conclusion more closely. We have evidence from the United States Bureau of the Census on the character and extent of Negro migration to cities. This evidence suggests that Negroes are more urbanized as a group than whites, that they have been in cities longer, and that they have been moving up from smaller cities to larger cities. If we assume that opportunities to achieve a better standard of living are greater in larger cities than in smaller towns, and some of our colleagues in economics have told us so, then this upward urban movement of Negroes is not entirely a bad thing. The fact is that Norwalk, Connecticut, is not a big city, and so I raise this question: if economic improvement is the goal we are trying to achieve, then the fact that Negroes left Norwalk may very well have been good and not bad. I say "may" because I am not sure; I don't know. But if we agree that the urban system is complex, interdependent, and interconnected, then a complex set of interrelated policies and values is implicated in any decision that touches on the racial fairness with which any one program is conducted. While the court in the *Norwalk* case handled the issues on a racial basis, it did not evaluate these issues in the larger perspective that would seem to have been required. Even had it done so, it would have had little guidance on how to balance the conflicting goals which this wider perspective would have brought into the litigation.

True, the purpose of judicial intervention in a case like *Norwalk* is to impose on urban renewal agencies an obligation to be racially neutral, if not racially compensatory, in the administration of their programs. But the point is that the courts cannot become implicated in the racial issue without

1. 395 F.2d 920 (2nd cir. 1968).

opening up for examination the entire question of urban policies and priorities which the program presents, for none of these problems can be approached in isolation. In the *Norwalk* case, for example, the court noted at one point that displaced Negroes may get less-desirable housing than whites simply because they are poorer. But the court was powerless to remedy the urban poverty problem.

#### VALUES AND VARIABLES IN URBAN POLICYMAKING

We can acquire even more understanding of the limitations on judicial consideration of these larger policy issues by turning to the analysis of expertise in decision-making which is contained in Professor Alan Altshuler's book, *The City Planning Process*.<sup>2</sup> Altshuler is concerned with how expertise is defined, and he concentrates on the city planner and related urban professionals. He notes that these professionals gain credibility by claiming a competence to make judgments on issues that are defined by a limited number of variables. Professionals are very careful in selecting the variables which limit their expertise, and the most successful tend to limit narrowly the variables over which they claim responsibility. He gives as an example the highway engineer, who confines himself to decisions limited to optimizing traffic flows. Altshuler then suggests that the selection of the variables that are considered critical to a policy judgment carries with it the selection of the values we are trying to implement. For example, it can be argued that public housing planners made important and critical value judgments when they decided to build massive, high-rise proj-

ects in order to minimize cost and maximize the housing contribution. By not considering the racial impact of their policies, they ignored the racial variable and, as a result, fostered racial segregation in the projects they built.

Altshuler points out that law contemplates a decision-making process which does not claim legitimacy through selection of a limited number of variables and so is carried out under conditions in which goals are highly uncertain. The legal process avoids the problem of goal selection by slipping around them, claiming its credibility on the basis of collective rational decision-making through the process of incremental change. I would also argue that, whenever the courts refuse substantive intervention in urban resource controversies, they do so to avoid the tough questions that require an exercise of value judgments. But courts may not shrink from a decision forced on them by racial discrimination, even though that decision carries value-laden judgments with it. Introducing the racial dimension also introduces many related policy questions for decision which are not racially based. Unfortunately, the guiding criteria to work out the conflicts that occur once the basis for decision has been broadened in this manner are not at hand.

There is another difficulty in the use of the judicial process to make policy choices, and it is here that we see more clearly the limitations of a judicially reformist role. The problem is that it is very difficult for the judicial process, on its own, to fashion new remedies for the redress of claims that do not get full consideration in the legal system as it now exists. To return to urban renewal, probably the best the judicial process can do, unaided, is to require fairness in the administration of the urban renewal program, assuming that the court chooses not to stop it alto-

2. A. A. Altshuler, *The City Planning Process; a Political Analysis* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), c. 6.

gether. It is clear that a court, on its own, can do nothing about money flows, interest rates, and subsidy levels, all of which directly affect the production and distribution of housing and which will have more effect on the provision of housing for persons displaced in urban renewal projects than any relief a court might provide.

What role should the lawyer and the law then play in this process of reform which appears so necessary as the legal structure adapts to changes in our economic order? I would first assert that the proper forum in which to work out the policy conflicts that social reform brings is political and that the judicial process is ill suited to the task of political compromise. If we accept this starting point as the basis for initiating a program of urban change, then we can find a new role for the legal process which goes beyond the introduction of new litigants to the judicial forum. Through the agency of the lawyer, the law can make a significant contribution by assisting the political decision-maker

in drawing those linkages between values and variables which must be understood before the distributive choices inherent in the legal system can be redefined.

For example, we might look at Negro migration patterns in the context of urban renewal, isolate those values and variables that appear critical to a public program in this area, and then describe a series of legal options that can best implement those policies that are chosen. Should we decide that Negro dispersion is an important issue in urban renewal programs, for example, and should we decide that we want to maximize that dispersion, we could then adopt a series of policies on relocation assistance, housing subsidies, and housing location, all of which would encourage that dispersion to take place. And we will have to argue to a court of law that dispersion under these conditions is a constitutional, not an unconstitutional, discrimination. It is in this multi-sided role that we, as lawyers, must learn to function.

# Electricity as a Social Force

By CHARLES R. ROSS

ABSTRACT: Until recent years the measure of a nation's economic and social prosperity was its consumption of electricity. Over the course of time, electricity has come to be considered indispensable. Thus, the aim of both government and industry was directed towards reducing the cost of power. These aims and goals are now being seriously questioned by the environmental movement. In the developing struggle it is going to be necessary to institute an orderly procedure by which solutions to these issues may be discovered. Such procedures must not, however, allow any one segment of society to impose its value system upon another. This can be prevented if everyone is given a reasonable opportunity to express his own values, during both planning and decision-making. Without full public participation there is a serious danger that society will never agree to accept the increased restrictions on its conduct which will be necessary in years to come if man is to survive.

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EVER since the Industrial Revolution, the world, and particularly the United States, has worshipped at the altar of the machine and its indispensable handmaiden, electricity. To provide an abundant, low-cost, and reliable source of electric energy, our forefathers gradually fashioned, with the aid of a constantly developing and expanding technology, an industry that today ranks first in the nation in terms of investment capacity and, ever more important, practically first in terms of our dependence upon its product.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY TO DATE

In order to understand the role the industry has played in shaping our nation and our individual lifestyles, it is important to note several significant characteristics of the industry. First and foremost, it is an industry to which society has seen fit to grant extraordinary rights and obligations subject to some overriding governmental controls because the power industry is considered to be a natural monopoly.<sup>2</sup> Simply put, it is commonly said that competition for such a necessary product in the typical sense is neither wanted nor necessary. In lieu thereof, regulation by local communities in some cases, states in most cases, and the federal government to some degree in all cases, is superimposed upon the industry to insure the proper performance of the industry for the benefit of the public.

Important in the development of the industry has been the delegation under governmental supervision of the right of condemnation. While many times this right was absolutely necessary in order to provide the most efficient ser-

vice with the least duplication possible and with a minimum of interference by obstructing parties, in a number of cases the right has been exercised with little regard to the human impact on the community.

In addition to being an industry that has been encouraged and benefited from technological innovation, it has also prospered from the economies of scale in the generation and transmission of its product.

Still another factor that should be noted because of its relationship to the change now confronting the industry is the degree to which the power industry has profited from the use of free environmental resources such as air and water.

All these factors have been instrumental in providing one of the most remarkable records in any industrial society, if one's basis for judgment is growth and production with an absolute decrease in unit costs at the same time. For example, electricity has grown at the rate of 7 percent per year for the last fifty years as compared to a growth rate for energy as a whole of 3 percent per year for the same period.<sup>3</sup> The price of electricity from 1928 to 1948 decreased 0.70 times as compared to an increase in the general price level—measured by the Consumer Price Index. From 1948 to 1969, by the same index, the general price level increased 1.52 times as compared to an increase in power rates of 1.14 times.<sup>4</sup>

Almost imperceptibly, electricity had become the master, not the slave. In 1929, the average domestic annual use was 484 kilowatt hours (kwh) com-

1. The Council on Economic Priorities, "The Price of Power—Electric Utilities and the Environment," New York, 1972.

2. James C. Bonbright, *Principles of Public Utility Rates* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 8.

3. Harry Perry, "Fuels for Electricity Generation" (Paper presented at Sierra Club Power Policy Conference, Johnson, Vermont, January 1972), p. 2.

4. Richard A. Tybout, "Electric Power Rates and the Environment" (Paper presented at Sierra Club Power Policy Conference, Johnson, Vermont, January 1972), p. 10.

pared to 7,385 kwh in 1971. In 1971, 575 thousand electric heating units were added, bringing the total to 5.2 million.<sup>5</sup> The electric water heater, the air conditioner, clothes dryer, television, freezers, ranges, refrigerators, and other miscellaneous appliances, such as can openers, knife sharpeners, and lawn mowers, are other examples of our total reliance upon electricity in the home—even the oil furnace will not operate without it. Moreover, as those who experienced the infamous Northeast Blackout of 1965 can attest, electricity is important in areas other than the home; the office elevator, the subway, the trains, the hospital, the airport, the gas pump, and the local radio-television station were found to be vital to the successful operation of a modern urban society.<sup>6</sup>

Before proceeding further, however, it should be emphasized that these servants of the modern urban-dweller are not necessarily used or possessed by all alike. In fact, to the poor, most of these appliances are luxuries that are known only on the television screen. For example, only 8 percent of non-white persons living in New York City have air conditioning as compared to 40 percent of all Caucasians.<sup>7</sup> Is it any wonder that the rate of crime escalates during one of our typical heat storms such as the one this past summer? Nor should we forget that these same persons are anxious to substitute mechanical devices for pure physical labor so that they, too, may enjoy the luxury of deciding how to most advanta-

geously use the extra time made available thereby. All hopes of stabilizing demand in the years ahead must take this unfilled demand into account. Most studies indicate that significant dampening of residential demand will accordingly not occur.

It is ironic that in 1972 the industry is criticized for making low-cost power available to a broad segment of our population, while in earlier years critics said this would be impossible to accomplish. Ironical though it may be, it is not surprising that it has turned out this way, for our society has always believed that low-cost energy would create an abundance of goods and satisfy most normal desires of man. One's standard of living was considered to be linked inseparably with the cost of power, whether for industrial or consumer uses. In fact, the showcase for America became, and to some extent still is, the Tennessee Valley Authority. Not only could the life of rural America be improved, but even more important, low-cost power could bring an industrial society to the Tennessee Valley. The Tennessee Valley Authority became a leading exponent of the philosophy that low electric rates meant better living. At the same time, low rates meant increased demand, which led to larger units, fossil as well as hydro, with decreasing unit costs. No wonder it appeared that the American dream had come true! Even the private utilities, opposed as they were to government-operated power systems, felt it necessary to compete in the battle to produce power at the lowest possible price—after considering the interests of their stockholders—in order to make available the possibility of a better standard of living for their consumers. Had they not been willing to do so, the Federal Power Act gave government a statutory authority to promote and encourage interconnections “for the purpose of

5. James J. MacKenzie, “Regional Patterns and Trends in the Generation and Consumption of Electricity in the United States” (Paper presented at Sierra Club Power Policy Conference, Johnson, Vermont, January 1972), p. 8; and, Statistical Report, Sales, *Electrical World*, March 15, 1972, p. 64.

6. Federal Power Commission, “Prevention of Power Failures—Volume I—Report of the Commission,” July 1967, p. 171.

7. MacKenzie, “Regional Patterns,” p. 10.

assuring an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy and with regard to the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources."<sup>8</sup>

The expression of this philosophy is best illustrated by the National Power Survey of 1964. The very opening sentence reads: "The electric utility industry of the United States stands at the threshold of a new era of low-cost power for all sections of our country. . . ."<sup>9</sup> As we said on page three, "the goal of the survey is to help continue and, if possible, accelerate the trend of lower unit costs which promote increased use of electricity. . . . The Nation can afford no less."<sup>10</sup>

As one who participated in the survey, I am troubled by these words, not so much for the goals sought, but more by the lack of appreciation of the cost to the nation of achieving them.

#### ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Many of us have benefited in the short run by the efforts of those who sought to bring the advantages of an industrial society to our nation as well as to export them to other nations. Hopefully, the increased standard of living resulting therefrom has not been purchased at the expense of future generations. Today the power industry, because of its very size and because it produces a product without which we can hardly live, has become the "primary target" for those who seek an enemy to symbolize what is wrong with society.

In brief, it is alleged that owing to our haste to increase our standard of living, the power industry, both public and private, has sold the country down

the proverbial river. Not only has it wasted our natural resources, it has ravaged our lakes and streams. Not only has it assaulted our eyes, ears, and throat, but it has caused us to become a soft and flabby society. By providing large amounts of low-cost electricity, it has enabled large cities to get larger and farmers to leave the farm. In its desire to innovate and progress, it has exploited man's most terrible and destructive weapon, posing a threat to his very survival. Furthermore, it is sometimes alleged that had there not been such abundant sources of power, obviously there would have been a tendency to limit the size of one's family and to slow down the rate of economic growth. As if to prove the point, there are those who would like to see society return to the more simple and communal type of life now that they have had the opportunity to taste the fruits of the other mode of living.

#### THE ISSUES

Oftentimes the focal point for the confrontation has been, and still is, the siting of power facilities, whether the generation station, the transmission line, or the distribution facility. Bitter charges are hurled by each side accusing the other of blackmail, of threatening the very security of the nation. Both sides actually seem to hope for the worst in order to be able to discredit the other. Some environmental groups apparently are hoping that by limiting the electrical demand, zero population and economic growth will come in due time. To them Malthus, together with the authors of *Limits to Growth*, are the prophets of tomorrow.<sup>11</sup>

11. Thomas R. Malthus, "Essay on Principles of Population," 1798; D. H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe Books, 1972); and, Carl Kaysen, "The Computer That Printed Out W\*O\*L\*F," *Foreign Affairs* 50, no. 4 (1972).

8. Federal Power Act of 1920, Section 202.

9. Federal Power Commission, "National Power Survey—1964."

10. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Contrasted to this pessimistic viewpoint, others more optimistic sought to determine the more specific issues that are confronting the nation, so that the various interest groups could study and debate them, and finally propose solutions to the decision-makers which would reverse the trend toward self-destruction. As an example, the Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York defined the nature of the problems as follows:

Only in recent years has the nation awakened to a truly national problem—the accommodation of society's competing interests in assuring a reliable supply of electric energy and in achieving and maintaining a safe, healthful, and pleasing environment.<sup>12</sup>

The report suggests that the problem resolves itself into seven issues:

1. How much electricity will society use?
2. How much capacity for generation and transmission is needed in each region and in what parts of each region, considering potential environmental risks among air, water sheds, and population?
3. At what specific sites should each plant be located considering the compatibility of adjoining uses, aesthetics, plant design, recreation, and historic preservation?
4. Which is the best alternative means of producing power: atomic, hydro, fossil, or others?
5. How should research funds be allocated?
6. What emission standards should each plant meet; what are the environmental, economic trade-offs?
7. What safety factors should be considered?

12. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, "Electricity and the Environment," 1972, p. I-1.

Along these same lines, the Council on Economic Priorities says the price of power must "come to reflect environmental necessities along with economic realities."<sup>13</sup>

At a conference in January 1972 at Johnson, Vermont, held for the Sierra Club by Public Resources, Inc., some of the issues which surfaced were: the adequacy of energy sources; the role of price—past, present, future—in determining demand for electricity; the changed attitudes about the necessity for conservation of energy and natural resources; the health effects of pollution; and the implication of various policies for different income classes.

Resources For The Future (RFF), in a special article entitled "Man and His Environment: The Issues in Perspective" included in its Annual Report for 1971, suggests in dealing with these issues that the following priority might be established:

In ascending order of gravity our environmental problems can be ranked in this order: (1) amenity considerations like litter, noise, and appearance of cities and countryside; (2) threats to human health; (3) threats to human genetics and reproduction; and (4) effects on ecological systems that would threaten the earth's capacity to support life. Some of the problems are local; others range in scope on up to global.<sup>14</sup>

As RFF further says,

It will be helpful if we keep our problems in perspective, recognizing that some, while annoying and immediate, do not threaten disaster, while others, less obvious in our daily life, must be carefully watched lest they bring catastrophic change.

Or as the Federal Power Commission (FPC) says in its most recent Power Survey:

13. Council on Economic Priorities, "The Price of Power," p. 7.

14. Resources For The Future, Inc., Annual Report 1971, Washington, D.C., p. 16.



- 1) We need to recognize the situation for what it is,
- 2) we need to distinguish between short range problems and long range objectives,
- 3) we need improved site selection procedures, and
- 4) we need a national energy policy.<sup>15</sup>

The man in the street, caught in the cross fire between the environmentalists and the utility industry, simply wants to know how all this is going to affect him and how he can show the common sense which the FPC says may be, as much as any other factor, the key.

Based upon the best information available, it appears that the change resulting from this confrontation and the solutions to the issues set forth will be substantial. However, it will obviously be much less than some, such as the doomsday adherents, would aspire to. Nevertheless, such change as has already occurred and which is likely to follow will insure society the lead time to develop strategies to maintain our life support system for the long term. This optimism is based upon the belief that man's lifestyle and value system can be modified given time and that man as a social creature can organize and discipline himself with others to work for each other's very survival. Developments in recent years lead me to believe that the system can work even though it has only done so fitfully at times in the past.

#### THE CONCERN FOR INCREASING DEMAND

Slowly, but surely, our society is demanding greater and greater recognition of the need to measure the effects on man himself of the dangers he has wrought in the balance of great natural forces and in the new environment which

15. Federal Power Commission, "The 1970 National Power Survey" (1971), pt. I, p. I-1-56.

he has created.<sup>16</sup> Fortunately we are progressing beyond the point of concentrating upon measuring the benefits to man by measuring the amount of power consumed. In fact, no longer is power an end in and of itself. Rather, for the first time since the Industrial Revolution, we are questioning the economists' maximization credo of producing the greatest number of goods at the lowest cost. The shift in emphasis, however, is having its own birth pains. In the eagerness to adopt a new approach, there has been a tendency for those who advocate such a change to impose their own value system on the remainder of society.

For example, because some individuals, not just technologists or industry executives, are confident that they can foresee the dire consequences of our present course of action, demands—not suggestions for study and examination—are made to cease generation of a particular type, to abandon the use of energy to satisfy what some consider entirely unnecessary and utterly senseless wants and desires, or simply to change our existing way of life by adopting a simplistic isolationist approach to living. Not only is economics never questioned, for all intents and purposes it is being blithely ignored, whether it be a classical or more liberal social welfare approach.

Encouraged by the fact that the system has finally recognized amenities and aesthetics as ends in themselves—and maybe one of the most important to man in the long run—some would impose upon the rest of society their individual values. If they are articulate, which generally means being a lawyer, teacher, businessman, or professional, and being a part of the power structure, then the odds are good that their wants

16. National Academy of Sciences, "Summary Report on Natural Resources," Washington, D.C., 1961.

will be understood and accommodated, particularly since the decision-maker is likely to be of the same culture. This has often resulted in either an elitist solution for most of the world, regardless of the desires of others; or the imposition of what elitists conceive to be what the rest of society, which is not as intelligent or sensitive, really needs; or, lastly, a solution that would wash the elitists' guilt-ridden consciences. For example, according to one line of thought, the masses need mass recreation or mass housing or mass education, since they would not appreciate anything else. Or, it is suggested that the rest of society should take their word that air conditioners and similar devices are not nearly as important as originally thought to be; or that all of us must now restrict our uses of power generally in order to compensate for the abuses to the system in the past. In the latter case, there almost seems an irresistible need to propose rash extremes as a punishment for past sins.

#### GROWTH AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE

Contrasted to this extreme, there are those who fully recognize some of the limitations of our economic system and want to find out more about its functioning.<sup>17</sup> To such persons, alternative costs are important if the external costs are included. Price still serves a very important function in the allocation of our resources, while at the same time maximizing not just production at the lowest reasonable cost, but also the individual's freedom of choice. As the Bar Association study indicates,<sup>18</sup> we must

17. See series of papers given at Sierra Club Power Policy Conference, Johnson, Vermont, January 1972, particularly the paper entitled "Who Will Pay for Cleaner Power," by Marc J. Roberts, Assistant Professor of Economics, Harvard.

18. "Electricity and the Environment," VI, 1, 2, 3.

analyze demand and supply and examine the trade-offs.

Rather than rely totally upon this judgment of individual, industrial, or environmental interests, we are now proposing to assess the impact of technology on a societal basis, and hopefully this assessment will specifically include the social effects. Along these lines I am greatly encouraged by the effort of the Energy Policy Project sponsored by the Ford Foundation under the direction of S. David Freeman, the former director of the Energy Policy Staff of the Office of Science and Technology. Among other matters, the Project hopes to focus on energy and the "quality of life": (1) by seeking to identify the changes in living standards occasioned by the increased use of energy and (2) by analyzing in depth how much energy is needed to bring the standard of living up to parity. It is fortunate, too, that there are studies such as the one by Resources For The Future, already mentioned, which suggest constructive approaches that can be used to reduce the confusion in seeking the right answer.

#### PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Most important of all, we are taking steps to insure that whatever the decision is as to the impact of the power industry on people, the persons who may be affected thereby will have a reasonable opportunity to express their hopes and desires, their own values and biases, both in planning and during the decision-making. The right of public participation becomes more, not less, important as technology takes over. Storm King, the case which most prominently articulates this viewpoint, becomes more, not less, important.<sup>19</sup>

19. *Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission* (Scenic Hudson

Efficiency and speed in the courts can be just as counter-productive as it is in the power industry, the critics to the contrary notwithstanding. Through public participation, with the admitted dangers of delays, we can hope, and even expect, that if our value systems are going to change—if our lifestyles need adjusting—such modification will be accomplished only after reasonable consideration of the impacts thereof upon all segments of society. Public participation also affords the less favored economic and social classes the opportunity to dramatize the impact of the power industry upon their own community.

To those who are required to submit

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I), 354 F. 2nd 608 (Second Circuit 1965),  
Certiorari denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).

to the exploitation of their community so that others more fortunate can indulge in the luxury of deciding what consumer appliance or consumer good they want the least, or in the luxury of establishing quotas against those who would join them after a life of toil or monotony in some out-of-state factory, it would not be offering too much to allow them the right to make it known how such decisions may affect them. If we do, and if the decisions that ultimately determine the direction are otherwise credible, that is, if some fair system of priorities is established, then we might reasonably believe that man can unite in a struggle to achieve long-term solutions which inevitably will require sacrifice by all. If we do not, man will not care what happens tomorrow because he will not survive today!

# Small Cities Can Help to Revitalize Rural Areas

By ROBERT L. WRIGLEY, JR.\*

**ABSTRACT:** In recent decades the United States increasingly has experienced an unbalanced pattern of settlement. The nation's population has become proportionally more and more concentrated into a relatively few large metropolitan areas. Rural areas have lost population as the number of jobs in farming and other activities declined. Thus, at the same time that urban congestion has aggravated big-city problems, many rural areas are stagnating with high unemployment. This paper is concerned with the possibility of achieving a more balanced national distribution of population in the future through the revitalization of rural areas. It is suggested that: (1) rural development activities be focused on those "small cities"—places of ten thousand to fifty thousand population—that have locational and other assets on which to build, and (2) the basic unit for planning and action be multi-county "districts." Several federal agencies are now using this district approach, in cooperation with the states, after finding smaller—county—units too limited in scope. Although major rural revitalization on a national scale would require large amounts of public and private investment, it is believed that much can be accomplished, even with present funding, by closer cooperation of government agencies and by recognition of the crucial role of the small cities.

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\* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Economic Development Administration.

IN 1970, almost 60 percent of the population of continental United States lived in or near 248 "urbanized areas,"<sup>1</sup> occupying 1 percent of the nation's land. Since six out of every ten Americans are concentrated in such densely populated areas, it is clear that much of the nation is relatively sparsely populated.

This unbalanced pattern of settlement, accentuated in recent decades by the very rapid growth of large metropolitan areas and the loss of population in many rural areas, is generally considered as being undesirable for the nation. We must cope, on the one hand, with the many economic and social problems resulting from rapid urban growth and congestion and, on the other hand, with the critical problems created by the declining population and economic vigor of rural areas.

These problems, influenced by geographic, economic, and historic forces, have been taking shape for more than a hundred years. Every Census since 1870 has revealed an increase in the proportion of people living in urban areas. Every decade since 1900 has shown the growth of metropolitan areas exceeding that of non-metropolitan areas, and by 1920 the nation was predominantly urban. This trend has continued, with some urbanized areas making spectacular gains; thus by 1970,

one-third of the total population was concentrated in twenty metropolitan centers.

Is it inevitable that this trend will continue? Or is it possible to achieve a more balanced urban-rural growth which provides choices for people, alleviates the deterioration of metropolitan areas, and effectively uses the resources of small cities in rural areas?<sup>2</sup>

There is some evidence to suggest that migration from rural areas to large cities may be appreciably reduced as we move into the 1970s, when the disadvantages of urbanization become as well known as the advantages are today. To really achieve a more equitable national distribution of population and economic activity, however, federal assistance is probably needed. Since 1955, several federal programs have focused on this problem. The latest legislation, the Rural Development Act of 1972, provides increased funding for strengthening the economies of rural areas.

#### PROBLEMS OF RURAL AREAS

The poverty and general economic distress in many rural areas is as great as that in big cities, although there are substantial regional and local disparities. The loss of jobs and population is primarily the result of deeply rooted economic development processes. Rural areas have long been sensitive to secular changes in agriculture, mining, and

1. The Bureau of the Census defines an "urbanized area" as a place of 50,000 or more in population together with its contiguous closely built-up area. A "metropolitan area," as used in this paper, is more extensive, including all of the county or counties containing the urbanized area; basically it is the same as an SMSA (standardized metropolitan statistical area) as defined by the Office of Management and Budget and measured by the Bureau of the Census. "Urban areas," on the other hand, are defined by the Census as "urbanized areas" plus other incorporated and unincorporated places with a population of 2,500 or more. All other areas are considered "rural."

2. As used in this paper, the term "small city" refers primarily to cities and towns, whether incorporated or not, in the general population range of 10,000 to 50,000 lying outside of SMSAs. There were 851 such places in 1970. For some sparsely settled areas of the country, particularly the West, considerably smaller places which serve functions similar to those in the 10,000 to 50,000 range in other regions, are included. Although the term used throughout is "small city," many of the places would be referred to by most Americans as "towns" and in some cases even "small towns."

forestry. In the last thirty years, however, the rapid technological changes—which have made the United States the most productive agricultural nation—accelerated the consolidation of small farms into big ones. The farm population of thirty million in 1940 fell to about ten million in 1970, reducing farm population to less than one-fifth of the total rural population and eliminating several million jobs in the process. Moreover, much employment in farming is seasonal. All of this contributes to underemployment and low income.<sup>3</sup>

The siphoning off of population—particularly the younger, better educated, and more adaptable—has reduced purchasing power, eliminated much potential leadership, and left behind a concentration of older, less skilled persons, many living in poverty. And even in those rural areas that have been less affected by out-migration, many small cities have suffered because of the mobility that the automobile provides. Farmers and other rural people, who once patronized the local Main Street, now commonly get their merchandise and services from a shopping center miles away.

Concomitant with the loss of population and commercial activity has been a severe erosion of the economic base. Many small cities are now without funds needed to maintain adequately water and sewer facilities, streets, hospitals, schools, and other public facilities and services. At the extreme are rural areas with poverty strikingly revealed by abandoned farmsteads, dilapidated houses, boarded-up stores, and crumbling sidewalks and roadways; but far more areas have declined than show such striking physical evidence.

3. The 1970 Census reports median incomes of \$10,196 for urban families, \$8,248 for rural non-farm families, and \$7,296 for rural farm families.

#### CAN THE TREND BE REVERSED?

Some writers believe that the trend of out-migration from rural areas will continue because the large metropolitan areas, in spite of their shortcomings, have strong attractive forces and, in particular, are great sources of jobs. Others, however, contend that this migration must and can be halted, or at least slowed down.

Some authorities maintain that small cities with a population of ten thousand to fifty thousand, and especially those below twenty-five thousand, have such limited human and material resources that public investment in them is not justified;<sup>4</sup> but others believe that improvement of selected small cities that serve rural areas with considerable population offers an opportunity for slowing rural out-migration, if not actually reversing it.

There are some indications that a counter-trend may be developing. A goodly number of rural counties grew in population in the 1960s, and among many that had lost population in the 1950s, a smaller decline or a maintenance of population was recorded in the 1960s.<sup>5</sup> Of the cities of ten thousand to fifty thousand in population within non-metropolitan United States, 65 percent showed some gains in the 1960s,

4. Among those who have studied national population growth, B. J. L. Berry of the University of Chicago, in particular, believes that few cities of less than fifty thousand offer qualities that make them candidates for public expenditure.

5. For example, Calvin L. Beale of the Department of Agriculture, in a statement to the Committee on Government Operations of the U.S. Senate in April 1971, cited a twenty-five county area in northwestern Arkansas which, in the 1950s, had an overall population decline of 9 percent and included only two counties that gained population, but which, in the 1960s, had an overall population gain of 19 percent and only two counties that lost population.

and almost 150 places grew more than 20 percent.<sup>6</sup>

Any major overall revitalization of the nation's rural areas—including small cities—however, can be expected to require large amounts of public and private investment—far more than has been expended to date. Additional appropriations may be needed, but available government funds would go far toward upgrading rural economies if better use were made of them. This entails better selection of projects—both by type and location—and more concentration of funding so as to improve communities, thereby helping to attract private investment.

If there should be a sizable increase in public funding for rural development, how could the monies best be used? Increasingly, development experts feel that the greatest leverage is achieved by reinforcing healthy trends—that is, by concentrating assistance in small cities that are successfully upgrading public services and attracting new business. Such cities—in some cases true “growth centers” which can attract industry, but more often “service centers” for several counties—would seem to be the logical nodal points around which rural revitalization can take place.

#### SMALL CITIES AND RURAL AREAS HAVE ASSETS

The 851 small cities of ten thousand to fifty thousand population of non-metropolitan America, and the rural areas that surround them, commonly have assets that can attract people as well as economic activity. Some of these assets are being recognized anew

6. It should be recognized that in many cases small cities, like large ones, have expanded along highways outside their corporate boundaries. Thus, there are undoubtedly cases of city growth not reflected in the Census data.

as metropolitan areas increasingly become choked with traffic, suffocated by smog, and alarmed by racial tension and crime.

#### *A pleasant place to live and work*

It is generally conceded that most people prefer to remain in their home area. Surveys have shown further that many who have left rural areas and small cities would be happy to return if they could find satisfactory jobs.

An increasing number of people living in metropolitan areas long for a quieter, less hurried life and an opportunity to be close to nature. Having a “little place in the country” is also very popular. And despite the fact that large cities offer great choices in ways to work, play, and lead individual lives, some persons now believe that these options may be as good in small cities. Anyone seeking active participation in the cultural, economic, or political life of a community is more likely to achieve it in a small city than in a large metropolitan center.

Older people living in large cities commonly look with favor on living in a small one, and the number of persons over sixty-five is increasing.<sup>7</sup> With larger pensions or social security payments and government annuities, many retired couples seek a favorable climate, scenery, or escape from congestion. Indeed, retirement communities in recent years have been well represented among the nation's faster growing small cities.

#### *Attractions for industry*

More and more industrialists actively looking for new plant sites are now considering small- and medium-sized cities rather than large ones.<sup>8</sup> Among the

7. In 1950 there were 12,366,000 persons sixty-five or over in the United States; by 1970 this group totaled over 20,000,000.

8. A recent study of the Southeastern States prepared by the Economic Development Ad-

factors cited for this in recent surveys are the following:

1. *Labor situation.* Labor costs often are lower than in the large city. Also, many workers living in small communities display attitudes beneficial to industry; for example, rugged individualism means willingness to commute long distances before accepting unemployment. Generally, workers of small cities and rural areas are dependable, and their productivity is high. Although skilled labor may be lacking, special skills often may be developed.

2. *Land availability and cost.* Modern plants tend to spread out and use much land, and large tracts are scarce near large cities. Therefore, metropolitan locations are expensive. Some small cities have been able to improve sites at moderate costs, and many others have the potential for this improvement. Taxes are generally lower in small cities than in metropolitan centers; this is not always a prime factor in location decisions, but few industries move to a new community without considering this item.

3. *Pollution aspect.* Where pollutants already are at dangerous levels in metropolitan areas, some types of industrial operations find the cost of meeting local regulations prohibitive. Small cities also may have regulations, but they may be less stringent than in a congested area. Each community, of course, needs to know its environmental capacity to tolerate the impact of new industrial plants.

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ministration found that between 1966 and 1970 more new industrial jobs were created outside of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas than within these areas. Carl W. Hale, in an article in *Land Economics* (February 1971), pp. 26-27, observes that new plant employment—as opposed to that resulting from plant expansion—“appears to be concentrated in areas entirely outside SMSA’s.”

4. *General livability of small cities.* Management, increasingly interested in the health and welfare of its employees, wants good community facilities and services. More and more firms favor a community with good schools, good recreational facilities, and the other attributes that make a place pleasant for living as well as working. In examining factors affecting plant location, some surveys cite living conditions as second only to market considerations. Although some small cities do not have these assets, many do; those that do not, often are able to add them.

5. *New types of industries.* In recent years “intellect-oriented” industries have become important—research and development activities, and some parts of the aerospace, electronics, and precision instrument industries. These industries, hiring a high proportion of scientists, engineers, and other professionals, particularly consider the desires and needs of their personnel. Although many firms of this type have located in the urban fringe of large cities, some are moving to small cities deep in rural territory, since they have found that the size of the city does not control the level of intellectual and recreational activity. With television, the use of films, and taping, people in small cities need no longer be isolated from the mainstream of thought and action.

6. *Market access.* Markets generally are recognized as the most important factor in the location of industries. Although closeness to markets still draws many industries to large cities, the expansion of highways and modern motor transport gives many small cities good access to markets.

It is clear that many people like the small city as a place to raise a family and to live in retirement. It is also clear that some industrialists feel that the small city can be a good location for



industry. But since many small cities have very limited financial and human resources and isolated locations, what can be done to spur their growth and improve their service to surrounding areas?

#### WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE

From a public policy viewpoint, if a more balanced growth is to be achieved by the year 2000, with a large number of aggressive small cities leading the way, then several aspects of rural development must be pursued with greater vigor. Among the viable avenues open are: (1) the subdivision of states into planning and development districts, (2) the selection of small cities to form nodal points for rural development and a concentration of investment in these cities, and (3) the improved coordination of government efforts in the economic development field. Although other policy matters affecting national population distribution and economic development are important, they are beyond the scope of this paper.

#### *Districting*

The major federal and state agencies concerned with the economic development of rural areas since 1955 have gradually changed their original basis of operation from single counties to multi-county units, commonly referred to as "districts." As of early 1972, forty-one states had been divided into districts, and 475 state "development districts" had been established.<sup>9</sup> This change in

9. Among the state districting programs, that of Georgia is outstanding. Beginning in 1959, state officials began working with local leaders in establishing multi-county Area Planning and Development Commissions. Local, state, and federal funds are now used to support permanent staffs in eighteen districts that have been organized. Virtually all federal agencies concerned with regional growth now recognize these units as "Economic Development Districts."

emphasis was made because experience showed public officials that individual counties generally are too small and lack the resources needed to be viable planning and development units. On the other hand, they found that when several counties worked together, with the greater population, leadership, and material resources, it was normally possible to create a competent citizen board to guide development and to hire, often with government assistance, a professional staff to plan and pursue development objectives.

The Economic Development Administration and the Appalachian Regional Commission, in particular among federal agencies, advocate the use of multi-county districts in development programs. The Department of Agriculture and the Department of Housing and Urban Development also actively support this concept. And the most recent legislation, the Rural Development Act of 1972—signed by the President in late August—provides for the support of "district," that is, multi-county, programs.

#### *Growth centers and service centers*

The preparation of an overall development plan for a district usually includes the identification of a "center" upon which development can be focused. This is a logical way to proceed, as the city thus designated normally is the nodal point in the highway system conveniently reached for services required by people living in the surrounding rural area.

Those who work with rural areas believe that development can best be achieved through encouraging the growth of and ability to perform services of selected small cities such as those identified as the center for a multi-county district. This means greater concentration of public funds, technical assistance, and leadership in (a) cities that appear

to have the basic resources needed for growth, and (b) other places whose major role is to provide services needed by a fairly well populated rural area. This policy entails the gradual abandonment of many isolated small towns and villages and the involvement of others into primarily residential communities.

In some cases the identification of centers is not easy, but considerable research has been done in this field and general criteria have been established.<sup>10</sup> Recent growth, a key location in the highway pattern, air service, and strong trade and service links to surrounding areas are considered the most important factors. In many districts one center stands out. In this case the choice is easy, but in some districts where there are several cities of near equal size, an evaluation is needed in order to identify the best or primary center for development programs. In a few cases the establishment of a new city<sup>11</sup> may be considered the best solution, and in others, a group of closely related small towns may be designated as the basis for growth.

In order to build up at least one viable center in each district, much of the public investment should be concentrated in the designated center. Failure to do this has often delayed the development of cities now recognized as district centers. From the standpoint of practical politics it is, of course, often difficult to designate a single center and to concentrate investment in it, but pub-

lic policy implementation always faces difficulties of this type.

### *Coordination of government efforts*

The multiplicity of government agencies involved in rural economic development complicates the problems.<sup>12</sup> On the one hand, there are special agencies such as the Economic Development Administration (EDA), the Appalachian Regional Commission, and Agriculture's Farmers Home and Rural Electrification Administrations, concentrating on overall economic planning and development. On the other hand, numerous federal programs developed on a functional basis, such as the federal highway program, defense contracting, job training, and housing and health programs, have important and often unplanned impacts on rural development. All of these programs need to be coordinated and meshed in an orderly fashion for any given area. The 120 districts fostered by EDA have been generally successful in their coordinating function.

Under present and proposed programs, the states increasingly are playing a vital role in planning and programming as the multi-county unit is more widely adopted. Much federal funding for the numerous functional programs is through state offices, and with increased revenue sharing still more funds will be channeled through the states. Thus the need for state settlement and development plans and sound management of programs will be even greater in the future. This is where the states may well find that working through districts, with emphasis on help-

10. Among those scholars studying the growth center approach, in addition to B. J. L. Berry mentioned earlier, are Niles M. Hansen of the University of Texas, William Alonso of the University of California, and Glen V. Fugitt of the University of Wisconsin.

11. In recent years much attention has been given to new cities, but most of these, including a number of retirement communities in the Southwest, have been built near existing large cities.

12. See, for example, James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, *Making Federalism Work* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), which describes the expanding role of government in economic development.

ing selected centers, is the logical way to get at rural problems.

Some students of economic development maintain that major regions, each covering a group of states or parts thereof—similar to those of the existing eight regional commissions<sup>13</sup>—are a better approach to resolving economic and social problems.<sup>14</sup> There are good arguments for this viewpoint when applied to such matters as natural resource development, highway planning, and flood control. In aiding small cities, however, the state and sub-state units—districts—are considered a better basis for planning and development. Moreover, to date experience has shown that where regional commissions exist, much of the planning and development for rural areas, in fact, is done at the state and sub-state level.

#### SPECIFIC ACTIONS FOR SMALL CITIES

In the final analysis, local units probably play a somewhat more important role than suggested above. Much local development is shaped by community leaders and business management seeking to fulfill their own objectives.

Those small cities that have recognizable potential, in particular those designated to function as centers of districts for concentration of project development and technical assistance, will generally be the growth centers and the

service centers of the future. This will be accomplished, however, only if concerted local efforts to make them attractive are an added ingredient.<sup>15</sup>

Listed below are some specific things that small cities can do, often with the assistance provided through government programs and district planners.

*Improving local transportation.* Tying into the system of major highways can increase the prospects of a small city which lies near the network but has been bypassed by it.<sup>16</sup> Improvement of other local roads can enlarge the commuting distance from the surrounding area. Building a regional airport is another improvement that business likes.

*Improving public works.* Good water and sewage systems, essential to economic growth, are lacking or poorly maintained in many small cities. Where local leadership pushes for high-quality surveys and plans to improve the system, available government assistance in this field may often be obtained. Police and fire protection facilities, inadequate for industry, may be amenable to improvement without large costs.

*Improving building sites.* Improvement of industrial and commercial land by establishing a well-planned industrial park with adequate facilities can be an important factor in attracting some types of industry. The mere setting aside of an area for industrial use, however, is not enough as the numerous empty "industrial parks" in scattered towns testify.

15. Some small cities have moved ahead through their own initiative and leadership with a minimum of government assistance, but these may be considered exceptions. See, for example, the recent story of Spencer, Iowa, in *Fortune* (April 1972).

16. This fact is recognized by the Department of Transportation which is now conducting, on an experimental basis, a program to build short roads to potential growth centers, called "economic growth center development highways."

13. In addition to the Appalachian Regional Commission, seven other commissions have been established for economically lagging areas: the Coastal Plain (southeast coast), the Ozarks, the Four Corners (parts of Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah), the Pacific Northwest, the Old West (Upper Missouri River Valley), the Upper Great Lakes, and New England.

14. Lloyd Rodwin, for example, believes that the entire country should be divided into several planning regions with the promotion of growth focused on regional and sub-regional centers. See his *Nations and Cities—A Comparison of Strategies for Urban Growth* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970).

*Improving amenities.* As noted earlier, an attractive environment for living is of increasing importance. Thus a small city seeking economic development needs to improve deficient amenities. Building a new school, enlarging a local hospital, obtaining a regional library, providing a golf course and a municipal swimming pool, or a public park with tennis courts and a playground for children may enhance a city's attractiveness sufficiently to have an impact.

Another important need in many cases is to upgrade the city's business center through modernization of stores, expansion of parking facilities, landscaping, and the preservation of historic and other structures that lend character to the downtown. In this way a city can improve its role as a market center and as a focus for social and cultural activity.

Additionally, good zoning and progressive local leadership can also assist in developing attractive residential areas. Some towns, recognizing their potential attraction to older people, are providing special incentives for housing and recreational facilities for this population group.

*Providing job training.* Recognizing that skilled labor is a problem in many non-metropolitan areas, some progressive small cities are making special efforts to develop nonagricultural vocational schools. Also, in cooperation with firms considering location in their cities, they are arranging for available government assistance in job training.

*Improving relations with surrounding areas.* Since many small cities exist primarily as service centers for a hinterland, developing good relations with the rural people living on the surrounding farms and the nearby smaller towns can be important. The main center, for example, by enlarging existing facilities, might have the district's principal hos-

pital, while smaller towns located throughout the district would have clinics and health centers to care for the more routine health needs of district residents. Or a city chamber of commerce, instead of focusing entirely on the city, might enlarge its service area and become a district chamber.

### CONCLUSIONS

By the year 2000, approximately 60 million more people may be added to the nation's existing 210 million. Will they congregate to the same degree or even more in the urbanized areas, or is there some alternative for a sizable proportion of them to reside and work elsewhere? These and other questions regarding the distribution of population, the size of cities, and the processes of area growth increasingly are being studied and debated. Certainly there is much more to be learned about these processes before national policies can reflect, with any degree of reliability, the complex interrelationships of migration, land use, location of cities, and economic and social development. Nevertheless, there is a growing realization that an overall national growth policy must be formulated and adopted.<sup>17</sup>

This paper has dealt with only one aspect of the problems of national population distribution and development: what can be done to reverse the stagnation or decline of rural areas outside the orbit of large metropolitan centers? It notes that some cities of ten thousand to fifty thousand population in these areas have grown in the 1960s as they have taken over the role previously

17. See, in particular, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future Growth* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), and Domestic Council Committee on National Growth, *Report on National Growth, 1972* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1972).

played by widely scattered smaller places and, in some instances, also have attracted new industries. It maintains that other small cities have the potential for economic growth and for the better delivery of public services. It indicates that, although more government aid may be desirable, better coordination of present programs and a focusing of expenditures on a few cities

within sub-state districts could provide opportunities to open up many rural areas to further growth, even without additional financing.

This approach, now being tried in a number of states, appears to be sufficiently successful to merit expansion. Therefore, if any overall effort to solve national settlement problems is initiated, it should be included.

# The Impact of Urbanization on Agricultural Processes

By GERALD F. WINFIELD

**ABSTRACT:** The relationship between urbanization and agriculture is examined. With heavy migrations from rural to urban areas in the United States, there have been significant changes in land utilization. Land converted to urban uses is increasing, though it has little effect on total crop production. The technological transformation of agriculture has had much larger effects and has operated as a push-pull on the cityward movement of people as farm functions have moved to the city. Energy and chemical fertilizers now come from urban bases, with large numbers of urban people working for farmers. Yields per acre and per farm worker have risen sharply so that needs for agricultural products are fully met. Urbanization and rising buying power have moved Americans up the food chain. The demand for expensive animal products grows. These forces have resulted in a dramatic escalation of solid waste production in cities and on farms. Urbanization and transformed agriculture have exploded the organic matter cycle. The nitrogen thrown away in farm and urban organic wastes in the United States each year equals 137 percent of the nitrogen in all chemical fertilizers. In contrast, China keeps her organic matter cycle intact and feeds a population four times as large as ours on an equal cultivated area. Future planning must meet the challenge of wasteful land utilization, the overshift of population to cities, and the problems of restoring the organic matter cycle.

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URBANIZATION is a dominant phenomenon of our time. It is the product of all the varied forces that have made this century the most change-ridden period in human history. There is a large and growing literature dealing with many facets of urban studies. Yet there has been little written about the relationship of urbanization and agriculture. This paper takes a look at some aspects of this relationship with special emphasis on the American experience over the past forty years and its significance for planning in comparison with similar processes in China.

The past forty years have been a period of speeding urbanization in the United States with an accompanying decline in farm population and farm employment. The total population has grown 65 percent from 122.8 million in 1930 to 203.2 million in 1970. The urban population has grown 117 percent from 68.9 to 149.3 million.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to urban growth from natural increase and immigration, there have been two internal migrations taking place. The first was the movement of rural people to the cities with a large component of blacks going to inner cities. The second was the movement from the inner city to the suburbs of the economically better off, predominantly white, but including an increasing number of middle-class blacks. These processes are seen in the figures that show the distribution of the population by metropolitan-nonmetropolitan residence in 1970 as compared with 1960.<sup>2</sup> During the decade, the total population increased 13.4 percent: the metropolitan areas 17 percent and the

nonmetropolitan areas 7 percent. About 80 percent of the net population increase took place in metropolitan areas. Virtually all of this increase was in the suburban rings. These changes continued trends that were described by Taeuber.<sup>3</sup> In 1900, 73.4 percent of the black population lived outside the metropolitan areas, while in 1970, 70.7 percent lived in them, with 55.2 percent in central cities. Since 1940, the proportion of whites in the inner cities has dropped from 34.9 to 25.4 percent and, in the suburban rings, has risen from 21.3 to 38.6 percent.

Between 1930 and 1970 as the percentage of urban people has risen from 56.2 to 73.5 percent and that of rural people has dropped from 43.8 to 26.5 percent, the number living in rural locations has remained constant. In 1930 there were 53.8 million rural people. Under the impact of the Great Depression this figure rose to 57.3 in 1940. By 1950 it had dropped to 54.2, and by 1970 it was back to 53.8 million.<sup>4</sup> This constant level of rural population resulted from the movement of farm people from farms to rural—under 2,500—communities as well as from farms and rural communities to urban areas. In these forty years the percentage of people living on farms has dropped from 24.9 to 4.8, and the absolute number has gone from 30.5 million in 1930 to 9.7 million in 1970.<sup>5</sup>

Consideration of these figures suggests a number of problems that need examination. First, what has happened to land utilization? Is the growth of metropolitan areas seriously eroding the

1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Information Please Almanac* (New York: Dan Golenpaul Assoc., 1972), p. 618.

2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas: 1970 and 1960," Current Population Reports, 1971, series P-23, no. 37.

3. Irene B. Taeuber, "Demographic Transitions and Population Problems in the United States," *THE ANNALS* 369 (January 1967), p. 131.

4. Calculated from table, note 1.

5. U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967 and 1971), 1967 table 649; 1971 table 648.

agricultural base of the country? What of the technological revolution in agriculture? What part has it played in the urbanization process?

#### LAND UTILIZATION IS CHANGING

The total land area of the forty-eight conterminous states is 1,900 million acres.<sup>6</sup> Somewhat over half that area has been in farms, rising from 52 percent in 1930 to 58 percent in 1964. Total cropland fluctuated between 360 and 380 million acres from 1930 to 1959, with a down trend in the '60s. Idle and withheld from cultivation cropland has gone up from 34 million in 1930 to 98 million acres in 1970. Cropland pasture and grassland pasture have gone up from 379 million in 1930 to 544 million in 1964. Farm land in forests and woodlots has remained constant at 150 million. Land not in farms has gone down from 916 million in 1930 to 794 million in 1964.

Of special interest are the urban, industrial, and nonfarm residential areas; parks and wildlife refuges; military lands; roads and railroads; ungrazed desert, swamp, and miscellaneous other areas. This category has grown from 130 million acres in 1930 to 178 million in 1964. This is an increase of 36.9 percent. In 1970 about 69 million acres in the fifty states were in urban and transportation uses, and some 115 million acres were in refuges, parks, and public installations. The Department of Agriculture estimates that about 1 million acres are now converted each year into uses associated with urbanization. About 160,000 are covered by highways and airports, 420,000 acres have become reservoirs and flood control projects, and 420,000 acres are developed for urban uses. About half the acreage converted to urban uses is

cropland and grassland pasture. The rest is forest and other land.<sup>7</sup>

While this conversion of land is having little effect on total cropland and no effect on total crop production, it still cannot be sustained indefinitely. Furthermore, the way these converted lands are used, in many cases, is wasteful and destructive of natural beauty and injurious to the environment.

#### THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION IN AGRICULTURE

The population shift from rural to urban was impelled by the revolution taking place in agricultural and industrial production. It was a push-pull situation. The push from agriculture came from an important change in the purposes for which harvested crops were used, the mechanization of farms, and the expansion in the use of chemical fertilizers. An element in the pull came from the shift of processes from farm to urban areas so that millions of jobs moved from country to city. People followed the jobs. The result has been the disappearance of subsistence farming and the emergence of commercial agriculture with strong emphasis on economic efficiency.

A closer look at these processes is in order. The relevant data are presented in Table 1. Part A shows how the purposes for which crops are used have changed. Four significant points stand out.

First, crop acres harvested have declined, slowly from 1930 to 1950 and more rapidly since.

Second, sixty-five million acres of farm land, which in 1930 grew feed for horses and mules to supply energy to operate farms, are now used for other

7. Council on Environmental Quality, *Environmental Quality, First Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1970), pp. 173-74.

6. *Agricultural Statistics*, 1971 table 629.



TABLE 1—FACTORS TO ILLUSTRATE THE NATURE OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

| A. ACREAGE FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES (MILLIONS) |                       |                           |         |                  |         |                  |            |         |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------|------------------|---------|------------------|------------|---------|
| Year                                         | Crops Harvested Acres | Feed for Horses and Mules |         | For Domestic Use |         |                  | For Export |         |
|                                              |                       | Acres                     | Percent | Acres            | Percent | Acres per Capita | Acres      | Percent |
| 1930                                         | 369                   | 65                        | 17.6    | 265              | 71.8    | 2.15             | 39         | 10.6    |
| 1940                                         | 341                   | 43                        | 12.6    | 290              | 85.0    | 2.20             | 8          | 2.3     |
| 1950                                         | 345                   | 19                        | 5.5     | 276              | 80.0    | 1.82             | 50         | 14.5    |
| 1960                                         | 324                   | 5                         | 1.5     | 255              | 78.7    | 1.42             | 64         | 19.7    |
| 1970                                         | 297                   | 0                         | 0.0     | 225              | 75.7    | 1.10             | 72         | 24.2    |

| B. MECHANIZATION OF FARMS |                      |                    |                                                         |                             |
|---------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Year                      | Tractors (thousands) | Trucks (thousands) | Combines, Cornpickers, and Milking Machines (thousands) | Harvested Acres per Tractor |
| 1930                      | 920                  | 900                | 211                                                     | 401                         |
| 1940                      | 1,545                | 1,047              | 473                                                     | 220                         |
| 1950                      | 3,394                | 2,207              | 1,806                                                   | 102                         |
| 1960                      | 4,685                | 2,825              | 2,500                                                   | 69                          |
| 1970                      | 4,790                | 3,185              | 1,970                                                   | 62                          |

| C. USE OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS<br>(ALL FERTILIZERS IN MILLIONS OF TONS) |            |                 |      |                 |      |                 |      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------|------|-----------------|------|-----------------|------|
| Year                                                                    | Total Tons | Nitrogen        |      | Phosphorus      |      | Potassium       |      |
|                                                                         |            | Average Percent | Tons | Average Percent | Tons | Average Percent | Tons |
| 1930                                                                    | 8.4        | 4.52            | 0.37 | 9.49            | 0.80 | 4.23            | 0.35 |
| 1940                                                                    | 8.6        | 4.90            | 0.43 | 10.66           | 0.92 | 5.08            | 0.44 |
| 1950                                                                    | 20.3       | 6.08            | 1.23 | 10.37           | 2.11 | 6.79            | 1.38 |
| 1960                                                                    | 24.4       | 12.43           | 3.02 | 10.83           | 2.64 | 8.90            | 2.17 |
| 1970                                                                    | 38.3       | 19.48           | 7.46 | 11.94           | 4.57 | 10.54           | 4.04 |

SOURCES: Relevant tables in U. S. Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967 and 1971).

purposes. The production of energy for farms has moved to urban areas.

Third, about three-quarters of the acres harvested have been used to meet the demands of domestic consumption, but with rising yields the acreage needed to supply each American has dropped from 2.15 acres in 1930 to 1.10 acres in 1970. At the same time the adequacy of the diet has improved.

Fourth, a significant portion of crops produced was exported. Since 1950,

exports have increased rapidly so that by 1970 almost one-quarter of the acreage harvested provided commodities for export. Export trade is handled by city people.

The land that grew feed for horses and mules now provides crops for other uses because mechanization has eliminated work animals. Part B of Table 1 documents this mechanization. In 1970 there were 5.2 times as many tractors, 3.5 times as many trucks, and 9.3 times

TABLE 2—COMBINED AVERAGE YIELD IN METRIC TONS OF THE TWELVE<sup>a</sup> MOST IMPORTANT FOOD AND FEED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930-1970

| YEAR | TOTAL ACRES<br>HARVESTED<br>(Millions) | TOTAL PRODUCTION<br>METRIC TONS<br>(Millions) | INDEX TOTAL<br>PRODUCTION | YIELD METRIC<br>TONS PER ACRE | INDEX YIELD<br>PER ACRE |
|------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1930 | 230.3                                  | 116.5                                         | 100                       | 0.51                          | 100                     |
| 1940 | 209.6                                  | 133.7                                         | 115                       | 0.63                          | 124                     |
| 1950 | 225.7                                  | 162.2                                         | 139                       | 0.72                          | 141                     |
| 1960 | 210.5                                  | 210.0                                         | 180                       | 1.00                          | 196                     |
| 1970 | 193.6                                  | 234.8                                         | 202                       | 1.21                          | 237                     |

SOURCES: Specific crop tables in U. S. Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967 and 1971).

<sup>a</sup> Corn, wheat, oats, barley, rye, rice, grain sorghum, dry beans, soybeans, peanuts, potatoes, sweet potatoes.

as many combines, cornpickers, corn hullers, and milking machines as there were in 1930. In 1930 there was one tractor to every 401 acres of crop; by 1970 there was one to every 62 acres.

The agricultural revolution has consisted of much more than mechanization. Experimental breeding has equipped farms with plants and animals whose genetics permit them to take full advantage of the improved nutrition that new knowledge has enabled the farmer to supply. Numerous advances help the farmer protect his plants and animals from insects and disease.

A major factor in increasing production per acre and productivity per farm worker has been the advances in the production and use of chemical fertilizers. Part C of Table 1 presents data that illustrate a number of points. The total amount of fertilizer applied to farm land has risen from 8.4 million tons in 1930 to 38.3 million in 1970. More significantly the concentration of plant nutrients has gone up. The average concentration of phosphorus ( $P_2O_5$ ) has risen 26 percent; potassium ( $K_2O$ ) 149 percent; and nitrogen (N) 331 percent. This higher concentration marks huge gains in the efficiency with which nitrogen is fixed from the air and has resulted in large reductions in the cost of transporting nutrients from urban

plants to rural use points. The increased tonnage and the rise in plant food in each ton have resulted in large increases in the amounts of chemical nutrients added to farm soils. In 1970, American farmers applied 7.46 million tons of nitrogen, 4.57 million tons of phosphorus, and 4.04 million tons of potassium to their soils. These amounts are a 20.2-fold increase for nitrogen, 5.7-fold increase for phosphorus, and 11.5-fold increase for potassium over the amounts applied in 1930.

#### YIELDS PER ACRE AND PRODUCTIVITY PER FARM WORKER

A prime result of the agricultural transformation has been a dramatic rise in the yield per acre and an even sharper rise in the productivity per farm worker. Table 2 shows the total production and the yield per acre of the twelve most important food and feed crops. These crops occupy about 65 percent of harvested cropland. Though the total acreage has declined, total production, in metric tons, has risen from 116.5 million in 1930 to 234.8 million in 1970. This is a rise of 102 percent. Average yield per acre has gone from 0.51 metric tons in 1930 to 1.21 in 1970, a rise of 137 percent. The population has increased 65 percent over this same period. Clearly the

rise in the yield per acre has produced agricultural output that has kept pace with national needs.

Productivity per farm worker has risen 383 percent. In 1930, each of the 12.5 million farm workers produced enough to supply the needs of 9.75 persons, 8.77 domestic and 0.98 abroad. In 1970, each of the 4.5 million farm workers met the needs of 47.1 persons, 39.9 in the United States and 7.2 overseas.<sup>8</sup>

#### URBANIZATION HAS MOVED US UP THE FOOD CHAIN

A significant by-product of urbanization has been a shift upward on the food chain. The American diet now includes more meat; at the same time the direct consumption of grains has declined. Americans have become more carnivorous. The average meat consumption has risen from 129.0 pounds per person in 1930 to 186.3 pounds in 1970, a rise of 44 percent.<sup>9</sup> Since it takes much more grain to produce meat, eggs, or milk to meet metabolic needs than it does when the grain is eaten directly, this climb up the food chain requires crop production and pasture forage to increase to feed the larger number of animals needed to meet increased demand for animal products. A principal cause of this increased demand was the rising buying power that came with urbanization and industrialization.

#### HOW MANY CITY PEOPLE WORK FOR FARMERS?

Functions once performed on farms now are performed by city people. The most dramatic is the shift in providing farm power from feed, horses, and mules, to machines, fossil fuels, and electricity.

It is instructive to estimate how many city people work for farmers directly to supply production needs, or indirectly, by processing, distributing, and selling farm products.

In 1970, farmers spent \$22.4 billion purchasing goods or services required for production.<sup>10</sup> This included \$2.1 billion for fertilizer and lime; \$5.1 billion for repairs and operation of capital items, including fuel and electricity; \$6.9 billion for depreciation and other consumption of farm capital, including cost of farm machinery; \$1.9 billion net rent to nonfarm landlords; \$1.7 billion interest on farm mortgage debt; and \$5.2 billion for other miscellaneous costs. Most of these expenditures went to city people. If one assumes that each person employed in the United States was responsible for the production of an equal share of the national income which, in 1970, was \$795.9 billion,<sup>11</sup> then the \$22.4 billion spent by farmers with city people required the effort of 2.26 million of the 80.29 million employed. Using the Department of Labor estimate of 3.7 million employed in farming, then for each three people working on farms there are about two city people engaged in supplying the goods and services required by their enterprises.

Look at the national food bill. In 1970 it was \$101.6 billion for farm foods.<sup>12</sup> Of this amount \$33.1 billion went to farmers and \$68.5 billion went to city people for their part in processing and marketing. Applying the above reasoning, this \$68.5 billion marketing cost required the effort of at least 6.9 million city people for the food component of farm production. One-third of the farmer's product is industrial crops not included in the food bill. There is another substantial group of city people

8 *Agricultural Statistics*, 1967 table 675; 1971 table 674.

9 *Agricultural Statistics*, 1967 table 528; 1971 table 525.

10. *Agricultural Statistics*, 1971 table 693.

11. *Agricultural Statistics*, 1971 table 625.

12. *Agricultural Statistics*, 1971 table 676.

that depend for their work on these farm products including tobacco, cotton, hides, and other farm-produced raw materials. It is conservative to estimate that for every farmer there are at least two city people that earn their living by processing and marketing, including exporting, farm products.

Adding these groups, farmers, city people supplying farm production needs, and city people processing and selling farm products, one comes out with the estimate that between 18 and 20 percent of the labor force of the country, who, with their dependents total 30 to 35 million people, are directly or indirectly dependent on agricultural processes. This compares with 39.5 million people who were the farm population in 1940 when it reached its peak in numbers, but had already dropped to only 23.2 percent of the total population.

#### THE ESCALATION OF SOLID WASTE PRODUCTION

The concentration of people in urban areas, the industrial/agricultural transformation, and the rise in buying power have generated a rapid escalation in solid wastes. In 1930, the 123 million U.S. people produced about 70 million tons of residential, commercial, and institutional solid wastes. About two-thirds of those wastes were coal ashes, 20 percent was garbage, and the remainder was trash, including 5 to 10 percent wastepaper. Some 45 million tons were produced in urban areas and 25 million tons in rural areas. Considerably less than half were collected and disposed of in an organized way. By 1970, solid wastes were being produced at the rate of 250 million tons per year,<sup>13</sup> an increase of 3.62 times 1930 production. Urban waste was on the order of 190 to 200 million tons, an increase of over 4 times the 1930 production. The composition had changed

13. *Environmental Quality*, p. 107.

drastically; glass, ceramics, dirt, and stones comprised 20 percent; metal 8 percent; essentially nonbiodegradable molded and film plastics, leather, and rubber 4 percent. This made a total of 32 percent that was biologically inert replacing the 60 percent that had been coal ashes in 1930. Garbage was 12 percent, wood and textiles 10 percent, and wastepaper 45 percent,<sup>14</sup> totaling 68 percent that was organic and could be acted on by microorganisms. The most striking composition change was the rise in wastepaper. The organic portion of these solid wastes contains quite large quantities of plant nutrients. The most important is nitrogen with about 850,000 tons.<sup>15</sup>

As large as was the escalation in city solid wastes, this is dwarfed by the amount of agricultural wastes. In 1930, most agricultural wastes were returned to the soil, particularly animal manure. Now with cattle feed lots handling tens of thousands of head on a single lot, concentrated hog raising, and the mass production of broilers, the quantities of animal manure returned to the soil have dropped, while production has sharply increased. It is estimated that agriculture produces 2,280 million tons of waste each year,<sup>16</sup> an amount over nine times greater than the residential, commercial, and institutional wastes produced.

#### THE SPATIAL EXPLOSION OF THE ORGANIC MATTER CYCLE

At the base of the ecological system is the organic matter cycle. This cycle involves: the production of great quantities of a vast array of organic com-

14. *Cleaning Our Environment, The Chemical Basis for Action* (Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1969).

15. My estimate based on total production and percentage chemical composition. There are considerable quantities of  $P_2O_5$  and  $K_2O$  as well that are not considered.

16. *Environmental Quality*, p. 107.

pounds by plant photosynthesis and biochemistry; the change and rearrangement of these materials as they move through the animal food chain where energy and structural material are extracted and wastes created; the death of plants and animals; the return of wastes and dead organisms to soil or water substrata; and the degradation of these materials by microorganisms to return essential materials, such as carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, sulfur, and many others, to forms that can again be used by plants.

In nature and preindustrial agricultural societies, the organic matter cycle is completed within a radius of only a limited number of miles. Modern technology has exploded these limits. With urbanization and fast, low-cost, bulk transportation, great quantities of organic matter—food, lumber, paper, textiles, and so forth—are now shipped long distances to urban areas where most people live. These organic materials are quickly or slowly turned into wastes that must flow from the cities. Food is converted to wastes that are carried away as sewage. The nitrogen present in the total sewage-type wastes of the country is on the order of 275,000 tons annually. About half of this amount goes into rivers, lakes, and the ocean in solution, even where good sewage treatment is used. About half of it is contained in the 12 million tons of sewage sludge that would be produced if all sewage were treated. Sludge is typically burned or dumped. Though it can be quite safe, almost none is returned to agricultural soil.

The organic portion of solid wastes contains about 850,000 tons of nitrogen, no significant part of which is returned to agricultural soils. The 2,280 million tons of agricultural wastes are all organic matter. They contain about 10 million tons of nitrogen. In modern animal production, feeds are frequently

shipped long distances to feed lots or broiler raising sheds. The wastes produced are not hauled back to the soil. Stanford, England, and Taylor<sup>17</sup> estimate that only 10 percent—1 million tons—of the nitrogen in barnyard manure is returned to the soil.

Adding these three sources of organic nitrogen gives an estimated 11.2 million tons in all types of solid wastes. Only 1 million tons get back to agricultural soil to directly re-enter the organic matter cycle; 10.2 million tons go into some kind of sink, where it may require centuries for them to be recycled into man's life.

The new chemical sources of nitrogen operate over wide geographical areas as well. By mass-producing chemical fertilizers and transporting them long distances, the total and per-acre yields of all crops have increased. In doing this, 7.46 million tons of chemical nitrogen are added to agricultural soils each year. The organic nitrogen in the wastes that are thrown away is 10.4 million tons, or 137 percent of current chemical nitrogen use. Of this amount, about 125 percent is in animal manure, 12 percent in solid wastes, and 2 percent in sewage sludge. Large amounts of fossil fuels are burned to fix nitrogen from the air to replace a portion of the nitrogen taken from the soil, turned into waste, and thrown away. Whatever the economic and efficiency advantages of this new system, it seems likely that, on ecological grounds, we will not be able to sustain the disruption of the organic matter cycle indefinitely. This basic biological fact creates one of the most urgent challenges that future planning must face.

There is another serious aspect of the urban waste problem. Cities concen-

17. G. Stanford, C. B. England, and A. W. Taylor, *Fertilizer Use and Water Quality* (Washington, D.C.: Agricultural Research Service, 1970), ARS 41-168.

trate a vast range of new chemicals that man has made for use in new products. Many of these chemicals do not fit into the organic matter cycle, or are toxic to man or other significant components of the ecosystem. City wastes, both solid and liquid, become contaminated with these injurious chemicals, thus adding a new dimension to the problems of disposing of city wastes in ways that do not injure the ecosystem and of recycling the organic matter portion to agricultural soils.

#### THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN CONTRAST

The way in which agriculture has developed in China through the centuries, including the last twenty years under the People's Republic (PRC), has been in sharp contrast to recent American trends. Under long-term population pressure, the Chinese raised prescientific agriculture to the highest levels attained by any people. In the 1930s, yields per acre for major crops except cotton, corn, and potatoes were higher in China than they were in the United States, and U.S. yields were less than 20 percent ahead of Chinese yields for those crops in which the United States led.<sup>18</sup> A huge Chinese population was fed on a cultivated land area only three-fifths of that cropped in the United States. High yields were achieved, even on soils that had been harvested for thousands of years, because the Chinese preserved the organic matter cycle intact. They returned a large percentage of all organic nitrogen to the soil. They also ate much lower on the food chain, consuming a large percentage of their food as grain with modest amounts of animal proteins. For a very large percent of the Chinese

population, those amounts were nutritionally adequate.

Now the farmers of the PRC put about 7.1 million tons of nitrogen into their agricultural soils each year,<sup>19</sup> as compared with 8.46 million tons in the United States. In China, 4.62 million tons—65 percent—come from organic sources, while in the United States, only 1 million tons—12 percent—come from organic sources. Yet yields per acre in China are between 0.72 and 0.82 metric tons of grain per acre depending on whether Erisman's or Chinese source's estimates of total production are used.<sup>20</sup> This compares with 1.21 tons per acre for the twelve leading U.S. grain crops. While the Chinese are increasing their use of chemical fertilizers, they maintain their conservation and recycling of organic matter, with its nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, and host of trace elements, directly to agricultural soils. Today, as in pre-PRC, they appear to be making excellent progress in protecting the populace from fecal borne diseases. The Chinese model deserves close attention because it has demonstrated that it can be sustained for long periods of time. There are serious questions as to the ecological viability of our urban dominated variant in view of the way it disrupts the organic matter cycle.

#### CHALLENGES TO FUTURE PLANNING

An important consequence of urbanization is a new balance with the agri-

19. This figure combines Erisman's estimate of chemical nitrogen with my updating of Dawson's estimate of organic nitrogen. Alva Lewis Erisman, "China: Agricultural Development, 1949-71" in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, May 18, 1972, p. 140. Owen L. Dawson, "Fertilizer Supply and Food Requirements," in *Food and Agriculture in Communist China*, Hoover Institution Publications (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 138.

20. Erisman, p. 121.

18. Gerald F. Winfield, *China The Land and the People* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), p. 61.

cultural processes. This new balance directs attention to a number of problems that must engage both formal and informal planning. These problems are serious because they impinge in a profound way on the total ecology. They are difficult of solution because they are entwined with the way the technologically based economy has developed. Any solution will have extensive economic effects. This paper has presented material that focuses interest on the following challenges to planning:

1. *Land utilization.* While the United States is blessed with an abundance of excellent agricultural land, the demands placed on it are heavy, and with population growth, extending urbanization, and rising levels of consumption, the wasteful ways land is used, particularly in and around the metropolitan areas, must be reassessed.

2. *Population shift.* It is possible that the shift of people to the cities has gone too far, even though a significant number of city people, in fact, work for

farm people and the agricultural process. It seems probable that a redistribution of population away from the great urban complexes and toward more rural settings could serve to assist in the solution of problems that affect the ecological system.

3. *Restoration of the organic matter cycle.* The biggest challenge to planning is the management of the organic matter cycle that urbanization has put under great strain. It seems likely that this cycle must be restored by working out ways to return both urban and agricultural organic wastes as directly as possible to agricultural soils. Biologically, agricultural soils can safely accept huge quantities of organic wastes with ecological benefit. The problems are social, mechanical, economic, and chemical; yet the change, technology, cost, and injurious chemicals must be dealt with if man is to avoid having the urbanization process generate a threat to the survival of the modern industrial society.

# Ecology and Economics—Partners for Productivity

By BRUCE LORD BANDURSKI

**ABSTRACT:** Energy from which power is derived to maintain human settlements is identified. The interconnectedness of mankind's endeavors and urban growth makes an interdisciplinary approach necessary and suggests greater lay participation in environmental management. The common denominator "energy" is scrutinized for the equity of its distribution since it is a master parameter for concerted effort toward enhancing lifestyle options. Two realms of investigation dealing with ecospheric dynamics—ecology and economics—are fused to demonstrate their capacity for taking into account most inputs and outputs, whether local or global. The necessity of bringing mankind's laws into line with natural law is stressed as an initial step by planning for viable and rewarding lifestyles. Humane values such as stability—physiological, psychological, and sociological homeostasis—diversity of opportunity, and freedom of choice are shown to be guaranteed by going along with rather than contravening our ecosystem's naturally antientropic tendencies. High productivity—maximal realization of benefits for each unit of energy input—may be the reward for aligning most of humanity's developments so that ecology and economics are natural partners for productivity.

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FOR sixty centuries cities have served all of man's needs in some measure. It will be that measure—and its potential for expansion—on which this article will concentrate.

Three categories are sufficient to summarize the roles of cities as suppliers of urban services for Planet Earth: (1) cities as central places, performing comprehensive services for a surrounding area; (2) cities with a transport function, performing break-of-bulk and allied services along transport routes, deriving support from areas which may be remote in distance, but close in connection because of their strategic location on transport lines; and (3) specialized-function cities performing a service such as mining, manufacturing, or recreation for large areas, including the general tributary areas of other cities. Most cities are a combination of the three factors which—from city to city—vary in their relative importance.<sup>1</sup>

Freedom, stimulation, the sense of belonging to a larger group, sharing in the pride of civic grandeur, opportunities for creative release and participation on a great stage—these our cities afford. To balance these qualities, our cities must also provide an environment “of a size and character that will not dwarf its inhabitants into anonymity, but will provide a stage of sufficiently intimate scale so that the citizen can master it and play his role with satisfaction.”<sup>2</sup>

#### DINNER ON-THE-TOWN

There are cities that produce more stimulus and delight than can be borne, but it is rare when they are products of the industrial revolution or its aftermath. . . . If we can create the humane city, rather than the city of bondage to toil, then the choice of

1. Chauncy D. Harris and Edward L. Ullman, “The Nature of Cities,” *THE ANNALS* 242 (November 1945), pp. 7-17 passim.

2. Charles S. Ascher, “What Are Cities For?” *THE ANNALS* 242 (November 1945), pp. 1-6, quote on p. 6.

city or countryside will be between two excellences, each indispensable, each different, both complementary, both life-enhancing.<sup>3</sup>

For a number of reasons, cities have failed to provide their residents the full spectrum of expected advantages of communal or concentrated existence. Supportive of this view Mumford observes that while “the order and stability of the village, along with its maternal enclosure and intimacy and its oneness with the forces of nature, were carried over into the city,” this was changed when the city's functional ties to elements of its supportive/productive ecosystem were allowed to wither. “. . . secondary ties and allegiances become too feeble to halt the disintegration of the urban community.”<sup>4</sup> Too readily, my eyes and ears provide evidence that he is correct.

Most of us have simply accepted the urban system as massive, incomprehensible and beyond our control. Like animals trapped in a zoo we have accepted our imprisonment in filthy urban cages. It is up to us to demand environments which enable man and amplify his potential instead of destroying it. Once we have understood that housing, transportation, population control, industrial zoning, pollution abatement, wildlife protection, energy planning, recycling of resources and outdoor recreation are all part of one Gordian package, we can free ourselves from the dictatorship of urban *laissez-faire*.<sup>5</sup>

The scale of problems of the cities seems to mandate the attention of cen-

3. Ian L. McHarg, *Design With Nature* (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1969), p. 2.

4. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 15.

5. William D. Rucklshaus, “The Coming Synthesis of Urbanism and Environmentalism,” *Environmental Capsule*, no. 26 (August 1972), pp. 2-3, quote on p. 3.

tral government, but I concur with Lewis Mumford's observation that solutions must—in the absence of fully representative government—come from another direction initially: "No planning proposal now makes sense unless it is conceived in terms of truly human purposes—self-chosen, self-limited, and self-directed."<sup>6</sup>

Aristotle, in his *Politics*, Book II, observed: "For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. . . . For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfil." Our city problems have been neglected mainly, I think, because—though they are "common to the greatest number"—each of us feels inexpert in the range that must be covered by any wholistic solution.

#### A LA CARTE OR TABLE D'HÔTE

Dynamics, the interrelations of organisms and their environs, is the subject matter of ecology. Perhaps ecology as a discipline—if it is that after being around a hundred years—has been relatively unsung as it is concerned mainly as a science of putting things (ideas) together. Only lately have humans begun to realize the global misery we have wrought by being more proficient at analysis—taking things apart—than we are at putting things together as we see logical connections. We all possess a relatively unused set of mental tinkertoys.

Ecology teaches that actions and inactions in our environment are as important for survival as are touchable things. Planners of human settlements, for the most part, have not yet discovered that fact. There are some important and unused connecting rods in

their kit of tinkertoys. Functional planning still gets too little attention.

Even our governments are still departmentalized mainly to arrange for things rather than for assuring the intactness of essential dynamic connections—in rural areas as well as in the city. Only in the last few years have national governments—spurred by the social costs of current metropolitan growth and the disparities between growth centers and depressed areas—begun to develop urban growth strategies. Of these, the proposed Minnesota Experimental City provides a prototype in this country, involving at least three departments of the federal government in a test of the strategy of a system of dispersed cities of controlled size.

There is a lot of evidence that it is the synergistic or combined interaction of the arrangements for individual and social process which boosts problems exponentially as urbanization occurs. In our cities, we are being made to see that bigger is not necessarily better in the functioning of the social processes identified by Lonberg-Holm and Larson as essential to societies based on industrial production: power, production, transportation and communication, storage, exchange, administration, protection, dwelling, education and research, recreation, repair and reconstruction, religious worship, elimination and conservation of waste, and war.<sup>7</sup>

Insufficient city resources all have the common element of energy at the root of the production-distribution-consumption function. Our "energy slaves" are beginning to let us down in many areas. No longer are they up to the task of supporting all of our previous modes of city living.

We have forgotten that we are links

6. Lewis Mumford, *The Urban Prospect* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), p. 207.

7. K. Lonberg-Holm and C. Theodore Larson, *Planning for Productivity* (New York: International Industrial Relations Institute, 1940).

in a nearly closed system and that one city function must be the elimination and conservation of waste. We have, for too long, considered our wastes as refuse rather than as valuable resources "which happen to be at the wrong place, or in the wrong form, or in the wrong amount, or at the wrong time."<sup>8</sup> Typically, we have been uneconomic. That means—if the following formula holds true—that we have also been, typically, unproductive where urban systems are failing. Let us test the formula:

$$\frac{\text{Ecology}}{\text{Economics}} = \frac{\text{productivity}}{\text{productivity}}$$

The rather simple formula constitutes this article's theme in the context of the title. Both terms at the left of the equation are derived from similar Greek root words. Both refer to household dynamics, household management. And they share the concept of "productivity."

Economist Kenneth Boulding has identified and explained quite clearly five basic similarities between ecology and economics:

In the first place, they both study not only individuals as such, but individuals as members of species. The concept of a population of like individuals constituting a species is indeed fundamental to ecology. The corresponding concept in economics is that of the commodity, and it is easy to see the population of commodities as a simple extension of natural species. . . . Commodities, of course, are not the only social species. We also have organizations, such as farms, steel firms, PTAs [Parent Teacher Associations], schools, churches, and so on. . . . A second similarity between economics and ecology is that both have an important concept of general equilibrium. In the case of ecology this is a

concept of general equilibrium of population. . . . In economics we do not usually postulate a simple system of ecological equilibrium of populations of different commodities, even though there is no fundamental reason why this could not be done. The general equilibrium of the price system, however, as developed, for instance, by Walras or by Hicks, or even as implied by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, has many basic similarities to a system of ecological equilibrium. . . . Indeed, it is quite easy to extend the concepts which are analogous to the price system. This, indeed, is the third basic similarity. Both ecological and economic systems involve a system of exchange among their various individuals and species as an essential element in determining their final equilibrium. In the case of economics, this system of exchange is symbolized in the price system, which is the set of rates of exchange of different commodities with each other. In the case of ecological systems, the exchange consists of the metabolic system—that is, the ratios of inputs to outputs of different individuals, organisms, or species. In both systems there has to be a balance of payments.<sup>9</sup>

The above will give an inkling of what is meant by the left side of the equation I am positing. Boulding expands it further by saying:

A fourth similarity between economics and ecology is that both imply some concept of development. Neither of them is content with the concept of equilibrium as such. In the case of ecology, this involves the concept of ecological succession—that is, the process by which the underlying determinants of the system of ecological equilibrium change in the course of the operations of the system. . . . Social evolution exhibits many parallels to the process of natural evolution, and we have ecological succession in society just as we do in

8. James O. Evans, "The soil as a resource renovator," *Environmental Science & Technology* 4 (September 1970), pp. 732–35, quote on p. 732.

9. Kenneth E. Boulding, "Economics and Ecology," in *Future Environments of North America*, F. Fraser Darling and John P. Milton, eds. (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1966), pp. 225–34, quote on pp. 225–30 *passim*.

the pond or in the forest. . . . A fifth important parallel between economics and ecological systems falls under the general head of policy. That is the distortion of the equilibrium of the system by man in his own favor. In the case of ecological systems, we see this most clearly exemplified in agriculture. . . . Corresponding to agriculture in the natural ecosystem we have policy at all levels in the social system. The law, for instance, is supposed to discourage criminals in much the same manner that harrowing or weed killer discourages weeds. . . . Without some form of policy as expressed primarily through political organization, the social ecosystem tends to degenerate into a jungle, and the well-ordered society seems to require a "farmer" in the shape of government to distort the natural social ecosystem in favor of some ideals or values.

Now let us look to the right of the equation. What is productivity? For individual man, productivity can be a measure of the extent to which an action satisfies any need—be it a need of the body or a need of the mind. An action which sustains an organism is by definition productive. Likewise—if we accept that all humans seek purposiveness in their lives—an action which assists man on a purposive path is productive because its effects are useful and are commodities of our earthly household.

Collectively, we seem to have taken quite a different view of productivity. Industrial/consumer goods "needs" are outpacing public service "needs" by way of the attention we give to collective productivity.

Galbraith investigated the dynamics of the American economy and concluded that the modern firm, instead of being controlled by the market, has managed to subordinate the market to its own interests. Since each firm strives to maximize its production, production for production's sake has become a national compulsion, manifested in the preoccupation with an ever-increasing GNP [gross national product] and the

passion for productivity. . . . Galbraith describes the situation as one of "private opulence and private squalor" and contends that, unless the money now being spent on the production of superfluous commodities is redirected to provide desperately needed public services, our society will succumb to a combination of consumption glut and urban rot.<sup>10</sup>

There is, however, more to the productivity story. Such humanocentric and monoculated viewing of productivity seems, over the years of advancing technocracy, to have dimmed our peripheral vision. At the very least it has strained the eye focused on humanity; it is now quite bloodshot. The other eye has atrophied, which means that in "File 13" lies nearly any ethical consideration of the rights of other life forms. [See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Supreme Court of the United States case No. 70-34, *Sierra Club, Petitioner, v. Rogers C. B. Morton, Individually, and as Secretary of the Interior of the United States, et al.*, April 19, 1972.] Unless other kinds of life are of obvious utility for mankind, we are not concerned with their state-of-health, their productivity. Few, if any, nonhuman beings—other than ships and corporations—have standing before our human courts of law.

#### KELP OR CHATEAUBRIAND

With both eyes forward and open, we cannot seem to focus simultaneously on what is best for the individual and what is best for the system which sustains that individual. With no turning back, we have passed by many options which could lead to "the Good Life." A few people seem concerned about this aspect—particularly those who appreciate the opportunity to make a choice of direc-

10. Ragnar Lange, "Galbraith, Yes, 'Nixonomics,' No!" (review of book: *John Kenneth Galbraith and His Critics* by Charles H. Hession), *Sunday Star*, Washington, D.C., May 21, 1972, p. B-6.

tion. The rest, with one or more senses in working order, are noticing Planet Earth's declining health. Many are aware that a growing number of their personal inputs to society are not achieving the results anticipated and, additionally, are affecting environmental quality in a negative way. Anyone with a sense of membership in the global community—in addition to a feeling of self-importance—can tell that a *net* accounting, a "world balance sheet,"<sup>11</sup> of the ratio of output to input is now necessary for meaningful measurement of productivity.

"At its heart, the environmental problem is an economic problem. It exists because the market economy fails to place a price on the use of environmental resources—public watercourses, the air mantle, and public lands. . . . to society as a whole there is no such thing as a free lunch."<sup>12</sup>

A sound conceptual foundation is a prerequisite to the provision of meaningful information by accounting systems and measurement techniques. Excessive reliance upon the theory of market competition causes national accountants to overlook the usefulness of viewing the economy as a cybernetic system. . . . One can now organize accounts that reflect the results of a highly complex cybernetic system without requiring that it conform to a particular type of market competition. The existence of disproduct becomes perceivable so that better measures of welfare and output are possible. The preceding analysis sums to one grand thesis—accounting as a tool of economic policy must emphasize theory

and practice as interactants that combine to reveal the evolutionary, dynamic nature of the economy.<sup>13</sup>

Judging by their tenure on this intricate earth, some of our predecessors must have worked out a suitably wholistic double-entry accounting system for keeping track of "where they were at." There is anthropological evidence that this sort of environmental bookkeeping was in the head of every member of such tribal groups as the Pawnee. The prairie-dwelling Pawnee people established a viable community in the heartland of North America for seven hundred-or-so years.<sup>14</sup>

Net productivity of the kind I mean would have been a readily understood concept amongst Pawnees. To them:

The house was a microcosm of the universe and as one was at home inside, one was also at home in the outside world. For the dome of the sky was the high-arching roof of the universe and the horizon all around was the circular wall of the cosmic house. . . . Being at home was spoken of as being "inside"; *ti-ka*, he is *inside*; house, *a-ka-ru*, the *inside*-place; the universe, *ka-huraru*, the *inside*-land.<sup>15</sup>

With such an outlook, nothing the Pawnee knew about could have been left off the list of things that concerned him deeply. Such a view of the ecosphere dovetails only with a fully binocular—I and thou—consideration of productivity. I believe we stand to learn much from digging into what must have been the Pawnee concept of household management.

11. Robert R. Doane, *World Balance Sheet* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

12. Robert H. Haveman, statement in *The Economics of National Priorities*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Ninety-second Congress of the United States, First Session, Part 1, June 4, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 220-63, quote on p. 221.

13. Boyd Collier, *Measurement and Environmental Deterioration*, Bureau of Business Research Monograph no. 34 (Austin: University of Texas, 1971), p. 82.

14. A. L. Kroeber, *Cultural and Natural Areas of Native North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939), pp. 84, 85.

15. Gene Weltfish, *The Lost Universe: The Way of Life of the Pawnee* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), pp. 78-79 *passim*.

Now, I am not about to advocate a giant step backward for humanity. However, we can learn from history—not only as reported, but as it actually existed. Recent archaeological discoveries in combination with the writings of great humane thinkers can give us yardsticks for measuring just how much progress man has made since the introduction of technology.<sup>16</sup> For such a measuring task, Rousseau's definition of economy should suffice—and meet the Pawnees' acid test, too. Economy "meant originally only the wise and legitimate government of the house for the common good of the whole family. The meaning of the term was then extended to the government of that great family, the State."<sup>17</sup>

In the same vein, I suggest that—for the proper perspective on how far the technocrat's spiraling history has taken him from primitive man's development—we embrace a concept, a measure, propounded by Denis Goulet: "Development is the entire gamut of changes by which any social system, with optimal regard for the wishes and welfare of component individuals and sub-systems, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory towards an alternative condition held to be *humanly* better."<sup>18</sup>

#### PLACING OUR ORDER

Perhaps our evolution was a product of time operating through the "total

biological channel"<sup>19</sup> and the attainment, through government, of the expressed goals of our predecessors, in search of the common good of the whole nation/state family. However, like Tugwell, I would tend to discount the latter—the possibility that deliberate pursuit of goals had much to do with our present status.

If the government is expected to reach certain objectives, it ought to know what these objectives are. Incredible as it may seem, they are not now known, and the resources necessary to reach them are only wildly guessed at. . . . Planning for the whole government has not been accepted, nor is it advocated, not even by those who might be expected to be the first to understand the need for it.<sup>20</sup>

I do not know what goals comprise the content of our collective aspirations, but—for a first accounting—I would suggest why we must adopt an ecologist's perspective. Why? Because once we have agreed that human survival is a primary value—and surely we can get to that point—the autecologist can perform his proper scientific role. With only that value to go on, he can begin evaluating conditions of our environment, for identifying those which will likely comprise roadblocks to our development. Scientific ecology does not offer values which would solve ethical and social problems. Properly, it can only offer descriptions of the interrelationships of environmental operants.

Once we have set forth value—survival, for instance—the ecologist may be appropriately assigned his problem-solving task as a member of mankind's planning team. His most important role may well lie in pointing out mistakes

16. Jacob Bronowski, "Technology and Culture in Evolution," *American Scholar* 41 (Spring 1972), pp. 197–211.

17. Jean Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on Political Economy" (1755) in *Great Books of the Western World*, Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed. (Chicago: William Benton, 1952), vol. 38, pp. 367–85, quote on p. 367.

18. Denis Goulet, definitions set forth in "East-West Conference on Technology, Development and Values," *Center Report* 5 (June 1972), pp. 8–9, quote on p. 9.

19. Ramón Margalef, *Perspectives in Ecological Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 97–100.

20. Rexford G. Tugwell, "A Case for Planning," *Center Magazine* 3 (January, 1970), pp. 86–89, quote on pp. 86–87.

after the fact. Like all living populations, mankind is part of cybernetic systems which operate by error control. We must, in anticipation of continued erring in our ecospheric interactions, limit our measures to control the entire ecosystem.<sup>21</sup> Ecologists should be given the task of—and wherewithal for—determining the need for pristine habitat—extent and type—sufficient to sustain plants and animals and geotope necessary in repair processes. Such provision should be considered the ultimate in life insurance.

Any wholistic urban planning effort should provide for an initial role, for a perceptive ecologist. His obligation should—of all things—be in the realm of law. He must make every involved planner understand that the laws of nature are inviolable, that they apply to all things, and that they state necessities of behavior. He must make it clear that human laws of conduct imply freedom for those to whom they are addressed—because they are violable. Any environmental confrontation between the two sets of laws must be settled by change in man's laws, not by a denial of the general principles which have been abstracted from four thousand years of recorded scientific speculations.<sup>22</sup>

Understanding of modern man's setting can derive in full only from a "systems outlook."

The adaptive system covers all those practices through which a society acts on nature in the effort to provide its subsistence and to reproduce the totality of goods and furnishings at its disposal. The associative

system covers the complex of norms and institutions that organize social life, discipline human coexistence, regulate the work force, and govern political life. Finally, the ideological system is the body of knowledge, beliefs, and values generated in the adaptive and associative efforts. . . . The understanding of social life and its dynamics demands . . . that abstract analysis of each of these factors refer always to the integrated complexes in which they coexist and act jointly. . . . Examining these interactions synchronically, the fact emerges that, in a given instance, any factor may play a causal role.<sup>23</sup>

#### CONSIDERING DYSPEPSIA

That is why, as an ecologist, I would set out on an urban planning course by giving initial attention to the ecological law of factorial control: "Although living beings react holocenotically (to all factors of the environment in their peculiar conjunction), there sometimes occurs a discrepant factor which has controlling power through its excess or deficiency (Del Villar, 1929)."<sup>24</sup> Ecological analysis would probably lead, very soon, to the "discovery" of a serious environmental confrontation between the laws of nature and the present laws of man. And, where such a confrontation does occur, we know which set of laws must give way.

Law professor Joseph Sax has arrived at the logical construct necessary to the understanding of why it is that legal changes must be made if man's eco-

23. Darcy Ribeiro, *The Americas and Civilization*, trans. Linton Lomas Barrett and Marie McDavid Barrett (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1971), pp. 32-33 passim.

24. Pierre Dansereau, "Ecological Tools and Their Use: An Application of Ecological Laws to Woodlots," in *Proceedings of the Lockwood Conference on the Suburban Forest and Ecology*, March 26, 27, 28, 1962; Paul E. Waggoner and J. D. Ovington, eds., *The Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, New Haven, Connecticut, Bulletin 652* (October 1962), pp. 45-56, quote on p. 53.

21. Frank B. Golley, "Energy Flux in Ecosystems," in *Ecosystem Structure and Function*, John A. Wiens, ed. (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1972), pp. 69-90 passim.

22. Gerald Feinberg, *The Prometheus Project: Mankind's search for long-range goals* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1968), pp. 27-38.

management<sup>25</sup> is to prevent and solve serious challenges to survival. Current "takings law stands as an obstacle to rational resource allocation. . . . Once property is seen as an interdependent network of competing uses, rather than as a number of independent and isolated entities, property rights and the law of takings are open for modification."<sup>26</sup> Hardin puts it another way:

We often speak of the "rights of private property," but what is "property"? The word has many meanings, among which are the following. If I say, "I own this land" I imply that: a. I can use the land; b. I can abuse the land; c. I can sell the land (i.e., I can break the tie of responsibility between my land and me). In an uncrowded world there may be no reason to restrict a person's freedom to do all three. But in a spaceship, where land is forever limited, there is a limit to our tolerance of the misuse of the heritage which our generation has received from our ancestors and which we hope to pass on to our descendants. Flagrant abuse is, indeed, almost certain to provoke us to limiting our neighbor's freedom to do what he wishes with "his property."

An acute and abiding awareness of the imminence of posterity leads us to conclude that private property is not so much something that a man owns as it is something for which he is a trustee. His enjoyment of certain rights with respect to "his" property is—or should be—conditional upon his acceptance of the implied obligations of trusteeship. Beyond the limits of his confining skin, no man can own any thing. "Property" refers not to things owned but to the rights granted by society; they must periodically be re-examined in the light of social justice.<sup>27</sup>

25. Jaro Mayda, *Environment & Resources: From conservation to ecomanagement* [San Juan: (Equity) School of Law, University of Puerto Rico, 1968], pp. 109–55.

26. Joseph L. Sax, "Takings, Private Property and Public Rights," *Yale Law Journal* 81 (December 1971), pp. 149–86, quote on p. 150.

27. Garrett Hardin, *Exploring New Ethics for Survival: The Voyage of the Spaceship*

Sax believes that his analysis does not obliterate distinctions of ownership that lie at the heart of private property systems. The stated purpose of his analysis "is not to permit a redistribution of land to achieve the most socially beneficial use, but only to put competing resource-users in a position of equality when each of them seeks to make a use that involves some imposition (spillover) on his neighbors, and those demands are in conflict."<sup>28</sup>

My ecological definition of "land" is, perhaps, at the node of any disagreement I might have with Professor Sax's analysis. My definition—and, I'll bet, Hardin's and the Pawnees'—is more in tune with that set forth by Aldo Leopold:

All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-operate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for). The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.<sup>29</sup>

It seems to me that our human "law of the land" must be changed in every instance where it is "a discrepant factor" in the environment, denying equal protection of health<sup>30</sup> and/or preventing equal access to basic energy resources for sustenance.

When do we need to investigate the acceptability of such factorial controls as man's laws? At the very moment that we identify their potential for dis-

"Beagle" (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), pp. 126–27.

28. Sax, "Takings," p. 161.

29. Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac and sketches here and there* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 203–4.

30. David Mechanic, "Human Problems and the Organization of Health Care," *THE ANNALS* 399 (January 1972), pp. 1–11.



ruption of our homeostatic or rhythmic mechanisms or those of our settlement systems, our cities. Such timely investigations are crucial if we are to retain the means for directing change in the quality of our environs.

The most casual investigation, today, shows that our cities, though pyknic in structure, provide no picnic for those of their inhabitants who wish to live a human-paced life in an aesthetic ambience. Rather than take more of our dwindling surface and air rights for machine-paced functions, it is time we reversed the transportation syndrome and buried it—cars and all. Tunnel trolley-trains with electromagnetic suspension have been technically feasible for seven decades; they, if we consider the principal purpose of cities, are economically feasible—at least for those to whom time is the primary worry.

Urbanized humanity is in a medical situation. The malfunctions of our built environment are prompting our investigation of "The Habitability of Confined Spaces."<sup>31</sup> It is becoming abundantly evident that "the art of land doctoring is being practiced with vigor, but the science of land health is yet to be born."<sup>32</sup> Considering the severity of our ailments, that science better be birthed soon. Just finding the diseases amongst the syndromes will tax the healthiest and most acute of humanity's minds.

How do we set about such a broadly construed journey toward an objective that might benefit everyman? First, each of us must obtain *power* in the full dictionary sense of the term: "ability, latent, exerted, physical, mental or spiritual, to act, be acted upon, effect

or be effected."<sup>33</sup> The power franchise should be obtained at birth. Additionally, each of us must get a clear view from our wagon seat to our "horses" and a hand on our "reins," the networks of power that link "the land."

#### POLITE CONVERSATION

How do we then get our horses to pull in unison? A symposium to ascertain national goals and energy policy is a promising way. One which was begun on October 20, 1971, by the Ninety-second Congress—pursuant to Senate Resolution 45—noted early that

Energy policy should be designed to promote and obtain a broad range of generally agreed upon national goals. . . . The Nation's goals provide a framework for analysis within which existing and alternative policies can be considered and tested. Energy policy is the means of achieving national goals and one test, perhaps the only test of energy policy, is its contribution for obtaining the social and political conditions expressed on goal declarations.<sup>34</sup>

How much of a harness do we have to put ourselves into to pull toward common goals? None, really. We have only to make certain that the wagon in which we are riding does not rut-to-erosion the land that supports it. Our wagonmasters—about sixty separate departments and agencies, at present, in Washington with some authority over inputs to this nation's energy program—need not be on the same path (in fact, they should not be) but the traffic pattern must be concerted.

33. *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (Chicago: William Benton, 1966), vol. 2, p. 1779.

34. Henry M. Jackson, in *National Goals Symposium*, Hearing before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Pursuant to S. Res. 45: A National Fuels and Energy Policy Study, Ninety-second Congress (First Session on Energy Goals and National Goals, October 20, 1971, Serial no. 92-11, Part 1) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1972), p. 1.

31. Stanley Deutsch, "The Habitability of Confined Spaces," in *First National Symposium on Habitability* (Los Angeles, May 11-14, 1970) National Aeronautics and Space Administration et al., vol. 3, pp. 1-83.

32. Leopold, *A Sand County*, p. 196.

In this world a tolerable harmony does not mean that humans must all operate under one form of government. It does mean, however, that for some basic requisites of all mankind there must be an interlocking of each form of government which has the capacity to influence these necessities for survival.

The world communities can be united in one system. . . . The overall objective of the system will be to create and maintain a viable human environment: social, economic, spiritual, and physical. To this end, the system will seek to harmonize the interests of all nations, regardless of their ideology or state of development, by increasing the participation of all peoples in the management of the environment and its spiritual and physical resources.<sup>35</sup>

Energy-sharing analogous to the revenue-sharing compromises recently worked out by House-Senate conferees, scientific/technological bridges such as that signed last September by the Soviet Union and the United States, and ecological endeavors such as the International Biological Program "so that we can try to close the gaps in our knowledge before it is too late"<sup>36</sup> provide examples of the sort of cooperation we need.

I see no better place to begin the participatory process than in a lay/professional endeavor to establish a basic definition of "comfort and health." Most of the parameters of such a definition should deal with our living-working quarters, the primary "shells"<sup>37</sup> that

comprise our cities. If we seek greater humane output per unit of planning and development input, we should start by fusing the knowledge of physiologists and environmental psychologists with that of ecologists, architects, and engineers. Surely such talents as went into the tomes *American Building*, *Environmental Psychology*, *The Radiant City*, and *Design of Cities*, could come up with plans for residential shells that would fully meet the thermal needs of man while circumventing the energy-wasting features of most dwellings of today, be they private home or city-entire.<sup>38</sup>

The American Institute of Architects (AIA) has already considered such an approach:

There are a number of special urban design problems which can best be tackled by AIA chapters: the question of design controls; sign designs; urban design education in nearby universities; urban design consideration in all public works; preservation of historic buildings and areas; contact with the local press (the Sunday art and local news sections are woefully lacking in articles on urban design); examination of local codes and building ordinances; parking plans for downtown areas—the list is indeed long.<sup>39</sup>

*City Politics and Planning*, Francine Rabinovitz' comparative analysis of the

*ments* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 21–43.

38. James Marston Fitch, *American Building 2: The Environmental Forces That Shape It* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Harold M. Proshansky, William H. Ittelson, and Leanne G. Rivlin, eds., *Environmental Psychology: Man and His Physical Setting* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to be used as the Basis of our Machine-Age Civilization* (New York: Orion Press, 1967); Edmund N. Bacon, *Design of Cities* (New York: Viking Press, 1967).

39. Paul D. Spreiregen, *Urban Design: The Architecture of Towns and Cities* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 228–29.

35. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, "The World Communities," *Center Magazine* 4 (September-October 1971), pp. 10–18, quote on pp. 16–17 passim.

36. H. Ellenberg, "Introductory Survey," in *Integrated Experimental Ecology: Methods and Results of Ecosystem Research in the German Solling Project*, H. Ellenberg, ed. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1971), pp. 1–15, quote on p. 1.

37. Constantinos A. Doxiadis, *Ekistics: An Introduction to the Science of Human Settle-*

roles of physical planners in urban political and developmental decision-making, points up the resources and constraints which condition the effectiveness of planners' inputs. Like the AIA, she recognizes the need for their political involvement:

The normative issue of the right of the planner to "impose values" on the community aside, it appears that if city problems are to be dealt with, it is up to the planner and his colleagues to develop strategies outlining how the city can best respond. These strategies must include not only programs on physical and social change but also a method of building support among the holders of influence in urban areas whose backing is necessary to make planning effective. Thus, only if the profession's image includes the picture of the planner as rightfully a political actor will planners obtain both professional rewards and the completion of concrete programs.<sup>40</sup>

The productivity of our endeavors to upgrade the structural character of our cities must depend, from the beginning, on the conjunction of planning expertise and the political maelstrom. Involvement in the political scenario and its attempts at accommodation need not detract from the planner's inputs of professional expertise in his discipline.

Being aware of a general area of agreement in one discipline is not sufficient ground for pursuing a particular urban planning scheme. There is, for example, in conceptions of ideal communities, a nearly uniform acceptance of functional separation of the parts of a city. If the matter of "the whole man" and reintegration of the family into the full range of urban activities is broached, what is regarded as an absolute might surface as less-than-desirable when values from other disciplines

are considered.<sup>41</sup> With this caveat, let us again focus on our adopted teleonomic<sup>42</sup> value: survival.

#### CLEANING OUR PLATES

Economy is the art of making the most of life.

George Bernard Shaw

*Law of competition-cooperation.* Organisms of one or more species occupying the same site over a given period of time, use (and frequently reuse) the same resources through various sharing processes which allow a greater portion to the most efficient.

Pierre Dansereau (1956)

As an accounting parameter which all earthlings might embrace, energy use seems a most likely candidate to give us a trace element for productivity measurement. We, as the Pawnee, should recognize the need for relating every activity in our cosmic house to *kahuraru*, the universe with which it is connected. Energy is the resource-in-common which can provide an adequate touchstone for Man-the-Ecomanager no matter what mix of languages—lay or professional—he uses in discussing household management.

Energy is used by producers and consumers. In being used, some of it is expended and lost to the producer or consumer; but what is left is net production, an amount which depends on trophic-dynamic efficiency.<sup>43</sup> The concept of energy loss in energy use or assimilation is broad enough to encompass consideration of diseconomies that at-

41. Thomas A. Reiner, *The Place of the Ideal Community in Urban Planning* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp. 151-52.

42. Addison Gulick, "A Biological Prologue for Human Values," *BioScience* 18 (December 1968), pp. 1109-12.

43. Raymond L. Lindeman, "The Trophic-Dynamic Aspect of Ecology," *Ecology* 23 (October 1942), pp. 399-418.

40. Francine F. Rabinovitz, *City Politics and Planning* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), pp. 131-32.

tend "monocultured use" or profligate use of this resource.

Let us use the letter Q to stand for the energy derived from burning some 33 billion tons of coal. In the eighteen and one-half centuries after Christ, the total energy consumed averaged less than one-half Q per century. But by 1850, the rate had risen to one Q per century. Today, the rate is about ten Q per century.

Dr. Homi Bhabha

"The paramount goal of the United States was set long ago. It is to guard the rights of the individual, to ensure his development, and to enlarge his opportunity."<sup>44</sup> From the looks of things in our cities, either this goal has demanded more energy than we have had at our disposal, or we have been very ineffective in what we have used—or both. Where can we find energy for individual growth and development in a world where numerous organisms, including humans, die for want of this resource? I would turn first to a net input-output accounting area where energy use is of great magnitude—the heating of the "shells" of us worldlings.

When humans still die from exposure and insufficient food to face healthily the gamut of climatic changes, mankind cannot afford to be an energy wastrel in terms of his architecture of shells. While most of our flat city rooftops function only as lids on nature, they could be caused to harbor second-stories for horticulture or for much of the natural carpet that preceded man's buildings. If they must remain biological deserts, they should at least serve—with solar cell roofing and storage cells—as energy catchments. Stored solar energy—or even wind power—

44. The President's Commission on National Goals, *Goals for Americans*, administered by The American Assembly, Columbia University (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 1.

could readily augment our night-lighting systems and augment those using electricity in daylight. Yet, "the structural arts give man less and less for more and more."<sup>45</sup> And, we—by ratio of energy consumption to gross national product—are using energy, generally, less efficiently than we used to.

The ethical and ecological mandates in this aspect of development and maintenance of human settlements are abundantly clear. As household space heating takes a lion's share in such technologically advanced nations as the United States<sup>46</sup> and as much of the underdeveloped world remains energy deficient,<sup>47</sup> I see cause for enlisting housing design assistance of architectural leading-lights under the auspices of a world body such as the United Nations. It would be appropriate work for a Division of Human Settlements as recommended by the Advisory Committee on the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment.

In its "landscape of production"<sup>48</sup> the United States

is wasting so much energy today that there is broad opportunity for all sorts of savings without curtailing essential activities. Energy has been so cheap that, except in industrial processes that consume large amounts, we have given almost no thought to using it efficiently. Right now, better-insulated refrigerators could be built to do

45. R. Buckminster Fuller, "City of the Future," *Playboy* 15 (January 1968), pp. 166–68, 228–30, quote on p. 228.

46. S. Fred Singer, "Human Energy Production as a Process in the Biosphere," *Scientific American* 223 (September 1970), pp. 174–90.

47. Joel Darmstadter, Perry D. Teitelbaum, and Jaroslav G. Polach, *Energy in the World Economy: A Statistical Review of Trends in Output, Trade, and Consumption Since 1925* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 31–32.

48. Philip Wagner, "America Emerging," *Landscape* 13 (Autumn 1963), pp. 22–26, quote on p. 25.

the same cooling job with half as much electricity. Some movement back to buses and trains, and a further shift to small cars, could bring a sizable reduction in the energy used for transportation. Instead of throwing away the waste heat from generating plants, utilities could use it to heat nearby apartments, as is being done in some new parts of European cities.<sup>49</sup>

... one reason we use energy so lavishly today is that the price of that energy does not include all the social costs of producing it.

Richard M. Nixon

The Office of Emergency Preparedness interagency staff study on *The Potential For Energy Conservation*, released last October, stated that our most significant realizable measures for effecting energy conservation lie in the realms of: improved insulation of homes; adoption of more efficient air-conditioning systems; shifts of intercity freight from highway to rail, intercity passengers from air to ground travel, and of urban passengers from automobiles to mass transit; consolidation of freight in urban freight movement; and more efficient industrial processes and equipment.<sup>50</sup>

Implementation of such changes might well affect even the climate of our conurbations. Lowry observes that "every major aspect of climate is changed, if only slightly, by an urban complex. The differences in a small city may be only occasional; in a large city every day is different climatically from what it would have been if the city were not there."<sup>51</sup> He identifies five basic influ-

ences that set a city's climate apart from that of the surrounding area: (1) the difference between surface materials in the city and in the countryside, (2) the far greater variety of shapes and orientations of city structures than exists in the features of the natural landscape, (3) the city's prodigious generation of heat from sources that the countryside either lacks or has in smaller numbers, (4) the city's ways of rapidly disposing of precipitation, and (5) the city air's load of contaminants which is, typically, much heavier than that of the surrounding countryside. I question only his point (2) in light of what appears to me to be infinite variety in nature.

Architects now know that the microclimate of a city is very much affected by the city's physical characteristics (things) and its human activity patterns (dynamic processes). This would seem an opportune time to transfer such knowledge to other operants in the planning processes—building codes, and so forth—which shape our towns, cities, and conurbations. Professionals in many disciplines could put this awareness to good use where wholistic solutions to city energy problems are sought.

#### THE DINNER BILL

E. J. Mishan notes that "the private enterprise system and the profit motive, on which we have depended for economic guidance for the best part of two centuries, can do wonders under certain conditions—briefly, under those conditions that ensure that the impact on the welfares of all peoples arising from producing or using economic goods is largely captured by the pricing system."<sup>52</sup> In the absence of any clear distinction between ecosystem and eco-

49. Edmund Faltermayer, "The Energy 'Joyride' Is Over," *Fortune* 86 (September 1972), pp. 99-101, 178-91, quote on p. 191.

50. Office of Emergency Preparedness, Executive Office of the President, *The Potential For Energy Conservation*, A Staff Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, October 1972).

51. William P. Lowry, "The Climate of Cities," *Scientific American* 217 (August 1967), pp. 15-23, quote on p. 23.

52. E. J. Mishan, "Economic Growth: Some Pessimistic Reflections," in *The Great Ideas Today: 1971* (Chicago: William Benton, 1971), pp. 52-71, quote on pp. 59-60.

nomic "goods," I would say that our most serious ecomanagement failing has been that of failing to recognize the planetary price of use of those goods. Any definition of "productivity" really suited to this ecosphere must take that price into full account.

Total productivity will rise when we identify—and preclude to the greatest extent possible—the hidden costs of human technological activity. The first step must be in the realm of law—a redefinition of property rights and personal rights.<sup>53</sup> The "goal of a system which regulates property rights should be the maximization of the output of the entire resource base upon which competing claims of right are dependent rather than maintenance of the profitability of individual parcels of property."<sup>54</sup> This full recognition of an ecosphere as our sole resource base makes nearly inane the current rash of titles on the subject "Economics versus Ecology." A noteworthy exception to this proliferation of divisive thinking is a discussion draft now being circulated for comment and entitled *Ecology and the Economy: A Concept for Balancing Long-Range Goals—the Pacific Northwest Example*. It was prepared by the Urban and Rural Lands Committee of the Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission. The Committee includes members from public and private sectors and in its draft has outlined a method for determining how much additional economic development and population growth in the Pacific Northwest could contribute to and be compatible with an optimum quality of life.

Now is the time to do everything in our power to coalesce the two concepts in the interest of productivity. But not

53. Thomas Gale Moore, "An Economic Analysis of the Concept of Freedom," *Journal of Political Economy* 77 (July-August 1969), pp. 532-44.

54. Sax, "Takings," p. 172.

everyone will lend personal energies to this combinative purpose. In technocracies, especially, power for environmental manipulation

is usually organized through interrelationships and combinations that are highly resistant to competing interests. . . . These techno-economic and techno-political combinations have evolved as the primary forces in American society in the making of environmental choices. The choices are those of interested parties, but become by institutional or political default the choices or non-choices of the whole society. . . . In brief, although the alibi of technical necessity is often raised in defending environment-impairing choices, the decisive factor is usually economic or political.

The choice of technologies in particular instances is seldom governed by technological considerations. It is evident that criteria for what is good, bad, tolerable or preferable are . . . functions of the total society. These criteria may be, and some have been, influenced by science. In the main they are manifestations of traditional culture and the tendency of society is to apply them uncritically to novel situations. Moreover, the fractionalization of the total culture as a consequence of the impact of technoscience has deprived society of general guidelines or standards by which the results or desirability of technoscientific innovations can be appraised. Freedom of choice thus becomes inability to make discriminating choices.<sup>55</sup>

#### PICKING UP THE TAB

The author of *Atlas Shrugged* pulls no punches in telling us how much latitude we have left to "spin our wheels":

. . . to think is an act of choice. The key to what you so recklessly call 'human nature', the open secret you live with, yet dread to name, is the fact that *man is a being of volitional consciousness*. Reason does not work automatically; thinking is not a mechanical process; the connections

55. Lynton K. Caldwell, "Shaping the Environment of Civilized Societies," Address (distributed) at Vassar College, April 9, 1968, 21 pp., quote on pp. 11-12 *passim*.

of logic are not made by instinct. The function of your stomach, lungs or heart is automatic; the function of your mind is not. In any hour and issue of your life, you are free to think or to evade that effort. But you are not free to escape from your nature, from the fact that *reason* is your means of survival—so that for *you*, who are a human being, the question 'to be or not to be' is the question 'to think or not to think'.

A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior. He needs a code of values to guide his actions. 'Value' is that which one acts to gain and keep, 'virtue' is the action by which one gains and keeps it. 'Value' presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? 'Value' presupposes a standard, a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative. Where there are no alternatives, no values are possible.

There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or non-existence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence. It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible. It is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil.<sup>56</sup>

A sniff of the air, a taste of the water, an opening of the ear, a touch of the summer sidewalk, a look around us in almost any of our urbanized places gives instant feedback at the unwanted end of the good/evil scale. The mise-en-scène is obviously worsening for most of

us urbanites.<sup>57</sup> Those of us interested in survival as a value must stand up for the standard of non-degradation of environmental systems which assure us healthy and rewarding lives.

Leopold has put into words that standard for economic and for ecological measurement of human activity:

An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist calls these symbioses. Politics and economics are advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all competition has been replaced, in part, by co-operative mechanisms with an ethical content.<sup>58</sup> We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect. There is no other way for land to survive the impact of mechanized man, nor for us to reap from it the esthetic harvest it is capable, under science, of contributing to culture. That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics.<sup>59</sup>

Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our educational and economic system is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of land. Your true modern is separated from the land by many middlemen, and by innumerable physical gadgets. . . . to him it is the space between cities on which crops grow. . . . The case for a land ethic would appear hopeless but for the minority which is in obvious revolt against these

57. Donald Appleyard and Mark Lintell, "The Environmental Quality of City Streets: The Residents' Viewpoint," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 38 (March 1972), pp. 84-101.

58. Leopold, *A Sand County*, p. 202.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. viii-ix.

56. Ayn Rand, *Atlas Shrugged* (New York: New American Library, 1957), p. 939.

'modern' trends. The 'key-log' which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.<sup>60</sup>

#### CASH OR CHARGE

Finally, some economists are letting it be known that they have recognized the global setting in which actual productivity must be measured. They, pulling into line with ecologists and some historians, are stating that notions of continuous disturbance must supplant that of once-over changes.

Behind productivity lie all the dynamic forces of economic life: technical progress, accumulation, enterprise, and the institutional pattern of society. . . . We cannot divorce changes in the productivity of one factor from the productivity of other factors, or indeed, from all the elements in an interrelated economic system.<sup>61</sup> The air mantle, watercourses and oceans, landscapes, the electromagnetic spectrum, complex ecosystems, climate, and rare geomorphological features of the earth are becoming relatively more valuable than the goods and commodities whose production impinges upon these 'superior goods'. Private property and market exchange have but little applicability to their allocation, development and conservation.<sup>62</sup>

Who can catalyze, who can implement, the endeavor of making our habitations livable? All of us know. We have all met the enemy.

60. Ibid., pp. 223-25, passim.

61. W. E. G. Salter, *Productivity and Technical Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 1, 3.

62. Allen V. Kneese and Blair T. Bower, eds., *Environmental Quality Analysis: Theory and Method in the Social Sciences* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), p. 4.

Call it by any name—chaos, unplanned growth, ribbon development, social anarchy, slurbs, the decline of American civilization, the resurgence of *laissez-faire*. But recognize it for what it is—a people's *laissez-faire*, which sinks its roots down past any rotting level of corrupt and cynical behavior by the few into a subsoil of widespread popular support and an abiding tradition of private property, individual freedom and "every-man's-home's-his-castle."<sup>63</sup>

Who can participate in the task of planning our cities? *Who Designs America?*<sup>64</sup> Who plans for *People and Buildings?*<sup>65</sup> The answer is—and must be—everyone, be he a programmer in the heart of megalopolis or a potter in some rural cabin.

We are passing through a revolution that is unhitching the social processes of urbanization from the locationally fixed city and region. Reflecting the current explosion in science and technology, employment is shifting from the production of goods to services; increasing ease of transportation and communication is dissolving the spatial barriers to social intercourse; and Americans are forming social communities comprised of spatially dispersed members. A new kind of large-scale urban society is emerging that is increasingly independent of the city.<sup>66</sup>

Whether this generalization tells the whole story, part of the solution to present urban problems lies in the retention of diversity—of structures, of lifestyles and, even, of aspirations. Ecologists, in studying ecosystems, have reckoned that it is the diversity of most mature

63. Paul Ylvisaker, "The Villains Are Greed, Indifference—and You," *Life*, December 24, 1965, pp. 92-102, quote on p. 96.

64. Laurence B. Holland, *Who Designs America?* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1966).

65. Robert Gutman, ed., *People and Buildings* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

66. Melvin M. Webber, "The Post-City Age," *Daedalus* 97 (Fall 1968), pp. 1091-1110, quote on p. 1092.



ecosystems which stabilizes them through efficient use of energy and which gives them resilience.<sup>67</sup> Everyone—despite his peculiarities—can have an important role in a heterogeneous system.

Economists, too, have found that in a diverse setting an increase in productivity can be reached in various ways. Where there is a multifaceted economy:

Human productivity can be increased by higher wages, a better working climate, better food, and many other incentives which may increase the yield of the production factor labour. The efficiency of the fixed capital such as buildings, machinery, apparatuses, and other equipment can be improved, whereby the efficiency of the production factor capital can be raised. Finally the entrepreneurial performances can bring about a better playing together of human labour and machinery by organisational improvements of the production processes; or a better utilisation of the market position, cheaper raw and basic materials, a limitation of the incidentals, and small profit margins may result in a cheaper product.<sup>68</sup>

The trip to individual accountability—self-management—fueled by solutions to the problem of government, is bound to be a long one. Were everyman intimately acquainted with energy as a resource that must be expended toward such a goal's achievement, the trip might be considerably shortened. A power franchise—in terms of a personal energy allowance, calories—to be budgeted by each human and drawn from a global

account would go a long way toward obligatory environmental education and it might even erase much of the disparity between personal incomes and opportunities. Surely, if per capita consumption of energy in North America is forty to fifty times that prevailing in Africa and developing portions of Asia,<sup>69</sup> much of what we waste could be turned toward the support of basic needs of others.

Our solutions must have at least the scope of our problems. Let us stop beating around the suburbs of our dilemma and get to the central city and its supportive countryside. Probably, the name of the game is "monetary reform." The appropriate framework, the format, is *energy*, with *calories* under every heading.

#### NO TIP FOR THE MAÎTRE D'

The real measure of a product's worth or an essential service's total cost is the net result of an accounting that tallies-up the diversion of energy which went into its making plus some consideration of its comparative quality. Both factors are important in the human eco-system, but—as in any conflict or posturing between the laws of nature and man-made laws—it is the former which must be given primary attention. The calorie, I submit, is a more appropriate measure of "value" of a product of our system than is the pound, the peso, the drachma, or the dollar.

"The issue area of environmental quality is not a separate sphere of activity. Rather it is a part of the general decision-making process for many kinds of issues."<sup>70</sup> There are more than

67. Francisco J. Ayala, "Competition between Species," *American Scientist* 60 (May-June 1972), pp. 348-57; Eugene P. Odum, *Fundamentals of Ecology* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1971), pp. 149-50.

68. Gerhard Fürst, "The Role of Official Statistics in Measuring Productivity," in *Productivity Measurement: Concepts*, vol. 1, G. Deurinck, ed. (Paris: European Productivity Agency, Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, 1955), pp. 61-79, quote on p. 61.

69. Darmstadter et al., *Energy in the World Economy*, p. 12.

70. Delbert C. Miller, James L. Barfoot, Jr., and Paul D. Planchon, *Power and Decision Making in Megalopolis, with Special Reference to Environmental Quality Problems*

enough issues to go around. Each of us is part of the problem whether or not we recognize the fact. With large populations multiplying the adverse effects of each type of profligate energy use, each spending spree, ecomanagement for the good life or Eutopia must begin with heightened environmental awareness and responsibility on the part of each individual.

Productivity indexes "are an indicator of the health of a community, since rising productivity reflects the expression on the material plane of the creative forces of individuals."<sup>71</sup> Rather than continue to search for distinctions between material productivity and the productivity of our cogitations and sensibilities, I believe we should try to find more of their linkages, making certain that the former does not overwhelm the latter.

The systematic activity of the human mind, applied logic, has succeeded beyond even our wildest dreams in building a complex material culture, a spreading system designed for energy conversion. It is, of course, thereby also ultimately responsible for our serious environmental problems and dilemmas. . . .

As we look around us and see man-made ugliness, pollution, and the impoverishment of the originally rich and varied environment in which we evolved, rendering this environment less and less fit to support us, the incongruity of human behavior seems astonishing and distressing. It doesn't add up in terms of the intelligence that supposedly sets off humans from the rest of the animal kingdom.<sup>72</sup>

(Washington, D.C.: Resources For the Future, Inc., 1970), p. 83.

71. John W. Kendrick (assisted by Maude R. Pech), *Productivity Trends in the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 19.

72. F. Raymond Fosberg, "Human Nature and Resource Valuation," Guest lecture (distributed) on November 13, 1969, at the Graduate School, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 9 pp., quote on p. 7.

## A HOME-GROWN, HOME-COOKED MEAL NEXT TIME

It does not add up because we have lost sight of the common denominators of apples and oranges in our proclivity for noticing their differences. We must recognize that energy terms are an "esperanto," an international language that can be a common one no matter how specialized a role each of us plays. Men of different skills, expressing similar ideas as proponents of ecomanagement,

can talk the same language, and such communication produces the rich dynamism of 'edge effects'. This interaction may be the ecologist's salvation. If specialists can be outward-looking as well and ecologists can communicate with them quickly, breadth of front can be deep also. Then ecologists will be able to take their place at the council table as socially conscious people capable of adjustment and compromise in a complex world where politics is a major ecological factor in the total environment.<sup>73</sup>

As transnational awareness of living-problems in common becomes heightened, we should view seriously such possibilities as a single international monetary/energy standard and "a hydrogen economy"<sup>74</sup> that could greatly assist our keeping track of resources in our intricate global household. I believe that, as the community of man coalesces in the interest of survival, money will eventually represent entitlement to various forms of earthbound energy. With such a conviction, I justified the focus on energy in the development of this article. It seems to me that such a focus in environmental management will

73. F. Fraser Darling, "A Wider Environment of Ecology and Conservation," *Daedalus* 96 (Fall 1967), pp. 1003-19, quote on p. 1018.

74. J. O'M. Bockris, "A Hydrogen Economy," *Science*, June 23, 1972, p. 1323.

assure the connection of each multifaceted point to our common concern of *productivity*.

The oneness of our ecosphere can only be understood when we recognize its common denominators. Toward that level of awareness, we should remove disciplinary blinders—especially from ecology and economics because they are principally integrative.<sup>75</sup> Used together,

they have the potential for providing the basic information we need for making astute ecomanagement decisions.

... you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient, but one of the principal parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the connection of things.

Epictetus

75. Paul B. Sears, "Human Ecology: A Problem in Synthesis," *Science*, December 10, 1954, pp. 959-63; Stanley A. Cain, "Human Ecology," Remarks at the Annual Meeting of

the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 29, 1966, U.S. Department of the Interior News Release, December 29, 1966, 12 pp.

# The Planning Syndrome in Western Culture

By CHRISTOPHER TUNNARD

ABSTRACT: The planning function embraces various postures and skills deriving not only from the natural and social sciences, but from the humanities, whence the artistic and cultural aspects lend color to the operation. One of its products, the city, has the longest history and has at times achieved a congenial and even inspiring setting for human affairs. In analysis, the components of the planning process emerge with Renaissance theory, but develop with the growth of nations and cities, colonization, and the birth of the great metropolis. New concepts bring changes in urbanized societies, but the pace of improvement slows as problems proliferate. The lack of social planning at last becomes apparent and, together with the realization that over-population and the side effects of industrial development threaten the continuation of life on earth, demands the view of the environment transcending the economic-physical approach of routine planning technology.

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PLANNING is a syndromic function, made up of strains that are not always easy to separate out—socio-economic, economic-physical—but whose concurrence is essential to the process if purely technical operations are eliminated from the concept. Successful planning is highly organizational; neglect of one factor or another—industrial location without housing, tourism without a transportation plan—can spell disaster. It works against the type of laissez-faire administration which has produced unchecked metropolitan growth and nowadays is pointing in all societies toward the centralization of operations through bureaucratic management—wherein lie the strengths and weaknesses of the whole system. The possible betrayal of individual freedoms remains a chimerical idea which haunts the entire literature of planned development. This can be overemphasized: it has only recently been recognized that cultural history shows little correspondence between lifestyles and physical patterns, or between behavior and the environment, at least to the extent that individual reactions to planned surroundings are various and unpredictable.<sup>1</sup>

We are dealing here not only with a complex operation, but with a set of changing phenomena. In an age of flush toilets, it is hard to imagine that life was at all possible at the court of Versailles, or that a seventeenth-century peasant of urban France could ever laugh or joke with his wife or neighbor in the appallingly overcrowded and insanitary conditions of a Paris *quartier*. Our way of living bears no relationship to theirs. The city changes in every generation or two—Paris itself was re-

built between 1850 and 1870. That this was the planning of a particular elite and would have been impossible to execute without dictatorial power does not gainsay the fact that the Paris created then has been in many ways infinitely more acceptable to the working class, whose passions the Haussmann plan was, incidentally, designed to curb.

Nations of cities and regions of cities exhibit diverse characteristics arising out of particular social climates. For modern man the most desirable monuments of the Middle Ages, according to Prosper Mérimée, were made possible only in places "where the people were religious, the clergy rich and the feudal overlords fond of lavish things."<sup>2</sup> Seldom have planned cities arisen from the concerted efforts of humble folk, although they have always been drawn into the operation as elements of the labor force. The creation of a human environment for the general welfare is a relatively new concept in the history of ideas.

In the realm of the physical, form and function occasionally mesh, although it is astonishing how man has been made to suffer from the inconvenience and poor planning of his cities and towns. An early model for suitability of premises may have been used in New Kingdom Egypt, where the temple economy was intimately bound up with that of the town, and since the temple was considered to be the actual home of the god, it formed a focal point and an incentive to settlement.<sup>3</sup> There was no intention of creating an ideal city—

2. As quoted by V. Ivanov, "Monuments and Society," in *Symposium on Monuments and Society*, Leningrad, USSR (Paris: International Council on Monuments and Sites, 1971), p. 18.

3. Barry J. Kemp, "Temple and Town in Ancient Egypt," in Ucko, Tringham, and Dimbleby, eds., *Man, Settlement and Urbanism* (London: Duckworth, 1972), pp. 668-76.

1. Thomas A. Reiner, "The Planner as Value Technician," in H. Wentworth Eldredge, ed., *Taming Megalopolis* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1967), vol. 1, p. 267.

merely a rapidly built-up arrangement of mud-brick dwellings and workshops—but at El Amarna, which is one of the few Egyptian settlements that has been excavated so far, and which had a two-tier economic system based on the temple and on private landholders—farm produce had to be on hand at all times—the plan appears to complement the social life which investigations are beginning to reveal. North-south axes twenty-five to thirty meters across served as thoroughfares to the center for public assembly, but each neighborhood, in which all classes mingled, founded its own plan within a loose framework. Spaces were left for wells and local markets, a pattern which was adopted much later in the Arab world. Barry J. Kemp calls the resulting claustrophilia “the essence of successful community living” and hints that the domestication of plants and animals may have arisen in such situations, lending credence to an idea recently aired that domestication was an innovation of cities rather than their prerequisite.<sup>4</sup>

This settlement may have worked well enough in its short life, since the main preoccupations of its residents were to be in contact with one's master, one's source of supply, one's family and one's working groups, according to the Egyptologist H. Stevenson Smith. However, El Amarna scarcely exhibits a philosophy of living, in spite of its startlingly “modern” superblocks; Western civilization provides this some eight hundred years later. To the ancient Greeks the city was primarily a political idea, so that there was not much distinction between the built-up center and the surrounding territory; the extent of the *polis* included both town and country. The term “synoecism” means “settling together,” and al-

though there might have been a central government, there could also have been independent groups of tribes living in villages, with their own cults and a certain amount of self-rule. In a pastoral democracy, observed Aristotle, the flocks of the farmers move freely about in the city and in the agora; even in the outlying districts the cattleherders can readily come to the assembly. Arguing that the polis was a creation of nature, Aristotle thought of the city as growing naturally and being run like a household, a process for which the term “organic” is perhaps best suited. Plato had said that the individual in the state exists to perform his natural function, a concept which has been challenged by skeptics of present-day environmentalism who find the use of laws of the natural environment as a moral code for man to be an over-extension of the organic metaphor. In any case, all this changed in Hellenistic and Roman times, when privileged status was given to the built-up area; foundation rites were practiced by the Romans; and a dichotomy between town and country was artificially maintained.

One cannot expect the planning of cities to have been treated as a purely rational act even as late as medieval times. Certainly the city itself possessed mystical significance, and in many societies rites were performed in times of disaster or triumph. One of the most common was a purification rite held in that part of the city where a crime had been committed. In Venice, the annual ceremony of the Wedding of the Adriatic, initiated in the tenth century, was continued throughout the days of the Republic. The vision of the city became entwined with the paradise legend, and although the city of man had been cursed as venial and everyone remembered the fall of Rome, nevertheless the heavenly city was the

4. See Jane Jacobs, *The Economy of Cities* (London: Random House, 1970).

model.<sup>5</sup> The journey was from Eden to Jerusalem; the garden was to be replaced with streets and squares of beryl, onyx, and chrysoprase. This was to be the meeting place with God. "In the middle of the city grows the Tree of Life and the gates of it shall never be shut" (Isa. 60:11). There was a belief that the world could be made over again in the form of a city. This was the vision of the Age of Faith.

#### EMERGENCE OF MODERN PLANNING

The strains that compose the modern planning syndrome have their origins in the growth of science, in the conception of the city as an independent unit, and in the utopian vision which begins in the Laws and the Critias. One may date as one chooses the time when art was separated from religion—the secularization of art is discernible in the High Renaissance—business from culture—not so early—and the practical from the aesthetic; but certainly modern planning both profits and suffers from the specialization of interests which have proliferated over the last five hundred years.

The acts of faith are of a very different kind. There is, for instance, the belief in individual genius, which has produced some of the most admired items in Western cultural patrimony. To be a recognized authority in the beginning, one had to work hard and have a patron. Later the state or the municipality became the patron—these bodies still play their favorites—but in Leon Battista Alberti's time it was Piero de Medici; and for Antonio Averlino Filarete, the author of the architectural Utopia Sforzinda, it was a duke of Milan. Alberti was first in line and ranged so widely that it is unwise to call him a specialist; yet he excelled in all fields. He is not to be

called a utopian; ironically enough, he used Plato to prove it. When Plato was asked where the perfect republic was to be found, that, said Alberti, was not a thing he troubled himself about. All he studied was how to frame the best that could possibly be, "and that which deviates least from a resemblance to this ought to be preferred above all the rest."<sup>6</sup> Alberti was the first to define the street as an architectural entity, the square as a structural unit, and the city as a work of art in proportion to the fitness of its parts. After him came a long line of planners with physical or visual preoccupations, civic designers if you will. One thinks of Sebastian Le Prestre de Vauban and his work on military towns enshrined in the Musée des Plans Reliefs in Paris, of John Nash and his transformation of the West End of London, of Karl Friedrich Schinkel in Berlin, of Daniel H. Burnham in Manila and Chicago, of Sir Edwin Lutyens in New Delhi, and of Henri Prost with his new towns in Morocco.

As invention followed invention and new techniques developed, so did the possibilities for new forms of living. Alberti's theory of perspective was utilized in town planning as well as in painting. Topographical art gave people a new view of the street as well as the skyline. A hundred years after Alberti, Gerhard Kremer Mercator made the first scientific map of the known world based on topographical surveys and astronomical observations. Geological studies were no longer hampered by the edict to believe the story that Noah's flood was responsible for fossil remains. Florentine bankers built villas on the hills outside of town and patronized the art of gardening with a variety of new plants brought

5. Jacques Ellul, *The Meaning of the City*, trans. D. Pardee (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1970), p. 159 ff.

6. As quoted by Joan Gadol, *Leon Battista Alberti: Universal Man of the Early Renaissance* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 235.

first from the Middle East and later from all parts of the world. Exploration and discovery led to the planting of colonies by Portugal, Spain, France, and England in virgin continents, where occasionally the plans for new towns echoed the architectural utopias of Renaissance designers. More often they were simple gridirons, with little differentiation between the parts of the plan, although they might be accompanied by most elaborate forts. This type of plan, so easily envisaged and transferred to the ground, became a mark of colonial settlement. There is some evidence to show that Thomas Jefferson chose a rectangular system for the division of the Western Lands because he thought it could be easily mastered and applied by untutored agents on the plains, just as he favored a decimal system of coinage as being easily understood by a largely rural population.

Geometric division of property, private and public, lends itself to easy land sale and transfer, but the notion that private property should come under community controls, now familiar to us in zoning ordinances, is absent outside utopian thinking, which produced communistic societies in Europe during the Reformation and brought Shaker communities in the United States as early as the 1770s.

The late eighteenth century is important in our story; the significant strains in modern planning emerge at about that time.

In 1946 a distinguished architectural critic drew attention to "the spirit and practice of Improvement," dating its inception to 1766 with the publication of John Gwynn's *London and Westminster Improved*.<sup>7</sup> Far from being utopian, this plan nevertheless forecast many features of the modern map of

London and included proposals that were echoed in the landmark County of London Plan of 1943. Shortly after 1800, London was the first modern city to reach a population of one million. With population growth came lighting and paving acts, street widening and bridge-building, and residential squares and terraces. In spite of the fact that improvement in Gwynn's day was usually an act of pecuniary self-interest on the part of an influential landowner, the development in question often required parliamentary legislation for its effectuation and thereby brought governmental deliberations into planning. The important building and road acts stem from the early days of improvement, and although there was no one body responsible for London's welfare as a whole until 1855 when the forerunner of today's Greater London Council was created—the Metropolitan Board of Works—there was a certain amount of concerted effort and action in the city and elsewhere, when, say, the cutting of a new street required an ad hoc act of Parliament for compulsory acquisition of the property it was to occupy.

Improvement was born while private abutting owners, in states like Connecticut, were still being required to pave the section of turnpike adjoining their land, which resulted in horrific conditions and unpredictable journeys through the countryside. But the idea soon caught on in countries outside England, and although a city like Paris or Budapest would have its own priorities and method of financing the work, metropolitan improvement together with railroad-building became a mark of nineteenth-century cities everywhere, and demanded flotation of municipal bonds and new concepts of running metropolitan affairs. The results might vary in appearance, since the century was notable for successive waves of architectural fashion, but what was

7. John Summerson, *Georgian London* (London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 151 ff.



done remains constant in the municipal planner's *vade mecum*—street widening, park systems, government centers, and so on. Tentatively, metropolitan improvement began to embrace housing, as in the Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act of 1864 in Queen Victoria's reign. Metropolitan improvement is still a dominant theme in the cities, and those critics of modern urban renewal who often with justification complain about its results may not realize that there is little that is novel in the operation, beyond a twist of governmental financing in aid of private development, to distinguish it from countless earlier civic enterprises attempted since the city became a national institution.

Improvement is usually for now, while planning is for the future. Nevertheless, public works will always dominate the capital budget program of any city and are an essential factor in the employment sector of the economy. Improvement may have a planning component, as witness the park reports of Frederick Law Olmsted or the San Francisco and Cleveland reports of Daniel Burnham, but the principle remains the same—past, present, and future—the improvement of property values combined with a promise of urban husbandry.

#### REFORMERS AND UTOPIANS

Concurrent with the earliest attempts at metropolitan improvement ran the substratum of reform. Although predominantly of the rising middle class, reformers took their lead from the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1801–85), whose interest in the liberties of the insane, in child labor laws, in the factory acts, and in housing, marked the parliamentary career of an exceptional Tory radical. Edwin Chadwick in public health, Frederick Engels on the housing question, John Ruskin on the workingman's

education, and William Morris on the dangers of urban sprawl were aided by the social novelists Charles Dickens, Charles Kingsley, and in America, William Dean Howells. In Europe and the United States, reformers spurred government action, while the problems mounted and multiplied. Not until near the end of the nineteenth century did any country find it necessary to build housing for the poor out of public funds, while in the United States, tenement house reform and the establishment of settlement houses seemed to be the answer. Britain's first attempts to finance housing out of the rates (taxes) were modest indeed. Perhaps the most original effort, and one which best characterizes the reform movement there, was Ebenezer Howard's Garden City, to be built by private enterprise and emphasizing the principles of a consumer cooperative. In the United States, the consolidation of the five boroughs into Greater New York, the long fight for which was spurred by Andrew Haswell Green, bears all the marks of a reform movement, as does the housing movement of the 1930s, which culminated in the public housing act of 1937.

Urban reformers are rather practical people, known in the past for introducing five-cent streetcar fares and free milk in schools; the dreamers are of another category. Utopia and dystopia—the one born of hopes for a better world, the other of disillusion and despair—have been a part of the cultural stream in the civilized West for centuries. There is always a planning element in utopia, albeit the main object may be something quite different—perhaps civil or religious liberty; Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* presented a vision of both. Architectural utopias tend to be all physical planning, whereas social utopias tend to revert to the vision of the paradise garden, as in

Aldous Huxley's last book, *Island*. Dystopias are always prisons of one sort or another, with Big Brother looking over the shoulder of everyone present, while the other worlds of science fiction are usually inhabited by Pavlovian dummies or robots trapped in political systems that scarcely match the scientific components of the author's invention in their ingenuity.

Utopian thinking has always influenced planning; it exhibits the daring quality needed for change. As Lord North complained: "Young men, for want of experience, . . . create Utopias in their own imagination, and calculate according to their present fancy."<sup>8</sup> In presenting alternatives to the life now led, the goals of planning have been held in question, and "the young men" and women of this generation have been utopian in the best sense of the word: in challenging the racial and environmental aspects of their society. They, in turn, have been influenced by earlier utopias, especially political ones. Seldom have any been as popular in their own day as Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1887); here it was the author's espousal of socialism, rather than his vision of the future Boston, which won the large audience. In our own generation, the Goodman brothers' (Paul and Percival) *Communitas* has presented a way of life that counters the bigness of industrial capitalism and has made a very wide impression on the youth of college age.

The manifest danger in utopian thought is that it may turn people away from immediate problems. Yet because it must deal in concepts, there can always be a salutary effect. No one could really enjoy the life described in *Walden II*, even though it embodies the progressist concepts of space, light, and air advocated by Fourier and Godin.

8. Lord North, *Lives* (London, 1734), vol. 2, p. 364.

Yet, because the trend is toward the dispersal of populations, this model, in tracing the ultimate, may well give pause to those who heedlessly advocate decentralized living. Utopia can also provide a goal. In a period that is notable for a settlement pattern gone out of control, the intuitive approach can provide imaginative solutions. Nonetheless, most previous cultural advances have come from the clash of opinions in the streets and council chambers of the city itself, and the present-day crisis there seems to emphasize this as a continuing fact of civilization.

#### NEW CONCURRENT STRAINS

If physical planning has been accepted as a governmental responsibility for half a century and economic planning since the 1930s, the role of social planning has not yet been universally accepted. Indeed, there are many conflicts to be resolved; in Israel, for instance, while most economists were recommending a rather complete wage freeze and efforts to slow down the rising living standard, advocates of social integration demanded that large parts of the population increase their absolute and relative standards of living.<sup>9</sup> It is apparent to this writer, however, that once the present crisis-oriented approach to human welfare is replaced by a planned cooperation rather than a set of remedial measures, social planning will be revealed as the final strain in the planning syndrome.

Urban renewal showed us the debacle of human relationships often amounting to class warfare which could result from physical and economic planning alone. The rush toward twentieth-century industrialization in developing countries brought similar dislocations

9. B. Akzin and Y. Dror, *Israel: High-Pressure Planning* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 34.

and an unbalanced spatial growth of cities which produced new social phenomena like the *barriadas* of Lima and the *favellas* of Brazil. Nor have the developed nations escaped the consequences of lack of social planning. The deficiencies of housing policy in Western nations reflect this lack, while Soviet planners have not yet been able to achieve an optimum size of cities to counter the bigness and "inhuman conditions" of American cities—as they view them.<sup>10</sup>

There is no lack of new approaches of a different sort. Facet planning, comparative urbanism, regional planning, systems planning, and human engineering are some of the spin-offs. The last-named is only a glimpse on the horizon, since it involves transforming the human body into a cyborg with brain implantations, or manipulating the reproductive process to produce a desired human type. The implications for a planned society are obvious and so far, avoidable. There is, however, a danger involved in the current preoccupation with technique, not only on the part of planners, but of other segments of society. Fascination with technology is born of very human desires for material diversity, as well as for weaponry, space exploration, and mechanical equipment of dubious value. Belated realization that the cost in environmental and moral damage has been very great has encouraged new forms of facet planning—the planning of single function social activities—such as the revival of metropolitan mass transportation, land trusts and land banks, steady-state economic plans, and others. Forward motion, as George Steiner puts it, is being replaced as an ideal by cultural circularity in some quarters,

10. Jack C. Fisher, "Urban Planning in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," in Eldredge, *Taming Megalopolis*, vol. 2, p. 1079.

particularly in those of the New Left.<sup>11</sup> The recent debate between Herbert Marcuse and Sicco Mansholt, president of the European Economic Community and author of the controversial Mansholt Plan to retire thousands of acres of unproductive farm land was essentially between a Marxist using the weapon of ecology to beat the capitalist mule, and a Socialist who believes in reducing pollution and upgrading the lives of the world's poor while maintaining a lower growth rate than the currently desired 5 percent, anything above which, he thinks, would preclude these goals from being achieved. "I have plenty of sympathy for a life à la Robinson Crusoe," says Mansholt, "but I don't believe it is possible for more than three hundred million human beings."<sup>12</sup> The inability of society to solve the problem of exponential population growth, a characteristic of societies, bank interest, and capital investment, so far has prevented any hope of equilibrium in an essentially finite global system. It is no wonder that planners have had to reassess their goals in the light of shifting world opinion, but it is important at the same time to be using the right tools.

The reassessment began with man himself, spurring the trend to social planning already mentioned. There had always been the slogan "planning is for people," but not much attention had been given to finding out who people were. Following the writings of Oscar Lewis, Saul Alinsky, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Moynihan, and Michael Harrington, it began to be perceived that the social web was all too easily broken

11. George Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes Towards the Redefinition of Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

12. "Ecologie et Revolution," in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 397, June 19–25, 1972, p. VIII.

by planned intervention and that the city which resulted from this intervention was becoming a series of segregated areas, with communication between social groups artificially restricted. At the same time, city dwellers themselves were protesting against an unbalanced economic situation in city welfare services, resulting from costly militarized programs and an unbalanced tax situation. They resorted to novel forms of civil disobedience in protesting intrusions by public and private works, notably in highway planning, and lack of self-determination in the neighborhoods. The last-named brought advocacy planning to public notice and a new set of community service organizations and a Model Cities program promising increased neighborhood administrative power. "In extricating the city from preplanned control," concludes the Brandeis professor Richard Sennett in a new book, "men will become more in control of themselves and more aware of each other."<sup>13</sup> Like C. E. Lindblom, Sennett is a strong advocate of partisan mutual adjustment in the public sphere.

There will always be conflict of aim and method, which must be accepted if we are to avoid the open violence of recent years. It is true that the synthetic function of planning is often obscured in the advocacy process or reduced to a series of small, substantive steps. But the need for a comprehensive physical plan at all levels exists; it is as foolish to attempt a national urban growth policy without one as it would be to set out to build a new town. Not only in the area of land use relationships is a plan needed, but as in the best examples of the past, a strong

aesthetic component is needed too; since all the ultimate satisfactions in human life are aesthetic ones, according to the philosophers, this means that as Alberti saw and "Improvement" attempted, how one turns the corner or enters the marketplace can be given a meaning more or less socially valuable. Nor will the need for economic planning lessen, although the goals may change from GNP to GNH,<sup>14</sup> and the methods of analysis also. As Kenneth Boulding has put it, "there are striking parallels between the concepts of ecology and economics . . . for both devote themselves essentially to the study of how the interaction of individuals and species constitutes a total system."<sup>15</sup>

Avoidance of trend-oriented approaches that follow the lines of least resistance is the key to innovation in the planning field. Fascination with new models—there are already a host of social system models—or evaluation techniques initiated by the defense and space agencies, while they hold promise for administrative efficiency, must not obscure the pressing need to change the settlement pattern drastically. Vague objectives like "the good of the majority" or "better housing for all" must be cast into last season's political wastebasket; they are not adequate in a crisis situation. Above all, a new vision is needed. The new view of planning, if it comes, will be born of the constraints imposed by ecology and the liberation afforded by the adoption of coherent social policies.

14. "Gross national product to gross national happiness," a Mansholt phrase.

15. Kenneth Boulding, "Economics and Ecology," in F. Fraser Darling and John P. Milton, eds., *Future Environments of North America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1966), p. 225.

13. Richard Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1971), p. 198.

# Urbanization and Asian Lifestyles

By EUIYOUNG HAM

**ABSTRACT:** Nations of Asia, predominately made up of villages with rural life more the norm than city life, have been changing into lands of cities. The uniqueness of this urban growth in Asia is the universality of its nature and accelerated pace, caused primarily by the explosive increase of population and its shifts into cities. As a result, the immediate consequence of population concentration in Asian big cities in particular, without an adequate base of industrial and urban economies, is the inevitable deterioration of human environment, which affects the lifestyles of families and individuals in cities and rural villages as well. In other words, the patterns of life that provided for the orderly handling of many matters have to be compromised or shattered altogether. It must be recognized, however, that the urbanization process in Asian cities is playing a dynamic role, demonstrating a new spirit in the development of the urban community as well as in the process of modernization of a nation itself. Asian leaders are now convinced that planned urban growth, including the improvement of human environment, is a necessary condition for both a balanced economic growth and a new quality of life.

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WHAT is happening in Asia today is a rapid change in every aspect of everyday life—the transformation of old ways of life into new ways; rural, agricultural economies into industrial, urban economies; and traditional institutions into modernity. It is a common phenomenon, despite the varieties of culture and tradition, in most of the developing countries in Asia.<sup>1</sup> Although these changes are promising and significant in relation to Asia's century-old aspiration to modernity, the process nevertheless has brought many new experiences, more than a few of which have been troublesome as well as painful in their innovative effect on lifestyles in most Asian countries.

#### MODERNIZATION AND URBAN CHANGE

A good many of the new experiences are directly or indirectly associated with the process of urbanization; consequently, urban change is "the most important single external ecological manifestation" of modernization in the contemporary developing countries of the world.<sup>2</sup> Nations of Asia, by and large, had been like much of the rest of the world—predominately made up of villages, with rural life the norm more than city life. This is rapidly changing: Asia of the '70s will be a land of cities, and those cities "are coming more and more to resemble Occidental cities."<sup>3</sup> This urban growth, essentially a post-war kind of development, has been accelerated in the last two decades, and the trend seems likely to continue to

intensify. A number of factors account for this sudden increase in the pace of urbanization in Asia. For one thing, the pressures growing out of the post-war population boom resulted in the distribution of people.<sup>4</sup> Existing cities with large populations increased in size at the same time that numerous new cities were being created. The urban population throughout Asia has, in the last three decades, more than tripled. The population of Seoul, the capital city of Korea, for instance, increased more than six times—from 940 thousand in 1944<sup>5</sup> to nearly 6 million at present. Such rapid growth is common in Asia. In 1920, Asia's urban population in the cities of 20 thousand or more inhabitants was only 6 percent of its total population. In 1960, its population in the cities of 2 thousand or more rose to 21 percent and is expected to reach 50 percent by the year A.D. 2000.<sup>6</sup> This means that more than 1,935 million Asians, one-third of the world population, may be expected to live in urban environments in sizable cities by the end of this century.

Urban growth is neither a new phenomenon nor restricted to a few regions of the world. The uniqueness of the current urban growth in Asia is rather its geographic spread and its explosive tempo. The present pace of Asian ur-

4. Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," in S. F. Fava, ed., *Urbanism in World Perspective: A Reader* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), pp. 40–41.

5. Rhee Jon-Mo, "A Study of Population Problems in Seoul—Reference to Labor Force," in C. I. Eugene Kim, ed., *Aspects of Social Change in Korea* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Korean Research and Publications, Inc., 1969), p. 130.

6. See International Union of Local Authorities, *Urbanization in Developing Countries: Report of a Symposium*, held at Noordwijk, Netherlands in December 1967 (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 12.

1. In this paper, Asia refers only to those developing countries in the areas of South, Southeast, and Far East excluding Japan except for occasional references.

2. S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 10.

3. See a French geographer, Jean Chesneau's article on Asian urban inhabitants, partially translated by J. E. Spencer, "Changing Asiatic Cities," *Geographic Review* 41, no. 2 (April 1951), p. 336.

banization, apparently much more rapid than that generally experienced in the West, may be an encouraging indicator of industrialized modern nation-building for Asians, since "big city," "megapolis," or "urban sprawl" have often been associated with economically advanced nations. There is considerable evidence, on the other hand, that the urban change Asians are experiencing could be a disruptive process.<sup>7</sup> For instance, the traditional village ways of life are pressured to adapt to new urban ways of life. This transformation—which is, in effect, a reorganizing of societal structures and functions in order to conform to changing urban settings, and which involves all manner of lifestyles—can be either a rewarding or a totally frustrating experience for Asians, as it affects many aspects of their political, economic, and socio-cultural ways of life. In fact, this process of urbanization, in Asia as well as in other developing countries in the world, warrants, on the one hand, optimism for expectant economic well-being, while, at the same time, it suggests to many a sense of alarm and concern, as change may bring in its wake serious social disorganization.

#### CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES

What, then, are the major factors which are responsible for the current acceleration of urban growth in Asia? The factors are many, and they may not be explained by means of a simple comparison with the experience of Western urbanization. Still, some argue that "except for its larger scale," Asia's urbanization process does not differ sig-

nificantly from that of the West, "where cities also grew, especially in the earlier stages of modern industrialization and urbanization, more through migration than through natural increase and where there was serious overcrowding . . . before employment, housing, and municipal services began to catch up with booming city populations."<sup>8</sup> However, many seem to agree with the other view that "it would be risky to assume that the patterns observed in the West necessarily apply to Asia."<sup>9</sup>

In the West, the urban change accompanied the development of industrial and urban economies, which provided the "pull" of jobs for migrants into the cities. On the contrary, in Asia, urbanward migration has been occurring while population pressure is extremely high and levels of living low, and industrial and urban economies are insufficient for the swelling city population. In current Asian urbanization the push factors have been more significant than the pull factors compared with the West, although many tend to argue that push and pull factors in Asia are difficult to differentiate.<sup>10</sup> The point such observers make is that "what causes migration is the difference between rural and urban livelihood op-

8. Rhoads Murphey, "Urbanization in Asia," in Breese, *The City: Readings*, p. 66.

9. Philip M. Hauser, "World and Asian Urbanization in Relation to Economic Development and Social Change," in Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, Proceedings of the Joint UN/UNESCO Seminar in cooperation with the International Labour Office on Urbanization in ECAFE Region, Bangkok, August 8-18, 1956 (Calcutta, India: UNESCO, Research Center on the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia, 1957), chap. 3, p. 86.

10. There are many similar views: for example, see N. V. Sovani, "The Analysis of 'Over-Urbanization,'" in Breese, *The City: Readings*, p. 328; and also see Gerald Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 80.

7. See Lucian W. Pye, "The Political Implications of Urbanization and the Development Process," in Gerald Breese, ed., *The City in Newly Developing Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Urbanization* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 401-406.

portunities."<sup>11</sup> This is true to an extent, but there are certainly many other factors which cannot be ignored.

For a simple illustration of this Asian situation, it seems appropriate to quote an observation made by Barbara Ward. A farm girl, who left the village for the city life in Hong Kong, has gained—in her own eyes and in those of her friends in the villages she left—"freedom from the ceaselessness of toil in the villages and the access to glamour and excitement."<sup>12</sup> Ward's characterization reflects both the push from the countryside and the pull to the city. Most Asian farmers, living at or near the base subsistence level, would share this motivation, that is, "to make good in the material sense" in any place. The subsistence level of agricultural economy tends to push already overcrowded rural peoples to the cities. Even the modernization of agriculture results in a surplus of farmhands who are likely to seek city jobs which seem to them, at the moment at least, better than farming. Furthermore, those rural youths who have become educated are more often than not inclined to look for the chance of a new, more rewarding life in the cities instead of the physically demanding peasant life in the villages.

Those migrants to the cities are well aware of possible misfortune and disillusionment in their city lives; unemployment, life in overcrowded slums, poverty, and lack of amenities have not yet discouraged them. The fact is that even though industrial outputs in the developing countries in Asia have been increased, because of the intensive nature of their new industrialization, in-

dustrial job opportunities for migrants have always been limited. In consequence, most new migrants find their first employment in the "unorganized industrial sector," in retail trading, tertiary activities, domestic services, and varieties of more or less casual work.<sup>13</sup> Whatever the in-migrants do in the cities, however, even when their urban jobs are not very productive in nature, their incomes appear to be better than they had been previously in their rural employments.

#### "Over-urbanization"

Thus, depending upon a new location to somehow provide better livelihood opportunities, the migrants are pushed from the rural areas and at the same time pulled to the cities, even though some have to be "pushed back"<sup>14</sup> to where they originally came from because of either unemployment or incapability to adjust otherwise to city life. This means, in effect, that the shift of these people who look for a better life in the cities is not due to industrial and economic development, as may often be the case in the West. As a result of these characteristics—a strong rural push rather than an urban pull, or the demand for labor by industrial and urban economies, as well as the consequent problems of unemployment and employment in low productivity—urbanization in Asia has frequently been referred to as "over-urbanization" or "pseudo-urbanization."<sup>15</sup> This term has been variously defined, but it sim-

13. For a detailed account of this situation, see Wellisz, "Economic Development and Urbanization."

14. Ashish Bose, "The Urbanization Process in South and Southeast Asia," in Jakobson and Prakash, *Urbanization and National Development*, pp. 100-101.

15. Gerald M. Desmond, "The Impact of National and Regional Development Policies on Urbanization," in Jakobson and Prakash, *Urbanization and National Development*, p. 60.

11. Stanislaw H. Wellisz, "Economic Development and Urbanization," in Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash, eds., *Urbanization and National Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 44.

12. Barbara Ward, "The Surge to the Towns," *UNESCO Courier* (September 1964), p. 5.



ply implies that under these circumstances, the rapid rate of urbanization is not only economically unhealthy, but dangerous because a high rate of unemployment or underemployment might cause a serious breakdown of the social lifestyles. It has been argued, however, that "what is considered over-urbanization from one point of view may not be from another."<sup>16</sup> It may be a harmful symptom from the standpoint of balanced economic development, but also it may be an encouraging sign of modernization for a country aspiring toward rapid achievement in economic as well as social developments.

Whether greater urbanization will speed up economic development in Asia or not is as yet unclear, although much has been said about the correlation between economic growth and urbanization. The available evidence certainly suggests a high correlation of the two among Asian countries. For example, both the Republic of Korea and Nationalist China on the island of Taiwan—the most rapidly developing countries in Asia—have achieved relatively successful economic growth and have growing urban populations, large metropolitan areas, expanding industrial production, and some indication of a decline in the rate of overall population increase.<sup>17</sup> These characteristics are the signs usually "associated with modernization, industrialization, and urbanization."<sup>18</sup> Similar signs may be seen in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. On the other hand, India, Pakistan, and Burma have low urban ratios as well as low rates of economic development. In contrast to these nations with their slow growth and change patterns, Thailand has been picking up

speed in both economic growth and urbanization.<sup>19</sup>

Along with over-urbanization, Asia's urban growth is also characterized by the phenomenon of "primate city." This concentration of urban population in one or two large metropolitan areas in each country may be recognized in such Asian cities as Rangoon, Manila, Seoul, and Djakarta. Although "metropolises" or "Great Cities" began to appear after the Industrial Revolution in the West, Asian metropolises made their appearance well in advance of their industrial development. Because of this, such cities have often been regarded as premature or atypical in their development patterns as compared with those of the West—an Asian version of over-urbanization.

These primate cities in Asia, actually the products of colonization by European powers, have overgrown into sprawling metropolitan centers, most of which are today serving as capital cities, centers of industrial, commercial, and trading enterprises, political organizations, and cultural activities.<sup>20</sup> This phenomenon of the Asian big city could be viewed positively as "a characteristic of a given stage of development, subject to transformation as develop-

19. By 1980, the proportion of urban and rural populations of these countries will be: China-Taiwan (urban population will be 67.7% in 1980), South Korea (44.9%), Malaysia (45.3%), the Philippines (37.4%), Singapore (75.0%), India (20.4%), Indonesia (21.0%), Burma (19.8%), and Thailand (25.6%). The data are quoted from the Urban and Rural Population Projections, Asian ECAFE Region: 1970-1980, prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations in the special issue: *Asia's Population Problem in 1970's*, in the *Asian Quarterly* (February 1971), p. 156.

20. About the development of these cities in "the Asiatic triangle—Pakistan to Japan," including India and China, see Norton S. Ginsburg, "Urban Geography and 'Non-Western Areas,'" in Breese, *The City: Readings*, pp. 413-35.

16. Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, p. 134.

17. Desmond, "Impact of Policies on Urbanization," p. 71.

18. Ibid.

ment proceeds," since any city has its "optimum size, beyond which it becomes less efficient."<sup>21</sup> Urban environments and lifestyles in all these big Asian cities share many problems, some of which are quite new experiences for many Asians.

#### LIFE IN THE BIG CITY

Most Asians seem to be proud of and at the same time wary of their expanding metropolises. The capital city tends to be a new country's image to the outside world.<sup>22</sup> Their pride is evident in the remark of a Korean student to an outside observer: "If you want to understand Korea, study Seoul."<sup>23</sup> Cities are important politically for Asians because they feel that whoever controls the big cities will control the whole country, since the political future of a country is generally thought to be determined in the city.

The physical appearance as well as the functions of Asian big cities, especially their central areas, are similar in many ways to those of Western cities. However, except for Singapore and Hong Kong, in demographic and territorial terms, most of them are "only part of a much larger nation."<sup>24</sup> Each of them, posing as "capital and nerve-center" to the countryside and "face" to the outside world, looks somewhat like "a sort of sociological island, or peninsula, an alien intrusion into . . .

[a] subsistence-minded hinterland."<sup>25</sup> Although they contain many of the problems of over-urbanization or the primate city, their lifestyles are relatively modern compared with those of the rural hinterland. For the rural people, the urban centers are symbols of success, opportunity, and the good life; and they generally believe that the only way to share and obtain these things is to hurry into the cities and, by whatever means, to become urbanites themselves.

Disregarding for the moment the eventual benefits of urban growth, the immediate consequence of population concentration in a big city is the inevitable deterioration of human environment, affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands. The congestion of city life is quite a new experience for rural-oriented in-migrants. Most big cities in Asia, like those in other developing countries, have similar city structures—"the agricultural urban shell with a nucleus in which all important functions take place"; and usually the city is shaped "with the best toward the center and the worst toward the periphery." Because of this tendency, the central area's density becomes high, which in turn leads to the intensity of land use, and to high land prices. As a result, land and buildings become "the most profitable financial investment"; this inevitably stimulates "even more density and crowding"; thus, "the main body of the city is compressed and the nucleus is more and more congested."<sup>26</sup>

21. Wellisz, "Economic Development and Urbanization," p. 41.

22. Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, p. 40.

23. See Herbert R. Barringer, "Increasing Scale and Changing Social Character in Korea," in Scott Greer et al., eds., *The New Urbanization* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 62.

24. T. G. McKee, "Catalysts or Cancers? The Role of Cities in Asian Society," in Jakobson and Prakash, *Urbanization and National Development*, p. 158.

25. F. William Howton, "Cities, Slums, and Acculturative Process in the Developing Countries," in Paul Meadows and E. H. Mizruchi, eds., *Urbanism, Urbanization, and Change: Comparative Perspectives* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 432.

26. Jorge Arango, *The Urbanization of the Earth* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 50-51.

This congestion in the city is a new experience for many Asians. Traffic jams, deficient transportation, housing shortage, insufficient water supply, inadequate sanitation systems, and now polluted air, are tolerated as part of the price one pays for urban ways of life. A foreign observer, for example, experienced the Asian congestion as he reached the city of Seoul, when he was overwhelmed by "literally hundreds of walking people" and "jumping children" and consequent "hazardous driving." However, the water shortage appeared to be the most serious problem facing him in his life in Seoul for, as he humorously remarked, "Running for water was more the rule than running water"; and he was also surprised to see "the firemen have to bring their own water tanks."<sup>27</sup> Any improvement in these urban essentials, however, seems to be slow in coming because of the continuous increase of city populations.

Furthermore, most in-migrants have difficulty finding jobs suitable for their needs. Even if employed, many of them, as mentioned earlier, are either underemployed or "redundant" labor.<sup>28</sup> In fact, most of them, looking for a better chance in the city, found they have exchanged "a miserable rural subsistence for urban living at an even lower level,"<sup>29</sup> in addition to finding themselves in a strange environment never dreamed of in the village. This is a life among "Calcutta's pavement dwellers, Hong Kong's packed tenement,

Manila's stilt-shanty slums, or Saigon's refugee settlements,"<sup>30</sup> as well as in Seoul's mushrooming squatter settlements. These are the most impressive but awesome urban scenes in most Asian big cities, in stark contrast to the multi-story modern buildings in administrative and commercial centers. Consequently, the lifestyles of families and individuals are forced to change as they adapt for survival.

### *Slum conditions*

It has been reported that, even by moderate estimate, one- to two-thirds of a big city's population in Asia must be considered to live in slums.<sup>31</sup> The living conditions are also at an unbelievably low level compared with Western standards. In Seoul, for instance, "a ten by ten foot" room, shared by four adults, is used "as a market place during a day and a combination kitchen-dining room-bedroom at other times."<sup>32</sup> Regardless of whether their settlements may be considered permanent or temporary, in the city they do not have the amenities of urban life, and any improvement in the supply of urban amenities tends to attract more people into the city. Thus these cities increasingly become centers of escalated congestion and deterioration.

Urban migrants, moreover, although they are within the city, do not quite

27. See Jerome Breunig, S.J., *Have You Had Your Rice Today?* (Chicago, Ill.: Loyola Press, 1964), pp. 7, 41, 8, respectively.

28. Dennis McElrath, "Introductory: The New Urbanism," in Greer et al., *The New Urbanization*, p. 4. For a case of Malaya, see Hamzah Sendut, "The Structure of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia's Capital City," in Breese, *The City: Readings*, p. 473.

29. International Union of Local Authorities, *Urbanization in Developing Countries*, p. 15.

30. See Aprodicio A. Laquian, "Slums and Squatters in South and Southeast Asia," in Jakobson and Prakash, *Urbanization and National Development*, p. 183.

31. International Union of Local Authorities, *Urbanization in Developing Countries*, p. 16.

32. Breunig, S. J., *Rice Today?*, p. 143. In some Asian cities, "families that occupy a single room may subdivide it by horizontal and vertical partitions and sublet the resulting windowless cubicles to other families." See Robert C. Cook, "The World's Great Cities: Evolution or Revolution?," in Meadows and Mizruchi, *Urbanism: Comparative Perspectives*, p. 47.

feel part of it. They tend to see the city "with peasant eyes, unaware of the requirements of time, money, and urban skills."<sup>33</sup> Without being adequately equipped to deal in any manner with urban ways of life, most of them end up as marginal members of the urban environment without having any reasonable chance of coping. Within the city, the inhabitants appear to be thus divided, according to their lifestyles, work experiences, and wealth, into old residents and newcomers, skilled and unskilled, and ultimately, rich and poor. Consequently, the Asian big city must be characterized by the duality of its city life, that is, the wider gap between the lifestyles of the urban rich and a majority, the urban poor. It is the few urban rich who have the means to enjoy urbanism as a modern way of life. To a very large degree, they are the only true beneficiaries of urbanization at present. Only the urban rich, for instance, can afford private cars, either imported or locally assembled, which have prices usually "two or three times higher" than those in the West.<sup>34</sup> They are thus able to move out of the congested inner city to the suburbs, or build exclusive residential areas of their own, far away from the areas of slums and squatter settlements.

There is, however, a sign of the growing urban middle class, whose conspicuous spending behavior has been noticed as a change "towards fitting the model of the Western urban way of life."<sup>35</sup> But this type of social change is not occurring among the urban poor, which constitutes not only the lower class, but also a clear majority of the Asian urban community. According to a recent social survey, for example, the lifestyle of this lower class in Seoul

"appear[s] to be more similar to farmers than to their middle or urban class compatriots," which means, in other words, that social change in Korea is occurring only rarely in any but the middle and upper classes within urban areas.<sup>36</sup> Changes are not occurring in the rural areas or in the urban lower class.

This points up another side of the wider gap between the urban and rural lifestyles. Although the situation in Korea has been considerably improved, the cleavage remains, nevertheless, in each of the Asian countries. They have been divided into a static traditional rural community and a dynamic changing urban counterpart.

This cleavage or fission has been seen also in life in the city itself. For instance, the traditional, patriarchal, extended family system in Korea has had to give way to the urban family of a congenial, smaller unit; even marriage, which used to be arranged by matchmakers, has been gradually changing to "the free selection of mate," and this in effect reflects a social behavior negating the traditional parental authorities.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the process of urbanization has brought not only the reorganization of the family structure, but also increasing rapid alienation in urban communities between the generations. The patterns of life that provided for the orderly handling of many matters have to be compromised or shattered altogether.

Moreover, owing to the unbalanced changes in interpersonal relationships among the urban populace, many signs of social disorganization are evident in other areas of the urban life; these include various forms of delinquency,

36. Herbert R. Barringer, "Social Change and Social Differentiation in Korea," in Kim, *Aspects of Social Change in Korea*, p. 224.

37. Yim Seong-hi, "Changing Patterns in Korean Family Structure," in Kim, *Aspects of Social Change in Korea*, p. 40.

33. McElrath, "Introductory," p. 6.

34. Arango, *Urbanization of the Earth*, p. 51.

35. McGee, "Catalysts or Cancers?" p. 166.

crime, perversion, anxiety, and frustration. A report, indicating that it is the urban crowd composed primarily of new in-migrants that was responsible for the increased urban crimes in Calcutta and Baghdad, says: "In a Big City, a person from a village loses his niche. These are the people that become lost souls."<sup>38</sup>

Thus, with deteriorating human environment, cleavages, and pathological social behaviors in Asian big cities, and without any real basis for any immediate improvement in sight, it is evident that there is a potential source of political violence and social unrest. These problems will almost certainly become more disruptive fissures under the pressure of population and poverty. On a more optimistic note, Asia's urbanization could serve to give a positive momentum toward modern nation-building, if the current urban change is thought of as a symptom of a strong thrust for social change and modernization. The cleavage as well as dysfunctional social behavior could be regarded not as "disorganization in the usual sense of anonymous urban masses," but as "a highly fractured social structure lacking the necessary ties which bind together each person's web of affiliation into a viable community."<sup>39</sup> Many studies of life in slums and squatter settlements, for instance in Manila, found out that, contrary to the popular view of the possible involvement of squatters and slum dwellers in riots and social unrest, they were exhibiting more neighborly intimacy, a strong "we" feeling, and psychosocial security.<sup>40</sup> Of course, variations in city governance will generate exceptions, but if the urbanization processes in big cities in Asia are observed on a

comparative basis with the rural areas, it must be recognized that urban change is playing a dynamic role. There are many evidences demonstrating the more than occasional manifestation of a new "spirit" in the development of an urban community as well as in the process of modernization of a nation itself.<sup>41</sup>

#### PLANNING FOR FUTURE

The growing tendency in the developing countries of Asia, as brought out in many international seminars on urban growth and national developmental planning, is to see most urban problems as inevitable as well as challenging. In other words, Asian big cities are expected to play a crucial role in the development of their nations. Asians are now convinced that planned urban growth, including the improvement of human environment, is a necessary condition for both a balanced economic growth and a new quality of life. Many Asian leaders are now convinced that it is necessary to make a concerted effort toward developing a national policy—one which is conscious of the population increase in the overcrowded slums as well as in the rural areas; rational, unbiased distribution of national resources for economic and urban development, and impartiality in the treatment of urban and rural social problems.<sup>42</sup>

41. See Bert F. Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of the Underdeveloped Countries," in Breece, *The City: Readings*, p. 234.

42. The planning problems are well summarized in Tarlok Singh, "Urban Development Policy and the Role of Governments and Public Authorities," in Jakobson and Prakash, *Urbanization and National Development*, pp. 229-40; and for a detailed account of the developmental process of Japan's urban planning and its administration, see Masahiko Honjo, "Urban Development Administration: The Case of Japan," in John D. Herbert and Alfred P. Van Huyck, eds., *Urban Planning in the Developing Countries* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 35-63.

38. Dan Behrman, "Understanding Man's Aggressiveness (3): The Big City Syndrome," *UNESCO Courier* (August-September 1970), p. 20.

39. McElrath, "Introductory," p. 8.

40. Laquian, "Slums and Squatters," p. 197.

Urban development policy ought not only to oversee the present rate of urban growth, but also to plan for future trends, envisioning the quality of life as it should be in well-conceived, planned, and productive urban communities. In the developing countries of Asia, the future well-being depends upon how effectively the people generally will support efforts to check the present rate of natural population increase in urban as well as in rural areas. As a pessimist argues, "if development is to take place" especially in those "poor" developing countries, "birth rate must be dropped,"<sup>43</sup> and this applies of course to all Asian countries. For instance, "to concentrate only on the policies to promote the growth rate of national output and neglect the population control policy," the Asian Development Bank in its study on Southeast Asia's economy in the 1970s states, "is to fight with one arm tied behind one's back."<sup>44</sup> It can safely be said, in short, that the control of population increase seems to be the key for Asian national development.

In addition to planning for population control, as rapid industrialization begins Asians must face another problem in their planning for the future city life—environmental pollution control.

43. Harris Brown, "After the Population Explosion," *Saturday Review*, June 26, 1971, p. 26.

44. Quoted in David L. Gamon, "Population Growth and National Development," *Department of State Bulletin* 65, no. 1677 (August 16, 1971), p. 178.

For instance, Tokyo's master plan (1970-75) has been cited as a unique example in its "emphasis on environmental pollution controls which are not now to be found in American master plans."<sup>45</sup> So it appears now that legal control for environmental pollution has become an integral part of urban planning.<sup>46</sup>

These Japanese experiences in urban development planning and pollution control could be instructive to the developing countries in Asia as long as they are interested in short cuts toward national development. This means, in effect, that Asian countries cannot afford the same costly mistakes that were made by developed countries in the past.<sup>47</sup> In other words, by learning from, and not repeating, the same blunders, Asians, in their planning and management of human environment, appear to have a better chance than their predecessors in the achievement of harmony between natural and artificial environments for change and in planning for a better city life in Asia.

45. See Louis Loewenstein, "The Shape of Things to Come," *Innovation*, no. 17 (January 1971), p. 45.

46. For a Japanese case, see a paper presented at the International Social Science Council's world symposium on pollution, sponsored by UNESCO, held in Tokyo, Japan, 1970, Shigeto Tsuru, "Kogai: Environmental Disruption in Japan—The Story of 3 Cities," *UNESCO Courier* (July 1971), pp. 6-13.

47. See Ignacy Sachs, "Industrialization without Pollution: A Challenge to the Developing World," *UNESCO Courier* (July 1971), pp. 30-32.

# Communicative Turbulence in Urban Dynamics— Media, Education, and Planning

By GEORGE FOX MOTT

**ABSTRACT:** Conflicting forces within society provide the framework of market and political decision. This article examines the three most pervasive mechanisms causing communicative turbulence and thus affecting decision. These three forces, media, education, and planning, are dealt with as separate entities in view of their related but somewhat disparate character. Taken together they do, however, hold out the greatest hope in meeting the critical problems of the day. And, taken separately, they can each create turbulence of such intensity as to threaten nearly all constructive efforts toward meeting the challenges of urban change and reformation. Today, the media are forsaking their objectivity and their public service responsibility for an interpretative role which deprives society of a sound information source. Television in its present aspects is an active deterrent to successful public education. Public education is foundering from a complex of confused programs and interpolations from the various special interest groups and the interpositioning of the courts between the citizens and their elected local school boards. Solutions suggested are both new and old. Higher education is suffering from the effects of the student population explosion, further complicated by special interest pressures and by unwise quasi-dictation from certain federal agencies. The planning process, as prerequisite to improved management in all areas of social activity, is beginning to show advances in effectiveness owing to accumulated experience, increased and assimilated data, and growing public acceptance, particularly in the field of urban planning.

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AS the interplay of separate and sometimes conflicting forces within diverse governmental, commercial, and social organizations provides the framework of market and political decision, the thrust of this article is to examine the three most pervasive mechanisms causing communicative turbulence and thus affecting such decision. These forces—media, education, and planning—taken together are capable of providing the wisdom—or contributing to the lack of it—to deal with the critical problems frequently accredited to the circumstances of urbanization.

Identification and examination of the ways and means of media, education, and planning in the decade now unfolding will lead only to part of the wisdom needed to arrive at a break-even point in dealing with urban dynamics. However, ignorance of how these forces operate reduces the possibility of improving and expanding the knowledge, imagination, and resources necessary to meet the real circumstances of transition and change now bearing down upon private and governmental sectors of civilization.

As used in this paper, the term *media* includes all the means evolved through any of the methods now available for the dissemination of information, news and views, or entertainment, whether generated as public service or private business, including particularly the newspaper and magazine press, television, and radio. Included here also are the performing arts. Though their position in the media is less easy to define, they are clearly part of the communications complex.

In this presentation *education* is used in its broadest sense to encompass learning of all kinds—except when limited by a modifying word to identify a particular manifestation of education pertaining to youth, adult, or a specific level of traditional or innovative learning—concerned with making men more able to

cope with their own and other contemporary lifestyles.

*Planning*, as used in this paper, is the rational process applied to solving problems arising out of the dynamics of change and urbanization by utilizing not only the mechanisms of the scientific approach of one or more disciplines of the professional planner, but also by programming-in the nonrational factors of the planning environment, in order to achieve a workable consensus of the goals of the publics being served.

#### MEDIA SELECT, INFORM, AND INTERPRET AT WILL

Except for a handful of men who may have remembered the canons of journalism,<sup>1</sup> some two hundred or so Washingtonians were only mildly shocked one evening early in 1972.<sup>2</sup> Their understanding of the purpose of a segment of the present-day press was enlarged. In derisive terms they were told that objective reporting is an outmoded, old-hat concept. Interpretative news writing is the order of the day. Indeed it is!

Not all media representatives are so blatantly scornful of news stories restricted to fact rather than interpretation as was the speaker on this occasion; nor are all newspapers so openly self-serving in their editorial and news slant. In fact, there are still a good number of the media press who have not thrown away their sense of public service responsibility or the basic tenet upon which professional journalism was built in this country—objective, factual reporting. But the number is becoming increasingly limited.

Of course, even when the goal of objective press reporting is respected, news

1. See any edition of Mott et al., *New Survey of Journalism*, College Outline Series (New York: Harper & Row), p. 17.

2. February 1972, "Getting Out a Daily Newspaper," a speech by Howard Simmons, Managing Editor of the *Washington Post*, at the Cosmos Club, Washington, D.C.



slant is never totally absent from the options available, as there is always more news than can be printed. Inevitably, in media as in all human affairs, the selection and decision processes operate all along the line, including placement and emphasis.

### *The air waves media*

Newer forms of media including television and radio have all the bounce of the young-at-heart and have never been burdened with any great sense of public service responsibility unless it was, or could be converted to, entertainment. The competition of commercial sponsors for prime time is one example of the commercial imperative which, on the whole, is the morality of the air waves in this country.<sup>3</sup>

Radio news is little more than headline news—generally, though not always, from some other press source; and television news—envisioned in the early days as the truly objective medium—is now seen to be, at its best, a commentator's paradise, and at its worst, an actual perverter of history, a *deus ex machina* for urban or other violence. People always have an insatiable appetite for entertainment—particularly in the form of shock and violence.

### *The "new" opinion press*

In describing the pragmatic nature of the media trends, it should be noted that an interpretative digest of the news satisfies many readers today almost better than objective news reporting. This is substantially true in both newspaper and magazine journalism. The people buying these publications apparently like to have news predigested and served in capsules.

It should also be remembered that

interpretative journalism is being increasingly nurtured by an important number of media practitioners. It is also encouraged by the moorings of a sacred cow cult that has grown out of journalism and which is called "Communications." Purveyors of this doctrine, striving to create a separate discipline, give special attention to theory and to the invention of a new jargon, and scant attention to the kind of journalism that trained press and broadcasting practitioners in the past for the roles of responsible reporters, editors, and publication business managers.

With this encouragement, the order of battle is changing and communicative turbulence is increasing. The printed and spoken word is the way to disseminate truth, but equally it may be used to create illusion and to transmit half-truths—and outright lies, if big enough—under the guise of interpretative reporting. Today's media seem to be only a step or two removed from the mystic and uncertainly credible opinion press of the Old World. Whether this trend is good or bad is not the subject of this paper. The point is simply that interpretative reporting is attempting to change the image of all media in the United States. With the status protection of the First Amendment, an opinion press in America could bring communicative turbulence sufficient to blight or even destroy the body of our free press system.

This trend against objective reporting is still far from universal. A survey in 1970 by *Seminar* magazine, published by the Copley Newspapers, ranked U.S. newspapers and magazines on a "most fair-least fair" basis.<sup>4</sup> The evidence seemed to show that there are still a good many newspapers which are consid-

3. For pertinent discussion, see Christopher S. Wren, "How to Find the Live Ones on Children's TV," *Saturday Review* (September-October 1972), p. 53 et seq.

4. "Is There a 'Fairer One' of All?" *Seminar* (a quarterly review for newspapermen, published by The Copley Press, Inc., La Jolla, Calif.), no. 17 (September 1970), pp. 14-24.

ered relatively objective in their reporting, reserving opinion to their editorial columns. These included: the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, and the *Los Angeles Times*—among others. The survey rated as “objective” also such news magazines as *U.S. News & World Report*, *Business Week*, *Saturday Review*, and *Newsweek*. Of these publications, the *Seminar* survey considered the first two of each category to be conservative, and the last two (of each) to be liberal in their editorial stance.

Yet the fact remains that most of our people are hardly concerned about interpretative reporting. Few recognize in it the seeds of retrogression. Americans, by and large, still pay lip service to a free press, as do also the media men themselves, especially when some particularly virulent example of abuse of this freedom is before the eyes of the public. But on the whole, the media have gradually taken on the style and trappings of the opinion press, including the print and view hash marks of what was once considered hard pornography and totally taboo.

This is not a phenomenon of the American public alone, or of any one group or class. On the contrary, the opinion press is accepted in most other nations of the world.<sup>5</sup> Only in America and in the British Commonwealth countries had we moved on to an objective press of high credibility.

This press standard of our recent past points up more sharply the fact that the media now are less responsible in their self-regulation and that news today is more and more suspect as to accuracy of the printed and spoken word by whatever media disseminated.

This battle of the media for the eyes, ears, and understanding of the public,

or for “heart, pocketbook, and opinion”—whether the media undertake the task with conviction or with cynicism—generates communicative turbulence in all areas of knowledge. While the protection of the First Amendment guarantees freedom of expression, subject to the laws of slander and libel, and is essential to freedom of action, it may—like most protective measures—serve as a shield for those who serve their own or contracted interests.

### *Media and planning*

To the extent that media have in fact retrogressed, rather than merely changed in style and breadth of content as the result of changed ideas of what news is “fit to print,” the economic caveat of “the buyer beware” must be recognized as a major conditioning factor in the media’s presentation of efforts to deal with civic problems through planning. The media’s approach to disseminating the pros and cons of community issues, including planning efforts, plays a major part in the public acceptance or rejection of any given concept or act. When all articles published on a subject are interpretative, a true statement as to how to improve our cities or our lifestyles has about the same odds as a gambler who puts his blue chips on the double zero.

The turbulence effect of the media on the role of reporting political news was reflected daily in the questions put to candidates for president and vice-president during the 1972 campaign. Any close reading of the transcriptions of the question and answer periods of any of the candidates on the campaign trail revealed repeatedly the subjectivity of the press corps assigned to follow any given candidate.<sup>6</sup> Though the local re-

5. Ruel R. Barlow and George Fox Mott, “Press Systems,” in *New Survey of Journalism*, chap. 32.

6. Private file transcriptions of the Republican and Democratic candidates’ public appearances from September 19 to November 6, 1972.

porters were supposed to be the ones primarily served, as the candidates traveled from urban area to town to urban area, it was the traveling press entourage who had the advantage of continuously exposing the candidates to their slanted questions—and who stole the show. This advantage was weighted further in their favor by the effort of the opinion-minded reporters among them to squeeze every possible ounce of conflicting information out of the candidate at bar.

By such tactics too often applied, media today are confusing, frustrating, and influencing news, from the point of gathering through the printing or broadcasting stages. In consequence, informal, objective, responsible public service reporting is hard pressed to compete with the reporter who is determined to sell a bias. This "sell," if confined to the political arena, is one thing; but its use in reporting everything from ecology to education is something else. It may well be one of the most serious causes of turbulence in all areas of human evolution. With media doing a largely subjective job, publishers and broadcasters are less public-service conscious. They simply do not meet the criteria long attributed to them as conservators of public welfare in their role as members of the Fourth Estate.

#### *Arts and the media*

In some not quite understood way, the arts—especially the performing arts—in any period of history in any civilization, play a synthesizing, even synthetic role. Cause and effect may not be completely clear, but a healthy society, of whatever level of sophistication, is usually characterized by a widespread and creative dance-drama-music-poetry expression. The artistic explosion in the United States in the last several decades is a very hopeful light shining in the midst of many dismal burned-out

social indicators. The precise setting of these activities in the modern scene is beyond the scope of this article. The arts are not to be confused with "media." Even the movies and television are not to be identified with the arts, which simply use the media and are used by them.

The role of the performing arts in urban life is a vast subject. It could begin with the Dionysian rites of pre-classical Greece and continue well into our present resurgence of "little theatre" and the off-Broadway stage. One phase of art pertinent to the planning syndrome is dealt with in this volume by Patrick Hayes in his paper, "The Arts in America—Our New National Product."

#### EDUCATIONAL AIMS, PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTIONS

Education in America has been periodically confused and frequently in trouble at one or more levels of learning. Today, the chaos in education is as obvious as in urban change, with which, of course, it is closely entwined. Public education especially is reeling from the onslaughts of the left and the right as to its ideological purpose and as to its two prime ingredients—process and programs.

Educational headaches were around long before urbanization became the symbol of our current national crisis. Three years ago<sup>7</sup> in a widely distributed private letter I observed:

... how we rejoiced when we left the Little Red Schoolhouse for the consolidated school. Now, we have neither Mark Hopkins, nor the McGuffey Readers, nor even the progressive theories of a beloved Professor Counts; but we do have Swahili, busing, broken windows, and teachers with union contracts prohibiting this and that, as though children were bricks or coal. The

7. December 24, 1969.

land of the free has outlawed the wisdom of the village square for the roundhouse of mechanical skills unselectively applied to the statistical child. *Saber-Tooth Curriculum*<sup>8</sup> has indeed been replaced by the contents of Pandora's Box, no longer legendary.

And we were happy about doing away with child labor several generations ago. Now, a farmer's son cannot plough his neighbor's field, a school boy can't get an after-school job, and the result is mass idleness of the poor and the rich.

In truth, educational turbulence may not be charged against either educators as a class, or citizens as their provocators and clientele, but rather to the cumulative changes in society which have outflanked the thinking, programs, and processes of all these workers in the vineyard. The simple recognition that going to school is the way to acquire knowledge, skills, and useful social attitudes has gradually been subordinated to diverse concerns, most of which have only a modicum of relationship to cognitive achievement. Relevant knowledge is not the whole of education, but no degree of wisdom or achievement is possible without it.

One is tempted to touch on clashes in theory and practice of educational aims in earlier eras of ferment, from at least the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Though such a recapitulation of these variances might illuminate the present intellectual, scientific, and pragmatic attack on the current turbulence, mere mention is all the scope of this paper permits.

#### *Earlier aims and programs*

Among the landmarks to different approaches to educational goals were those of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who arranged his *aims of education for complete living* in order of their sur-

8. Harold R. W. Benjamin (alias J. Abner Peddiwell) (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).

vival value to the individual and society; then the theoretical goals of Johann F. Herbart and Friedrich Froebel increased the ferment, until the gain in secondary school enrollment preceding and following World War I pushed educators in this country to reappraise the status of educational goals at all levels. The most notable result was the formulation of the *Seven Cardinal Principles of Education* by a commission of the National Education Association, in 1918. Educational goals, unlike the division of the governance of Gaul in three parts, were divided into seven areas which sought to present the purpose of education in terms of the sociological environment within the conditioning framework of the political and economic reform advocates of the day. Of course, this was simply Spencer's "complete living" concept, updated.

Changes followed, in theory and practice. Many thought that such haphazard empirical aims needed to borrow the techniques of science. Next, the numbers (statistical) advocates took over, and job analyses of life activities were programmed into the educational consensus of the day. In sum, the older aims were broken down into constituent parts.<sup>9</sup> This influence stimulated such educational psychologists as Edward L. Thorndike to develop the view that educational aims were a projection of human desires. At one point, Thorndike declared, "The aims of education should be then: to make men want the right things, and to make them better able so to control all the forces of nature and themselves that they can satisfy these wants."<sup>10</sup> Of course, he, like Bobbitt,

9. Franklin Bobbitt, *How to Make a Curriculum* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924), chap. 2; and Werrett W. Charters, *Curriculum Construction* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), chaps. 4-6.

10. Edward L. Thorndike, *Education* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923), p. 11.

thought that the "right things" should be categorized, broken down—perhaps near-pulverization would be more descriptive.

This is more than enough to suggest the nature and depth of ferment which went on up to the entrance of the philosophic determination input of John Dewey in the twentieth century, which probably created the environment for the child-centered aspect of what came to be known as *Progressive Education*.<sup>11</sup> This movement, well advanced in the late 1920s and through the 1930s, was a compound of historical factors including Dewey's instrumentalistic or pragmatic philosophy of education. Of course, most progressive education advocates—and it was the rampant approach of many—swallowed a good deal of Freudian psychology along with much conditioning of the Protestant-democratic ethic, and laissez-faire individualism into the educational ideal of building a new social order—one recognizing social aims and demanding social efficiency in industry and politics as well as in education.<sup>12</sup> This change in goal emphasis made the educational apparatus a partner in the mobilization of the manpower required for World War II which nearly all Americans viewed then as the defense of democratic ideals.

Please note, I have added no comments such as: That system worked; these other objectives proved to be sound; that school of thought cut the mustard; one of these schemes fouled things up. Because, really we do not know. Individually unsuccessful results we can see and pinpoint, but the basic overriding causes of our present educational failure we cannot, even flip-pantly, attempt to evaluate.

11. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916).

12. G. S. Counts, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (New York: The John Day Co., 1932).

### *Present problem areas*

With this time-machine approach to education of the past, I suggest that the present education crisis shows both marked differences and astounding lack of newness. Educational gimmicks have proliferated; experimentation has continued, each new scheme costing more than the one before. The hard deterrents to the worship of new educational gods: a great depression, or the universal burden of war restrictions, danger to status, property, or subsistence—all have been lacking. There has been little semblance of mass hardship for at least twenty-five years. Of course there were individual griefs and hardships growing out of Korea and Vietnam, but only the overseas participants and their families were really affected, despite the rhetoric of the anarchists, the fellow travelers (paid and unpaid), the doves (sincere and insincere), and the young people whose boredom and lack of purpose led them marching into swamps and over mountain passes in a modern version of the Children's Crusade of the Middle Ages.

Many of our educational efforts have resulted in an achievement void in our educational institutions. Today, current educational aims, processes, and programs face the greatest single challenge since the Renaissance took us out of another kind of educational blackout.

Prior to discussing the current educational turbulence, I wish to share with the reader a statement which expresses, much better than I can, a belief which, nevertheless, I have held for many years.

What sets worlds in motion is the interplay of differences, their attractions and repulsions. The ideal of a single civilization for everyone, implicit in the cult of progress and technique, impoverishes and mutilates us. Every view of the world that becomes extinct, every culture that disap-

pears, diminishes a possibility of life. In the historical ambit, the action of progress is like that of entropy in the material ambit: as differences are suppressed, history grows "cold" and the human species advances with greater speed toward extinction.<sup>13</sup>

In the light of this belief, which I happen to share with poet-diplomat Paz, let me touch on several circumstances that increase the modern educational turbulence. I shall start with an article that attracted my attention while I was writing this one. It concerns our earlier subject, media, but also it is one of the most clearly discernible causes for educational failure. I quote:

"Children. They are our most precious resource," rhapsodizes a CBS release, unveiling what its Saturday mornings have in store this season. "When they are entertained creatively and instructed with great care and imagination, all of society benefits." One feels, somehow, that CBS doesn't have its heart entirely in creativity and imagination, for the next paragraph begins: "This season will once again feature the popular animated favorites such as *Bugs Bunny* (43 per cent share of audience), *Sabrina, the Teenage Witch* (the highest rated Saturday morning program last year, with a 54 per cent share), *The Harlem Globetrotters* (38 per cent share). . ."<sup>14</sup>

And later this boxed gem of truth is highlighted:

Television is vicarious. It shows a child how people do things. If you show him that people relate with violence, that's what he'll learn; if people treat each other with respect, that's what he'll learn.<sup>15</sup>

13. Octavio Paz, in an interview by Rita Guibert, in *Intellectual Digest* (December 1972), p. 74. The statement is an abridgment from her book, *Seven Voices* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, forthcoming).

14. Wren, "How to Find the Live Ones," p. 53.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

What does it mean, "It means that parents are delegating to an electronic box those child rearing duties that they do not assume themselves."<sup>16</sup> And, although media fill the void, as gas fills a vacuum, their lack of social accountability compounds the stunting of the growth pattern of children who are parked day after day in front of the television.

Here, at the risk of interrupting my argument, I wish to point out the dangerous habit of generalizing or of forcing everyone and everything into categories. For example, we say, parents do thus and so, or they fail to do thus and so, forgetting, or at least not voicing the fact that "parents" are an unstable statistic, changed every sixteen to thirty years, and that the parents of one decade were the children, the school population, of a few years before. The abdication of responsibility on the part of some parents is no doubt partly the result of the same process on the part of their parents, so it might be well if we could point to one decade or even a lesser span in which this dereliction first occurred. It might be desirable, but we cannot do it. However, keep in mind the nonstatic identity of parents and of pupils. Indeed, *Bugs Bunny* and the rest have more continuity than several generations of television watchers.

A professional survey made of a Washington inner city community revealed the actively pernicious influence of television in terms of educational growth. The findings included the following:

Though educationally [the parents of this particular community] are not at the illiteracy level, the communication level of the family is frequently minimal. . . . This is noticeable in much of the oral interchange observed both within and outside of the family circle.

16. *Ibid.*

This lack of person to person interchange is aggravated rather than helped by the one-way audio-visual communication media which are available in every household. . . . The children live with it from the day they are born. Such communication is entertainment and contact with the world. . . . There are few if any places in most of the homes where children can go to study without television vying for their attention. . . .

. . . The reading habit has no chance to get off the ground. Organized oral speech and conversation give way to one-word or one-phrase commands, amiable or pejorative comments.

In consequence, training in two-way language communication is at a more primitive level than even in a so-called illiterate society. Of course, this blunting of two-way language thrust exists to a greater or lesser extent in other communities all over Washington and all over America. . . .

. . . It means that community leadership and the schools must work harder to accomplish the job of educating children to meet basic living responsibility and two-way communication situations.<sup>17</sup>

#### *Solutions which do not solve*

Is a multimillion dollar—Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) financed—community Head Start Program going to cure this parental abdication of responsibility? Can it bring these children into an active relationship with the world which they have already lost by lack of communication in the family?<sup>18</sup>

17. George Fox Mott, *A Socio-economic and Educational Profile of the Kenilworth Area in 1968* (Washington, D.C.: Mott of Washington and Associates, 1968), quote on pp. 37-38. This survey revealed that no home was without a television or a radio, regardless of socio-economic level, and that they were turned on sixteen to eighteen hours each day.

18. The Head Start Program began in 1964. It acquired, with all other federally aided educational programs of HEW, the slogan: "Quality Enriched Education." At first, Head Start was billed as necessary because certain three- and four-year-old children were poor or black. They were first called "economi-

The morning paper reports that "the Ford Foundation has concluded that the ten years and \$30 million it spent to develop 'lighthouse schools,' models for reforming all American education, were 'a failure in strategy.'" The staff writer goes on to explain:

Programs similar to those sponsored by Ford under its Comprehensive School Improvement Program from 1960 to 1970 have become the mainstay of federal innovation grants, amounting this year to some \$146 million.

Ford, however, has moved on to other approaches.<sup>19</sup>

True, 1960, the year of Ford commitment, was, according to Edward J. Meade, Jr., of the Ford Foundation:

"a time when nearly everyone thought that with more money, more buildings and more teachers, our nation's schools could indeed make a few adjustments and changes to produce a better society.

"Those were not days of decentralization, student rights, teacher militancy, full state funding, free schools outside the public system, busing for purposes of education," and the other issues of the 1970's. . . .<sup>20</sup>

The Ford Foundation's comprehensive effort to change educational techniques, we are told, was because "any piecemeal approach would not make the significant impact needed to reverse the decline in the quality of education."<sup>21</sup> Ford grants under this program produced all manner of lures designed to make students learn, or—to put it more euphemistically—to encourage in students a desire to learn. The approach assumed that neither home nor society could any

cally deprived," then "culturally deprived," and more recently "educationally deprived." The program might well be described as "multi-purposed foster-parent laboratories for child orientation."

19. Andrew Barnes, "Ford Foundation Sees School Project a Flop," *Washington Post*, November 30, 1972, p. A-2.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

longer reach the young unless a new dimension were added. Of course, most youths of this period acquiesced, even if passively, in the need to move through school and graduate from high school, but few saw the value of learning enough to sit above the salt, or, indeed, to learn much more than the three R's. Against this attitude the Ford Foundation tried motivation encouragement first in suburban schools—where, they felt, the effects of national affluence and parental laxness were greatest—by grants to provide team teaching, nonprofessionals in schools, flexible schedules and pupil groupings, open space, audiovisual materials, and many other variables of earlier techniques.

Here I would like to point out a basic flaw in the reasoning of all concerned in this worthy effort. Childhood is not a time for far-sighted planning, or for calculation of any kind. Children have always crawled "like snail, unwillingly to school," even long before Shakespeare's time, if we can believe the recently discovered writings of the ancient Sumerians. The child's tie with his school has been a love-hate relationship. Not to be a part of the school scene, with his peers, would have been exile of the direst sort. If there is, indeed, a change in this basic attitude, the disease is even worse than we think and is shared by the nonstatic parents even into the third and fourth generation. Perhaps the Ford Foundation's efforts should have been directed toward the parents.

Of course, not even the officials of the Foundation need tell any competent observer—let alone, any good school professional—that this planned and concentrated effort of private funds, together with the vast flow of federal and other public funds, failed. The evidence is everywhere. The amazing thing to this observer is that so many of our youth of the '60s pushed through the

educational turbulence with only slight scars or a belated start on the road to educated adulthood. Total failure was simply prevented by the other forces of the man-nature environment—not by urban public education as it was practiced nearly everywhere at all levels in the '60s.

And then came busing—that second "noble experiment" of the twentieth century. The first noble experiment had demonstrated—in addition to the old saw that "Hell is paved with good intentions"—that a minority group, however righteous its cause, cannot impose in the name of social welfare a moral code or restriction on the majority in the United States, or not for long.<sup>22</sup>

Busing is contrary to all educational ethic and practice in the public school system of the United States. No other concept in education is more firmly a part of the American way as the right of every child to go to his neighborhood school, or a private school of his parents' choice. This has been so since the colonial period. There has never been an educational reason for challenging this right. There is none now. Yet, for reasons having nothing to do with the aims of education for the majority of citizens, or even for the socio-cultural happiness of the minorities concerned, most of the machinery of a great government, at astronomical dollar cost, has involved the entire hierarchy of educators, politicians, and parents—with the turbulence makers running in and out—in an attempt to force a highly debatable social objective on all citizens and their children through busing, whether they want it or not. The turbulence quotient of this prescription is beyond speculation.

The "travel orders" for this noble experiment are being written by the

22. The Eighteenth Amendment, the Volstead Act, ratified in 1919, was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, in 1933.



courts. The first one used the legislature. Now the courts have assumed the role of school boards and educators. The legal prescriptions resulting are usually quite untenable in terms of educational aims. The resulting ferment has all but destroyed school plant planning and most of the processes and programs carried on by the entire school administrative and teaching apparatus.

Public education, during its term of success in America, was the near-exclusive concern of the most local of local government—the freely elected American school board.

Busing is proceeding on its collision course at the same time that educators, politicians, neighborhood leaders, and parents are again asking for local control. Local option at the neighborhood level is having a revival in the public favor. The whole principle of revenue sharing is aimed at making state and local government again tenable.

This is not the place to describe further the results of busing as an effort to remake the school systems of America; nor is it the place to take issue on the question of the courts and their real function in the tripartite relationship with the executive and the legislature. Still, recent court rulings at all levels on this matter remind me of the old comedian's proposal: "Don't raise the bridge, boys. Lower the water!"

#### *A new-old plan*

The latest effort on the part of a large number of professional educators and others seeking to calm educational turbulence has been labeled "community education." A complete recent issue of the educational journal the *Phi Delta Kappan* reports its characteristics and objectives.<sup>23</sup> The lead editorial written by its guest editor calls "community

education" "a feasible reform," and describes it in part thus:<sup>24</sup>

Community education is committed to the task of helping all citizens learn what to be and what to be able to do as well as what to know. . . . We do well to consider Plato's admonition that it is the whole soul that learns, not just the mind . . . education . . . must do more than impart knowledge; it must also enrich his soul.<sup>25</sup>

The community education approach . . . provides experiences which contribute to change in values and the improvement of personal talent and skill . . . it enriches the knowledge-gaining experience of the individual.

. . . people learn from the total environment . . . the entire community is the school plant. All the people are potential teachers. Everything in the community is a potential resource.

Does it sound new? And another statement farther on parallels another version of the reinvention of the wheel:

Opportunities for school-age boys and girls to explore on their own time, to recreate, to try out their special talents, to fulfill their creative desires, and to experiment in areas of learning not included in the required curriculum contribute much to the enrichment of their required school work.<sup>26</sup>

This concept of community education, now being accepted as it is in large numbers of communities across the land, is endorsed by signatures of leaders in and out of education, in the referenced issue of "the Kappan." The issue also includes an introductory statement by

24. Totten, "Community Education," pp. 148-49.

25. As a result of recent court decisions citing the First Amendment, school administrators are again struggling with the renewed irruption of the secularization issue. Court decisions add to the ferment by interfering with local option. See Prince George's County, Maryland, action reported in "Schools Forbid Hymns—County Issues Guidelines," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1972, p. C-1.

26. Totten, "Community Education," p. 149.

23. "Community Education: A Special Issue," W. Fred Totten, guest editor, *Phi Delta Kappan* (November 1972), p. 148 et seq.

Commissioner of Education Sidney P. Marland, Jr., who says:

. . . community education, with its flexibility and its practicality, is here to stay; and . . . the future of society and the entire field of education will be brighter because of this new creative thrust.<sup>27</sup>

I find nothing very new. The thrust of the concept is to reestablish the neighborhood school as a center of community educational and cultural involvement—which is good, but quite traditional until recently; it makes a concerted effort to involve adults and children alike in educational growth, utilizing the school plant and its facilities—an idea as old at least as the adult educational development programs of the late 1920s; it endorses child-centered education—whose advocates have been legion for decades; it advocates “the concept that knowledge is not enough, that the educative process must help people learn how to live uprightly as well as how to make a living”—a notion going back to our colonial forefathers. I quote:

#### CHILDREN

Forasmuch as the good education of children is of singular behoofe and benefit to any commonwealth; and whereas many parents and masters are too indulgent and negligent of their duty in that kinde: It is therefore ordered by this court, and authority

thereof,

That the selectmen of every towne in the severall precincts and quarters where they dwell, shall have a vigilant eye over their brethren and neighbours, to see, first, that none of them shall suffer so much barbarisme in any of their families, as not to indeavor to teach by themselves or others, their children and apprentices, so much learning, as may inable them perfectly to read the English tongue, and knowledge of the capitall lawes, uppon penalty of twenty shillings for each neglect therein; allso,

27. Ibid., pp. 146–47.

that all masters of families, doe, once a week, at least, catechise their children and servants, in the grounds and principles of religion . . . and further, that all parents and masters doe breed and bring up their children and apprentices in some honest lawfull calling, labour or employment, either in husbandry or some other trade profitable for themselves and the commonwealth, if they will not nor cannot traine them up in learning, to fitt them for higher employments. . . .<sup>28</sup>

Some continuity there must be in life. The fact that the community education concept is not really new is not to disparage its facilitators wherever they appear. It is rather to point out that the social aims of education which are made operational in any community do and should differ markedly from one another, unless, of course, Americans are willing to capitulate as a people to standardized programmed lesson plans with identically oriented textbooks and a robot-teacher as facilitator. If Americans want this, then, indeed, “differences are suppressed, history grows ‘cold’ and the human species advances with greater speed toward extinction.”<sup>29</sup>

#### *Higher education—“green” or “blue”?*

All readers of this paper will have heard, read, or participated in issuing one or another pronouncement about the confused state of what we would once have considered one of the better creations of organized society—the liberal university.

Among these pronouncements are two which have analyzed the present un-

28. *The Code of 1605*, “being a compilation of the earliest laws and orders of the General Court of Connecticut: also, the Constitution, or Civil Compact, entered into and adopted by the Towns of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield in 1638–9,” compiled by Silas Andrus: Published at Hartford by the authority of the Clerk of the District of Connecticut, pp. 38–39.

29. Octavio Paz, previously quoted in text, see note 13.

satisfactory state of higher education with considerable exactness, and which suggest some hope for the future. I quote from Professor George A. Kelly, to wit:

There is, first of all, the battle over the roles and relations of the university "estates": students, faculty, administration, trustees . . . alumni and employees. Second, there is the miasma and drift of national politics, which provides much, but not all, of the atmosphere for the tension. Third, there are the many effects distributed under the familiar headings of "style revolution," "generational conflict," and the like. Although the second and third categories had very distinct causations, they have become joined in a deeply-felt hatred of war, imperialism, conspicuous consumption, and indeed property and authority. In the fourth place, there is the increased worldwide density of both youth and literacy and their concomitants: aggression and aspiration.<sup>30</sup>

And then he quotes Herbert Moller, and adds a judgment:

"Irrespective of social and economic conditions, an increase in the number of youth in any society involves an increase in social turbulence. Young people are conspicuously inclined to take risks, to expose themselves and others to danger, and tend to engage in socially disruptive behavior." A student internationale scarcely needs to exist; social determinism can do much of its office work.

Because I, also, found Charles A. Reich's *The Greening of America*<sup>31</sup> "atrocious nonsense," I quote from Dr. Peter C. Berger, coauthor of an article called "The Blueing of America,"<sup>32</sup> who set the record straight in a speech

30. George A. Kelly, "The Future of the University," *Interplay* (October 1969), p. 4.

31. Charles A. Reich, *The Greening of America* (New York: Random House, 1970).

32. Peter L. and Brigitte Berger, "The Blueing of America," *New Republic* (April 1971). Dr. Berger is a professor of sociology at Rutgers University.

to the American Association of State Colleges and Universities<sup>33</sup> by saying, among other things:

If everybody in the society "greened," one would have to have serious worries about the future viability of the society. There would be a lot of "beautiful people" doing what at least they themselves would consider beautiful things, and there would be no one left to do the chores necessary to keep the society going. . . . the "greening" phenomenon is not evenly distributed throughout the society; rather, it is strongly class-specific. The "greeners" . . . are mainly the children of the upper-middle class.

To the extent that "greening" means a turning away from careers in the major economic, technological and bureaucratic occupations—we made a distinction between the full "greeners," who really drop out to become sandal makers and the like, and the "halfway greeners," who go into such things as creative advertising, social work, or . . . academic sociology—essential jobs will remain unfilled. This means new opportunities of upward mobility for the children of the lower-middle and blue-collar classes.<sup>34</sup>

#### *Public higher education subsidy*

While reflecting on these commentaries on the state of turbulence in higher education, it is well to keep in mind concurrently the increase in post-secondary education during the '60s. The number of universities, colleges, and junior colleges rose from some 2,000 institutions in 1960 to 2,525 in 1970, with marked increase in the college student population in nearly all older institutions. This resulted in an increase in college faculty from 438,300 to 833,100 in a single decade.<sup>35</sup> The increased

33. In a speech delivered in Washington, D.C., Nov. 13, 1972.

34. Peter L. Berger, "A Lot of 'Beautiful People' . . . No One Left to Do the Chores," *U.S. News & World Report*, December 4, 1972.

35. "The Magnitude of the American Educational Establishment," *Saturday Review*,

numbers of college students entering new and old institutions, whose faculties contained a proportionately increased number of "undigested" and un-oriented members, upset the pecking order. Senior faculty were challenged by new faculty with unregimented student hordes at their backs as "infantry" and *agents provocateurs*. The results were as predictable as for any other social or political institution thus suddenly enlarged. The system broke down under the strain.

There are signs that universities will again attain an uneasy equilibrium as the various pendulums of student and faculty turbulence swing back, and as the peak in college populations is reached and begins to decline.<sup>36</sup> However, there is another educational policy issue which should be examined—namely, the justification for providing public subsidy of all manner of higher education in nearly all population centers in every state in the nation, and thereby intensifying the competition between public and private institutions. In addition to making it more difficult in view of rising costs for private colleges to survive, we are, in effect, removing the public service role of our traditionally distinctive and individually motivated institutions, particularly the smaller liberal arts colleges which were founded and evolved because they offered something special in the way of educational emphasis.<sup>37</sup> Two generations ago, most students went to a par-

ticular college less on economic or convenience grounds than for some particular consideration—socio-cultural, outright religious, legacy; or for some special characteristic—for example, military, agricultural, co-educational or not, white or black. Fewer and fewer of these choices are available with the proliferation of essentially coeducational, integrated institutions in the public sector, and with a corresponding loss of private, specially oriented institutions.<sup>38</sup> For example, black colleges now face the integration guillotine, unless the Court returns to its bench less transfixed and more enlightened.

Apart from the courts, the most serious deterrent to higher educational independence and diversity of approach grows out of the massive and often arbitrary way in which HEW and particularly the Office of Education have used their federal grant and aid power and recently acquired legal enforcement powers as to race and sex balance, to force quotas on educational institutions. Unless the universities of today are less jealous of their independence than they traditionally have been, there will be more turbulence—and in my view for good cause.

#### PLANNING ROLES, PATTERNS, AND EXPECTATIONS

Planning is always near the "eye" of the communicative turbulence which precedes and follows every circumstance touched by any aspect of urban change. This is especially true when master planning attempts to both follow and anticipate the crises associated with urbanization. Any citizen whose interest is even slightly "nicked" can and often does call upon one or another of the "great winds" at his command to blow away the plan and the planner. No other professional is more often forced to return to the old drawing board over

September 19, 1970, p. 67, based on estimates provided from the U.S. Office of Education and the National Educational Association.

36. See John Mathews, "Meeting Sees Dire Times for Colleges," *Evening Star and Daily News* (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 15, 1972, p. D-3.

37. A succinct statement of this issue is: Stuart A. Sandow, "Public-Private Competition in Higher Education," an exploratory report from the Educational Policies Research Center, Syracuse University Research Corporation, July 1971.

38. *Ibid.*

and over again before even a consensus is reached by the civic apparatus providing the authority and means of implementation.

The scope of the planning role for the purposes of this paper has already been set forth. Our principal need here is to detail in nontechnical and abbreviated fashion the roles, operational processes, and responsibilities of the planner. Some idea of what the planner does, and how he carries out the roles he assumes as planner, must be understood by the lay as well as the professional reader, for appreciation of the sensitive and essential function the planner, his staff, and the planning commission perform as the social control process of urban development.

#### *Role of the professional planner*

The essential role of the professional planner—whether in-house or out—is to provide a basis for decision-making. As decision-making in the United States involves more than rational planning as evolved by experts, successful community planners must consider the inputs of the marketplace and politics in urban change. Each of these last two serves the decision-maker in varying degree from community to community, but urban planners succeed most often when rational planning is recognized as having an adjunct relationship to the inputs of economics and politics.

Urban planners frequently have to settle for therapy, rather than full-scale community-wide planning. This approach is generally unacceptable to the older doctrinaire planner who is taught that there is really no substitute for bending all efforts to achieve a comprehensive plan. As nearly all planners recognize, the value of insisting on the full-scale community-wide approach—ultimately the goal of planners—is largely one of style. In merchandising

one would call it the “soft-sell” versus the “hard-sell” approach.

The urban planner may come to his job through any of a number of disciplines, or combinations thereof, but, as with any professional, whether in swaddling clothes or ancient and unbowed, the effort in recent years is to provide a professional umbrella—a means to achieve an instant sense of belonging. This may be most easily acquired by membership in a society of like-minded professionally oriented people.<sup>39</sup> It is assumed, and most often truly, that no one not professionally trained and degree-ed, as well as duly experienced, would apply.

The first step of professional planning is the job of exploring with all the expertise at command the total resources available, together with the various options open to analysis and consideration. Out of this will come one or more rationally arrived at models which appear to meet the urban or other planning mission assigned, the assumptions made, and the long- or short-range implementation requirements. In pursuing the rational approach thoroughly, the urban planner<sup>40</sup> is able to conceptualize whatever goals or guidelines have been given him and at the same time make his own input as to what steps need to be taken, and in what order. He has some factual awareness of the potential before he has to face the realities of compromise on

39. The American Institute of Planners is the more doctrinaire, while the American Society of Planning Officials is the more liberal, work-a-day organization. Together, they lead the pack. The least that should be said about any society or association is that such groups attempt to maintain continuing liaison with every professional who is involved with full- or part-time activity in an area of common interest and concern.

40. “Urban planner,” as used in this paper, is a generic term applying equally to diverse types of multi-area planning—namely, neighborhood, community, urban, county, metropolitan, regional, and so forth.

the basis of the marketplace and politics. In doing so, he does not lose his focus on the rational model. What he does is to examine the nonrational facts, and program into his rational plan enough of the goal demands of the non-rational elements to permit the decision-makers to buy his rational (overall) plan in modified form.

In order to be effective as a staff aide to the decision-makers in an urban setting—or, for that matter, in any type of business, government, or institutional organization—a planner wears more than one hat. That is, he plays many roles if he is productive. This is particularly so when the planner is a consultant—for example, evaluating a city government, including perhaps its performance as a Model City.<sup>41</sup>

#### *Style and roles*

Apart from the specific functions an urban planner performs, his personality and style determine not only how he

will deal with the various hierarchical categories in both the public and private sectors of the community he serves, but also the nature of his alliances with the diverse groupings in these sectors and with the individuals who have the largest clout in governing his community. The very fact that no aspect of governance is capable of evoking more controversy—communicative turbulence—than the changes that are initiated by planning is reason enough to recognize the importance of a planner's style, role, or status as a conditioning factor in the way planning is done—whether for land use, design, or the preoccupation with one or more aspects of socioeconomic analysis.

If we think of functions in terms of roles which planners must perform, one could say he serves, at one and the same time, as:

1. A principal administrator of the planning agency.
2. The principal professional in the sense of specific training and relationship to the professional societies and associations.
3. The principal problem solver, advocate, and counsellor to the administrative (city manager, engineer, and others) and political (mayor, council, city attorney, planning commission) apparatus.
4. The source of information and education for the community to which he is committed as a planner. (This includes all organized civic and business groups, the media, and so forth.)
5. The defender of the planning function, to include responsibility for adequate budget and staff to maintain the work load required to meet approved goals.
6. Coordinator of capital improvements in relation to the budget.

In order to fulfill all of the six functional roles described, the planner must

41. See, for example, *One Town's Experience as a Model City—A Management Profile of the City of Texarkana, Arkansas* (Washington, D.C.: Mott of Washington and Associates, 1970). Prior to 1970, this community and many others of the twenty-five thousand to fifty thousand population class were "bootstrap" operated, with small budgets. (Model City funds, where wisely used, as here, were a marked help—revenue sharing will permit more city-wide programs.) This city had been limited in planning and research to "essential routines having to do with zoning and similar 'brush fire' decision making." (See chap. 7, especially p. 56.) The job of the consultant in this case was to move the city toward some kind of "organization equilibrium," from a late '20s model into the '70s. The senior consultant and the firm had to go back of and beyond its contracted goal of evaluating the management of the Model City Program and the role of the city manager, mayor, and board of directors of the city. Meeting this need required the consultant firm to engage in a multi-level mixed survey and on-the-spot implementation of operational improvements including the procedure necessary to provide for a "Planning Office."

have high technical competence. This is his professional role, and on this base, as augmented by his staff, he carries on all manner of research, liaison with technical support groups, and the design and analysis required to produce plans and programs. When these are innovative, he has the additional burden of "proving" their relevance and practicality to the policy guidelines and goals he has been given.

Concomitant with the responsibility of the planner is the responsibility of the political and administrative apparatus of the community to the planner and the planning commission, to encourage the planner to make a maximum input into all decisions related to planning. Too many cities have made good planners and good commissions impotent and valueless by not actively seeking their counsel at every turn of the planning wheel.

#### *Citizens must be educated*

Planning—even specific urban planning—is not exclusively governmental, as pointed out previously. The lay leadership of each community is also involved. This is impressively so when a two- or three-industry town gives a few economic tycoons an influence which cannot be denied. Hence, a planner who expects to avoid extinction must keep this leadership, as well as others, informed and educated.

The key value of some planners is their public relations and coordination effectiveness. Such planners often end up with this role as their full-time activity. Of course, in this case, they succeed only in direct relation to the technical competence of their staff who perform the other roles mentioned.

The foregoing description of planning roles is prologue to the proposition that the major function of the planner is to assist the community to make rational decisions. When this is well done, com-

municative turbulence is minimal. If, on the other hand, planning is done in the vacuum of an ivory tower, along doctrinaire lines unsuited to the time and place, or in some way having the effect of upsetting the long-range goals or the current lifestyles of society, stalemate or worse results. This brings all the natural forces of human concern and discontent to the fore.

Indeed, few citizens—of villages, towns, or cities—fail to react vigorously when planning concepts are not acceptable for any reason. The greatest sensitivity is when a plan projects physical changes affecting real or imaginary economic or other equities that the citizens either do not understand or do not want to accept for private reasons. The less they understand, or the more they dislike the decision, the greater the turbulence and the more apt the planner is to have raised against him the "great winds": the provocators of socioeconomic and political influence.

#### IN GOD WE TRUST—ALL OTHERS PAY CASH

These three coins—media, education, and planning, making up to an uncertain sum of our current life circumstances—have, each, a reverse side. Our official faith perforce must go to our government, our professional people, and our citizens. On the other side, what we lay on the line—cash on the barrel head—is the empirical, intuitive, experiment-modified set of trial and error methods which work—in spite of government, academic disciplines, and human selfishness.

I refer the reader to the last paragraphs of Dr. Banfield's article which begins this volume. I agree with him profoundly in his conclusion. I disagree only in his premise of pessimism. We are bad-weather animals. We will act when the climate gets bad enough. I may well live to see it.

# The Arts in America—Our New National Product

By PATRICK HAYES

ABSTRACT: The arts have been extolled in recent official rhetoric, including speeches of three Presidents, as essential to the quality of American life. Public demands on arts organizations for cultural and educational services have increased their work load without increasing their income—the reverse is true, that their deficits have grown larger. The arts in America are private in origin and independent in character, but they must now turn to the public sector for major subsidy support, or falter. Are the arts important enough to warrant up to \$200 million a year in federal funds, and higher amounts in future decades? The writer declares in the affirmative, taking due note of the risks of political interference and of the fact that there exists a substantial degree of public lethargy. The American audience for music, theatre, dance, and for art galleries and museums is limited, but growing. If the arts are for the few today, they are available to the many. Stages for the performing arts abound in the form of old and new performing arts centers. Artists, especially our American artists, are in good supply. The central question is that of the national attitude toward them and the nation's willingness to sustain them.

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SOON after Antal Dorati arrived in Washington to become Music Director of the National Symphony Orchestra, he made a speech at the National Press Club. In response to a question about his plans to introduce classical music to a wider public and to establish a new relevancy in the spirit of the times, he replied that he had no such plans, that his task was to make music, good music, the best music, for those who wished to come and hear it. "We are an elite," he said. "This music is not for everyone."

A few in the audience gasped. Here was an Old-World attitude, that art and the good things in life are only for the privileged few; and such an attitude was being expressed in the 1970s by the new leader of the symphony orchestra of the capital city of the world's leading democracy, where any reference to or emphasis on any project or movement as being "only for the few" was anathema. Mr. Dorati's brief comment in this direction was not picked up, nor was much made of it. Even if it had been, the dialogue would have been healthy; for upon reflection, it can be shown that he was both right and timely, and not undemocratic at all. His own personal feeling and assertion about an elite do, indeed, stem honestly from his European background, but the application of his assertion to the American scene has a different connotation than he might have imagined.

American society which is not necessarily rich and privileged and is not privy to social and political power, there is also a musical elite, and it is found in a vertical column rather than a horizontal stratum of our society. The audience for classical music, for opera and ballet, for theatre, and those attending art galleries and museums in the United States include people from a wide span of economic and social levels whose appreciation of these arts makes them an elite for all their diversity of levels of affluence, education, family backgrounds, and individual lifestyles.

This understanding of the audience for the arts in America is essential to an appraisal of whether the American people may one day become a broadly cultivated society, Athenian in tone and Augustan in proportion. If appreciation and patronage of the arts were confined to an elite at the top of our society, it would be a question of their eventually trickling down to the lower levels where most of us are, and this would be a slow process of audience development. As it is, then, we find the arts-elite already spread upward and downward in the social and economic scales, and they need only widen to embrace more people at each of the levels to increase the audience and bring to more people the cultural enrichment and personal pleasure which are the mission of the arts.

#### WHO ARE THE MUSICAL ELITE?

It has to do with the nature and character of "the few" for whom classical music holds charm. Usually an elite or "the few" implies those at the top of a society, the well-to-do and privileged, and those with social and political power. But in the same way that there is an intellectual elite in

#### AUDIENCE-POPULATION PERCENTAGE SMALL

How wide is this vertical band today, and how far does it have to expand for Athenian and Augustan dreams to come true? All available figures add up to not more than 5 percent of the total U.S. population, and the study of Professors Baumol and Bowen of Prince-

ton<sup>1</sup> put the figure closer to 3 percent. Lest those who read these paragraphs become discouraged at such a low percentage, let me promptly put it in positive perspective. Three percent of America's two hundred million population is six million for the category of the arts-elite. Not bad. And 5 percent is ten million, an important constituency for any activity or national program. However, at this juncture in our history the percentage of the population which identifies with the arts is smaller than it should be. The reasons for the limitation are rooted in our history, dramatically forecast by John Adams in a letter to his wife—probably written from Philadelphia during the long dreary year leading up to the final agreement and signing of the Declaration of Independence. Mr. Adams wrote:

I must study politics and war, that my sons may have the liberty to study mathematics and philosophy. My sons ought to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history and naval architecture, navigation, commerce, and agriculture, in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture.

In a speech delivered at the American Federation of Arts in April 1962, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., quoted these words of Mr. Adams and added:

The arts logically occupy a secondary place in the priorities of national development. A nation must achieve its independence and begin its economic take-off before it can begin to devote serious attention to the quality of its culture. We have as a nation fulfilled these conditions. We have long since secured our political identity and our economic momentum. We have long since reached John Adams's third phase.

1. William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, "Performing Arts—The Economic Dilemma," A Twentieth Century Fund Study, 1966.

#### CHARACTERISTICS OF ADAMS'S THIRD PHASE

If the arts in America may be referred to as a product, they presume a market and a marketplace. Thus far in this article we have dwelt on the audience as the market for our arts. What of the marketplace? The arts marketplace is a concert hall, an opera house, a theatre—let us here agree to refer only to the performing arts, with which the writer is identified, although the reader may easily substitute "art gallery" or "museum" for reference to painting and sculpture. The United States in the 1970s abounds in places to perform. The cultural real-estate boom of the last decade has been of bullish proportions. Examples are the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York City, the Pavilion in Los Angeles, and the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C. Many universities have added substantially to the national total of performing arts buildings, for example, the University of Illinois with its Krainert Center, Butler University in Indianapolis with the Crowe Auditorium, Dartmouth's Hopkins complex, and the University of Michigan's new Power Theatre.

These concert halls and theatres, by their mere presence, attract attention and serve as a magnet for action. Actors want to act, singers want to sing, dancers to dance, and producers are quick to seize upon all opportunities to bring these forces together into performances for the public. The well-publicized growth of ballet and modern dance in the United States during the last fifteen years and the spread of regional theatre, decentralized away from Broadway, are two evidences of this fact, not to mention the phenomenal growth in the number and quality of America's symphony orchestras, with

nearly thirty of them rated high in excellence by world standards. When a fine arts activity building is built, there is a natural inclination to use it—it is not a question of the chicken or the egg—for while the artist indeed always comes first, he must have a place to perform; he can exist without a place to perform, but this would be mere life-existence, not artistic fulfillment. It is a matter of good fortune and rejoicing that in these times our artists have performing arts centers to turn to with a supporting network of university auditoriums to supplement the opera houses and concert halls of the major cities for well-planned tours. In our Adams's third phase, the arts-housing problem can be said to be well solved.

#### THE ARTIST AS A VALUABLE PRODUCT

In *Hamlet*, act 2, scene 2, Shakespeare reveals his own understanding of the actor as an artist. After greeting the itinerant players, Hamlet charges Polonius with their care, saying: "Will you see the players well bestowed? Do you hear, let them be well used; for they are the abstract and brief chronicles of the time: after your death you were better have a bad epitaph than their ill report while you live." During the nearly four hundred years since these lines were written, the artist as a brief chronicle of his time has not always been well bestowed or appreciated or understood. The artist is a distinctive member of society. He has every attribute of other human beings of the time, plus artistic talent. He enjoys the blessing of a gene, the seed word of "genius," that comes down through generations of his family. How else to account for a Mozart, a Beethoven, a Shakespeare, a latter day Heifetz and Rubinstein? Recently a critic observed about Rudolf Serkin that "he came out of the womb playing a piano." Born talent is what usually sets artists apart

from their fellow men, and the degree of born talent is what sorts them out among themselves.

Another paragraph from Mr. Schlesinger's speech on Government and the Arts says it well:

The first point to understand is that the source of art is the artist. This sounds obvious enough. Yet in a day when patrons of the arts sometimes seem to act as if the source of art were an institution—a university, say, or a foundation—it is no wonder that some go on to suppose that in the future the source of art might be the government itself. Universities and foundations are splendid institutions, and so too is government. But art results from the confrontation of experience by a disciplined, sensitive and passionate *individual*, possessed of an intense interior vision and capable of rendering that vision in ways which heighten and deepen the sensibility of others; and it is this individual—the artist—who must always remain in the forefront of our consideration.

#### EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN ARTISTS

American artists have come into their own in this century, especially in the last twenty-five years. European artists still hold a special place in our esteem and affection as do the European countries themselves, and they are warmly welcome in our annual programs of concert presentations. But it had to happen, as John Adams's third phase had to come, that our own country would produce its own artists. Today we see American names in the opera lists, where Italian and German names dominated thirty to fifty years ago—Richard Tucker, Roberta Peters, Leontyne Price, Jess Thomas, James MacCracken. Russian names such as Rachmaninoff, Horowitz, Piatigorsky, and Milstein dominated the instrumental lists before World War II; now we see the names of Van Cliburn, Isaac Stern, Andre Watts, and an all-American Juilliard String Quartet. Among conductors we have Leonard Bernstein,

Thomas Schippers, Michael Tilson Thomas, and the young James Levine, the newly appointed chief conductor of the Metropolitan Opera Company. Our university fine arts departments and our conservatories turn out hundreds of well-equipped musicians every year, adding to the national inventory of performers and teachers. Herein lies a challenge to the American society to accelerate the national audience growth rate so that all of our artists may be well used.

Thus far our growth in the arts has been sporadic, unplanned, and without official encouragement. The tensile strength of our artists themselves has brought us as far as we have come. In contrast to our progress in the space program where all was indeed planned, encouraged, and financed, the arts have had to make progress on their own.

It is surely now time for a national thrust of public commitment and financial support commensurate with the levels of the Arts Council of Great Britain and of the Canada Arts Council, judged in per capita ratios. Present policy only implies a statement of national purpose with skeletal legislation establishing a National Council on the Arts and the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities. We have the beginning of an intelligent bureaucracy in the staff of the National Endowment for the Arts, with Nancy Hanks as chairman. Appropriations for this endowment are increasing modestly year by year, to a present level of just under forty million dollars, and there is a recent call from a group known as "Partnership for the Arts" for a two hundred million dollar goal of federal support for the arts in America by 1976.

#### JUSTIFICATION FOR PUBLIC SUBSIDY SUPPORT

Although private in origin and development, as are universities and hos-

pitals, the public service demands on arts organizations are extensive, so much so that the costs of rendering such service outrun private capacity to pay for it. If service to music itself were the sole question generation by generation, chamber music in small places for a few people would serve the purpose—as was the case prior to the first public musical events in 1672 in London. But public music is the order of the day, and it carries a high price tag which invokes a dilemma. If the costs of public music were passed on to its consumers, ticket prices would be increased to a point beyond the reach of a majority of the members of the vertical column of patrons. Attendance would drop, while costs continued to rise. "Ticket prices within the reach of all" has been our public philosophy since at least 1881, when Henry Lee Higginson founded the Boston Symphony Orchestra to perform concerts for a general public. With ticket prices kept within general reach, ticket revenue, like tuition revenue at a university, does not cover the total costs of the arts presented to the public, and this leads to annual deficits which must be covered. Private gifts and donations and general sustaining funds no longer suffice. A point of no return has been reached. The time for higher levels of government subsidy is at hand.

As we move toward necessary full public support for the arts in the form of federal funds, we must be on the alert to avoid any semblance of political interference in artistic programs and activities. The American arts of today are preponderantly a product of the private sector, and the independence inherent in the private origin of our arts organizations, as well as the independence of our artists themselves, must be maintained and held inviolate. Governor Nelson Rockefeller cautioned his fellow governors in a speech at their

fifty-ninth annual meeting in October 1967, with these words: "The politics of art are hazardous—yet an unalterable axiom will eliminate all dangers: *There must be no political interference in the arts by government.* If the artistic community feels it is being used or its freedom controlled by government, it will react loudly and heatedly."

Care in the language of the act of Congress that established the National Council on the Arts, and later the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities, has made possible a record of several years of noninterference by government in artistic programs. The grants of money from the endowment to arts organizations are on a basis of no-political-strings-attached, only that there be strict and complete accountability for the expenditure of the funds for the purpose stated in the application.

#### TOWARD FULL USE OF OUR ARTISTS

The end result of adequate financing of the arts in America will be the full use of our artists, making it possible for them to give their full measure toward improving the quality of life in our society and to assist all of us in the pursuit of happiness. In his speech to the nation's governors just referred to, Governor Rockefeller said:

The arts are a critical measure of "the quality of life"—a fact that historians, if not always politicians, have recognized for centuries. And as politicians and governors, we are constantly faced with combating the negative, inherited problems that have become too much for any other segment of society to handle—drug addiction, crime and poverty to name a few. The arts offer us the rare opportunity to further something that is positive—the expansion of human capacity and the pursuit of happiness—which is, after all, not

only the central element of the arts, but of good government as well.

In sum, there is now underway a trend toward the arts in our lives, consistent with John Adams's prediction. With each generation more people become educated and cultivated and have more leisure time. We have a splendid supply of artists in our population. We have, today, a national awareness of the value of the arts in our society. It remains for us to widen the base of participation on the part of audiences and to provide for intelligent and adequate public financing measures, and thus achieve a democracy of artistic appreciation.

In his remarks at Amherst College upon receiving an honorary degree on October 26, 1963, President John F. Kennedy said:

I see little of more importance to the future of our country and our civilization than full recognition of the place of the artist. . . . I look forward to an America which will reward achievement in the arts as we reward achievement in business or statecraft. I look forward to an America which will steadily raise the standards of artistic accomplishment and which will steadily enlarge cultural opportunities for all of our citizens. And I look forward to an America which commands respect throughout the world not only for its strength but for its civilization as well.

It was also Robert Frost Day at Amherst, and among several references to the Vermont poet, President Kennedy made this comment which I commend to both friend and doubter of the arts in America today: "The nation which disdains the mission of art invites the fate of Robert Frost's hired man, the fate of having 'nothing to look backward to with pride, and nothing to look forward to with hope.'"

# Elected Local Leadership in Municipal Government

By WENDELL E. HULCHER

ABSTRACT: Though it is assumed by some that local governments are having a constantly decreasing role, the evidence is not conclusive. The manner in which local elective officials exercise leadership will be determining. Changing demands on the traditional functions of local government and changing complexities of the technological age result in unprecedented responsibility for local elective officials. The leadership role, including planning which encompasses all activity of local government, demands new, additional personal characteristics to cope with new technology and lifestyles.

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**D**ESPITE Constantinos A. Doxiadis' dour warning that "man has lost today the battle for control of his cities,"<sup>1</sup> both he and most experienced municipal leaders know that this simply is not true. But he also knows that there is a salutary warning in this prediction to the effect that local leadership must face up to the ongoing forces and complexities which have accompanied urbanization trends in all towns and cities, including those of modest size such as Ann Arbor, Michigan, in which community I had my baptism of fire.

The relative significance of local leadership insofar as it can be equated with the day-to-day life of most people can be seen from the following table, which shows how extensively elective local leadership touches the lives of all.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, a total of 508,720 local officials are elected, as compared to 13,038 state officials, or almost forty times as many. Within the half-million local officials there is, of course, significant diversity of duties, degree of authority, and term of office. Many thousands are volunteers, and other thousands are partially compensated. Most derive their positions from a vote of the citizenry.

Despite the traditional role of local government, and the challenge to fulfill this role, it is not at all clear that local leadership is responding fast enough to either the traditional functions of local government or the newer complexities of our technological age. For example, computerization and revised record-keeping and accounting are, in effect, being forced upon some local units of government by requirements of certain state and federal grant programs, as well as by increasing data demands—

for example, in biostatistics. New levels of service speed are demanded by the public for copies of such vital documents as birth certificates and marriage licenses. The speed at which our society is traveling is unprecedented and demands new levels of response.

Though the predictions that local governments will have a lesser role are understandable and supportable from some points of view, the trend is by no means conclusive. In fact, evidence is accumulating that home owners desire even more local government of their own choosing in the form of community associations through which they can express their needs and desires.

#### PUBLIC SERVICES NOW AVAILABLE FROM PRIVATE FIRMS

These community associations of neighbors, growing out of interests acquired upon becoming property owners, are forming at the rate of two thousand new associations annually, according to market surveys.<sup>3</sup> The president of one of the leading companies servicing such nonprofit community associations estimates that annual assessments nationally will be more than a billion dollars for complete communities starting by 1975, and more than four billion by the year 2000.<sup>4</sup> It is estimated that more than 15 percent of the total national population will reside in communities with community associations by the year 2000, with more than 20 percent of total consumer purchasing power represented by that population.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, traditional local government is finding, for the first time, a major competitor in the delivery of public services.

3. Private survey conducted by Touche-Ross and Company under commission by Community Management Corporation, Reston, Virginia, April 14, 1972.

4. David B. Wolfe, President, Community Management Corporation, Reston, Virginia, as of October 1972.

5. Ibid.

1. Constantinos A. Doxiadis, *Emergence and Growth of an Urban Region* (Detroit: Detroit Edison Company, 1966).

2. U.S. Census Bureau, *Census of Governments* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), Introduction, p. 1.

TABLE—ELECTIVE LOCAL LEADERSHIP

| TYPE OF GOVERNMENT        | NUMBER OF UNITS<br>OF GOVERNMENT | NUMBER OF ELECTED<br>OFFICIALS | AVERAGE PER<br>GOVERNMENT |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Counties                  | 3,049                            | 74,199                         | 24.3                      |
| Municipalities            | 18,048                           | 143,927                        | 8.0                       |
| Townships                 | 17,105                           | 129,603                        | 7.6                       |
| School districts          | 21,782                           | 107,663                        | 4.9                       |
| Special purpose districts | 21,264                           | 56,943                         | 2.7                       |
| Local governments         | 81,248                           | 508,720 <sup>a</sup>           | 6.3                       |
| State government          | 50                               | 13,038                         | 260.8                     |

<sup>a</sup> Adjusted to avoid duplicate counting of elected officials serving both a county and another local government.

As John Stuart Mill has said, in respect to municipal and provincial representation: "the two questions to be resolved are, how the local representative bodies should be constituted, and what should be the extent of their functions." How this is resolved depends upon the leadership of the local governments concerned.

#### LEADERSHIP AS ROLE AND COMMITMENT

The leadership role begins with the decision to run for elective local office, expands during the campaign for election as issues are met with answers and promises, and culminates in a public image of the man and what he stands for. A candidate must show awareness and capacity concerning the broad dimensions of planning, encompassing all activity of local government, for this role constitutes a major aspect of elective local leadership. He must commit himself to the total responsibilities which are entailed by the nature of the role he will have to assume. To be successful, he must somehow cope with the explosive nature of change as it affects the lifestyles of his town and its citizenry. The '70s, even more than the '60s, will tax his capacity to deal with all the dimensions of governance through planning and the kind of guidance his community will accept.

The reverse of the coin is for the

voters to decide whether the candidates for mayor and council have not only the breadth to understand the necessity for meeting conditions as they arise, but also the ability to anticipate needs by positive planning. American cities have too long suffered the results of negative planning—by those who are either anti-planning in their attitude, or sit-'n-rock defenders of the status quo. Through this decision-reaching process of evaluating candidates for office, the citizen voter exercises a vital leadership choice. He judges and, hopefully, rewards by re-election those who serve their cities constructively and astutely in the face of urban change.

Once in office, the local elected official has the choice of exercising his leadership role either to enhance or thwart the community's progress toward meeting present needs and future requirements.

In a mayor-council form of government, or in any community where there is a titular type of mayor, the mayor's post is the focal community symbol, viewed as the single most authoritative position. In actuality, with the authority being substantially less than the symbolized responsibility, leadership often becomes a matter of involving the other appropriate elected local officials.

For example, a new mayor may be faced with the lack of multi-year plan-



ning in the financial affairs of the city. He may find property tax rates bumping up against the charter limit, while the expenditure trend shows no sign of leveling off. Simultaneously, the budgets of the school board, the county, and the community colleges may be placing larger demands upon the taxpayer. Therefore, in some instances a mayor may decide to enlist the help of a citizen committee, supported by staff, to develop a multi-year financial plan for the city and ask for the cooperation of the elected officials of other local units of government in undertaking a joint endeavor.

The creation of a citizen committee on revenue and expenditure, for example, can accomplish several things concurrently, namely:

- force a reevaluation of goals, priorities, and policies;
- create community attention for an upcoming problem;
- capitalize on the expertise of citizen appointments—at no salary cost to the city;
- initiate a process which requires coordination with other local governmental units; and
- attain depth and thoroughness of financial analysis and planning that are not available from the administrative personnel.

Leadership in cases like this usually can be achieved by initiating the undertaking only after an administrative organization has been developed and only after specific direction has been formulated by official coordination and control mechanism. Once a citizen chairman is appointed, the leadership role passes to him and his citizen committee members, with the mayor as appointing authority exercising only a general surveillance and consulting role. Nevertheless, mayor, or city manager where there is one, does not abdicate his re-

sponsibility. At the least, he will have to take responsibility for coordination, and to see that both work and objectives are not at cross-purposes with one another.

In some matters, such as community financial planning, the leadership role frequently has to extend far beyond a single municipal boundary. For example, a drive launched in Ann Arbor in 1967 for federal revenue sharing soon had state overtones, including expressions of support from the Governor, other mayors, and council members in the state. It proceeded to testify before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress and got a resolution adopted by the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors. At the time of this launching, the idea was not popular because the grant process was well tied in to the concept of patronage. By 1972, it had become a popular idea, with mayors teaming up with other local elected officials and governors to put lobbying pressure on Congress. The impact of leadership by state and local officials can be determinative. Local leadership more often than not makes the difference.

The nature and scope of leadership sometimes required may be pointed up by the circumstances which followed the Detroit riots of 1967. Ann Arbor, though forty miles away, was faced with rumors and counter-rumors, all of which suggested a spillover from Detroit into our, as well as adjoining, communities. Applicable state law was unclear concerning the degree of authority that could be exercised by the various local elected officials in such matters as declaring an emergency, imposing a curfew, and forbidding gasoline and liquor sales. Without a clearly spelled-out coordination mechanism, local leadership responsibility, in towns like Ann Arbor, was, by the nature of the position, the mayor's. The action taken

included the convening of key local elected officials and the chief law enforcement officers of eight other surrounding local jurisdictions. Consensus was reached as to responses necessary to maintain order when and if trouble occurred. Additionally, lines of communication were established with the Governor.

Thus, local leadership met the vacuum in procedure by developing an emergency plan which not only alerted all concerned, but also developed routines for meeting the emergency.

#### THE NATURE OF LOCAL LEADERSHIP

For a local elected official, community leadership involves the ability to move community forces together and simultaneously toward a desirable objective. Sensitivity as to the timeliness of such leadership action is vital. Someone has said that timing is everything. Certainly, it is almost everything in exercising the role of local leader.

Leadership is often possible also as mediator, which is another role of the local leader. As forces emerge and become identifiable, they attract enemies as well as friends. Pro-groups and con-groups form. Thus change will almost certainly replace status quo. In any event, the nature of change then becomes manageable to the extent that appeal can be made to the emerging forces through mediation.

Emerging needs and desires of the people must always be recognized by local leadership. Illustrative was the emergence of the civil rights movement in the communities across the country. In 1959, the prime civil rights objective in Ann Arbor was the attainment of equal housing opportunity through legislation. During the next five years, marches, sit-ins, demonstrations, and picketing became weekly, and sometimes daily, events. Human emotion

was at peak level as conflicting attitudes, forces, and ideas confronted each other in the press, over radio, on the sidewalks, in church—anywhere that people met and through all communication media. At times the confrontations were accompanied by violence.

The need for mediation and new approaches to attain community peace and harmony was obvious. An emerging new level of community conscience with respect to racial equity and justice was evident, but still lacked a majority of citizen support. Leadership and action by citizen groups abounded, amounting to near-anarchy in some instances. The general welfare of the city made elective local official leadership mandatory.

Fortunately, a recently established Human Relations Commission provided a focal point for leadership recommendations and also for expressions of discontent and demand. The mayor and council, as elected officials, had to face up to the divisive issue and either lead or be forced to react. Both types of action occurred. As consensus could not be reached quickly, even with mediation, confrontation placed constantly new demands upon the operational leadership of the city.

Eventually, turmoil gave way to a move toward fairness and equity, and sentiment for a fair housing law expanded. When a self-proclaimed conservative neighbor approached me in my elective capacity one evening on the sidewalk, he said with resignation: "I guess we have to do something." This signal, made operational, helped result in the first local fair housing legislation in Michigan—one of the earliest in the nation.

Academicians to the contrary, the judgment of when to act is not a science. Nor can it be taught in the classroom. It belongs to that category of leadership often referred to as "flying by the seat of your pants."

Be that as it may, a primary task of an elected local official is keeping the government sensitive to the needs and desires of the people. Citizen pressure is effective at the community level because of daily, hourly contacts between officials and the citizens in the most personal ways. There are ample opportunities for a citizen neighbor, businessman, home owner, or nature lover to buttonhole the official and make a point. Obviously, such contacts are beneficial to both the citizen and the official. An irritated citizen has expressed his views; an official is made aware of the problem. Independent information is attained which often differs from that presented to elected officials by the employee-managers in the administrative structure of the city government.

No elected local official is in office long before he knows that buck-passing and hiding behind piles of red tape can go on only for a short time. All local officials can be identified, found, and directly confronted by the citizens of the community—except in the largest cities and counties, whose problems go beyond the scope of this paper.

#### THE SEA OF FACES

Though physical planning is only one aspect of the planning syndrome, it looms large in smaller communities. One city attorney brought his council to a quick recognition of its implications when he told them frankly:

You ladies and gentlemen know what good zoning is but every time a large group of citizens from a neighborhood shows up you look at their sea of faces and do what they ask. How do you expect to have good planning and good zoning when you're always giving the benefit of the doubt to the sea of faces.

He was right. Periodically, planning commission and/or administrative per-

sonnel recommend zoning actions that appear to meet all professional criteria, but which are not acceptable to citizen home owners adjoining the property concerned.

Thus, the elective local official often must cast his vote either in support of the professional planners, or in support of the pressures exercised against a plan by any combination of citizens affected. All who have faced this decision-making responsibility know the feeling of discomfort as the hard choice is made. The courage of leadership can easily translate into re-election failure. Conversely, the lack of courageous leadership can undermine or destroy, in whole or in part, the efforts of a planning commission and its professional advisors to anticipate a city's total lifestyle requirements, its growth pattern, and present and future goals as a community. This most vital decision function of local elected officials remains a difficult one, not to be exercised by rule of thumb.

In recent years, local elected officials have faced rapidly growing and changing problems which seem to defy workable solution. Owing to the complexity of urban life, crisis events that are not planned for or anticipated occur almost daily. In exercising leadership to achieve solutions, the local elected official must (a) have the ability and information necessary to define, diagnose, and analyze the problems correctly, (b) recognize what kinds of influence he can exert in a given situation to ensure constructive resolution, (c) interact with the major bases of community power and community resource potentials, and (d) have the will and ability to intervene.

Thus, the elective local leader needs not only the old-time charisma, ability to get elected, and sensitivity to the public weal; but also he must have personal awareness of new dimensions. He needs sophistication regarding the new

technology and lifestyles which have altered the environment and human relationships, and the ability to evaluate and utilize dramatically exploding new knowledge to solve practical problems.

#### NEW KNOWLEDGE

For example, what is needed now to relieve the causes of vehicle congestion and accompanying air pollution in cities and abutting countrysides is the political decision to use the technology that is available.

Although recognizing that the application of new solutions involving science and technology is of critical importance to problems such as pollution, traffic congestion, housing shortages, and urban deterioration, local governments share with the states the sparsity of facilities for scientific and technical research, development, and utilization. The current distribution of domestic research and development spending is about one penny by state and local governments—including federal grants and assistance—to every dollar by federal agencies, according to the Committee on Intergovernmental Science Relations. The Committee report contains the following instructive words:

Technology "transfer" (whether it be county to county, Federal to State, or industry to industry) is much more complex than the mere transporting of an ideal solution or piece of hardware from one place to another.<sup>6</sup>

Incisive local leadership is required to identify the local problems, identify and evaluate new knowledge, and apply it effectively.

6. Executive Office of the President, Superintendent of Documents, *Public Technology. A Tool for Solving National Problems*, Report of the Committee on Intergovernmental Science Relations to the Federal Council for Science and Technology (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, May 1972).

#### TALENT ENLISTMENT

Fortunate indeed are the communities which have established formal and informal means whereby talented citizens apply their expertise to the identification, analysis, and solution of community problems. Mayors in communities that are the homes of universities and research organizations often enlist at no cost—or very low cost—professional expertise which the city budget could not possibly afford. Public service and volunteerism remain strong American motivating factors, particularly if the elected leader and the purpose warrant high respect.

Many mayors have found, however, that while the appointment of persons to boards, commissions, and committees serving the local government can be low-cost enlistment of talent in budget terms, concurrently it can be very costly indeed in terms of time, energy, and devotion of the appointing authority. The policy influence of such appointments makes this role of the local elected official rank high on the scale of vital functions.

#### LOCAL LAND USE POLICY AND ECOLOGY

As we contemplate the future, the effectiveness of local elective leadership may well be tested in the crucible of fire by land-use policy and control. Zoning, long the traditional province of local government, through the delegation of authority by the states, may be subject to future scrutiny by the federal government as part of environmental policy considerations. Russell E. Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, has observed: "Land use is the single most important element affecting the quality of our environment which remains substantially unaddressed as a matter of national policy."<sup>7</sup>

7. *Resources*, no. 59 (January 1972), p. 21 (Resources for the Future, Inc.).

The dean of a law school, and a former city councilman, once stated that land-use zoning is the most notable example of the exercise of sheer, raw governmental power in America. Will our local elective leadership, working with their state leadership counterparts, step up to the obvious citizen demand for new levels of environmental concern, planning, and protection? This issue is illustrative of the concurrent opportunity and obligation of local elective officials if the prediction of a declining future role for local government is to be refuted. It has been reported that there is a developing consensus that a national land-use policy is needed.

What role will be played by local officials in developing that policy? And what role will be played in the future by local government in land-use control?

#### CONCLUSION

The changing demands placed upon the traditional functions of local government and the changing complexities of our technological age result in unprecedented responsibility and challenge for local elective officials. The leadership role, including the broad dimensions of planning which encompass all activity of local government, demands new, additional personal characteristics to cope with new technology and lifestyles.

# Professional Local Administration in Municipal Government

By ROBERT B. MORRIS

ABSTRACT: Urban areas are no longer sharply defined, and local administrators cannot ignore neighboring areas. Trained professionals are necessary today. They are employed by half of all cities in the United States with populations between ten thousand and fifty thousand. The professional's functions include planning and coordination of city and intergovernment agencies. His characteristics must include sound training, tact, patience, self-confidence, and communicative skill; also imagination and courage. More and more, the professional local administrator is called upon to be a pace-setter in city planning and operation.

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TODAY the urban area itself, no longer fenced in at the city limits, is unrecognizable compared with that of even a decade ago. The fences were broken down by population and technology, choking air, jammed highways, too little fresh water, and overloaded sewage and refuse facilities.

Can governments, their professional administrators, and citizens turn their backs on the problems of their neighbors? If they do, they are likely to pay more for their governmental services, deprive residents of limited resources and opportunities, and, in the long run, end up with more tensions and greater stagnation. In twentieth-century America—urban America—good fences do not make either good neighbors or good planning.

Every local government administrator must be aware of what is going on outside his own unit or level of government. He must be interested in the outside, get to know officials from other units of government, and be knowledgeable about government, its overlapping, its complexities, its strengths, and its weaknesses. Above all, he has an obligation to serve the public in the best way possible. That obligation transcends his own position or his level of government. He must realize that, if the public is to be served well—and what other purpose does government have?—he must look beyond his immediate desk, job, or office, and cultivate, by his actions, improved intergovernmental relations.

As a city manager today, I find myself spending at least 25 percent of my time dealing with intergovernmental relations: contacts with other municipal officials, state and federal officials, and area and regional organizations outside the confines of our community. Ten years ago virtually all my time was spent managing our community's problems that occurred within our municipal boundary lines.

My experience is duplicated by hundreds of public officials at all levels of government. Americans are living in an urban society where some 90 percent of our population lives in cities and villages, and urban problems in 1972 do not stop at municipal borders.

Beyond a doubt one of the most dramatic changes in our society is the shrinking of our world, nation, state, and community in terms of time and space. Our world has improved technology. America, indeed, is in the middle of an urban revolution—a revolution that has to do with adjusting to an urban society, governmental officials getting along with each other and learning to understand the problems of others. The local government professional administrator must recognize the need for new concepts in government and in governmental relations.

#### NEED FOR PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS

Today's urban problems are becoming increasingly complex even in the small and medium-sized city. Perhaps there was a time—it must have been long ago!—when anybody without any special training or experience could manage a city. Those days, however, have long since passed.

Cities today require professional leadership—persons with specialized knowledge, training, and personalities—to cope with the increasing problems in all sizes and types of communities. This professional, most often called city manager or administrative officer, devotes his career to studying and solving municipal problems. He is a trained, practicing municipal administrator, a generalist in urban government.

The need for this professional administrator will continue to grow as more cities establish council-manager government, the fastest growing form of local government in this country, and as

more mayor-council cities select professional administrators. Elected officials, who traditionally have overseen all parts of municipal government, are coming to rely increasingly on professional managers.

Many of the professional administrators in our large cities and in metropolitan areas have gained their experience as professionals in small and medium-sized cities—the urban training ground of America. Oftentimes young professionals take positions in small towns with an eye to finding positions in larger cities as they gain experience.

#### CITY MANAGERS

Today city managers are employed in half of all cities having between ten thousand and fifty thousand population. There are over 2,600 city managers in cities of all sizes, including managers working under the council-manager form of government, working as administrators in mayor-council cities, and working as heads of metropolitan or regional organizations, such as councils of government.

The city manager is appointed by the community's elected officials. His duties vary by city size, but generally include appointment of department heads and key personnel as well as coordination and administration of municipal operations—finance, law enforcement, public works, health, planning, building, zoning, and so forth.

City managers plan for future development of cities and surrounding areas by providing for population growth and expansion of public services. They frequently appear at civic and community meetings to inform citizens of municipal operations. They work closely with officials from other units of government. Even in the small cities, the city managers usually direct staffs consisting of department heads, assistant department heads, and administrative assistants.

Overcrowding, pollution, and high crime rates are examples of the many interwoven problems that challenge city governments. Managers cope effectively with these complex issues by using sophisticated managerial techniques. Many communities are turning to specialists who have the skills to meet these urban challenges. City managers are these urban specialists.

Minimum educational qualifications needed for entrance into the city management profession usually are a bachelor's or master's degree, preferably with a major in political science or public administration, and municipal experience, preferably as an administrative assistant, assistant city manager, or municipal department head.

Because long, tedious days are common, especially during a crisis, certain qualifications, such as dedication to public service, enhance the city manager's chances of success. Most city managers work at least fifty hours a week, including weekends and evenings—the favorite time for most community meetings—and oftentimes are called upon to handle emergency situations. The city manager must be on call around the clock—to serve his community well.

The city manager's typical day will be anything but monotonous. He may begin his day by talking with his assistants and department heads about a myriad of municipal activities and problems, meet the public and community leaders, and communicate—in person, over the telephone, or in writing—with individuals and group leaders. However, his work schedule must be flexible. He will deal with a variety of problems: (1) from engineering to personnel; (2) from physical to human; and (3) from day-to-day activities to long-range planning. His day undoubtedly will include both behind-the-desk duties and around-the-town visits; certainly it will involve



changing pace and subjects numerous times during the day to adjust to the needs of people; and most likely his work day will continue into the evening for governmental and community meetings.

#### DESIRABLE TRAITS

Desirable traits for the local government professional administrator include tact, patience, tolerance, sound judgment, ability to make decisions, self-confidence, ability to communicate orally and in writing—even under stress—ability to understand and work well with people, sense of humor, and ability to develop teamwork.

Today's local government professional administrators—unlike their predecessors—are more broadly educated, more mobile, less committed to specific programs, more people-oriented, more carefully and scientifically selected, and more interested and motivated. Competent local government administrators also must possess those skills that involve creativity and innovation. The local government administrator must have the vision to create, the ability to encourage subordinates to create, and the willingness to change.

A criticism sometimes leveled at local government professional administrators is that they are too efficiency conscious. Instead, these critics say, administrators should practice human relations and should lead in human and social matters by: (1) being friendly, (2) getting to know people better, (3) recognizing the dignity and worth of individuals, (4) praising good work, (5) talking, listening, and noticing people, and, above all, (6) learning more about people and problems by asking questions.

The well-oriented manager will develop teamwork by using the "we" and "our" approach and language instead of "I" and "my." He recognizes that it is no sin to admit error, and he does not

care who gets the credit. He knows the importance of developing communications up, down, and sideways. He talks with his employees and invites them to submit their ideas. He believes in participatory management. He involves his staff in decision-making. He leads and directs—often softly—instead of demanding and ordering. He works hard to develop teamwork among all employees, regardless of department, level of position, or type of duty assignment.

Increasingly today, the local government professional administrator is shifting from a "bricks and mortar" approach to one of social planning. He must be knowledgeable in intergovernmental relations, for he must deal increasingly with federal, state, and other city agencies and representatives to obtain cooperation, support, or technical assistance in resolving pressing problems and in satisfying needs. He needs to sharpen his skills of negotiation, persuasion, arm-twisting, analysis, and communication. Lacking such skills and knowledge, he will find himself sidelined and isolated from the arena of public action.

One of the primary characteristics of the local government professional administrator today is his greater career mobility. Today many are "broad gauged" men who, during their careers, spend time at all three levels of government—city, state, and federal—and with private business, private consulting firms, and colleges and universities.

#### LEADERS AND RISK-TAKERS

Graham W. Watt, Deputy Mayor of Washington, D.C., and President (1971–72) of the International City Management Association (ICMA), at the ICMA Fifty-eighth Annual Conference in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on September 18, 1972, identified a growing group of local government professional administrators, what he called "a new breed of managers

—leaders and risk-takers,” as men and women “involved in shaping the future of our urban society and in making things happen.”

This “large and significant group,” he said, is composed of “reformers and change agents.” These local government professionals are concerned with “concepts and purposes as well as operations and process.” What sets this professional apart from his predecessors? Mr. Watt responded: “It is that he has added to his formal training qualities which can’t be taught in the university—the quality of humanity and the quality of leadership,” and the principal characteristic of this professional is “humanism.”

These professionals “are accustomed to listening to the citizens they seek to serve, to getting to know them, and to meeting them on their turf. They are finding out what the real needs are.”

Mr. Watt stressed that many local government administrators are making their cities better places by working with community groups and by serving as catalysts to make things happen. He said that the true professional

displays his humanism in his management style as well. He seeks to create a government which responds more sensitively to the needs of those who are a part of that system. He works to overcome the impersonality of the organization; he believes that hierarchy must concern itself with the individual. He effects a style of management which encourages this transformation of his own organization as a worthy, though difficult, goal.

Men and women who will exercise courageous leadership in these times of change still command a premium. Change can be planned and directed for the benefit of our communities.

There is a need for people who understand the process of change and are willing to undertake the task of making

change come about, and today’s local government professional administrator can fill that important role. Machiavelli said: “There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor doubtful of success, no more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.” Francis Bacon stressed the necessity, even if hazardous, of bringing about change. He said: “He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time is the greatest innovator.”

#### FOUR QUALITIES

The local government professional administrator, regardless of his title, should:

(1) Become a generalist with knowledge in all subject fields involved in city management—engineering, public works, health, public safety, planning, building, zoning, law, personnel, information systems, recreation, parks, housing, pollution, traffic control, transportation, and so forth. He should have the expertise to know where to go for up-to-date information; he should be well read in both physical and human aspects of community life; and he should attend seminars, conferences, and meetings to extend his knowledge into all aspects of urban government.

(2) Use his diverse knowledge in dealing with other officials—those in his own local government and in other local governments and in state and federal government—as well as with business leaders in the community.

(3) Innovate and use creativity in solving urban problems. He should not be bound by custom and tradition but should be willing to experiment.

(4) Recognize that his community is only part of the total, that no community can stand alone, and that he must consider the broader “community” in solving urban problems.

Professional administrators must deal with far more than physical things; they must be concerned with human and social concepts. They know their cities, their people, and their community organizations and are geared to listening to citizens, getting to know citizen needs

and interests, and working with citizens in solving urban problems.

This kind of professional leadership requires a person with a humane sense of community who is willing to lead his city into new human and social programs for a better today and tomorrow.

# Planning Solutions Aided by Management and Systems Technology

By CHARLES W. N. THOMPSON AND GUSTAVE J. RATH

ABSTRACT: Urban change is an extreme example of the proverbial product of a committee—most of the changes cannot be attributed to formal or organized planning. Planners who are trying to introduce a more orderly future, to correct present problems, and minimize future ones, must call upon all the skills of man—and perhaps, more—and it is unfortunate that planners are divided, in C. P. Snow's sense, into two cultures which little understand one another. The contribution of technology to planning solutions has its greatest potential and its severest limitations in the emphasis upon formal models, and analysis and evaluation based largely on quantitative techniques. The understanding of these methods, and the combining of them with other methods of planning, will provide the "optimal" solution.

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THE case for urban change has already been made not only by scholars and other informed observers, but also by the legions of people bringing about changes of their own—from children disposing of nonreturnable bottles, to major producers discarding those materials they do not use; from makers of insecticides, fertilizers, and gang plows forcing farmers to move to the city, to suburban zoning boards making sure they stay in the city; from health care professionals delaying decreases in the population, to concupiscent amateurs doing their best to increase it. And we find ourselves with systems—transportation, water, waste disposal, welfare, housing, power, communication, education, public safety, health care, social, legal, and governmental—designed and staffed for other times and places.

It would seem equally clear that the case for "planning," in the sense of a formal, deliberate activity to bring about relatively large changes, has been made. Many of the urban changes that have and are taking place are the result of the additive effect of many individual plans and choices, and we find few voices to suggest that these heterogeneous choices will significantly contribute to bringing about essential changes. For example, the inhibiting effect on urban renewal of the individualistic bias in American legal style is only one of many obvious factors which limit the impact of the individual in dealing with large, complex societal problems. We do not, however, intend to slight the many claimants for the centrality of the individual—the religious, the existentialists, the sensitives—but Thomas Wolfe may well have said it all for those of us who have recently visited Walden Pond. There does not seem to be any available alternative to bigger plans to deal with the bigger problems we face.

Fortunately, we are blessed with many who are willing to provide formal

plans on a large scale to deal with all of our problems. And these volunteers bring a wide variety of skills from many different disciplines—physical, biological, and behavioral science; economics; engineering; management; law; medicine; communication—and vocations—politicians; academicians; business and labor; consultants; and do-gooders. In all this, there would appear to be two very common problems: first, their plans do not always agree, in point of departure or destination; second, most of them do not talk to one another to try to work out their differences. The evidence for the former point is, perhaps, obvious. Evidence for the second point may be found in the unawareness—perhaps intentional—of one group of planners of others working in the same area,<sup>1</sup> such as comparing the references used by two authors ostensibly discussing a common problem.<sup>2</sup>

This problem of lack of agreement and lack of communication among plan-

1. For example, in a commentary on J. W. Forrester's *Urban Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969) and E. C. Banfield's *The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1970), this statement: "Perhaps because Forrester's book is technically oriented and he is not well known in political science circles; and perhaps because Banfield's book is traditionally oriented in its methodological approach and Banfield is not known in technological circles, the two books and sets of ideas have not been linked." Marshall H. Whithed, "Urban Dynamics and Public Policy," *IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics* 2 (April 1972), pp. 170-73, at p. 170.

2. And this point, with the additional reference to D. F. Blumberg, "The city as a system," Decision Sciences Corp., Jenkintown, Pa., Tech Rep. (undated), as follows: "It is interesting to note that the Forrester project, the Banfield study, and the Decision Sciences Corporation work, all done at different places and times, and evidently without cross-reference, seem to tentatively point in similar directions in evaluating certain urban programs." *Ibid.*, p. 171.

ners may be inherent in the number and complexity of both problems and solutions; however, the imperative nature of the problems requires that all of our resources be brought to bear.

This paper proposes that "all" means not only the politicians, social scientists, architects, planners, and so forth, but also the technologists of all kinds. One basis for this argument is that they have contributed mightily to the problems and ought to help clean them up.<sup>3</sup> The modern western city would hardly be viable without technology—for example, the elevator, electric lights, flush toilets, automobiles, at least; and it is clear that the industrial and communications revolution is a central component of our present cities and will be a significant part in the future. Technologists point with pride to their achievements with large problems, for example, the Manhattan Project and the Apollo Project; but the applicability of these systems management and engineering skills to large social and political systems is by no means accepted. Before arguing further, let us look at what management and systems technology is, and what its record is.

#### MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

It is perhaps clear to lexicographers and laymen that technology is "the application of science, especially to industrial or commercial objectives." Implied at least is an emphasis on material objectives, suggesting the science to be

3. Urban dog lovers have heard this argument. On a less pedestrian plane, see Lewis M. Branscomb, "Taming Technology," *Science* 171 (March 12, 1971), pp. 972-77. In a different context, Katz said, "To a considerable degree, it is modern science and modern technology, the very source of the trouble, that may make it possible to devise suitable remedies." Milton Katz, "The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment," *Cincinnati Law Review* 38 (Fall 1969), pp. 587-662, at p. 600.

applied is physical—and biological—rather than social, but the distinction is not always clear. A stronger case may be made for distinguishing the pure (basic, research) scientist—and mathematician—whose declared interest is, at most, to "apply" the methods of science, as distinguished from applying the substantive findings of science, in order to contribute some modest increment to human knowledge as judged by his peers.<sup>4</sup>

Science has tended to ignore or avoid problems for which hard data are not available or for which regular "laws" are not applicable, such as social systems.<sup>5</sup> The technologist tends to paral-

4. The strategy of the great scientist is a source of continuing wonder and argument. See, for example, the beautiful description by a Nobel Laureate, Richard P. Feynman, "The Development of the Space-Time View of Quantum Electrodynamics," *Science* 153 (August 12, 1966), pp. 699-708. Fortunately, many scientists are "pimple people" who carefully limit themselves to adding little bumps of knowledge around the periphery of what is already known, slowly and iteratively expanding the state of the art with modest theories and elegant experiments.

5. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Sociology of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," *American Sociological Review* 30 (December 1965), pp. 833-43, for example. And see Karl W. Deutsch et al., "Conditions Favoring Major Advances in Social Science," *Science* 171 (February 5, 1971), pp. 450-59. We would hope to avoid, by definition, those scientists dealing with cosmology, large physical systems, and the like; and, by this modest acknowledgment, those pioneers in unified theory and general systems and similar areas. The strategy of dealing with very complex and controversial problems takes many forms, as can be illustrated by two currently interesting books. Elaine Morgan, in *The Descent of Woman* (New York: Stein and Day, 1972), looks at the past—and present—drawing upon data which are mostly familiar or at least available to all, and using familiar methods; the solution is stated in ways characteristic of the poet and prophet as well as scientist or philosopher, saying much better what is (now) obvious. Donella H. Meadows et al., in *The Limits of Growth* (New York: Uni-

lel the scientist in dealing with those complex problems for which science has provided a basis for confidence, but the choice of problems is less often his, and he is progressively called upon to work on the important and urgent whether or not he is ready to deal with them.

For our purposes, we propose to briefly outline, using a rough typology, the major areas of management and systems technology as a basis for assessing what their contributions might be to the planning of urban change. There are, of course, alternative typologies. For example, Branch includes operations research as part of systems analysis, uses "scientific management" for our term organizational sciences, and adds another group called "urban dynamics."<sup>6</sup> And a special note should be made of the term "management science" which is sometimes used as a complement, or even a substitute, for "operations research" in describing the varying boundaries of the field.

### *Operations research*

The first of these major divisions is operations research. From its modest beginnings<sup>7</sup> in improved search patterns

verse Books, 1972), look at the future—and present—drawing upon data which are mostly unfamiliar and unavailable, and in ways somewhat precious—or different; the stating of the solution is characteristic of soap box saints and rabble rousing rhetoricians, saying, in ways we would not, what was—but no longer seems—obvious.

6. Melville C. Branch, "Delusions and Diffusions of City Planning in the United States," *Management Science* 16 (August 1970), pp. B-714 to B-732.

7. Lawyers may have mixed feelings about the contributions of the late W. Barton Leach—no mathematician or scientist—who was instrumental in the introduction of this new "science" or "technology" to the United States during World War II. Lauris Norstad, "W. Barton Leach: In His Country's Service," *Harvard Law Review* 85 (February 1972), pp. 726–28. For a delightful and extensive rejection of suggestions that mathematical methods are potentially useful in the

and emphasis on applying analytical and mathematical techniques to specific operations problems, operations research has become a major, identifiable discipline in schools of management and engineering, with societies and journals of its own, and with practitioners in government and industry developing theories and methods and applying them to problems in a wide variety of areas under the self-serving rubric of "a scientific approach to problem solving for executive management."<sup>8</sup> The claims for the method are limited to those parts of real problems which can be extracted, converted into mathematical models, and solved by various optimization and stochastic methods. A method that may be considered as part of operations research or as within the next category here of systems is that of computer simulation which has been developed as an alternate or supplement for certain problems with dynamic interactions and complex interdependencies. However, the emphasis in operations research on quantitative—mathematical—methods largely constrains its usefulness to problems for which numerical data are available and for which the relations among the variables are sufficiently understood to allow for mathematical manipulation. It does not require hostile and suspicious outsiders to suggest the limitations of O.R.<sup>9</sup>

legal process, see Laurence H. Tribe, "Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process," *Harvard Law Review* 84 (April 1971), pp. 1329–93; and this was followed by a barristers' brawl in the June 1971 issue of the *Harvard Law Review*, pp. 1801–20. The law has more friendly relations with outsiders in the social sciences. See, for example, *Law and Society* passim.

8. Harvey M. Wagner, *Principles of Operations Research* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). This recent text serves, perhaps as well as any of the many others, to outline the field for those who are unfamiliar with it.

9. See, for example, Harvey M. Wagner, "The ABC's of OR," *Operations Research* 19

### Systems

A second, and a less clearly bounded, major division is the wonderful world of "systems"—systems management, systems engineering, systems analysis, and so forth. Part of the problem in describing this area is that the term is ubiquitous—all systems are composed of systems and are part of systems; everything is a system in one sense or another.<sup>10</sup> In the sense that it takes one to know one, we can identify several subdivisions of people who call themselves "systems people." Perhaps first are the "high-technology systems" people who deal with specific physical systems, from scientists and engineers who deal with communications and control systems in the abstract, to those who design and build and maintain the phys-

ical counterparts of them in the real world. In a second subdivision are the "systems and procedures" people who design and run accounting and management information systems—both long established flow charters and the new look in computer buffs.<sup>11</sup> A third subdivision includes those who design and develop the "big systems" which involve not only a wide variety of technology, but also require consideration of an even wider variety of nontechnological factors—economic, behavioral, social, political, and the like.<sup>12</sup>

The impact of the first two subdivisions upon planning for urban change is obvious; the design or evaluation of alternative high-technology systems and complex—computerized—information systems demands requisite skills. The claims of the "big systems" people are more diffuse. Among their methods are large-scale project management,<sup>13</sup> systems analysis techniques—drawing upon operations research and econom-

(October 1971), pp. 1259–81, and C. West Churchman, "Operations Research as a Profession," *Management Science* 17 (October 1970), pp. B-37 to B-53. See also J. I. Round, "Regional Input-Output Models in the U.K.: A Re-Appraisal of Some Techniques," *Regional Studies* 6 (March 1972), pp. 1–6. A recent and controversial airing of differences among OR practitioners participating in public policy debates appeared in the September 1971 issue of *Operations Research*. See the bemused comment by Nicholas Wade, "ABM Debate: Learned Society Split by Old Grievance," *Science* 174 (October 15, 1971), pp. 276–77. And see, further, the several comments in the June 1972 issue of *Management Science*, pp. B-608 to B-629.

10. The itching results in a lot of scratching. See, for example, Russell L. Ackoff, "Towards a System of Systems Concepts," *Management Science* 17 (July 1971), pp. 661–71. And see Harold Chestnut, "Information Requirements for Systems Understanding," *IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics* 6 (January 1970), pp. 3–12. For a wide-ranging discussion of the relations among the disciplines, with other theories, and of the strengths and weaknesses of the systems approach—and systems engineering—applied to social systems, see P. B. Checkland, "Systems and Science, Industry and Innovation," *Journal of Systems Engineering* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1970), pp. 3–17.

11. An interesting and relevant critique is provided by Ida R. Hoos, "Information Systems and Public Planning," *Management Science* 17 (June 1971), pp. B-658 to B-671; and this was followed by a heated exchange in "Letters to the Editor," *Management Science* 18 (February 1972), pp. B-352 to B-356. For a cautionary comment on computer people, see Robert Boguslaw, *The New Utopians* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

12. A useful description of the "big systems" man is provided by Morten Gale and Paul Alelyunas, "The Systems Man," *Space/Aeronautics* 46 (December 1966), pp. 81–87. See also Arthur D. Hall, "Systems Engineering from an Engineering Viewpoint," *IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics* 1 (November 1965), pp. 4–8, and Kenneth J. Schlager, "Systems Engineering—Key to Modern Development," *IRE Transactions on Engineering Management* 3 (July 1956), pp. 64–66.

13. See, for example, David I. Cleland and William R. King, *Systems Analysis and Project Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), and Richard A. Johnson et al., *The Theory and Management of Systems*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).



ics<sup>14</sup>—and the techniques of systems engineering.<sup>15</sup>

### *Organizational sciences*

The third and last of these proposed divisions might well be identified as the organizational sciences, overlapping to some extent the others, and particularly "systems," but also mixed with the behavioral sciences, and other disciplines and professions. In the sense that a profession is an applied science (or art), the field of management—business, administration, and so forth—has, from its claimed beginnings with F. W. Taylor and others, and drawing upon sociology, psychology, economics, and others, developed an increasingly science-based set of methods and substantive findings for dealing with the problems of planning, organizing, directing, and controlling of large and small human enterprises. Theories of individual and group behavior, models of organizations, particularly those based on decision-making and communication,<sup>16</sup> and the

14. See, for example, Richard de Neufville and Joseph H. Stafford, *Systems Analysis for Engineers and Managers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), and Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). For a relevant, clear, and candid discussion, see Kenneth W. Heathington and R. Brian Bunton, "Systems Approach and the Civil Engineer," *Engineering Issues—Journal of Professional Activities, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers* 97 (October 1971), pp. 65–74, and the "Discussion" by Thomas C. Kavanagh which follows, pp. 75–82. In this context, "systems analysis" refers to the applications of a variety of decision-making techniques to large-scale problems; it should be made clear that the term is also used for the application of these or similar techniques to considerably more modest problems.

15. See, for example, Arthur D. Hall, *A Methodology for Systems Engineering* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962).

16. Singling out Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), does a disservice to the voluminous literature which has appeared

introduction of the concept of administrative experimentation<sup>17</sup> are examples of the kinds of methods which are being developed and used. Another, and special, case is that of the change agent, the academic researcher who actively intervenes in the real world to bring about a particular change, as distinguished from trying to understand what is happening or to test a hypothesis.<sup>18</sup>

Ignored in this recital is the greater part of technology in the applied sciences and engineering which is concerned with the bulk of the common and important problems of designing the materials and equipment and subsystems which contribute both problems

since. A useful compendium is Walter Buckley, ed., *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), which does not, however, include Warren Weaver's "Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication," in Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication* (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1949), pp. 93–117. Note should be made, at least, of decision theory, represented by Ward Edwards, "The Theory of Decision Making," *Psychological Bulletin* 51 (July 1954), pp. 380–418, and Peter C. Fishburn, *Decision and Value Theory* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).

17. We identify this with Donald T. Campbell, "Administrative Experimentation, Institutional Records, and Nonreactive Measures," in J. C. Stanley, ed., *Improving Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 257–91, and his later, and more directly applicable, "Reforms As Experiments," *American Psychologist* 24 (April 1969), pp. 409–29. We have further described a variety of activities, such as experimentation, study, field testing and evaluation, in terms of three dimensions—exploratory to a priori, normative to empirical, and study to experiment. Charles W. N. Thompson and Gustave J. Rath, "The Administrative Experiment: A Special Case of Field Testing or Evaluation," *Human Factors*, forthcoming.

18. As a reference to the literature, see Warren G. Bennis et al., eds., *The Planning of Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961).

and solutions. The technology associated with the automobile provides many examples—safety devices in the vehicle and on the highway, fuels and engine accessories to minimize pollution, designs to decrease damage and deterioration to the automobile.<sup>19</sup> Also ignored are the futurists who map out both optimistic and pessimistic views of what will come to pass.<sup>20</sup>

#### PROMISE AND PROMISES

The hopes—and fears—that the large aerospace companies and their governmental counterparts would transfer their competence in the planning and carrying out of the design and management of large-scale military and space systems to the critical civilian sector have not materialized, with, perhaps, some interesting exceptions.<sup>21</sup> From other areas of management and systems technology, and we have described them above, have come some modest contributions.

Where the particular method is well adapted to an otherwise confusing or complex problem, for example, inventory control and transportation, operations research has proved useful in planning. Problems for which large amounts of data present both an obstacle to, and

an avenue for, solution have provided the opportunity for large-scale computers and simulation to prove their value as planning tools. It is evident that the large-scale high-technology systems—telecommunications, power networks, military and space systems, highly automated industries and distribution systems, and very large physical facilities—and a wide variety of consumer products are dependent on technology for their creation and maintenance. Industries and some institutions have adopted schedule and cost control techniques, such as PERT, to improve their ability to control and plan in these areas.

Applications of operations research, systems techniques, and the organizational sciences to the planning and control of large social systems are less obvious. Characteristic of these systems is a large behavioral component for which there are no generally acceptable stable models, or sets of easily decomposable models,<sup>22</sup> because of the intractability and unpredictability of the humans who make up, individually and collectively, major parts of the system. Compounding the problem is the general unavailability of useful data on the many variables, although governmental agencies, educators, health care professionals, business, and others are all working to improve our (historical)

19. A study of the effect of five diverse technologies on social change is presented by Amitai Etzioni and Richard Remp, "Technological 'Shortcuts' to Social Change," *Science* 175 (January 7, 1972), pp. 31–38.

20. And their critics, for example, Dennis J. Chase, "Future Shock: A Time to Curb Forecasters," *Chicago Tribune*, June 4, 1972, sec. 1A, p. 7. In contrast with those futurists describing Christmases to come are the exciting groups planning to throw off the chain. For example, the Committee of the Future which, among other things, is planning to colonize the moon to recreate a frontier for man. *New Worlds* (April-May 1972).

21. For a refresher on those promises, and a chance to exercise some 20/20 hindsight, see Lawrence Lessing, "Systems Engineering Invades the City," *Fortune* 77, no. 1 (January 1968), pp. 154–57, 217–21.

22. Admittedly, there are a number of candidates. Illustrative of the problems in one area is the discussion by Frank E. Horton, "Behavioral Models in Transportation Planning," *Transportation Engineering Journal, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers* 98 (May 1972), pp. 411–19. And, as an alternative to preparing "new" models, one can draw upon established models. Robert R. Mayer, "Social System Models for Planners," *AIP Journal* 38, no. 3 (May 1972), pp. 130–39. See also Darwin G. Stuart, "Rational Urban Planning: Problems and Prospects," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 5 (December 1969), pp. 151–82. And Donald N. Rothblatt, "Rational Planning Reexamined," *AIP Journal* 37 (January 1971), pp. 26–37.

data banks, and others are working to develop social indicators,<sup>23</sup> such as measures of health and crime rates.

There are some beginnings, particularly where the government has put up the money for extensive studies. The evaluation of proposed technological systems, and proposed or in-process programs, has generated a large project selection literature. Related to this is work on technological forecasting and technology assessment. An example of a specific system of interest to the urban scene is found in the concern with crime which has resulted in a large effort to improve the efficiency of the police in terms of surveillance and communications systems, and operational techniques such as police patrol patterns. A wide variety of other mission-oriented programs could be listed. Of special interest is a relatively new National Science Foundation program called Research Applied to National Needs (RANN).

It may seem strange that a science and technology which can put a golf cart on the moon, bring brotherhood to pass with cloning, throw a curve at the concept of a limitless universe, impose a Gregorian calendar on primordial motes in calcified slime, and put Phœbus' chariot in silos and submarines is not well on the way to solving the problems of urban society. Yet the major contribution to solving the poisoning of babies with lead in paint appears to be the tearing down of tenements to build research hospitals, and a similar solution to urban transportation is to replace homes and industry with expressways.

#### AIDING AND ABETTING

It would seem clear that the technologists will not only continue to con-

tribute to the planning of the "high technology systems" which are part of urban change, but will also be invited to contribute in other areas of planning which call for the creation of technical alternatives and their evaluation. The problems and choices here are those which arise whenever the services of specialists are required. In a pluralistic society, the technologists can also be expected to insist on offering their skills in other areas, sharing in the planning—and the rewards. The problems here are the familiar ones of the marketplace.

There is, however, an at least implicit claim that some parts of the technology are particularly relevant as a complementary or even alternate strategy for dealing with planning—and directing and controlling—of large complex systems, such as urban complexes. With this claim goes the argument that the engineer must broaden himself because the sociologist, lawyer, and so forth, is incapable of filling the engineering gap. The more pervasive, if not persuasive, claim is that of using the methods of science, in some cases where science is not prepared to claim they are suitable, to deal with not only the obvious high-technology components of systems, but also the overall system itself. These claims raise divisive problems and choices concerning the form and substance of the contribution of technology. Technology can be called upon to provide specific technical data on alternatives as input to the planning process, and, after the planning is accomplished, to provide the designs specified by the planners, and to contribute to the technical part of the evaluation. This is no more or less than the specialist function described above. At the other extreme, the technologist may be given—or even participate in the setting of—the broad objectives and carry out the planning, designing, and implementing in the "big systems" fashion more characteristic of

23. See Kenneth C. Land, "On the Definition of Social Indicators," *American Sociologist* 6 (November 1971), pp. 322-25.

military and space systems. A third, and intermediate position, is that of a full partnership between the technologist and nontechnologist planners, what is often referred to as an interdisciplinary approach.

While all of these alternatives may be found in practice, there is evidence to suggest that the gulf between the "two cultures" has been an impediment to the interdisciplinary approach. Whether or not they are technologists, planners, and those closely associated with them, need no evidence from others, but a few comments may be in order. "You see the nonscientist, confident in his superior ability to manipulate the power that the scientists have indirectly given him, prepared to follow his intuition and his horoscope but unwilling to base his actions on the rich store of analysis and knowledge that science can give him."<sup>24</sup> And, contra, "At the risk of incurring hostility in some quarters, I must say that I think engineers kid themselves and kid the American people when, in discussing possible remedies for urban ills, they talk about a systems approach and a management approach and the contribution of the engineer."<sup>25</sup> It should not be surprising that the nontechnologist planner believes that the technologist's preoccupation with formal models and obsession with number crunching limit his ability to deal with the complex, human elements in social change. And it should not be surprising that the technologist feels the same way about people untrained and unskilled in his formal methods. If there is a "planning syndrome," it is in this idiosyncratic insistence by one planner that the planner from another disci-

pline—or culture—should not be a full partner, that his methods and goals, the first an issue of credibility and the second of values, must be kept apart. And these may be very different issues. A professional arbitrator, Donald B. Straus, reflecting on his experience in dispute settlement, commented that the ones which don't get settled are those where you see evil in your opponent; if you see him as only stupid, you can turn him into a student.<sup>26</sup>

The argument favoring the intermediate relationship—of the interdisciplinary approach—in organizing the resources of planners—managers, designers, evaluators, and so forth—to meet the complex requirements of large urban problems has been advanced by many.<sup>27</sup> The difficulty and seriousness of the problems would suggest that all available resources be used, and the variety of the problems, from questions of technical and economic feasibility to priorities in

26. From a tape recording of a conference at Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, May 5-7, 1972, sponsored by the Council on Population and Environment.

27. See, for example, the following: Herman G. Berkman, "Urban Systems in General Systems Research," *IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics* 2 (April 1972), pp. 231-37, at pp. 232 and 237. Branch, "Delusions," at pp. B-725 to B-727. Branscomb, "Taming Technology," at p. 976. Ursula Cliff, "Ian McHarg: The Designer as Ecologist," *Design & Environment* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1970), pp. 28-29, 65. Henry Fagin, "Planning for Future Urban Growth," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 30 (Winter 1965), pp. 9-25, at pp. 10 and 24. Harold Gershinowitz, "Applied Research for the Public Good—A Suggestion," *Science* 176 (April 28, 1972), pp. 380-86, at pp. 381 and 385. Gabor Strasser, "Impediments to societal problem solving," *IEEE Spectrum* 8, no. 7 (July 1971), pp. 43-48, at pp. 44, 45, and 47. John Zeisel, "The Design Team as a Political Tool," *Design & Environment* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1970), pp. 46-48, 66. But see the delightfully hostile (and incisive) criticism by William Alonso, "Beyond the Inter-Disciplinary Approach to Planning," *AIP Journal* 37 (May 1971), pp. 169-73.

24. Branscomb, "Taming Technology," p. 977.

25. Philip M. Hauser, "The Chaotic Society: Whither?" in *The Engineer and the City* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Engineering, 1969), pp. 109-13, at p. 110.

defining the "quality of life," would suggest a broad spectrum of skills. Beyond this, however, is the interrelationship among these problems. These problems involve variables of different kinds, dimensionally unrelated, based on conceptually unrelated models and theories, for which insufficient data are available, and which are often uncontrollable or unpredictable. The relationships among the variables are often imperfectly understood, are nonlinear, require relating phenomena not the province of any single discipline, or are not decomposable into two or more isolated and manageable problems. It would seem evident that such problems require the simultaneous and iterative cooperative contributions of all the relevant skills from the earliest stage of preliminary identification of a problem through all of the study and planning to the implementation, evaluation, and redefinition to meet progressively changing objectives. Doing anything less, in view of the urgent and serious problems we are faced with, may bring about the fate Patrick Henry described.

That we may not yet know how to put interdisciplinary teams together cannot excuse an unwillingness to recognize the necessity or to make the attempt. Until methods of interdisciplinary cooperation are better developed, it will be necessary for planners to actively seek out others concerned with similar problems and be willing to educate and to be educated.

In addition to this central argument for the integration of the general skills of technology into the planning process, we would propose to discuss a few selected areas which we believe offer promise of future contributions to planning. These are unstructured problem-solving, goal-defining processes, non-hierarchical organizations, individualistic processes, and administrative experimentation.

### *Unstructured problems*

Unstructured problems include the whole area of fuzzy, poorly defined, messy problems, characterized by insufficient information on the critical factors and their relations, and including goals and criteria.<sup>28</sup> As distinguished from deterministic and probabilistic problems, problems for which disciplines have provided a strategy for solution, these problems remain the domain of heuristics, of "muddling through." A resurgence of interest in recognizing unstructured problems as a separate and real category of problems, calling for verbal and quantitative and, perhaps, other kinds of models directed to the apparently discontinuous characteristics of these problems, may provide approaches more directly relevant than the approximations currently available.

### *Goal-defining processes*

Goal-defining processes are common—voting, for example—and are basically person-specific. It is in the growing awareness that distinctions between fact and value, between objective and subjective, are less differences in kind than differences in "who agrees" that goal-defining will mature. The use of delphic models, as a way of facilitating convergence among panels of experts,<sup>29</sup>

28. The currently prominent examination of this area is represented by Richard E. Bellman and Lofti A. Zadeh, "Decision-Making in a Fuzzy Environment," *Management Science* 17 (December 1970), pp. B-141 to B-164. The broader sense we intend here is better represented in Churchman, "Operations Research." See also Walter R. Reitman, "Heuristic decision procedures, open constraints, and the structure of ill-defined problems," in M. W. Shelly, II, and G. L. Bryan, eds., *Human Judgments and Optimality* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 282-315.

29. Olaf Helmer and Nicholas Rescher, "On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences," *Management Science* 6 (October 1959), pp. 25-52.

and the facilitation of other group-decision processes, such as by "decision seminars,"<sup>30</sup> may be expected to be accompanied by the development of theories and methods which will increase our ability to deal with the elusive nature of goals, criteria, objectives, and the like.

### *Non-hierarchical organizations*

Pressure upon planners from the government and segments of the population has increased the importance of methods for obtaining the participation of non-formally organized parts of the population. The powerful and effective methods developed and used in military, industrial, and other highly structured organizations are difficult to apply where the participants are unprepared for, or unwilling to accept, the assumptions upon which they are based. And this is true not only for the intended beneficiary of the planning process, but also for the professional called upon to work in an interdisciplinary group. The ubiquitous "informal organization" which students of management have used to explain the exceptions to classical theories of organization shares many of the characteristics of the ad hoc neighborhood and special interests groups.<sup>31</sup> One of these characteristics is the relative lack of the comfortable

hierarchical structure present, or apparent, in most if not all formal organizations. The problems of goal-defining, of resource allocation, of decision-making, and resolution of conflict at interfaces in a non-hierarchical organization represent an area of potentially critical importance. It may be that a relatively simple control model—identification of the gap between plan and performance, and communication of this information to others in the organization—will provide the basis for the understanding (and creation) of organizations without formal order giving and taking structures.

### *Individualistic processes*

Increased attention to individualistic processes would allow the planner to take advantage of the power of self-specification, so long a cornerstone of the law. Designers of man-machine systems have long known that the machine must be acceptable to the user or it will not be used, or used poorly. One of the ways to introduce a new information system is to provide it in parallel to the old, allowing the individual to "discover" its advantages by test and comparison. Consumer marketing, impulse buying, for example, encourages the individual to actively participate in the process. Methods for providing information and alternatives, and for receiving information from the individual, will increase his ability to contribute.<sup>32</sup> For example, costly supervision and inspection systems to ensure that contractors mowing grass along highways are doing their job might well be replaced by providing the interested pub-

30. This was suggested by Harold D. Lasswell, *The Future of Political Science* (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 125-33.

31. See, for example, Russell L. Ackoff, "A Black Ghetto's Research on a University," *Operations Research* 18 (September-October 1970), pp. 761-71. In some cases, at least, the apparent hierarchical character of these groups may be unilateral; see Neil Gilbert and Joseph W. Eaton, "Who Speaks for the Poor," *AIP Journal* 36 (November 1970), pp. 411-16. The larger, and more general, problem of non-hierarchical relations between the planner and his "client" and among all of the individuals and organizations involved is presented by Richard S. Bolan, "The Social Relations of the Planner," *AIP Journal* 37 (November 1971), pp. 386-96.

32. See, for example, two proposals in this regard. Joseph L. Sax, *Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action* (New York: Knopf, 1971). Ellis R. Mottur, *Technology Assessment and Citizen Action* (Washington, D.C.: Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George Washington University, May 26, 1970).

lic with copies of the schedules and specifications; similarly, the bus-riding public has a self-interest in providing feedback on bus drivers who are either early or late. Industry has long known that well-informed members of the organization can be an effective alternate—or supplement—to an elaborate system of inspection and supervision. It is no novel or recent idea to push decision-making down into the lowest elements in an organization, and, with the introduction of the computer, it has become possible to speed up and to centralize the use of information in an organization and, paradoxically, to increase the possibility of decentralization and individual freedom.

#### *Administrative experimentation*

The last, and perhaps most important and well-developed, area is that of evaluation, and particularly administrative experimentation. The formal testing of theory using previously agreed upon methods and procedures is an (the) established process of science, and the replicated or replicable experiment, under carefully controlled conditions, is a preferred form. In the field, randomized assignment to experimental and control groups, and control of parameters, is not often an available option, but the argument is that an approximation can be approached with care in keeping track of the rival hypotheses which are introduced. The sense of "administrative" is in recognition that the interesting experimental interventions are more likely to be within the prerogative of the administrator who controls the resources and conditions.<sup>33</sup>

33. This is more extensively presented in Campbell, "Reforms As Experiments," and Thompson and Rath, "The Administrative Experiment." A criticism of the approach and

The provision for formal evaluation as a part of the initial planning process provides not only increased assurance that the planner will have a clearer statement of his objective, but also will provide both the planner and his customer with agreed milestones at definite future points, both near and long term.

#### SUMMARY

Our purpose has been to urge that the technologist be recognized as a full partner in the planning process, as a contributor whose preoccupation with numbers and formal models should be tolerated and, in some cases, taken advantage of. We have outlined briefly the skills and potential contributions to the planning process of "management and systems technology," and we have suggested some areas of particular promise for the future.

a rebuttal appear in *Administrative Science Quarterly* 15 (March 1970)—Robert S. Weiss and Martin Rein, "The Evaluation of Broad-Aim Programs: Experimental Design, Its Difficulties, and an Alternative," pp. 97-109; Donald T. Campbell, "Considering the Case against Experimental Evaluations of Social Innovations," pp. 110-13. And a similar dialogue appears in the *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 7 (December 1971)—Donald T. Campbell, "Reforms As Experiments," pp. 133-69; Phillip Shaver and Graham Staines, "Problems Facing Campbell's 'Experimenting Society,'" pp. 173-86; Donald T. Campbell, "Comments on the Comments by Shaver and Staines," pp. 187-92. The more general subject of evaluation is discussed in Francis G. Caro, ed., *Readings in Evaluation Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1971). See also Walter Williams, "The Capacity of Social Science Organizations to Perform Large-Scale Evaluative Research," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 7 (June 1972), pp. 431-72. And see Wilbur A. Steger and T. R. Lakshmanan, "Plan Evaluation Methodologies: Some Aspects of Decision Requirements and Analytical Response," in *Urban Development Models* (Washington, D.C.: Highway Research Board, 1968), pp. 33-72.

## Book Department

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### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SYDNEY D. BAILEY. *Prohibitions and Restraints in War*. Pp. xiii, 194. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$3.75. Paperbound.

This little book, from the pen of an able British scholar who has written extensively on United Nations institutions, evokes in this reviewer rather mixed reactions. The volume consists mainly of an historical review of doctrines and movements designed either to render war less inhumane or to make its occurrence less likely. The review, which goes back in time to the doctrine of the "Just War" in early Christian ethics down to contemporary efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament, is well documented even if weighted at times with so much legal detail as to make for tedious reading.

Bailey believes that it is no longer practicable to separate the law of The Hague—on methods of conducting hostilities—from the law of Geneva—relating to the innocent victims of war. In this connection, the author notes the disappointingly limited impact of the Nuremberg Charter and the Human Rights activities of the United Nations. UN organs, it is observed, have shown reluctance to deal with questions which pre-suppose the persistence of war. The International Law Commission, for instance, early considered that as war had

been "outlawed," the regulation of its conduct had ceased to be relevant.

If, Bailey asks himself, wars should continue to occur in spite of all efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping, are there any restraints which civilized nations should observe unilaterally, or on a reciprocal basis? His answer to this question is impliedly in the affirmative, but the point is not developed in any specific sense. Bailey's personal position on the elusive problem of war would appear to be quasi-pacifist. As he concludes his commentary, however, he admits that there is no single panacea "for preventing indiscriminate or excessive violence in armed conflict. . . . Man becomes more a danger to himself as his capacity to injure, kill and destroy by unnatural means increases"—for example, by nuclear weapons. For the pacifist "the problem is whether the renunciation of armed force is compatible with responsible citizenship in a substantially non-pacifist world." Even so, the humanitarian effort to protect the innocent and to prevent unnecessary suffering in armed conflict is "a task in which the pacifist and non-pacifist can unite." Pope John XXIII is quoted—from his *Pacem in terris*—as saying that "the same moral law which governs the relations between individual human beings serves also to regulate the relations of political communities with one another." Bailey seems tacitly to agree.



In this reviewer's judgment, a special difficulty with this scholarly book is that it is not clearly pitched to any particular audience. The level of treatment assumes something more than the background of undergraduates. On the other hand, the analysis is not sufficiently developed in depth as a reference work for international relations specialists or even for most graduate students. At the same time, the book's contents are so circumscribed substantively that they are not likely to generate a wide interest for the lay public. For example, Bailey repeatedly stresses the necessity of constructing effective institutions of peace, but how to go about this frustrating task is ignored. The most crucial problem is thus left hanging in the air.

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CYRIL E. BLACK and RICHARD A. FALK, eds. *The Future of the International Legal Order*, vol. 4, *The Structure of the International Environment*. Pp. xvi, 637. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$17.50. Paperbound, \$9.50.

According to the editors, the purpose of this volume, the fourth to result from a large-scale collaborative project, is twofold. First, its aim is to discuss "the international legal aspects of the most important problems of the development of the human environment." Second, its goal is to analyze "the institutions, agencies, and movements that must be further adapted to the rapidly changing needs of humankind." The hope is to explore "the adjustments in the present international system that are minimally necessary and practicable" (p. ix).

The book is comprised of fifteen essays by leading specialists in international law, institutions, and politics. All of the authors write about subjects that they have dealt with at greater length elsewhere and with which they are prominently identified. Not surprisingly, the result falls far short of a program for action for the near future.

Nor will the reader find a coherent and comprehensive treatment of the implications of foreseeable technological developments for international law and institutions. Instead, the volume is more a sampler of the available literature from which the reader can pick and choose, and the range of choice is wide and the overall quality high. Those interested in the future of the international legal order will find much in the volume that will interest and stimulate them.

The list of topics covered is by now familiar: population, food, eco-systems and their modification, ocean resources, and other similar issues that have been salient in recent popular and academic discourse. The treatment, of course, varies with individual authors, but all blend description, prediction, and prescription. In general, the specialists in international law among the authors are less inhibited about making normative assertions than the political scientists. But for all, the hoped for, as well as the expected, future involves a global system with increased authority for political units that are more inclusive than the nation-state. Some of the authors show clearly how technological developments pose problems that almost inescapably will have to be resolved by assignments of authority to larger units. The plan of the book, however, provided for a division of labor; some authors were to raise certain questions that others were to answer. As is inevitable in enterprises of this genre, the execution of the scheme has left lacunae, questions raised but not answered—concerning, for example, population—and seemingly gratuitous answers—involving, for example, individual responsibility in international law.

Questions of value are largely unexplored, except of course through the general bias in favor of more inclusive systems of authority. However, in a fascinating introductory essay Harold Lasswell points toward one possibility of the principal elites throughout the world identifying with one another and consolidating a global system of public order that would buttress their positions vis à vis mass discontent. This issue of the value consequences of

international authority system clearly deserves greater attention.

The basic weakness of this book is that of the field generally. Our capacity for prediction is extremely limited. The methodology used here is that of the sensitive observer, analyzing the recent past and speculating about the future. Whether a different approach would have produced more, must at this stage remain a matter of debate. Whatever ones position in this debate, however, there is much in this volume that will be of interest.

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WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. *The United States and the Industrial World: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970's*. Pp. xv, 463. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$13.50.

This is an outstanding book, though not because of the novelty of the analysis or the boldness of the recommendations. It contains no call to the barricades, discloses no secret information, sets up no heroes, impales no villains, and reveals no shortcuts to peace and prosperity. But it is a gold mine of relevant information. It is gracefully written, well organized, and intelligently indexed. It is suffused with the mature wisdom of a Cicerone who knows his way around, not only in international economics, but in other fields as well.

The result is mercifully undogmatic: indeed, the book may suffer slightly because a decent author operating under Council on Foreign Relations or Brookings' ground-rules tends to give more than a fair shake to "on-the-other-hand" arguments put forward by impetuous members of his sizable supporting cast of study groups, advisory panels, and manuscript readers.

The theme of Diebold's book is the evolution since World War II of United States economic relations with other major industrialized areas—Western Europe, Japan, and Canada (the special relationship with Canada is particularly well analyzed)—

and the problems posed for the future by the efficiencies and deficiencies of what the author calls "the Bretton Woods approach." By that term, he means the effort to build a global economy based on intergovernmental cooperation, the equal treatment of sovereign nations, and the gradual removal of barriers to the movement of goods and funds (but not people) across national boundaries—in short, the major objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Diebold's shorthand may be mildly disconcerting to those who associate the GATT with Geneva or Havana and regard the World Bank and the IMF as the true Bretton Woods twins. Nevertheless, there is plausible logic in his terminology and little likelihood that Cuba will complain.

The aim of the Bretton Woods or GATT-IMF approach was to unleash a process to get the world moving in a direction. Despite zigzags and setbacks, the result was more prosperity by the beginning of the 1970s than the world had ever before known. It was also, however, a United States lacking in either program or goals for the years ahead. Present requirements extend well beyond anything that can be described as "the removal of barriers," an essentially negative function, and involve greater harmonization of domestic economic policies and more positive "management" of the international economy. Diebold is specific about the kinds of actions that need to be taken but deliberately refrains from saying when they should be taken. Space limitations prevent this discursive reviewer from summarizing the recommendations on policy and machinery. Suffice it to say that they build constructively on existing foundations and will whet readers' appetites for the two follow-up books on United States foreign economic policy projected by Diebold.

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OLE R. HOLSTI. *Crisis Escalation War*. Pp. 290. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972. \$11.00.

The crisis of 1914 has been scrutinized many times by historians. The documentary records, personal memoirs, and other materials exist in profusion, and are probably completely open to study. Professor Holsti has been able to shed new light on the crisis by measuring the effects of stress on the organizations and the men who made the decisions which ended in the First World War.

He has used content analysis and statistical techniques to measure the elements of stress which increased from the end of June until the first week of August: perceptions of international hostility; effect of time pressure; increase in volume and complexity of communications; perceptions of alternatives open to allies and adversaries; the closing of options as the situation became more tense. All these measurements reveal increasing stress and its adverse effects upon the men who made decisions. Professor Holsti's first chapter gives a careful summary of the findings of psychological investigations into the effect of stress upon decision-making.

A brief but careful overview of the crisis serves to guide the reader through the detailed analysis so that he can appreciate the significance of increasing pressures and complications. Professor Holsti is a careful and conscientious scholar, so he devotes a good part of his third chapter to two validity experiments—comparison of his results with the judgment of the international financial community in 1914, and statistical refinement of his data by sorting out the effect of the situation from the individual judgments of the participants. Both of these tests yield a general confirmation of his results.

Need all crises lead to war? The author devotes his seventh chapter to an examination of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. He is aware of the limitations of his data compared with the wealth of materials available for the earlier crisis, but he makes excellent use of what can be assembled and draws a number of contrasts with the tragic record of 1914. This enables him, in a final chapter, to make a few suggestions about the handling of crises, and the reduction of stress upon decision-making.

The book includes an appendix giving detailed statistical tables, and a discussion of methodology. Readers are referred to two books on content analysis. Nevertheless, more explanation might have been given of these methods. More people might read and more fully understand the book, and its significance and importance justify a wider audience. The industry and care with which the author has used his data, the caution with which he has drawn his conclusions, and the ingenuity of his analysis make this a valuable and important book, not only for students of international affairs but to a wide group of interested citizens.

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PHILIP JABOB et al. *Values and the Active Community: A Cross-National Study of the Influence of Local Leadership*. Pp. 416. The International Studies of Values in Politics. New York: The Free Press, 1971. \$13.95.

This ambitious study of the relationships between the values of local leaders and the vitality, or "activeness," of community life in India, Poland, the United States, and Yugoslavia is both very encouraging and slightly disappointing. Its general design and methodological sophistication give hope that the study of comparative politics has entered a new and much more rigorous age. One wishes, however, that its basic hypotheses were more conclusively confirmed, although this does not detract much from the value of the work.

The design of the project represents a major expansion in team research in the field. With a total of thirty scholars from the four countries cooperating over a period of four years in interviewing 3,930 local level political and governmental office holders, the study must have required funding in amounts one usually associates with the physical, rather than the behavioral, sciences. Moreover, this is a genuinely comparative and integrated project, not the series of poorly connected chapters by local scholars writing on their respec-

tive specialties that so often characterizes comparative multi-authored projects. The use of native scholars for questionnaire design, identification of indicators and interviewing minimizes the common danger that the investigator's ignorance of the cultural context may lead to misinterpretation of data.

This sensitivity to cultural context shapes the methodology of the study. Activism, the main dependent variable, is treated as an underlying phenomenon to be measured indirectly by indicators that are in themselves system specific. Factor analysis is then used to determine the degree of interdependence between indicators. The aim of this approach is to develop for each country a scale measuring activism that can be related to scales for every other country in the study. Thus a common structure or pattern of activism within and between countries may be discerned.

It is in the attempt to discern common patterns that the reader feels some disappointment. The basic proposition of the study is that "community activeness," defined as high mobilization of resources by local government and high popular involvement in public life, may be explained as a function of the values held by local leaders—values relating to social change, economic behavior, public participation, national identification and ethics. Control variables include personal characteristics of leaders, such as age and education; community characteristics, such as population density and social structure; and systemic differences in local and national political structure. No unambiguous correlations are discovered, which leads the authors dangerously close to inferring the overwhelming importance of rather vague national system characteristics—a conclusion which does not necessarily confirm the cross-national presuppositions of the methodology. The authors conclude that the values of leaders may yet be decisive in community development. This is not wholly satisfying from a scientific viewpoint, but yet is far from trivial. In any case, this study by the International Studies of Values in Politics (ISVP) has set a high standard of rigor and will be valued as much, if not more, for the manner in which it was carried out

as for its conclusions. It is an important achievement.

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HERMAN KAHN and B. BRUCE-BRIGGS.

*Things to Come: Thinking about the 1970s and 1980s.* Pp. 262. New York: Macmillan, 1972. \$6.95.

As part of Hudson Institute's futurology series in things to come, the authors identify fifteen components of the so-called long-term multifold trend in Western culture, including increasingly sensate, bourgeois, bureaucratic and meritocratic, centralized economically and politically modernized and industrialized, affluent, urbanized, educated, and the institutionalization of technological change. They assert the increasing universality of the multifold trend "although by 1985 this trend may begin to top out, if only because the universality will have become nearly universal" (p. 29).

The authors perceive the development of a so-called *La Deuxieme Belle Epoque*—the original was 1900 to 1914—with relative peace, rapid economic growth, expansion of world trade, investment, travel and communication, and stability. The analogy is worrisome—the original era did end in war.

The book offers a "surprise-free projection" of the world of the 1970s and 1980s, avoiding sole reliance on "current trends," but using theories or intuitions, possibly contradictory, "that the author happens to believe or finds plausible" (p. 40). A "surprise-free projection" seeking to cover all reasonable possibilities, even if contradictory, eschews identifying, weighting, and evaluating current trends to help understand the future.

The surprise-free projection offered involves a half unified, multipolar world, general high GNP growth, worldwide green revolution, growing role of multinational corporations, new issues of international control, including worldwide concern with law and order issues, and persistence of chronic international confrontations. The authors review "sources of stability and in-

stability in the international system" and offer three alternate United States futures: "neutral context," "modestly pessimistic context" with possible "branch points" of low probability but high impact if they occur, such as a Vietnam debacle (pp. 163-175).

This book has the casual journalistic or almost total lack of scholarly citations, off-the-top-of-the-head character of such other recent nonbooks as Toffler's *Future Shock*, no matter how perceptive we may credit the authors with being.

The authors claim a "methodological framework" employing a technical jargon—which they apologize for—and incorporating "relevant insights from a broad range of academic and technical disciplines" without dropping to the level of some other recent works, that of "basically faddish journalism" (pp. 1, 4). The authors appear to be ignorant of some of the recent results of empirical research in the social sciences. They tend to take stereotyped, unitary views of nations, national characters, and people; present a grab-bag of pop anthropology without ascribing any sources—where did the oracular "12 Traditional Societal Levers" come from?

The authors concede that "basic changes . . . may elude the forecaster if his analysis is not sufficiently wide in scope" (p. 206). Yet they claim "technology can often solve its problems . . . if there are new techniques for insurgency, criminality, or ordinary violence, we need new techniques for counter-insurgency or imposition of order" (pp. 214-215). Most current writers on technology and society reject the technological fix as the fundamental method of reform since the large problems are social as well as technological. This book exudes intoxication with the technical and the futuristic, from exotic military hardware to unusual alternate cultures. This is at once its strength and major failing.

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BERNARD MENNIS. *American Foreign Policy Officials: Who They Are and What They Believe Regarding International Politics*. Pp. 210. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1972. \$11.00.

This is an empirically based study of the background, attitudes, and foreign policy beliefs of a select group of Foreign Service officers in the State Department and a corresponding group of political-military officers in the international affairs sections of the Department of Defense. With the Defense Department now playing a major role alongside the State Department in foreign policy formulation, it is important to identify any significant differences between the outlooks and foreign policy beliefs of officers holding comparable positions in the two departments.

Military officers, for example, are often thought to have certain attitudes of rigidity, intolerance and authoritarianism, sometimes referred to as "the military mind," which distinguish their perception of world affairs from that of their State Department counterparts. But few attempts have been made to deal with this concept or reduce it to empirical measurement.

Professor Mennis has done a good job filling this gap and also identifying differences between State and Defense Department officials with respect to their social origins, religious affiliation and involvement, political orientation, cognitive style—by which the author means the tendency to think in doctrinaire, dogmatic terms or not—and finally their foreign policy beliefs. Although political-military officers in the Defense Department were found to resemble their Foreign Service counterparts in terms of social origins—geographic background, status of parents, education—other significant differences appeared:

1. Political-military officers showed considerably greater religious involvement than Foreign Service officers—as measured by frequency of church attendance and self-description of the depth of their religious feeling.

2. A high percentage of Foreign Service officers had a "democratic-liberal" political

orientation, while an almost equally high percentage of political-military officers were characterized as "Republican-conservative."

3. Nearly two-thirds of the political-military officers were highly doctrinaire, dogmatic and rigid in their systems of thinking, whereas less than one-quarter of the Foreign Service officers fell in this category.

4. Political-military officers were much more "hard-line" in foreign policy beliefs—anti-communist, absolutist—than Foreign Service officers. The latter placed greater emphasis on war prevention, arms control, and tolerance of non-alignment policies by other nations.

Differing social backgrounds did not explain these differences in hard-line and non-hard-line foreign policy beliefs between Foreign Service officers and Defense Department officers. But the study did show that differences in foreign policy belief correlated with certain differences in religious involvement, political orientation, and doctrinaire thought patterns. Thus, individuals with greater religious involvement—as defined by the author—Republican-conservative political orientation, and more doctrinaire thought patterns were found more likely to become political-military officers with hard-line foreign policy beliefs. Individuals with less religious involvement, a Democratic-liberal orientation, and less doctrinaire thought patterns were more likely to be Foreign Service officers with non-hard-line beliefs.

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CARL VANSANT. *Strategic Energy Supply and National Security*. Pp. xiii, 135. New York: Praeger, 1971. \$15.00.

MASON WILLRICH. *Global Politics of Nuclear Energy*. Pp. xii, 204. New York: Praeger, 1971. \$15.00.

For those who are skeptical of the "energy crisis" scare stories being circulated by the oil industry, Carl Vansant's thin book may have some use. Not only does Vansant challenge the fears that the world

stands to run out of energy in a literal sense, but he also argues that "the relevant indicators give no special cause for alarm over the future costs of traditional energy supplies, although they may vary markedly from present costs." He is optimistic that the application of new technologies can give timely operational reality to the hypothesis, advanced by some physicists, that "energy is fungible—one form can replace another and civilization can continue to survive and thrive."

Vansant places most of his faith in intelligent research and development decisions. He favors a big push to produce electric power from hydrogen fusion, pointing out that this field has been neglected up to now as a result of a Research and Development strategy which diverted most intellectual efforts and funds to the perfection of the nuclear fission process. In the meantime, however, we will have that "marvelous" fission machine—the fast-breeder reactor, which manufactures its own nuclear fuel as it uses it. Vansant is also impressed with the possibility of using hydrogen as a fuel. Then again, we may want to go back to United States coal resources which, according to Vansant, "contain perhaps as much energy as the resources of petroleum and natural gas combined."

All of this, unfortunately, is presented in a very sketchy manner. The tough trade-offs that would be involved in an intelligent R & D strategy are only hinted at; and the ecological considerations that need to be weighed are given short shrift. Despite the inclusion of some information on military uses of various fuels, this is nowhere near the study of strategic energy supply and national security the policy community so badly needs.

Mason Willrich's book is in a different league altogether. It does indeed deal with the intricacies of the global politics of nuclear energy. Building upon a decade of practical experience as staff member and then consultant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Willrich—now a professor of Law at the University of Virginia—combines an ability to write clearly on the technical aspects of nuclear energy

with a solid appreciation of the political and institutional issues that developments in this field have created for world society. Willrich is not at all optimistic that without radical alterations in the political structure of the world, it will be possible to attain a rational economic distribution of the benefits of nuclear energy or to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons:

Within the mold of the existing international system, nuclear energy seems destined to be exploited in a way that is wasteful economically and dangerous militarily. For its enormous economic potential to be fully realized, nuclear industry demands operations and financing on a scale that very few nations can provide within their borders. And for the international security risks to be contained within reasonable limits, nuclear industries must be organized and operated on a multinational basis. . . .

Even those alternatives that would result in only a marginal degree of international control over nuclear technology seem . . . to require radical departures from the status quo or sharp reversals of existing trends. Regrettably, the exploitation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes appears to be already beyond the reach of effective international control.

His pessimism derives in large part from a recognition that the nuclear fission process, leading to the fast-breeder reactor, and not the fusion process, now seems to have all the momentum. The production of electric energy from fusion would hold great promise of producing abundant energy with substantially less risks than fission of radioactive contamination, thermal pollution, and diversion of thermonuclear materials to weapons purposes. But the dynamics of scientific-industrial competition in the existing decentralized international system make it unlikely that the slower, large-scale multi-national efforts needed to pursue the fusion route will be instituted in time to dissuade nations from accelerated fission programs.

Willrich is critical of national and international decision processes that have allowed the fission *fait accompli* to occur. He concludes that the only way to reverse the trend is to cut deeply into the sovereign

prerogatives of the nation-states. But there he stops, as if paralyzed by his own shocking conclusion. It is late, he seems to be saying; the reforms are too big, the vested interests too entrenched. One is reluctant to fault Willrich personally for this passive attitude. He has done his bit before Congressional committees in recent years trying to get the politicians to wake up. Yet the cool analytical tone to this illuminating book seems sadly inappropriate to the magnitude of the mistakes that are continuing to be made.

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RAYMOND VERNON. *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. Pp. v, 326. New York: Basic Books, 1971. \$8.50.

From an economic viewpoint there is little particularly novel or surprising about the present growth of United States multinational manufacturing enterprises. It is merely an evolutionary development of firms that find themselves in what might be called advanced-stage oligopolistic industries. Like the current conglomerate merger movement, it is, given the present industrial context, a non-price competitive response to business uncertainty in the face of U.S. government antimonopoly pressures. As such, rapid extension of overseas commitments should have been an institutional change capable of being predicted by a skilled observer of the economic scene. Professor Vernon, indisputably such a person, provides us with a clear understanding of the proliferation of multinational firms in *Sovereignty at Bay*. The single disappointment of this book is that he does not use his expertise and judgment to take us beyond an analysis of what is, to what is likely to be the future transformations of manufacturing enterprise. He speculates insightfully on potential governmental adjustments to U.S. multinational enterprise, but there is too little attention accorded to multinational enterprise metamorphoses *per se*.

What are the general qualities of oli-

gopolies that have "multinationalized" themselves? Like all oligopolies, these are industries characterized by firms of extraordinary size, abnormally large profits, and very substantial flow-through of funds. They face markets in which marked, recognized interdependence is prevalent. Hence, ignorance and uncertainty in the decision-making process—if not somehow contained—is pervasive. But beyond these common features of oligopoly, industries which have recently "gone abroad" are generally those which rely heavily on skilled manpower, have an innovationary bent that is labor-saving—especially of skilled labor—and produce for a high-income clientele. Above all, these advanced-stage oligopolies have outgrown the size of their domestic markets—either as sellers of their final product or, equally, as purchasers or producers of inputs, which includes more than raw materials and embraces financial resources. It is this last factor—outgrown markets—which primarily explains why U.S. multinational firms have an extremely high propensity to export and have been instrumental in the development of the Euro-dollar market.

All of this is skillfully analyzed by Vernon. He organizes his information by splitting U.S. multinational enterprises into those that are predominantly raw materials ventures and those that specialize in fabricating activities (although almost all firms are substantially vertically integrated); by dividing host nations into economically advanced and less developed countries—perhaps Canada should have been given singular treatment—and by categorizing internal strategies and personalities of multinational firms. This is a surprisingly productive analytical matrix which, especially for fabricating industries, is subject to felicitous exploitation by the product cycle model. The insights afforded by this research matrix are discussed so cogently by Vernon that a thoughtful reading of this book will reward "men of affairs" and social scientists alike. That this volume presages more detailed reports on supporting research by Vernon's associates, and that Vernon himself is continuing to participate in and oversee this research, promises further interest-

ing analyses of the multinational thrust of many United States industries.

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#### AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

JOHN HUNTER BOYLE. *China and Japan at War: 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration*. Pp. ix, 430. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1972. \$16.50.

Almost all major episodes in modern Chinese history are controversial, and the story of China's chief collaborator, Wang Ching-wei, with Japan during the war is one of the most controversial. Most Chinese would like to forget this episode, for Wang's defection to Japan at the bleakest hour of China's resistance against Japan's invasion brought unspeakable shame to the nation. Yet for the sake of objective historiography, Wang's story must be told. And if the story is told in its proper perspective, then all the better. Professor John Boyle's story is about Wang, and one must commend Professor Boyle for his excellent story-telling and history writing.

Substantively, the book is based on three tales. The first one is about major figures, civilian and military, in Japan in the late 1930s and their thought about war with China. The second tale is about major Chinese leaders, mainly Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, and their thinking about Japan's aggression against China. The third tale is about Japan's use of various Chinese puppet regimes to impart a veneer of respectability to Japan's military occupation and ruthless exploitation of China. Thus, the story is extremely complex, involving numerous personalities, factions, and even nations. In essence the story is about a group of men, some seemingly noble and some plainly treacherous and crooked, all trying to—or pretending to—achieve the impossible. It is about Japanese wishful thinking that against their extensive atrocities and outright racism



inflicted on the Chinese people they could still create a puppet regime acceptable to the Chinese people as "their" government. It is about Wang Ching-wei's incredible folly that he could establish such a regime and compel Japan to withdraw troops and accept China as a sovereign nation.

In writing such a complex story, Professor Boyle has done an enormous amount of research, especially on Japanese sources. He has also conducted interviews with former participants in this semi-comical drama. In describing the thought and policy of major personalities, Professor Boyle does not neglect their social background and their personality traits; all these add to the readability and insightfulness of the book. In the concluding chapter Professor Boyle compares Wang with one other well-known collaborator in the Second World War, Pierre Laval of Vichy France. The comparison is interesting though very brief. On the whole Professor Boyle has made a significant contribution to our knowledge about that period of modern Chinese history. The book is a must for every student of modern Chinese history and politics.

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KYUNG-CHO CHUNG. *Korea: The Third Republic*. Pp. xii, 269. New York: Macmillan, 1971. \$6.95.

Dr. Chung, currently with the Defense Language Institute, has presented us with a sequel to his two earlier works on Korea, *Korea Tomorrow* (1960) and *New Korea* (1962). Setting out to comment on recent (post-1963) developments, this volume is less an intensive research effort—there are no footnotes—and more a systematic treatment of the author's thoughts on two important problems facing Korea today—political development and unification.

After a quick summary of Korean history in thirty-five pages (part 1), the author launches into a detailed discussion of the political system and its processes in part 2. In chapters such as "Political Parties," "The Judiciary," "The National

Assembly," and "The Presidency," the dichotomy between legalistic structure and theory on the one hand, and function and practice on the other, is admirably handled, more than offsetting the sometimes dry recitation of lists of political organizations and sections of the Republic of South Korea constitution (contained in its entirety in the Appendix). Other chapters entitled "The National Defense," "Foreign Relations," and "The Third Republic" are more descriptive and lively.

Part 3 consists of two chapters. In the chapter "Democracy in Korea," Dr. Chung pursues questions such as political stability and the 1969 constitutional amendment (Korea must have an orderly transfer of government leadership), economic development (South Korea is about to enter the "take-off" stage), national division (the results are frustration and insecurity), political participation (the individual is more responsible to his family than to the state), and presidential decision-making (it is authoritarian, haphazard, and extemporaneous).

As in other recent works dealing with Korea, there is a chapter on reunification. After describing previous attempts and proposals for unification, the author reminds us that Korea is still at war. As such, the role of the Korean people both North and South is the primary one of the initiation of a dialogue and the mutual intercourse of correspondence, travel, commerce, and culture, while the role of the United Nations and the big powers involved is that of a secondary or "harmonizing" influence. It might be noted in passing that the worth of this book is demonstrated in one small measure in that, subsequent to publication, several of the prescriptions of Dr. Chung have borne fruit in the Red Cross talks.

Dr. Chung has produced a book which has accomplished what it set out to do, that is, to inform a reading audience unfamiliar with Korean developments during the past decade. While continuity between the chapters is sometimes lacking, the political acumen of the author's observations excel throughout. As such, we are given a sympathetic but balanced view of the Park administration which can be used with

profit by both specialists and non-specialists.

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L. ALAN EYRE. *Geographic Aspects of Population Dynamics in Jamaica*. Pp. viii, 172. Boca Raton: Florida Atlantic University Press, 1972. Distributed by the University of Florida Press, Gainesville. \$7.50.

EDWARD BRATHWAITE. *The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820*. Pp. xvi, 374. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. \$16.00.

These studies, by coincidence, complement each other very well. Human geographer Eyre focuses attention upon the most important current problem of Jamaica: population pressure; while historical sociologist—or social historian—Brathwaite concentrates on the most important problem of Jamaica's past: African slavery. Moreover, any study of these problems of Jamaica, present or past, are essentially the major problems of the Caribbean area. They deserve the attention not only of specialists in the area, but of all who are concerned with the general question of peace and stability in the hemisphere.

The Eyre volume falls into two major divisions, as this reader sees it. In the first section of five chapters are discussed the theory of population pressure on resources (chap. 1), the Jamaican situation in the world picture, its general dimension, the fertility of the population and factors associated with it, and the relation of the population changes to the land base.

The second division consists of in-depth studies of four selected sample areas. These sample areas illustrate what the author terms the "options" which are possible means of effecting adjustments of growing numbers to a "finite area." His six options are as follows: (1) "Increased productivity from existing utilized land in primary production"; (2) "Increase in the area of utilized land that is, occupancy of virgin or long-abandoned land"; (3) "In-

crease in nonprimary activity"; (4) "External migration"; (5) "Reduction in per capita levels of living with concomitant rise in morbidity and eventually in mortality rates"; and, (6) "Control of fertility" (pp. 8-9).

In spite of the clear and difficult demographic problem of Jamaica, the author makes estimates to support his belief that the food gap can be met to support a growing population through maximizing production on the better coastal lands, using such crops as corn, soybeans, and the "miracle rice." Yet, this reviewer would say that food is not the crucial problem as yet; it is space. As one keen observer has said, "a worm doesn't need much space, but a butterfly does."

Brathwaite states the rationale of his monograph as follows: "It is an historical study with a socio-cultural emphasis, seeking to understand the workings of a 'creole' society during the central period of British West Indian slavery" (p. xiv). The author presents the substance of his thesis in four parts, after an introduction. Part one describes the nuclear institutions of the island, with emphasis on the Assembly. Part two deals with Jamaica and the American Revolution. Part three is the heart of the work as this reviewer sees it, and consists of lucid descriptions of the various social strata based in large part on color, but also on other factors. Part four is, naturally and logically, the intellectual distillation of the author's research in support of his basic thesis. He calls the section "Social Activity and Social Change."

The Brathwaite book is a superior piece of research and writing, a well-documented account of the evolution of Jamaican society. Originally a dichotomous social system of white masters and black slaves, both mostly immigrants, second and later generations of both groups came to regard Jamaica as home. These are the creoles. Miscegenation of white males and black females in the course of time created a fantastic color mix with a corresponding heterogeneous status system within the "colours" where degree of "bleaching" was the status symbol.

To factors within Jamaica working for social change were added two great social convulsions with major impact on the island. These were the American Revolution and the Haitian slave revolt generated by the French Revolution. The first compelled Jamaica to look to itself for ways of compensating for the loss of trade with the North; while finding its destiny more closely tied to the mother country. The second event compelled master and slave alike to see themselves in a new light, and became a harbinger of things to come in the island, including ultimate emancipation in 1833.

The study deserves a wide reading among social scientists, including not only historians, but especially sociologists and anthropologists.

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S. D. GOITEIN. *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, vol. 2, *The Community*. Pp. xvi, 633. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$20.00.

Volume 1 of this justly acclaimed work was reviewed in *THE ANNALS* (vol. 378 [July 1968], p. 189). Everybody aware of Professor Goitein's recent activities as a teacher, lecturer, and author, which far from diminishing have actually increased in the intervening years, was certain that volume 2 would live up to the expectations raised by the first volume. Like the first volume, volume 2 is indeed a mine of new and significant historical discoveries and wise and illuminating sociological insights. Again we have here the rarest of events in historical scholarship, a work of synthesis based overwhelmingly upon hitherto unknown material, or material published recently by the author himself and his students. And by virtue of their central location in time and place, the Cairo Geniza papers from the eleventh to thirteenth cen-

turies allow Goitein and his readers to look backward and forward in time and to the East and the Northwest and to be instructed by comparison and contrast about other periods and regions.

As the volume's subtitle implies, it is concerned with the internal organization and workings of the Jewish community. Thus it deals more than the earlier volume with the elements that set the Jewish community apart from its Muslim neighbors. Among its primary concerns is the degree of connectedness and separateness that exists between the minority group and the majority. The administration of the various Jewish communities, their sizes, the tensions within them, their charity system, their social stratification and economic status, their physical distribution within the larger urban complexes are among the subjects dealt with, and many previous views of Jewish history are shown to be unfounded or unsupported by the authentic Geniza material. But even in this connection, Goitein's findings contribute to a better understanding of the larger picture of Muslim society. This aspect of his work becomes more obvious when he deals with matters such as religious conversions, elementary and higher education, or teachers and professional men, among whom physicians and pharmacists were prominent and their activities are documented with details practically unavailable anywhere else. The legal position of minority communities in Islam, the legal and actual interfaith relations, majority control versus minority self-government are subjects of prime importance for the understanding of Muslim history. They are here presented in what must be called their true light, as they appeared to those affected by these matters in their daily lives. They are, of course, also subjects of eternal relevance to human society. In this respect, Goitein's work is a source of information and instruction far beyond its superb contribution to the knowledge of facts, though the latter remains fundamental. Another volume to appear, it is hoped, soon will complete the work, but our knowledge will also be enriched by further studies of the author

which are in an advanced state of preparation.

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GARY R. HESS. *America Encounters India, 1941-1947*. Pp. 211. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972. \$9.50.

The United States has never really had a South Asia policy. Its actions have been derivative of other interests. The American commitment to Pakistan was the product of the Cold War containment policy in which Pakistan was viewed as the eastern flank of the defense perimeter along the southern border of the Soviet Union. Little consideration was given to the impact of arms to Pakistan on India or South Asia as a region. The massive U.S. aid to India in the 1960s was itself largely a reaction to perceived Chinese threats to the subcontinent, and the myopic American policy in the Bangladesh crisis was again substantially derivative of "big power" concerns—balancing Soviet influence in South Asia and securing an opening toward China. Indeed, the history of American involvement with India has been, for the most part, a low profile of indifference. Despite the efforts of many Americans, in government and out, to better Indo-American relations, the "era of good feelings" in the last decade is a lone plateau.

Gary Hess explores the derivative character of the American stance in South Asia in the encounter with India from 1941 to 1947. India, in the American popular mind, was a jumble of contradictions, colored by Hollywood images and the horrors of Katherine Mayo. During the 1930s there was a generalized sentiment for Indian nationalist aspirations, but India was remote and the American involvement minimal. The war, however, brought India into critical focus. Concerned primarily with the war effort, but sustained by anticolonial inclinations, various State Department officials unsuccessfully urged

Roosevelt to exert pressure on Churchill so as to secure Indian independence and the Congress' commitment to the war. Under increasing pressure after Pearl Harbor from State Department officials, senators, the American press, and Chiang Kai-shek, the United States now raised the India question with Churchill, but with little pressure and no effect. The fall of Burma, the failure of the Cripps Mission, and congressional non-cooperation deepened United States concern, leading to the dispatch of two presidential missions and heightened hopes of intervention. While he doubted the wisdom of Churchill's policy, Roosevelt refused to act. "Ultimately," Hess writes, "the preservation of Anglo-American unity proved the priority consideration" (p. 82).

The last days of the raj in the immediate postwar period brought renewed American interest in India. Concern had been awakened by anti-American sentiment in India; by fears of increased Communist influence; by expanding Soviet prestige; and by anxiety over ramifications in the Middle East of any Indian settlement unfavorable to the Muslim League. Hess argues that the United States declined opportunities during the war to advance an unequivocal policy and pressure the Churchill government, and by acquiescing in British imperial policy, the United States sustained the course of events leading to partition and the creation of Pakistan.

Hess presents a largely descriptive chronology, based on American sources. He rarely steps back from the data and, alas, seems almost unwilling until the very end to draw out the implications of the rich materials with which he deals. He provides, however, an insight into the foundations upon which subsequent American policy has been based.

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HAROLD JAMES and DENIS SHEIL-SMALL. *The Undeclared War: The Story of the Indonesian Confrontation, 1962-1966*. Pp. xiii, 201. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1971. \$9.50.

Two retired British army officers have offered a new perspective on Indonesia's military confrontation against the Federation of Malaysia during the Sukarno period. Departing from the familiar emphasis on elite-level political and diplomatic analysis, the authors expose what confrontation meant to the British forces stationed in Sarawak and Sabah across the border from Indonesian Borneo. Often informative and sometimes colorful, the resulting chronicle of patrols and ambushes is flawed not only by a repetitive style, but also by too narrow a focus and too strong a bias.

Throughout the reconstruction of the four-year Borneo campaign, the focus is on the tactical, operational level. The book sometimes even reads like an army operational manual. Each chapter does, however, highlight a major element in the overall counter-insurgency strategy in Borneo. Among the factors stressed are the leadership of British officers; the cooperation of military and civilian security units to check the threat of internal subversion; the employment of indigenous border scouts to monitor the thousand-mile border with Indonesian Borneo; and an intensive program to reach "the hearts and minds of the people." While these guidelines for counter-insurgency do emerge, they are inadequately explained and uncritically evaluated. Moreover, they are often obscured by the detailed accounts of military clashes. Finally, a more sociological emphasis could enrich the narrow tactical level approach. One wonders, for example, about the dynamics of English-Gurkha relations and the attitudes of the Iban border scouts toward their alien tutors.

A more disturbing flaw in this book is its unabashed, pro-British bias. Most prominent in the effusive praise showered on the British forces, the authors' bias is also evident in their almost exclusive reliance on British-Malaysian sources. Such reliance contributed to the color and immediacy of their story, but it also led to the uncritical adoption of the official British-Malaysian propaganda line of the confrontation period. The result is distortion whenever the authors turn to the political-diplomatic context which so heavily condi-

tioned the evolution of confrontation. Perhaps most serious in this regard is the stereotype picture of the Indonesian "enemy" which arises. The complex motivations behind Sukarno's foreign policy are reduced to a congenial, mono-causal explanation. Confrontation is simply "one man's dangerous dream of a mighty Indonesian empire." There is no concession to the possibility that—like many other colonized nations—Indonesia's hostility to British influence in Borneo stemmed also from rational assessments of potential threats to her security and from legitimate claims for a voice in the affairs of her own region.

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ROBERT N. KEARNEY. *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon*. Pp. 210. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. \$10.00.

VISAKHA KUMARI JAYAWARDENA. *The Rise of the Labor Movement in Ceylon*. Pp. 382. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1972. \$10.75.

These two books together are a welcome addition to the still limited literature on Ceylon. Kearney, a political scientist, focuses on post-World War II labor organization and politics, particularly the complex interdependent relationships between trade unions and political parties. Miss Jayawardena, an historian, starts in the 1880s and carries the story down to 1933.

Kearney's book is based on field research, substantial interviews and careful review of available literature, official and ephemeral. He characterizes the political and economic environment of trade unionism and the growth of the labor movement, and explains the typical but obsolescing leadership by "outsiders" rather than by workers themselves. He is best when he discusses the partisan role of the trade unions and the problems and opportunities party sponsorship and control of trade unions have contributed to unionism. Intense partisan competition, the stamp of Ceylon's elec-

toral politics, plays a central role in the way parties and trade unions are linked. Competition for votes in Parliamentary elections leads non-worker politicians to seek to organize party-sponsored trade unions. These in turn bargain with their sponsors for better wage claims and working conditions. One gain to unionism is that external resources are brought from the political arena to promote trade union organizations. Some unions would not even exist, he believes, were it not for this partisan sponsorship. And the conditions of organized workers in Ceylon have improved through legislation quite as much as through strikes. On the other hand, the price of such political support is division; the partisan divisions preventing labor solidarity. Competing politicians may pit their respective union followings against each other. This also precipitates more labor unrest than is good for the economy, constraining economic growth and raising the cost of Ceylonese products to both local and foreign consumers.

His discussion is enriched by a series of profitless or party-oriented trade unions, party sponsored unions and those that are uncommitted.

In conclusion, he assesses the consequences to Ceylon's polity and economy of having the type of "militant trade unionism" that has developed in Ceylon.

While Kearney's analysis is descriptive and analytical, based on political science categories and behavioral observation, Miss Jayawardena's historical analysis provides more vivid characterizations of the early plight of Ceylonese workers in the tradition of Marx and the Webbs. Kearney's interest in political behavior leaves little room for the conditions of workers. At the same time, Jayawardena finds class categories more useful for her purposes than does Kearney, though she is realistic enough to realize the limitations of class categories in a social setting like Ceylon's.

She provides ample evidence for the argument that labor organization was related to religion and incipient nationalism in the early days, confirming by careful evidence the familiar argument about the

importance of Ceylon's temperance and Buddhist revival movement into the 1915 period.

The author's research sheds new light on the 1915 riots. Usually identified as religious riots, she marshalls evidence to show there were strong underlying economic issues which led Sinhalese Buddhist townsmen and peasants alike to resent the Muslims in their midst—all-too-often the money lenders and shopkeepers, who would inevitably be blamed by consumers for the rise of prices and poor quality of goods resulting from wartime shortages.

For the later period, after the turning point of the 1915 riots, religious consideration rapidly diminished in importance. Radicals and moderates among the Ceylonese middle class saw things increasingly differently as some sought immediate independence, universal suffrage, and maximum trade union organization while, she argues, the others less willing to risk their middle class economic interests, sought constitutional change of a more moderate kind and were less eager to see rapid unionization.

Jayawardena shows how the development of trade unionism, its organizational modes and its operating style followed British practice, a fact that is startlingly brought out by Kearney's analysis. She stresses the importance of the general strike of 1923 and the coming to power of the Labor government in Britain, in 1929, with Sydney Webb, then Lord Passfield, becoming Secretary of State for the colonies. Webb's reforms were swift, but the depression promptly—though temporarily—wiped away many of their practical effects on the trade union front. In view of Kearney's analysis, however, the universal franchise promoted by Lord Passfield, in the end, had a more profound effect upon the rise of trade unionism than the individual strikes which Miss Jayawardena chronicles with such affectionate care.

As Kearney concludes that trade unionism and a pluralist party system are eminently appropriate as they are found in Ceylon, Miss Jayawardena obviously believes the more trade unionism the better. Both are partisans of their subject; their enthusiasm enlivens the readers interest.

It is a pity that these volumes each costing over \$10.00 will have few readers in South Asia unless their American publishers make more efforts to arrange local editions.

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JOHN LEWALLEN. *Ecology of Devastation: Indochina*. Pp. 179. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1971. \$1.95. Paperbound.

HILA MYINT. *Southeast Asia's Economy: Development Policies in the 1970's*. Pp. 189. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$2.95. Paperbound.

The principal thesis of John Lewallen's *Ecology of Devastation: Indochina* is that the Vietnam War "marks mankind's first wartime use of technological power to devastate the living environment of Earth." The author blames the employment of environmentally destructive tactics on the "technocratic structure" that wages war. The harm is the result of the desire of bureaucratic defense organizations to grow and their command of modern scientific technology.

The movement of the Vietnamese to the cities, partly because of tactical considerations, is criticized for breaking up family ties, destroying the identity of people, and exposing them to violence and American materialism. The author describes in detail the possible environmental damage resulting from the use of herbicides and insecticides, and there is a chapter on the ecological damage resulting from bomb craters. The author has not presented much strong evidence for his conclusion that environmental damage in Vietnam has been extensive. The number of persons that he suggests have been poisoned by herbicides is based on estimates made by the National Liberation Front. The source of the claim that most of the old trees in a botanical garden in Saigon have died is an unpublished article by a Vietnamese newspaper reporter.

Because of the author's extreme opposition to American policy in Vietnam, the book suffers from exaggeration. In a chapter entitled "War Upon the Animals," he

writes that "The buffaloes of South Vietnam, quite docile when approached by Vietnamese, often lunge with rage at Americans." He strains our credulity again when he quotes a report that concludes that although many animals have been killed by insecticides and herbicides, "tigers are getting along quite nicely." This is because they have learned to associate sounds of gunfire with dead and wounded human beings, and they apparently consume large numbers of battle casualties.

*Southeast Asia's Economy, Development Policies in the 1970's*, by Hila Myint, is concerned with the kind of economic policies that the countries in Southeast Asia might pursue in order to further their economic development. Most of the book was initially written as an overall report on six detailed studies prepared by other economists for the Asian Development Bank. The six topics studied were: the Green Revolution, industrialization, foreign trade, foreign private investment, aspects of population growth, and impacts of the end of Vietnam hostilities and the reduction of British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore. Because of its usefulness to college students, the author's original report on these six studies has been republished in this volume together with an introductory chapter entitled "Southeast Asia's Economy Before 1970."

A principal conclusion of the studies summarized is that the world market for the exports of the Southeast Asian countries is likely to grow rapidly in the 1970s. This is because these exports will be needed by their rapidly growing trading partners, notably Japan. As a result, the major economic task facing these countries is to assure that their exports keep up with the demand. The benefits to the Southeast Asian countries from maintaining a large volume of exports are substantial because these countries will then be able to import the capital resources necessary to support their own economic development.

The author is critical of efforts to reduce imports by stimulating local manufacturing industries through subsidies, low interest

rates, and tax concessions. He also believes that there is danger that the new agricultural technology in the Green Revolution will be used merely as the means to attain self-sufficiency in rice rather than as an opportunity to produce rice at a lower cost. The author skillfully applies the economic arguments for free trade to many government policies that are currently popular in these countries, but are probably harmful to their economic development.

Little is said in this book about the economic effects of the ecological damage in Vietnam resulting from the war. The author believes that the necessary adjustments to assure adequate economic growth in Vietnam when hostilities end are basically the same as those required in the other Southeast Asian countries.

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D. A. Low. *Buganda in Modern History*. Pp. xi, 265. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1971. \$8.75.

This work is a general reflection of the major historical developments in Buganda from the last two decades of the nineteenth century to the 1960s. D. A. Low has primarily used secondary sources, church missionary archives, and some Foreign Office references at the Public Record Office.

The author's initial themes are the missionary conversion of the ruler's (*kabaka's*) court and provincial feudal chiefs, and British imperial and commercial interests' creation of a "new" entrepreneurial landed oligarchy through the *mailo* land tenure agreement of 1900. The latter served to counter the traditionalist aspirations of the *kabaka* while simultaneously developing valuable cotton and coffee cash crops. Low repeatedly states that during the first half of this century, the *kabaka* and an even "newer" group of men of pre-1900 traditional clan heads with religio-aristocratic elements—the Bataka federation—maneuvered to exploit peasant discontent as in the 1940s against the entrepreneurial landed chiefs. However, the author does not

clearly define the exact socio-economic backgrounds of these groups nor of the British-trained administrative personnel of the 1930s. Nor does he describe the quantitative and qualitative value of these groups in the post-World War II anti-colonial movement. Low describes how the British, initially fearing rapid change, backed the established *mailo* group, but by 1956 made some concessions to the *kabaka* and the neo-traditionalists. His position is that London sought to increase African administrative control of Uganda of which Buganda, contrary to the *kabaka's* interests, was to be an integral part.

Unfortunately Low is confusing in many parts of the work. He applies the term "revolutionary" to missionary and feudal oligarchic interests, uses "new," "newer," "populist," and "advanced men" within generalities like historical "phase" developments without sufficient explanation. He neglects to discuss the plight of *Bakopi* serfs and exploited peasant masses, yet repeatedly associates them with "populist" causes supporting the feudal *kabaka*. Low makes the extraordinary statement that the people exhibited their power in 1956 when the British made concessions to the neo-traditionalists. He treats lightly the political parties' base of support, but at the end of his work cataclysmically introduces Milton Obote's Uganda Peoples Congress party which gained power in 1962, and mentions the *kabaka's* overthrow four years later. Again, as throughout the work, Low neglects to consider special socio-economic interests, opportunistic causes and the basic enforced ignorance of the masses by the elite establishment.

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ABRAHAM F. LOWENTHAL. *The Dominican Intervention*. Pp. v, 246. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. \$10.95.

Lowenthal's book is detailed, exciting, ringing with authenticity, and bound by analytical sensitivity. It is built, too, on an



informational base that should daunt any beginning Ph.D. student: Lowenthal was in the Dominican Republic in 1965; confidential U.S. government tapes and written materials were made available to him; 139 persons were formally interviewed in the Dominican Republic, the United States, and Puerto Rico; and the bibliography of published materials must be exhaustive. An appended "Guide to Public Sources for Study of the 1965 Dominican Crisis" is excellent.

*The Dominican Intervention* falls into three parts, and it is important to note what it does not try to cover. First is a brief survey of United States policy toward the Dominican Republic in the period prior to April 1965. Leading themes are extracted, and if this chapter is too brief for some readers, the references lead to the published sources. The second section, the bulk of the work, is a very detailed study of the first week of the crisis from the viewpoint of the American actors. The actions in the Dominican Republic are covered thoroughly, those in Washington less so, and the Johnsonian White House remains something of a sphinx, as it does over Vietnam. I would not attempt in a few lines to unravel simplistically the intricately woven story. It must be read whole.

The final section attempts to explain why the U.S. invasion occurred and why it took the direction it did in those early days. Lowenthal examines and discards as inadequate or wrong the three existing basic explanations: the "official line" of "an act of statesmanship and courage," etc.; the "radical" view that the troop landing was a normal and deliberate event in U.S. conservative-counterrevolutionary policy; and the "liberal" interpretation that the invasion was a unique deviation from the mainstream of policy, an accidental blunder brought about by individual errors and circumstances peculiar to the case.

Lowenthal suspects that the United States actions in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and the Bay of Pigs are of a category. That is, these "accidents" recur. But how to explain their causes? The "rational policy model" is jettisoned as simply not fitting the facts. Instead, he shifts

the focus of enquiry "from purposes and personalities to premises and procedures." His approach, although only an outline, is complex and merits examination by all interested in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. But it leaves me with a sense of assumptions unchallenged. This stems from the demotion of purposes and personalities as explanatory factors. I suggest, for example, that the personality make-up of Dulles, Johnson, Rostow and Kennedy is of a high order of importance. Moreover, Lowenthal appears to accept implicitly that the purposes of U.S. foreign policy are fundamentally good from a liberal point of view, and that these recurrent "accidents" are not of the mainstream. But are the revisionists—a branch of the radicals—wrong in essence about the purposes of U.S. foreign policy? Perhaps these aberrations are not, after all, outside the mainstream of either purposes or means. They occurred in order to produce a rightist or far rightist result, and they involved armed might. The aberration of the Dominican Republic and Vietnam may lie in the use of American troops once the local military had proved inadequate for United States purposes.

One complaint, not directed at the author: the price of \$10.95 for this physically small book is outrageous. I trust that a far cheaper paperbound version is in the offing.

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DAVID G. MARR. *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*. Pp. 341. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California, 1972. \$3.65.

JEFFREY RACE. *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province*. Pp. 323. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$11.95.

Phan Dinh Phung, Vietnamese insurgent leader, received a message from an old friend. The message said that if Phan did not come out of hiding in the central Viet-

namese hills, his elder brother would be killed, his family tombs scattered, and his home village annihilated. Phan replied, "if anyone carves up my brother, remember to send me some of the soup."

Phan was not a dedicated leader of the National Liberation Front. He was a monarchist in the 1880s, striving from mountain base camps to drive out the French, overwhelm their many Vietnamese collaborators, and install Ham Nghi as Emperor of all Vietnam. He failed; his body was reduced to ashes and shot from a cannon, no savory fate for a member of the privileged Confucian scholar-gentry class. Today, David G. Marr notes in his book *Vietnamese Anticolonialism*, Saigon's Phan Dinh Phung Street "runs through a tree-lined, upper-class remnant of colonial grandeur." Phan was not forgotten by the Vietnamese; rather, he was first in a long line of scholar-rebels, anticolonialists who Marr argues convincingly form a highway of Vietnamese resistance to foreign domination leading to the present day.

Marr's book is good reading not only for Vietnam scholars. Marr is a sensitive and subtle historian; his mind toys with the volumes of French and Vietnamese-language sources with which he constructed his work, striving "to convey something meaningful about the origins and communication of anticolonial myths in Vietnam, orienting the question around the Vietnamese sense of their identity as a people." His study has something of the quality of historical romance, packed with action and anecdote, in touch with the human spirit of the Vietnamese.

The two main protagonists of his tale are Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh: the former a dedicated anticolonialist, whose social policy evolved as he sought ways to drive the French from Vietnam; the latter an anti-feudal reformist, who believed the French could guide Vietnam into the modern world if they would abandon the corrupt Vietnamese court and their own repressive ways. Marr's account ends as Nguyen Ai Quoc, who became Ho Chi Minh, began welding these two main trends of Vietnamese resistance into an effective revolutionary program. It is a tale alive with the indomitable spirit of the Vietna-

mese people; one wishes that America's Indochina war planners would toss away their bizarre counterinsurgency studies and read it.

This reviewer's response to Jeffrey Race's *War Comes to Long An* is equivocal. Race, relying on interviews and captured documents, has constructed an analysis of the war between Vietnamese revolutionaries and sundry Saigon-based, American-supported governments, from 1954 to 1970, in the Mekong delta province of Long An. The book accurately begins by noting that the Saigon governments lost the war, and offers much primary material to explain why that happened. Race did the study with his own funds, after the U.S. State Department cut off his study grant when he arrived in Vietnam. It is one of the very few field studies we have of this period which is not produced by a government-sponsored think tank.

Race concludes that the Saigon-American team could have won the game if it had played correctly. "What happened did not have to happen," he writes, "except as a consequence of a limited understanding by the principal government participants and their foreign advisors." The war, in other words, was an analytical struggle won by the revolutionaries. But he has described a series of Saigon governments that are controlled by widely loathed elites, out of touch with the needs and aspirations of Delta residents, supporters of the wealthy landlord class created by the French in the Delta, and physical and spiritual dependents of the American military. The point that emerges from Race's account—a point he apparently missed—is that in order to win, the government would have had to become the revolution. And winning means tossing the Americans out of Vietnam, for reasons Marr makes clear and Race totally ignores.

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A. S. MATHEWS. *Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa*. Pp. 318. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$15.00.

World opinion has been so overwhelmingly antagonistic to South African authoritarian rule and the policy of Apartheid that comment tends toward indictment, emotional fervor, and moral indignation. It is rewarding, therefore, to have a cool and scholarly analysis of South Africa's internal security laws, most of which are the outgrowth of the racial situation and the government's determination to forestall any liberal political movements.

The author, Anthony S. Mathews, is Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Durban. A South African himself, he views the recent security laws of his country in the light of Western political and legal traditions—which, after all, constitute the background of the white rulers of the Republic.

Mathews is a meticulous jurist with a ranging mind. His strategy is first to assess the nature and significance of the "rule of law" in the growth of modern democracies, and then to analyze pertinent South African statutes in light of well-established principles of this rule. The result is to demonstrate incontrovertibly that at almost every point the security laws enacted by the Nationalist Party since 1948 contravene fundamentals of the rule of law. (Mathews succinctly summarizes that rule: "government through known, clear and precise rules which are administered by independent tribunals applying rational fair trial procedures"; it implies "maintenance of certain basic freedoms upon which the rational operation of the legal system depends.")

The author does not need to raise his scholarly voice: the government stands condemned in every single enactment by facts, not polemics. Forty-five acts are analyzed, with especial attention to the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), whose real purpose is to punish opposition to the status quo; the Criminal Procedures Act (1955); and the Unlawful Organizations Act (1960). Moreover, some two hundred judicial decisions are minutely dissected. Mathews's formidable documentation is at times rather overpowering: almost 1,800 footnotes in fine print accompany the lucid, straightforward, but hardly animated, text.

A final 60-page section explains the present political system—a "pragmatic oligarchy"—that has led to the spate of restrictive laws. Mathews predicts the downfall of the Apartheid system—demographic projections predict 40 million Africans and only 8 million whites by the year 2000—and therefore of the restrictive security laws. He suggests steps by which his country might proceed toward a "viable liberal-democracy."

The book has great value for all who concern themselves with African affairs—especially in debates at the United Nations—with racial tensions, with comparative legal institutions and political systems. Mathews, who was a visiting scholar at Harvard Law School in 1968–1969, adds interest for Americans by comparing our security legislation and cases and decisions with South African ones.

Readers must be warned of several obstacles in the book. South African usage may bewilder. For example, judges are cited as Fannin J, Dowling AJP, Centlivres CJ; and what would even a lawyer make of a reference to "*R v Ntonja* 1956(3) SA 370 (E) under s 5(1)(e)"? Latin phrases, untranslated, and not merely legal ones, appear on scores of pages; more rarely, Afrikaans sentences and expressions appear. The index is almost useless, and numerous authors cited in the text are not listed in the bibliography. Yet, although one must often plod, the scholarly journey is well worth the effort.

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ARVIN PALMER. *Buddhist Politics: Japan's Clean Government Party*. Pp. vii, 98. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. 16.20 Guilders.

PAUL F. LANGER. *Communism in Japan*. Pp. vii, 112. Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1972. \$5.95.

Barring an international economic crises of great severity or a Japanese political upheaval resulting in a coalition government of opposition parties, neither the

Clean Government party (Komeito) nor the Japanese Communist party (JCP) has any chance of sharing the power of government. So say these writers. Nevertheless, because of their recent substantial gains at the polls and their increasing influence in Japanese domestic and foreign affairs, the two minor parties discussed here are closely watched. Anyone interested in clearcut and scholarly appraisals of them will find it rewarding to read what Messrs. Palmer and Langer have to say in their monographs of roughly 100 pages each.

The two studies show that, despite widely disparate origins—one rooted in Nichiren Buddhism, the other in Marxism-Leninism—Komeito and the JCP appear to have much in common. Both are conceptually undemocratic, Komeito being the prisoner of totalitarian convictions of the Right and the JCP of the Left. Both have commitments outside Japan. Both advocate recognition of Communist China and oppose constitutional revision, rearmament, nuclear weapons, the United States-Japan Security Treaty, and "American imperialism." Both make a strong appeal to displaced urban people in the lower economic brackets. Both advocate clean government, redistribution of wealth, and the end of Liberal Democratic party rule. Both are tightly organized, highly disciplined, amply financed, dynamic, and effective at proselytizing; and both, despite their anti-democratic ideologies, seek to relate to existing Japanese economic, political, and social conditions. And their efforts are paying off at election time. In the December 1969 House of Representatives election, Komeito candidates received 5,120,000 votes and JCP candidates 3,200,000, the two parties together obtaining just under eighteen percent of the total votes cast and winning sixty-one of the 486 seats contested.

But the lusty Komeito will have no truck with the JCP—nor with any other party. Komeito was founded in 1964 by the lay Buddhist group, Soka Gakkai, or Value Creation Society, which claims a total membership of over 12 million. Regarding Komeito, Mr. Palmer develops three propositions. First, "Komeito is . . . only a political arm of its mentor, Soka

Gakkai." Second, it "is supported by a segment of Japanese society that had . . . not been adequately represented by the other political parties. . . . The Liberal Democrats are usually perceived as representing big business and rural interests, and the two Japanese socialist parties are affiliated with labor groups and those intellectuals with varying leftist orientations. Neither the Komeito leaders nor their supporters are generally representative of these groups." Third, "Komeito is apparently adapting itself to the democratic political process, despite Soka Gakkai's generally undemocratic political philosophy and structure." The author believes "it is unlikely that Komeito will become *the* major political force in Japan"; but it "may . . . become a challenge to the Socialist party as the second major party."

The JCP, according to Mr. Langer, "has little leverage in the Diet, nor is it strong enough to otherwise affect Japanese policy directly. . . . Increasingly, pragmatism is replacing dogmatism among Japanese intellectuals, who constitute the politically most effective and vocal group on which Japanese communism can draw for support. . . . the growing trend among the Japanese Communists to make of their movement a force that is truly independent of foreign influence and dedicated to the defense of the Japanese national interest will allow the Party to develop a real mass following. . . . in a coalition the Party, even if it should continue to gain in strength, would still be relegated to a junior position, and the command of power would remain out of its reach."

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RIORDAN ROETT. *Brazil in the Sixties*. Pp. xiii, 434. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972. \$15.00.

This book is both enlightening and frustrating. The task of portraying Brazil in the 1960s is considerably more complex and challenging than capturing with a Brownie still camera the full wonder and meaning of a herd of stampeding elephants. These thirteen analytical essays have at-

tempted to dissect and analyze the condition of Brazil from diverse disciplinary points of view.

Riordan Roett, who has edited this volume and presented a concise introductory essay entitled "A Proletarian Army in Politics," has summarized the origins of Brazil's military intervention in 1964 as "an outgrowth of the repercussions of rapid social mobilization and weak political institutionalization: the Brazilian political system confronted a series of modernization 'time sequences' and 'rates of change' that precluded the political system successfully comparing with growing 'loads,' given its continuing influence of traditional social and political power contenders."

The 1960s began in the aura of optimism based upon democratic government since Vargas' overthrow in 1945 and Kubitschek's industrializing and master-building administration, 1955-1960. From 1961 to 1964 the national situation deteriorated rapidly with economic slowdown, rising foreign indebtedness, worsening inflation, and a population explosion. Despite the Goulart government's mouthing of basic and social reforms, the atmosphere of economic and physical insecurity, together with numerous strikes and shortages of food and services, only convinced the average Brazilian that "things could not continue this way." The military took over by a coup in March 1964. It is ironic that the "economic miracle" in the late 1960s has occurred under the military government.

The essays are most instructive when they try to present concrete facts on what actually happened, for example, regarding Brazilian-American relations, the growth and change in higher education, and the rise of a rural and middle class in a frontier society.

The less successful presentations, involving more political and economic interpretations, seemed preoccupied with fitting limited observations into abstract models derived by North American academics.

What did not come through in these pages, but what anyone who has lived in Brazil knows, is that what Brazil and Brazilians have achieved cannot be coldly measured and attributed to dry statistical

inputs of a given situation. The indomitable Brazilian confidence is the unknown and indeterminate factor which defies measurement by social scientists. And yet, that is a dominant force which is shaping the Brazil of the 1970s.

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VIRGINIA THOMPSON. *West Africa's Council of the Entente*. Africa in the Modern World Series, edited by Gwendolen Carter. Pp. 313. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. \$13.50.

It is not quite clear what this book is about, but it is not about its title, properly speaking. It is not a book about an international organization like Woronof's *Organizing African Unity*, for example. Nor is it a book of international politics, like my own *International Relations in the New Africa*. Nor is it a study of comparative politics of the Council's members, like Liebenow's *Liberia*, Hess' *Ethiopia*, and LeVine's *Cameroon*, the other books which have appeared so far in the Cornell series. It comes closest to Foltz's *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* in combining all of the above. Yet in each of the three columns its strengths are matched by weaknesses, its data untrammelled by concepts, and its events more depicted than explained. Furthermore, an editor must have told the author not to clutter the work with lots of strange names, because only a very few personages are actually identified and even the Ivoirien Ministers for Entente Affairs (Denise, Diomande) or any other Entente states' Ministers for African Affairs (Aplogan, Ikhia) never appear—Denise is named once, in another role.

The first third of the book is a history of related domestic and foreign affairs of the four, later five, Entente states of Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and then Togo. It is accurate, complete without being detailed, and not very new. There follows a good narration of military coups in the latter three states, ending with some wise reflections on the tenacity

of the older generation and the weakness of the young radicals. There is then a review of different member policies on major issues such as France, South Africa, Ghana, Biafra, and dual nationality, and a longer survey of different types of leadership and aspirants: top elites, traditional authorities, youth and labor. After an economic survey, the book ends on an overview evaluation of Africa's oldest international organization.

It is difficult to bring out accurately the strengths and disappointments of the book without having one obscure the other. All of the narratives on these subjects have the same characteristics as those already noted for the first part. For example, a basic fact of Entente actions is French influence, within certain limits. The book tells us of this, says that it is not as strong as it used to be or might be but that it is nevertheless present (pp. 137-42). Some interesting details are given. But there is nothing much new in the review, and the big questions that no study has ever handled satisfactorily—How does French influence work and on what areas and subjects? What are the mechanics of conflict and decolonization? How much co-ordination is instinct or acculturation and how much intervention or influence?—are never raised, let alone answered. There are some good flash insights—the cost of training a civil servant versus the per capita income in Niger (p. 222) or the role of French advisors in obtaining local government autonomy (p. 227)—but they come mainly from *Afrique Nouvelle* or *Marches Tropicaux* or *West Africa* (as did the two examples) and are not followed through, generalized, or compared. The best discussion was a sound evaluation of the problems of absorbing the production of labor candidates and students in the disjointedly developing economies and societies—and ultimately, politics—of the Entente states (pp. 216-237 *passim*). That alone lifts the study above the ordinary. The rest is encyclopedic.

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ERIC R. WOLF and EDWARD C. HANSEN.  
*The Human Condition in Latin America*.  
Pp. vi, 369. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$12.50.

Eric Wolf, long respected for his scholarly research on Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World, has been joined by Edward C. Hansen in an ambitious effort to portray the history and current reality of our Latin American neighbors. This is quite an undertaking for a relatively short volume. The authors draw heavily on the writings of scholars and activists from both sides of the border and succeeds in presenting some of the major themes characterizing national and international relations.

The book commences with a detailed discussion of economic conditions in Latin America. While delineating the differences which exist between city and countryside, mountainous areas and seacoast, the authors stress that metropolitan or non-national forces have largely determined the location and direction of national development. Advocates of "dependencia" theory will find Wolf and Hansens' major emphasis quite congenial with their own approach. The less sophisticated reader will benefit from a first chapter which specifies the conditions which vitally affect the lives of all Latin Americans.

In chapter 2 the clock is turned back to the earliest days of European exploration and conquest. The societies of those native to the region were forever transformed by the invading Spaniards and Portuguese. Wolf and Hansen become editors as they draw upon lengthy diaries recorded by actual participants. The selections are intriguing and give the reader a firsthand exposure through the eyes of the conquerors. Yet, here, and later in the volume, the selections are allowed to stand with little comment or direction. How should the diaries be interpreted? How do they compare to other accounts? The reader must make too many assumptions for lack of guidance.

In subsequent chapters on the nature of community life and religion, accounts of anthropologists and political scientists predominate. Here the nature of the analysis

is more obvious and the editors deftly intersperse their own interpretations. For example, the nature of family relations in different social classes is one of the issues illuminated. Wolf and Hansen also succeed in providing a close-up view through the analyst's lens of violence and power relationships. Political developments in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba are discussed through lengthy excerpts that focus on the mesh of national and international forces in social change. Some readers will take issue with the essentially radical interpretation of the Cuban Revolution.

In a final chapter, Wolf and Hansen summarize their major conclusions. They have covered much time and territory and their work serves as a very useful starting point in attempting to understand the millions we call Latin Americans.

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### EUROPE

GEOFFREY BEST. *Mid-Victorian Britain, 1851-1875*. Pp. xvii, 316. New York: Schocken Books, 1972. \$10.50.

FRANCIS SHEPPARD. *London, 1808-1870: The Infernal Wen*. Pp. xx, 427. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1971. \$11.75.

No one can seriously quarrel with either of these fine books. They do not come primarily from original research but they are competently and interestingly put together. Best's is a think-book, emphasizing interpretation; Sheppard's is an informative work, full of immensely varied material firmly and surely handled. They easily survive slight errors of fact or interpretation, such as Sheppard's placing a map upside down (p. 87) and Best's mention in the preface of a series in which his book is supposed to figure, although what the series is, nowhere appears.

Best proves himself a better historian

than his prejudices would lead one to expect. In his preface he sets forth a defiant pronouncement that fiction is as good evidence for social history as other sources—or even better—(p. xiv), and anyway, he doesn't know enough sociology to get full value from anything else (p. xv). Actually he makes little or no use of fictional material as real evidence and thinks his subject through with an earnest effort to get at the truth. As far as he goes he convinces the reader that Britain suffered extreme social and economic illnesses but tells little about the happy people—the Pickwickians?—who certainly contributed something to make a reasonably viable society. In general the book has a tone of depreciation of the propertied and other classes above the very poorest and destitute, though formally acknowledging their places and functions. Such is the stage of historical digestion which scholarship has now reached. Recognizing the harmony which characterized British society, Best confesses himself unable to understand it, perhaps, we might think, because of his over-think—as in his treatment of religious sects—perhaps because his approach requires concentration on discontent.

His first chapter, though definitely uneasy and groping when dealing with economic matters, has some very interesting discussion of town government. Avoiding the temptation to concentrate on London, it brings out the great variety of local governments, a heritage of past developments. In fact, one of the merits of the book generally is the demonstration of the great variety of institutions of all kinds, political, charitable, religious, and economic.

Francis Sheppard's slice of the history of London (the seventh volume in a series of which he is also editor) gives a comprehensive, straightforward, factual, and tremendously absorbing survey of a period of surging and shifting population, a rapid development of mobility, and a revolutionary growth of the transportation system. Everything about the book seems better balanced than Best's work. Even the illustrations have a different flavor, showing a believable, dynamic society, partly whole-

some, partly rotten. Gustave Doré's "Organ in Court," for example, which appears in both books, seems to me to strike a different note. Standard though Sheppard's interpretation is, any reader will find his own range of knowledge about the metropolis greatly broadened. Perhaps he will be most struck with the well-proven thesis that London was one of the great industrial towns. It produced everything from chemical fertilizers to scientific instruments, had two-fifths of the country's furniture makers, and in 1851 employed 197,000 persons in the making of clothing. The reader will learn of the great expansion of the insurance business, the development of coal and gas businesses, and the first real rise of London to preeminence as the world money market. Social problems are not slighted and they are tied in with the industrial and commercial development, as, for example, by the contention that the slums ("rookeries") owed their growth largely to the fact that the workmen, especially before cheap workmen's trains became effective, had to live near their work. Anyway, Sheppard blows away the smoke and fog that all too literally obscured the "great wen" and shows us London as it was.

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BRIAN L. BLAKELEY. *The Colonial Office, 1868-1892*. Pp. vi, 195. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1972. \$9.50.

The British Colonial Office, which originated in the early seventeenth century and now absorbed by the Foreign Office, has been known in history by several different names, such as the Committee for Trade and the Plantations, the Lords of Trade, and the Board of Trade. Not until the nineteenth century did the Colonial Office emerge as a distinct unit of government with the duty of administering the colonies and overseas territories.

Following the loss of the American colonies in 1782, the management of overseas territories was delegated first to the Home Office and then to the War Office. Not un-

til the expansion of the empire during the Napoleonic War did the heavy weight of imperial business necessitate the creation of a distinct Colonial Office. At about the time of the outbreak of the American War of 1812, the first secretary for the colonies, Lord Bathurst, was appointed; and he, in turn, appointed the first under-secretary. Lord Bathurst and his under-secretary, Henry Goulburn, jointly created the modern Colonial Office. With the appointment of Sir James Stephen in 1836 as the first permanent undersecretary, the Colonial Office achieved the power and prestige commensurate with its responsibilities.

In his important book, Brian Blakeley has studied the reorganization and the growing importance of the Colonial Office during the last half of the nineteenth century. The author recognizes that the development of the Colonial Office has been gradual and continuous, its reformation coming about as a result of external pressures rather than being initiated from within the bureaucracy. The failures experienced during the Crimean War enabled the civil service reformers to establish the principle of competitive examinations for government appointments. In 1872 the Colonial Office accepted open competition as the proper method of recruiting its staff; and thereafter, men with first-class university degrees were brought into the service of the empire. Other major reforms, embodying the principles of the division of labor and the delegation of responsibility, enhanced the efficiency of the imperial government. But in spite of these reforms, several perennial problems remained unresolved, the most important being the division of jurisdiction among several departments, especially the Treasury and the War Office. The War Office was often more interested in reducing the size of its garrisons than in proving adequate defense for the colonies. So long as the Treasury held the view that improvements must wait on the growth of local revenues, the Colonial Office could do little to ameliorate social conditions in the colonies.

Professor Blakeley's carefully researched book provides considerable evidence to con-



firm the ongoing influence of liberal and humanitarian principles in the formation of imperial policy. The accumulated evidence also shows the basic weakness of imperial administration. Initiated primarily by royal prerogative, the Colonial Office rarely obtained the full attention of Parliament; and if the British people took notice of the empire, it was at times of international crises or when imperial policy trenched upon those cherished principles by which they conducted their domestic affairs. The strength of Blakeley's book is this accumulation of evidence illuminating the problems of imperial government; its weakness is the neglect of an imperial vision, the failure to see the world crises which overwhelmed the Colonial Office with conditions that they could neither understand nor control.

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ANDREW R. CARLSON. *Anarchism in Germany*, vol. 1, *The Early Movement*. Pp. 448. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1972. \$12.50.

The role of anarchist theorists and organizations in modern German history has been surprisingly neglected in German historiography. Professor Carlson's carefully researched study is the first monographic study of this topic in English. Although his book includes a wealth of detail on anarchist organizations and activities in nineteenth-century Germany, it is on the whole a very disappointing monograph. Carlson loses his reader in all too numerous narrations of details, which are very often insignificant. The organization of several of the chapters is glaringly forced, and in several cases the smallest thread of argumentation or logical development connects unrelated subject matter in adjacent chapters. It is tragic that such assiduous research as Carlson's has been so compromised by careless organization and a pedantic writing style.

The book is the first volume of an intended two-volume study of anarchism in

Germany during the period from 1830 to 1933. Carlson's first volume covers the period from 1830 to 1889, with emphasis on the years 1874 to 1889. The author's major thesis, that anarchism was important in the development of Germany, is very unconvincingly argued. Although discussions of the ideas of individual German anarchists such as Johann Most, John Neve, and Josef Peukert are scattered throughout the book, Carlson fails to analyze in a systematic fashion the comparative impact of individual German anarchist theorists. In his excessive zeal for detail, Carlson has provided scholars with a great many details about anarchist organizations and activities in the 1870s and 1880s. However, his major thesis is not proven. Anarchism's impact on Germany's development was minimal and largely negative. Anarchists' activities obviously were exploited by Bismarck during the period of the Socialist Law, and, of course, arguments with anarchist thinkers of the 1830s and 1840s forced Marx and Engels to sharpen their own social and economic thought. However, in both these examples the anarchist influence was not the only operating cause and was probably very insignificant in relation to other factors. These two examples are the key instances of anarchist influence which Carlson discusses in his very brief conclusion.

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RICHARD C. COBB. *Reactions to the French Revolution*. Pp. 310. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$13.75.

Richard C. Cobb, an authority on the French revolutionary armies, police, and public order, in this book moves from the period of the Terror to the Thermidorian reaction and the years of the Directory (1794-1799). During the latter period, as the republican terrorists were hounded and destroyed, counter-revolution and counter-terror became the focus of attention. The counter-terror flourished especially in those parts of France which had suffered under the revolutionary extremists of Paris—

Lyon was the center and it was widespread in the Rhone valley and southwestern France. Local and individualistic counter-terrorism found expression in lynchings, the activities of murder gangs, pillaging and banditry. Often the distinction between counter-terror and banditry was difficult to discern. In an introductory chapter the author appraises the sources of the counter-revolutionary commitment, and a second chapter examines the relationships between environment and counter-revolution, using Lyon, the second largest city in France, as a model. Another chapter employs the personal case history to establish significant types—a provincial terrorist, a government terrorist, a profiteer of the terror, and an ultra-terrorist. Examined also are such aspects as the terrorist mentality, the move from private life to public militancy, and the exploitation of the revolutionary chance for private gain.

"Living on the Fringe of the Revolution," one of the chapter titles, seems best to describe the purpose and principal content of this original and scholarly study. Traditional historiography of the French Revolution developed around the actions and fates of active participants, high and low, significant and insignificant. Cobb's study highlights those who hovered the fringes of society and sought to avoid the contest for power and responsibility over others. But was it possible "to live outside the Revolution"? In fact, as the author points out, the Revolution was never at any point for the many, and some sectors of private life escaped its impact entirely. It had nothing to offer the vast body of the poor, the vagrants and beggars, the sick, the abandoned children, and the indigent aged. What, for example, did Robespierre's Republic of Virtue mean for vagrants, laundresses, fruit vendors, and servants? Very little, the author concludes. Indeed these persons were most often simply exposed to violence and victimized by the perpetrators of violence. To them the Revolution probably appeared more oppressive and interfering than the officials of the Old Regime. Charity and traditional mercy and compassion were greatly weakened by the secularism of the

Revolution. Penalties for vagrancy were notably increased and individual liberties were often restricted by revolutionary legislation. Although the legal position of women—daughter, sister, wife, and the unmarried mother—was greatly improved under the new order, there was probably less protection of females in ordinary society than under the paternalism of the Old Regime. Priest and nun were traditionally compassionate toward women forced by circumstances into crime and prostitution, but the Revolution left the unfortunate female "alone in the dock, in the face of a pitiless secular public," a conclusion supported by many cited cases of anti-feminism and brutality toward women.

Cobb's study is not in any sense a defense of the Old Regime, but an original and innovative work in social history which is derived from a careful mining of the contemporary records of the ministries and courts of justice, police records, contemporary reports, petitions and letters. Several appendices supply additional material supporting the author's conclusions.

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KENNETH BRADSHAW and DAVID PRING. *Parliament and Congress*. Pp. 426. Austin, Texas: The University of Texas Press, 1972. \$10.00.

RICHARD H. S. CROSSMAN. *The Myths of Cabinet Government*. Pp. vii, 126. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. \$5.95.

Although these two books deal with some of the same themes, they are completely different in approach. Bradshaw and Pring's book about the British Parliament and the United States Congress is a detailed, descriptive work, the type of which is currently being done infrequently in the United States. On the other hand, the Crossman book is a brief statement of a few basic ideas relating to the operation of the parliamentary system in Great Britain.

The authors of *Parliament and Congress* are skilled technicians, having served for a considerable amount of time as clerks in

the British House of Commons. Their book reflects their skills. Subjects such as the formal nature of leadership and membership in the national legislatures of the United States and Great Britain are discussed, but too little information is provided about the intricacies of the exercise of power. In a chapter on membership no profile of the legislators emerges. Instead, detailed information about the duration of the Congress and the Parliament sessions, qualification and disqualification, and privileges and immunities is provided. This chapter is typical of the approach taken throughout the book and, hence, it goes over familiar ground in areas such as the organization and operation of first and second chambers and committee systems. Legislative procedure, the process related to financial legislation, and scrutiny and control of the legislature are the other subjects covered. Although most of the material discussed can be found in separate volumes written about the British Parliament or the United States Congress, it is useful to have it in an up-to-date single book. Information about reforms in the House of Commons in the last decade and the impact of the Legislative Reorganization Act on Congress is especially welcome. A limited amount of useful comparison is provided. Unfortunately, the authors do not provide a general concluding comparative chapter which is a definite shortcoming. This book will serve as a useful reference tool on Parliament and Congress, but students of these legislatures will not be able to substitute it for works such as those by Jennings, Morrison, Campion, Galloway, Griffith and Fenno to cite a few. In *Parliament and Congress* references to basic literature are scant and no bibliography is provided.

*The Myths of Cabinet Government* is based on the Godkin lectures delivered by R. H. S. Crossman at Harvard University in April 1970. It is a small book—there are eighty-eight pages of basic text plus an interesting introductory chapter by the author, and a report of question and answer sessions which followed the three lectures Crossman gave. The book has all the

limitations that works based on brief public lectures contain. However, that is not to say that it lacks value. Mr. Crossman's rich experience as an academic, a government bureaucrat, a party and party faction leader, a journalist, and a minister make him eminently qualified to treat questions related to the operation of the British government. Crossman uses Walter Bagehot's arguments about the comparisons between the British and American systems of government as a point of departure. He puts these arguments in a contemporary context and analyzes their validity. This analysis leads the author to conclude that British government has evolved from a parliamentary to a prime ministerial system. He cites as the really significant changes in the twentieth century (1) the growing power of the central government and (2) the growing dominance of the Cabinet, Whitehall, and in the electorate of the Prime Minister, the elective chief magistrate.

Again going back to Bagehot, Crossman considers myths and legends as opposed to the actual operative elements of the British system. He divides his work into discussion of the powers of the control of the administration or the executive; the power of control of the parliament; and the power of control of the party. Although a lively and thoughtful book, it lacks some of the fire one expects from the frequently controversial Mr. Crossman. Moderate tones have rarely been the mark of the author's life. (Note the national controversy which arose from his recent dismissal as editor of the *New Statesman*!)

In reading these two works, one muses that the Bradshaw and Pring volume could have been significantly improved if Crossman had edited it!

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R. M. ERRINGTON. *The Dawn of Empire: Rome's Rise to World Power*. Pp. x, 318. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. \$8.75.

ROBIN SEAGER. *Tiberius*. Pp. 315. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972. \$12.95.

Errington's book, which will be discussed first, is aimed primarily at the "interested general reader," who is further described as apt, "like Shakespeare, to have little Latin and less Greek." The period dealt with is approximately the same as that covered by Polybius in his forty book history, except that while Polybius begins where Errington does, with the First Punic War, he ends in 146 B.C. while the present work goes on "(where appropriate) until 133 B.C." Polybius' theme, the rise of Rome to world dominion and the reasons that made that possible, centers around the virtues of the Roman state, which he describes as a mixed constitution, combining the virtues of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. Errington, however, has based his own account on a narrower interpretation and one not original with himself, namely the client-patron relationship, plausibly worked out by Professor Ernst Badian in his *Foreign Clientelae*. The chief difficulty with this approach to a highly complex subject is oversimplification. In emphasizing the new and valuable contribution of Badian to our understanding of this period, the author often gives the impression that no other important factors were involved.

Partly because of this fixation the author finds no time to give a convincing narrative. Instead of describing Scipio's famous exploit in capturing New Carthage along with the bravery of the Roman troops, Errington merely remarks: "These are all detailed by Polybius and Livy and can easily be found in their books" (p. 87)—presumably by the same reader he envisages as having "little Latin and less Greek." However, the author does a good piece of work in showing how the Roman idea of the mutual relations between patron and client were extended to foreign policy. For Rome this meant one thing but for her new clients quite another. Once the tie of friendship had been established, Rome expected, and eventually got, a moral commitment by the client state that could never be terminated. However, Errington makes too

many modern allusions. The United States is not analogous to Rome. In a way this is rather amusing. The author, who gives a rather unpleasant picture of Roman policy uses the United States as his parallel—but so did Tenney Frank, who felt that Rome, like the United States, followed an altruistic foreign policy (*Roman Imperialism*)! Allusions to hawks, to peace in our time, and to the Cold War abound. Worst of all is the attempt to bring the Carthaginian disaster home to us by saying that Carthage perished "with a bang, not a whimper" (p. 268), which has the effect of destroying her once more, with a cliché. There are well-rounded portraits of individual Romans, of whom Titus Flamininus deserves special mention. But non-Romans are seldom as well done. For example, Syphax's behavior is naively explained simply by his lust for women (p. 98).

Turning now to Robin Seager's *Tiberius*, we find a book intended both for the general reader and the specialist, and attempting to take account of the advances in the field made since F. B. Marsh published his distinguished study, *The Reign of Tiberius*, in 1931. In attempting to do Tiberius justice Marsh paints a more flattering picture of the emperor than the evidence justifies. Seager has resisted the temptation to react sharply to his predecessor's interpretation; instead he has supplied us with nuances. In Marsh we read of Tiberius' famous rebuke of the prefect of Egypt for sending him more than the required tribute—that he "wished his sheep sheared but not shaved" (Marsh, p. 151). Seager adds that Tiberius' point of view was that of the sheepfarmer not that of the sheep (p. 173); that is, his motives were not humanitarian, but based on the permanent usefulness of the province to Rome. Other modifications include a more believable Sejanus, and a less fatuous Germanicus.

One of the best parts of Seager's work is his discussion of Tiberius' life before he became emperor, particularly his painful relationship with his stepfather Augustus, whose unflagging determination to save the rule for his own descendants dominates all

policy. Had Caius Caesar lived, or even had Germanicus been a few years older when Augustus died, we are led to believe Tiberius' own life would hardly have been worth the purchase. Also Seager firmly places the blame for the Varus disaster on Augustus' shoulders: Varus was appointed for the wrong reasons, because he was "the husband of his great-niece Claudia Pulchra" (p. 44). The author brings out the tensions in Tiberius' life, his essential Republican conservatism and dislike of the Principate confronted with the wish to survive and with a strange, almost mystical loyalty to the man who adopted him.

Limited space prevents doing justice to this book, but it is quite able to speak for itself.

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ROBERT FORSTER. *The House of Saulx-Tavanes: Versailles and Burgundy, 1700-1830*. Pp. xii, 277. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. \$15.00.

In this study Professor Forster of Johns Hopkins University teaches us much about the complexity of society in the Old Regime. Because of the full record keeping by the Saulx-Tavanes family for nearly three centuries, he has been able to craft a meticulous study of the family and its lands. Forster does for this family what he did in 1960 for *The Nobility of Toulouse in the Eighteenth Century* in his exposition of family discipline and policy and the vigorous tightening of estate administration with the concomitant revival of feudal obligations. Now he shows us how a family, its land, its tenants and sub-tenants fared from the seventeenth century until the family died out in 1870.

Carefully, perhaps too carefully, Forster is tightly relevant to his main theme. Thus, there is hardly a hint that such Tavanes as Charles-Marie-Gaspard (1713-1784) and Charles-Francois-Casimir (1739-1791) lived during the Enlightenment. We learn of lucrative marriage contracts without learning how they were negotiated and to what extent the agreements reflected

astute family planning or affection. We do learn much about conspicuous consumption in Paris and Versailles and its rising cost. Laid bare is the shift, characteristic of Louis XIV's era, from being a resident, great lord and captain to being a courtier living expensively in Paris and Versailles, maneuvering to enrich the family by royal favors and by robe and bourgeois marriages.

The most informing and interesting portions of this book explain how the Tavanes as absentee landlords kept a tight and profitable control over their lands in Burgundy. Rich in details of seigniorage, of land size and distribution, of management by a competent *feudiste*, these chapters reveal the intricacy of social-economic statuses neatly distinguished in documents (part 2). Effectively pictured here is a highly complex society of many gradations, squeezed by price changes and the re-establishment of such feudal dues as the *droit d'indire*. The rising costs of lordly status drove the Tavanes to seek more and more from their estates. As 1789 approached, tenants and sub-tenants increasingly fought back with law suits. Even Casimir, first duke of Saulx-Tavanes, whose *feudiste* collected dues voided on the night of August 4, did not perceive the depth and durability of the French Revolution. Finally the family emigrated; later it found some solace under Napoleon and more, including partial indemnification, during the Restoration, but the great role of the family was ended.

This workmanlike, readable volume is valuable alike to students of the Old Regime, the French Revolution, social status, the organization of agriculture, and the conduct of government.

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C. DESMOND GREAVES. *The Irish Crisis*. Pp. 222. New York: International, 1972. \$2.65. Paperbound.

Rarely has the voyeuristic and exploitive character of our educated elite been so

clearly visible as in the present Ulster tragedy. Book after shabby book has appeared to be snapped up by a waiting public. Some authors seem primarily interested in quick money, others in bolstering some ideological viewpoint by dipping their pens in the wounds of the Northern Irish. Mr. Greaves' book, an undisguised polemic, belongs to the second category, a polemic.

The author summarizes his own argument as follows:

There is a clash of interest between English monopoly capitalism on the one hand and the Irish people on the other. . . . The present superior strength of imperialism is expressed in the determining fact of enforced partition. Economically, partition imposes severe disabilities on each part of Ireland, but especially on the part denied political sovereignty, comprising six countries. These disabilities are made to press one-sidedly on the Catholic and Nationalist minority in the north, who are denied civil rights so as to render them politically powerless and encourage them to emigrate. . . . The result is that partition influences every aspect of the class struggle within Ireland, so that all other issues must be related to it and cannot be understood otherwise. In virtue of these circumstances English imperialism is responsible for the resultant evils, and the British people are of necessity involved.

As a description of the present situation in Northern Ireland this analysis has no more resemblance to reality than a panda has to a pachyderm. In itself the book demands no attention, but certain of its characteristics are interesting because they are quite widespread in academic and intellectual circles. The first of these is the refusal of most observers to recognize that the pattern of events in Ulster cannot be explained by ideological or social-scientific models developed for other countries. Thus, the only scholars so far who have made much headway in analyzing the situation have been social geographers—chiefly those trained by E. Estyn Evans of Queen's, Belfast—individuals who have accepted the culture's uniqueness as a fundamental precept and have then proceeded to deal with it on its own terms.

Second, few writers have been able to face the simple fact that, whatever its his-

torical roots, the present Ulster crisis is chiefly a domestic conflict. Despite each sides' rhetorical references to outside groups—the southern republican government on the one hand and the British army on the other—they both recognize quite clearly who the enemy is: each other.

Because the hatred of Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland is so irrational, so parochial, so nearly an autonomous drive, and, so resistant to the analytic models beloved by ideologists and academics, most readers probably will prefer the specious clarity of books such as Greaves' to the unsettling ambiguities, paradoxes, and ironies which are the authentic hallmark of Ulster society.

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NIGEL HARRIS. *Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives, the State and Industry, 1945-1964*. Pp. 384. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. \$12.75.

The original draft of a survey of British Conservative postwar economic policy was presented by Nigel Harris for a higher degree at the University of London. Later it was expanded into the form of the present volume which describes, cogently and with full documentation, why the British Conservative party has been one of the most successful parties in modern history.

In spite of major alterations in society and major threats from other political parties, British Conservatives have maintained a record of success, partly because they have related "their beliefs about British society and their characteristic responses faced by successive British governments." These beliefs are derived "from what Conservatives view as the past record of success or failure in coping with the challenges to their survival."

The Harris book provides an excellent background to an understanding of British Conservatism in this century, especially since World War II. It also affords a review of problems of the British economy

and of British industry which have always been of primary importance to Conservatives.

One of the most important claims of British Conservatives is that their party embodies "all that is most characteristically British—or English; that there is something called a 'British way of life' which is peculiar and valuable and which the Conservatives conserve."

In describing the transition from an agricultural Britain to a managerial society, Harris interprets the many crises faced by Conservative leadership. In recent years, the issue has been to cope with the emergence of world capitalism. The challenge ahead for Conservatives, as the volume stresses, is to decide whether they should adjust to the declining sector which constitutes the heritage of their party, thus preserving "Britain" as the outstanding tradition. Harris concludes that there is no alternative to the need for the Conservative party to adjust to international business. Without this adjustment, Conservatism will be weakened, philosophically and practically, and will decline as a political force in Great Britain.

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JAMES A. HENRETTA. *"Salutary Neglect": Colonial Administration under the Duke of Newcastle*. Pp. xii, 381. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$14.50.

The title of this intelligent and useful work is something of a misnomer: it is not so much concerned with England's administration of the colonies as it is with the politics of patronage and spoils in the age of the Pelhams and the consequences of that system for the empire. In this respect it differs from previous studies such as that of O. M. Dickerson, Charles M. Andrews, George Beer, Dora May Clarke, T. C. Barrow, and others, who have for the most part been concerned with the evolution and operation of constitutional and administrative machinery in the legal and constitutional sense. The author's conclu-

sions about the impact of "salutary neglect" are not radically different from those of these earlier writers but he gets at them from a new and somewhat original point of view—one which sees colonial patronage as a by-product of the struggle for power between Newcastle, his brother Henry Pelham, Lord Carteret, Robert Walpole, the Duke of Bedford, and the other leading political figures of mid-eighteenth century England.

Henretta builds his interpretation inductively through a succession of narratives telling of the political circumstances behind the appointment of a long succession of governors, deputy governors, secretaries, naval officers, and the like: Belcher and Shirley in Massachusetts, Spotswood in Virginia, Cosby in New York, Hope in Bermuda, and so on. A substantially convincing thesis gradually emerges from this mass of detail. Briefly, it is that "salutary neglect" was in the immediate sense not so much a deliberate policy as it was a consequence of the deliberate subordination of all considerations of efficient administration to the political imperatives of patronage.

Newcastle's own career illustrated the corruptive force of this system only too well. Earlier he had been interested in a modicum of decent administration for America, but by the time of his triumph over Walpole, between 1737 and 1742, he had become utterly indifferent to administrative considerations, and instead "indulged himself in the freedom bestowed by complete power." The consequences, the author demonstrates, were altogether pernicious. Not merely did the quality of colonial officialdom appointed decline drastically in the course of the first half of the eighteenth century, but, even more serious, the system whereby subordinate officers in the colonies were appointed independently from England and without reference to internal colonial considerations made it impossible for royal governors to wield the patronage club effectively as a coercive device against the various assemblies. The ultimate result was the decay of effective British authority in the colonies and a steady increase in the de facto autonomy of the colonial legislatures. "By 1763," the au-

thor concludes, "perhaps even by 1754, the American colonies as inferior and subordinate possessions had already been lost." Pelham patronage policy, in short, emerges as one cause of the American Revolution. Within its limits, it is a convincing argument.

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RICHARD JACKSON. *The French Communist Party Versus the Students*. Pp. 215. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. \$8.00.

ANNIE KRIEGL. *The French Communists: Profile of a People*. Pp. 408. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1972. \$12.50.

It is fitting that these books be reviewed together, for both are concerned with the structured authoritarianism of the French Communist party. Professor Kriegel has been a member of the French Communist party, and thus writes of that organization from the point of view of a participant-observer. Richard Jackson was an observer in Paris at the time of the student riots of May-June 1968—at that time he was an undergraduate student at Yale, though his book was written evidently after he became a graduate student. The sophisticated perceptions of Jackson tend to make the comments of Professor Kriegel appear somewhat naive at times. (The translation of the latter's book does not help for it appears to be an almost literal reading of the original French, with the result that many ideas seem to be only half-expressed, with sentences left dangling in mid-air.) The Yale Press, however, has sold Jackson short by turning out a very sloppy printing job bound in a handsome cover.

Jackson has done an outstanding job in analyzing the traditional conflict between the self-educated proletarians who become the Party bureaucrats and the middle-class intellectuals who believe that they should share in the thinking for the Party. Though the Party rebuffs any intellectual who does not look upon the Party as the

Guru, it is willing to accept him if he is properly subservient and docile. Though the believing intellectual often refuses to play this role, he finds that other Party intellectuals look upon him as being nonexistent if he tries to ply his ideas outside the Party. He needs continuous approval from the Party, but the latter makes him grovel for it. The students who were able to get young workers to join them in the Paris riots of May-June 1968 were expecting the impossible when they hoped that the conservative hierarchical and student-hating proletarian bureaucracy would support them in their opposition to the French government's indifference to their overcrowded classrooms, the poor teaching provided them, and the very poor physical facilities available to the students at the University of Paris.

Professor Kriegel almost duplicates Jackson's observations when she describes the priesthood of the French Communist party, who alone are empowered to interpret the "scientific" Marxist-Leninist traditions of the Party. One needs to be a leftist Frenchman to understand the attraction of the Party, which is still visualized as being the defender of the French Revolution, the protector of the people against the exploiting aristocrats and capitalists, the upholder of the traditional socialist—basically anarcho-syndicalist—truths, and the way of the future—in Party mythology only the militant proletarians are capable of ruling and remaking the future. Though the leftist intellectuals may be rebuffed and even excommunicated by the Party, they still believe in the truths upon which the Party holds a monopoly, and they fear that being ostracized from it is equivalent to exclusion from participating in the future.

Again, one must be French and a leftist intellectual to believe that the world of tomorrow belongs to the proletarians; whereas the economic and social trends of our present industrial and scientific civilization seem to indicate that both proletarians, in the blue-collar sense of that term, and the peasants are slowly becoming obsolete as social classes. In the United States, the white-collar employee outnumbers the blue-



collar worker—and France is not too far behind. It is not the proletarian in France who will shape tomorrow's society, but the educated white-collar employee—both manager and technician. Thus, the Communist party in France is selling inadequate information about the future, just as it is merchandising an irrelevant package of panaceas based upon unscientific predictions. What France—and also the rest of the world—needs it not outdated notions of authoritarian ownership and millenarian socialism in all of its myriad varieties, but a better understanding and a new extension of democracy in all aspects of social interactions. The wave of the future, as the Czechs discovered in the mid-1960s, is not communism or socialism, but a greater extension of human democratic rights which permit men to criticize, dissent, and seek new alternatives to traditional ones in the field of problem-solving. If the study of contemporary communism has taught us one thing, it is that we cannot build a less frustrating human society without more democracy so that all of us can make our individual contributions to rebuilding a world that we have played little part in making.

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ANDREW C. JANOS and WILLIAM B. SLOTTMAN, eds. *Revolution in Perspective: Essays on the Hungarian Republic*. Pp. 196. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$10.00.

ROGER PETHYBRIDGE. *The Spread of the Russian Revolutions: Essays on 1917*. Pp. 238. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. \$11.95.

These books are related to each other very tenuously. Both deal with Communist revolutions and both touch on the question of coalitions between Communists and Socialists. But in the case of Russia, the coalition ended quickly as the Bolsheviks found that their allies were not needed and in fact were an encumbrance. In the case of Hungary, the coalition persisted because both groups needed each other.

But if the subjects of these books are only slightly related, they are important in themselves.

Pethybridge takes up the eight month period between the overthrow of Tsarism and the triumph of the Bolsheviks. He is concerned with the mechanics of the growth of Bolshevik support among railway workers, communications workers, the press, and the capital cities. He credits the Bolsheviks with more astute use of the press and agitation than their opponents. But the admittedly superior organization of the Bolsheviks, under tight central control unlike their opponents, was not the overriding factor in Bolshevik success. For Pethybridge, the Bolshevik triumph is explained by the weariness of the people with war, the increasing anarchy, the squabbling and disorganization of the parties, the supply problem and the correspondence between Bolshevik slogans and the defeatism of the soldiers. In passing, the author suggests that it was only in July 1917 that Lenin became convinced that his Bolsheviks might not be able to triumph as a member of a coalition but would have to take minority control of Russia. In September, Lenin ostensibly returned to a belief that the Bolsheviks must triumph as representatives of the majority. But by this time Lenin had reinterpreted his concept of the majority to include only the advanced segments of the population in the Petrograd and Moscow soviets. To some extent, Pethybridge's argument parallels that of Robert Daniels in *The Conscience of the Revolution*. The argument is plausible but does not emphasize sufficiently the expedient character of Lenin's espousal of majority rule.

Pethybridge's book makes it very clear that the strength of the Bolsheviks was their unity and the weakness of their opponents was their inability to unite. His book is useful in showing how a very small number of Bolsheviks energetically and intelligently conducted themselves to increase their influence.

The history of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 is related in the book edited by A. Janos and W. Slottman.

Janos presents a valuable essay that notes the high degree of social mobility in pre-World War I Hungary, a mobility masked by a facade of exclusiveness and immobility and limited by economic backwardness. His use of political sociology is not obtrusive. Kenez offers an excellent essay on the coalition that governed Hungary, in which he argues that the alliance worked and that the republic fell only because of foreign intervention. Other essays concern the failure of the Soviet regime to satisfy the demands of the peasants and the Rumanians in Transylvania. In a concluding essay, Lowenthal argues that the experience of the Hungarian revolution persuaded Lenin to insist, from that time on, on a narrow and authoritarian party structure. The position is arguable.

Both books make it clear that victory or defeat of revolutionaries depended less on their skill, doctrine, or even support. While important, each of these factors was less significant than the opportunity national disaster gave to the revolutionaries.

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WILLIAM M. JOHNSTON. *The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History*. Pp. 532. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$17.50.

William M. Johnston, a professor of history at the University of Massachusetts, has written a book that has no competition. Although many fine studies of individual Austrian thinkers already exist, *The Austrian Mind* is the first book in English or in German to analyze both in depth and breadth the intellectual history of the Habsburg Monarchy between 1848 and 1938.

Based upon an impressive command of primary and secondary published sources, Johnston's book is a tour de force. In 400 pages of text the author evaluates the contributions of Austro-Hungarian intellectuals to economic, legal, and social theory, to the arts, to philosophy, to literature and criticism, and to medicine. Of the more

than seventy men and women discussed, some, like Sigmund Freud and Franz Kafka, require no introduction; others, however, such as Christian von Ehrenfels and Adolf Stöhr, the author rescues from obscurity. By presenting a distinguished cast of characters, he documents the wealth of innovative thought produced during a century of profound social and political change in the lands once ruled by the House of Habsburg.

Johnston's book is of special interest for its application of the sociology of knowledge, a discipline pioneered by two of his protagonists, to the history of ideas. In an introductory chapter devoted to methodology, he ably summarizes the scope and organization of his study, which is divided into six sections. "Part One," he explains,

shows how bureaucracy sustained the Habsburg Empire while inciting economists, legal theorists, and socialists to urge reform. Part Two examines how Vienna's coffeehouses, theaters, and concert halls stimulated creativity together with complacency. Part Three explores the fin-de-siècle world view known as Viennese Impressionism. Interacting with positivistic science, this reverence for the ephemeral inspired such pioneers as Mach, Wittgenstein, Buber, and Freud. Part Four describes the vision of an ordered cosmos which flourished among Germans in Bohemia. Their philosophers cultivated a Leibnizian faith whose eventual collapse haunted Kafka and Mahler. Part Five explains how in Hungary wishful thinking reinforced a political activism rare elsewhere in Habsburg domains. *Engagé* intellectuals like Lukács and Mannheim systematized the sociology of knowledge, while two other Hungarians, Herzl and Nordau, initiated political Zionism. Part Six investigates certain attitudes that have permeated Austrian thought, such as hostility to technology and delight in polar opposites.

Within this organizational framework, the author provides biographical data on the major figures he has chosen to discuss, explicates their thought, and relates each to that segment of Austro-Hungarian society to which he or she can be understood to have belonged. Rather than describing a single Austrian mind, Johnston compares and contrasts the intellectual life of Vienna, Prague, and Budapest and convinc-

ingly argues that the diverse social and political conditions of the various provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy strongly influenced the attitudes of intellectuals and the types of problems to which they addressed themselves. Unfortunately, the biographical information supplied is often overly detailed and is occasionally even gratuitous. On page 197, for example, the reader is informed for no apparent reason that between 1907 and 1923 the philosopher of language Fritz Mauthner "occupied a house on Lake Constance where the poetess Annette von Droste-Hülshoff once lived." Frequently, moreover, this reviewer found himself wishing for more clear explanations of the thought of several of the philosophers discussed in Part Four. Johnston assumes a greater familiarity with modern philosophy than many readers will bring to his book.

The author has undertaken so ambitious a project, however, that it is unreasonable to expect him to sustain a consistently high level of performance. Least satisfactory are the early chapters dealing with the political background to nineteenth-century Austrian thought. Historians of the monarchy's internal policy will be justifiably critical of statements on page 19 that imply it was Metternich rather than the Habsburgs who ruled Austria between 1815 and 1848. Metternich's influence over domestic affairs was far more limited than Johnston is willing to admit. Diplomatic historians, moreover, will question whether Prince Montenuovo, by his spiteful handling of the funeral arrangements for Archduke Franz Ferdinand, really did help "unwittingly to instigate" World War I, as the author claims on page 37. Elsewhere Johnston is on firmer ground, yet intellectual historians will be disappointed with the sketchy treatment accorded the revolutionary developments in music inaugurated by Arnold Schönberg, while they may wish to take issue with the tendency to treat Austrian thought in a vacuum, with only passing reference to the intellectual history of Europe in general.

Despite these and other criticisms that could be made, the book's merits far outweigh its weaknesses. Throughout, Johnston correctly stresses the importance of attitudes formed in the period before

1848 for the subsequent development of Austrian thought. The virtual exclusion from consideration of non-Austrian intellectual history has the advantage, moreover, of emphasizing the extent to which thinkers working in Vienna, Prague, and Budapest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have influenced contemporary thought. Repeatedly, Johnston offers penetrating insights into the relationship of Austro-Hungarian intellectuals to one another and to their cultural and social milieu. By concentrating on the political activism of Hungarian literary figures, for example, he is able to establish continuity in the thought of Georg Lukács and to shed light upon Lukács' influence on Karl Mannheim and the development of the sociology of knowledge. Finally, excellent sections on Freud and Vienna and on Viennese aestheticism will enable many a lecturer to appear uncommonly learned before his students.

*The Austrian Mind* comes highly recommended. In 1969 a jury appointed by the Austrian Institute of New York and chaired by Professor Robert Kann of Rutgers University conferred upon the manuscript the Austrian History Award, while in its edition of June 2, 1972, Vienna's leading newspaper, *Die Presse*, termed the book the most significant American contribution to Austrian history since the publication in 1950 of Professor Kann's own study of the nationality problem in the Habsburg Monarchy. In his preface, Johnston thanks the University of Massachusetts Graduate School for its valuable support in the preparation of the manuscript "when all other sources of financial aid had failed." In light of the recognition *The Austrian Mind* has deservedly received, the University of Massachusetts should be congratulated for its good judgment.

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BRUCE KUKLICK. *American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations*. Pp. viii, 286. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. \$9.50.

ELEANOR L. DULLES. *The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts*. Pp. xiii, 105. Columbia, S.C.: Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina, 1972. No price.

In the postwar era, Soviet-American relations have gyrated from dangerous confrontations to peaceful competition and cooperation. While the Cold War seems to be thawing, it is essential for historians and observers to analyze the root causes and the areas of friction. Bruce Kuklick's volume is an important contribution to the literature on the outbreak of the Cold War; Eleanor Dulles' volume is a less satisfactory contribution to the study of one Berlin crisis.

Kuklick has thoroughly researched one aspect of Soviet-American friction during and immediately following World War II. Basing his findings on a range of public and private documents and manuscripts in United States archives and libraries, the author has shed light on the complex negotiations over the German reparations problem between the former four wartime allies, but especially the United States and the Soviet Union. Should the Soviet government ever open its diplomatic files to scholars, then the missing pieces in this area of confrontation politics might further clarify and explain its policies. Until then, one must be grateful to the author for providing a necessary corrective to the tendentious and subjective memoirs published by a number of American policymakers at the height of the Cold War.

In concentrating on the period from 1939 to 1946, the author deals with wartime planning for peace in Germany, including the famous Morgenthau plan, with the contours of Soviet-American relations, and with important postwar diplomatic conferences and negotiations. Kuklick advances the thesis that American policymakers took an "intransigent and uncompromising" position in the matter of German reparations to the Allies. Repeatedly, at a number of conferences with Soviet negotiators, United States officials, ranging from Stettinius to General Clay, were wary of providing the Russians with any reparations from the Western zones in Germany

and were opposed to making significant concessions to Soviet demands. Rather, they hoped that Soviet officials would accept the more modest United States reparation proposals and simultaneously reduce claims in the Eastern zone. The author contends that this intransigent American position was responsible for the kind of division of Germany which then occurred, "and perhaps for the rigid division of Europe." Too engrossed in his own study, Kuklick loses sight of the fact that a host of other factors contributed equally to these divisions.

The author also asserts that ironically the American reparations policy ran counter to the expressed long-range policy of "multilateralism." The latter encompassed a quest for trade expansion and the global establishment of liberal democracy. In the German setting, it meant that the State Department opted for a unified Germany which would make minimum reparations and then contribute to an expansion of international trade. But these long-range plans were thwarted by the Soviets who could not possibly agree to United States proposals inimical to their own interests.

While revisionist interpretations of American diplomatic policies in the postwar era, such as that of Kuklick, must be lauded for their salutary effect on providing greater balance and objectivity, Eleanor Lansing Dulles' study of the Berlin crisis of August 1961 does not fall into this category. In this slim volume, the former specialist on German affairs in the Department of State and the sister of the late John Foster Dulles, recounts the dramatic days of August 1961 when the Communists erected the Wall sealing off East Berlin from West Berlin. Since Mrs. Dulles was not in Berlin at the time, she has reconstructed the events primarily on the basis of interviews. There is little new in this poorly written account other than anecdotes and useful glimpses into the slumbering American decision-making process. But what is one to make of such assertions as "In 1961 for the first time since 1948, . . . East Berlin was ceded by the West to the communists" (p. 90), or as, at the time of

a visit to the Wall in 1963, she "was observed by officers on the watch," who "sent other officers to various points so that they knew where I was and guessed at a mission which was unfriendly to the GDR" (p. 85)? A serious, analytic, and scholarly account of the Berlin crisis of 1961 still has not appeared in this country.

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ANTONY POLONSKY. *Politics in Independent Poland, 1921-1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government*. Pp. ix, 572. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$24.00.

This is a welcome and important addition to English-language studies of the East European nationalist experience during the interwar period. In tracing the history of Poland from the institution of the Republican constitution in 1921, to the death of the state during the Blitzkrieg of 1939, Polonsky has described objectively and perceptively the tragic failure of a democratic experiment. It is Polonsky's basic thesis that almost all the failings of the Republic "can be traced to the political inadequacies of the new state" (p. 508). To prove this argument, he has produced a well-balanced political history which treats internal political processes, economic machinations, minorities questions, military affairs, and foreign relations.

From the beginning the Polish Republic was plagued by its own history. Divided among three powers for over a century, hampered by a persistent and weak agrarian economy, fractionalized by ethnic rivalries, flanked by two massive traditional enemies, and overly reliant upon the military establishment, the new state was forced to deal with inherent impediments to its proper functioning. Emerging from this situation, as Polonsky illustrates, was a series of cruel ironies which mark the history of interwar Poland. Polonsky has shown how economic backwardness helped to thwart realization of the dreams of the nationalists who created the Republic. He has described in detail how the instability of the Rightist

government in the early years of the state caused many to look to the Left and its leader—Marshal Josef Pilsudski, the hero of the First World War and the Russo-Polish conflict—for deliverance from the evils of civilian control, only to have Pilsudski establish an authoritarian regime following his coup d'état in May 1926. And, Polonsky has pointed out how the "Colonels" created by Pilsudski to run the state as he molded it, came, in their internecine and parliamentary struggling after the Marshal's death in 1935, to violate and abrogate the principles for which Pilsudski had stood.

Certainly the most significant character in the history of interwar Poland was Marshal Pilsudski. Hostile to the Constitution of 1921, unwilling to cooperate with the rival statesmen and parties, and hovering over the tottering state like a *deus ex machina* awaiting a cue, Pilsudski dominated the Republic for two decades. Polonsky has performed a careful and dispassionate task in placing the Marshal in proper perspective. Thus, he views Pilsudski as "a brilliant military amateur" (p. 198) who as a politician was basically a pragmatist lacking "any real ideological foundation" (p. 510). Polonsky also sees the Marshal as a moralistic and stern patriot whose military past caused him to distrust all politicians and most military men who had not experienced war as he had. It is from this personality that there emerged the non-totalitarian strongman whose form of authoritarian control, in Polonsky's view, approached that of Giolitti or Taffe rather than that of his ruthless dictatorial contemporaries. It is ironic, however, that once Pilsudski managed to gain ascendancy over his parliamentary opposition in 1930, he was too old, tired, and ill to exercise control over his own followers. This resulted in what Polonsky calls "the increasing inadequacy and incompetence of the Pilsudski regime in the 1930s" (p. 333).

Polonsky has placed an interesting emphasis upon the history of the Polish military and its poor performance in 1939, as he has found fault with both the military and the government. He has pointed out

the antiquated outlook of the leading officers who envisioned the future war as a repeat of the Russo-Polish conflict of 1920. This resulted in a diminution of the value of an air force, artillery, and a motorized cavalry, and an emphasis upon the infantry and the mounted cavalry. Polonsky has also traced the deleterious effect which the Pilsudski-ites had upon the military, as they tampered with careers, refused to modernize, and demonstrated a general incompetency in leadership throughout the 1930s. And even after the war had broken out, as Polonsky illustrates, the political ineptitude of the Colonels was tragically exposed by their refusal to form a coalition government. These developments, when viewed in light of the statistical weakness of the Polish military relative to that of Germany, makes bitterly myopic the enthusiasm for war which many Poles shared in the summer of 1939.

Polonsky has produced a lengthy and expansive study of a complicated subject. There are imbalances in his coverage (for example, he is too sketchy in his study of Polish foreign policy before the 1930s), however, the final product is a well-researched, impressive analysis of a Polish and European tragedy. As such, Polonsky's book is an outstanding contribution to the historiography of the interwar period, and the most definitive study to date of the Polish Republic.

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PETER J. POTICHNYJ. *Soviet Agricultural Trade Unions, 1917-1970*. Pp. vii, 258. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. \$12.50.

Soviet studies have in recent years fallen on lean times, not only financially but also intellectually. In this context Professor Potichnyj's book is a welcome sign of life, but it is also symptomatic of the general fatigue and *ennui* which seem to have overtaken the field. In a sense, we should be grateful for Potichnyj's thorough, systematic, and exhaustively documented, though

often plodding, presentation of the subject; yet theoretical insight and the zest of discovery and argument are almost entirely missing from his work. Reading it has the same mildly depressant effect as watching someone try to roll a boulder uphill, bail a sinking boat, or hoist himself up by his own bootstraps.

Potichnyj presents his evidence in one general introductory chapter, five chapters devoted to various aspects of Soviet agricultural trade unions, and a very brief chapter of conclusions. Each of the six substantive chapters follows a parallel plan which is essentially chronological. One gets the impression that five separate, loosely interconnected stories are being told. Organization and structure, membership, finances, conditions of labor, and social insurance are dealt with on the basis of an exhaustive study of the sources and with the mechanistic type of approach which has become customary in academic political science, at least where the Soviet Union is concerned. A great deal of valuable statistical data are summarized in a series of appendices, and there is a bibliography which is useful in itself, since most of the sources are quite obscure. Potichnyj documents the painfully limited role which Soviet agricultural trade unions in particular have played up to now, and also the extent to which they are beginning to serve as channels for genuine grass roots opinion and pressure.

It is a pity to say so, but this is an uninteresting book. Perhaps this is the fault of the subject, which for all its obvious importance may simply be uninteresting. But I do not think so. Someone with a real interest, not so much in how systems work as in how people get together, will have to take Potichnyj's laboriously collected data and make something interesting out of them; but I can foresee that this will require the passage of considerable time, and a different climate of opinion.

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## UNITED STATES

ROBERT S. ALLEY. *So Help Me God: Religion and the Presidency, Wilson to Nixon*. Pp. 160. Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1972. \$4.95.

This is a great subject which has never been systematically explored. The religious attitudes, training, and background of most of the Presidents have been studied, sometimes in great depth and detail, by biographers. Ralph Ketcham's study of Madison, for example, deals definitively with the fourth President's lifelong preoccupation with religious belief and practice, while Irving Brant, earlier, dealt exhaustively with Madison's concern with the relation between institutional religion and the state. Similarly, such Presidents as Jefferson, the Adamses, Lincoln, Hayes, Hoover, and the Roosevelts have been the subjects of satisfying scholarly treatment from the point of view of religion. Most recently, John Kennedy's Catholicism has been not only a matter of popular and biographical interest but the focus of a splendid scholarly work by Lawrence Fuchs (*John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism*, New York, Meredith Press, 1967). But no study of the subject as a whole has taken advantage of such scholarship. Professor Alley, dealing with the Presidents from Wilson to Nixon, has put together a string of brief essays which are topical, often personal, and sometimes both penetrating and entertaining. But the book can make no claim to broad scholarship. The author does not appear, for example, to be familiar with Fuchs' work.

Identifying his own views throughout with those of Reinhold Niebuhr, Professor Alley deplores the kind of moral and religious rhetoric that so often clothes statements of public policy. But unlike Niebuhr, he does not propose a Christian alternative. He finds that most Presidents can be categorized as rationalists (the Adamses, Jefferson, Washington, Madison), Calvinists (most), or pragmatists (F.D.R., Kennedy). None, he observes, succeeded in promoting what he calls a "civil religion," though he considers that Eisenhower came nearest to that dubious achievement.

His heroes are Jefferson, Lincoln, F. D. Roosevelt, and Kennedy, that is, the rationalists or the pragmatists. But much of the writing is so diffuse that it is never entirely clear why they are heroes, or what role Professor Alley would like religion to play in presidential leadership.

A major, full scale work on religion and the Presidency remains to be written.

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WILLIAM E. AMES. *A History of the National Intelligencer*. Pp. xi, 376. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972. \$11.95.

Founded on borrowed money by a twenty-eight-year-old Philadelphian, Samuel Harrison Smith, the *National Intelligencer* of Washington, D.C. began in 1800 a career which was to last for nearly seventy years. In 1810 the paper came into the hands of Joseph Gales, Jr., who two years later made his brother-in-law, William Winston Seaton, his associate. Both men were in their twenties. Until the death of Gales in 1860 the newspaper was a Gales and Seaton enterprise. In 1864 it was sold, and in 1869 it ceased publication. Seaton died in 1866.

Having originated as an organ of Jeffersonian Republicanism, the *Intelligencer* retained this character throughout the administrations of Madison and Monroe. But following the transitional administration of J. Q. Adams, Gales and Seaton placed themselves squarely against Andrew Jackson and his Democratic following. Whig leaders Clay and Webster now became their heroes and Clay's American System their political point of reference. Whig principles continued to guide them, but finally became merged into a kind of political eclecticism: the *Intelligencer* rejoiced at the defeat of Whig and Republican presidential candidates in 1856; supported Bell and Everett in 1860; and, breaking with Lincoln over emancipation, favored McClellan for the presidency in 1864.

Without government printing contracts few Washington newspapers could survive.

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
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## PERSPECTIVES IN GEOGRAPHY

Vol. 2



# GEOGRAPHY OF THE GHETTO

*Perceptions, Problems, and Alternatives*

HAROLD M. ROSE, *Volume Editor*

Professor and Chairman of the Department of Urban Affairs  
at the University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee

This volume is a milestone in research on the geography of the ghetto. It contains the largest single number of papers on the spatial aspects of the ghetto to appear anywhere under a common cover; all of the articles appear in print for the first time.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE GHETTO considers specifically the ethnic ghettos and especially the Black ghetto—presently one of the most crucial and vexing problems of urban society. Geography has lagged in addressing itself to the problem of social justice for the poor and minority residents of America's urban areas. Because of the unique spatial factors involved, the geographers represented in this volume can correct that failure and contribute solid

research to a new understanding of the current crisis.

The contributions in this volume are the result of a systematic study of urban phenomena, and deal with such topics as ghetto formation, patterns of Black mobility, housing quality, recreational opportunities, and similarities and differences between West African and Black American ghettos. Outstanding contributors are: David Harvey, Richard Morrill, Stephen Gale, David M. Katzman, Robert J. Colenutt, W. A. V. Clark, David R. Meyer, John Mercer, Shane Davies, Donald R. Deskins, Jr., Paul D. Marr, Curtis C. Roseman, Charles M. Christian, Henry W. Bullamore, Barfour Adjei-Barwuah, and Harold M. Rose.

x/273 pages LC 72-1388 CIP  
ISBN 0-87580-031-9

**\$15.00**

## PERSPECTIVES IN GEOGRAPHY

Vol. 1



# MODELS OF SPATIAL VARIATION



HAROLD McCONNELL  
General Editor

Edited by HAROLD McCONNELL and DAVID W. YASEEN

x/131 pages, illustrations, index, LC 75-149933 (1971)  
ISBN 0-87580-024-6

**\$12.50**



NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY PRESS  
DEKALB, ILLINOIS 60115

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Mr. Ames shows how other papers, including the *Telegraph* and the *Globe*, came and went, while the *Intelligencer*, despite financial crises, lived on. That it could oppose powerful Democratic forces and still continue publication was owing partly to its competent coverage of congressional speeches. The editors were stenographers. Moreover, political friends usually were able to secure for the *Intelligencer* at least some of the public printing. And to improve their finances the editors launched the *Register of Debates in Congress*, the *Annals of Congress*, and the *American State Papers*.

Although this book obviously required much labor and on its main theme is a useful contribution, its treatment of the general history of the times bears marks of insufficient reading and casual editing. The result is an account which is often confused and faulty, this being especially true of discussions of developments in political and constitutional history. In this connection one must note that Lincoln's opponent for the presidency in 1864 was George B., not "John," McClellan, and that W. H. Seward in 1866 was secretary of state, not a "former secretary of state" (pp. 336, 338).

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PAUL G. CLARK. *American Aid for Development*. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. Pp. 231. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$8.50.

This scholarly monograph will be required reading for years to come for anyone who is seriously concerned with the process, achievements, and problems of economic development in low-income states. Although it will be most useful for economists and other specialists, including officials who are engaged in the making and implementation of public policy, the general reader will also find this study to be a rich source of basic information and policy analysis. It is studded with citations of relevant primary and secondary source material, and it includes thirteen invaluable statistical tables. Some of the latter are reprints from familiar official sources, but

most of them are products of the author's painstaking research and analysis of development problems.

Following a description of the crisis in United States aid policy, the author moves in five successive chapters to discuss the "development setting of the 1970s," the nature of United States interests that are served by extensive support of international development, the assistance needs of low-income countries, the nature of United States and international programs, and, finally, an outline of a new United States development program. As will be indicated below, the innovations and reforms he advocates are imaginative and constructive.

One of the most controversial aspects of this study concerns Clark's method of establishing assistance needs of the world's developing states. To this end he utilizes a purely economic model that only specialists will fully understand. Tacitly eschewing consideration of political factors, which in the real world will probably continue to be determinative of most aid allocations, Clark establishes needs on the basis of "helping recipients realize degrees of acceleration of income per person that, realistically, they seem capable of achieving over the 1970s." In consequence, his estimates of needs of sixty specific countries, which he groups into five categories, "are based on statistical projections of key economic variables . . ." (p. 86). According to Clark, it is these needs that a revitalized aid program should serve, and it is on this basis that allocations of aid funds should be made. His projections point to the need for doubling "development assistance"—from all sources—by 1980. Presumably the United States should continue to provide about fifty percent of the total sum disbursed.

In addition to urging a vast expansion of development aid, the author addresses himself to most of the key issues concerning its organization and administration. Each proposal will probably elicit controversy, although an excellent case has been made for most of them. The following samples of his proposed basic principles will suggest some of the continuing issues:

1. "Development assistance should be provided entirely separately from security assistance. . . . The State Department . . . should assume responsibility for all security assistance programs. . . ." Political obstacles to achieving these laudable goals are many and require more analysis than was presented in this brief monograph.

2. An independent government corporation should replace AID (Agency for International Development) as this country's principal administrative agency for administering development (cf. security) aid. It should be much stronger than the corporation proposed by President Nixon, with extensive authority for independently devising and financing the American program. Clark appears to believe that at the beginning of each President's term Congress can be persuaded to provide a four-year authorization of funds, including "a schedule of future annual appropriations." This procedure is designed to counter the tendency of Congress to appropriate substantially less each year than it has authorized. The odds against such reform are ignored, and they will continue to be formidable as long as development assistance continues to be a useful instrument of American foreign policy.

3. Funds should be proposed and voted in terms of three geographic regions—Asia, Latin America, and Africa. In defense of this system, Clark unwarrantedly assumes a harmony of regional interests, and he somewhat naively seeks to effect a reduction of congressional and executive influence on allocations to specific regions and countries. Another alleged advantage of his regional approach is to reduce the State Department's ability to "give greater weight to short-run diplomatic considerations to Latin American aid programs than in other regions." In the author's opinion, the State Department has been a "significant obstacle for the Administrator of A.I.D. . . . [and] greater separation between development assistance and diplomacy would be an improvement" (pp. 195–96). Here, once again, is perhaps the most vulnerable feature of Clark's proposed reforms—the serious quest for a development assistance program that is not only separate from security assistance but that

is also essentially free of political influence. He simply ignores the national goals and their powerful supporters that dictate disproportionately larger aid allocations to "democratic" states like Israel and to independent "socialist" states such as Yugoslavia than will (or should?) be allocated to other needy states in their respective regions. In this reviewer's opinion, policymakers will continue successfully to insist that the overall external goals of the United States cannot be adequately served by devising development aid programs solely on the basis of allegedly "objective" economic criteria.

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PAUL H. DOUGLAS. *In the Fullness of Time: The Memoirs of Paul H. Douglas*. Pp. xiii, 642. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971. \$13.50.

To those numerous friends of Paul Douglas who mourned his defeat for a fourth term in the United States Senate, these memoirs should provide some compensation, for, according to the publishers, he was determined "not to write a stuffy, pussyfooting 'official' autobiography" and therefore waited until his retirement to complete the book. Certainly there is in it no stuffiness or pussyfooting, but a straightforward, frank, incisive, and fascinating account of the life and experiences, the successes and frustrations, of one born to a hard boyhood, who became through his own efforts a distinguished economist, a scholarly but not ivy-walled professor at the University of Chicago, a Chicago Alderman, and finally for eighteen years Senator of Illinois.

Paul Douglas has much to tell, and what he tells throughout the book reflects his early and continued interest in the common man and his "passionate convictions" about social and economic problems. He was always an activist—in the earlier, well-mannered sense—ready to fight for the causes in which he believed, even with some risk to his university career; and he won a

national reputation for his economically sound, if also passionate, actions in the battles against the Insull and other monopolistic interests in Illinois. His idealism did not, however, prevent him from being also a practical realist in the sense that he was willing to accept some progress and partial solutions rather than fight losing battles for the whole. As a Chicago Alderman and as Senator he proved his political independence, but at the same time worked within his party, learned to respect and won the respect of Mayors Kelly and Daley, National Committeeman Arvey, and other party leaders. ("It is a pleasure to record that the Cook County Democratic party under Jack Arvey and Dick Daley never asked me to endorse a man who did not conform to these [merit] standards. They were as anxious as I to keep our record clean.") He recognized that his lifelong convictions as a Quaker pacifist would not meet the threat of Hitler's Nazism, so he modified those convictions and became a combat Marine, winning medals, promotions, and serious wounds on the battlefield.

Special attention is given by Douglas to the legislative issues before Congress during his Senate service—civil rights, social security, housing, education, monetary and tax reform, and all the others. He explains his own participation in their consideration, the parliamentary and political problems involved, and the reasons for success or failure; but he does much more in that he provides the background and setting for each of these issues and an analysis that makes the intricate and, in some cases, highly technical problems quite understandable to the ordinary reader.

Among the most interesting chapters are, to this reviewer, those on the Senate, its traditions, power structure, and personalities; and those dealing with Douglas' several campaigns for the Senate. They add much to an understanding of how government operates, how Senators behave, what campaign techniques are developed and how successful, how much money is needed and how to get it. Paul Douglas suffered because of the seniority rule; he was against the filibuster but for full discussion of matters before the Senate, and both these matters are explained at length. Dur-

ing much of his Senate service the conservative coalition was actually dominant, in spite of the nominal Democratic majorities; this was made possible by the loose party system ("There were not two, but really three—or perhaps, more accurately, three and a half—parties in the Senate, and three and a quarter parties in the House") and by the failure of the party leadership to call party caucuses.

Paul Douglas was surely among our most outstanding Senators, but he had his problems. His personal relations with his colleagues were generally cordial, even with such Southern opponents as Harry Byrd and John Stennis, whom he learned to respect. His closest friends were probably Estes Kefauver, Albert Gore, and Hubert Humphrey. But he was never completely acceptable to the Establishment—"... we Democrats from the Northern states were at the bottom of the totem pole of prestige. Of all these, Douglas, Humphrey, and Lehman were at first the very lowest. It was suspected that we not only advocated liberal causes, but also actually believed in them. This was the unforgivable sin. In time, with Johnson's help, Humphrey crawled up the totem pole without sacrificing his principle on roll calls. Lehman and I never tried." Douglas had difficulties with President Truman and with Lyndon Johnson, whether as the Senate party Leader or as President, especially, in the latter case, over his report as Chairman of the Commission on Urban Problems. Douglas, on the other hand, warmly praised and supported both for their legislative programs; he agrees with those historians who rate Truman "while still living as one of our near-great Presidents," and strongly supported Johnson even on Vietnam, a matter on which his views have apparently undergone some change since his retirement. The book is a fascinating commentary on American government.

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LOUIS FISHER. *President and Congress: Power and Policy*. Pp. xvi, 347. New York: The Free Press, 1972. \$7.95.

Why another book on the President and Congress? Is there anything new that can be said on this much discussed subject? Mr. Fisher believes that there is. He thinks that most textbooks and scholarly works do not tell how government actually works and he conceives his book as a corrective of existing studies. By concentrating on certain critical areas he hopes to bring into bolder relief significant operating realities neglected or obscured by other writers.

The areas he has selected for critical analysis are: the principle of separated powers, legislative powers, delegation of power, spending powers, taxing powers, presidential war powers, Congress and war power. Except for his first chapter, which is exclusively historical, and his final one, which is wholly contemporary, his pattern in each chapter is an introductory or background historical section followed by contemporary material. Of 240 pages of text almost one half is historical. A useful appendix entitled "Historical and Philosophical Background on the Separation Doctrine" and a detailed annotated reference section, along with a table of cases, add substantially to the book's value.

Mr. Fisher has produced an interesting and informative book. The material he presents does indeed bear directly upon "the operating realities" he seeks. His book is not, however, a fully satisfactory treatment of the complex subject he has chosen to examine. The mixture of legislative history, judicial history and contemporary analysis, combined with the compression he seems to feel necessary, does not always make for the clarity he sets such store by.

There is some doubt, moreover, that he has really succeeded in doing what he set out to do. He takes pains to emphasize that his chief concern is "power and policy" rather than "process." Yet the focus of his book, both the historical part and the contemporary descriptive analysis, encompasses process as well as power. Most of the changes to which he calls attention are, in fact, changes in process rather than in power or policy.

One other point should be mentioned. In

view of his desire to describe how government actually works it is surprising that in his own account of the struggles between President and Congress he gives so little attention to the operation of the standing committees. Although he devotes some attention to committees in the Continental Congress and under the Articles of Confederation, his only detailed reference to present-day committee activity is a brief mention in his discussion of congressional oversight. Elsewhere, he makes passing reference to the influence of or action taken by specific committees, but at no time does he discuss the really crucial role committees play in our governmental process.

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DAVID FREEMAN HAWKE. *Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly*. Pp. x, 490. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971. \$15.00.

In this significant work the author has deliberately concentrated on the non-medical aspects of Benjamin Rush's life from 1746 to 1790. During these years Rush experienced much controversy and excitement. After studying at Princeton he finally chose medicine over law. Starting an apprenticeship in Philadelphia, he could "expect to make a good living . . . where disease, endemic and epidemic, flourished steadily the year round" (p. 25).

The passage of the Stamp Act, to which Rush reacted violently, stirred his interest in politics and set the pattern for his later life. In the Stamp Act he characteristically saw "only saints and villains." With strong encouragement from several doctors he decided to pursue advanced medical studies at world-renowned Edinburgh. There he enjoyed two highly stimulating years.

On his return Rush almost immediately developed a profitable practice which partially explains his frequent crusades and the consequent neglect of his practice for varying periods without serious financial repercussions. Most of his causes were highly laudable, but he displayed a disconcerting

tendency to abandon or reverse his efforts in mid-stream. After spearheading the drive to found Dickinson College, he suddenly dropped it. Later he directed his energies to establishment of a rival institution, Franklin College—later Franklin and Marshall. After fighting to destroy Pennsylvania's charter government, he violently opposed the revolutionary constitution when adopted. He seems basically unstable psychologically, but nowhere does one find any serious attempt to probe the underlying causes.

His service in the medical department of the Continental Army produced scathing denunciations including even Washington. Fortunately, he was a better physician than military expert for he greatly admired Generals Gates, Conway, Mifflin, and Lee!

Consistently he evinced concern for the unfortunates of society including slaves, prisoners, and insane. In 1773 he wrote a strong tract on "Slave-Keeping" in which he vigorously attacked the slave trade and slavery.

This is an admirable study based on meticulous research in the voluminous Rush papers in Philadelphia. Smoothly written and impressively documented, it convincingly proves that Rush was an important "Revolutionary Gadfly" who threw himself unstintingly into many causes. Yet, in eschewing the opportunity to evaluate him as a physician the author has left the reader frustrated. The book ends very abruptly in 1790 with Rush's major contributions and influence as a physician still lying ahead. With this splendid study to whet our appetites we can only hope that Hawke soon will publish a second volume centered upon Rush's later medical career.

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ROY JENKINS. *Afternoon on the Potomac? A British View of America's Changing Position in the World*. Pp. 59. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. \$3.95.

Three perceptive lectures, ranging in content from 1917 to 1971, for the Henry L.

Stimson series at Yale, comprise this concise, urbane book. In Parliament since 1948, Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1967 to 1970, Jenkins' stand in favor of Britain's entry into the Common Market led to his resignation from the number 2 role in Harold Wilson's shadow cabinet in 1971. *The Guardian* describes this author of biographies of Attlee, Dilke, and Asquith as "the most readable writer among contemporary politicians."

With friendly understanding, he describes America's waning economic, political, and military power, but "the contribution still to be made by the United States is immense." He fervently hopes that a role less dominant than in the past generation will not be equated with rejection of our world role. He does not underestimate the domestic problems, but he wishes—argues—that "the solution to them will go with a generous, outward-looking, community approach" (p. 55).

Jenkins feels the continued existence of NATO will "be necessary for a considerable time to come," even though the balance will change for such reasons as the accession of Britain and other candidate members to the European Economic Community (p. 56). He says the United States is entitled to demand to be released as the pivot of the whole world monetary system. Only a world reserve unit, growing out of special drawing rights—and he hopes freed of any connection with gold—will suffice. The dollar would have the right to fluctuate against this international standard. Then, he adds, "and if [the United States] wishes to effect a change in its parity this must be done by a devaluation rather than by expecting everyone else to do a series of revaluations" (p. 49).

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ROBERT MANSON MYERS, ed. *The Children of Pride: A True Story of Georgia and the Civil War*. Pp. xxv, 1,845. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. \$19.95.

The whirlwind of the Civil War made shambles of the world of the South's plantation aristocracy. What the war meant in the personal lives of members of one plantation family, that of the Rev. Dr. Charles Colcock Jones of Liberty County, Georgia, is revealed in detail in this massive collection of 1,200 private letters. Arranged to form a continuous narrative of the years 1854 through 1868, these letters provide an unfiltered view of plantation life from the perspective of the "big house."

The story begins in the prosperous and vibrant years before Fort Sumter, when the Jones clan seemed hardly touched by external events but responded to the everyday imperatives of crops, weather, disease, slaves, salvation, and family. The Joneses are revealed as a people of intelligence and culture, of piety, rectitude, and gentleness, "good masters" for the times, dedicated to their plantations, church, and community. The war slashed through their lives, destroying some, remodeling others. Four years of struggle left their world "a heap of ruins and ashes" (p. 1273). The "dark, dissolving, disquieting wave of emancipation" had broken over the South, confronting the planter class with the "emancipation trials" (p. 1292). Survival demanded that each plantation adapt quickly to free Negro labor, but this particular family was unable to make the adjustment. After three years of struggle, Mary Jones, widowed, exhausted, and disgusted, concluded that "Negroes and Negro labor are so entirely unreliable that a sum certain is far better than a speculative interest in labor" (p. 1403). She sold the plantation, the family scattered from New Orleans to New York City, and, as one member of the family remembered, "all that we were seemed to be passing away" (p. 1282).

True to life, these letters reveal the Southern plantation in all its tedium, drama, and pathos. Because the participants are allowed to tell their own tales, the mundane and humdrum are juxtaposed with the dramatic and significant. But while the chatter of the Joneses is sometimes tiresome, it does clearly indicate the patterns and rhythms of their lives and express the basic assumptions and values

which guided them through these revolutionary years. And therein lies the primary value of this collection. Handsomely prepared by Yale University Press, superbly edited by Robert Manson Myers, *Children of Pride* is as complete and continuous as any set of plantation letters yet published and is altogether an impressive and valuable accomplishment.

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MICHAEL NOVAK. *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics: The New Political Force of the Seventies*. Pp. xxii, 321. New York: Macmillan, 1972. \$7.95.

JACK NEWFIELD and JEFF GREENFIELD. *A Populist Manifesto: The Making of a New Majority*. Pp. xi, 221. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$5.95.

These two studies have a few things in common. Both try to determine what is wrong with America in the "age of protest," and both draw up a program for reform. The second study which we shall call, for convenience, "The Field Report," because "field" is part of the name of both authors, is more clearly political and suggests reforms similar to those advanced by Scammon-Wattenberg in *The Real Majority* (1970) which is subtitled *The New Populism*. But neither Field nor Novak accept the S-W method of analysis—mostly mathematical-behavioral, like the earlier studies of the Lazarsfeld-Campbell-Converse school of analysts of voting patterns. The Field Report entails a program that is to the left of the Centrists. Novak's program, outside of certain revolutionary proposals, is about the same. But the "Field" reliance is on economic groups and Novak is depending on a revival of ethnic diversities and cooperation.

There is much duplication and some inconsistencies in Novak's work, but he persuasively presents the case against "the melting pot" concept of American homogeneous social integration, celebrated in Emma Lazarus' famous inscription on the Statue of Liberty. His reasons are not

those of Fairchild ("The Melting Pot Mistake") and his motives are directly contradictory to those which inspired the advocates of immigration limitation in the late nineteenth century and in the commission reports made and laws passed from 1911 to 1965.

What Novak demands is that we recognize the inutility of the myth of cultural homogeneity. The "WASPS," have persistently retained and augmented their power, and until vigorously challenged in the past decade, had imposed on all Americans a homogeneous American way of life. His prime example of the "New Americans" who were oppressed, but not crushed, is the *PIGS*. Unavoidably, he relates also the experiences of certain other militant minorities.

Now, who are the WASPS? This term is popularly translated as *White Anglo Saxon Protestants*. Students of the behavior of religious groups show that priority is given to Episcopalians and Presbyterians and even "non-Protestants," such as Unitarians and Quakers. Other writers, historians and critics of the power-structure in America, refer to the Old Americans as "the people from the Northeast." There is no question that American primary and secondary education, and the whole process of defining the American way has been dominated by spokesmen for New England and the Middle Atlantic states. I think Novak passes by too readily the phenomenon of Scandinavian and German Progressive Revolt in the Midwest. Still, it is true that, aside from their agrarian political preferences, the Northern European-Americans did easily accept the WASP models for political, economic, and social strivings.

The emphasis in Novak's work is on the *PIGS*, which he defines as Poles, Italians, Greeks, and Slavs. At one place (p. 46) he adds Armenians, Lebanese—Nader is his favorite—Slovenes, Ruthenians, Croats, Serbs, Czechs (Bohemians and Moravians), Slovaks, Lithuanians, Estonians, Russians, Spanish, and Portugese. These are mostly Eastern and Southern Europeans and they are mostly Slavic Catholic. Novak is of Slovak descent, and most of his comments

on their values are drawn from personal experience. The Iberians and Italians are Catholic—but not as zealous in their religious behavior as the Irish. The non-Catholics he refers to find no place in his comments. Nor do the Russians. Whole chapters are given over to the analysis of the experience of Jews and Italians. Since the way in which they have adapted themselves, or failed to adapt, to the American Nordic way is well known, we can accept what Novak says about their persistence as identifiable ethnic minorities as reasons for defending their efforts to preserve their identity. And the same goes for the Irish Catholics who had to wait until 1960 to see one of their own elected President.

But Novak sincerely believes that his reform proposals should be acceptable to the blacks and other minorities, and that through collaboration, they can reorganize America in an honest and effective manner. What he wants is a new cultural pluralism drawn from many sources. Although the values and life styles that he defends are those he is familiar with in Slavic communities, he sees no reason why the values of any minority group should not be tolerated and even accepted, provided the values and activities are not violent or injurious to the welfare of others. With regard to his "white ethnics," he lists six seals of Americanization which have to be broken: (1) they don't want to be considered inferior as they were in the 1911 Dillingham Report or in the debates on immigration restriction bills; (2) since they have faith in a beneficent world, they don't accept the aggressive optimism and Social Darwinism of the elite; (3) they don't like the American dream of *mastery* which made heroes of cowboys and brigands; (4) they prefer the family unit to the myth of self-help; (5) they don't like to equate American with the Kingdom of God—the instinctive Catholic view is to reject the worship of success; (6) like all Catholics, the Slavs tend not to trust individual conscience—we need to devise social and legal means of control. (See A. J. Heidenheimer, ed. *Political Corruption*, 1970; and scores of treatises on the *Issues of Modern Time*.)



The author's views on why we should protect white ethnic living styles and values can be stated as the following:

1. They look upon the family as a close-knit social unit, bound together by love and respect. Statistics on the family are hard to come by—but it is obvious that the modern family is weakened by divorce, dissolution and indiscipline.

2. Novak's *PIGS* look on the neighborhood, or commune, as an extended family. Planners tell us neighborhoods are threatened with extinction, Blacks dislike segregation for reasons other than that a definable ethnic group lives in a commune.

3. Novak opposes excessive urbanization and maldistribution of the population. Like Franklin D. Roosevelt, L. Mumford, and Victor Gruen, Novak would like to see a balanced population pattern. So would many Americans—but we seem not to know how and when to start on the project.

4. Novak and his friends would like to promote a just redistribution of rewards—partly by taxes and partly by equalizing wages. And he would like everyone who is capable, to accomplish some skill and practice in the crafts. (In case this sounds communistic, one could point out that this was an American ideal in the time of Jackson.)

5. Noting that 40 percent of the world's irreplaceable resources are consumed by Americans, and that we are responsible for one half of the world's pollution, Novak would like some restraint on productivity.

In conclusion, this study is not liberal, leftist or radical, but realistic and rational. It might help us understand political support for Wallace in Michigan and Indiana, where the Alabama Governor spoke directly to those who were being ignored by other candidates. Many Americans, even WASPS, will agree that the time has come to accept cultural pluralism and to stop trying to enforce a rigid conformity, to Anglo-Saxon standards, by the citizens of one of the most heterogeneous states in the world.

Both "Field" and Novak reject the Scammon-Waltenberg thesis of the new

majority. Field also rejects Charles Reich, with *Consciousness III* that emerges without human intervention, and Kevin Phillips' *The Emerging Republican Majority*. Based on American political dissent history, which they trace back 200 years to Jefferson, and on to Jackson, Weaver, Bryan, La Follette, Norris, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Truman, with the emphasis on Weaver's and Bryan's programs of the 1890s, they define it as an ideology having as its goal "a more equitable distribution of wealth and power," and the elimination of "the entire arrangement of privileges, exemptions and free rides that has narrowed the opportunity of most Americans to control their own destiny."

Unlike Novak, "Field" does not single out "the white ethnics" for special attention. He champions the cause of "the working classes, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation." He does not attack the WASPS, but it is the same Anglo-Early American elite which is blamed for troubles: concentrated economic power; the control over money by the banking and insurance combines; the exorbitant powers and profits of the "natural monopolies"—that is, the telephone, telegraph, television, electric, gas, and related public utilities. They condemn the exploitation of the common man, accomplished by corporate controls over private and quasi-public employment, by means of an unfair tax structure, which allows some corporations and wealthy individuals to go scot-free.

One chapter in the Field study poses the failure of the regulatory agencies. Another gives detailed data on how "agri-businesses" are driving the small owners out of the farms. Another is critical of television—but Field suggests a complete reform along the lines of the French TV. A short condensed chapter on crime touches on every aspect of this problem, from causes to police, guns, courts, prisons, and narcotics. The analyses of the health and medical problems, and the role of labor unions, have style and content much like that one finds in the pertinent comments in liberal, even radical, journals. The chapters on foreign policy and reform of the political process could

have been written by McGovern. Field's final proposal for a *New Majority* is more modest than Novak's—for the good doctor would hope to get us started on a complete social demographic, economic, and political revolution. It is true to the Populist tradition (see Normal Pollack, *The Populist Response*, 1962), but it is geared to our times; it is a detailed program—more specific than Nader's or Gardner's, but faithful to their values. The Democrats in 1972 seem to have embarked on a Field Populist program. But Novak, whose spiritual progenitors were Masaryk, Mill, Montesquieu, Myrdal, and John Dewey, will have to wait longer to witness the realization of his dreams.

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LEONARD SILK. *Nixonomics: How the Dismal Science of Free Enterprise Became the Black Art of Controls*. Pp. ix, 212. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$6.95.

BRUCE MAZLISH. *In Search of Nixon: A Psychohistorical Inquiry*. Pp. v, 187. New York: Basic Books, 1972. \$6.95.

In this 47th presidential quadrennium, two mostly unfavorable treatments of Nixon and Nixon's economic policy received widespread attention in the nation's Sunday book review supplements and were prominently displayed on the bookstands. It was a contest of sorts, the two books versus Mr. Nixon.

Leonard Silk, venerable *New York Times* financial columnist, is urbane and amusing as he treads the serpentine economic road traveled over the past four years by the Nixon Administration. First, observes the author, the Administration tried Friedmanism, a sophisticated attempt to cure the motley ills of the American economy (were they inherited from the preceding administration?) by means of monetarism—pegging the increase in the money supply to the output of real goods and services while holding down inflation. This essentially conservative game plan brought cuts in Federal expenditures, notably on de-

fense, and was wed to a philosophy of laissez-faire toward price and wage decisions taken by industry and labor.

But by the end of 1970, the President's hopes for avoiding a recession had been shattered, observes Silk, as a slowdown occurred in economic growth while unemployment continued to climb. Came the switch in signals: the adoption in the summer of 1971 of the New Economic Policy, which is not to be confused with Lenin's tactical retreat of the same name fifty years previous. The Nixonian New Economic Policy, itself a liberal retreat, was ushered in under the tutelage at the Treasury of Texas Democrat John B. Connally. Again, Silk points out, "the American economy refused to follow [Mr. Nixon's] script." Phased "freezes" of prices, wages, dividends, and rents combined with boosts in total spending through tax cuts and higher government outlays—modified Keynesianism—were not working, according to the author, whose deadline for the book was the end of 1971.

Since publication of *Nixonomics*, the author's rather pessimistic prognoses have had to yield to the many actual signs of an improved American economy by mid-1972. By then, prices had risen only moderately during the year and the Administration's inflation-control program was working quite successfully. And while the rate of unemployment showed little improvement, the rate of increase in total civilian employment was up markedly. Moreover, real output of goods and services showed an impressive upturn at rarefied trillion-dollar heights, and the U.S. trade deficit showed signs of improving itself as the economies of overseas American customers like Japan and Western Europe appeared to be recovering from their own recessions.

What Mr. Silk wryly calls in his final paragraph "the most comprehensive economics in the history of the world," a bundle of "contradictions," was in fact working, and Mr. Nixon was winning his race with Mr. Silk.

Bruce Mazlish was apparently eager to outdo Polonius in coining any manner of esoteric terms, with or without hypens.

Polonius' tragical-historical, historical-pastoral, and pastoral-comical become Mazlish's "psychohistorical . . . psychodynamics . . . psychohistorian . . . etc." (Hyphenation without hyphens and hyperbole without sense.) 'Tis a consummation devoutly to be wish'd to defeat Nixon with alleged evidence of presidential mental disability. Professor Mazlish's psychoanalytic method incorporates remote control, without recourse to a single personal interview or even a casual acquaintanceship with his analysand. On the basis presumably of male—as opposed to woman's—intuition, Mazlish concludes that Nixon is hopelessly flawed psychically; the author drives home his points by charging his paragraphs with such psychoacademic or academeobehavioralistic B.T.U.'s as "orality . . . anality . . . guilt feelings . . . overdetermination . . . fear of passivity and softness . . . authoritarian personality . . . psychic reality . . . castration anxiety . . . etc., etc.," in a Quixotic attempt to outdo Freud himself in the latter's *ex post* psychoanalysis of Leonardo Da Vinci.

True, the author inserts numerous qualifiers in his text—"it would seem that . . . perhaps . . . may have . . . quite possibly . . . some evidence that . . . etc.," but this only adds to the general shakiness of the book's foundations. Indeed, his data are so questionable that if they were included in a Ph.D. dissertation even in the Ph.D.-bullish early 1960s, any self-respecting panel of dissertation examiners would have rejected them. This book is, in fact, a work of almost incredible, if not world-historical, *chutzpah*.

It is discouraging to find that the vulgar "tricky-Dicky" epithet has been exchanged in the hands of Mazlish for a "sicky-Dicky" portrait. Given the author's good credentials, one would have expected better of him.

In any case, whatever the outcome of the election on November 7th, Nixon can chalk up two easy victories along the way—over these two books.

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GADDIS SMITH. *Dean Acheson: The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*. Vol. 16. Pp. 473. New York: Cooper Square, 1972. \$11.50.

There have been rumors along the scholarly grapevine to the effect that Dean Acheson did not like Gaddis Smith's study of his years as Secretary of State, a study based in large part on unpublished materials supplied by Acheson, and thus publication was delayed until after Acheson's death. If true, one would have to conclude that the mustachioed Dean of Midletown was over-sensitive. Smith's book, written in full awareness of the present debate between revisionists and traditionalists, gives as reasoned and balanced a defense of the Acheson-Truman foreign policies as we are likely to have in the near future. It is a more convincing book than Acheson's own *Present at the Creation*.

Unlike some scholars who emphasize economic motivation, Smith views Acheson and his colleagues as more "driven by the ghost of Hitler" (p. 423) than by any desire to make the world safe for capitalism. The key ingredient in all major policy decisions—Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin Blockade, NATO, Korea, Indo-China—was the firm resolve not to repeat the mistakes of the 1930s. Appeasement gave way to "negotiation from strength," isolationism was replaced by military alliances, military weakness turned into a defense budget of \$45 billion. If Acheson sometimes glossed over inconsistencies in the Western position, it was because he saw the Soviet threat as comparable to that of Nazi Germany. It was better to over-react and be firm than to under-react and be destroyed. Smith recognizes that all of Acheson's assumptions have not stood the test of time, that Stalin was not following a Hitlerian blueprint, and that some Russian moves can be explained as defensive reactions to American policies. Nonetheless, Smith correctly points out that Acheson articulated widely held views and that the most formidable critics of American diplomacy were on the Right, not the Left. George Kennan, for all his perspicacity, "was the only ranking Ameri-

can diplomat to dissent from Acheson's view of the world" (p. 419).

Smith is most critical of Acheson's Far Eastern policies, where he too readily abandoned—after Korea—the correct view that Peking's Communists were independent of Moscow. And, in a superb chapter, Smith makes good use of the *Pentagon Papers* in showing how the Truman Administration was beguiled into supporting the French in Indo-China through fear of Communist domination and the even greater desire to win French support for German rearmament in Europe. Acheson, far more than his much-maligned successor, John Foster Dulles, found it expedient to support European colonialism.

The book is well written and carefully edited. This reviewer caught one instance where the printer put two lines out of order (pp. 330–31). One hopes that the editors of this series, Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel Flagg Bemis, are contemplating further volumes on Dean Rusk and William Rogers.

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R. HARRIS SMITH. *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*. Pp. xii, 458. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$10.95.

This is an admirable and informative work, skillfully pieced together from all available printed sources in addition to 73 personal interviews with former members of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), plus telephone conversations with 103 others. It is written with fair-mindedness and moderation, and is equipped with all the necessary apparatus of footnotes, lists of names, and an extensive index. It is a secret history in the sense that it describes operations the official documentation of which is still classified, but it is not written from secret classified sources. Although the author was briefly a member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), resigning in 1968, his former employers made

it clear that classified OSS archives would not be made available to him. (Thus he did not use, and probably is unaware of the existence of, an administrative history of the agency, ordered by General Donovan on July 25, 1944, of which Conyers Read of the University of Pennsylvania was appointed Chief, and of which large fragments were completed by the time the project was discontinued in September 1945.) It is indeed remarkable how comprehensive and detailed and knowledgeable this book is, in spite of its not having had the benefit of access to classified sources.

This volume is a much more systematic and analytical history of OSS than any of its predecessors. It avoids the hysterical, gee-whizzy approach which has often characterized previous accounts of General Donovan and the agency. It threads its way with remarkable skill through all the clashes of personalities and all the conflicts among competing branches of our own government, among our allies, governments-in-exile, and among political factions in maquis and underground groups, and judges each situation without *parti pris*. The author's standpoint is constantly that of being in the field, which of course makes his book all the more absorbing. But he does so at the cost of not emphasizing quite enough the organizational and constitutional history of the Washington side of the agency and of how it shifted from a brain-child of the White House created by Executive Order on July 11, 1941 to being fitted into the Joint Chiefs of Staff's chain of command on June 13, 1942.

The author speaks of this book as being a political history of the agency; it is this and more, for he describes how the OSS figured in, and was related to, the whole diplomatic and military history of the war. After a preliminary chapter on the origins of the agency, the operations of OSS are described in each theater of the war, in successive chapters dealing with North Africa, Italy, Yugoslavia, France and Germany, China ("The Chinese Puzzle," an especially good chapter), Thailand and Indochina. In addition, very particular attention is given to Allen Dulles' exploits in Berne from 1942 to 1945. The conclud-

ing chapter is an account as well as a critique of the influence of OSS upon the development of the CIA.

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EDWARD H. SPICER and RAYMOND H. THOMPSON, eds. *Plural Society in the Southwest*. Pp. viii, 367. New York: Interbrook, 1972. \$5.95.

On August 24-28, 1970, the Weatherhead Foundation sponsored a conference on "Plural Societies in the Southwest" which was held at Patagonia, Arizona. This volume is not only essentially a chronicle of that conference, but also evidence of its success. In revised and expanded form, this volume has successfully recorded for a wider audience the vitality and scholarship of the conference, and, in a meaningful way, it has captured the cultural significance of the least known and understood of America's major regions—the Southwest.

As is true with similar volumes containing essays by numerous scholars with dissimilar backgrounds and approaches, clear-cut themes are hard to find. All start from essentially the same point: the Southwest is unique in America because people from three cultures—Indian, Spanish and Anglo-American—have at different times controlled the region and continue to live there in more or less identifiable worlds. From that point onward, the contributors take their individual approaches as they attempt to survey important aspects of cultural differences through the eyes and vernacular of scholars as dissimilar as the cultural groups they are discussing. The result is eight significant and provocative articles by a political scientist, a poet and lecturer, a philosopher, a sociologist, an oceanic historian, an assistant coordinator of Indian programs, an anthropologist, and an ex-Bureau of Indian Affairs bureaucrat. Together they attempt, with a good deal of success, to investigate four fairly identifi-

able aspects of Southwestern cultural diversity: the past and current presence of Indians in the area; the importance of the cultural contact of Spaniards and Anglos; the impact of almost continuous migration into the area from both north and south; and the cultural variation that the different groups have given to the Southwest. Despite the general nature of most of the essays, *Plural Society in the Southwest* is not a volume for the casual reader or one who is unfamiliar with the region. Though most of the essays are written in a readable and clear style, a more than passing familiarity with the history of the Southwest is essential if the reader is to enjoy and understand the uniqueness of its cultural diversity.

It is always easy to find topics that should have been included but, for some reason or other, were not. This volume is somewhat unique in that the editors correctly identify those topics for us. And they offer no esoteric excuses for a reviewer to weigh. Editors Spicer and Thompson freely admit that technological, economic, and political considerations are missing and somewhat detract from the otherwise fairly broad view of the cultural arena. Of course, though admission is admirable and good for the scholarly soul, one is still left with the query of why these omissions were permitted when they knew better all along. It is hard to accept their subjective dismissal of economists by suggesting that "clarity about the nature of the relationships among elements of cultures is so often lacking in the approach of economists" (p. 13). Maybe so, in many instances, but we all tend to magnify our own disciplines and biases; that is no reason to ignore important cultural implications of economic and political problems and approaches.

However, despite an unnecessarily narrow base upon which to study Southwestern plural societies, this volume is scholarly, readable, and thought-provoking. It would have been enhanced by better and more numerous maps, a bibliographical essay evaluating the paucity of materials available on the general topic rather than a simple listing of available titles, and pic-

tures to illustrate conditions and places mentioned in the essays. But these are only minor irritants to the reader. More important, this handsome volume is full of pertinent and useful information that adds a new dimension to our understanding of the heritage of a region of breath-taking beauty and cultural diversity. Hopefully, it is also a region of bright promise whose future depends, in no small part, on finding a way of allowing diversity to enrich and not destroy obvious potential.

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WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, JR. *Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919*. Pp. v, 305. New York: Atheneum, 1970. \$8.95.

*Race Riot* is a history of past riots, with emphasis on those of 1919 and touching upon those of the 1960s, with thoughts and ideas of the differences and similarities among all of them.

It is interesting to learn that persons living around 1919 remember little about the race riots of their time or the imagery from memory was poor indeed. Those not yet born at that time seem not to have learned of them. For both these groups the readings should be a revelation. For those who have an involvement in racial problems the book should be of great interest and value.

The book then has a very useful and interesting purpose historically and prospectively, especially in relating to events in the beginning and during the riots. These events, if handled in a different manner racially or politically, could have reduced the severity of the riots or prevented them entirely. For instance, the killing of a black boy by a white, followed quickly by the killing of a white boy by a black sparked the bloody riots of 1919. Revenge was the word. Exaggerated reports of the incidents of beatings and murders brought retaliation upon retaliation and continual occurrences of personal and property damage. Lessons learned should not be wasted.

The involvement of police and politicians

is a lesson in itself. Although this involvement has changed in character it is still a problem. There are many lessons to be learned and it should be considered invaluable in understanding the problems generally in these later years.

A lot of things regarding racial riots have changed since 1919—such as the riots of that date being mostly attacks on persons and those of later years being attacks on property, the attitude of the police, and the policies of the politicians. All these things make a great difference over periods of time. A reading of *Race Riot* should help us to understand them and increase our ability to break the trend of racial riots.

Professor Tuttle's book is the kind one likes to read. It is easy to read and interesting from cover to cover. The bibliography is both complete and extensive.

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## SOCIOLOGY

SIMON ABBOTT, ed. *The Prevention of Racial Discrimination in Britain*. Pp. xviii, 502. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1971. £5.00. \$16.00.

MICHAEL J. HILL and RUTH M. ISSACHAROFF. *Community Action and Race Relations: A Study of Community Relations Committees in Britain*. Pp. xvi, 317. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1971. £4.25. \$13.75.

These publications are part of a series of comparative national studies of multi-racial societies and effectiveness of measures against racial discrimination undertaken by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and the Institute of Race Relations.

Historically, Britain has been largely free from domestic racial prejudice. But within a single generation, race relations in Britain have become a problem serious enough to create social tensions and disruptions and consequently warrant government legisla-

tion for preserving social harmony. The volume edited by Abbott reviews the history of immigration of the various minority groups in British society; discusses the process of discrimination through examination of housing, education, employment, and opinions of minority group leaders; and reviews the prevention of discrimination through recent legislation and the work of statutory bodies, the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission and its councils, and also of other government and private measures.

Early immigrant groups, including the Irish and the Jews, were effectively assimilated in British society. Government policy then was one of immigration control combined with *laissez-faire* in economic and social matters. But recent post-war colored immigrants, mainly from the Indian sub-continent and the West Indies, have experienced difficulties in integration, as the volume indicates, because of problems of adjustment/adaptation to the new society and their highly visible darker complexions. The government's new policy is "a compound of migration control and integration," aiming "not at a flattening process of assimilation, but at equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance."

A major finding in this work is that society in Britain is in part discriminatory, and many of the anti-discriminatory measures of specific bodies are "of limited effectiveness." It is also emphasized that the race factor is closely related to the allocation of social, economic, and political resources of the society, and, therefore, "the complete elimination of racial discrimination in certain situations depends upon the major restructuring of society."

The book by Hill and Issacharoff studies and evaluates the work of eight out of eighty committees which have been established by the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, the Community Relations Commission, and other organizations to improve race relations in Britain. The authors reach pessimistic conclusions about the activities of these committees.

A general finding of Hill and Issacharoff is that the community relations movement in Britain has not been an effective force "because of the unwillingness of the government to back it effectively, either with sufficient funds, sufficient power, or with policies compatible with the doctrine of racial equality for which it is supposed to stand." The authors also indicate the need for agencies to press for the rights of Commonwealth immigrants and their dependents, and also to stimulate the mutual education of citizens of a multi-racial society.

Though these publications relate to race relations in Britain, the concern of the researchers has been "on a trans-national level, and with the elimination of racial discrimination as a United Nations goal of universal application." In fact, comparative references have been made to race and ethnic relations in other societies, including the United States and Canada. The problem in Britain, compared to that, for example, in the United States, is less serious and is more rectifiable by government and private efforts. Experiences of other countries in handling the race problem have provided some guidelines in the British situation. In these studies, common criteria have also been established for an effective comparative approach to problems and policies vis-à-vis race in various societies. This series of comparative studies should be useful for promoting a better understanding and solution of a worldwide problem.

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PAUL DIESING. *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences*. Pp. vii, 350. Chicago, Ill.: Aldine, 1971. \$11.75.

In evaluating someone else's work, one has to constantly keep in mind his own prejudices and learnings. This is true especially in the area of theory. We begin with certain implicit and explicit assumptions and theories of our own. Our own frame of reference determines what we look for and what we abstract. Consequently, a review can be little more than the point

of view of the reviewer. It is a matter of degree of degree of subjectivity—as Postman says in *Teaching as a Subversive Activity*. I find some solace in the fact, however, that there are mainly three levels in a review: one is descriptive of what the author has done, which is less subjective; how well he has done it is more subjective; and what he should have done is much more subjective. I shall dwell on the three levels and the reader should use the above model to evaluate my comments.

The general theme emerging in Diesing's book was a theory of theory. This was his own and according to my abstraction it can be captured in this manner: it is a holistic theory of theory embracing holism and formalism. This, then, becomes epistemological theory—post-holism if you will. In terms of hierarchy, it can be summed as follows: holism, formalism, models, types, abstract, empirical—not necessarily in this order.

In the beginning of the book this reviewer got the feeling that it would all be very low-level theory, quantitative that is, and concrete empirical theory. As I approached the third chapter I began to feel more excitement. It turned out to be more than I expected. Diesing has written what I consider an exciting book. He covers in depth empirical, abstract, and middle-range theories. I refer to them as primary and secondary theories. He seems to be very much involved in the whole range. For example, he treats many kinds of holism, many kinds of middle-range theory and empirical theory. He makes definitive distinctions and not to the boredom of the reader. There is excitement in his writing. However, while he subscribes to holism and refers to himself as a participant-observer type, he does not bring into the picture a large enough theory which he could use as a vehicle for placing the complexity into some kind of systematic arrangement. For example, the relationship between systems theory or cybernetic theory was never related to abstract and holistic theory in a manner which would show a proper relationship, superior subordinate if you will. Nor does he thematize the circular process

that may be involved in a formulated theoretical process; his holism falls down here. In other words, he does not utilize a theoretical frame to bring the thesis, theme and theories together. His theory would have to have a methodology as well as a general frame of reference in order to go beyond holism.

I never did get the feeling, except in word usage, that he regarded a particular theory as being subordinate to another—even the particular case theory. If this is true he needed a justification as propounded by Korzybski in relation to the theory of relativity when he referred to it as particular case within the theory of time binding, and Dr. Bois went even further by introducing the epistemological profile and refining the semantic transactor. These methodologies introduced three items: process theory; substantive theory; and a frame of reference with methodologies that would enable one to locate those theories, see them, and evaluate their worth within the existing framework.

The book, while excellent in content, should have revealed the frame of reference the author was using in describing various processes. This would have taken the reader to another level; allowed the reader to share the author's implicit assumption; revealed his frame of reference and methodology; and given the reader a glimpse at the author's epistemology, which is a transactive sharing—that is, at one level is the strategy and the comments and at a more basic level is the frame of reference or theory that gives rise to the strategy. The author refers to theory of theories but does not utilize the same in his approach.

However, in spite of this brief criticism, I like this book and I think it is a valuable contribution to the social science literature and can be expanded upon. Diesing has given us something which can serve many classroom, theoretical and pragmatic purposes. It is a sound reference, which offers not only a commentary, but a point of view. No one book that I know of in social science theory is as comprehensive, lucid, and easy to read as this. It is stimu-



lating and provides information and direction.

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STANLEY ESTERLY and GLENN ESTERLY.  
*Freedom from Dependence: Welfare Reform as a Solution to Poverty.* Pp. 178. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1971. \$6.00.

This short book argues the case for income maintenance plans, called Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI) by some, Negative Income Tax by others, Cash Assistance Grants (CAG) by still others, and Family Assistance Plan (FAP) by the Nixon Administration. Each of these schemes, by whatever name, is designed to put a new and more cheerful face on the governmental business of giving money to the poor.

The authors begin with a chapter entitled "The Obsolete Welfare System" and in their evaluation conclude that it cannot eliminate poverty nor can it be reformed. Along the way, a slap is taken at welfare for the non-needy which, according to the Esterlys, includes those who receive unemployment compensation as well as those who receive agricultural subsidies and various and sundry tax breaks.

Another chapter describes the new income maintenance proposals, with their presumed advantages. An attempt is made to define poverty. The attempted definition is unfortunate because it does not make clear that poverty is relative to the standard of living in the society as a whole. Consequently, income maintenance levels will certainly always be inadequate—as are Social Security payments—and will always be as much of a political football as are the amounts paid to welfare recipients. Welfare by any other name is still public money dispensed by politicians.

One of the better chapters examines the alternatives to income maintenance as devices for fighting poverty: education, training, jobs, and so forth. The fact is that most welfare recipients are either children, the aged, the mentally and physically dis-

abled or the unskilled mothers of children. In 1967, only 360,000 out of about 8,000,000 persons on welfare had some job skills or even the potentials to benefit from training.

The chapter dealing with the impact of income maintenance on the economy relies largely on the arguments of Leon Keyserling that we can afford this program, that it will not be inflationary, and that we can at the same time improve housing, education, and health services. Desirable as these goals are, the reader is given no help in evaluating their economic impact. The authors simply state that they will "... accept Keyserling's theory until someone provides evidence (and not dogma) to the contrary."

The final chapter is a history and partial evaluation of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan which the Senate is on the verge of totally rejecting in this election year. The Esterlys conclude that FAP is neither as good as its proponents claim nor as bad as its opponents insist. Little matter. We will apparently begin a new presidential term and congressional session with welfare reform as remote as ever.

Although this work adds volume to the now substantial literature advocating income maintenance, nothing new has been contributed. The journalistic style makes for easy reading and understanding of the argument but, unfortunately, the uninitiated reader will probably be led to believe, as many of us believed nearly a decade ago, that GAI is the grand answer to society's ills. No one really knows. The true test must come with the enactment of a plan, even a partial one such as FAP, to replace "the welfare mess." We hope, with the Esterlys, that it will occur soon.

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C. RAY JEFFERY. *Crime Prevention through Environmental Design.* Pp. 290. Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1971. \$10.00.

Jeffery has produced a very intriguing book for criminologists which attempts to indicate that a new approach to the pre-

vention of crime and delinquency is badly needed. The new approach must find ways to deal with crime before it occurs. It must develop direct controls over behavior.

The deterrence model of controlling crime has been a failure, including our present criminal justice system. The rehabilitation model, with emphasis on the treatment of the individual offender, has also been a failure in Jeffery's estimation. In place of deterrence and therapeutic efforts, our society needs environmental engineering, the input of systems analysis, decision theory, and the new forms of behavioral science research, in order to prevent the occurrence of crime.

Jeffery believes that it was the so-called positive school of criminology which got us on the wrong track, by focusing attention on the offender and his involvement in crime. He claims that the positive school set the stage for society to focus upon efforts to rehabilitate the offender. The attempts at rehabilitation of individual offenders have emphasized individual and group therapy, overcoming the impact of poverty on the individual, re-education, job training, and social welfare programs.

The study of the individual offender, according to Jeffery, really ignores the possibilities of changes in the environment. He claims that therapy has for the most part been unsuccessful in changing the individual. The attempts to overcome the various aspects of poverty have also been a failure, primarily because poverty is really not a cause of crime and delinquency. Likewise, Jeffery claims that there is no evidence to prove the effectiveness of programs to overcome lack of education and unemployment among ghetto youths and adults.

The environmental control of behavior is found to be displacing the "mentalistic clinical" approach which focuses on what the individual has done in the past. Behavior is future oriented. Criminologists must help society remove the environmental reinforcement which maintains criminal behavior. Hence, science and technology must devise methods to prevent crime before it occurs. Urban planning can be designed for security and safety, that is, for prevention. In addition, society needs

new "nonlegal" controls over professional crime, organized crime, and white-collar crime. Public policy in crime prevention must more and more be based on systems analysis and on decision-making analysis.

The major shortcoming, in Jeffery's projection is that he does not suggest the ways in which science and technology, urban planning, systems analysis, decision analysis can prevent criminal and delinquent behavior. He merely states that these measures can do so. It would have been helpful also if he could have listed the shortcomings of the outstanding attempts at prevention of delinquency—there have really been none in the field of adult crime—for example, the Chicago Area Project, the New York City Youth Board, Mobilization for Youth, and several recent projects.

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GEORGE R. LA NOUE, ed. *Educational Vouchers: Concepts and Controversies*. Pp. v, 176. New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1972. \$8.50. Paperbound, \$3.50.

George R. La Noue has edited a welcome collection of articles and excerpts from other works which provide a much needed source book on educational vouchers. Though apparently only an economic device for distributing tax monies to consumers of education so that they might send their children to schools of their choice, the social and political questions raised by voucher plans are quite complex and frequently fraught with controversy. Questions about racial integration, parochial school aid, equal educational opportunity, free schools, equitable tax policy, and so forth, are interwoven throughout voucher plan discussions. Voucher plans are not simple fiscal tools. La Noue's collection treats these complex questions from a variety of perspectives, and it also provides a clear and somewhat detailed description of actual voucher plans.

It is unfortunate that the topic appears to be a specialized and highly esoteric con-

cern of educational planners. It is not. One would hope for a wide range of readers. Religious leaders, politicians, lawyers, judges, economists, philosophers, are among the contributors to this book. There are many public concerns at stake as well as many strong, vested, private interests. Public confusion or disinterest in voucher plans could be easily exploited, and the consequences for the public weal would indeed be traumatic.

A breathtaking example of ideological speculation about balancing the private and public ledgers in education is present in a selection from Milton Friedman's work. Though this economist agrees that the public gains from universal education "... are sufficiently important to justify some government subsidy," he asserts that, "... imposing costs on the parents would tend to equalize the social and private costs of having children and so promote a better distribution of families by size." A modest proposal, indeed, which bears logic similar to that in Swift's proposal to encourage a taste for cooked infant in order to solve simultaneously the problems of Irish famine and overpopulation.

Let us hope that La Noue's book contributes to widespread public discussion of the issues surrounding voucher plans. They are terribly serious issues.

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FRANK LEVY. *Northern Schools and Civil Rights: The Racial Imbalance Act of Massachusetts*. Pp. vii, 190. Chicago, Ill.: Markham, 1971. No price.

SEYMOUR SACKS, DAVID RANNEY, and RALPH ANDREW. *City Schools/Suburban Schools: A History of Fiscal Conflict*. Pp. v, 201. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1972. \$9.95.

While the title of Mr. Levy's book is misleading, the subtitle *The Racial Imbalance Act of Massachusetts* more appropriately pinpoints the author's volume which is a comprehensive and lucid description of Massachusetts' attempt to eliminate de

facto segregation in the Boston public schools. This book should be a must for the secondary school social studies required reading list. It is bound to motivate serious students to become more active in municipal reform. The book is a natural for all civil rights students. There is little in Levy's analysis to commend the residents in Horace Mann's commonwealth whose public schools were once the pride and joy of Massachusetts and the nation. The low level of Boston's schools in the book stands out in unbelievable contrast to New England's high motivation for a quality education. Generations of neglect and apathy have resulted in not only general neglect in Boston's schools but in discrimination against the poverty children in "Old Boston." In every comparison such as dilapidation of school buildings, overcrowded classes, inexperienced teachers, lack of sufficient texts, transference of teachers to the more affluent areas, and expenditures of funds, the poverty areas came out very poorly. In this case poverty areas corresponded with black residential neighborhoods.

Educators and others interested in racial discrimination will be interested in the author's comments upon the peer group effect and busing to secure desegregation:

Most integration plans rely on busing, educational parks, or similar programs where integration takes place almost exclusively during classroom hours. If one believes in a peer group model where values are transmitted primarily during after-school activities with playmates, none of these programs offers much promise in raising achievement levels. . . . a peer group effect may exist, but its existence has not yet been proven. This uncertainty may yet be resolved soon, as new data is expected within the near future.

As the word "busing" is used today, it has two meanings. One connotes voluntary, which usually means busing of Negro children into predominately white schools. The other refers to forced busing, which usually means busing of white children into formerly de facto segregated schools. The Boston experience suggests that both inner city and suburban white parents are able to distinguish the two; they accept the first but oppose the second. . . . If integration in de facto segre-

gated school systems is to have a chance, this distinction must be reemphasized.

Levy also comments that city and suburban school boards should be encouraged to provide voluntary busing for Negro students to transport them to vacant seats in predominately white schools. The author concludes "Even if all opportunities for voluntary integration are put to use, the Boston experience suggests that integration will only proceed at a moderate pace . . . are the results worth the effort? . . . If the choice were really between moderate integration and well-funded imaginative compensatory programs or well-funded community controlled schools, there would be serious grounds for debate."

This book should appeal to the general reader of non-fiction books and to those who want to understand current affairs more comprehensively than one is presented via the mass media. It is readable and interestingly written. It has a useful index and bibliography and it is very perfunctory documented.

Students of municipal government, school administration, and political science specializing in United States government will find *City Schools/Suburban Schools* very useful. The authors present a strong case for federal intervention in the fiscal affairs of big cities. Each chapter has an excellent summary which will give the schoolman and others interested in big city finance a quick review of the book. It has many charts, tables, and documentary notes with a large bibliography and a useful index.

In the conclusion the authors summarize in part:

Large city school finances deserve much more careful study from a state and national perspective than they have been previously been accorded. This would be true apart from the very pressing educational and fiscal problems now confronting the vast majority of large cities. New analytical breakthroughs are necessary if we are to deal with the complex set of inter-governmental relationships which now characterize school finances. . . . The objectives of this study have been twofold. First, the analysis has been designed to document and explain the disparities which exist

between large cities and their past standing. The analysis has been specifically designed to view large city school finances from a national perspective, taking account of the underlying state, metropolitan, and noneducational considerations which jointly determine their behaviour. Second, the variables and the analysis have been aimed toward making large city school finance policy relevant from a national perspective.

The task has been momentous and more demanding than can be reported within the 200 pages. Those who are familiar with the financial provision of several states or even one state will often have reservations about the conclusions as the authors struggle to give a national perspective; this does not detract from the usefulness of the book.

The volume is provocative. The title is misleading as the suburban schools are given only brief references from time to time. In fact, at times we are led to believe that suburban school districts as a rule are wealthy and get more state aid than the cities, when here in the East poor districts with low income and low school expenditures are also in suburbia. The use of per capita indexes too can be misleading when the number of parochial pupils in the large cities far exceeds the percentage in the districts surrounding the large cities. Educational administrators and school board members will find the discussion on teacher-parent participation on page 122 very significant. The chapter "Independence for the Schools?" gives the authors a chance of dragging out the old favorite of the purist political scientists, should education be a department of city government? Certainly no one could seriously propose that the school functions in small and medium school districts be transferred to the municipal authorities. One wonders where is there a large city which is exemplary in its current operations? In a day when city government is giving up functions to the state and to private semi-public authorities it seems absurd to give them one of the nation's most important governmental activities. Apart from fraud and mismanagement, cities find it difficult to undertake a single large capital expenditure.

Even though the United States Supreme Court may support the lower courts in outlawing the school board's right to tax local real estate and hence require new approaches to financing of schools, this book is worth being on the shelves of the professional libraries. In fact, it might be more in demand, for the breakthrough the authors were looking for might come in the new state plan for distribution of state funds. Hopefully the local needs in state plans will not be limited to the number of pupils enrolled. This volume gives support to more imaginative and far-reaching plans which are tuned into local needs with adequate provision for renewal, development, and societal changes.

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RICHARD NEUHAUS. *In Defense of People: Ecology and the Seduction of Radicalism*. Pp. 315. New York: Macmillan, 1971. \$6.95.

This book is addressed explicitly to those who are active in the movement for radical social change, and its purpose is to sound a warning about the relationship of the relatively recent organized concern with ecology to that movement. For Neuhaus the present interest in ecology and the enhancement of the natural environment, especially among young people, represents a seduction away from more pressing and more genuine social issues, especially the plight of the poor both at home and abroad. It is dangerous because of its appearance of innocence: What could be more wholesome than a wish to end the waste and destruction of the landscape?

This innocence is a mask, Neuhaus claims, behind which lurks the reactionary social ideology of the anti-population crusaders and the conservationists who have united their causes with that of ecology. Some of the leading spokesmen of the former group are quite explicit about the repressive political measures which they propose as the only solution for the popu-

lation disaster; and the latter, according to Neuhaus, have long been identified with a conservative political outlook and supported by upper-class social strata. Add to this the keen enthusiasm for ecological matters shown by the great American corporations, and one has a very poor candidate for consideration as a force for the radical transformation of the existing society.

The thesis outlined above is presented and argued from various angles in this book. Parts of it are well documented and closely reasoned, especially the long sections on the so-called population problem which are the best parts of Neuhaus's case. The writing is generally quite good, marred only occasionally by rhetorical flourishes. There is an excellent opening chapter which nicely sets the tone for what follows. The book ends with a practical proposal for a "covenant with the poor" which correctly attempts to ground political issues in a moral perspective.

The book's message would have been all the more forceful had the author organized his material more tightly around its central theme and eliminated the frequent digressions and extraneous remarks which interrupt the flow of the argument. Its length could easily have been reduced considerably as a result, and the main points would have been clearer. Moreover, these basic contentions—such as the "structural conservatism of the ecology movement"—need to be supported much more soundly. Finally, Neuhaus fails to follow up on one crucial notion—namely, the suggestion of "internal contradictions" in this movement which might result in a fundamental transformation of its social function.

At the very least, everyone interested in radical social change will have to ponder two of Neuhaus's principal challenges: (1) that the ideology of "living in harmony with nature" has reactionary, even proto-fascist, overtones; (2) that ecological concern under corporate capitalism is a "closed-circle process in which those who commit the crime also assess the damages, also prescribe the cure, and also evaluate the effectiveness of the cure." There is much truth in both of them, and Neuhaus

has performed a valuable service in opening these issues for debate.

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JOAN RUBIN and BJORN H. JERNUDD, eds.  
*Can Language Be Planned? Sociolinguistic Theory and Practice for Developing Nations*. Pp. ix, 343. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1971. \$12.00.

The Preface identifies the purposes of this book as manifold:

... to demonstrate the need for a multidisciplinary approach to language planning, to awaken the interest of all the social sciences to the role of language in modernization, to interest social scientists in the theoretical gain to be had from the study of language planning, to help widen the field of sociolinguistics by interesting linguists in people's attempts to influence their own speech and to encourage participant language planners to scrutinize the processes that occur as they proceed to make and carry out language decisions. It is also meant to serve as a stimulus to research in language planning.

The several parts of the book are titled: "The Motivation and Rationalization for Language Policy"; "Case Studies of Language Planning"; "A General Approach to Language Planning"; "Research Strategies and a View toward the Future." The contents present the revised versions of papers presented at a 1970 meeting of scholars representing the disciplines of anthropology, linguistics, sociolinguistics, political science, sociology, economics, economic planning, and social psychology.

The strengths of this work lie in its uniqueness, the excellence of some of the papers, and its potential usefulness. The book is a first as an overall consideration of the potentialities and limitations of language planning. Fishman's article, which compares the impact of nationalism on language planning in early twentieth-century Europe with the same phenomenon in contemporary South and Southeast Asia,

puts the subject into perspective. The case studies provide a substantial empirical description of the social reality of language planning, its successes and failures. They include the movement for the restoration of Irish; spelling reform in Israel; planning and policy in the Philippines; language policy in East Africa; language reform in Turkey; planning processes in the development of Indonesian-Malay; the development of Bengali since the establishment of Pakistan. Rubin's article on evaluation is particularly insightful, comprehensive, and lucid. Einar Haugen provides a strong reminder that language is more than an instrument, and that planning must take this into account. The latter part of the book deals with such mundane, but essential in planning, subjects as cost-benefit analysis, and presents a research outline for comparative studies.

The social scientist who is neither a linguist nor a language planner will find the inadequacy of the editorial context of these papers exasperating. Very little framework for the papers is presented, either by way of introduction, coordination, or interpretive comment. The introduction, which attempts this function, is marred by verbosity and obscure writing. Since the stated objectives of the work include several which are directed to social scientists in general, this limitation is self-defeating. Nevertheless, the book is important because of the matter with which it deals. "The recurrence, salience, and significance of language problems in developing societies press for overt techniques of solution and create a demand for a theory of action that would offer ways of finding and evaluating alternative solutions to given problems" (p. xiii). An earlier work, Joshua Fishman et al., *Language Problems of Developing Nations*, 1968, is recommended to those wishing to be better informed concerning the basic issue. Its reading would also make the present report on language planning more meaningful.

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BERNARD SCHOENBERG, ARTHUR C. CARR, DAVID PERETZ, and AUSTIN H. KUTSCHER, eds. *Psychosocial Aspects of Terminal Care*. Pp. v, 388. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972. \$12.50.

This book grew out of a symposium organized by the Foundation of Thanatology and the Columbia University Departments of Psychiatry and Nursing. It presents the proceedings of the conference and contains twenty-seven papers or chapters and thirteen shorter statements. The shorter statements are either summaries or opening statements of the various workshops which were held. These papers and statements, including a foreword, are authored by forty-eight persons from such disciplines as dentistry (1), hematology (1), medicine (8), nursing (4), oncology (1), pediatrics (2), pharmacology (2), psychiatry (12), psychology (6), radiology (2), religion (1), social work (3), sociology (2), and surgery (3). The authors came from various places in the United States and from as far away as Australia, Hawaii, and England.

The authors deal with the deficiencies in the psychosocial training of health personnel who are going to be in contact with the terminally ill and their families, and they make a plea that a new approach is needed. They point out that one of the problems of modern society is that death is considered unnatural, that the medical profession itself is often in conflict over its role in treating the terminally ill. The following illustrates what the authors want to avoid. After a series of tests a patient has to call his doctor after not having had a report from him. The doctor asked whether his nurse had not called and being told that the patient had heard from no one, said, "Oh, I see. Well the tests reveal that you will be dead in from four to six weeks." Often when physicians cannot cure they have feelings of guilt and anxiety, and can scarcely cope with their own fears of dying.

The authors deal with the differences between the needs of young patients who face death and older ones. They discuss the problems of the family which loses a

young child and the very different problems of the family which has an elderly person going through a prolonged period of a terminal illness. There is a discussion of the psychosocial needs of the young and the very different psychosocial needs of the elderly.

There are chapters that discuss ethical issues such as euthanasia, organ transplantation, and the questions which are raised when persons are kept alive by all kinds of mechanical means even after no evidence of humanness and personality is left; they are biologically alive but humanly dead.

Although this book is addressed in general to those who teach medical students, nurses, social workers, and others who are likely to have contact with terminally ill patients or their families, it has much in it for readers who are interested in ways of ameliorating the often callous treatment of the dying patient and the bereaved family. The volume should contribute greatly to the growing information about the problems of the dying. As the numbers of aged persons increase and society and institutions become more secular, there is a new awareness of the many psychosocial problems which beset the terminally ill and their families. It is illustrative of the newness of the changes taking place that a great majority of the citations used in this book are from works published after 1960.

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RONALD H. STONE. *Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians*. Pp. 272. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1972. \$8.00.

Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), after serving as pastor of an Evangelical church in Detroit from 1915 to 1928, was called to Union Theological Seminary, where he was a professor of Applied Christianity from 1930 until his retirement in 1960. In the remaining years of his life, though handicapped by ill health, he held part-time positions at Union, Harvard, and Barnard College. He should not be confused with his

equally distinguished brother, H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962) who taught theology and Christian ethics at Yale University Divinity School.

Reinhold Niebuhr was a prolific writer, author of a number of books, founder and editor of at least three different journals, including *The Christian Century*, and contributor to several others, among them *The Nation*. His theology and social philosophy were so complex, and were modified so much during his career, that it is impossible to sum up his chief contributions in this brief review. He was prominent for his vigorous writings on social reform and international affairs, his relatively radical views in social ethics and theology, and his persistent effort to express social ethics in terms of the Christian tradition, which he regarded, however, as something to be understood symbolically and mythologically, rather than as literal history. The author thinks, apparently with some justification, that Niebuhr was considerably influenced by the pragmatism of William James.

This book is a fairly successful compression of Niebuhr's voluminous writings; anyone who could not find time to examine these writings in detail might find a useful substitute here. It badly needs a somewhat fuller yet condensed biography; the information contained in footnote 109 on page 263 ought to have been added to chapter 1. There is also need for a rather full bibliography of Niebuhr's books and other principal writings, with dates, and, in the same context, accounts of his editorial connection with several journals. The index is only fairly good.

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HARMON ZEIGLER and KARL F. JOHNSON.  
*The Politics of Education in the States*.  
Pp. 246. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972. \$8.00.

This volume, one of a series dealing with public policy formulation, is intended to indicate why certain policies are selected

rather than a concern for what these policies should be.

Two questions are presented by the authors. "How are educational resources allocated in the fifty American States? and How do state legislators approach the budgeting and financing of education?" The approach to finding the answers to these questions is a search for a general theory of educational policy about resource allocation. The method involves a general systems framework, and concentrates on systems models, including an economic model and a legislative model. The route for the reader is through attitudinal indices which the authors state they created for the study: an educational issues index, an education lobbyist index, and a legislative process scale. The economic model is tested with comparisons to political and social indicators; the legislative model concentrates on structural and demographic variables, with an analysis about such matters as party affiliation, leadership, party competition, the extent of urbanization of a legislative district, and legislator-lobbyist relationships.

The title of the book does not suggest the approach to the problem nor the content. It does not specifically touch on public higher education. The "politics" of education is analyzed and presented with an array of tables and correlations. Illustrative is the treatment about public school expenditures. The authors state that factors of family income, state and local taxes, and age are "all positively associated with this variable for both the zero order correlation and the standardized regression coefficients." This suggests the general flavor of the book and gives the reader of this review a notion of what he might expect.

The authors assert their thesis that educational policy outcomes are determined by the interplay of a host of variables. The conclusions reached do not appear to be either new or startling. The chief contribution is the approach to the study of resource allocation for education.

The book is not for the general reader and presumably will interest mainly those who comprehend an analysis of public policy formulation through the use of cer-



tain hypotheses and the generous application of models and approaches taken by those who are devoted to various methodological techniques.

There is a bibliography covering a wide range of interests about the legislative search for educational policy although some very useful works on the legislative process are not included. The index is well suited to any selective use of the volume.

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GERALD H. ZUK. *Family Therapy: A Triadic-Based Approach*. Pp. vii, 239. New York: Behavioral, 1971. \$12.95.

There is a consistent trend in this book on family therapy regarding the role of therapist, and therefore the nature of therapy, which can perhaps best be stated by quoting the author: "The concept of therapeutic power will mean the capacity of the therapist to define the therapist-patient relationship and to initiate actions to increase control of the relationship in ways he believes to be in the best interest of the patient." Implied in this quote is the belief that a sick person needs a knowing healer who will act upon him.

Let us juxtapose this with a current trend in thought proposing that reality can never be fully defined—that we know that we will never absolutely know. Living with this thought, one needs to become more humble as we realize our inability to adequately define a human being, control his relationships or know his best interest. Implied, in relation to therapy, is the belief that the troubled person needs another human being with technical—or "how to"—knowledge to struggle with him.

The two trends clearly have their effect on how family therapy will be conducted.

Much of the tenor of Gerald Zuk's book reflects the fact that we have not yet laid aside a tradition which implies the ability for a person to be outside a system, diagnose its pathological components absolutely enough and determine someone's best interest for them. This kind of

thought is inherent in the tradition which grows out of the doctor-patient or illness model. Many therapists use this model in their work. As long as we hold on to it we get trapped in the extreme importance given to the doctor in this doctor-patient relationship, and both we and the consumer of our services pay the price.

In our culture when people are conceived of as ill in a physical sense, they are in need of a healer—a doctor or therapist—who will act upon them while they remain in an essentially passive position. Patients checked into hospitals for operative procedures often feel as though they are reduced to the status of bodies being acted upon with no will of their own and little explanation. Although there is a recognized need for change in the medical system itself, those psychological services which follow that model visit the same ills upon the people who use their services.

The wise teacher knows that education is an internal process which must be supported, but basically is determined by the student. The student must be an active participant for the process to have its desired effect. A "teacher-student" or "consultant-consultee" model are increasingly accepted as viable alternatives to the patient-doctor model of earlier therapeutic concepts. Those who are experimenting with this approach place the therapist as a student along with those coming for help. The therapist has knowledge specifically in how to seek some answers; he does not have these answers in hand. It is the process which allows growth in a person who wants to change that can be imparted, and no more than that.

Those who have moved toward such approaches have recently been interested in the "systems and network" approaches to human interaction. Zuk himself is interested in the contributions these fields have to offer. And he contributes to our understanding of the dynamics occurring in family therapy when he describes the "triadic" or triangular relationships, which clearly put the therapist in the system in which family members or outside agencies take different sides.

There is also some provocatively interest-

ing material in his studies of silence and laughter, again the author studies this behavior as it serves a function for people who are communicating with one another. Laughter and silence, even as they become extreme, serve not only an intrapersonal but also an interpersonal function, as they are used in a family trying to communicate about issues such as anxiety and control.

For those involved in the currently developing systems approach to family therapy, this is certainly a provocative and interesting book to read.

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### ECONOMICS

JACK BARBASH, with the assistance of KATE BARBASH. *Trade Unions and National Economic Policy*. Pp. xiv, 206. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972. \$8.50.

In the authors' words, "this study delineates the policies, institutions, and environments which made trade union involvement in national economic policy—or union responsibility—feasible or unfeasible in varying degrees in Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France" (p. 1). A chapter is assigned to each of these countries in this order. The ordering of countries in this way has been prompted by their standings on the scale of integration which depends "on the extent to which the trade union shares a core of common values with other elements in society and on the availability of mechanisms through which these common values can be converted into mutually acceptable policies and programs" (p. 2). By this criterion, Sweden is considered the "ideal type," while France is seen to be suffering from "polarization." After the country chapters, efforts are made to derive some sort of theory of "integrated unionism" in chapter 8. The last chapter (chap. 9) of the book is devoted to the implications for the United States.

The country chapters are lucid and informative. Major policy areas are identified—such as labor market adjustment, unemployment and redundancy, training and education, wages and incomes, economic planning, and so forth—and the degrees of trade union involvement in the formulation and implementation of policy measures are searchingly described. Perhaps because of the authors' interest in building a kind of "economic policy model" of unionism, they tend to idealize ideologies, rules, and mechanisms that have produced a particular kind and degree of trade union integration into national economic policy-making in each country. It therefore appears that the authors have consciously emphasized the integrative aspects and discounted or neglected evidence suggesting forces of disintegration or disruption.

Conceptual difficulties arise from the relationship of integration to the scope and effectiveness of institutionalized trade union involvement in national economic policy. *Integration* is defined as sharing common values, while *involvement* only refers to the mode or strategy of trade union activity in relation to national economic policy. The two concepts are not identical. Involvement is observable, but integration is subject to conjecture. Values are hard to define, and common values are even harder to identify. Although the authors claim that French unions are less integrated than Swedish unions, it is hard to imagine that French unions share the common values of France less intensively than Swedish unions share those of Sweden. German unions have a low level of involvement in national economic policy, but this is not because they do not share the common values of Germany but because the common values they share do not emphasize national economic policy.

One also feels that the authors have been a little too much impressed with the formal availability in Europe of institutional arrangements for trade union involvement in national economic policy. How effective these arrangements are with respect to implementation of policy measures is another matter. The authors' own excellent work in chapter 4 showing that the concept

of national wages policy in the Netherlands has lost all its virtues suggests that it is difficult to rate the Netherlands third among six countries in terms of integration of trade unions into national economic policy. Wildcat strikes in Sweden in recent years suggest that the ideal type is indeed too ideal to be real. The authors are not unaware of these factors that tarnish their model (pp. 175-177), and one reads with mixed feelings the authors' own disappointment about their model. "The events of 1969 and 1970, while they do not yet constitute a decisive trend, may be interpreted as a sign of obsolescence of the economic policy model, at least of its fuller development" (p. 177).

Nevertheless, underlying the whole book, and especially so in the last chapter entitled "Implications for the United States," is the authors' value judgment that trade unions' involvement in national economic policy is good and desirable in itself and perhaps inevitable in the course of modern capitalism's evolution. Fundamentally, however, it is up to workers and unions in each country to determine to what extent they should be involved at the national policy level and what kind of action they should press for. It is still premature to suggest that more and more involvement in national economic policy is already built into the logic of trade union behavior or strategy. Despite reservations about these fine points, this reviewer is actually impressed with the elegance of the book and the hypothesis of integration that supports it. The book will be a rewarding reading to anyone who has been puzzled by diverse developments in the European and American labor movement.

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PHILIP H. BURCH, JR. *The Managerial Revolution Reassessed: Family Control in America's Large Corporations*. Pp. xi, 196. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972. \$12.50.

This monograph is a critique of the statistical base for the 1932 Berle and Means

thesis that the separation of ownership from control in large American corporations diminishes, if it does not eventually destroy, family control, and replaces it with bureaucratic, professional management. The author maintains that Berle and Means used faulty statistics; that their proposition was not true in 1932, nor is it true today.

Subsequent analysts, particularly Lerner and Sheehan, have repeated these errors, and prestigious generalists have transformed an erroneous generalization into an American myth—a self-evident truth beyond need of proof. Though it is late in the day, Professor Burch thinks it important to correct the statistical errors of Berle and Means. Having done this, he then tempts fate by presenting his own statistical analysis.

Using as a base 450 largest corporations—300 industrial, 50 merchandise, 50 transport, and 50 commercial banking—he finds that 42.3 percent are family controlled, 16.7 percent "possibly" so controlled—a potential total of 59 percent—and only 41 percent management controlled. He concedes that had he included the 50 largest public utilities and the 50 largest insurance companies, the family controlled percentage would have been reduced to 37-39. Further, he concedes that had certain service and financial institutions been included he "is not sure what the final overall family control would be."

With respect to the 300 largest industrial corporations, he concludes that about 45 percent are family controlled. If the base were expanded to the 500 largest, then about 50 percent would be family controlled. These, he says, are conservative figures and the most reliable that can be assembled from available data.

These estimates are reasonably close to those of Berle and Means in 1932 and the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) in 1942, but nearly twice those of Lerner and Sheehan in 1966 and 1967. In view of the revolutionary changes in the corporate and financial systems during the last forty years—most of them inimical to family control—Burch's conclusions are not tenable. Close reading of the text indicates he himself has serious misgivings on this score.

The problem is not defective statistics, but rather the irrelevance of statistics. Corporate control, being intangible, is not susceptible of quantification. No one understood this better than Berle; he regarded corporate power as an illegitimate form of sovereignty; he used statistics to illustrate the operation of his thesis—not to prove it. Subsequent discovery of imperfections in his statistics cannot invalidate the thesis itself.

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EDWARD HALLETT CARR and R. W. DAVIES.  
*Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929: A History of Soviet Russia.*  
Vol. 1, Part 2. Pp. 570. New York: Macmillan, 1972. \$12.50.

This volume is the second half of a 1,000 page treatment of the three-year period during which the Soviet Union abandoned the New Economic Policy and adopted the First Five Year Plan. It consists of chapters 17 to 38 and deals in great detail with the various sectors of the economy such as the development of the labor force, the persistence of unemployment, female and juvenile labor, methods of attempting to increase labor productivity, wage and financial policies, budget practices and foreign trade.

Because of the overwhelming detail—that is nevertheless fragmentary with respect to certain topics—the treatment does not make for exciting reading, and it abounds with statistics and minutiae of varying degrees of interest. Yet it does deal with important developments and conveys the tension between work norms and wages, the loss of such independence as the trade unions enjoyed and the end of their criticism of managers, the destruction of specialists in industry, and the taxing of private traders out of existence. It faithfully recounts the endless controversies over prices—retail/wholesale and agricultural/industrial—the lack of currency stability, the introduction of food rationing with uncertain supplies and inevitable queues, problems of the state vodka mo-

nopoly, the adoption of state loan subscriptions with lotteries, and the inevitable rise in direct and indirect taxes to pay the costs of socialism.

The introduction of economic planning in the Soviet Union meant tension between the planners and the financial officials who were concerned with revenues. In the end the banking system ceased to operate on a commercial basis, and the Commissariat of Finance was subordinated to planning agencies that did not function on the basis of financial orthodoxy. The replacement of the market by planning agencies and the origins of the idea of the Five Year Plan are discussed in terms of a detailed and tedious examination of the various drafts. The volume concludes with a discussion of some of the major projects such as the Turk-Sib Railway and the Ukrainian Dnieper River Dam.

The authors are to be commended for having made effective use of the Trotsky Papers. If this volume and part one suffer from a shortcoming, it is that of excessive fragmentation resulting from a highly analytical and topical treatment of closely related subjects and events. Thus, at times the narrative suffers from an excessive division of the subject matter. Yet it is probably as definitive a work as can be written on the basis of available sources, and its value is not limited to economic historians.

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LESLIE A. CLARKSON. *The Pre-Industrial Economy in England, 1500-1750.* Pp. 268. New York: Schocken Books, 1972. \$10.00.

Every generation has to rewrite its textbooks as new information becomes available and new perspectives emerge. Earlier historians have written of Tudor, Stuart, and early Georgian England in institutional terms and have been primarily concerned with the following: leases and enclosures, joint-stock and regulated companies, sixteenth-century planned economy and Parliamentary Colbertism, religion, and the

rise of capitalism. But now, as Dr. Clarkson demonstrates, interest has shifted and so he presents an account of England in this early modern period as a market economy.

Comparison with the contemporary world clearly suggests that England at this time was not an underdeveloped economy, but was quite simply an economy in which the process of industrialization, with which we are now familiar, had not taken place. After two opening chapters which deal with the structure of the economy between 1500 and 1750 and the environment of change—geography and resources, population, prices, the political and social framework and attitudes toward economic development—Dr. Clarkson discusses agriculture, industry, commerce and communications, and the role of government in turn, and concludes with a discussion on wealth and poverty in pre-industrial England. His continuing theme is that the growth of wealth occurred only slowly and intermittently between 1500 and 1750. Poverty, he believes, was the pervading condition in pre-industrial England because of the low level of technology, the unskilled nature of the workforce, and, above all, the lack of market opportunities so that private producers had little incentive to increase output. And the growth of wealth even when it took place was continually disrupted by bad weather, epidemics, and wars. Only when population growth slowed down after 1650 did per capita incomes begin to rise faster in this Malthusian world. At the same time, the slow improvement of agricultural techniques increased food production and transport developments extended market areas. With falling food prices there came a rise in demand for non-agricultural goods. Thus, economic advance slowly began to take place.

Inevitably in the main, Dr. Clarkson's book is a distillation of other men's writings, but he usefully draws on his own specialist knowledge of the history of the leather industry while his table of occupational distribution in pre-industrial England—which brings together a mass of information from parish registers, freemen's rolls, muster rolls, taxation returns, and

probate material—makes clear the considerable differences in the regional distribution of industry. Finally, Dr. Clarkson provides a detailed bibliography which serves as an excellent guide to both the monograph and journal literature. As a first introduction to the economic history of England in the early modern period, this volume is now the best available.

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GEORGE D. GREEN. *Finance and Economic Development in the Old South: Louisiana Banking, 1804-1861*. Pp. xiii, 268. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1972. \$8.75.

Here is in some respects still another brand of "new economic history." Not econometric, not counterfactual, nor even strongly and conventionally quantitative, it uses a theoretical framework to analyze the contributions of Louisiana banking to Louisiana's economic performance prior to 1860.

For example, questions are raised concerning the adequacy of the "money supply, banking facilities, and finance" for "optimal . . . economic development." Measures of banking density and banking resources are invoked in the spirit of Gurley, Shaw, Goldsmith, and others. "Sources of financial fluctuations," are analyzed in terms of "modern theories of financial fluctuations," that is, "the 'central banking' school, the Friedman school, and the 'financial intermediary' school." Turning to "financial theories of economic fluctuations," the author examines the impact of money on Louisiana's economy to determine their relative explanatory power.

On the non-theoretical level are interesting findings: for example, the insistence of rural areas on branch banking to insure agricultural financing facilities; the factor as middleman between planter and banks, performing a risk-reducing function for the banker; insights into the usefulness of suspension of convertibility during periods of crisis; private efforts to give something

akin to deposit insurance for notes of weak banks; the hindering of growth by the innovative, high legal reserve requirement against notes and deposits which in 1842 brought "sound" banking.

On the other hand, there are gaps or thin spots in the institutional story, for example, on bank profits and interest rates. Only modest amounts of statistical data and analysis appear, with nine text and nine appendix tables.

This reviewer finds Professor Green's attempt to use a theoretical framework for financial history meritorious. One can then ask sensible questions about the role of banking in economic performance and use appropriate criteria for testing the answers. One is thus less likely to accept without challenge intuitive conclusions—such as that highly conservative banking is better for economic development than loose banking. Nonetheless, one can question the appropriateness of this approach for an individual state such as Louisiana. Its population in 1830 was 216,000 and in 1840, 352,000, roughly 2 percent of the corresponding United States population. Its inter-connections with the rest of the economy were presumably such as to cause the effects of disturbances originating locally to be swamped generally by forces originating elsewhere. Additionally, the fragmentary character of the data minimizes confidence in tests utilizing them. Perhaps Professor Green's chief contribution, therefore, is to assist in breaking new methodological paths for others to use in broader economic arenas.

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DONALD P. JACOBS. *Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure: An Empirical Estimate of Their Relations*. Occasional Paper 115, National Bureau of Economic Research. Pp. 103. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. \$5.00.

EDGAR R. FIEDLER, assisted by MAUDE R. PECH. *Measures of Credit Risk and*

*Experience*. National Bureau of Economic Research Series. Pp. 357. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. \$12.50.

These two volumes report results from two continuing research projects at the National Bureau of Economic Research. The short book by Professor Donald Jacobs of Northwestern University describes a large empirical analysis of commercial bank lending in which he attempts to measure the cost of loan market imperfections to short-term business borrowers. The second book principally consists of tables and graphs depicting economic time series of credit measures; it may prove useful as a data source, but makes no theoretical contribution toward analyzing financial crises.

Professor Jacobs starts off on the right foot when he argues persuasively, following the lead of Donald Hodgman, that the relation between a bank and its customers is complex and must be analyzed as a "package" and not on a transaction-by-transaction basis. In imperfect markets what counts is the total profits a bank earns from all its transactions with a business firm; it is not necessary to make a profit on each deal. To investigate banking market structures, Jacobs acquired data on some 8,000 individual loans made by 160 banks in 1967. With this rich resource he attempted to measure the extent of market imperfections by relating the loan rate of interest and the mean annual demand deposit balance of a borrower to various measures of the lending bank, its market setting, and the borrower's business with the bank. Characterizing the combined values of the loan rate of interest and a borrower's deposit balance as the "price" of a loan he concluded: "But the absolute price differences are not of a magnitude to significantly affect [*sic*] the allocation of resources" (p. 59).

Is he correct? Unfortunately, Professor Jacobs could not avoid stumbling over his own right foot. To acknowledge that all the relations between a customer and his bank should be considered simultaneously and then to reduce these relations to two variables is a remarkable bit of reasoning.

If there are other relations, shouldn't they formally enter the analysis? A bank is likely to favor a loan applicant who has profitably given it a pension fund, a payroll, or a lock box to administer. Parameter estimates will be biased if such arrangements exist and are ignored; apparent low interest rates probably have an explanation if only one looks a little harder.

His analysis is defective in another important respect as well. He uses the level of a borrower's demand balances to explain the rate of interest on a loan and the rate of interest on a loan to explain the borrower's demand balances. For econometricians, this procedure is unjustifiable since it introduces simultaneous equations bias into all estimates. In short, Jacobs' method and his estimates are inconsistent; his conclusions should not be accepted. This is particularly lamentable because he appears to have acquired large amounts of valuable data which deserve a thoughtful analysis.

The problem with the theoretical formulation of measuring credit risk in the Fiedler volume is that we are never told formally what shocks are to be avoided or absorbed. Another depression should certainly be avoided, and Dr. Fiedler is right to point out that too much safety may cost us as much as a large number of bankruptcies over a period of years. However, he doesn't satisfactorily analyze the important roles which bankruptcies and foreclosures play in an aggregative economic system, and there is no attempt to measure the collective absorbing capacity of a set of links in our financial network. Instead the vague notion of a "peril point" is suggested and it is suggested that researchers should construct a diffusion index of credit risk. The wall is not so easily breached, for severe aggregation problems beset analysis of the financial stability of the American economy. That is why the Federal Reserve was so concerned with the seemingly inconsequential bankruptcy of the Penn-Central railroad.

Fiedler's interpretative remarks on the whole are very sensible, although he is less than convincing when explaining why interest rate differentials are not good risk

measures. It is through the mechanisms of interest rates—and corresponding asset prices—that borrowers and lenders evaluate and aggregate risks in the financial network.

The book discusses the amazing total of 599 time series of credit risk measures. This total is successively distilled to 190 and then to 34 key measures. According to Dr. Fiedler, "In the absence of more inclusive measures, these thirty-four are perhaps the minimum that it is necessary to follow in order to maintain even a moderately close watch on the risk position of the nation's credit" (p. 28). This claim is surely exaggerated, but his identification of these series may prove quite helpful to business economists in coming years.

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MARION J. LEVY, JR. *Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors*. Pp. xi, 160. New York: Basic Books, 1972. \$5.95.

Among the recent books on modernization, this one is most unorthodox and daring. The author uses a functional approach to the problem, yet does not subscribe to evolutionism. He defines modernization as a function of the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power and traces the manifold complexity of socio-politico-economic changes caused by the rapid increase in this ratio during the last century or so. Contrary to those who believe in continual progress toward better life for humanity, Levy is sceptical as to viability of such rapid change in modernized societies and believes that the latecomers to modernization have a very poor chance to succeed.

According to Levy, modernization is a universal social solvent which subverts established beliefs in nonmodernized countries and leads to disintegration of the status quo without any assurance that a successful process of modernization can take place. The latecomers have some obvious advantages, such as being able to use the advanced technology and the know-how of modernized societies. Yet, the dis-

advantages of being late in the process of modernization are overwhelming. To be effective, the changes must be drastic and must be undertaken on a very large scale. The facilities needed for technological advance cannot be directly converted from available skills and materials. The economies of the latecomers must grow at a very high rate just to keep up with the advanced countries. The latecomers to modernization also face the problem of a radical transformation of their social organization to meet the requirements for increased coordination and control.

The author believes that the modern patterns taken for granted by technically advanced nations are bizarre and subversive when applied to nonmodernized societies. And since no large set of people has lived in the past for any extended period of time with such bizarre patterns of change, he even questions their viability. As modernization progresses at an ever accelerating pace, the education must prepare for an unknown future. Is there an upper limit to a human's ability to adjust to rapid social changes? Can people adjust to an increased depersonalization of social relations imposed by modernization? Can humans cope successfully with the proliferation of highly specialized organizations which will control their lives? Can the requirements of increased coordination and control lead to an unbearable degree of centralization of all human activities?

The author asks pertinent questions and admits that we know very little about many aspects of modernization processes crucial for survival of mankind.

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LEONARD R. MEREWITZ and STEPHEN SOSNICK. *The Budget's New Clothes: A Critique of Planning-Programming Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis*. Pp. 318. Chicago, Ill.: Markham, 1972. \$10.95. Paperbound, \$5.95.

IDA R. HOOS. *Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique*. Pp. 270. Berkeley,

Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$10.00.

In the early fall of 1965, President Johnson issued a memorandum instructing all federal agencies to begin plans for the eventual introduction of a new budget process called planning, programming, and budgeting (PPB). At its inception PPB was heralded as a long-needed tool for rationalizing our special-interest oriented, often misinformed process of public choosing. Following the Federal lead, many state and local governments—the notable examples are California and New York City—embraced PPB as their own. But just what is this mysterious savior and how does it work? Did it work? And most importantly, will PPB really give us a better system of public choice?

Two recent books, *The Budget's New Clothes: A Critique of Planning-Programming-Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis* by Leonard Merewitz and Stephen Sosnick and *Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique* by Ida Hoos, begin to search for the answers to these questions. The Merewitz and Sosnick book provides a good start for the novice. It is a generally competent and fair critical analysis of the internal logic of PPB. The key elements of the PPB approach are outlined and discussed in early chapters on program accounting, multi-year costing, program descriptions, and zero-based budgeting. Chapters 6–10 summarize the PPB methodology, benefit-cost analysis. The final two chapters, the most interesting in the book, look at the effects of PPB analysis on the California Water Project and the Supersonic Transport cases and offer guidelines for how PPB might best be used in such decisions. The Merewitz-Sosnick proposal calls for a judicious mixing of analysis and politics. PPB techniques are to provide the information for choice, through selective in-depth analysis and a network of alternative budgets—a “same-dollar amount” budget, a “same-performance amount” budget, and a “recommended-amount” budget. The process of choice remains unaltered, however. The budgets will still arise through internal administrative negotiations, be prodded, kneaded, or



ignored by a congressional committee, and finally emerge from Congress as part of an appropriation bill. The Merewitz-Sosnick proposal is a modest, harmless first step, and I think an improvement over the costly but largely ineffective 1965 mandate for universal reform. The initiate to the analytics of PPB will find the book's tense, dry style difficult and tedious. But if you have a knowledgeable and entertaining friend to serve as translator, I recommend chapters 5-11 as about as good an introduction to benefit-cost analysis as you will find.

Dr. Hoos' book is a more spirited search for the devils in the PPB bible. She is a disciple of another religion—lead by Charles Lindblom and Aaron Wildavsky—and she delivers the message with ear-pleasing prose. For Dr. Hoos PPB is at best an expensive but useless exercise, at worst, a source of deception and error. With its emphasis on rigid decision rules—"adopt all projects with a ratio of benefits to costs greater than one"—and quantitative analysis, PPB sacrifices flexibility and feeling in public choice. For the Hoos-Lindblom-Wildavsky sect, budgeting is and should be a fundamentally judgmental political process. PPB is viewed as a threat to this process and Dr. Hoos' mission is to expose this threat for the menace it really is. She does us all, Lindblom and Wildavsky included, a disservice. The book fails to extend the serious analysis of Lindblom and Wildavsky on the design of social choice processes, nor does it offer any real understanding as to why PPB seems to have had so little impact—even when accompanied by so much noise—on public decisions since its initiation. What it does do is give us stock critiques in very eloquent but readable language. I would be less concerned if the quality of her prose matched the quality of her analysis, or conversely. The case for or against PPB techniques in public decision-making is far from closed.

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ANDREAS G. PAPANDREOU. *Paternalistic Capitalism*. Pp. 190. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. \$7.50.

Papandreou—former Greek cabinet minister and presently a professor of economics at York University—has written a brief essay in the vein of the "new political economy." His thesis is that ours is not a market economy, although it has a market. Resources are allocated "*through* the market but not *by* the market" (p. 6). Combining some of the flavor of Gardiner Means' administered pricing concept and Galbraith's technocratic elite, he argues that private corporate managers use the market for purposes of private planning. The adjective "paternalistic" is used not to convey benevolence, but to indicate "the autocratic, big brotherish aspect of the process." The role of the state, he asserts, is to serve the dominant and ruling class. The state becomes "a cog in the process of private planning by the corporate establishment" (p. 91).

Familiar stuff, these days. Papandreou differentiates his own position from both the Marxists and the Galbraithians, attempting to develop his own theoretical variant under the label "paternalistic capitalism." The merits of his economic arguments, I cannot judge; but politically, he ends up as just another "new left" critic of the Establishment. This term he defines as comprised of a normal coalition of two sub-groups: the state elite, or elected officials, and "the spokesmen for structured, visible" interests, ranging from large corporations to professional associations and the church. Sometimes antagonistic to one another, these "enclaves of power" (p. 102) usually form coalitions—and these constitute the ruling Establishment.

Like all partial elitist interpretations, this one fails to grapple with the always bothersome empirical question: How do you differentiate the circumstances in which interests compete and check one another with those in which they combine synergistically at the expense of the residual category defined as "the mass?" Also avoided is the even more difficult question

that still plagues even the best efforts in political economy, so-called: Precisely what are the linkages between economic power and political power? Because it remains at the speculative level, Papandreou's little book advances the discussion of economic influences in governmental policy-making only slightly.

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GLENN PORTER and HAROLD C. LIVESAY.  
*Merchants and Manufacturers: Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth-Century Marketing.* Pp. ix, 257. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. \$11.50.

While many studies have concentrated upon the process of production, this work examines the marketing of manufactured products in the nineteenth century. This period offers an especially appropriate time to analyze the change in the distribution of manufactured goods, the role of the general merchant, and the shift to specialization in line with changes in manufacturing practices.

The authors do not attempt to trace the complete flow of the product through the marketing system. Rather, the book deals almost exclusively with wholesaling. The manufacturers of this time produced broadly similar products, "generic" goods regarded by middlemen and by the market as susceptible to similar merchandising techniques. As a result, a uniform distribution system prevailed throughout the entire economy.

However, during the nineteenth century, shifts in the make-up of market and of products in many industries led to fundamental changes in the way goods were distributed. This book, in the authors' words, "describes and analyzes the changes and the reasons behind them, and it delineates and explains the survival of the older marketing order in those segments of manufacturing sector which remained largely immune to change."

At the beginning of the nineteenth cen-

tury, all manufactured products were distributed through merchants, who dominated the economy. This was the pattern of many centuries and particularly the Western world and in the American colonies before the Revolution.

These conditions continued until late in the nineteenth century so specialized wholesalers constituted the dominant marketing mechanism for manufactured products since manufacturers generally did not find it economically feasible to create and maintain a company wholesale force. By selling his goods to an urban wholesaler, the manufacturer avoided all the difficulties and expenses of marketing them to a diffuse mass of customers. However, widespread changes in the marketing patterns for manufactured goods occurred in the late nineteenth century. The producers moved to replace merchants in wholesale distribution (1) as it became possible for them to market their own products at a lower unit cost than could the mercantile network; and (2) when independent wholesalers were either unable or unwilling to merchandise goods effectively.

Changes in the nature of markets and products brought about the need to modify the structure of marketing. The rise of large corporations and coming of oligopoly brought (1) concentrated markets; (2) closer relationships between producer and consumer; and (3) more technical products which led to more wholesaling by the manufacturer replacing the traditional wholesale merchant.

The authors give specific attention to the changes in marketing of iron, financing economic growth, the railway supply industry, and ascendancy of the manufacturer, and the continued relevance of the jobber in the tobacco industry.

The book contains an extensive bibliography and should be of special value to students of economic history who want to delve into nineteenth-century manufacturing and distribution.

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ROBERT C. WILLIAMS. *Culture in Exile: Russian Emigrés in Germany, 1881-1941*. Pp. xviii, 404. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. \$14.50.

Despite the sixty-year time span indicated in the subtitle, close to ninety percent of the book deals with the last twenty-seven of those sixty years—that is, the period of World War I and the years between the two world wars, up to the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. Nevertheless, the discussion of the earlier period, the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, is extremely valuable to the understanding of the overall subject. The antecedents trace the background and establish the historical basis for the mutual love-hate relationship between Russians and Germans. Without it, the later period, despite its more detailed treatment, would be difficult to understand. Throughout the book, the erudition of the author and his understanding of the many subtleties of the subject are bound to impress the reader.

The author calls attention to the two elements among the many Russian émigré groups in Germany that were destined by their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic heritage to bridge the gap between host country and émigrés. The first of these groups are the Russians of German origin: the Baltic nobility—that is, the descendants of the Teutonic knights and, to a lesser extent, the craftsmen and artisans called to Moscow by earlier czars, as well as the German peasants invited to the Volga and other regions. The second element is composed of the relatively numerous Russian Jews among the Russian émigrés of both the pre-World War I and the post-World War I periods. The latter group consisted of different political elements, distinct in each of the two sub-periods. The emphasis on the German Russians and on the Russian Jews among the overall émigré population as catalysts and bridge-builders constitutes an important contribution of this book.

Both the variety and the comprehensiveness of the source material used by the author are impressive. It includes memoir literature of Russian émigrés, correspond-

ence and other archival materials, and the results of interviews and correspondence with émigrés. The sources range widely geographically, including Soviet sources and publications as well as materials from German and other European origins. The care the author has taken in research and writing is also reflected in the bibliography, the biographical notes and glossary, the index, and a list of abbreviations of the archival collections used.

This reviewer hopes that the author will continue his analysis through the years 1941-1945. Particularly valuable would be a study of the amazing parallelism in German methods and objectives in both World Wars, including the attempted use of Russian émigré groups to conquer and hold parts of Russia.

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## PREFACE

It has become almost a cliché for military establishment watchers that the United States military establishment is the largest institution in the United States, if not in the entire world—and probably the most pervasive. The statistical and even the anecdotal evidence is beginning to sound repetitious.

But relatively little attention has been paid to the future of this enormous institution, as it emerges from the first war the United States has lost in 160 years, near the peak of its strength and at—or near—the nadir of its popularity. The question becomes acute for a number of reasons:

- As public sector funds become increasingly scarce, the military budget looks like the only part of the system with any give to it.

- As the end of the draft puts the military on a completely—and truly—voluntary recruitment basis, the availability of minimally skilled manpower, rather than the availability of dollars, may determine the size and shape of the military establishment.

- As the Nixon Doctrine begins to take on specific content under the pressures of a multipolar world, the military requirements to serve U.S. foreign policy may shift significantly.

- As the professional military begins to face up to the bleak prospects of a shrinking officer corps, heavy on rank and seniority, problems of morale brought on by the impossible role assigned them in Southeast Asia may be exacerbated instead of being ameliorated at the end of the war.

Whatever happens to the U.S. military establishment over the next five to ten years, it is not going to disappear. Even if the military budget were cut back as far as the most radical critics of the establishment have suggested—and well beyond the relatively mild proposals of George McGovern—it would still be very large, almost certainly larger than the expenditures for any other federal program. Without attributing to the military any improper or self-aggrandizing motives, one cannot avoid the conclusion that its presence will make a difference. It will still have to be recognized as a significant factor in the processes by which U.S. foreign policy is shaped, and it cannot help seeing itself as a factor in those processes. If this great hulking creature is allowed to go bumping about in American society, and in the world, the range of consequences runs from broken china to shattered civilizations. But if we can shape the future military establishment to the needs of a sensible foreign policy, neither paranoid nor grandiose, it may be able to internalize a sense of purpose that will keep energies under control. If we fail—or if we do not even try—then our military establishment will surely shape our society in ways that are not pleasant to imagine.

The essays that follow explore some of the consequences of the continuing presence among us, for better or worse, of a major military establishment, and some of the public policy options that are, as of this writing, still available to us in the continuing effort to make that establishment more of an effective servant and less of an unwitting master of U.S. foreign policy.

ADAM YARMOLINSKY

# After Containment: The Functions of the Military Establishment

By SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

**ABSTRACT:** After World War II, the United States reconstituted its military policy for the third time in its history. A strategy of deterrence was adopted as the military counterpart to a foreign policy of containment. This strategy involved military alliances, overseas deployments, larger and diversified military forces, higher levels of readiness, and development of programs for strategic retaliation, continental defense, European defense, and limited war. By 1972, the original basis for this strategy was disappearing: public support for military burdens had decreased; the Soviet Union had achieved military parity with the United States; Europe, Japan, China were independent centers of economic and political power; local hegemonic powers had emerged in the Third World. For the foreseeable future, only the Soviet Union is in a position to aspire to global preeminence and thus pose a significant threat to U.S. security. Hence the U.S. must aim to avoid: military inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, diplomatic isolation among the major powers, and exclusion by the Soviet Union from political or economic access to any major portion of the Third World. These goals require military forces to support diplomacy as well as to maintain deterrence. More specifically, they require: a redefinition of the role of the strategic retaliatory force, recognizing its diplomatic as well as deterrent functions; the adaptation of U.S. forces deployed in and designed for the defense of Europe to the more general purpose of great power reinforcement; and the conversion of limited war forces into counterintervention forces to deter Soviet military intervention in the Third World. While civilians played a major role in developing the strategy of deterrence, the principal responsibility for elaborating these changes in strategy will rest with military officers.

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ONCE upon a time, military men believed—and some may do so still—that military forces and deployments were the products of national strategy, which, in turn, was shaped by national policy, which, in turn, reflected a carefully codified and formulated set of national purposes. Nowadays political scientists tend to hold almost exactly the opposite view: military policy is seen as the haphazard outcome of bureaucratic politics and procedures, of vested agency interests and manipulative personalities. In some measure, of course, the War College image and the Brookings image each does have a handle on the truth. But each by itself is hopelessly inadequate, the sophisticated cynicism of the scholars as well as the straightforward rationalism of the soldiers. In particular, the size, shape, and functions of the military establishment are as much the product of past history and future visions as they are of either current politics or current logic. Producing changes in military programs and functions to reflect new national needs and priorities is a complex, tortuous, frustrating, but not entirely impossible, task. During the course of two centuries, the American military establishment has adapted—or been adapted—to three major changes in its domestic and external environments. The changes currently taking place in those environments appear to pose a fourth challenge to the military to make the appropriate adaptations in their programs and policies, forces and functions, and, most importantly, concepts and doctrines.

#### THE EMERGENCE OF A STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE

Until the defeat of Napoleon, the principal functions of the armed forces were to protect the American states against invasion by European armies and American merchant ships from seizure by European navies. What was

needed was a "hedgehog" sort of military establishment for essentially defensive purposes. After the separation of Europe from America in the second decade of the nineteenth century, U.S. military policy shifted from this eighteenth-century pattern into a new continental or "frontier" phase in which the primary focus was on the military and civil functions which the army played in protecting settlers from Indians and in promoting national development. The navy performed somewhat similar functions, protecting and regulating American commerce in the non-European areas of the world and promoting its expansion through scientific research and treaty negotiation.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the domestic and foreign environments of policy again changed and in due course led to fundamental shifts in military strategy and structure. The development of the European navies and the acquisition of overseas colonies stimulated the creation of a battle fleet designed to prepare for the mobilization of a major military force and for its projection overseas, most probably in a European direction. The fighting army of the nineteenth century did not need a reserve system, a general staff, or war colleges. The mobilization-oriented army of the first half of the twentieth century needed all of these and got them.

After World War II, the environments of American military policy went through changes comparable to those which followed upon 1815 and 1890. Wartime images of postwar cooperation among the victorious powers proved mirages. By word and by action, Stalin's Soviet Union seemed to launch a series of direct challenges to the independence and security of other states. Soviet control was firmly established over Eastern Europe. Soviet troops entered Iran and were withdrawn only



after vigorous protests by the United States. Pressure was applied upon Turkey for concessions over the Straits and its eastern provinces. The civil war in Greece was resumed with support from the communist powers. Berlin was blockaded in 1948; Korea was invaded in 1950. These events produced and reinforced a rapid crystallization of opinion within the U.S. government that the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy must be the containment of the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union and communist states and movements under its control. In the immediate postwar years American policymakers lacked the resources to achieve this goal. But gradually in the late 1940s and then rapidly in the early 1950s, after the invasion of Korea, the requisite forces, weapons, alliances, and doctrines were brought into existence. The military counterpart to a foreign policy of containment became a strategy of deterrence.

This strategy required fundamental changes from the pre-World War II concepts of mobilization and preparedness. If the United States was to deter the expansion of communist states, it would have to make clear and firm its commitments to come to the defense of other countries if they were attacked, and it would have to have the military capabilities to respond to aggression by imposing unacceptable costs upon the aggressor. These commitments and capabilities necessary for deterrence in turn required:

1. a system of bilateral and multilateral military alliances which began in the late 1940s and by the mid-1950s had been expanded to include most of the noncommunist countries of Europe and Asia, as well as all of Latin America;

2. the overseas deployments of American forces to bolster the morale of our

allies and to underline the seriousness of our intentions to our adversaries;

3. the maintenance of much larger and more diversified military forces, including nuclear capabilities, than the United States had ever before maintained in peacetime; and

4. the achievement of much higher levels of readiness for combat for these forces than had been acceptable under a mobilization strategy. (Aggression, it was assumed, and the Korean experience seemed to prove the point, could come with surprise and swiftness; hence the forces to deter it must be ready for instant response.)

More concretely, over a period of many years, a set of military forces came into existence organized, equipped, and deployed to meet four major needs: a strategic retaliatory force to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States or its allies and a full-scale conventional invasion of Western Europe; a continental air and missile defense system to minimize damage to civilian and military targets in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack; a massive deployment of air, ground, and naval forces to Western Europe to deter and, if necessary, to defeat Soviet attack on Western Europe; air, ground, and naval conventional forces to deter if possible and to defeat communist aggression in other parts of the world and deployed, in part, in the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific.

The strategy of deterrence was thus based on the assumption that in the absence of appropriate countervailing force, communist powers, large or small, would attack or subvert the United States and its allies. The major strategic debates centered about the types of forces necessary for deterrence. At one extreme, when the United States had overwhelming superiority in strategic power, the case could be made for

a strategy of "massive retaliation." As the Soviets gradually developed their nuclear forces, the case for a strategy of "flexible response" became more persuasive, leading in the Kennedy administration to a major buildup in both strategic and conventional forces. In general, deterrence neatly married alliances—with other countries—to armaments—in U.S. stockpiles. For the soldiers it furnished the rationale for military forces stronger than those of any potential aggressor; for the diplomats it furnished the rationale for a network of diplomatic and political ties with an incredible number of allies and satellites. The ends of containment would be served by the mere existence of the deterring alliances and armaments. Deterrence was thus a concept that enabled the United States to avoid many of the more troublesome problems concerning the relation of policy to force and the active use of military means to secure diplomatic or political goals.

#### CHANGES IN THE MILITARY POLICY ENVIRONMENT

During the bulk of the years that deterrence was the key to U.S. strategy, the United States was far more powerful economically, diplomatically, and militarily than any other state. The American economy was twice the size of the Soviet economy. The quantity, variety, and deployment of the U.S. nuclear arsenal meant that for most of this period the Soviets could never rule out the possibility of a first strike. The technological sophistication and quantity of American naval and air power made it possible for the United States to project its military forces abroad into any nook or cranny of the world. Diplomatically, the United States had a truly global system of alliances. During these years American security rested on U.S. military superiority over the

communist world and U.S. political-economic hegemony in the noncommunist world. These constituted the foundation for the strategy of deterrence.

In recent years, that foundation has been crumbling.

First, and most important, the domestic basis for American foreign policy has disintegrated and produced the trends toward demilitarization and withdrawal which now dominate the American scene. The American public no longer is willing to support military intervention abroad or an expanding military burden at home. The United States still, of course, has a huge military establishment, but in both absolute and relative terms the American defense effort has been declining. This reflects both decreased involvement in Southeast Asia and, more broadly, the reassessment of the U.S. role in the world embodied in the Nixon Doctrine. The last four years have seen a reduction in U.S. military forces by almost 1,200,000 men. At the peak of the Vietnam involvement, the U.S. defense effort took 9.5 percent of the gross national product (GNP); in 1973 defense will consume roughly 6.4 percent of the GNP—the lowest it has been since 1950. Overseas military deployments are down by almost 50 percent from four years ago; across the globe, bases are being closed, the flag is coming down, the troops are coming home. These trends reflect not only a shift in military strategy—like that from massive retaliation to flexible response—but also more fundamental changes in American culture and opinion in an anti-military direction.

Second, the Soviet Union has developed its own military capabilities to the point where it is the rival if not the equal of the United States as a global superpower. A superpower is distinguished from other major powers by possession of: (a) an effective and

credible second-strike capability against nuclear attack by another state; and (b) the intervention capability to deploy its military forces for combat almost anywhere in the world. During the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the United States was alone in its possession of both these dimensions of global power. The Soviet Union, however, has now acquired the first capability and is moving to develop the second. Strategic parity is a reality. Soviet naval forces are deployed on a new scale in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union is now the principal external influence in the Middle East and in South Asia. It is pursuing a more active diplomacy in Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

Third, the Sino-Soviet split has become a continuing and seemingly deep-rooted reality of world politics. International communism is no longer a monolith, if indeed, it ever was. In addition, Japan and the European countries have emerged as major economic powers with many interests in trade and monetary policy which run counter to American interests. While American military power has declined relative to that of the Soviet Union, American economic strength has declined relative to that of Europe and Japan. Hence, it makes some sense to speak of a pentagonal relationship among the great powers, recognizing the significant differences in the amounts and forms of power which still exist among them.

Fourth, marked disparities in power have developed among Third World states. Regionally dominant powers or "local Leviathans" have begun to emerge: Brazil in South America, South Africa in Southern Africa, Israel in the Middle East, Iran in the Persian Gulf, India on the Subcontinent, North Vietnam in Indochina. In comparison with the other local states, these re-

gional strong powers may have more population and resources, higher levels of political and military organization, and more industrialized economies, including at times armaments manufacturing capabilities. In some cases they have developed hegemonial relationships with at least some other local powers, supplying them with military advice and assistance, technical assistance, and diplomatic leadership. The decline in American hegemony is thus associated with a greater equality of power at the global level and with greater disparities in power at the regional level. Local hegemonies emerge as global hegemony fades.

The United States remains the strongest power in the world. But the preeminent feature of international politics at the present time is the relative decline in American power. American security policy and military strategy need to be reformulated to reflect this fact. To what extent does a strategy of deterrence remain appropriate in these changed circumstances?

#### THE DIFFUSION OF POWER AND U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

Containment and deterrence reflected a territorial concept of security, in which a line was drawn about territories of the "free world" whose collective security against communist aggression was considered essential to the security of the United States. The changes that have taken place in the international and domestic environments of U.S. foreign policy now, however, have stimulated a rethinking of the nature of American security interests. Security can no longer be usefully defined primarily in terms of geography. No particular piece of foreign territory is, in itself, essential to American security. It becomes important to the United States only insofar as changes in its control affect the overall

relationships of the United States with the other major powers in world politics. American security now rests primarily not on the defense of territory, but instead on the development and maintenance of a set of relationships among the major powers so that no power or combination of powers can threaten the United States. Security in this sense may be as much the product of diplomacy as it is of armaments.

As American hegemony recedes, it seems clear that the United States would feel insecure and would hence *be* insecure if any other power or combination of powers acquired global preeminence comparable to that which the United States is now losing. The American goal on the global level has become that of classic British policy with respect to the Continent. The accomplishment of this goal requires neither military superiority over the communist powers, nor political hegemony among the noncommunist ones. What it does require is the maintenance of a world balances of powers system in which no state is in a position to establish global predominance. Such a system can furnish the minimum requisites for American security which isolation provided for over a century before World War II and predominance for two decades after World War II.

This approach to the problem of security has two rather obvious implications. First, at the present time and for the foreseeable future, the only other single power that conceivably could achieve global preeminence on its own is the Soviet Union. Two or more powers could achieve the equivalent result if individually each established its predominance in Europe, Asia, or some area of the Third World and if collectively they cooperated to pursue anti-American policies. In the foreseeable future, such a result could, conceivably, be achieved only by collabora-

tion between the Soviet Union and China or between the Soviet Union and a united Western Europe. Consequently, the Soviet Union is an essential participant in any significant threat to American security. In the longer run, it is conceivable that other powers could aspire to global hegemony. Hence, the basic interest is in perpetuating a system in which *no* power exercises such hegemony. This requires, over time, a policy of relative detachment with respect to the other major actors in world politics. To achieve its goal, the United States must be actively involved in the system of world politics, but not permanently and totally committed as an ally or enemy to any one participant in that system. It must follow the general goal of maintaining a balanced set of relationships among the major powers which means, among other things, shoring up the weaker side in any significant controversy or conflict between two other major powers.

Secondly, U.S. concern with the maintenance of a global balances of powers system also means that U.S. security interests in the affairs of minor powers, in the peripheral regions of the system, and in local balances of power, will be limited to those matters which in turn have an effect on the overall global balances of power. A global perspective on world politics will enable the United States to divorce itself from local issues that are of little direct interest to it. Whether changes in the control of any particular piece of territory threaten American security depends upon its effect on those global relationships. Thus, if a country—allied or not with the United States—were to be threatened by the Soviet Union or, conceivably, by China, the United States would, in all probability, have an interest in protecting the country in order to maintain the overall balance of power. If the same country—allied or

not with the United States—were threatened by another state—allied or not with the Soviet Union or China—the damage to overriding U.S. security interests would be marginal at best, and there would not be, except in the most unusual circumstances, grounds for U.S. counteraction. To put it concretely, an attack by North Vietnam on Thailand does not engage American security interests. An attack by China on Thailand could well engage those interests, not because we are concerned with Thailand, but because we are concerned with China. The criterion for U.S. involvement, in short, is not who suffers from aggression, but who benefits from it. The overall object is not to deter aggression, but to maintain a balance of power.

These observations on the limited security interests of the United States in the relations *among* non-major powers apply in spades to what goes on *within* other states. Obviously the United States would prefer to have in power in any country a government sympathetically disposed to the United States and open to trade and cultural relations. But the United States has insufficient security interest in any particular Asian, African, or Latin American country to warrant resorting to military action to maintain a particular regime or political system in that country. To take a concrete example, the Kagnew communications base at Asmara in Ethiopia is an important military convenience for the United States; it is clearly, however, not worth military intervention in Ethiopian politics in order to maintain it. Similarly, the conquest of power in any Third World country by a communist or other revolutionary movement is something that we may regret, but it is something that we can and should be able to live with. In most countries, in most of the world, governments can fall and boundaries

change with little damaging impact on U.S. security interests.

The primary security interest of the United States is, thus, to prevent another power from achieving global hegemony and consequently to maintain a global balance of power. More specific American security interests might be defined as follows:

First, with respect to direct relations with the other superpower, the United States would feel and would be insecure if the Soviet Union approached a first-strike capability against the United States in strategic forces, or achieved a significant superiority in deployable conventional forces. Hence one goal of American security policy must be to maintain rough military parity with the Soviet Union.

Second, with respect to the major powers generally—China, Japan, the European countries, as well as the Soviet Union—the United States would feel and would be insecure if it became diplomatically isolated either (a) because any other major power was seriously weakened by the Soviet Union, or (b) because one or more of these powers formed a hostile coalition with the Soviet Union. Hence, a second American goal should be to develop and maintain among the major powers a favorable diplomatic concert vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Third, with respect to those regions of the world lacking indigenous major powers—Southeast Asia, south Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—the United States would feel and would be insecure if any major external power—presumably the Soviet Union or, conceivably, China—achieved a monopoly of external influence or control in any one of these regions and consequently was in a position to shut off American political, economic, and cultural access to the region. Hence, a third goal of Amer-

ican security policy should be to prevent any one of these regions from falling under the exclusive dominance of another external power.

#### DETERRENCE AND DIPLOMACY

Given these American security interests, deterrence will continue to be a key concept in shaping U.S. military forces. But it will also play a less central role in U.S. strategy because:

1. Many of the actions that we previously thought necessary to deter we no longer see as in our interest to deter; that is, the scope of the actions to be deterred is more limited.

2. The probability that some of the actions which it is still in our interest to deter actually will occur in the absence of deterring action on our part has decreased; that is, the need for deterring actions is reduced.

3. Some actions that the United States still wishes to deter can be deterred by actions by countries other than the United States; that is, responsibility for deterrence can be devolved.

In the achievement of U.S. security objectives, diplomacy may thus come to play an increasingly important role compared to that of deterrence. In a world where there is a bipolar military balance, but a multipolar diplomatic balance, the dangers of diplomatic isolation can be as great as those of military inferiority. In a purely bipolar world, an opposing power becomes threatening when it becomes the enemy of one's friends. In a more complex system, it becomes threatening when it becomes the friend of one's friends. In some measure, the competitive pursuit of military capabilities is supplemented by the competitive pursuit of diplomatic assurances.

The concept of deterrence did not imply active negotiation with potential enemies to achieve mutually satisfac-

tory agreements. It thus did not involve efforts to put pressure on adversaries to make concessions to the American viewpoint. The implicit assumption was that one could not negotiate satisfactorily with the enemy except from a position of strength, and if one was in a position of strength, there usually did not seem to be much incentive to negotiate. In an era of confrontation, there is not much that military force can be used for except to confront, that is, to deter. In an era of negotiation, paradoxically, the potential uses of military force multiply: military buildups, weapons decisions, deployments, and even actions, all become ways not simply of deterring military aggression by the other power, but also ways of putting pressure on him to make concessions at the negotiating table. So long as there were no negotiations, there was no opportunity for military power to perform this function. This shift in the role of military force from an instrument of deterrence to an instrument of negotiation became obvious, of course, in the "bargaining chip" concept which the Administration used in the debates over the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and has since reasserted on other occasions.

A major function of U.S. military forces is thus not only to deter future aggression, but also to support current diplomacy. This requires increased responsiveness of military forces and programs to political and diplomatic needs. The requirements of diplomacy as well as the requirements of deterrence need to shape U.S. military programs and policies. At times those requirements may well differ significantly.

#### THE ADAPTATION OF MILITARY PROGRAMS

The principal military programs for deterrence were designed for strategic retaliation, continental defense, Euro-

pean defense, and limited war. The new security environment of the United States suggests that three main changes are in order in these programs: the redefinition of the functions of strategic retaliation—now incorporating continental defense—for an era of superpower military parity; the adaptation of the European defense forces into forces more generally designed for the maintenance of the balance of power among the major powers; and the conversion of limited war forces primarily designed to prevent aggression or subversion by small communist states in the Third World into counterintervention forces designed to head off Soviet intervention in the Third World. In addition, all three types of forces—those required for strategic retaliation, great power reinforcement, and counterintervention—will need to be responsive to the dual purposes of both deterrence and diplomacy.

#### *Strategic retaliation*

The deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and its allies will clearly remain a major function of U.S. military forces for the indefinite future. At times, questions have been raised about overredundancy and the need to maintain a full-blown triad of retaliatory forces. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), however, seem to have damped down these criticisms. The Moscow Treaty imposed restrictions on the size of the strategic retaliatory forces which could be employed for deterrence, and subsequent arms agreements may impose still further limitations, although some people remained worried about the possibility of a qualitative race in weapons improvements. In general, however, the changes required to adapt strategic forces to the new conditions of deterrence are relatively minor. In the early

1950s it had made sense to develop a continental air defense capability against potential Soviet attack on cities and airfields. With the development, deployment, and diversification of missiles on both sides, defense missions now are largely limited to warning systems and passive missile defense, and the SALT treaty would appear to insure that this will remain the case for the foreseeable future. Hence nuclear defense capabilities can be seen as an integrated part of strategic retaliation forces.

The broader issues involving the retaliatory forces concern not their deterrent but their diplomatic role. To deter a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States, Western Europe, or Japan, the United States need only maintain a nuclear force capable of imposing unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union after absorbing a Soviet first strike. The United States could have this deterrent capability with a strategic force significantly smaller in size than that of the Soviets in terms of launch vehicles, warheads, and megatonnage. But does military-sufficiency-but-numerical-inferiority meet the needs of American diplomacy, or is a rough approximation of military parity essential?

In 1971 and 1972 many military analysts argued that deterrent sufficiency without military parity was enough. They tended to criticize the Nixon administration for asserting that security required something more than an "assured destruction" retaliatory capability. They argued that strategic forces should not and could not play any real political role, and hence the level of such forces should be determined by the actual military purposes they might serve. Since military superiority beyond military sufficiency is militarily meaningless, there is, in this view, no point in expanding the U.S.

retaliatory force simply because the Soviets expand their short of achieving a significant counterforce capability. The Soviets may believe that they will gain a political advantage from having stronger nuclear forces, but in fact they would be deluding themselves and wasting their resources because: (a) that numerical advantage would have no military significance and hence would not be a "real" advantage; and (b) so long as the United States was not taken in by the Soviet claim that military superiority conveyed political advantage, that superiority would in fact not convey political advantage.

In terms of deterrence these arguments are plausible. They certainly have great appeal to any American administration confronted with big domestic demands on its tax resources. Yet in terms of diplomacy the opposing arguments in favor of strategic parity rather than mere sufficiency are more persuasive. The underlying question concerns the extent to which nuclear weapons can and will play a political role in the relations among states. The issue is not military capabilities, but the *meanings* which people attach to military capabilities and *whose* view of those meanings is to prevail. In all societies, political leaders will give priority to political relationships and political advantages. Soviet military policy since the early 1960s suggests that Soviet political leaders saw significant political disadvantages in a situation of military sufficiency but inferiority vis-à-vis the United States. At great cost they inaugurated and carried through military programs which produced effective Soviet-American strategic parity, and they obviously felt that they had achieved a long-sought major goal when this parity was explicitly and symbolically recognized at the Moscow meeting and in the SALT agreements. They thus believed that deterrent-

sufficiency-but-military-inferiority was politically unacceptable.

In itself, this does not mean that U.S. political leaders should be unwilling to accept such a status. But it does raise questions about future Soviet goals. The SALT agreements permit either side to attempt to achieve a qualitative breakthrough and also give the Soviets latitude to attempt to achieve a substantial numerical superiority in all aspects of strategic weapons if they so desire. Should they move in this direction, it would, presumably, be evidence that they thought there were significant advantages to be gained from such superiority and that such superiority would pay diplomatic dividends in dealing with the United States with respect to Western Europe, the Middle East, China, or future SALT agreements. If U.S. leaders belatedly became convinced that the Soviet qualitative or numerical superiority would put the United States at a significant disadvantage, the United States would presumably launch a dramatic, all-out drive to catch up militarily with the Soviets. This could have a very destabilizing and unsettling effect on international relations in part because American leaders would probably feel the need to exaggerate the threat which they saw from Soviet superiority in order to generate the public and congressional support for the crash military programs which they believed necessary. American political leaders might also attempt to compensate for their military inferiority through some "unconventional" foreign policy action which, in turn, could well lead to a major international crisis. This is, after all, precisely what happened in 1962. Confronted with the prospect of negotiating with Kennedy over Berlin and other issues from a position of marked strategic inferiority, Khrushchev took quick, unprecedented, and clandestine steps to even the bal-



ance and thereby brought the world to the nuclear brink.

Alternatively, U.S. political leaders might refuse to recognize any political advantage accruing to the Soviet Union from military superiority. In this event, a contest of wills is likely to ensue as each side attempts to persuade the other that its estimate of the political consequences of military superiority is the right estimate, which should be accepted by the other side. Having invested huge resources in the proposition that military superiority will convey diplomatic advantage, the Soviet leaders would have major incentives to attempt to validate their reasoning and to act as if it gave them political advantages in order to persuade American leaders that it actually did give such advantages. The more American leaders refused to make concessions to the Soviet leaders because of their strategic superiority, the more the Soviet leaders might be likely to feel that they would have to demonstrate that their strategic superiority did, in fact, furnish reason for such concessions. Any one who questions the probability of this scenario would do well to review the process of escalation in the Vietnam War which, in effect, was the American response to the refusal of the North Vietnamese to recognize the political advantages which Americans saw in U.S. military superiority.

A competition of wills, in this sense, could be far more unsettling than a familiar competition in weapons development and deployment. An effort to maintain military parity with the Soviet Union could be more costly in the short run, but much less dangerous in the long run than simply maintaining a "sufficient" assured destruction capability. More broadly, the argument that strategic weapons should be limited to those that serve a real military purpose reflects an erroneous and dangerous ef-

fort to separate military goals from political ones. It is the contemporary equivalent of the arguments made by American generals during World War II that U.S. military action should aim solely at military victory and should eschew broader political goals. Ironically, now it is those who wish to limit the arms buildup who say that military forces should be devoted solely to military purposes. This is a position, however, that can easily be turned to purposes which would be highly objectionable to those who currently adhere to it.

#### *Great power reinforcement*

The disengagement of the United States from the war in Southeast Asia again focuses attention on the central role of Europe in U.S. military strategy. "Happily," as General Davison, army commander in Europe, put it, Europe "is once again receiving priority in the allocation of American military resources." To many in the army this represents a welcome return to normalcy. Ever since its first commitment to major warfare in this century, in France in 1917, the army has had a strong European orientation. This orientation was reinforced by the experiences of World War II and by the extent to which "European" officers—Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins, Ridgway, Taylor—rather than MacArthur protégés from the Pacific, shaped the outlook of the postwar army. The European focus was also reinvigorated by the creation of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) and by the deployment of four U.S. divisions to Europe early in the 1950s. To many officers, indeed, one of the dangers of the Korean War was that it might distract the army from its main job in Europe. Only slowly in the 1950s did the concept of limited war as a major mission catch on within the army. This

was, of course, reinforced in the 1960s by White House interest in limited and sublimated conflict, and by the acceptance of the idea of flexible response. The experience in Vietnam, however, soured the army on anything remotely resembling limited war and hence provoked, in effect, a return, so far as the army is concerned, to its long-standing primary concern, the defense of Western Europe.

This concern is well reflected in U.S. ground force deployments. Four and one-third of thirteen army divisions are stationed in Europe; eight army divisions plus one marine division—nine out of a total of sixteen—are trained and pinpointed for European operations. In addition, eight of nine army national guard and reserve divisions are designated for European contingencies. The substantial elements of these forces deployed in Europe were, of course, designed to help ward off small-scale Soviet incursions and to deter a large-scale Soviet attack. In the future, these purposes will continue to exist, but they will probably become downgraded in importance. In the atmosphere of détente, *ostpolitik*, European security conferences, and proposals for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, it is hard to maintain and would be wrong to maintain the sense of threat and urgency about the danger to Western Europe which existed in the 1950s. The threat is simply less real. The potential ability of the Western European countries to deal with the threat has increased tremendously. Their actual ability has increased somewhat. In terms of the requirements of deterrence, the United States undoubtedly ought to maintain some garrison in Western Europe, but there appears to be little deterrent need to keep it at current levels.

Existing European deployments of American forces have to be justified in

terms of diplomacy, not deterrence. Three arguments can be made. First and paradoxically, the possibility of negotiating force reductions on both sides—itsself testimony to the decreased deterrent role of U.S. forces—adds a good bargaining reason for not reducing them unilaterally. Second, the maintenance of existing force levels in Europe can also conceivably be put to good diplomatic purposes to achieve concessions on monetary arrangements, trade barriers, and investment controls from the European Economic Community countries. Finally, U.S. security would be threatened not just by a Soviet military conquest of Western Europe, but by the more likely contingency of a reorientation of the European countries away from the United States and toward a closer association with the Soviet Union. Even this latter danger is not very great, but it clearly could be made more real by U.S. mishandling of the timing and manner of its troop reductions.

The more probable and more significant security threats to the United States on the Eurasian continent would stem from changes in the relations between China and the Soviet Union. Soviet military pressure is more probable against China than against any other great power. If that should occur, the reaction of the United States would undoubtedly be primarily diplomatic in character. But conceivably some form of military response might be called for. The U.S. military have devoted an inordinate amount of time to preparing for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. They would do well to devote some attention to the still remote but more likely possibility of a Soviet invasion of northern China. The other development that would fundamentally alter the American security position would, of course, be a major rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China. At pres-

ent, the probability of such a realignment seems low. This situation could change, however, and there might be relatively little that the United States could do diplomatically seriously to affect the probabilities of this change. Given the increased military strength of both communist powers, the military implications for the United States of a return to the diplomatic lineup of the early 1950s would be formidable. One has only to think of the psychological and political consequences on Western Europe if the Soviets coupled a diplomatic offensive offering various concessions to European governments with the transfer of forty divisions from their Chinese frontier to their western frontier.

In general, the probability of any sort of military action against the major powers coming out of the blue seems fairly small. The need to keep a substantial portion of the U.S. active forces prepared for this contingency is correspondingly less. In some measure, a balance of powers has been restored on the Eurasian continent. A military disruption of this situation, particularly in the form of a major Soviet action in Europe, is only likely to come after a period of increasing antagonism and diplomatic realignment. Hence there is considerably less need to keep U.S. active forces in being and deployed in Europe. The need is not to deter an attack now, but to have the capability of deterring such an attack in the future following a marked deterioration in the relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. In such a situation, as the Berlin crisis experience of 1961 suggests, the most effective military deterrent might well be the mobilization and movement to Europe of substantial American forces. The United States can provide the necessary military underpinning for the existing diplomatic balance among the great

powers if it substantially reduces its current European deployment, reduces the total active forces earmarked for European contingencies, improves the readiness, training, and transportability of the Guard and Reserve units, and broadens the planning and preparation for other possible threats to great power equilibrium, such as a war between the Soviet Union and China.

### *Counterintervention*

During the past two decades the United States has attempted to prevent communist governments and insurgent movements from altering by force the status quo in Latin America, East Asia, and the Middle East. It seems unlikely, however, that the United States will maintain this same security interest in the same manner in the immediate future. This decline in the need for the familiar limited war capability could be counterbalanced, however, by the growing Soviet military role in some areas of the Third World.

In the past the U.S. military generally have not had to be concerned with the likelihood of direct engagement with Soviet conventional forces outside of Western Europe. In no case during the past twenty-five years has Soviet military or paramilitary intervention in the politics of another society provoked American military counteraction, and in no case has American intervention provoked Soviet military counteraction. The United States did not dare to counter the Soviets in Eastern Europe, and the Soviets were not able to counter the United States in Latin America, Africa, or Southeast Asia. This situation of mutually exclusive zones for intervention is now declining. The Soviets could now intervene or interpose military forces in the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas. They may soon have the ability to do so elsewhere.

It will rarely if ever be in American interest to intervene militarily against local forces in the local conflicts or in the domestic conflicts of Third World states. But what happens when there is a revolution in an oil-rich Persian Gulf state, and the Soviets intervene with their military forces in order to insure its success? During the early 1960s, U.S. policymakers became preoccupied with the doctrines and tactics of *counterinsurgency*. These will have little relevance to U.S. military needs in the future. What will be needed, however, is some attention to the doctrines and tactics of *counterintervention*. In two instances, off Cuba in 1962 and off Vietnam ten years later, the United States has used its naval power to stop Soviet ships carrying weapons to Soviet allies. In both cases, the Soviets backed off from a direct confrontation. In the Cuban case they were, of course, at a tremendous disadvantage in terms of strategic weapons. In both cases, they were in an inferior position in terms of available local naval power. In the future, however, would the United States be willing to take comparable risks if Soviet troops were being transported to participate in a military conflict in a third country? Would the Soviets back away if they had committed themselves by sending troops instead of weapons? What would the United States and the Soviet Union do in this sort of situation where the available naval forces on each side were more nearly equal? One classic case of this type of great power confrontation occurred in 1889 when U.S., British, and German warships converged on the harbor of Samoa in order to influence the political future of that island's shaky government. Fortunately, before they could start shooting at each other, a hurricane blew the warships out to sea, and the issues were subsequently resolved at a diplomatic conference. It

would be tempting fate, however, to count on timely and propitious winds to provide a "Samoa solution" to future U.S.-Soviet military confrontations.

In general, it appears in the U.S. interest to minimize great power military involvements in violent conflicts in and among Third World countries. The United States is now negotiating with the Soviet Union over the strategic balance and over European security arrangements. It might well be in the U.S. interest to attempt to negotiate "mutual abstention" agreements with the Soviets on military actions in Third World areas. In the absence of such understandings, it will be in the U.S. interest to develop the doctrines, forces, and tactics for deterring Soviet military intervention in Third World conflicts. It would also be well for U.S. military planners and political leaders to drop the assumption that any sort of military confrontation or conflict with the Soviet Union is likely to escalate to a nuclear showdown.

Naval power, and particularly naval airpower, will be of critical significance to the counterintervention mission. The tendency within the navy and elsewhere to stress the future role of the submarine as the critical naval weapons system is quite appropriate for deterring or even fighting a general war. But the very qualities which make submarines useful for those missions also render them of little help in deterring Soviet intervention in Third World areas and in providing military support for U.S. diplomacy in those areas. Vessels designed to "run silent, run deep" do not contribute to an impressive but flexible and responsive show of force. They will not be of much use to a president who has the political need to put a hundred planes in the air over Amman, a battalion landing team on the ground in Kuwait, or a blockading force in the waters off Beirut—to name only

three things which there would be a greater than zero probability that a president might want to do to counter or to deter Soviet military action in the next Middle Eastern crisis. To perform these functions, substantial surface, air, and marine corps capabilities will be required in the coming decade.

#### MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN STRATEGIC CHANGE

The strategic concepts of the 1950s and 1960s were in large part the work of civilians: Brodie, Wolfers, Osgood, Kaufmann, Kissinger, Schelling, Wohlstetter, Kahn, to mention only some of the more prominent names. The strategic concepts and doctrines of the 1970s will have to be largely the work of the military. As Colonel Donald Bletz has pointed out, there is a striking disjunction in generations between civilians and military interested in strategic ideas. The civilians with this interest are middle-aged if not elderly, their concern deriving from World War II and the early years of the cold war. Younger civilian scholars interested in strategy are few in number. Among the military, on the other hand, the older generation officers were often less than completely receptive to the new ideas and approaches which the civilian strategists were developing. Now, however, there is a younger generation of professional military officers, the products of the war colleges, civilian universities, and research institutes, who have the intellectual and academic background and interests to play a role in developing strategic doctrines and ideas. In the absence of a new generation of civilian strategists, they will have to take the lead in adapting U.S. military doctrine and strategy to the changes in the domestic and world environment of the 1970s.

Stimulated in part by the obvious need to reconstitute and reorient the

armed forces after the traumas of Vietnam, many officers have already begun to question long-standing policies and practices and to rethink U.S. military needs. Indicative of this reassessment were the penetrating and wide-ranging papers and discussion which characterized the "First Inter-Service Defense Policy Conference" organized under the auspices of the Department of Political Science of the Air Force Academy in May 1972 and attended by some two-score field grade officers from all four services. The papers prepared by the military authors for this conference dealt with, among many other topics, arms control, multipolarity, the role of the ground forces after Vietnam, the Europeanization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, nuclear proliferation, the future of amphibious warfare, the strategic implications of the volunteer army, executive branch organization for defense, the impact on military policy of the changes in American society, the effectiveness of the military educational system, and the defense budget process. Conference discussions revealed a wide-ranging willingness to reconsider fundamental assumptions underlying both strategy and organization and to air for debate critical views on such normally sensitive topics as promotion policies, service parochialism, the place of women in the armed forces, the relevance of the service academies, the place of tactical nuclear weapons in American strategy, the rationale for the Triad, the utility of game theory models for strategy, the ways of minimizing possible military interventions overseas, and the political uses of military forces. Out of the processes of analysis and discussion such as this within the military ought to emerge the strategic concepts and policies, as well as the military leaders, necessary to adapt the U.S. military establishment to the changes taking place in Ameri-

can society and in the international environment.

The adaptations in military policy which are now required are in some respects less fundamental than those which occurred during previous times of change and in some respects also considerably more subtle. Working out the conceptual and policy implications for military policy of the new place of the United States in world affairs, moreover, is only the first step. The political problem of implementing these changes will require not only sensitivity at the higher levels of the military establishment, but also some measure of active civilian political leadership. The

changes in military policy that occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century were good for the bulk of that century. Those that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century were good for about half a century. Those that occurred after World War II needed adaptation after a generation. It invariably takes much longer to change military policy than to change foreign policy. Now, however, the adaptations in strategic doctrine and military programs which seem necessitated by recent changes in the U.S. international position could well be obsolete when they are made unless they are made quickly.

# Military Capabilities and American Foreign Policy

By GRAHAM T. ALLISON

ABSTRACT: Can the availability of a rapid response capability lead the United States to intervene militarily in situations where, without those ready forces, the U.S. government would decide that military intervention was not required? Secretary of Defense McNamara said *no*; Senator Richard Russell said *yes*. After examining the basic approaches to weapons selection that led McNamara and Russell to opposite conclusions, this article reviews recent instances—Dienbienphu, Laos, Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and Vietnam—in which the presence or absence of a ready military option may have affected decisions about the use of force. A conclusion about who had the better part of the argument provides a base for drawing some implications concerning the full costs and benefits of military capabilities and the responsibilities of the secretary of defense.

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For help in preparing this article, the author is grateful to Fred A. Morris.

If Americans find it easy to go anywhere and do anything, they will always be going somewhere and doing something.

THE issue was FDL: Fast Deployment Logistics ships. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed these ships as part of the "balanced mix of airlift, sealift, and equipment prepositioning to meet U.S. deployment objectives." This posture would, in the Secretary's words, enable the United States "to respond promptly to clear threats to our national interests and the security of our allies . . . to deter and to prevent such threats from expanding into larger conflicts."<sup>1</sup>

The epigraph expresses the view of Senator Richard Russell, a seasoned observer of American government. Faced with a choice about this specific weapons system—FDL—Russell voted *no* on the grounds that creation of a ready, rapid reaction capability would make it more likely that in a crisis the U.S. government would decide to use military force.

Russell's aphorism played no part of the systems analysis that led McNamara to propose FDL. Indeed, after Congress had once denied funds for FDL, McNamara's subsequent submissions of the proposal took explicit aim at the proposition that "because of the rapid response capability provided by the FDL, we would be tempted to intervene in situations where our long range best interest would dictate otherwise."<sup>2</sup> McNamara denied the argument any validity whatever: "I want to emphasize that the FDLs, per se, would in no way add to or subtract from our

commitments."<sup>3</sup> McNamara's Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, Alain Enthoven, reconsiders this question in his review of Department of Defense programs from 1961 to 1969. "The FDL," Enthoven notes, "ran into opposition from certain Congressmen who feared that it would only provide the United States with more capability to act as the world's policeman and thus increase the possibility of our getting involved in more 'Vietnams.'"<sup>4</sup> But Enthoven finds these fears unfounded on the grounds that "having an efficient capability should be separated from the question of political wisdom about when to use it."<sup>5</sup>

As this juxtaposition of judgments suggests, Russell's approach to the problem of force posture differed substantially from the approach of Messrs. McNamara and Enthoven. The aims of this article are three:

1. to characterize the approaches that brought McNamara and Russell to such contrary conclusions;
2. to examine the central issue about which they disagreed: namely, whether the existence of a rapid response capability could lead the United States to intervene militarily in situations where, in the absence of that capability, the United States would decide that military intervention was not required; and
3. to speculate about what an answer to this question implies for future military forces and for the responsibilities of the secretary of defense.

These issues are usually discussed abstractly, with reference to some general, unspecified case. Clarification of the dispute, however, demands a con-

1. Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget, January 22, 1968, p. 139.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 238.

5. *Ibid.*



crete instance. Here, the question will be examined with specific reference to FDL. The first two sections outline briefly the two approaches to the problem of selecting military forces. This specification of the argument provides the base for the third section's review of recent historical cases in which the presence or absence of ready military capabilities may have affected decisions about the use of force. The last two sections draw some implications of this argument for the broader issues of U.S. military forces and the secretary of defense's responsibilities.

#### FROM COMMON SENSE TO PPBS

How should one think about the problem of choosing military forces, that is, manpower and equipment? Faced with questions like the following—How many divisions of troops should the U.S. maintain? or, How many strategic missiles? or, Should we buy FDLs?—how would the reader proceed?

Most people would, I think, start down the path of common sense à la home economics. The problem is one of matching means and ends in the light of some budget constraint. The ends for which we maintain forces are national security and foreign policy interests, in particular the defense of other nations important to the United States. The means for achieving these objectives—detering potential aggressors and defending when deterrence fails—are military forces capable of performing specific actions in particular circumstances. Thus one should buy the military forces—divisions, FDLs, or whatever—needed to provide the capability, choosing among alternative forces so as to purchase the necessary capabilities at the lowest cost—or to provide the greatest capability for any given budget.

The Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS) that became the orthodoxy of defense analysis under Secretary McNamara simply makes the common-sense approach more systematic and rigorous. According to Enthoven,

The fundamental idea behind PPBS was decision-making based on explicit criteria of the national interest in defense programs. . . . The main purpose of PPBS was to develop explicit criteria, openly and thoroughly debated by all interested parties that could be used . . . as measures of the need for and adequacy of defense programs.<sup>6</sup>

Defense Department analysts devoted an immense intellectual effort to specifying the links in the chain between U.S. national interests and particular defense purchases.

How does PPBS approach a question such as whether to buy FDLs? Secretary of Defense McNamara's annual Force Posture Statement went to great lengths to explain the conceptual framework used in determining military requirements. While this analysis can become complex and even technical, it need involve no mysteries. The major links in the chain of reasoning about FDL are accessible to the careful reader of the Force Posture Statement.<sup>7</sup>

6. Ibid., p. 33. Enthoven and Smith's excellent exposition of PPBS outlines a number of other major strands in the approach, in particular, comparisons of alternative forces and judgments of cost-effectiveness. For the purposes of this article, however, we will focus on the central idea in PPBS; namely, structuring choices about defense posture.

7. The seventy plus billion dollars of purchases are separated on the basis of their primary purpose or mission into "program packages." The two principal programs are "Strategic Forces," which consist of capabilities for fighting nuclear wars, and "General Purpose Forces," which consist of capabilities for all military actions short of nuclear war. "Airlift and Sealift Forces" form a third program aimed primarily at transporting general purpose forces. FDL was one item in the airlift and sealift package.

Table 1 summarizes the major elements in PPBS calculations of forces and quotes snippets from Secretary McNamara's final Force Posture Statement that record his judgment about each of the elements as it affected his decision to recommend FDL.

The structure of the argument could hardly be plainer. The need for general purpose forces arises primarily from U.S. interests in other countries expressed in our commitments to their defense. Commitments give rise to contingencies which U.S. forces must be able to meet. Defense policy judgments about the manner and method of U.S. responses are translated into requirements for specific forces which are chosen with the aim of providing the necessary capability at the lowest cost.

Enthoven and Smith spell out the PPBS calculations about FDLs in greater detail. Their story begins in part III of Table 1, defense policy about deployment. The basic question was:

Do we want to get there quickly and in large numbers and pay the extra cost, or do we want to take our time, save money, and accept greater risks? A series of landmark studies conducted in 1963 and 1964 . . . addressed this question. The first of these studies looked at alternative deployment strategies for countering an enemy assault. . . . The study compared three strategies, each requiring alternative speeds of deployment: (1) a "forward" strategy . . . ; (2) a "defensive" strategy . . . ; (3) an "intermediate" strategy. . . . This study confirmed a common sense conclusion derived from World War II and Korean experience. During the first few months of each war, the enemy swept down quickly over a lot of territory, and American and Allied forces had to spend many months painstakingly pushing him back. . . . *In terms of the cost to fight a conventional war, the forward strategy was estimated to save more than \$10 billion over the defensive strategy.*<sup>8</sup>

8. Enthoven and Smith, *How Much Is Enough?*, pp. 235-36, emphasis added.

Enthoven reports that "as a result of these studies, it was generally accepted that there was very great value to having the ability to deploy forces rapidly to reinforce Allied and U.S. forces in overseas theaters."<sup>9</sup> The question then became, What combination of transportation and prepositioning would allow the United States to achieve this objective in the most cost-effective manner? Enthoven and Smith continue:

Through the joint efforts of the Services, the JCS, and the Systems Analysis Office, a mathematical representation of the situation—a model—was developed which, by 1968, tied together some 3,000 separate factors relating to the cost, capabilities, and limitations of each major component of U.S. mobility forces. . . . We could calculate the combination of ships, aircraft, and inventories of Army equipment pre-stocked in overseas locations which would enable the United States to meet any of these deployment objectives at the least total system cost. . . . Several years of analyses of this kind suggested that a balanced mix of airlift, sealift, and equipment prepositioning to meet U.S. deployment objectives consisted of six C-5A squadrons, 14 C-141 squadrons and 30 Fast Deployment Logistics ships (FDLs); prepositioned equipment in Europe and the Pacific; a Civil Reserve Air Fleet; and 460 commercial general-cargo ships.<sup>10</sup>

On the basis of these calculations, Enthoven recommended to McNamara and McNamara recommended to Congress that the United States buy thirty FDLs.

These detailed calculations are important. Readers seriously interested in force posture should study them carefully. But the trees must not be allowed to obscure the forest.

What is the essence of this PPBS approach to defense policy and military posture? It is: *first*, conception of the

9. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-37.

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF PPBS CALCULATIONS OF FORCES QUOTING SECRETARY  
McNAMARA'S FINAL FORCE POSTURE STATEMENT

| I. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERESTS,<br>AND COMMITMENTS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | III. DEFENCE POLICY: CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES<br>FOR MEETING CONTINGENCIES                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>—Our military posture remains rooted in a commitment to <i>collective defense</i>.... When this Nation made the decision at the end of World War II to base its own security on the principle of collective defense, it was with the hope that there could be created, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, a world in which even the smallest state could look forward to an independent existence, free to develop in its own way, unmolested by its neighbors, and free of fear of armed attack or political domination by the more powerful nations.<sup>a</sup></p> <p>—We sought to achieve this same high purpose by aligning ourselves with other like-minded nations in a series of multi-lateral <i>mutual defense treaties</i> ... [in which] 40 odd sovereign nations bound together to defend their freedom and prevent the further extension of Communist influence and hegemony.<sup>b</sup></p> <p>—The overall <i>requirement for General Purpose Forces</i> is related not so much to the defense of our own territory as it is to the <i>support of our commitments to other nations</i>....<sup>c</sup></p> | <p>Defense policy consists of complex judgments about a large number of interrelated issues including: enemy capabilities; pre-attack warning; deployment strategy; interaction with enemy forces; length of war; reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; capabilities of U.S. allies; and numbers of contingencies to be met simultaneously. Judgments about each of these issues affected McNamara's calculations about FDLs. The critical choice was that of a rapid deployment/forward defense strategy.</p> <p>—The ability to respond promptly to clear threats to our national interests and the security of our allies possibly in more than one place at the same time, can serve both to deter and to prevent such threats from expanding into larger conflicts.... The significance of a prompt response was illustrated by our experience in the Korean war, where we came close to being pushed off the Korean peninsula before we were finally able to stem the attack and secure a beachhead for later reinforcement.<sup>f</sup></p> <p>—Further study ... has opened up the possibility of an entirely new <i>rapid deployment strategy</i>.<sup>g</sup></p> |
| II. CONTINGENCIES                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | IV. COST-EFFECTIVE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES<br>(MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <p>—Each of these commitments gives rise to <i>contingencies</i> for which we must plan.<sup>d</sup></p> <p>—Our policy now is to set the size of the General Purpose Forces so that we can <i>simultaneously meet the more probable contingencies</i>.... We must provide, in addition to our NATO requirements, the forces required to meet such an attack in Asia as well as our commitments in the Western Hemisphere. Because of the basic uncertainty inherent in estimates of such requirements, we add to these forces a Strategic Reserve.<sup>e</sup></p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <p>—The key to this <i>rapid deployment strategy</i> was the very fast reaction time required of the sealift, a fact which dictated that a ship assigned to this role could not be used in peace time for any other purpose such as point-to-point cargo transport. Rather, the Fast Deployment Logistics ships (FDLs) would be used either in the Forward Floating Depot role, or be held in a ready status in U.S. ports where heavy equipment could be quickly loaded when the need to deploy arose.<sup>h</sup></p> <p>—Neither of the two equal cost alternatives to the FDL force can do as well in meeting the requirements of a <i>rapid deployment strategy</i>.<sup>i</sup></p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |

<sup>a</sup> Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget, January 22, 1968, pp. 2-3, emphasis added.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid., p. 3, emphasis added.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid., p. 78, emphasis added.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid., p. 78, emphasis added.

<sup>e</sup> Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid., pp. 139-42.

<sup>g</sup> Ibid., p. 141, emphasis added.

<sup>h</sup> Ibid., p. 141, emphasis added.

<sup>i</sup> Ibid., p. 143, emphasis added.

central problem as one of matching military forces to specific defense objectives in a cost-effective manner; and *second*, definition of this problem as a primarily intellectual job consisting of four major tasks: (1) defining U.S. national security, interests, and commitments clearly enough to measure their achievement; (2) specifying the contingencies that U.S. forces must have the capability to meet; (3) determining the form of the U.S. response; and (4) comparing alternative forces so as to select the cost-effective means for satisfying specific requirements.

Advocates of this approach devoted themselves primarily to producing analyses that defined each of these ele-

ments clearly, refined it to the point of measurement, and identified means for achieving objectives. Secondly, they tried to make actual Department of Defense purchases conform to this blueprint.


And what about an argument like Russell's? Couldn't the creation of ready forces affect interpretations of commitments and inclinations to intervene?

Advocates of PPBS mostly denied or dismissed the possibility of this kind of feedback on the grounds that it confused the sequence of steps. Basically they seem to have thought of the problem as essentially like that of programming a computer:

first one selects the basic functions he wants the program to perform;

then, he devises routines for performing these functions effectively;

then, he writes sub-routines for performing these routines efficiently.



At each stage, ends determine means. Means should not, and need not, affect ends. The decision to use military force is a separate problem, one that must be faced by the president in the light of U.S. objectives and commitments, unaffected by the existence of any particular capability.

#### "RUSSELL'S ALTERNATIVE"

Senator Russell never presented a definitive account of his approach to the problem of weapons selection. But

taking his aphorism as a clue, it is possible to outline an approach roughly consistent with his view; hence "Russell's alternative."

According to this approach, PPBS calculations about cost-effective means for well-specified defense objectives constitute one piece of the problem. But only one. Other pieces emerge from the fact that military forces are an inextricable strand in the unwieldy processes of the U.S. national security establishment. In consequence, it is

unreasonable to separate choices about weapons systems from the larger problem of managing these processes so as to increase the probability of the American government's making the preferred decisions and taking the preferred actions.

The processes of the national security apparatus can be characterized crudely as follows:

1. Foreign policy problems are inherently difficult. Foreign policy problems are inherently so complex that reasonable men can reach fundamentally incompatible conclusions about their solution.

2. Decisions about the use of military force are, and should be, "situational." No one has been able to specify an acceptable set of principles that identify unambiguously when and where the United States should and should not use military forces. Definition of U.S. interests and articulation of presumptions about responses to contingencies provide useful guidelines. They do not permit deductions about particular cases. The number of factors that are, and should be, taken into account in deciding to use military force are too numerous to be summarized adequately in a set of principles that yield deductive choices. These factors include not only American interests, commitments, and the estimated probability of success at various levels of cost and risk, but also such equally important considerations as the immediate background, similarities with previous cases, the historical trend, and congressional and public moods.<sup>11</sup>

3. As a consequence of 1 and 2, the individuals involved in choosing whether or not to intervene militarily in a spe-

cific situation can, and do, and will differ substantially about what should be done. Rarely have the central actors in the U.S. government unanimously chosen to use military force. At any point in time, individuals differ sharply over issues like whether the United States should respond to a North Vietnamese attack on Thailand by the introduction of American troops, or whether the U.S. troops should aid Thai counter-insurgency efforts. These differences in conclusion about military intervention stem from sharp disagreements about every link in the chain of PPBS calculations and judgments—for example, whether Greece is important to U.S. security; how the U.S. commitment to Greece should be interpreted; whether the likelihood of a major Soviet attack on Europe is high enough to justify U.S. maintenance of ready forces to defend against it; how the U.S. should meet this attack if it occurred; and whether this contingency requires ten or thirty rather than seventeen active divisions.

4. Many differences in judgment are organizationally grounded. Individuals have separate responsibilities which require them to focus on different issues and thus encourage differences in what each sees and judges to be important. The president and Congress create organizations to pay special attention to some aspect of a problem. Over time—and not much time is required—these organizations develop goals and interests of their own related to their definition of their problem. Thus, organizations' reactions to problems reflect organizational priorities and perspectives as well as the purposes for which the organizations were created.

5. Capabilities created to increase the government's options by generating information and alternatives that would otherwise be unavailable, also, and of necessity, create interests in, and often

11. For elaboration of this point, see Graham Allison, Ernest May, and Adam Yarmolinsky, "Limits to Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 48 (January 1970).

lobbies for, the use of these capabilities. The creation of a capability brings with it officials commissioned to search for instances in which that capability might be appropriately used, a flow of information about such problems and their solutions, and groups with interests in the exercise of that capability. Such factors tend to change other government officials' awareness of, attention to, and judgments about the use of that capability.

In crises, governments tend to "go with what they've got." Ready options dominate potential but not-so-available alternatives. This results not only from the logical truism that at any point in time a government must choose among actions that it is capable of taking, but also from the empirical fact that deadlines tend to narrow the options leaders seriously consider, highlighting actions subordinates are best equipped to carry out.

Moreover, in time, capabilities create demands. There seems no limit to the number of situations around the globe that might, in the judgment of some reasonable citizen, be improved by the introduction of American military forces. Since 1945, we have witnessed more than a hundred wars between nations and a hundred additional civil wars, in each of which someone preferred that U.S. troops try to play a peace-keeping role. One recalls Bangladesh, Biafra, the Congo, Rwanda, and Northern Ireland. How many injustices are there today that, in the eyes of some, call for American military intervention? And the number of conceivable contingencies is limited only by one's imagination.

6. Given the fact of substantial differences among the participants who make choices about the use of force, such choices must emerge from what is to some extent a bargaining process in

which different individuals, institutions, and substantive views are differentially advantaged and disadvantaged.

If one accepts this rough characterization of the process, then the selection of a weapons system that creates a new capability can importantly affect probabilities of actions. Capabilities can affect apparent costs and risks of the use of military force; the existence of a capability can affect politicians' interpretations of national interests, commitments, and defense policies; capabilities can affect the advantages and disadvantages of contending officials within a government. Capabilities can create temptations. While an issue like FDL should not be decided apart from judgments about deployment strategies and calculations about economic costs, the choice cannot be made reasonably without attention to its effect on the balance of forces within the U.S. government on questions of use.

In contrast with PPBS, the core of Russell's alternative approach to weapons selection is: *first*, conception of the central problem as that of structuring the processes of the U.S. government so as to increase the probability of the preferred decisions and actions about the use of military force; and *second*, definition of that problem as a primarily managerial job in which (1) existing processes consist of numbers of largely autonomous and intractable individuals and institutions; (2) each participant's ability to affect the behavior of other individuals and institutions is quite limited; (3) fine tuning of these processes is therefore infeasible—and highly refined analyses that require fine tuning thus unnecessary and even unhelpful; (4) changing the process is essentially a matter of gross adjustment; and (5) choices about ready military capabilities are one important means of making gross adjustments.

THE CENTRAL ISSUE:  
MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DECISIONS  
TO USE FORCE

These two approaches to weapons selection differ in many ways. Review of these differences and careful examination of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach are required, but in this article, we must limit attention to the central factual issue in the dispute about FDL: namely, whether the creation of ready military capabilities can contribute substantially to the likelihood that the U.S. government will decide to use military force in some situations where, without those ready forces, the U.S. government would decide not to intervene. Putting the McNamara assertion as a question: Could the FDL, in some way, add to or subtract from our commitments? Turning Enthoven's prescription into a question: Can the possession of an effective capability be separated from the question of political wisdom about when to use it?

McNamara and Enthoven have answered these questions clearly. But even within the logic of PPBS, if the issue is taken to its strict logical conclusion, their answers are incorrect. Consider a single rational decision-maker who in some scenarios prefers to use military forces. If he is given an additional option that reduces the costs and risks of intervention in some situations, this should increase the probability of his deciding to intervene.<sup>12</sup> This

12. The extent of impact of an option on probabilities of a single rational decision-maker's actions would seem to depend on further assumptions about that actor's preferences, risk orientation, and the ratio of change in costs and risks to the full costs and risks of the relevant class of action. Forcing buyers of wedding licenses to appear in person at the purchasing office prevents few weddings, whereas giving investors the option of placing orders for common stock by tele-

might not be so if the decision-maker's commitments to intervene consisted of inescapable promises to perform specified actions in unambiguous circumstances—and if he could act only where committed. But U.S. commitments promise “to meet the common danger in accordance with its [national] constitutional processes” and to “assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith . . . such action as it [the United States] deems necessary”<sup>13</sup>—to take operative lines from our Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments. Thus, creating options that affect ease and costs and risks of action should, in logic, affect the single rational decision-maker's interpretation of where military intervention is justified—given the costs and benefits of action.

Logic, however, is the nub of the argument. The issue is one of fact. In recent American history, has the availability of ready military options had any significant effect on decisions about the use of force? Many former Department of Defense officials are inclined to agree with McNamara and Enthoven that the answer is *no*. In an excellent but insufficiently noted critique of U.S. defense policy, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke considers the issue of “limiting the options of the U.S. national security establishment.” According to Messrs. Warnke and Gelb,

it is difficult to accept that . . . [military] “leanness” makes a tough decision significantly easier. Where the President sits is at the head of the table—both within the bureaucracy and within the American political arena. When it comes

phone—rather than having to appear in person at the stock exchange or brokerage—substantially increases the number of stock transactions.

13. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, art. 4; North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5.

to the use of force . . . the President, his views and values, will continue to be the "critical variable."<sup>14</sup>

Warnke and Gelb cite two cases in support of their conclusion. "When it comes to the use of force in particular," they maintain, "Presidents can resist their bureaucracies, as Eisenhower did over Dienbienphu in 1954, and they can lead them, as Kennedy did with Laos in 1961."

These two cases deserve careful inspection. There now exists a rich historical record about each. Here we must summarize briefly, at the risk of caricature. But we will note the judgments of historians who have studied these events.

### *Dienbienphu*

In late 1953 and early 1954, the fall of Indochina seemed imminent.<sup>15</sup> The U.S. government faced the issue of military intervention. From the record, it appears that no one involved in the intra-governmental debate questioned Indochina's value to U.S. security interests in the Far East. Rather, participants focused on the issue of the desirability and feasibility of military intervention. Many participants, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur William Radford, recommended U.S. air and naval action. Army Chief of Staff Matthew Bunker Ridgway disagreed. The *Pentagon Papers* reproduces the Army position

14. Paul C. Warnke and Leslie H. Gelb, "Security or Confrontation: The Case for a Defense Policy," *Foreign Policy*, no. 1 (Winter 1970-71), p. 20.

15. This summary draws on *The Pentagon Papers*, the Senator Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), vol. 1; Melvin Gurtov, *The First Vietnam Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Chalmers Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," *The Reporter*, September 14, 1954; and Robert Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956).

paper submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) in the first week of April 1954. It argues:

1. U.S. intervention with combat forces in Indochina is not militarily desirable. . . .
2. A victory in Indochina cannot be assured by U.S. intervention with air and naval forces alone.
3. The use of atomic weapons in Indochina would not reduce the number of ground forces required to achieve a victory in Indochina. . . .
4. Seven U.S. divisions or their equivalent with appropriate naval and air support would be required to win a victory in Indochina. . . .
5. Two U.S. divisions can be placed in Indochina in 30 days, and an additional 5 divisions in the following 120 days. This could be accomplished without reducing U.S. ground strength in the Far East to an unacceptable degree, but *the U.S. ability to meet its NATO commitment would be seriously affected for a considerable period.*<sup>16</sup>

The President seems to have been impressed by Ridgway's argument.<sup>17</sup> Thereafter, other service chiefs and Department of Defense officials backed away from the issue in deference to the Army. President Eisenhower insisted on congressional approval before any military venture. Dulles and Radford presented their plan for an air strike to congressional leaders who raised questions about the position of the

16. *Pentagon Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 92-93.

17. According to Ridgway's memoirs, *Soldier* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), an Army report on the feasibility of U.S. troops fighting in Indochina was strongly negative. "As soon as the full report was in, I lost no time in having it passed on up the chain of command. It reached President Eisenhower. To a man of his military experience its implications were immediately clear. The idea of intervening was abandoned, and it is my belief that the analysis which the Army made and presented to higher authority played a considerable, perhaps a decisive, part in persuading our government not to embark on that tragic adventure" (p. 227).



service chiefs, the need for ground forces if an air strike failed, and support and participation of Allies. Dulles and Radford could assure them on none of these issues. In particular, no ally was willing to join in the "united action." On May 7, the issue died with the fall of Dienbienphu.

In a survey of President Eisenhower's decisions as commander in chief, the diplomatic historian Ernest R. May writes:

In 1954, when the Viet Minh closed around Dienbienphu, the President spoke as if he meant to deal with Indochina as a new Korea. He compared the nations of Southeast Asia to a stack of dominoes, and said at a press conference on April 7 that if one fell, all might fall. It is reported that he initialed his "OK" on a NSC recommendation for limited intervention. Only then did he learn from General Ridgway that there were not the necessary troops or transports and that to carry out the decision would mean national mobilization at least on the scale of 1950-1951.

The President hesitated. While the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Vice-President, and others urged him to act, conflicting counsels came from other members of the administration, senators, and representatives of allied governments. Dienbienphu fell, and north Indochina became Communist territory.<sup>18</sup>

May concludes that "America's inaction appeared to be the product not of a conscious decision, but of procrastination and indecision."<sup>19</sup> Among the factors fueling that hesitation were the absence of ready troops and fast transport; the trade-off between committing forces to meet this threat and saving them for the much more important NATO contingencies; and the necessity for national mobilization to implement the decision.

18. Ernest R. May, ed., *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief* (New York: G. Braziller, 1960), pp. 220-21.

19. Ibid.

### Laos

Laos presented a rather different issue, one which President John Kennedy inherited from his predecessor.<sup>20</sup> During the transition, Eisenhower warned Kennedy that the situation was deteriorating and recommended U.S. military intervention if necessary. Approaching the issue with an inclination for action, Kennedy accepted the advice.

A combination of causes postponed the President's decision. First was the military's lack of enthusiasm for a limited intervention. Army Chief of Staff George Decker opposed intervention unless we were prepared "to go all the way so as not to get bogged down in an endless war." The reluctance of the Joint Chiefs was summed up in Chairman Lyman L. Lemnitzer's proposition to Kennedy: "If we are given the right to use nuclear weapons, we can guarantee victory."<sup>21</sup> Arthur Schlesinger concludes that: "This opposition to limited intervention had a powerful effect. As Robert Kennedy said: 'If even the Marines don't want to go in!'"<sup>22</sup>

A second factor was the inability of Kennedy's military advisers to agree on what forces would be required for victory. The Joint Chiefs of Staff requirement started at 40 thousand U.S. troops. It quickly escalated to 60 thousand and then to 140 thousand equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. A third consideration was the effect of intervention on our ability to act elsewhere. Kennedy's military aide, Gen-

20. This summary draws on Charles Stevenson, *The End of Nowhere: American Policy toward Laos since 1954* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); and Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

21. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 338.

22. Ibid.

eral C. V. Clifton, has written of Kennedy's "stunned amazement" when he learned that if he sent 10 thousand troops to Southeast Asia, he would have no strategic reserves left for other contingencies.<sup>23</sup> A fourth factor became especially important in the late April crisis. At that point, Lemnitzer recommended limited intervention. Fresh from the Bay of Pigs fiasco (April), Kennedy questioned this advice. He insisted that his military advisers state their views clearly in writing. From the Pentagon he received eight different memoranda—one each from the secretary, the service secretaries, and the four Chiefs of Staff. As Kennedy remarked afterwards, "Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did. Otherwise we'd be in Laos by now—and that would be a hundred times worse."<sup>24</sup>

Further factors may have been of even greater importance: congressional opposition, public opinion, and the President's personal values. But can one feel confident that the United States would not have intervened if a mobile strategic reserve of 140 thousand men had been available and the Chiefs had unanimously guaranteed success?

These two examples demonstrate that "leanness," that is, the absence of ready military capability, can indeed affect interpretations of commitments and decisions about responses to contingencies that might be met by military force. But are there cases on the other side, that is, instances where the existence of specific ready capabilities encouraged more expansive views of U.S. interests and commitments (than would have prevailed in the absence of these capabilities) and actual decisions to use military force? Again, the

available evidence must be examined thoroughly; but again, limits of space permit only crude summaries.

### Korea

Korea is by all accounts an instance in which presidential preferences overrode all other factors.<sup>25</sup> In the period preceding the June 1950 invasion of South Korea, the U.S. government on two separate occasions considered the issue of Korea's importance to the United States and even addressed the specific question of what the United States would do if Korea were attacked. All interested parties participated in these discussions. On both occasions the National Security Council reached formal decisions, approved by the President. The NSC paper of April 1948 read: "The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a 'casus belli' for the United States."<sup>26</sup> The Army advocated complete withdrawal of its forces from South Korea. General Douglas MacArthur, commander of American forces in the Far East, supported this position with the judgment that "in the event of any serious threat to the security of Korea, strategic and military considerations will force abandonment of any pre-

25. This survey relies heavily on Ernest R. May, "The Power of History's 'Lessons': Intervention in Korea, 1950," in E. R. May, *The Misunderstood Muse*, forthcoming; and Glenn Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York: The Free Press, 1968).

26. Robert Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG In Peace and War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1962), p. 30; J. L. Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 29, cited by May, "Power of History's 'Lessons.'"

23. "Hail to the Chief," *Army* 14 (January 1964), quoted in Stevenson, *End of Nowhere*, p. 135.

24. Sorenson, *Kennedy*, p. 644.

tense of military support.”<sup>27</sup> In May of 1949 the NSC reaffirmed its 1948 decision and authorized withdrawal of American forces by June. Shortly thereafter, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley sent to the other Chiefs a memorandum entitled “Implications of a Possible Full-Scale Invasion from North Korea Subsequent to Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Korea.” Bradley recommended that in such an event U.S. nationals be evacuated and the aggression be reported to the United Nations. But he held open the possibility of reintroducing American troops as part of a U.N. force. The other Chiefs overruled Bradley, agreeing on the following statement:

From the strategic viewpoint, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Korea, summarized briefly, is that Korea is of little strategic value to the United States and that any commitment to United States use of military force in Korea would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of the potentialities of the over-all world situation and of our heavy international obligations as compared with our current military strength.<sup>28</sup>

In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered his celebrated National Press Club speech defining a perimeter beyond which the United States would not try to defend positions. Bordered by Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines, that perimeter excluded Korea. Thus, to whatever extent the U.S. government can ever be said to have made a policy choice about future action, it had chosen not to use American troops to defend Korea.

When on June 24, 1950, North Korea

actually invaded South Korea, President Harry Truman took the lead. His *Memoirs* recall his initial reaction to the news:

I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. . . . I felt certain that if South Korea were allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. . . . If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war.<sup>29</sup>

Before the first meeting with his advisers as a group, he began sending signals that he meant to “hit them hard,” that he did not intend to “let the U.N. down.” At the initial Blair House meeting, he probed his advisers with questions about the readiness of U.S. forces in Asia, the ability of the Air Force and Navy to check the North Koreans unaided by ground troops, and the time needed to shift the U.S. divisions in Japan to Korea.<sup>30</sup> Truman’s decisions for American involvement escalated in steps: from logistic support, to air and naval action, to troops. But Truman’s *Memoirs* suggests that by the end of the first Blair House Conference, the die was cast. He had determined to do what was necessary to save South Korea. Since he sat at the head of the table, his determination was sufficient.

It is impossible to settle speculation about, What would have happened if. . . . One must consider, however, how the decision might have come out had the United States found itself without capability for immediate response. As it happened, there were three divisions of occupation forces in Japan. Fourteen days after the attack, the first of these divisions reached the front line. Twenty-three days after the attack, the two additional divisions arrived. These

27. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 28; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1956), p. 329, cited by May, “Power of History’s ‘Lessons.’”

28. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 30.

29. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 333.

30. See Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, pp. 335ff; and Paige, *Korean Decision*, pp. 125-43.

forces stemmed the attack and secured a beachhead for later reinforcement. Without these divisions, the South Korean Army would have been pushed off the Korean peninsula within the first month of war. The first division of U.S. troops deployed from the continental United States to Korea arrived on the fifty-sixth day after the attack.<sup>31</sup>

Had there been no U.S. troops or air and naval forces in the vicinity of Korea, the American commander in the Far East would have been forced to report the likelihood of South Korea's being overrun before U.S. troops arrived. In that case, Truman's questions to his military advisers on that first night at Blair House would have elicited rather different answers. Incapable of preventing a North Korean takeover of South Korea, the President would have faced the question of whether to commit the United States to the defense of South Korea, given the near certainty that this would mean months of building up U.S. troops in the Far East prior to a Normandy-style invasion of an enemy-held peninsula. The JCS's earlier judgment about the strategic unimportance of Korea might have loomed larger. The JCS recommendation would certainly have been different. Indeed, it might well have been for general mobilization in preparation

for major war. What Truman would have decided in these circumstances is unclear—though one should recall that another President, confronting North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*, and lacking any ready capability to respond, chose to do nothing.

### *The Bay of Pigs*

The impact of a para-military option on the President's decision to initiate the abortive Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-led invasion of Cuba in 1961 is quite clear.<sup>32</sup> When Kennedy arrived in the presidency, this train was on the track. Invasion forces being readied by the CIA in Guatemala were growing restless, and the Guatemalan government insisted that they leave. The CIA guaranteed the operation's success. The Chiefs of Staff concurred—perhaps because they had no direct responsibility for the venture.

Kennedy had a choice between saying yes on the one hand, or trying to derail the train on the other. In the campaign, he had taken a strong stand against Castro. If he now chose the latter course of action, Cuban refugees in Miami and disgruntled officials in Washington would charge that he stopped an Eisenhower-initiated, quick fix of the Cuban problem that was certain to succeed. So he went ahead. As Arthur Schlesinger concludes:

The determination to keep this scheme alive sprang in part, I believe, from the embarrassments of calling it off. As Dulles said at the March 11 meeting, "Don't forget that we have a disposal problem. If we have to take these men out of Guatemala, we will have to transfer them to the United States, and we can't have them wandering around the country telling everyone what they have been

31. In an entirely different context, and without reference to this issue, Secretary McNamara's Force Posture Statement lends support to this argument: "We came close to being pushed off the Korean peninsula before we were finally able to stem the attack and secure a beachhead for later reinforcement. What prevented this from happening was the availability of three U.S. divisions in Japan" (p. 142). General J. L. Collins writes of going to the first Blair House Conference: "I thought how fortunate it was for us that the Soviets had picked for this venture the one area of the world where the U.S. military forces of all arms were well positioned if we should decide to intervene" (*War in Peacetime*, p. 4).

32. This summary draws on Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs* (New York: Norton, 1964); Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*; Sorenson, *Kennedy*; Karl Meyer and Tad Szulc, *The Cuban Invasion* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

doing." . . . *The contingency had thus become a reality: having created the Brigade as an option, the CIA now presented its use against Cuba as a necessity.* Nor did Dulles's arguments lack force. Confronted by them, Kennedy tentatively agreed that the simplest thing, after all, might be to let the Cubans go where they yearned to go—to Cuba.<sup>33</sup>

(This case also illustrates how existing capabilities can be resisted. During the invasion, despite strong recommendations that the United States employ available aircover, Kennedy refused.)

### *Vietnam*

The most complex and troubling case is Vietnam. The Kennedy administration built up U.S. ready conventional capabilities for meeting brush-fire threats, increasing active army divisions from eleven to sixteen. The administration emphasized preparation for counter-insurgency. The *Pentagon Papers* leaves one with a strong—but perhaps deceptive—impression that it was essentially a matter of time before someone, in some circumstance, would find a winning argument for putting these forces to use, somewhere. The availability of this capability plus advertisements about its effectiveness certainly contributed to the unanimity of Lyndon Johnson's circle of advisers—with the exception of George Ball. These forces-in-being permitted President Johnson to make major war in Vietnam without the kind of major signal at home that mobilization or a call-up of the reserves would have provided.

Perhaps the point need not be labored further. *The availability of a ready military option has been one major factor in U.S. decision about the use of force—not the only factor, not neces-*

sarily the determining factor, and not an insurmountable factor. Other factors have been more important: the general public consensus about the main lines of American foreign policy; the president's deep-seated values. But, however other factors are assessed, one influence on presidential decisions to respond to crises by the introduction of American troops has been the availability of a ready military option.

### CALCULATING THE FULL COSTS—AND BENEFITS—OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The preceding argument might seem to lead to the conclusion that the United States should slash its military capabilities lest they suck us into yet another tragic war. Given the pervasive post-Vietnam intervention allergy, many people are tempted by this conclusion. The temptation should be resisted. That conclusion is no part of the argument of this article.

For the present and for the foreseeable future, the United States will require substantial conventional military capabilities. The stability and benign evolution of Europe depend critically on American commitments and military might. Japan's confident entry into the international community depends importantly on American security guarantees. The deterrent role of U.S. promises and power still seems a linchpin of the existing international order. Consider the likely consequences of a total and complete American conventional disarmament. The greatest mistake in our history to date, Vietnam, might shrink into a short chapter in what would become a book of tragedy. Fortunately, such a drastic reduction of American conventional capabilities is politically inconceivable.

What then does the preceding argument imply? Mostly it raises issues that carry far beyond the scope of this

33. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 242, emphasis added.

article. Here we can simply state six implications starkly.

1. We must recognize the fact that creating some kinds of military capabilities does affect decisions about the use of force, and we must find ways of including this fact in choices about such weapons systems.

Not all weapons systems create new capabilities or perceptibly affect costs and risks of action. For those that do, however, Russell's range of considerations cannot be denied. Choices about such weapon systems inevitably involve hard trade-offs among a number of competing objectives: (1) the deterrent—and interaction—effect of the particular capability; (2) the defense utility of the capability; (3) economic costs of the capability; and (4) effects of the capability on probabilities of use. Objective 4 is the most difficult to calculate and seems essentially incommensurate with the others. People's judgments about each of the clusters of considerations will differ. Regarding objective 4, those who feel that the United States is likely to err on the side of inaction or late action will judge capabilities differently from those who worry more about action where none is required. While the author's biases will be no secret, the Korean example certainly demonstrates the enormous costs and risks entailed by the lack of ready forces.

2. When, for reasons of deterrence or defense or cost-effectiveness, it seems wise to create military capabilities that do have added, independent effects on probabilities of use, we must find ways of posting warning signs about these effects, and, where possible, of creating countervailing pressures.

Denials of the impact of capabilities on decisions have obscured the few precautionary clues that were available. In the late 1950s and early 1960s,

civilian strategists concentrated on the problem of alternatives to massive nuclear retaliation. Consequently, they advocated a substantial buildup of conventional forces. As the Kennedy administration expanded ready conventional capabilities, Defense Department analysts planned an array of conventional options that would permit the president to meet contingencies without having to rely on nuclear weapons. No one put forward hard analyses of the wider effects of these capabilities and plans—illustrating once more the way in which the general weakness of State Department analysis, as compared to Defense analysis, meant a further predominance of military over political considerations within the U.S. government. It is perhaps too much to hope that far-sighted White House staff could have commissioned careful examinations of recent cases that might have made vivid to the president and other major officials the probable secondary effects of the chosen course. In the climate of the times, that would have seemed a hopelessly abstract academic exercise. Indeed, if anyone had bothered to search the products of academe, he would have found no detailed analyses of specific ways in which capabilities can affect official expectations, contingency plans, military and diplomatic estimates, advisers' recommendations, and in the end, presidential decisions.

What about countervailing pressures? If the creation of a ready military option brings with it professionals—both military and civilian—commissioned to search for contingencies in which that option can be exercised, and committed to finding ways of meeting contingencies successfully, a minimum counterweight would be proportional increases in the ability of independent sources to assess the need for and effectiveness of that option. Unfortunately, conven-

tional capabilities and intelligence estimates were regarded as entirely separate problems. Central Intelligence Agency estimates of threats were available—and in retrospect, quite respectable. There existed no independent analysis of military operations—though, in retrospect, the military professionals' predictions get higher marks than do the bets of civilian professionals involved in this process. No one familiar with the unfolding of U.S. choices in Vietnam, however, can underestimate the importance of more systematic analysis of proposed uses of American forces, more careful projection of enemy reactions, and an attempt to consider the consequences if less favorable projections turn out to be right. The absence of competing sources of information and assessment, both about likelihoods in situations where military intervention is contemplated and about military performance, estimates, and requirements, remains the major gap in U.S. military posture.

3. As developed and applied by McNamara and Enthoven, PPBS provides a greatly improved methodology for comparing effectiveness and costs of alternative military forces. This approach is important in every case and especially powerful in choices about weapons that have few important effects beyond their military mission narrowly conceived. These include, for example, most choices about tanks, rifles, or tactical aircraft.

4. Even on this home ground, PPBS is simply one analytic tool. In rhetoric and often in practice, PPBS advocates tended to present their calculations as the dominant determinant of the size and shape of our military forces. A reader of Force Posture Statements might conclude that the secretary of defense and his analytic staff had a firm grip on the defense budget and considerable control: that he could, for

example, reduce the budget total by 20 percent—if calculations showed that were wise—or adjust the number of divisions or carriers by 20 percent. This could not be further from the truth. Though this article has focused primarily on effects of military capabilities outside the Defense Department, the characterization of the national security establishment applies inside the Pentagon as well. The impact of President Nixon's 40 percent reduction in the number of contingencies the United States is preparing to meet simultaneously tells the tale: the President reduced from two and a half to one and a half the number of wars the United States will prepare to fight simultaneously; service calculations of the forces required for meeting one and a half wars called for only slight increases over existing levels. (In fact, a slight decrease resulted.) As Russell's argument suggests, participants are often clearer about the conclusions than they are about the calculations.

5. Review of current American forces in the light of the above considerations raises serious questions about a number of weapon systems—none more so than American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

At present, the United States and its NATO allies maintain a level of forces in Europe sufficient, according to official estimates, to provide a conventional defense against a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact without resort to nuclear weapons. In addition, U.S. general purpose forces are armed with over seven thousand tactical nuclear weapons, the primary objective of which is to deter Soviet use of similar weapons in any conventional war. These weapons are deployed as part of the standard equipment of front line units, both American and Allied—under U.S. guard.

What impact will this tactical nuclear option have in the case of a major en-

agement between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces? Civilian defense analyses show that NATO conventional forces can withstand an attack. These calculations appear in the Force Posture Statement as the official doctrine and the rationale for these capabilities. But most military officers flatly disagree with these conclusions.

In the unlikely event that Warsaw Pact forces actually attacked NATO, no one can be sure what would happen. But one plausible scenario has American military forces falling back; a request by the American commander in Europe for authorization to use tactical nuclear weapons to prevent defeat; and a Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation to the president for such authorization. In this case, the president would not have an unbiased choice about using nuclear weapons.

6. The argument of this article provides yet another reason for careful re-examination of the requirements for the current large, standing ready military forces—sixteen active divisions, sixteen aircraft carriers, and twenty-one modernized tactical air wings.

Why do we need a fundamental re-evaluation of the rationale for current U.S. conventional forces? The list of considerations is long:

- a. The emergence of a U.S.-Soviet stalemate in strategic capabilities—which makes conventional adventures less dangerous, thus perhaps more likely, and therefore possibly requiring different conventional forces;
- b. changes in the basic political environment, including U.S.-Soviet détente; U.S.-Chinese discussions; Soviet-Chinese hostility—thus decreasing the probability of Warsaw Pact attacks on Europe, Chinese attacks on Southeast Asia, and

both attacks occurring simultaneously;

- c. the economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan—thus permitting them to provide more of their own defense;
- d. revised assessments of the importance to the United States of the security or political regime of many other countries, including some who are our allies;
- e. the demonstrated unwillingness of the American public to support wars like Vietnam;
- f. budgetary stringency and the need to shift resources to domestic priorities.

Effects of capabilities on probabilities of use add another reason to the list. But the connection between these considerations and reductions of our conventional forces is less clear than it might seem. A review of the rationale for conventional forces will, I think, conclude that reductions are desirable. It will not recommend cutting forces below those required for meeting our major commitments in Western Europe and Japan. These forces are essentially fungible, that is, they can be used for contingencies other than the ones for which they are designed. Thus the minimum forces conceivable are still sufficient to allow the president, or the president and Congress, if they so choose, to intervene militarily in almost any contingency in almost any country. Limiting conventional capabilities will not, in and of itself, foreclose the possibility of an initial commitment of forces anywhere.

Nevertheless, reducing ready conventional capabilities can have significant effects: on expectations within the military and civilian bureaucracy about the number and kind of situations in which we will intervene; on contingency plans for such; on general estimates about



what we can do; on specific estimates in particular situations; and on the perceived trade-off between meeting one contingency and being prepared to meet others.

Moreover, certain specific features of our conventional capabilities have more effect on probabilities of use than others. In particular, the location of forces, their mobility, and the availability of supplies are little-noted but important factors. Consider the impact of forward supply depots à la FDLs on expectations, contingency plans, and specific estimates in crises. For many years, the United States has used control of supplies to affect the actions of allies like the Koreans or South Vietnamese. There may be a clue here for congressmen, or secretaries of defense and presidents interested in affecting U.S. behavior.

A final factor deserving careful further study is readiness. Contrary to revisionist historians, military leaders are rarely eager to go to war. Indeed, they are rarely ready.<sup>34</sup> Historically, both American and other national military services tend to recommend "further preparation" when confronting crises that might seem to require war. If the American military services are simply allowed to "do their own thing," the United States will have few ready forces. The services have traditionally prepared for the long haul, concentrating on hardware that requires years of development. This behavior reflects—or is at least consistent with—a theory that the decision to make war involves a major national commitment that should not be importantly affected by short-term considerations. The services have conceived of deterrence less

in terms of a ready ability to meet every level of threat, and more in terms of the overall strength and will of the United States. In the current international environment, the United States may need ready, mobile forces for some contingencies. But the services' longstanding judgments about these issues deserve a much more careful hearing than they have yet received.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Full recognition of the independent impact of American military capabilities on American foreign policy would force a substantial reconception of the responsibilities of the secretary of defense. That work has not even begun. But taking the case of FDL as a point of departure, we can suggest some lines for further investigation.

By law, the secretary of defense is "the principal assistant to the president in all matters relating to national security." Though in fact he shares that responsibility with the president's assistant for national security affairs and the secretary of state, his responsibility for military policy and posture is paramount.

He takes the responsibility for providing American military forces second to none. He must determine what capabilities are required to deter potential aggressors. He must decide what capabilities are sufficient for meeting relevant contingencies. He must select among alternative forces so as to achieve the most defense for the available dollars. But can he separate these responsibilities from those of interpreting American commitments or deciding about when and where to use military force? Evidently not.

With the assistant for national security affairs and the secretary of state, he must assume responsibility for man-

34. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), especially chap. 3, "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic."

aging the complex processes of the U.S. national security establishment so that the president and the country are well served. Specifically, that means structuring the processes to assure: (1) identification of the important issues that demand presidential attention; (2) education of the president on these issues; (3) good maps of these issues including a detailed layout of alternatives with careful estimates of the consequences of each; and (4) maximum leeway for the president to choose and to implement actions consistent with his best judgment of the country's best interests.

Could such responsibilities require the secretary of defense to limit the president's options? Obviously not—though the president himself might well decide to limit his own options in order to preserve his freedom of action. Eisenhower's "New Look" in defense policy seems to have reflected not only his decision that the United States should not fight another war Korea-style, but also his recognition that this force posture would shield him against inevitable demands that he "do all that was possible" to prevent a communist victory in a situation like Indochina. In 1970, President Nixon strongly, but unsuccessfully, opposed congressional legislation giving him the power to impose wage and price controls—an option which, some twelve months later, he employed.

Do these responsibilities require that a secretary of defense's public rationale for weapons selections include factors like the affect on probabilities of use? Again, perhaps not—since, to do so might well be counter-productive. (Some of Secretary McNamara's greatest contributions seem to have involved using a PPBS rationale to bias the bargaining game in favor of outcomes he judged right on the basis of calculations broader than PPBS.)

Do these responsibilities require the

secretary of defense to emphasize effects of weapons systems on probabilities of use, to the neglect of deterrence, defense, and cost-effectiveness? Again, obviously not.

But these responsibilities do require the secretary of defense to recognize the wider effects of narrower decisions about military posture and policy: the numerous ways in which decisions about military forces taken with an eye to one set of objectives produce secondary consequences of equivalent or even greater importance. The impact of ready military capabilities on decisions about the use of force is one. The effect of professionals, especially civilian professionals charged with finding an effective way of doing successfully what may be an essentially undoable job, is a second. (Would professional alchemists charged with making gold for the price of coal not come up with a contingency plan that offered, in their judgment, a substantial probability of success?) Further examples of Defense decisions that have important, but mostly neglected, secondary effects include: foreign military bases—and consequences for relations with host countries; military aid—and effects on U.S. policy towards developing countries; and military arms sales—and the impact on buyers.<sup>35</sup>

Americans naturally resist secondary effects, especially unintended effects of a systemic nature. We tend to operate on the implicit assumption that problems are decomposable; that each man can concentrate on his piece of the problem, leaving other pieces to others; that doing one aspect of a job better will produce a better outcome overall—rather than tilting some larger

35. For elaboration of this argument, see Adam Yarmolinsky, *The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), especially chap. 9.

interdependent system in favor of one set of considerations or toward one kind of outcome. Thus, for example, we minimize such effects as those of wealth or expertise on outcomes in courts before which every man is equal. And we neglect the effects of technical competence or expertise on the outcomes of regulatory processes meant to mete out impartial judgments. The complexity of systems like the processes of the U.S. national security establishment boggle the mind. But is the system not part of the problem?

In the context of the early 1960s,

given a Democratic president's vulnerability to charges about another "loss" of China, and the clout of the military in Congress and society; the creation of large, ready conventional military capabilities, coupled with so much attention to the threat of insurgency and so many people devising strategies for counter-insurgency, had the effect of making almost inevitable a decision to use these forces somewhere. Yet who today is trying to calculate the secondary effects of substantial reductions in American conventional capabilities in the post-Vietnam climate of the 1970s?

# The Governance of the Military

By SIDNEY HYMAN

ABSTRACT: First, this paper traces the root sources of the crisis of legitimacy now gripping both the civil and military components in the governance of the American military establishment. Then it shows how our national reactions to revolutionary changes in post-World War II military technology and in world politics shattered the long-standing 1789 constitutional formula for a controlled military impulse. Next it focuses on certain aspects of the legitimacy crisis. Constitutional assumptions underlying amateur-expert relations in military governance have been unhinged by the tendency of the civil order to subordinate its own judgment of an "emergency need" to the judgment of the professional military experts. Further, old constitutional fiscal controls over the military establishment have been shattered by the Congress, and Congress has allowed its own constitutional power to "declare war" to be swallowed up by the grants to the president or his assumption of a unilateral discretionary power to "make war." Finally, it examines some remedies for the crisis of legitimacy, focusing not only on congressional reform, but on the role of the electorate and the indispensable need for a president to place himself under a self-denying ordinance.

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WHAT is the present state of the structure for the governance of the American military establishment? A quick answer heard on all sides goes like this. The American military, and the land army in particular, is in a profound "crisis of legitimacy," and the cause stems from its afflicted role in the Vietnam War. It is now viewed by many Americans as an institution with a bar sinister on its heraldic shield and thus has lost its moral authority to command automatic public allegiance to its purposes.

The quick answer, so stated, has the ring of a maxim. It has the virtue of simplicity, and it does contain a nugget of truth. Still, it not only falls short of a large reality, but obscures it. The larger reality is that the crisis of legitimacy now grips not merely the military, but all the civil components—the presidency, the Congress, and the electorate—in the constitutional structure for the governance of the American military establishment. Further, the onset of the crisis predated by almost two decades the hour when American armed forces were committed on a massive scale to a direct combat role in Vietnam. The crisis began with the first interactions between our national responses to the post-World War II revolutionary changes in military science and technology, and to the concurrent revolutionary changes in the nature of world politics.

Whether those responses were wise, or whether they should have taken some alternative form, need not be argued right here. The main point is that they shattered the long-standing structure we inherited from the 1787 Constitutional Convention for the governance of the American military. In nonmilitary realms, when lines of action prompted by changing needs moved beyond traditional constitutional constraints, attempts were generally made to clamp

a new harness of legal controls on the matter at issue. This was not true, however, in the military realm. No new system for responsible power was erected to take the place of the old one that had been shattered.

A brief glance at the 1787 constitutional provisions for a controlled military impulse may help—through force of contrast—to bring into clear focus the way things stand today.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The authors of the 1787 Constitution saw in Union itself—and the favorable geography of the nation—the chief means for reducing the need for large and costly standing armies. Union, for example, would foster policies that would remove the causes of internal disorders, while the very size of the Union would present a formidable obstacle to the ambitions of hostile foreign powers.

It was recognized, however, that liberty could not be left entirely defenseless. It needed a protective military shield. So the constitutional authors set in place the interrelated terms for the common defense and for its governance.

They provided for a small federal force that would always be at the disposal of the central government, but the main reliance was placed on "well regulated state militias." Second, Congress was granted the right to call the state militias into the service of the United States and to organize, arm, discipline, and govern them in that service—though the appointment of militia officers was reserved to the states. The Congress was also granted the power to raise and support an army and navy, and to pay the debts incurred in the common defense. But to forestall the danger that the forces, once raised, would remain in being forever, congressional appropriations for defense—as

for all other matters—were limited to two-year periods.

As a further control on the military impulse, the power to "declare war" was vested in Congress alone. The Constitutional Convention itself, however, distinguished between the power to "declare" and to "make" war. In a constitutional draft of August 6, 1787, Congress was entitled to "make" war. But as James Madison observed in his Notes, the verb "declare" was put in place of the verb "make" so as to "leave the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." It was also recognized that the treaty-making power had concealed in it a capacity to commit the American armed forces to the support of a foreign alliance. To forestall abuses on this account, the president was granted the power to "negotiate" treaties, but the right of ratification was reserved to two-thirds of the Senate.

Finally, the constitutional formula made the president the commander in chief of the regular army and navy, and of the state militias when called into the actual service of the United States. "The propriety of this provision," Hamilton observed in the *Federalist*, "was so evident in itself and, at the same time, so consonant with the precedents of state constitutions in general [where the military authority was vested in the governor] that little need be said to explain or enforce it." In fact, while the *Federalist* dredged every word and comma in the Constitution and showed what they meant in a wide range of contingencies, the vast and dark continent of the "commander-in-chief" clause was barely touched.

In the original view, the power the president could exercise as commander in chief apparently was limited to purely military objects. He was the top general and the top admiral, and there were no officers over him. In that high state, he was authorized to direct

the movement of military forces placed by law at his command and to employ them in a manner which he thought would be the most effective in harassing, conquering, and subduing the enemy. But this was all he could do in the conduct of military operations. Despite his high ranking title, the president could not wield any powers presumably assigned to the legislative branch of the government.

The latter view underwent a sharp change with the outbreak of the Civil War. The commander in chief who had formerly looked forward to the battle line alone was now equipped with a second pair of eyes, fixed on the whole zone of the interior, supporting the clash between armed formations. Lincoln, under the pressures of necessity, so interpreted his role as commander in chief that it became a source of "inherent powers," divorced from the legislature and virtually unlimited in scope to meet the domestic aspects of a war emergency. The precedent thus established, and extended in the First World War, developed an autonomous life of its own; so much so, that by the fourth decade of the twentieth century, presidents invoked their title of commander in chief to give a legal gloss to actions which neither they nor the Congress could lawfully take under the cover of any other phrase in the Constitution.

#### AFTER WORLD WAR II

In the passing years, every point in the 1787 constitutional design was subject to episodic or variable strains. However the overarching constitutional structure for the governance of the military remained reasonably intact until the end of the Second World War. Today, as I have suggested above, it is a many-splintered thing.

Union itself, and American geography, no longer work silently to elimi-

nate the need for costly military establishments. American interests collide daily with those of other powers, while the advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles has drained the oceans behind which Americans could once slowly mobilize their forces. With the contraction of time and space as factors in national defense, state militias were declassed in significance. A huge standing army came into being at the disposal of the central government—a standing army that differed not only in size but in purpose when compared with the small standing army on the eve of the Second World War. It was not a “mobilization cadre” whose essential purpose was to train a mass of reserves and conscripts in time of war. It took on the character of a “force in being,” presumably competent to deal at once with any emergency situation that might arise.

New modes of warfare, coupled with new doctrines of deterrence, spurred the rise of a vast national security bureaucracy whose layers upon layers threatened to poke a hole through the soles on the sandals of the Heavenly Choir. Bilateral alliances, once limited to the length of a shooting war, became bloc alliances that were open-ended. Deployments of American forces, which used to be confined to soil under American sovereignty, were extended in time of peace to the soil of friendly foreign powers around the world. Federal expenditures in support of the diverse purposes of the military consumed over three-fourths of annual budgets, while the civilian personnel alone in the defense establishment was more than one-half of all the persons on the executive payroll.

More profound changes undercut the theory of knowledge, derived from John Locke, and which had once sustained the whole of the constitutional structure. In his *Second Treatise on Civil*

*Government*, Locke had written: “Who shall judge whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? . . . The people shall judge: for who shall be judge whether the trustees or deputy act well according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deposes him.” The constitutional design similarly included a structure for amateur-expert relations with respect to knowledge. The president, for example, was assigned an expert’s role in matters of the sword and the negotiation of treaties. In other matters, such as the purse, the president was reduced to amateur status, while the expert’s role was assigned to the Congress. At the same time, it was assumed that the people at large, as amateurs or generalists, would know enough to judge whether the president and the Congress acted well according to the expert-amateur trusts reposed in them directly.

In the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth, an educated man could, in fact, know enough to pass an informed judgment about the public cases that were either decided in his name by his deputies in government, or by himself directly as an office-holding deputy. When the cases to be decided lay in the realm of military affairs, he seldom felt overawed at the outset of a controversy with professional military experts. Least of all was he overawed when the matter at issue was a proper definition of military “need” or “emergency.” He did not hesitate to argue vigorously his own version of reality.

Today, however, the Lockean theory of knowledge and the constitutional arrangements flowing from it have been hard hit by an accelerating scientific and technological revolution. Many of the cardinal political problems at the center of the governmental process—problems like those posed by nuclear weapons, missiles, space exploration,

defense systems—are now deeply entwined with intricate scientific and technological questions. The questions, moreover, are not confined in reach to the American mainland. They are worldwide in scope, corresponding to the worldwide deployment of the army, navy, and air force, and to a worldwide system of alliances.

In these changed circumstances, do the deputies of the people—the president and the members of the Congress—know enough to act well? Do the people themselves know enough to judge whether the president and the Congress have, in fact, been faithful to their trust by acting well? I will argue in a moment that there are vital aspects of the new style questions where the president, the Congress, and the people are in touch with a special kind of knowledge which they could draw on to pass an independent and informed judgment on points at issue. The real problem is, however, that they all too often exhibit symptoms of an eroded morale. They seem to lack confidence in their ability or their right to challenge the professional military expert's version about the reality of an emergency, the character of a need, the choice of allies, or the identity of enemies.

#### *Further complications*

The case is further complicated from two sides. One is that the defense contract, in its political-economic aspects, has become a form of patronage whose scope renders ridiculous the old-style patronage geared to appointments to posts such as those of a postmaster, judge, ambassador, and so on. The second is that the old constitutional control of two-year congressional appropriations for military defense is now as vague as a line drawn through steam. Authorizations instead of appropriations

are made to permit the award of contracts for the development of weapons that take a number of years to perfect. The instrument being developed under that authorization, however, can be rendered obsolete by the advent of something new on another front, or can prove to be as impossible of fulfillment as a project to build mountains without valleys. When either of these conditions of fact becomes clear, a reasonable reaction would be to stop all further work on the instrument. But the facts of local life which tell on congressional behavior are often far larger than logic.

Many local interests that have come to depend for their bread on what turned out to be an irrelevant developmental project see themselves personally threatened if it were discontinued. Unions protest the threat of unemployment. Businessmen protest the threat of bankruptcy. Bankers protest the threat of mortgages in default. Professional men protest the threat of unpaid fees due them. The commotion engulfs the representative of the congressional district where the project is located; so he deforms his own judgment and seeks to elicit from the military experts a deformed judgment that the project is really essential to the national defense. It is not an arrangement likely to engender any respect among the military experts for the integrity of the political order. Nor, conversely, is it an arrangement likely to engender a spirit of independence among members of the Congress when they are confronted by the quid pro quo requests of the military experts. It is an arrangement for mutual corruption.

On top of everything else, the old constitutional structure for the governance of the military impulse has been massively breached by the fact that the power of the president to make war has swallowed up the power of the Congress to declare war.



It is true that in generations past, presidents often made war without a declaration of war by the Congress. During the nineteenth century, for example, presidents acting on their own authority used American armed forces to suppress piracy, to quell Indian uprisings, and to suppress the slave trade by American ships. They were also used in "hot pursuit" of criminals across frontiers and to protect American lives and property in areas where effective local governments were nonexistent or had ceased to exist. It was in the first decades of the twentieth century that presidents began to use American armed forces on their own authority, not against individuals, but against sovereign states. The states themselves were located either in the turbulent Caribbean, or in equally turbulent Central America—as in the instances of Colombia, Panama, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Mexico.

Beginning in the presidency of Truman, and extending through the presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, the presidential power to make war, and not the congressional power to declare war, came sharply into view as the paramount means whereby the country could be committed to a major war. Part of this shift in the locus of effective power stemmed from the atomic energy law which, of necessity, vested in the president alone the right to decide when nuclear weapons could be used. But another part of this shift stemmed from a series of new-style congressional resolutions which appeared to say, *a priori*, that the president could make war as he saw fit.

The first of these, the Formosa Resolution (1955), paid some sort of residual respect to the power of the Congress to say *yes* or *no* to the initiation of a war. The Congress, by the terms of the resolution, *authorized* President Eisenhower to "employ the Armed Forces"

upon his own finding of fact that their employment was needed for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. Subsequently, the Middle East resolution (1957), the Cuba resolution (1962), and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (1964) all dropped the concept of congressional authorization. The texts, by failing to express a direct grant of power by the Congress, seemed tacitly to accept the view that the president already had the power to use the armed forces on his own initiative as commander in chief and that the resolutions were no more than an expression of congressional moral support and a summons to national unity. In the specific case of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the language used was so broad as to constitute an acknowledgment of virtually unlimited presidential control of the armed forces. When the long list of bereavements in the Vietnam War was coupled with a long list of new demands in support of the war, members of the Congress vainly protested that in adopting the resolution their purpose was to take a firm stand which would help *prevent* a large-scale war—that it was not their purpose to lay a legal basis for the conduct of such a war. Maybe so. But if so, the resolution should be put at the center of a course on how *not* to write a declarative sentence.

#### HEALING THE BREACH

If I have correctly described some of the features in the breach between power and responsibility in the inherited 1787 constitutional structure for the governance of the military, what can be done to heal the breach?

An indispensable first step would be to restore the amateur's confidence in his capacity to hold his own in adversary proceedings with military experts in defining the meaning of "emergency" and "need." The military expert knows something. But he does not know

everything. For example, he does not know everything about human motivations, convictions, aspirations, fears, individual and group loyalties, justice, ethical criteria, and varieties of forms of leadership. Further, though he may bring an expert's knowledge to the specifically military component in any salient national security decision, he does not know everything about the many other factors that must be taken into account—domestic costs and resources, competing demands on those resources, psychic tensions, the likely reactions of friendly or hostile nations, the time factor involved in what goals can be attained by other means.

In all such matters, the politically minded amateur—whether he is part of the civil order of government or stands outside it—is or can be an expert of sorts in his own right, and his educated guesses can have a higher order of validity than those of the experts in military strategy and tactics. Indeed, it is possible that a military man's creative effort in his theoretical or applied science can warp other aspects of his personality. He can become intolerant of all views except his own and settle into a caste spirit. He can lose all sense of moral judgment, all sense of the relationship between himself and other men. In his approach to complex matters lying outside the traditional boundaries of his scientific discipline, he can ignore all variables and jump to conclusions based on nothing more substantial than his good opinions of his own opinions.

Even when the military expert stays within the four corners of his technical specialty, nothing in the historical record warrants the assumption that he always speaks with the voice of Divine Revelation. Prior to the First World War, for example, the most distinguished military experts of Germany and France concluded that any future war must be short. They reasoned that

modern industrial nations could not sustain a long war because they would collapse economically; and secondly, the immense power of modern weapons, mass armies, and modern means of communications must lead to a swift but decisive campaign of the utmost violence. The convictions were fundamental to both Germany's Schlieffen Plan and to the French Plan 17, both of which became in practice a massive misprint written in the blood of a massive and protracted hemorrhage.

Or again, the Imperial German Navy, after devoted study, believed that the German maritime situation demanded a battle fleet; so a German High Fleet was built. Its main achievement in the war was to decorate the dockyards of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, while Germany almost won the war with fewer than a hundred operational U-boats, a weapon seen before the war as having only limited auxiliary purposes. The British, too, after devoted study by their naval experts, concentrated on battleships before the war and in 1917 were very nearly defeated at sea because of their want of the humble escort vessel.

Yet again, it might have been supposed that after the airplane had been used for bombing during World War I, the opposition of the military experts to its further development would die. The case was otherwise. In 1919 the United States Army issued a pamphlet in which it was concluded that "contrary to general belief outside military circles the principal function of the airplane is the securing of information with fatal accuracy." Later, there was a swing with a vengeance to an opposite extreme. In the period between the two world wars, it was widely believed, on the testimony of military aviation experts, that in the war of the future, the bomber would decide the issue in a few weeks by smashing the enemy's

social and industrial structure. The belief, which turned out to be profoundly wrong when applied to the British and the Germans alike, nonetheless colored the whole of British diplomacy and rearmament in the 1930s.

It is true that these unfortunate bets placed by military experts preceded the advent of the new school of strategic analysis in the United States with its post-1945 sophisticated techniques and calculating equipment and its quantifications borrowed from the physical sciences. Yet the American military experts who had at their command all the analytical resources of the new strategic school were not thereby raised to a plane above all ambushes to human perception. The Bay of Pigs fiasco and the successive miscarriages of strategic and tactical plans in Vietnam stand as melancholy monuments to their personal fallibility—and to the fact that the first law of life is the law of surprise.

To suggest that military experts have been wrong is not to argue that they have never been right. Much less is it to argue that the security of the Republic is best served by primordial ignorance sounding through the voice of men whose blurps resemble the Homeric polemical exchanges among frogs contending for the right to squat on a leaf in a lily pond. Military experts have sometimes been right, sometimes half-right, and sometimes apocalyptically wrong. In this view of the case, their post-World War II record has been no worse and no better than the record of our most eminent natural scientists turned military strategists and political moralists.

The foregoing is another way of making a simple point: that human rivalry in all its forms is so subtle, unmeasurable, irrational, and haphazard, that it makes little sense to entrust its resolution to a single hypothesis promulgated by a single group of experts, with all

their vulnerability, to the virus of self-centered advocacy. In dealing with the variable forms of human rivalry, it makes more sense if the decision about what should or should not be done is reached after a dialectical encounter where the perceptions of the politically minded amateur and those of the technical expert rub hard against each other in a process of mutual correction.

#### STRENGTHENING CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

Still, a mere restoration of the politically minded amateur's confidence that he is qualified to join the military expert at some points in defining the meaning of "emergency" and "need" will not by itself heal the breach between power and responsibility in the governance of the military establishment. We must also look to the members of the Congress to strengthen their institutional capacity to get on top of the broad political-scientific-military questions which face them as legislators. Only then can they grasp the full implications of what they are being asked to decide and convey to their constituents what those implications happen to be.

There are two compelling reasons why the institutional capacity of the Congress must be strengthened in the foregoing respect. The first is that where national security matters are at stake, we do not have a Supreme Court standing by, as in domestic matters, to serve as a watchdog over any dubious uses of power. The Court, by a self-denying ordinance, is extremely reluctant even to hear cases and controversies in the external realm of military power and diplomacy. That means that in national security matters, we do not have a government where three kinds of power—executive, legislative, and judicial—confront each other, but a government confined to the president and the Congress. Moreover, in this two-way encounter,

the communications advantages the executive now enjoys in the age of telecrazia—despite the president's own high visibility as a target for concentrated attack—can now be converted by an adroit executive into the advantages of effective power. The executive, with its ready access to expensive modern means of mass communications like radio/television, can absorb public opinion to itself by speaking to the nation with many voices, but subject to central executive discipline and synchronized to give the impression—true or false—that its grasp of reality is all-embracing and that a dissenting view voiced by a legislator or a group of legislators can be dismissed as being fragmentary, parochial, ill-considered, unpatriotic, or the product of personal pique.

The question of congressional reform is, of course, a very old one, and library shelves have been filled with proposed remedies for congressional inefficiencies. The most familiar proposals point toward changes in the seniority system affecting chairmanships of congressional committees, or changes in the powers of the House Speaker and Rules Committee, or changes in the Senate rule to limit debate, or the introduction of electronic devices that would contribute to the swift tabulation of roll call votes. Yet even if all such changes were made, they would not touch the real heart of the problem to be solved.

The institutional changes needed to get at the heart of the problem are those which would enable the individual congressman to gain a coherent view of the different aspects of the national security questions to which he is expected to give *yes* or *no* answers. As things stand, these questions are considered piecemeal by the specialized committees of the Congress, each with its own axe to grind, in a seeming war of all against all. Contradictions of policy abound; so do contradictions of priorities. The

individual congressman is thus put into the frenetic position of Emerson's elderly Boston gentleman who insisted on being awakened every ten minutes from his after-dinner naps so that he might be told the latest news. The whole of the case is made to order for exploitation by an executive who can play off one committee against the other, so that his own powers will be unchecked and unbalanced.

The Congress plainly needs the equivalent of a Bureau of the Budget of its own, staffed by the ablest of civil servants, who can tell the members what lies concealed behind each line in the budget submitted to it by the executive. It plainly needs the equivalent of a National Security Council of its own, again staffed by the ablest of civil servants, who can tell the members what lies concealed behind *all* the national security policy proposals the executive submits to the Congress for ratification. True, there may be formidable structural barriers to the kind of thoroughgoing congressional reorganization that is needed if we are to restore some semblance of responsible power to the governance of the military impulse. But unless the electorates in their own interest *insist* on the need for such reorganization, nothing at all will be attempted except a few marginal gestures. There is a harsh truth in Napoleon's maxim that "the tools belong to the man who can use them." But there is an even harsher truth in that same maxim. Unless the Congress acquires the means to discharge its own responsibilities in the conduct of national security policies, the effective tools of decision will increasingly be monopolized by the executive.

There is room for a final comment, and it concerns what we have a right to expect from a president with respect to the structure for responsible power in the governance of the military. From

the very outset of American national life, members of the Congress have used various military figures as weapons with which to strike at a president. They encouraged these men to violate orders they received from the commander in chief. They promised them aid and comfort in their violations. They encouraged inter-service rivalries, destructive of military discipline. They tried to arrange things so that military men could veto the commands of the president as commander in chief.

Of late, however, we have seen presidents themselves reverse the process by pushing military men forward as shields behind which presidents have hidden in what should have been a direct presidential-congressional confrontation. Few things could more seriously imperil the traditional American ideal of a skilled military leadership, untouched by, and not itself touching, partisan domestic politics.

We have a right to expect the president to be the first to defend all aspects of the integrity of his role as commander in chief. Because he is the

civil as well as the military head of the armed forces, he is the only person the nation can remove without dragging the whole military apparatus through the gauntlet of partisan domestic politics. And precisely on this account, he cannot evade or divide the burdens which properly fall to him as commander in chief. That is to say, he cannot and should not justify his conduct by saying that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Security Council approved of what he did. Few among us have not felt uneasy at times when the president ignored even the best of advice. Yet the Constitution vests in him, and in him alone, the primary responsibility for what he decides as commander in chief. If a precedent is allowed to take root where a president can only justify his conduct by saying that what he did was approved of and supported by the military establishment, we will invite a situation where a president will be undone because the military decides to get rid of him and chooses as its means the bloodless device of saying that he has lost *their* confidence.

## The Military on Capitol Hill: Prospects in the Quest for Funds

By ROBERT S. BENSON

ABSTRACT: Public backing for defense expenditures is at its lowest ebb in recent history. Despite pervasive disenchantment, public knowledge about military programs remains limited and the translation of that disenchantment into effective political action even more restricted. Congressional lobbyists on both sides of military issues remain relatively ineffective. Congress, reacting to waste and poor weapons system performance, is doing an improved job of scrutinizing military programs and weeding out proven failures, but has remained impotent in canceling new programs its members consider ill advised. Overall, Congress has very little impact on military expenditure levels. Presidents regularly succeed in getting approved virtually the full range of military programs they request from Congress. During President Nixon's second term, that trend is expected to continue. While he might prefer to see his 1976 military budget rise above \$100 billion, the President's greater wish to hold down taxes and total federal spending is likely to produce a 1976 military budget slightly in excess of \$90 billion.

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THE fiscal year 1973 budget recommended by the President included a request of \$83 billion for the Department of Defense, an increase of \$7 billion from the previous year. A one-year increase of this magnitude is far from unique in American government annals, although the juxtaposition of that military spending increase against a simultaneous administration claim of winding down American involvement in an expensive war was certainly novel.

Perhaps even more unusual was the subsequent announcement by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird that he planned personally to take the case for the administration's defense policies and budget to the American people during the election year.

Equally surprising was a statement voiced shortly after the budget's release by Chairman John C. Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee—a statement sharply criticizing the Pentagon for “stratospheric” prices they are paying for weapons, the “rocketing” cost of military manpower, and the proportion of support troops to combat troops.

Any student of military affairs who happened to return to these events after being out of contact for a few years would have been extremely puzzled by this behavior. Previous secretaries of defense never felt compelled to take their case to the public, beyond making occasional forays to annual conventions of the Air Force Association or the American Legion. Their serious pleas in support of budget requests were reserved for a select group of senators and congressmen—numbering fewer than a hundred and populating just four committees—and were uttered strictly behind closed doors. What the rest of the American public thought, if they thought about the subject at all, really did not matter that much. John Stennis, meanwhile, could be counted

upon consistently to articulate the case for more weapons and higher military spending.

Part of the confusion can be explained by the role playing and the personalities of the participants (Melvin Laird's campaign instinct, for example—a natural inclination in an election year for a highly successful former congressman). The essential answer though seems to be that national moods and attitudes about the military have shifted, even if the size of the defense budget has not yet significantly reflected that shift. A recent Louis Harris survey showed that “the whole area of defense expenditures [was] at an all time low in terms of public backing.” Six times as many Americans today as compared with a decade ago put defense spending as a top candidate for cuts in the federal budget.

The single most important reason for this opinion shift is generally conceded to be despair and anguish over the American role in Vietnam. The American public is greatly disillusioned about our attempt to apply military force in such a conflict and does not want the mistake repeated. Vietnam opened the door for a host of other questions about the U.S. military. As a probing Congress and press unearthed a long series of cases of procurement cost overruns, new weapons that did not work consistently, top-heavy command structures, post exchange scandals, and the like, public confidence was further shaken. The defense budget, long a sacred cow, became fair game for questioning.

It is important to put this mood of disenchantment into perspective. While record numbers of Americans may now think the defense budget ought to be cut, recent polls also consistently show that very few people have even an approximate idea of how large the defense budget actually is. While in-

creased interest in and scrutiny of military policies may be the current watchword, only a frighteningly small number of reporters, scientists, political aides, and others outside the American military world actually are engaged in studying and monitoring national defense needs and performance.

Against this background, what are the prospects during coming years for the military on Capitol Hill? How are they likely to fare in their future quest for funds? Answers to these questions require an analysis, in turn, of the structure and inclinations of the congressional committees charged with defense budget oversight, the efforts and efficacy of the Department of Defense and its allies pushing for larger military budgets, and the degree of influence critics of current military policies can muster.

#### THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

The four relevant congressional committees are the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and the Defense Subcommittees of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. In theory, each of the four is responsible for reviewing the entire defense budget. In practice, they specialize. The Armed Services Committees concentrate on weapons system purchase decisions, research programs, and military pay matters—giving only cursory attention to other parts of the defense budget. The Appropriations Subcommittees do just the opposite, concentrating on monitoring unglamorous defense operations such as overhead and maintenance, training, computer operations, and management of the procurement process.

Over the years, these committees have generally accorded the Defense Department quite friendly treatment. Their questioning has always been thorough, but in the end the committee

members have almost always been willing to suspend any disbelief or uncertainty and pretty much grant the Department everything it requested. Even more friendly has been the treatment accorded the recommendations of these committees by the full Senate and House—virtually a rubber stamp reception.

These results have been fostered in the past by a tight clublike atmosphere on the committees. Most testimony has been behind closed doors, and only administration witnesses were heard on defense matters. The need for secrecy was constantly evoked to keep information tightly held. A pervasive belief that some special skill was required to understand defense matters kept investigative reporters, academicians, and other congressmen from becoming informed.

This controlled, familial process has suffered a few jolts during the past three years. Ideologically, a strong majority of the congressmen who have gravitated toward membership on the four committees favors a strong military and remains sympathetic toward new Defense Department proposals. But as congressmen, they hate waste, and even more, they hate being shown up for doing an inadequate job. As examples of scandal and mismanagement of the defense establishment began to cascade forth, these committee members were forced to respond. Funds were cut back in some programs plagued by cost overruns or equipment malfunction. Critical congressional reports were issued about such other subjects as the current top-heavy manpower rank distribution. And key figures like Senator Stennis made some threatening pronouncements.

Some of these kinds of posturing and actions always went on,<sup>1</sup> but never be-

1. In some respects it has been a staged game. When, for example, the Defense De-



fore in such volume. Chairman George H. Mahon and other members of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee have always enjoyed wide respect for their perceptive criticisms of defense management practices, but the 1970 budget marked the first time they recommended and won a substantial slash—more than \$5 billion—in the administration's budget request. Senator Stennis has always possessed great skill in making small concessions to other committee members in order to forge consensus, but only during the past three years has he been forced to make significant concessions on the Senate floor to well-prepared opponents. Even the House Armed Services Committee, the staunchest pro-military bastion on Capitol Hill, has opened up its proceedings a crack to hear nonadministration witnesses in sessions open to the public.

If we delve beneath the commotion to look at the results, we see some decline in the military's success rate on Capitol Hill, but not a very significant one. In areas where the Defense Department invited wrath with its own blunders or misguided original conceptions—such as the F-111, the Main Battle Tank, the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, the Safeguard ABM (anti-ballistic missile), the Cheyenne helicopter, and huge new aircraft carriers—programs have been eliminated, cut back, or approved only after very tough sledding. A new adversary constituency has been formed consisting of congressmen, reporters, and scientists sharing doubts about how well the U.S. military is run and whether it need be

partment estimates the expenditures that will result from its new annual budget proposals, it first estimates what the whole program would produce in expenditures, then adjusts downward in each specific appropriations category to allow for the "traditional" congressional appropriations reduction, and publishes only the latter figure.

as large as it currently is. While small in terms of the number of people involved and only loosely organized, this group seems to have enough staying power to serve as an effective watchdog for some time to come. But thus far, questioners have really succeeded only in denting military programs which had already come unglued in public; they have achieved no significant success in forcing new Defense Department proposals they consider ill advised to be scuttled.

#### PRESSURE GROUPS—LOBBYISTS

In further analyzing future budget prospects for the military, a careful look is due at the pressure groups which have played such a significant role in the defense legislative process. Secretary Laird's attempts to take his case directly to the American public may garner a lot of newspaper ink, but as he well knows, they are unlikely to have much impact on the Congress. Administration lobbyists work more subtly. And no such cadre is larger than, nor has worked so effectively over the years as, the Defense Department legislative liaison staff.

Comprising hundreds of people—military and civilian—and feeding off a very substantial annual budget, this staff dwarfs all other lobbies in Washington, public or private. Nominally, its function is to provide Congress with information on defense programs and to help congressmen with military-related personal problems brought to their attention by constituents. Measured in sheer man-hours, the defense legislative liaison staff does spend a major share of its time on such matters. But its focal activity clearly is lobbying. Like most effective lobbyists, these men work quietly—passing messages, arranging briefings, and providing small conveniences and perquisites.

At one time, key personnel at the

Defense Department effectively worked out the budget with members of the Armed Services Committees, with legislative liaison personnel providing the messenger link. It was a symbiotic relationship and an effective alliance. The Defense Department got its budget approved, and the key senators and congressmen received an inordinate share of military bases and contracts for their districts.

A cooperative relationship still exists, but it has been considerably tempered in recent years. The old clublike approach worked well as long as defense matters remained below the level of real public consciousness. The new surge of interest and criticism has brought the defense budget out in the open. Senator J. William Fulbright even raised particularly searching objections to the size and role of the legislative liaison staff itself. With all this extra scrutiny, the staff's influence has waned, although it remains significant.

As for other military lobby forces, few are very effective in a sustained way on either side of the issues. Defense industry spokesmen generally tread carefully on Capitol Hill, sensitive to the fact that they are virtual wards of the state. Their preferred persuasive forums are the fields where demonstrations of new weapons are staged for congressmen and other VIPs. Veterans groups are powerful in numbers, but they have consistently done little in-depth homework and have failed to discriminate among alternative proposals—they seem to favor proceeding with every conceivable military project—and so have forfeited potentially great influence.

Groups pushing for a smaller military force are of more recent vintage, but share the characteristic of having limited impact. Their problems tend to be different from those of the veteran's groups—the problems of generally small

numbers and lack of leverage, not quality of argument and research.

A few organizations like the Federation of American Scientists and the Council for a Livable World have had a significant impact on some senators and congressmen eager to learn a different viewpoint from that advanced by the Defense Department. An ad hoc organization came within one Senate vote of scuttling the Safeguard ABM system before that project got off the ground. But staying power and leverage have been wanting, and, without these, results have been limited.

An internal organization, the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL), has provided an organizing and educative vehicle for senators and congressmen who desired cuts in some military programs, but who themselves did not serve on one of the four committees with jurisdiction over defense matters. Senators Walter F. Mondale, Clifford P. Case, Thomas F. Eagleton, Philip A. Hart, John Sherman Cooper, and others have effectively influenced decisions about military purchases even though they lacked a committee base to work from.

To a great extent, the involvement of such men has stemmed from their convictions and concerns about military spending in the context of other national needs and priorities. Each in his own way saw that a new tank that would not work, a ship that was obsolete before it was built, or an ABM that promised to lessen rather than increase security was consuming dollars they felt could be better used for more pressing public purposes. The same understanding has begun to seep into the consciousness of the constituencies built by various public social programs. These advocates—whether for increased social security benefits, child care, national health insurance, higher education, or whatever—are increasingly

framing their demands in compelling national priority terms. Most point quickly to military spending as a prime candidate for reductions, but hardly any have yet done the research necessary for them to become more specific, and thereby effective, in articulating their views on military spending. They have begun to understand that all their pleading for increased attention to human social needs will have no consequence if the military absorbs the lion's share of discretionary funds . . . but they have not really buckled down to the task of tackling the military spending issue head-on. As a result, there is no sizable constituency working effectively on Capitol Hill for sharply revised national priorities, even though many powerful groups there do favor such a shift.

In summary, the four congressional committees with defense oversight responsibilities seem likely in coming years to be somewhat more insistent on reasonable answers and sound performance from the military than they were in the fifties and sixties, but they remain inclined to grant the Defense Department what it requests. The lobbies, on both sides of the military issue, seem likely to have relatively little impact on the military's overall prospects on Capitol Hill. The emergence of an adversary constituency will provide better balance as issues are argued and will force more accountability, but it seems destined to have little impact on the overall result.

#### THE CONGRESS

What about the Congress itself, taken as a whole? A sizable portion of the membership—though probably not yet a majority—does seem to desire a fundamental shift in national priorities. Groups of skeptical congressmen, like those represented under the banner of MCPL, performing solo crash investiga-

tions of singled-out weapons systems have been painful thorns in the Defense Department's side—and have even occasionally forced a program to be delayed—but their piecemeal approach will never force a fundamental examination of the entire structure or premises upon which the military budget is constructed. In the absence of the emergence of powerful, new outside forces, their cause seems destined to impotence.

The Congress simply is not staffed or organized to deal effectively with the national priorities issue. Capitol Hill provides a fine forum for vague talk about the need to reorder priorities. Since national priorities choices really boil down to how the federal budget is to be carved up, and since the Congress theoretically has the power of the purse, it would seem that Congress could really affect fundamental national priorities choices. It cannot. To begin with, the Congress is hopelessly undermanned for the budget review task. By recent count, there were only twenty-three professional staff members serving the entire Senate Appropriations Committee, and thirty serving its House counterpart. There is a single computer on Capitol Hill, used more for keeping the payroll than for analysis. These resources are arrayed against thousands of budget officers and hundreds of computers spread throughout the federal administrative bureaucracy. The congressional staffers try to beat the odds by getting help from the General Accounting Office and by putting the administration's budget officers to work responding to probing questions, but it is still no contest. Congressional budget review in most areas, and particularly defense, consists of picking around the edges of a selected number of target issues.

The task is difficult. Even the administration's own Budget Bureau, with several hundred top-notch analysts, has

fared poorly for years in trying to keep a tight rein on Defense Department spending proposals. But Congress could do a much better job by: (1) creating a new cadre of management and systems analysts—perhaps made a new division of the General Accounting Office—whose talents could be tapped by any member of Congress interested in investigating a military spending issue; (2) equipping these analysts with adequate computer and other research tools; (3) rotating membership and the chairmanships of the four relevant congressional committees; (4) appropriating funds on a two-year rather than an annual cycle, reviewing part of the defense budget each year; and (5) using a zero-base approach to all defense budget reviews, that is, starting from scratch each year rather than assuming last year's amount as the unquestioned base. None of these proposals seems likely to be adopted soon, even though all have been aired before.

Even if the above changes were made in the handling of defense matters, Congress presently would remain defeated in any attempts to shape the broad priority directions of the federal budget by its own chosen pattern of organization for review of the budget as a whole. In the current budget review process, there is no stage at which Congress examines the total picture and considers what goals should be guiding and what national directions should be emphasized. Rather, Congress implicitly accepts the administration's emphases by its procedural decision to take each new budget and immediately parcel it out piecemeal to functional subcommittees. There is never a forum for comparing health needs with military requirements, space shuttles with child care centers. Each piece is considered in isolated splendor by separate subcommittees. The result is budget priorities arrived at by addition rather

than by comparison and choice. And what it really means is that Congress does not have much impact at all on national priorities, nor will it during the 1970s so long as current archaic forms of organization prevail.

#### PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET REQUESTS

The answer to, "How will the military fare during coming years in the battle over national priorities?" is not to be found on Capitol Hill, just as it has never been resolved there in the past two decades. The question was really answered November 7, 1972. National priorities are set in the mind of the president, influenced in the broad dimensions only by his closest advisers. What emphases and choices he wants get reflected in his budget proposals. And whatever he proposes be budgeted for military programs will essentially be approved by the Congress.

The proof of this claim is found in the record of congressional action on defense budget requests by the past five presidents. Five times in twenty years the Congress has voted to increase defense budget authority 10 percent or more above what the president originally requested. Those figures, however, are misleading; in each of the five cases, congressional action reflected a response to later supplemental requests for additional funds from the president. During 1952 and 1953, Korean War requirements were the cause. The 1962 increase reflected both the Berlin crisis and the revised budget proposals of the new presidential administration. The 1966 and 1967 increases were products of the growing U.S. commitment in Vietnam.

Setting aside these five crisis years, the record otherwise is quite different. During the other fifteen years, Congress has hardly made a dent in the president's defense budget requests—either up or down. Thirteen times out

TABLE 1—CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON DEFENSE BUDGET REQUESTS OF THE PRESIDENT  
(EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

| FISCAL YEAR | BUDGET AUTHORITY<br>ORIGINALLY RECOMMENDED<br>BY THE PRESIDENT | BUDGET AUTHORITY<br>APPROVED BY CONGRESS | PERCENTAGE CHANGE |
|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1952        | 60,971                                                         | 67,518                                   | +10.7             |
| 1953        | 52,359                                                         | 57,225                                   | +10.9             |
| 1954        | 41,535                                                         | 39,471                                   | - 5.0             |
| 1955        | 34,859                                                         | 33,656                                   | - 3.5             |
| 1956        | 36,742                                                         | 35,903                                   | - 2.3             |
| 1957        | 39,743                                                         | 41,344                                   | + 4.0             |
| 1958        | 43,600                                                         | 40,448                                   | - 7.2             |
| 1959        | 44,298                                                         | 45,517                                   | + 2.7             |
| 1960        | 45,222                                                         | 44,761                                   | - 1.0             |
| 1961        | 45,282                                                         | 45,994                                   | + 1.6             |
| 1962        | 46,278                                                         | 52,414                                   | +13.3             |
| 1963        | 54,744                                                         | 54,323                                   | - 0.8             |
| 1964        | 56,702                                                         | 53,762                                   | - 5.2             |
| 1965        | 53,652                                                         | 53,198                                   | - 0.8             |
| 1966        | 52,274                                                         | 64,766                                   | +23.9             |
| 1967        | 63,355                                                         | 75,276                                   | +18.8             |
| 1968        | 79,556                                                         | 79,228                                   | - 0.4             |
| 1969        | 82,317                                                         | 80,058                                   | - 2.7             |
| 1970        | 82,985                                                         | 76,689                                   | - 7.6             |
| 1971        | 73,153                                                         | 75,219                                   | + 2.8             |

SOURCE: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget of the United States Government* (1952-73) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951-72).

of fifteen, the size of the budget they approved was within 5 percent of the amount originally requested. The usual pattern, reflected eleven times out of fifteen, saw Congress making a small reduction in the amount requested.

The same pattern holds through Republican and Democratic administrations, through periods of decreasing, increasing, and level defense budgets. And there is every reason to expect the pattern to continue based upon our conclusions about the poor organization, overmatched analytical capabilities, and basic inclinations of the Congress.

So the fate of near future defense budgets in the battle over national priorities on Capitol Hill has essentially been determined by the American voters—by their votes for president, not for members of Congress.

### *McGovern pledges*

George McGovern pledged that if he were elected president, he would work for a reduction in the military budget of about \$28 billion—from \$83 billion to \$55 billion. There exist three schools of thought on the McGovern proposal. One, articulated by Secretary Laird, is that McGovern's recommendations so flew in the face of the realities of military threats and international relations that its implementation would have doomed the United States to a policy of surrender. A second view, most cogently articulated by Earl C. Ravenal,<sup>2</sup> finds the \$55 billion level of spending called for by McGovern fully adequate to meet U.S. defense

2. Earl C. Ravenal, "How Much for Security?" *Washington Post*, September 24, 1972.

needs, but inadequate to serve the purposes and provide even the reduced level of forces McGovern called for. Proponents of this view say the McGovern defense concept is neither "dangerous or irresponsible"; it simply tries to do too much with too little money and would end up costing \$70-\$80 billion by 1975.

The third view is that the McGovern proposal both provided adequate security and was accurately costed. Basically, this view holds to a more circumscribed interpretation of McGovern's real policy objectives than is reflected in the Ravenal view. It assumes—based upon new readings of Soviet and Chinese intentions and of the capabilities of U.S. allies, plus a more hard-headed, pragmatic understanding of the limitations of military forces in advancing U.S. international interests—that McGovern indeed did intend to pare back sharply the U.S. worldwide defense perimeter, more so than was indicated by some of his campaign rhetoric on commitments.

Even accepting, for sake of argument, this last interpretation, there still remains the issue of whether McGovern would have possessed the political toughness to implement a \$55 billion defense budget. I feel that there is little doubt about the depth of his conviction and resolve on this issue; as his campaign unfolded, he personally backed off perhaps less on the defense spending issue than on any other. There can be little question though that his proposals would have met with substantial resistance from the military and from influential members of Congress. It is possible that congressional behavior in the face of proposals for a \$28 billion cut in military spending over three years might be different from historical behavior patterns in response to generally smaller year-to-year fluctuations. It is almost certain that Con-

gress would have appropriated more funds than McGovern would have requested, and that McGovern would then have refused to spend the extra funds, thus precipitating a new and most lengthy struggle to date over this constitutional powers issue.

We can only speculate on the results of such a battle. My own guess is that McGovern would have been perhaps 80 to 90 percent successful in getting the Congress to accept the budget reduction proposals—and in getting military leaders, new appointees if necessary, to accede—but that his own inability to oppose pay increases or hold down other inflation would eat away an additional \$3-\$4 billion. Thus instead of a 1975 military budget of \$55 billion, we would have ended up with one amounting to about \$64 billion.

### *Nixon goals*

Richard Nixon did not give us such specific yardsticks as to his military spending intentions, though the policies pursued during his first term as president offer a helpful starting point. The Brookings Institution's review of the 1973 federal budget<sup>3</sup> estimated that existing military programs plus just those new ones whose development the President was already on record as supporting would together cost slightly over \$100 billion during 1977. Nothing the President said about defense policy during his reelection campaign suggested a shift in direction; he spoke mostly about negotiating from strength, maintaining our commitments abroad, and remaining the number one power in the world.

Post-election comments suggest another dimension. President Nixon wants badly to hold down federal

3. Charles L. Schultze, Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin, and Nancy H. Teeters, *Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1972).

spending—to \$250 billion this year and as low as possible in succeeding years in order to avoid any increase in taxes. His chances of attaining the latter goal are virtually nil, but his basic predilections are clear.

Limiting the growth of federal spending to the minimal pace the President desires would be challenge enough, but the task becomes well-nigh impossible given his post-election expressions on the direction of military spending. He has said that weapons expenditures will grow, that numbers of military personnel will remain level unless mutual force reductions are negotiated with the Soviet Union, but that significant efficiency improvements can result from reductions in the numbers of Defense Department civilian personnel. The problem with that strategy is that even elimination of half the civilian jobs, probably far more than the President is contemplating, would save just \$6 billion a year. That reduction, coupled with the aforementioned procurement and force level policies, would still leave the President with a \$95 billion 1977 military budget.

The catch is that such a military budget, \$12 billion above current levels, would be inconsistent with the President's objective of no tax increases. The root of the problem is the fact that \$51.6 billion of the \$79.8 billion in 1973 federal spending officially classified as relatively controllable is spending for national defense.<sup>4</sup> The remaining two-thirds of budget outlays are classified as relatively uncontrollable and are collectively growing at an annual rate in excess of 10 percent. To be able to achieve his overall spending goals, the President would have to cut

drastically in the controllable spending area. Politically, this result cannot be accomplished without reducing military spending from current levels.

The President is caught in a trap. Either he must yield on military spending or on his overall fiscal goals. Which way he will move is problematical at this point. My own hunch is that he will hedge—that military spending will not rise much above \$90 billion, but that a tax increase will be required. Since \$90 billion is only slightly higher than the current military budget—and because massive proposed cuts in spending for domestic social problems will keep constituents of these programs and their allies in Congress preoccupied with defending their own lifeblood—the President is likely to have little difficulty securing congressional approval for a request at or slightly above this level. He is likely to request \$95 billion, since he knows that Congress will cut the usual 3 to 5 percent. He will try to blame the tax rise on the Congress; the major real causes will be military spending and social security rate increases.

So the reelection of Richard Nixon probably means a \$90-billion-plus military budget instead of about a \$65 billion one, which could have been expected under a McGovern presidency. And short of U.S. involvement in a new war or unexpected rapid agreement on new troop reduction or arms limitation treaties, that result seems already solidly ordained for the coming four years.

Effectively, the American people have voted for a retention of the status quo in U.S. military posture, pending the results of new international negotiations. Depending upon one's viewpoint, that decision is judicious and prudent, or it reflects a lost new opportunity for dramatic change.

Such a new opportunity is present and growing. Formerly, the public for-

4. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget of the United States Government: 1973* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 501.

feited all judgment on military spending levels to whoever was president; accumulative propaganda about communist threats made proposals for significant year-to-year reductions untenable. Now, thanks to disillusionment over Vietnam, Richard Nixon's historic opening of the doors to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and other developments, the way is cleared for a president to propose and win public support for a significantly smaller military budget. It is probably fair to say that among knowledgeable observers there exists a substantial consensus on the need for the United States to spend at least \$45-\$50 billion annually on military programs during the next several years. That amount can be supported by analyses of real threats to the United States and the costs of deterring those threats, plus hard core

deterrence support to key allies. The need for additional spending above those levels depends on the intuitive judgment of the president or other person making that judgment. Experts can be found to make and support the cases for any figure from \$50 to \$100 billion. Above \$50 billion, the issue ultimately comes down to each man's view of the relative urgency of different national priorities and the prospective returns from public investment in different endeavors.

Though this issue now appears resolved through 1976, American public debate over the role of the U.S. military in national and international affairs is only just emerging from a glacial post-World War II freeze. A continued thaw marked by broadened participation in the debate will be healthy for the nation.



# The End of Overrun: Prospects for the High Technology Defense Industry and Related Issues

By BERNARD UDIS

ABSTRACT: Influences leading to the high cost of acquiring advanced weapon systems are examined, including the historical background of defense procurement and the difficulty of measuring the military value of these systems. Efforts to improve the military contracting system are detailed, including the McNamara reforms, and analysis is given of new efforts to reform weapons procurement. An important recent trend has been the changing composition of the military budgets, resulting from inflation and growing manpower costs. Recent developments by European competitors in the aircraft industry are explored, and possibilities for market diversification are suggested. Finally, military and government support of research and development is discussed in terms of technological advance.

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WHETHER the near future will bring an end to cost overruns is hard to predict, but that it will bring a period of lean years for the high technology industry which has developed since the Korean War with a heavy dependence upon military contracts is a virtual certainty.

To some extent the old song, "You Made Me What I Am Today, I Hope You're Satisfied," might be the theme song of this industry in describing its relations with the Defense Department. To understand the present situation it is helpful to examine the changing pattern of weapon systems procurement as it has evolved over time.<sup>1</sup>

#### OVERRUN: A USEFUL CONCEPT?

The term "cost overrun" has become a cliché which serves to divert attention from the main problem—the high cost of acquiring advanced weapon systems. Improvements in the art of cost estimation, while helpful in minimizing surprise and perhaps in improving cost-effectiveness analysis,<sup>2</sup> would not in themselves cut the cost of military equipment. After surveying studies of cost growth between initiation of major weapons development programs and their delivery, Perry concluded that on the average, major programs for all services experienced a cost growth of about 40 percent—after discounting for the effects of inflation and changes in

1. The author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to Mr. Dennis Barclay for valuable assistance in the preparation of this section of the paper.

2. Even this possible advantage may be a modest one if those charged with procurement decisions build in a corrective factor for systematic cost underestimation by producers. For a debate on the extent of such discounting of original cost estimates, see Frederic J. Scherer, "Comment," in Richard R. Nelson, ed., *The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 498; and Burton H. Klein, "Reply," in *ibid.*, p. 504.

the quantity of items purchased—and that of this figure, "native imprecision of cost estimating processes was responsible for . . . 15 to 20 percent."<sup>3</sup> He noted that ". . . most cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls appear to be attributable to factors other than estimating inaccuracies" and called for fundamental changes in the system acquisition process.<sup>4</sup>

Obviously the nature of these changes depends upon the assumed characteristics of the acquisition process deemed to be responsible for the present deficiency. That serious deficiencies exist seems beyond question. Wide coverage was given to then-Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard's August 1970 remarks to the Armed Forces Management Association in which he said, "Frankly, gentlemen, in defense procurement, we have a real mess on our hands. Let's face it—the fact is there has been bad management of many defense programs in the past." By early 1972, Packard, now returned to private industry, was still complaining in public about ". . . people playing games with each other,"<sup>5</sup> and "absurdly low cost estimates."<sup>6</sup>

3. Robert Perry, *European and U.S. Aircraft Development Strategies*, P-4748 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1971), pp. 1-2. Perry's 15-20 percent range for estimating error appears to be confirmed by data contained in a recent Defense Department publication. It reported on \$19.8 billion of cost increases for forty-five systems—including the C-5A, F-111, and FB-111. What are identified as "estimating changes" are assigned \$4.3 billion or 21.2 percent of the total. These figures are unadjusted for inflation. See Department of Defense, Comptroller, *The Economics of Defense Spending: A Look at the Realities* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1972), p. 157.

4. Perry, *European and U.S. Strategies*, p. 2.

5. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, March 20, 1972, p. 18.

6. *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, February 24, 1972.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Defense procurement has been a problem throughout our history, although the nature of the difficulty has changed somewhat over time. Prior to World War II, profiteering by government suppliers in wartime was the most common complaint. During the American Revolutionary War certain high government officials, including Robert Morris, were apparently associated in questionable procurement deals, and a congressional inquiry found "... fraud, negligence, and waste of public property."<sup>7</sup> The Civil War was marked by widespread corruption of government officials and contracts, resulting in the removal of Secretary of War Simon Cameron by President Lincoln. A congressional investigation of the Cameron affair compared the harmful effects of profiteering to "... the plotting of actual treason."<sup>8</sup> In 1896 Congress found that the Carnegie and Bethlehem steel companies were selling armor plate to the Russian government at one-third the price being charged the U.S. government, but profiteering reached its peak during World War I and resulted in widespread public revulsion when it was later made public. The Federal Trade Commission report, "Profiteering," issued in 1918, disclosed evidence of fraud, deception, and huge profits on war contracts by steel, oil, and gas companies. The American Legion pressed for war-profit controls and at its 1922 National Convention recom-

mended that in time of war, materials as well as men be conscripted. Both major political parties endorsed similar proposals in their party platforms for the 1924 presidential election. During the 1930s a detailed study of the defense industry was conducted by the Nye Committee, which revealed questionable practices on large navy ship contracts during the war.<sup>9</sup>

The Second World War resulted in high profits, but nothing to compare with the abuses revealed by the Nye inquiry. This better record was in part a result of the watchdog activities of the Truman Committee.

The modern procurement dilemma begins with the Korean War mobilization and the Cold War. In earlier times of national urgency the procurement problem was one of profiteering scandals. Following each war came demobilization and a return to commercial activities or "reconversion." The term correctly suggests the existence of civilian counterpart markets to which defense producers could return. The high sophistication of modern weapon systems with their accompanying research and development requirements have drastically altered and complicated the process of weapons acquisition. Despite the occasional charges, few significant scandals of the profiteering type have been unearthed in recent years.<sup>10</sup>

9. U.S., Congress, Senate, *Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry*, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., 1936, vols. 1-5; and Kaufman, *War Profiteers*.

10. Debates about the size of profits of defense producers continue, however. For a summary of some recent studies and a judgment, see Department of Defense, Comptroller, *Economics of Defense Spending*, pp. 170-81. A related exchange on the effectiveness of a government regulatory board is A. M. Agapos and Lowell E. Galloway, "Defense Profits and the Renegotiation Board in the Aerospace Industry," *Journal of Political Economy* 78, no. 5 (September-October 1970), pp. 1093-1105; Arthur E. Burns, "Aerospace

7. "Report of the Special Committee of the House," *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, March 27, 1772, vol. 1, pp. 38-42. See also Richard F. Kaufman, *The War Profiteers* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

8. U.S., Congress, House, *Government Contracts. Report to the House Select Committee to Inquire Into the Contracts of the Government*, 37th Congress, 2nd session, 1861-62, H. Rept. 2, pts. 1 and 2; and Kaufman, *War Profiteers*.

Rather, the general dissatisfaction now emphasizes inefficiency and waste in the contracting for and management of weapons development programs.

#### MEASURING MILITARY VALUE

Most discussions of weapon systems decisions are phrased in terms of trade-offs between time required to design, produce, and deliver the system; the associated costs; and the system's performance characteristics. Such trade-off decisions require a context of military value. Thus, alternative time-cost-performance combinations must be compared in terms of their relative contributions to national security before a decision is possible. Yet it is precisely this concept of military value which inherently is difficult to measure. The value of a weapon system is not stable, but varies with the number and quality of weapons possessed by a potential enemy as well as the purposes for which the system is intended. Deterrence, defense, and offense are different concepts, and the same weapon system may be ideal for one but useless for another. In lamenting the absence of a measurable concept of value in the military area, Morgenstern once observed, "To develop a method [for determining military worth] would be more important than to introduce some further, purely technological, advances in some weapon system. It would improve the use of all of these."<sup>11</sup>

To relate this to the original point: if time and performance expectations are realized in the development of a particular weapon system, but costs are triple the original estimate, one can

Profits and Renegotiation: A Comment," *Journal of Political Economy* 80, no. 4 (July-August 1972), pp. 822-26; and A. M. Agapos and Lowell E. Galloway, "A Reply," *ibid.*, pp. 827-28.

11. Oskar Morgenstern, *The Question of National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 205.

only conclude that the program was three times as costly as anticipated—not that an efficiently run program would have cost only one-third as much. There is no market-provided yardstick available. Perhaps out of desperation, Halperin has presented a code for separately designating proposed weapon systems as "good" (programs which reduce the probability of war), "bad" (programs which make a negative contribution to our security by stimulating the strategic arms race and increase the danger of nuclear war), and "wasteful" (programs excessive to our needs but which do not increase the chance of war or stimulate the arms race).<sup>12</sup> The problem of choice among "good" systems still remains unsolved, however.

To some extent, all non-market decision-making shares these problems, and recent debates about the relative effectiveness of educational and medical innovations point up the issue. Indeed, Nelson has argued recently that the traditional theory of the firm is inadequate even in the market context, when rapid change is occurring in either demand or supply conditions and in particular, where major innovations are involved.<sup>13</sup>

#### ALTERNATIVES IN MILITARY

##### CONTRACTING FORMS:

##### THE McNAMARA REFORMS

Given these difficulties in defining, let alone attaining, efficiency in weapons acquisition, there have been continual efforts to improve the situation, largely through experimentation with the con-

12. Morton H. Halperin, "The Good, the Bad, and the Wasteful," *Foreign Policy*, no. 6 (Spring 1972), pp. 69-83.

13. Richard R. Nelson, "Issues and Suggestions for the Study of Industrial Organization in a Regime of Rapid Technical Change," in Victor Fuchs, ed., *Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972), pp. 34-58, especially pp. 46-48.

tracting system. An additional problem must be confronted here, since often the results of a particular change in contracting form take years to determine.

Competitive bidding has played a minor role if any in the acquisition of modern weapons. Typically, the government holds preliminary discussions with several possible producers and chooses one on the basis of the attractiveness of the program proposal submitted. The cost estimate, which is not a firm bid price, has played a role distinctly secondary to that of technical performance offered. When the government and the chosen contractor reach the stage of contract negotiation, the situation closely resembles that of bilateral monopoly with the outcome depending on the relative bargaining skills of the two parties.<sup>14</sup> One of the details to be settled is the type of contract, and there are three general categories: cost plus a fixed fee, incentive contract, or firm fixed price. The type of contract chosen depends to a great extent on the type of work to be done. The amount of uncertainty anticipated is an important determinant of the contract form chosen. Where uncertainty is prevalent, some form of cost reimbursement contract is most often used. Fixed price or incentive contracts have been more frequent when cost estimates are more likely to be reasonably accurate. The type of contract also varies with changing procurement policies of government, as was evident during the tenure of Robert McNamara as secretary of defense when his preference for incentive contracts gained wide public notice.

14. For a discussion of the bilateral monopoly model and related points, see A. M. Agapos and Paul R. Dunlap, "The Theory of Price Determination in Government-Industry Relationships," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 84, no. 1 (February 1970), pp. 85-99.

McNamara and his associates were familiar with the studies of weapons procurement problems of the 1950s conducted at the RAND Corporation and the Harvard Business School,<sup>15</sup> and McNamara's efforts at change were designed to correct the weaknesses identified in these studies. His program rested on the twin pillars of incentive-type contracts and improved "contract definition." The prevalent form of cost plus fixed fee contracts widely used in the 1950s provided little financial incentive for firms to cut costs, since profit was guaranteed almost without regard to cost. Thus it was reasoned that a contract form that resulted in higher profits as a reward for lower costs would be preferable. It also had the presumed advantage of having the contractor firm share with the government in the risks of development. While the logic was sound, incentive contracts require great care in the establishment of the cost goal viewed as the standard which the firm would attempt to better in performance. As anyone familiar with labor-management relations could have predicted, there was a tendency for the performer to attempt to set the standard artificially low to ensure an easy surpassing of the goal. In the context of defense contracting, this was evidenced by overstating the estimated cost figures, and the government lacked adequate cost estimation skills to police the system effectively.

The effort at improved "contract definition" was motivated by the belief that the high cost overruns experienced in the 1950s were a result of inadequately defined projects. The new sys-

15. A. W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling, "Predictability of the Costs, Time and Success of Development," in Nelson, *Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity*, pp. 461-75; and Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1962).

tem was conceived as a competition during which firms trying to win the contract would prepare detailed technical specifications and estimates of their cost. The finalists were obliged to provide extensive studies supporting the feasibility of their proposals, and the system did yield massive paper studies which unfortunately were often far from the mark of accurate predictions of either cost or performance. On the other hand, the task often required peering into the unknown, and there has been a tendency to skip too easily over the enormous technological challenges posed by some of these projects.

Critics disagree on the effects of the McNamara reforms. Robert J. Art claims that "... the reforms of the 1960's have not touched . . . the causes [of waste]. . . ." <sup>16</sup> The staff administrator of the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, while acknowledging that a great deal was learned about procurement as a result of the McNamara efforts, nevertheless maintained that, "after a near-decade of McNamara reforms, the situation in weapon system acquisition seems to be worse than ever before." <sup>17</sup>

While Art concedes that cost overruns in the 1960s were less on the average than in the 1950s—close to twice instead of three times original estimates of cost—he discounts the significance of this fact since "... weapon systems of the 1960's were carried out with less urgency and incorporated smaller technological advances than did those of the 1950's." <sup>18</sup> Perry seems to agree in his

observation, "In a comparative sense, the prediction and control of program outcomes in the 1960's did not significantly improve over the previous decade." <sup>19</sup> Such judgments seem to be in conflict with an interesting point made by Scherer in recent congressional testimony. He notes that the first generation of weapons to exploit new technological opportunities can be drastically improved over their predecessors with relative ease. Later generations, however, face the task of solving problems in an environment where only the more difficult areas are left unexploited. In his words, "It has been more costly to achieve further increments of military capability in programs of the 1960's than it was when the technological frontiers were wide open." <sup>20</sup>

Despite such differences in evaluation of the success of the full package of reforms, there is rather general agreement on the reasons for the failure to achieve the highest hopes of the reformers. The tendency to overestimate costs in incentive contracts has already been noted and was, indeed, observed. The government lacked a staff of independent, competent cost estimators to counter this tendency, and the attempt to escape reliance upon contractor cost estimates through the system of "parametric costing" appears to have been unsuccessful. Art describes it as one which "incorporates all the inefficiencies of past programs and therefore projects past waste into future programs." <sup>21</sup>

In addition, a blizzard of contract change orders during development served to balloon costs of major programs. Such changes, while often use-

16. Robert J. Art, "Why We Overspend and Underaccomplish," *Foreign Policy*, no. 6 (Spring 1972), pp. 95-114, especially p. 99.

17. Herbert Roback, "From McNamara to Laird: Passing Reflections on Defense Reforms," Address to the National Security Industrial Association, Washington, D.C., February 25, 1970, pp. 5-6.

18. Art, "Why We Overspend," p. 98.

19. Perry, *European and U.S. Strategies*, p. 1.

20. Frederic M. Scherer, "Testimony," in U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, *Weapon System Acquisition Process*, December 6, 1971, p. 138.

21. Art, "Why We Overspend," p. 106.

ful, are an important source of cost escalation. Finally, experience with total package procurement as in the case of the C-5A cargo transport was unsatisfactory, although it was clearly misapplied here since both contractor and buyer grossly underestimated the unique technical advances which were being attempted. In this case, apparently too little flexibility proved as costly as too much flexibility in earlier experience.

Efforts at improved contract definition were also disappointing. Typically, the detailed proposals submitted tended to underestimate remaining uncertainties with little actual testing to resolve them.

#### NEW EFFORTS AT REFORMING WEAPONS PROCUREMENT

The most recent effort to improve procurement was the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel chaired by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh. Its report was released in July 1970 and underlies many of Packard's reforms. The central recommendations called for the reduction of uncertainty through operational testing prior to full-scale development and the provision of added flexibility in acquisition strategy.<sup>22</sup> Specific recommendations included the elimination of concurrent development and production; flexibility in the choice of contract type depending on the amount of risk involved; incremental development of subsystems and components separate from the development of major weapon systems; limitation to essentials to avoid "gold plating"; and the prohibition of total package procurement.

Packard introduced three major

changes: the replacement of reliance upon contractor paper studies with hardware testing or the new widely publicized "fly-before-you-buy" approach.<sup>23</sup> In addition, in an attempt to reduce "gold plating," a Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council was established to scrutinize contract changes to insure against unnecessary modifications. Finally, in response to the concern of the panel that rotation and promotion policies of the armed forces worked against effective program management by military officers, Packard attempted to improve the quality of military program managers by increasing their authority and the prestige and rewards available to those performing well in their duties.

Art considers such reforms as promising, but incomplete, and recommends two additional measures: the inclusion of the contractor's capital investment in a proposal before awarding a contract and determining allowable profit, and more extensive use of "should cost" techniques based on analysis of the plant where the system is to be produced.<sup>24</sup> Adding investment to the reimbursable cost base should encourage contractors to make cost-reducing investment, while the "should cost" objective is to improve the government's ability to evaluate cost figures submitted by prospective contractors. Art has also expressed concern about securing cooperation from the service branches and raises the possibility of creating a corps of civilian weapon system managers.<sup>25</sup> The centralized

22. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, Appendix E, Staff Report on Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Process, July 1970.*

23. See, for example, David Packard, "Improving R&D Management Through Prototyping," *Defense Management Journal* (July 1972), pp. 3-6; and "Talk by David Packard in Accepting the National Security Association's James Forrestal Memorial Award, Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., March 9, 1972.

24. Art, "Why We Overspend," pp. 107-8.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

procurement of military hardware on the British or Swedish models might also be a possibility worth studying.

Perry expresses skepticism about traditional approaches to less costly weapon acquisition which stress refinements in management procedures or the exercise of better control over contractor activities. He recommends a departure from recent patterns of defense procurement and a reliance instead upon two principles: first, incremental acquisition, based on a sequence of decision points and a succession of development and production phases; and second, pronounced austerity in the early phases of development.<sup>26</sup> Incremental acquisition would introduce a clear break between the *development* of a system and its subsequent *production*. Demonstration of the system's potential would precede detailed analysis of reliability and maintainability, for example. This would contrast sharply with the "concurrent" school of development now held in ill repute. In Perry's "austere initial development," hardware would be viewed simply as a method of acquiring information necessary before proceeding to the next phase, and only directly relevant information to the problem under review would be sought.<sup>27</sup> He supports his recommendations with impressive demonstrations of their successful implementation by European aircraft producers.

One important point which emerges from all of the foregoing is that the heart of the problem of modern weapons acquisition lies in the relationship between buyer and seller, and not in the legal status of the seller as private company or some other form such as a nationalized institution. Two of the most successful and efficient producers of advanced military aircraft in Europe

which figure prominently in Perry's analysis are Marcel Dassault in France and Saab-Scania in Sweden. Both are private firms. This point was reinforced in recent conversations with high Defense Department officials in Europe who maintained that nationalization per se provided no assurance of efficient performance and that both types of organizations were to be found among both efficient and inefficient producers. A recent critical evaluation of high technology programs in the United States—breeder reactors for civilian electric power and the supersonic transport plane—faults government pressure for what the authors consider premature programs apparently pressed upon a more cautious industry.<sup>28</sup> Nationalization is unlikely to have been a corrective measure in these circumstances. Even the Nye Committee which recommended nationalization of the arms industry—to prevent profiteering—exempted the aircraft industry because it was in an area marked by rapid technological change. It is still not clear that nationalization is the cure for what ails the modern weapons producing sector.

#### "A WIDENING GYRE?"

James R. Kurth has drawn on William Butler Yeats's *The Second Coming* for the picturesque title to his paper on weapons procurement, "A Widening Gyre." He foresees:

... expansion in the number of production centers, in the number of production lines, in the costs of weapons systems, and in the dangers and damages that they bring; weapons procurement will feature wider and wider scope, higher and higher

26. Perry, *European and U.S. Strategies*, p. 14.

27. *Ibid.*

28. George Eads and Richard R. Nelson, "Government Support of Advanced Civilian Technology: Power Reactors and the Supersonic Transport," *Public Policy* 19 (Summer 1971), pp. 405-27.



costs, greater and greater risks, and less and less control by the President, by Congress as a whole, and by the people they are supposed to represent.<sup>29</sup>

He likens all this to Yeats's falcon, "turning and turning in the widening gyre, the falcon cannot hear the falconer."<sup>30</sup> Kurth's argument rests heavily on the belief that fear of local unemployment resulting from the closing of redundant production lines will make such actions highly unlikely. This is an example of the staying power of conventional wisdom, even after underlying circumstances have changed. The Nixon administration has repeatedly demonstrated its conviction that unemployment is a lesser evil than inflation. The sharp cutbacks in procurement during the post-1968 Vietnam demobilization were accompanied by the tightest monetary policy in forty years, hardly a "compensatory" policy in the usual meaning of the term. While the regional unemployment fear is used to help support particular arguments, it is rarely a sufficient condition to prevent contract cutbacks or cancellations. The real localized distress in centers of the aerospace industry since 1968 did not evoke a spate of new assistance programs. Fear of local unemployment also failed to halt the closure of many military bases during the last decade. Even in Europe with its more highly developed concern over unemployment, military projects have been reduced and canceled with what industry must consider appalling regularity.<sup>31</sup>

29. James R. Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement," *Public Policy* 19 (Summer 1971), pp. 373-404, especially 395.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 395.

31. For a discussion of these conflicting pressures in Europe, see John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972), pp. 132-37.

#### CHANGING COMPOSITION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

An important trend has emerged in the last few years with a significant bearing upon military producers, but has gone virtually unnoticed in the press. It is the shift in the composition of defense spending resulting from the twin effects of inflation and burgeoning manpower costs. These trends were presented in a recent document issued by the comptroller of the Defense Department.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps most important was the impressive increase in pay and related costs, which climbed from \$32.6 billion in fiscal year 1968, the peak of Vietnam War spending, to an estimated \$42.8 billion in fiscal year 1973, while total military manpower was *falling* by 1.2 million persons and associated civil service employment by over 250 thousand. In the same interval the overall military budget fell by \$1.5 billion, with a resulting squeeze on military procurements, research and development, and military construction in the aggregate of \$10 billion.<sup>33</sup> The very sharp increase in military manpower costs in a period of declining numbers of men under arms is explained by four basic developments:

1. The comparability pay principle embodied in a 1967 law designed to permit "catch-up" increases to reduce the differential in wage *level* between government and private industry. This was supplemented by another piece of legislation the same year tying military pay *increases* to civilian raises.

2. Rapid rates of pay increase in industry during the period to which government pay increases were linked.

3. A sharp increase in military pay in November 1971 to aid the transition to a volunteer armed force.

32. Department of Defense, Comptroller, *Economics of Defense Spending*.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

4. Increases in the population of retired military personnel qualified for retirement pay, plus increases in retirement benefit levels.<sup>34</sup>

While some of these influences are once-for-all in nature, the overall pattern of increased personnel costs within an essentially level military budget is increasingly evident in most Western countries, and it may exert downward pressure on procurement funds for some time.

#### EUROPE AS A COMPETITOR

A look at recent developments in Europe may cast some light on the future prospects of the American aerospace industry. The single most impressive change in the European aerospace industry has been the reduction in number of firms. In a recent unpublished paper, Mary Kaldor of the University of Sussex has traced the changing structure of this industry in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Her data indicate that between 1955 and 1972 the number of producers of aircraft in Britain fell from twenty-one to essentially two, BAC and Hawker-Siddeley, while aeroengine firms declined from nine to one, Rolls-Royce—bankrupt, at that. France's nine airframe producers were reduced to two, Dassault-Breguet and l'Aérospatiale, during the same period. West Germany, because of its defeat in the war, took somewhat longer to resume aerospace operations, but followed the pattern of the others by shrinking from eight producers in 1960 to three most recently. Further reduction as a matter of conscious policy was recommended in July 1972 by Commissioner Altiero Spinelli of the European Economic Community, who set as a goal a single aircraft engine enterprise in Western Europe and two airframe pro-

ducers.<sup>35</sup> Such a streamlined European aerospace industry is seen by many as a serious competitor to the U.S. industry.

The postwar American dominance of the European aircraft industry could not have been expected to continue indefinitely and has already begun to show signs of fading, in both military and civil aircraft. Thus, in 1963 about 65 percent of military aircraft in use in Europe was of American origin. By 1970 the U.S. share had fallen to 50 percent.<sup>36</sup> French military aircraft are increasingly important as competitors with American aircraft, and in the case of the British Hawker-Siddeley "Harrier" VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) plane, the United States is in the unusual position of buyer. While the numbers presently being acquired are limited, the Harrier is flying in the U.S. armed forces (marines), while at least one of its potential competitors, the Lockheed "Cheyenne" helicopter, is dead. Some Washington officials worry about further inroads into U.S. aircraft markets abroad posed by the MRCA (multi-role combat aircraft) now under development by the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy. The A300B airbus, the Mercure, the Fokker-VFW F-28 Fellowship, and the VFW-614 are all multi-national, medium- and short-range civilian passenger aircraft with the capacity to provide substantial challenge to American products. There is also the unevaluated threat posed by the long-range Anglo-French "Concorde" and the potential export challenge posed by Soviet and Japanese aircraft, not too many years away. The highly compe-

35. "United It Flies: The Spinelli Plan for Europe's Aeronautical Industry," European Community Background Information, no. 22, August 9, 1972, p. 1.

36. Stanley and Pearton, *International Trade in Arms*, p. 147.

34. Ibid., pp. 135, 137.

TABLE 1—U. S. OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN EUROPEAN AIRCRAFT FIRMS

| COUNTRY      | FIRM               | U. S. SHAREHOLDER | PERCENT U. S. SHAREHOLDING |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| France       | SNECMA             | Pratt & Whitney   | 10%                        |
| West Germany | VFW                | United Aircraft   | 26.4                       |
| West Germany | MBB                | Boeing            | 16.6                       |
| Italy        | Aeronautica-Macchi | Lockheed          | 20                         |
| Netherlands  | Fokker             | Northrop          | 20                         |
| Spain        | CASA               | Northrop          | 24                         |

SOURCE: John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972), p. 156.

tent Swedish aircraft industry has demonstrated its skills in the impressive Viggen 37, and a restrictive arms export policy is the principal inhibition to its appearance as an important military competitor.<sup>37</sup> Traditional Swedish isolation is under challenge from various quarters, and Saab-SCANIA is now cooperating with British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) in the development of a QSTOL (quiet short take-off and landing) passenger aircraft.

Some of these developments cannot be viewed as complete surprises, and some American firms have shown the foresight to buy into their European counterparts. Thus at a recent date the ownership interest shown in Table 1 prevailed. Then again, the core engine powering the Viggen 37 is a GT-8 Pratt and Whitney engine with a Swedish-developed afterburner. Despite these forms of U.S. participation, however, growing competition from the European aerospace industry is a certainty. Such increased competition will present an important public policy issue as the inevitable cries for protection of the domestic industry become louder. To satisfy such demands will surely result

37. A dash of comic relief is contributed by the prospect that a reduction in the number of "hot spots" throughout the world may increase the number of areas in which Saab can peddle its Viggen 37 strike aircraft as a result of the vagaries of Swedish arms export policy.

in longer-run damage to U.S. industry's export position as a result of retaliation, which will make it more difficult for American aircraft to be sold in Europe, and in the general deterioration of our relations with friendly nations. There is already widespread annoyance in Europe at the contrast between duty-free importation of U.S. aircraft into Europe and the 5 percent tariff levied on foreign aircraft brought into the United States, plus other inhibitions resulting from decisions by the Export-Import Bank and other American agencies with responsibilities in the area of foreign trade.

#### MARKET DIVERSIFICATION

When one cumulates the effects of these various influences: lower procurement budgets, or, at best, restrictions on the growth rate of spending for procurement; new and more demanding standards for the award of procurement and research contracts; tougher foreign competition; plus the residue of hostility to military-related ventures and concern for social needs; a Darwinian competition looms as imminent—some would say it has already begun.

One obvious move would be to reduce dependence on the military by attempting to penetrate other markets.<sup>38</sup> The

38. One other possibility which is rarely commented upon is that of a reduction of "military" requirements designed to reduce the

conventional view today is that aerospace firms have a trained incapacity to work in civil markets. This is perhaps too hasty a judgment. It is true that long association with military buyers tends to atrophy two important keys to survival in commercial markets: marketing, and the capacity to cut back quality or performance requirements to a level that will permit competitive pricing. However, such deficiencies can be overcome in time. Of interest here is the unusual attempt now under way at the British Atomic Energy Establishment at Harwell to train scientists in marketing to help them communicate their capabilities to potential users in private industry—up to and including the construction of prototypes. If the principle of comparative advantage is to be realized, however, new areas of operation must be congruent with the basic capabilities of those attempting diversification. This is true whether diversification is attempted by the introduction of new product lines in existing corporate operations or via the acquisition of other firms. An example of such congruence was well expressed recently by G. W. Miller, president of the conglomerate enterprise Textron, Inc. In explaining his policy of staying within the manufacturing area Miller said, "I understand how to control manufacturing costs, but I'd be at a loss to control some of these service outfits that have 347 locations and no 'things.'"<sup>39</sup>

Textron, incidentally, provides an in-

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difference between what the armed forces purchase and close civilian products, where such exist. Thus, for example, the Dutch army has drastically reduced its special requirements for military trucks, permitting the producer to manufacture both military and civilian trucks on the same assembly lines. It is after all the special purpose production facilities for the military which lie at the heart of the conversion problem.

39. *Business Week*, October 7, 1972, p. 38.

teresting case study of the effect of corporate structure on aerospace performance. While the case has not been firmly established, the Bell Aerospace Division of Textron appears to have been more successful commercially than some of the independent aerospace firms. One may speculate that the tough "deliver or else" concern with profitability for which the parent firm, Textron, is noted may have had much to do with this result.

There are examples of promising developments in related fields. For example, the British Advanced Passenger Train designed to run at speeds of up to 150 miles per hour on existing roadbed was a product of aerodynamic engineering applied by a group of aerospace engineers. According to informed officials of the British Railway Board, however, they worked closely with those familiar with existing railroad operations. Also very important in determining the success of such ventures is the nature of the customer. He must be competent and well-informed about his needs, and it helps considerably if the number of units produced is large enough and sufficiently standardized to permit economies of scale in production. Close collaboration between buyer and seller in the development phase also seems to be essential.

Most public sector markets in the United States are characterized by a multiplicity of units—states, counties, school districts, sewage districts, and so forth—all jealously guarding their perceived independence. This condition is surely a massive obstacle to public sector marketing in this country, especially in high technology areas. Limited efforts have been made under private commercial auspices to develop a unified approach by state and local governmental units toward defining their needs and toward purchasing goods and services to meet their expanding role in

modern society.<sup>40</sup> Additional assistance may be possible from federal sources. Some time ago Nelson and his associates proposed steps to make federal government procurement more progressive and experimental in order to "... enlarge the ranks of early users where external economies of information useful to later prospective buyers may be great."<sup>41</sup> An effective program of this sort would be of benefit to both users and producers.

There are no foolproof guide lines to aid in diversification, and the more prominent examples of it are often the result of historical circumstances which were essentially unique. It is unlikely, for example, that an American aerospace firm will be able to follow the lead of Saab by producing automobiles and computers in addition to military aircraft. The successful cases that do exist, however, suggest that the firm attempting to diversify must first thoroughly know itself and its basic strengths and limitations and also the characteristics and requirements of the potential new product line to determine whether there is indeed a congruence between them. This is not an easy task, and as is often the case, what is obvious is not always true.

#### MILITARY R & D AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE

The Defense Department has been called "our real National Science Foundation,"<sup>42</sup> and it is indeed true that

40. For an interesting effort to overcome the effects of this structural problem, see *Business Week*, August 5, 1972, pp. 42-43.

41. Richard R. Nelson, Merton J. Peck, and Edward D. Kalachek, *Technology, Economic Growth and Public Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 209.

42. Michael D. Reagan, "Science and Politics—Emerging Tensions" (Paper prepared for delivery at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,

the bulk of support for research and development (R & D) in the postwar period has been performed under military auspices. There has been a reduction in the relative share of the total U.S. research and developmental effort which is described as defense-related in recent years, even when space research activities are included.<sup>43</sup> Nonetheless, debate continues as to whether the relationships between military/space research and domestic/industrial research are complementary or competitive.<sup>44</sup> What is clear, however, is that no single rallying cry in the past thirty years or so has been as successful in gaining federal funds as that of national defense. Some fear that recent and prospective cuts in military and space research spending will threaten U.S. "technological leadership" on a wide front.<sup>45</sup> For example, a recent Department of Commerce report on the aerospace industry concluded with the warning that:

World technological leadership earned by the United States aerospace industry during the 1960's is being eroded in the 1970's because of a lack of new programs. In contrast, there are continuing achievements by the European and United Kingdom consortiums and the Soviet Union. The United States' traditional major share of the world aerospace market in 1980 can be achieved only with leadership and fund-

Los Angeles, Calif., September 8-12, 1970), p. 10.

43. Department of Defense, Comptroller, *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 43. See also in this volume, Davis B. Bobrow, "Military Research and Development: Implications for the Civil Sector," *THE ANNALS* 406 (March 1973), pp. 117-28.

44. Department of Defense, Comptroller, *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 51.

45. For an interesting historical treatment of the concept of a gap in technology see Richard R. Nelson, "World Leadership, The 'Technology Gap' and National Science Policy," *Public Policy* 19 (Summer 1971), pp. 386-89.

ing required to develop and launch major new programs.<sup>46</sup>

While the implicit assumption here, that military and space-sponsored R & D has served as the cutting edge of new American technology, is debated by some, it is a widely held belief and points up the need for greater clarity in the role of military, and more generally, government support of the discovery of new knowledge and its application.

Over the post-World War II period, the accepted role of the federal government has shifted from one of support of basic science and its general application, into one of active partnership with industry in the development of particular products. Eads and Nelson have traced this evolution from the support and operation of R & D facilities for general use by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics for such things as wind tunnels for aerodynamic research and design of engine parts, properties of fuels, structural aspects of aircraft design, and the like, to almost the status of senior partner in the SST (supersonic transport) development.<sup>47</sup> They disapprove of this trend, urge its reversal, and warn of the premature freezing of designs, the discouragement of competitive options, and the adherence to plans long after they show clear signs of unworkability. The counter-argument often met in government

circles is similar to the above quote from the Commerce Department and stresses the need for a more active government role to enable our industry to meet foreign competition. It is remarkably similar to the position one hears enunciated in Europe repeatedly—that competition in development is desirable in principle but is very expensive and wasteful in reality, and only a wealthy country like the United States can afford such a luxury.<sup>48</sup>

The stakes are quite high, for as Eads and Nelson point out, "The basic issues posed by these programs [SST and breeder reactor] involve the whole institutional structure of industrial research and development including who proposes, who decides, and who funds and takes the risks."<sup>49</sup> It might also be added that the increasingly important task of technology assessment will be easier to accomplish if the government charged with the responsibility for such assessment is not also an interested party in the development of projects being subjected to such scrutiny. This is but one of many policy questions in the military-industry interface which are in serious need of debate and resolution, but which are usually lost in murky harangues over "needs"—military or social.

48. Interestingly, at least in certain influential European academic quarters this viewpoint is beginning to be challenged. See, for example, Keith Pavitt, "Technology in Europe's Future," *Research Policy* 1, no. 3 (July 1972), pp. 210-73.

49. Eads and Nelson, *Government Support of Civilian Technology*, p. 406.

46. Randolph Myers, Jr., "Aerospace," in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Domestic Commerce, *U.S. Industrial Outlook*, 1972, pp. 330-31.

47. Eads and Nelson, *Government Support of Civilian Technology*, p. 407.

## Cutting Back Military Spending: The Vietnam Withdrawal and the Recession

By EMILE BENOIT

**ABSTRACT:** The present public complacency about the possible economic effect of further defense cuts probably reflects not so much a confidence that we could adjust to defense cuts without hardship, as a doubt that any further substantial cuts are imminent. Indeed, despite the Vietnam withdrawal, and despite Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the outlook for major cuts now seems unpromising for the near future. By explaining the 1969–1971 recession as attributable to the Vietnam withdrawal, President Nixon has, however, strengthened the association in the public mind between defense cuts and economic hardship. In our opinion, this explanation is quite unjustified. This recession must be blamed not on defense cuts, but on the failure of public policy to supply adequate offsets to the defense cuts. This is shown by the fact that the loss of gross national product in relation to the size of the cuts was much bigger than after the Korean War or World War II and by the failure to allow non-defense federal programs to expand as the defense programs were cut back. Our ability to transfer defense resources to civilian uses without serious economic difficulties or loss has greatly improved over the last decade. There is now a greater willingness to accept budget deficits, to provide tax reductions, and to expand essential public programs—and there has been considerable experience with manpower retraining programs. But we cannot apply these capabilities in a situation where an economic recession is deliberately induced in a misconceived effort to combat inflation.

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THE conclusion in 1972 of the two first international agreements under the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) negotiations—the Treaty on the Limitation of the ABM Systems and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms—has occasioned very little apparent public anxiety about their economic impacts, even though they follow upon a period of significant cutback in U.S. defense expenditures connected with the withdrawal of most U.S. ground troops from Vietnam. Moreover, the stock market has recently staged brisk rallies on the basis of rumors of moves that might facilitate a settlement of the Vietnam War and termination of hostilities.<sup>1</sup>

Does this mean that the decade-long effort of various economists to debunk the myth that the United States “could not ‘afford’ to disarm”—in an economic and business sense—has finally succeeded? I am afraid it would be over-optimistic to jump to this conclusion. Public complacency in this matter may depend less on confidence that the government could successfully cope with the reconversion problem than on the belief that further substantial defense cuts are now unlikely.

#### ARE MORE DEFENSE CUTS IMMINENT?

Such a belief would be easy to understand. The SALT talks, after all, are aimed not at disarmament, but at heading off a large expansion of defense programs, which is threatened as a result of certain technical developments.

1. For example, the *New York Times* reported on July 7, 1972, that on the previous day a United Press account of an unconfirmed rumor that China and Russia had advised North Vietnam to settle with the United States without much further delay had inspired a sudden wave of buying in the New York Stock Exchange and sent the Dow-Jones industrial average up 17.69 points in just one hour.

Miniaturization and improved accuracy of missiles and progress in ABM (anti-ballistic missile) systems have destabilized the strategic “balance of terror” and raise the specter of a new weapons race in pursuit of a first-strike capability: that is, an ability to mount a preclusive attack with the likelihood of escaping an unacceptable amount of damage from retaliation by the victim’s surviving forces. Such a posture, if ever attained, would be both far more costly and far less stable than the present one. Therefore, both parties have a common interest in mutually avoiding it, if possible. But an agreement to do so, even if attained, would tend more to stabilize present defense levels than to reduce them.

Indeed, the preliminary agreements reached in the first phase of the SALT negotiations may, it is alleged, even call for an increase in defense expenditures. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has now stated quite seriously before a congressional committee that he would not recommend the ratification of these agreements, unless the Congress is prepared to raise defense expenditures by several billion dollars to strengthen aspects of the U.S. military programs not covered by the agreements, thereby offsetting the additional risks which the self-imposed limitations of the SALT agreements will entail.

As for the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, it appears that reductions in defense expenditure from that source have, since the third quarter of 1971, been exceeded by rising defense expenditures on non-Vietnam defense programs which were held back during the period when Vietnam programs were given an overriding priority. Indeed, the estimated increase in the first quarter of 1972 of \$4.6 billion—at an annual rate—is the most rapid since the early Vietnam buildup in 1965. There was a further rise of \$1.9 billion in the



second quarter, and the Congress has now approved further increases for the coming year. Continued progress toward an all-volunteer military force would imply a continuation of the sharp uptrend in military pay. And there is reluctance in Congress to cut off research and development (R & D) on major new weapons systems, if only to assure an adequate supply of "bargaining counters" in our arms control negotiations with the USSR.

Thus the short and intermediate term outlook is for rising rather than declining rates of defense expenditure, even with a further reduction in Vietnam expenditures—except under three possible conditions: (1) major U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe and deactivation of various other foreign and domestic military bases; (2) abandonment or drastic curtailment of land-based missile sites and nuclear bombers, and dependence henceforth exclusively or predominantly on submarines for the strategic deterrent; (3) major cutbacks in limited war forces and conventional type defenses, as, for example, the fighter-interceptor command, and the surface navy, including aircraft carriers. All such measures are viewed by a substantial body of opinion as involving serious risks to U.S. security, especially in responding to any challenges short of a nuclear war.<sup>2</sup> While some moves in this direction seem likely if the mood of détente continues, progress will probably be slow.

#### THE ASSOCIATION OF DEFENSE CUTS WITH RECESSION IN PUBLIC OPINION

It is our impression, in any case, that the association between defense cuts and recession in the public mind is far from dead. For its revival and

2. This article makes no judgment on the security aspect of defense programs, being concerned exclusively with their economic impacts.

strengthening President Nixon must be given a share of the responsibility. His policies have in fact produced a major recession during a time of defense cuts, thus automatically strengthening the association in the mind of the public. Moreover, he has deliberately capitalized on this association to supply an alibi for the recession, claiming it was an inevitable by-product of the Vietnam withdrawal. In the circumspect language of the Economic Report of the President, the argument was stated as follows:

While the Nation was making the transition to a less inflationary economy it was also making the transition to a lower level of defense spending. Men released from the Armed Forces have been out of touch with the civilian labor market and need time to readjust. Workers laid off from defense production are likely to be concentrated in particular areas, which are often not the areas where nondefense activity is expanding. Their curtailed purchasing power further tends to lower employment of others in their area. During 1970, the number of persons in military and civilian employment for defense was reduced by about 1 million. Most of these people have found work, and others will soon do so. But during the transition many were unemployed, and their number added to the total unemployment rate.

These two simultaneous transitions, from a wartime to a peacetime economy and from a higher to a lower rate of inflation, would inevitably be accompanied by some decline in output and rise in unemployment. The aim of our policy was to keep the decline in output and the rise in unemployment as small as possible.<sup>3</sup>

#### WAS THIS REALLY GOVERNMENT POLICY?

Granted that *some* frictional losses were inevitable in any shift of resources from one use to another, is it a valid

3. Economic Report of the President, January 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 4.

TABLE 1—DEFENSE CUTS AND GNP LOSSES

|                                                                                                 | 1945-47 | 1953-55 | 1969-71 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| (1) Size of defense cuts (as percent of GNP)                                                    | 30.75%  | 3.66%   | 1.6%    |
| (2) Loss of GNP<br>as percentage points of achievable<br>(4.5 percent per annum) real<br>growth | 22. %   | 2.9 %   | 7.0%    |
| (3) Transfer cost index<br>(line 2 divided by line 1)                                           | 0.72    | 0.79    | 4.4     |

characterization of government policy in the period 1969-71 to say that it aimed to keep the decline in output and the rise in unemployment "as small as possible?" There are two indications that throw doubt on this claim.

The first indication is the relatively large amount of gross national product (GNP) lost relative to the share of GNP being shifted from military to civilian uses. This stands out clearly when we compare this experience with the similar experiences after the Korean War and after World War II shown in Table 1.

Each of the three two-year periods shown is from the peak year of defense expenditure to the year of temporary low after which an upturn occurred. The magnitude of the cuts is measured by the reduction in defense expenditures on goods and services as a percent of GNP. The loss of GNP during the period of the cuts is measured by the extent to which growth in real GNP over the two-year period fell below 4.5 percent per year—which various studies have held to be achievable in the U.S. economy even after full employment has been reached.

It appears from these estimates that the defense cuts from 1969 to 1971 involved a shift of only 1.6 percent of GNP out of defense, but were associated with a loss of 7 out of the 9 percent of achievable growth over this

two-year period. The index of transfer costs—the losses in GNP in relation to the share of GNP shifted out of defense—was far higher than in past episodes of major defense cuts after wars. Whereas in 1945-47 and 1953-55 the lost growth was only about 0.75 percent per annum for each percent of GNP shifted out of defense, in the defense cuts associated with the Vietnam withdrawal, the lost growth was nearly 4.5 percent per annum for each percent of GNP shifted out of defense.

This gives us some sort of approximate historical standard by which we may judge how much of the recession as a maximum could properly be attributed to the defense cuts. Applying the more recent and more comparable transfer-cost index of the post-Korean defense cuts as a standard, we find that if President Nixon had done even as well as President Eisenhower in shifting resources from defense to other uses without losing them in the process, then he would have needed to sacrifice no more than 1.23 percent of achievable growth in the years 1969 and 1970 rather than the 7 percent actually lost. The recent recession was therefore at least four times as severe as it need have been on account of the defense cuts, and no more than a quarter of the losses sustained—at the outside—could properly be attributed to the defense cuts.

Indeed, the loss of income truly imposed by defense cuts of this size would be too small to create what is ordinarily called a recession. The loss we have indicated was 1.23 percent of GNP over a two-year period, or 0.61 percent of GNP per annum. This would bring a full employment growth rate down only from 4.5 percent to 3.9 percent. But 3.9 percent is higher than the average U.S. growth rate and if attained, would be regarded as a relatively good performance rather than a recession. On the basis of this analysis, this is the rate of growth that could have been attained in 1969 and 1970, despite the Vietnam withdrawal, if real growth had been seriously pursued.

#### CUTS IN NON-DEFENSE SPENDING

A second indication suggesting that the government did not give a very high priority to minimizing unemployment and loss of production is what happened to non-defense federal expenditures. It is standard practice, if one wishes to minimize the disruptions of defense cuts, to expand needed non-defense programs as defense programs are cut back. In the present instance, there was a crying need for expanded federal programs to overcome glaring weaknesses in the fields of pollution control, mass transportation, public health, education, urban renewal, and so forth.

However, the Administration's ideological hostility to federal spending and federal bureaucracy would not allow it to utilize the opportunities in these areas for valuable compensatory programs to take up the slack left by cut-backs in defense expenditure. Between 1968 and 1971 real federal expenditures on goods and services—that is, adjusted for price increases—were reduced by a fifth. Not only were the non-defense federal programs not increased enough to offset the defense cuts, but it seems

likely that, at least in 1969 and 1970, they were actually cut back in real terms.<sup>4</sup>

#### THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION

To be sure, the background circumstances of the recent experience differed significantly from those that prevailed after the Korean War and after World War II. In particular, the inflationary trend was more serious, and balance of payments constraints were more severe. But it is far from clear that these factors made a major recession inevitable in the event of defense cuts.

It is notable, for example, that after the Korean War the general price level—as measured by the implicit GNP price deflator—advanced only 2 percent in two years, compared to 3 percent in the previous two years. But from 1969 to 1971 the same price indicator rose by 11 percent, which was 2 percent more than the 9 percent rise in the two previous years. There is no question that the government wanted to stop inflation, but it wanted to do so without the politically unpopular wage-price controls and federal enforcement machinery which were indispensable to coping with the type of cost-push seller's inflation that it actually confronted.

There is no solid evidence of substantial demand inflation in 1969–71. Unemployment averaged 4.7 percent in these years, and utilization of installed industrial capacity remained well below the ratio preferred by business. The fact that the inflation accelerated despite the credit squeeze, cuts in real

4. Published data do not permit an unambiguous determination on this point. Since the middle 1960s the government has ceased to publish separate estimates of defense and non-defense expenditures at constant prices. However, if one assumes defense prices and non-defense federal prices move roughly in parallel, then one could draw the conclusion reached above.

federal purchases, and the 1970 decline in industrial output strongly suggests that excess demand was not the cause.

#### BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONSTRAINTS

What about balance of payments constraints? The events of 1971 strongly suggest that these constraints were influential only as long as they pushed the U.S. government to pursue policies that it wished to follow anyhow for domestic reasons. As soon as they became a serious encumbrance to the adoption of moderate recovery measures required by the Administration to prepare for the approaching 1972 election, the Administration moved to scrap the inflexible crisis-prone gold-exchange international monetary system, which then began to limit U.S. freedom of action. At worst, a steadfast pursuit of the high employment and production goals of the Employment Act of 1946 might have precipitated the international monetary crisis of August 1971 a year or two sooner. If so, this might, perhaps, have been a small price to pay.

But one cannot even be sure that a sustained high rate of employment and output would have had the adverse inflationary and balance of payments consequences that many people assume. Operating at far below full utilization of capacity, the U.S. economy has faced high and rising overhead unit costs, with a severe slowdown of productivity increases. This by itself has strengthened inflationary trends and has undermined our international cost competitiveness. A more expansionist policy, with respect to production—especially if wage rates had been effectively linked to productivity increases—could have led to less inflation and a stronger payments position. (It must be remembered that a large increase in output at low costs is itself a powerful anti-inflationary influence and a helpful factor for the balance of payments!) Under

the circumstances, even the creaky gold-exchange standard might have survived a little longer—assuming this would have been desirable!

#### IMPROVED ADJUSTABILITY

Actually the technical possibilities of a good economic adjustment to further defense cuts, when such cuts again occur, have been substantially improved in the last decade. The deficit-financed tax cut of 1964 has broken public inhibitions against using this fundamental fiscal-policy tool for economic expansion. There is also a rapidly growing public recognition of the value of federally assisted programs in such fields as pollution abatement, population control, urban redevelopment, mass transit, public health, and education, which could very well absorb resources released from defense programs. And we have now gained valuable experience and essential infrastructure in the field of manpower retraining. With these instruments at our disposal, we should be able to cope with any foreseeable defense cuts, without hardship—indeed, with considerable net benefit.

But none of this will work in an economic environment in which a recession is being deliberately cultivated for its supposed benefits in curbing inflation. In that kind of situation it is politically unrealistic to suppose that ex-soldiers, and former defense workers, will be given sufficient preference or priority over other unemployed persons—many of whom may have been out of work longer and may be less well prepared to find a job—to enable them to reenter the civilian economy without considerable loss and even hardship.

Similarly, defense contractors are likely to suffer serious loss unless there is an adequate number of new government contracts available to apply advanced R & D and engineering capabilities to the difficult challenges of peace:

to the discovery, improvement, and recycling of raw materials, to the control of pollution, to the solution of problems of population control, transportation, education, public health, and the like.

If defense cuts are allowed to result in hardships for former soldiers, defense workers, and defense contractors, it is to be expected that politically effective resistance to defense cuts may arise, resistance inspired by economic, rather than security considerations. Such resistance is tragic if it causes us to maintain a higher level of defense activity than is required—or even beneficial—for security, and wastes resources vitally required to meet some of our most acute and dangerous internal problems.

#### CONCLUSION

The recent recession provides no confirmation of the popular notion that defense cuts necessarily bring recessions and that the transfer of economic resources from defense to alternative uses must inevitably be at a high economic cost in wasted or unutilized manpower and industrial capacity. Defense cuts

produce recessions only if they are allowed, or encouraged, to do so by government policies which, by failing to provide the necessary offsets, deliberately invite recessions as a means of coping with inflation. Such deflationary measures are, however, largely ineffective against the cost-push type of sellers inflation which we now primarily confront, and—by raising unit costs—they may even be counterproductive in the fight against inflation.

In any event, we need have no economic concerns in cutting the defense budget whenever we get a chance to do so. It remains as absurd today as it always has been to continue to spend a cent more on defense than we actually need for security reasons. The incapable transitional costs of adjusting to a lower level of defense expenditures (which are of a structural and frictional character) are relatively trivial—and can be minimized and widely shared by supportive, retraining, and relocation programs, if desired. There are no economic benefits from spending on defense that cannot be matched or exceeded by alternative uses of the same resources.

# The Military and the Balance of Payments

By EDWARD R. FRIED

ABSTRACT: U.S. military cooperation with Western Europe and Japan is intermittently threatened by controversy over who should assume responsibility for the foreign exchange costs of stationing forces abroad. This question has been the cause of a long-standing dispute between the United States and its allies. At home, the need "to strengthen the dollar" by eliminating the foreign exchange drain on military account is frequently cited as a major reason for withdrawing U.S. forces from Western Europe, Korea, and Japan. There may well be compelling political, military, or budgetary reasons to revise U.S. mutual defense arrangements and reduce forces stationed abroad, but to make the decision on balance of payments grounds is to confuse means and ends. Our allies might appropriately be asked to mitigate the effect of this problem by cost-sharing arrangements and by military procurement in the United States, but the case for their doing so should meet the test of efficiency as well as equity. In the last analysis, however, the military balance of payments deficit should be viewed not as a military or security issue, but as part of the general process through which nations correct payment imbalances—surpluses as well as deficits. For this reason the stability of U.S. mutual defense arrangements over the future will depend in part on the success achieved in current negotiations to reform the international monetary system.

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UNITED STATES military activities abroad currently involve foreign exchange expenditures of about \$5 billion a year. At the same time, the United States receives about \$2 billion a year from sales of U.S. military equipment and services abroad, more than half to Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. To former Secretary of the Treasury John Connally—and to other secretaries of the treasury before him—these figures argued strongly for special measures by Western Europe and Japan to reduce this foreign exchange burden on the United States.

The response of Western European countries and Japan to this argument has been ambivalent, partly because this was a convenient position to take, but also because some U.S. military foreign exchange costs are for purposes these countries may not support—for example, the Vietnam War—or for which, as regional rather than global powers, they do not see that they have any responsibility.

In any event, the framework for discussing these matters widened markedly on August 15, 1971, when the United States suspended convertibility of the dollar and thereby began the process of reforming the international monetary system. The U.S. balance of payments deficit on military account, and the argument over what specific measures other countries should take to offset it, then became part of the more general problem of devising an effective means of correcting persistent deficits and surpluses in the balance of payments of all countries—from whatever causes. The issue now is not whether the U.S. military balance of payments deficit is to be neutralized, but rather the form that adjustments are to take. Specifically, how much of the deficit is to be offset by actions on the part of our allies in the military sector—that is, by sharing in the cost for stationing U.S.

forces abroad and by military procurement in the United States—and how much, if anything, is to be left to the general adjustment process—that is, to actions such as exchange rate changes and trade liberalization measures that could improve the nonmilitary trade and services account and thereby serve equally to offset military foreign exchange outlays.

### *Differences in foreign exchange expenditures*

Discussion of the military balance of payments deficit and what to do about it has suffered from a failure to distinguish between two kinds of foreign exchange flows: (1) those that involve a budget cost for the United States when it stations forces abroad and which therefore belong in the sphere of burden-sharing negotiations; and (2) those that do not involve a budget cost and which become a problem only if the international monetary system is not effective in encouraging the adjustments among all countries necessary to achieve balance of payments equilibrium. The \$5 billion in U.S. foreign exchange expenditures for military purposes is divided about equally between the two categories.<sup>1</sup>

About half is a true budgetary cost, consisting of payments for local goods and services to construct and operate military facilities abroad. Some of these facilities are part of a common defense effort, such as American NATO

1. The following analytical breakdown of military foreign exchange expenditures is drawn largely from Edward R. Fried, "Foreign Economic Policy: The Search for a Strategy," in Henry Owen, ed., *The Next Phase of Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973). A technical review of the data appears in Leonard G. Campbell and Robert J. Shue, "Military Transactions in the U.S. Balance of Payments," U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business* 52, no. 2 (February 1972).

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) bases in Europe; some arise from a joint defense arrangement, such as American installations in Japan. In these cases, legitimate questions can be raised about how operating costs should be shared between the United States and the host country. Where common defense is not involved in any specific sense—for instance, military expenditures in Vietnam and expenditures for U.S. bases elsewhere in the world—the cost-sharing argument loses force.

The other \$2.5 billion in foreign exchange expenditures is not a burden on the budget. It consists of (1) government purchases abroad of supplies for military forces, such as petroleum, and government procurement of major military equipment, usually under reciprocal buying arrangements with allied countries; and (2) personal expenditures abroad by the armed forces and their dependents. Supplies and equipment are purchased abroad only if they cost less than if they were brought from the United States; hence they represent a budgetary saving rather than a cost. Spending by military personnel and their dependents abroad is analogous to expenditures by tourists; no budgetary cost is involved. In neither case are there obvious arguments for cost-sharing by other countries.

On the other hand, the total \$5 billion foreign exchange outlay occasioned by the military, whether involving budgetary costs or not, represents a special adjustment burden for the international monetary system. A large part is not related to commercial transactions, for which the system is chiefly designed. Moreover, some major expenditure requirements are relatively insensitive to changes in exchange rates, although the size of these expenditures is greatly affected by such changes. For example, the revaluations of the German D-mark over the past few

years substantially increased the dollar cost of operating U.S. military facilities in Germany, but did not reduce requirements for these facilities. Similarly, the dollar cost of operating U.S. military installations in Japan has been increased by the revaluations of the yen. As a result of these revaluations and a steady increase in domestic wages and prices abroad, military foreign exchange expenditures rose considerably over the past few years despite a substantial reduction in the number of U.S. forces deployed overseas.

#### *Offsetting measures and counteracting transactions*

The extent to which these noneconomic foreign exchange flows complicate the monetary system depends on whether the governments directly concerned take special offsetting measures when needed and, if they do not, on whether the system is effective in encouraging counteracting commercial transactions. For example, when the payments position of the United States was strong, as in the first postwar decade or so, this military-related outflow proved useful as a balancing device in providing a supplemental source of foreign exchange for other countries and thereby contributed to a progressive liberalization of trade and capital movements through most of the first two postwar decades. In these circumstances it would have been unfortunate had the United States sought offsetting actions by other countries. When the U.S. balance of payments situation began to deteriorate, however, military foreign exchange transactions aggravated the difficulty of regaining equilibrium, particularly since the monetary system did not operate flexibly enough to facilitate offsetting adjustments in the commercial accounts. Through most of the 1960s the disturbing effects



of these military transactions were mitigated by Germany's cooperation in holding dollar reserves, which provided a stable, although partial, means of financing the U.S. balance of payments deficit. This cooperation, however, did not prevent costly economic reactions in the United States. Concern over the balance of payments deficit and its seeming relation to military transactions caused the administration to minimize defense procurement abroad and to give preference to domestic suppliers, even when this would increase costs by as much as 50 percent. These wasteful "buy-American" measures continue in effect. On the same reasoning, the question keeps cropping up of producing in the United States under license the British-made close support aircraft—the Harrier—used by the U.S. Marine Corps. This would reduce foreign exchange costs, but increase total budget costs. More generally, the deficit was a factor in the buildup of protectionist pressures in trade, which in themselves had a disturbing effect on U.S. relations with its allies.

Of at least equal concern is the fact that balance of payments worries have repeatedly created pressure in the United States to change its security arrangements—for example, by unilaterally withdrawing troops from Europe. Such changes may at any time become justified on security and political grounds, or they may become necessary as part of a general reduction of peacetime U.S. military forces, but to make them on balance of payments grounds confuses means and ends and reflects more than anything else a failure of the international monetary system to make these means and ends compatible.

#### *A future burden?*

How much of a balance of payments adjustment burden are these military transactions likely to be in the future,

and how should they be viewed in light of the pending reform of the international monetary system?

At present, gross military foreign exchange expenditures of \$5 billion and military foreign exchange receipts of \$2 billion suggest a net military deficit of \$3 billion.<sup>2</sup> The geographic distribution of foreign exchange expenditures, which mainly determine the balance of payments impact of the military accounts, can be attributed as follows: \$2 billion to NATO activities; \$1 billion to forces and installations in Japan and Korea; \$1 billion to Vietnam-related activities; and \$1 billion for troops and bases elsewhere in the world. The end of the Vietnam War and troop redeployments elsewhere associated with a moderate worldwide military retrenchment program might reduce military foreign exchange outlays and the net military foreign exchange deficit by perhaps \$1 billion. Beyond that, partial reductions in troop dispositions abroad are not likely to bring proportionate reductions in the net military foreign exchange deficit, both because of the

2. Measuring the net military impact on the balance of payments in this way involves a large number of conceptual and technical difficulties, which cannot be taken up here. The following are noted to indicate the nature of the problem. On the expenditure side, this procedure makes no allowance: (a) for the increase in U.S. nonmilitary exports stimulated by foreign exchange expenditures on military account; or (b) for the fact that some military foreign exchange expenditures, such as for petroleum, reduce U.S. import requirements. For these reasons, gross figures overstate the effect of military activities on foreign exchange outlays. In the case of receipts, on the other hand, no allowance is made for the fact that some sales of U.S. military equipment and services would occur in any circumstances. Hence, use of gross figures overstates the extent to which military receipts are an offset to military foreign exchange outlays. For present purposes, it does no analytical damage to assume that these adjustments counterbalance each other.

large element of relatively fixed costs in the operation of military bases abroad and because substantial reductions of forces in Europe and Japan would probably be followed by some reduction in foreign military procurement in the United States. For the next several years at least, and without allowing for additional counterbalancing transactions by allied governments, a net military foreign exchange deficit in the neighborhood of \$2 billion a year might be a reasonable expectation.

In present circumstances, a military-related balance of payments deficit of this magnitude would seem to be by far the smaller part of the total adjustment problem. Whereas in the 1960s the military deficit was larger than the total balance of payments deficit, it compares for 1972 to an overall basic deficit of \$11 billion in U.S. accounts. Hence achievement of balance of payments equilibrium must depend overwhelmingly on an improvement in the nonmilitary trade and services account, which is where ultimate adjustment responsibility must in any event lie.

What, then, is the role of special adjustment measures in the military field?

#### *Possible cost-sharing*

First is the question of whether Western Europe and Japan might do more in the way of sharing costs of stationing U.S. forces abroad. The United States at times has argued that while it is prepared to assume the cost of providing and transporting the forces it deploys abroad under NATO and under mutual defense arrangements with Japan, which is many times the foreign exchange cost, the host countries should assume all or most of the relatively minor cost of maintaining and operating the facilities where these forces are stationed. Such cost-sharing, furthermore, may be politically neces-

sary to convince critics in the U.S. Senate that our allies are bearing an equitable part of the military burden. Currently the U.S. spends about \$1 billion to operate and maintain military bases in Europe and about \$200 million a year on military installations in Japan—all representing a foreign exchange as well as a budgetary outlay. Whether Western Europe and Japan assume part or all of these costs in the future will depend on their judgment as to whether such action is indeed politically necessary to maintain effective U.S. military force dispositions, and whether it is politically feasible at home. If they do share more of these particular costs, the size of the military foreign exchange deficit would, of course, be commensurately reduced.

#### *Foreign purchases of U.S. equipment*

Second, increased foreign purchases of U.S. military equipment, where the equipment is available at a saving in cost, could continue to be an important form of adjustment. The United States has significant comparative advantages over a wide range of military production. Nevertheless, strong political constraints obviously exist on increasing military procurement abroad, even at lower cost. Each country wants to support its own defense industry for both security and domestic employment reasons. There may be room, however, for some increase in this military trade without impinging seriously on the existing base of national defense production. To the extent that this is so, the United States and its allies could achieve savings from moving toward commonality in military equipment. More generally, a greater degree of freedom of trade in military products could contribute to the more efficient utilization of resources in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in much

the same way as would greater freedom of trade in civilian products.

*International adjustment process*

Any residual military balance-of-payments costs should merge into the general process of achieving equilibrium in foreign exchange flows. Where the United States is otherwise in deficit, these costs will require that much more in the way of international adjustment action to enable the United States to increase its receipts on nonmilitary account. Where the United States is otherwise in surplus, the military deficit will require that much less adjustment action to reduce U.S. nonmilitary foreign exchange receipts. In this sense, security arrangements in the future will continue to be heavily influenced by international monetary arrangements. If monetary reform brings about an effective balance-of-payments adjustment process, there will be little reason for the United States to be concerned

on foreign exchange grounds about its military dispositions abroad.

In sum, the long-standing dispute over the balance of payments burden of military alliances and collective security arrangements should become less contentious if the separate underlying issues are properly understood. Who pays the cost of operating alliance military bases established for the common defense is a true burden-sharing question that will have to be settled on its political merits. Increased trade in military products among allies involves questions of efficiency and mutual gains—not economic burdens. To the extent that military foreign exchange outlays are not offset by cost-sharing and military procurement, the international adjustment process will have to do the work. This, too, is not a question of burden-sharing, but of improving the degree to which the monetary system facilitates international activities that nations wish to carry on.

# The Social Demography of the All-Volunteer Armed Force

By MORRIS JANOWITZ

**ABSTRACT:** With the termination of the Selective Service System in 1973, the armed forces will be reduced in size, but for the first time the United States will have an expanded military operating as a "force in being" rather than a cadre for mobilization. Several fundamental public policy questions are involved: will the armed forces be able to recruit the necessary number and quality personnel; will this force be relatively representative of the larger society. With present reduction in force levels, recruitment is made more difficult because of lack of career stability and declining opportunities. The end of the draft has already resulted in shortages of skilled and technical personnel as well as declining enrollment in Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and National Guard and reserve units. Together with age restrictions and educational guide lines, this suggests that progress toward numerical quotas is in part a compromise in quality. A review of the characteristics of the manpower pool indicates that it is weighted toward the low-income and modest social status group. The social demography of the armed forces is not predetermined, but it will play an important role in the internal viability of the armed forces in civil-military relations in the post-Vietnam period.

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THE all-volunteer military establishment that will come into being after July 1, 1973, represents a new departure in the American experience. After each major war, the military, and especially the ground forces, have been reduced to a skeleton structure. Since the end of World War II, the United States has relied on a draft to maintain its armed forces which have been continuously deployed throughout the world and which have fought two major engagements in Korea and in Vietnam. With the termination of the Selective Service System the armed forces will be reduced in size, but for the first time the United States will have an expanded military operating as a "force in being" rather than a cadre for mobilization.

The all-volunteer force raises fundamental questions of public policy. First, will the armed forces be able to recruit the necessary number and quality personnel? Second, will this force be relatively representative of the larger society, or will it draw heavily on particular social groups, blacks, and poor whites as enlisted personnel and on the sons of the military at the officer level as well as recruiting a high concentration of cadets from the hinterland of the South and the Southwest? The social demography of the armed forces is not predetermined, but it will play an important role in the internal viability of the armed forces and in civil-military relations in the post-Vietnam period.

#### FORCE LEVELS AND VOLUNTEERS

The transition to an all-volunteer force has been taking place during a period of steady as well as projected reduction in overall force levels. From a high of 3.5 million in 1968, the total manpower has been reduced to 2.4 million in March 1972—see Table 1. At the low point in the post-Korean

period and before the Vietnam buildup came in 1960, the total force was 2.4 million. The decrease in the size of the armed forces means the number of officers and enlisted personnel to be recruited annually has diminished. It also implies that during the period of cutback, the task of recruitment is made more difficult because of the lack of career stability and declining opportunities. The U.S. military is fully aware that the British volunteer force during the decade of 1960–70 has continuously suffered an overall "short fall" in new recruits, while its total size has been steadily reduced. With the leveling off of the force structure in the early 1970s, there has been some improvement in the ability of the British forces to recruit. Of course, other factors are involved, especially the enhanced reputation the forces gained during the new Irish troubles.

It is difficult to estimate the size of the reduced U.S. armed forces in the next five or ten years. The President's Commission on an All Volunteer Force—the Gates Commission—estimated in 1970, 2.5 million or roughly the size of the military before Vietnam. In 1971 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird spoke of 2.25 million, and by 1972 Defense officials were quoting unofficially a 2.0 million figure. The projection of Senator McGovern of 1.75 million in the summer of 1972 appears to be more realistic, and an even lower figure for the mid-1970s cannot be ruled out.

The major reduction in manpower will take place in the army, which will also have the most difficult problems of transition. The other services have varying traditions of a volunteer force. In addition, the ground forces have had to institute changes while at the same time winding down in Vietnam and reacting to the agonies of this experience. From Table 1 it can be seen that the army has reduced its

TABLE 1—TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL, 1950-1972

|               | ARMY      | NAVY    | AIR FORCE | MARINE  | TOTAL<br>DEPARTMENT<br>OF<br>DEFENSE |
|---------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|--------------------------------------|
| June 30, 1950 | 593,167   | 381,538 | 411,277   | 74,279  | 1,460,261                            |
| June 30, 1955 | 1,109,296 | 660,695 | 959,946   | 205,170 | 2,935,107                            |
| June 30, 1960 | 873,078   | 617,984 | 814,752   | 170,621 | 2,476,435                            |
| June 30, 1965 | 969,066   | 671,448 | 824,662   | 190,210 | 2,655,389                            |
| June 30, 1966 | 1,199,784 | 745,205 | 887,353   | 261,710 | 3,094,058                            |
| June 30, 1967 | 1,442,498 | 751,619 | 497,494   | 285,260 | 3,376,880                            |
| June 30, 1970 | 1,321,859 | 692,882 | 792,000   | 260,311 | 3,067,052                            |
| Feb. 28, 1971 | 1,217,378 | 644,243 | 753,319   | 225,225 | 2,840,165                            |
| Feb. 29, 1972 | 885,779   | 595,193 | 747,999   | 196,080 | 2,425,051                            |

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1971, p. 252, *Navy Times*, April 19, 1972, p. 23.

personnel from 1.57 million in 1968 to 890,000 in 1971, or a drop of over 40 percent. A further reduction to 700,000 after Selective Service would mean an overall 5.5 percent reduction.

The shift to the all-volunteer system has been accompanied by a gradual reduction in draft calls, an increase in military pay, improved conditions of military life, plus changes designed to modernize the profession. From 1968 to 1972 the draft calls have dropped as follows:

| Calendar Year | Draft Calls      |
|---------------|------------------|
| 1968          | 299,000          |
| 1969          | 289,000          |
| 1970          | 163,000          |
| 1971          | 98,000           |
| 1972          | 50,000 Estimated |

For this period, it is extremely difficult to estimate the success of volunteering since the indirect effect of the draft was still at work. While the initiatives designed to increase "true" recruits have had a positive impact, the available evidence indicates that the goals required for an effective transition to the all-volunteer force have not been accomplished. Thus Secretary Melvin Laird, in his 1973 annual report commented on enlistment rates, "Encouraging as these facts are the higher

enlistment rates still fall short of those required for the termination of the draft."<sup>1</sup>

The introduction of the lottery system and the advent of the end of the draft has decreased the indirect pressure to "volunteer." All services experienced some shortages, especially in skilled and technical personnel. Even the marine corps, the epitome of the volunteer service, found itself without sufficiently qualified applicants for its officer candidate courses and was required in 1972 to institute a crash recruitment program. A key indicator was the number of enlistments in the combat arms of the ground forces. During the last half of 1970 the monthly average was 250, and by the last half of 1971 it had increased to nearly 3,000. This level of volunteering still failed to meet the required 1972 goal of 5,000 per month. This figure is not a stable or accurate indicator, since young men during this period could avoid combat or any type of service in Vietnam by volunteering for combat assignment in Western Europe. In addition with the

1. Melvin R. Laird, *National Security: Strategy of Realistic Deterrence* (Washington, D.C.: House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, 1972), p. 1957.

approach of a zero-draft, the armed services were particularly concerned with the procurement of lawyers and physicians.

The impact of the end of the draft could be seen particularly in the declining enrollment in the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and in the reserves, a route which was extensively used during the period of high draft calls. The sharp decline in ROTC is shown below, including the decrease in enrollment in the marine corps' Platoon Leaders Class (PLC), its equivalent of Officer Candidates School:

| Academic Year | ROTC Enrollments | PLC Enrollments |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------|
| 1968-69       | 218,466          | 2,921           |
| 1969-70       | 161,507          | 2,255           |
| 1970-71       | 114,950          | 2,325           |
| 1971-72       | 87,807           | 2,427           |

In National Guard and Reserve units, a similar pattern of decline was already experienced with a 45,000 short fall by the end of 1971. For example, the total strength of the Army National Guard declined from 402,175 in June 1971 to 380,742 in December 1971, with new enrollments forecasting continuing overall decline.

In terms of achieving the required quotas, a comparison with the British experience reveals one startling fact. In anticipating the problem of recruitment under an all-volunteer system the Griggs Report, the equivalent of the Gates Commission, realistically anticipated that a major source of new personnel would be young "boys," that is youngsters age fifteen and sixteen. In effect, the British recruitment system relies heavily on this age group, which by U.S. cultural definition is ruled out for military service. In 1969, 67 percent of the Royal Navy/Royal Marine recruits, 47 percent of the Royal Army recruits, and 38 percent of the Royal

Air Force recruits were boys of this age group.

The armed forces rely on the criteria of graduation from high school or the equivalent Category IV—limited educational performance—as a measure of the quality of their enlisted personnel. While either of these two criteria are arbitrary, they do serve as guide lines. The limited available data indicate that especially for the ground forces, progress toward numerical quotas in part is the result of compromises in quality. For the period January–April 1971, 23.9 percent of new enlistments were from Category IV personnel—a high concentration from the military point of view.

At the officer level, college education is used as the equivalent criterion, and the services are excessively arbitrary in seeking to apply this standard. In the past there has been a tradition by which men with less than four years of college were commissioned with the opportunity to complete college while in the military service. Of particular importance is the widely publicized issue of whether in the post-Vietnam military the most outstanding younger officers will resign and withdraw. The resignations from the military academies continue to fluctuate near 25 percent of each class by the end of the obligated tour of duty. Moreover, among highly selected junior officers, there have been reports of noteworthy resignations. For example, in the eighteen-month period ending in June 1972, thirty-three officers who were members of the U.S. Military Academy faculty at West Point resigned. Their motives involved a combination of doubt about career opportunities, reactions to the war in Vietnam, as well as uncertainty about the mission of the army, and the difficulties involved in adapting the military profession to its changing role.

## SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Military leadership has been and remains very sensitive to the problem of maintaining a representative officer corps. The available trend data indicate that a degree of selective recruitment will affect the all-volunteer force.

There has been a trend in progress over the last decade of increased self-recruitment, that is recruitment from military families into the officer corps. At the service academies over 25 percent of the cadets have fathers who were career military personnel, including a high concentration of sons of enlisted personnel for whom entrance into the officer corps is an important mobility step. Such a concentration is about equal to occupational inheritance in medicine, but it has more public salience in the case of the military. Given the size of the career military and the birth rates of their families, this trend of self-recruitment is most certain to continue through the 1970s.

Second, in ROTC recruitment there appears to be some persistent selectivity, but it is more complex than the image of the Southern officer candidate if only because Southern tradition and interests in the military have been extended to the Southwest. Those ROTC units which have been terminated in recent years have been concentrated in New England and in the Midwest, while new units have been added in the South and Southwest. Some of the most productive ROTC units are in these areas. This pattern plus the high concentration of military bases in the South and Southwest and the tendency for officers to marry disproportionately women close to military installations and to retire in the region make it likely that regional affiliations will be reinforced.

However, ROTC units located in or near downtown metropolitan centers in

the Northern urban centers, including units in private Catholic institutions which service lower middle-class ethnic and working-class groups are emerging as a new important source of ROTC procurement.

Third, the services face persistent problems in the recruitment of black officers. Opposition to the war in Vietnam in the black community, plus the new career opportunities for college graduates, are at work here. The result is, for example, that in the army as of the late 1960s there was a higher concentration of black colonels and majors than of second and first lieutenants. In fact, only 0.5 percent of the second lieutenants were black in 1967, while the overall percentage was 2.7 percent, with the highest concentration at the general officer level—5.6 percent. Energetic recruitment programs for blacks at the service academies have been launched at new ROTC units at black colleges in the South. Thus the pattern of officer recruitment includes a continued strong emphasis on self-recruitment with some limited regional affiliation from the Southern and Southwestern areas, plus an admixture of offspring from the big city white ethnics. But the dominant issue is that there will be a marked deficit of black officer personnel.

At the enlisted level during the transitional period to the all-volunteer force the continued higher rate of recruitment of blacks and their higher rates of reenlistment in ground forces still operate. In 1964 the army's first-reenlistment rate for blacks was 49.3 percent and for whites it was 18.5 percent. By 1967, reenlistment had dropped sharply, but the markedly higher rates for blacks persisted: 31.7 percent as compared with 12.8 percent. Even if one anticipates some decline in this difference, the problem of an overconcentration of blacks in the ground force



and in special combat units remains a dilemma. It may well be manageable in terms of transfer policies to the other services, control of intake by higher educational standards, and by inservice training programs which will increase the marketable skills of black personnel and increase their exodus to civilian employment.

From the available data one can project that college graduates will be almost wholly absent from the ranks of the enlisted volunteer, and there even will be fewer recruits with some college education. The goal has been and will continue to be to recruit young men with high school education. Even applying this criterion, the pool—both black and white—will be heavily weighted toward the low-income and modest social status groups. To meet personnel requirements, the forces and especially the ground forces will have to be taken from a segment of non-high school graduates, and these will come from the most deprived areas of the inner city. In the past, the rural areas and especially the South supplied important segments of the enlisted personnel. The size of the rural manpower pool has declined proportionately, and urban values have penetrated into this cultural area. But impressionistic observations indicate that rural areas continue to be a source of military personnel. It needs to be emphasized that we are not dealing with a poverty and low-income factor per se, but with a combination of economic and cultural factors as predisposing elements to volunteering. Thus, economic recessions are not as productive of new enlistments as might be anticipated, although they enhance reenlistments. Moreover, the growth of welfare state benefits, such as aid to dependent children, and other forms of welfare cushion an economic “push” into the armed forces.

In the search for personnel under an

all-volunteer system, the number of women, who constitute an untapped supply, is likely to increase. The number of women in the military service has grown from approximately 30,000 in 1965 to over 42,000 in 1972. The military authorities plan to enlarge the number in the decade of the 1970s from the previous level of less than 2 percent of the active duty personnel to approximately 4 percent, and this number seems readily obtainable.

#### PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE

To recruit personnel for an all-volunteer force the military leaders have sought to make employment more attractive, maintaining those professional forms which they believe are essential for the military mission while at the same time making the form and content of a military career more like one in the civil service.

First, the most startling change has been the increase in the rate of pay especially for the lower ranks—see Table 2. The pay schedule for 1972 gave the private a base pay of \$288.00 per month with an automatic increase to \$320.00 after four months of service. Thus, his starting salary including allowances and federal tax advantages was \$4,986.96, or in effect, the symbolic \$5,000 a year. Likewise, a colonel with twenty-six years of service and three dependents would have a regular annual military compensation of \$28,495.60 per year.

Second, the services are seeking within the limits of operational requirements to convert a military assignment into a specified job. This involves the elimination of marginal duties which can be performed by civilians and by a trend toward a forty-hour work week. Of course, as in any civilian organization, key managerial personnel and ambitious men disregard these work

TABLE 2—ANNUAL COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY GRADES, 1972 SCHEDULE

| PAY<br>GRADE | YEARS<br>OF<br>SERVICE | NUMBER<br>OF<br>DEPEN-<br>DENTS | BASIC PAY   | QUARTERS   | SUB-<br>SIST-<br>ENCE | FEDERAL<br>TAX<br>ADVANT-<br>AGE | REGULAR<br>MILITARY<br>COMPEN-<br>SATION |
|--------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------|------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| O-6          | 26                     | 3                               | \$23,198.40 | \$3,099.60 | \$574.56              | \$1,623.04                       | \$28,495.60                              |
| O-5          | 20                     | 3                               | 18,284.40   | 2,865.60   | 574.56                | 1,224.69                         | 22,949.25                                |
| O-4          | 14                     | 3                               | 14,760.00   | 2,584.80   | 574.56                | 963.52                           | 18,882.88                                |
| O-3          | 6                      | 3                               | 11,656.80   | 2,347.20   | 574.56                | 682.77                           | 15,261.33                                |
| O-2          | 2                      | 2                               | 8,013.60    | 2,109.60   | 574.56                | 564.70                           | 11,262.46                                |
| O-1          | 0                      | 1                               | 6,368.40    | 1,699.20   | 574.56                | 522.69                           | 9,164.85                                 |
| E-9          | 22                     | 3                               | 11,433.60   | 2,210.00   | 532.90                | 616.24                           | 14,793.14                                |
| E-8          | 20                     | 3                               | 9,522.00    | 2,066.40   | 532.90                | 507.68                           | 12,628.98                                |
| E-7          | 18                     | 3                               | 8,287.20    | 1,936.80   | 532.90                | 513.81                           | 11,270.71                                |
| E-6          | 14                     | 3                               | 6,836.40    | 1,800.00   | 532.90                | 492.99                           | 9,662.29                                 |
| E-5          | 4                      | 2                               | 5,151.60    | 1,163.20   | 532.90                | 433.73                           | 7,781.43                                 |
| E-4          | 2                      | 1                               | 4,392.00    | 1,458.00   | 532.90                | 385.90                           | 6,768.80                                 |
| E-3          | 0                      | 0                               | 4,003.20    | 867.60     | 532.90                | 327.36                           | 5,731.06                                 |
| E-2          | 0                      | 0                               | 3,848.40    | 766.80     | 532.90                | 299.89                           | 5,447.99                                 |
| E-1          | 0                      | 0                               | 3,456.00    | 720.00     | 532.90                | 278.06                           | 4,986.96                                 |

SOURCE: *Army Times*, March 29, 1972, p. 5.

norms. Closely related is the halting effort to eliminate "Mickey Mouse" regulations and needless intrusions into personal privacy.

Third, a larger proportion of the armed services will be stationed in the United States, and one of the features of military service—overseas assignments, which for many was an attraction—will be further eroded. In 1968, 35 percent of the military was stationed outside the United States. This percentage is projected to decline in the 1970s. In addition, military men will be more and more like civilians in that the percentage of personnel who are married will approach that of the outside community. Officers with a career commitment are in fact as likely or more likely to be married than their civilian counterparts in their age group. Over 95 percent of those who are majors or of higher rank are married. Enlisted personnel particularly are currently more likely to be married than in former times. Top ranking noncommissioned officers have a pattern similar to that of officers, while as many

as one-quarter of the lower ranking noncommissioned officers are married.

Finally the growth of the working wife pattern represents both a military and a civilian trend. At the officer level the younger and better educated wives are more interested in outside employment. Among army officers in 1965, 16.2 percent were found to be working, while for the enlisted men the figure had already reached the level of 31.6 percent. If the military is able to reduce the amount of transfer of station from one assignment to another—and there is no inherent reason why they should not be able to—military families, which already have a lower divorce rate than civilian families, will serve as a source of stability, and one of the major sources of the dissatisfaction with a military career could be reduced to some degree.

Sociologists no longer make simple or direct inferences from social background to professional and political behavior. The processes of education, professional socialization, and the impact of organizational life are indeed

powerful. This is not to deny that the emerging patterns of social recruitment into the all-volunteer military indicate that explicit initiatives will be required to maintain both quality and social representativeness. Likewise, the issue of the social isolation of the military establishment is a problem which cannot be dismissed. However, effective civilian control and internal viability of the military will depend as much or more on the system and content of military education, career assignments, retirement schemes, and civilian supervision as on the social demography of recruitment.

# The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in the Armed Forces

By CHARLES C. MOSKOS, JR.

**ABSTRACT:** The transformation of the armed forces from a segregated to an integrated institution was an impressive achievement in directed social change. Yet in the present period the relationship between white and black servicemen is characterized by polarization with attendant interracial conflict. Data are presented which show an overconcentration of blacks in the combat arms as well as substantial cross-service variation in the distribution of black personnel. At the same time, service life continues to attract and retain a greater proportion of eligible blacks than whites. The special situation of black servicemen overseas is discussed along with an appraisal of the military establishment's current efforts to cope with its racial difficulties. Finally, despite the fact that racial strife has hampered the mission effectiveness of the armed forces, it may be that the military will most likely set the pace towards the alleviation of America's perennial dilemma—race.

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The research on which this article is based was made possible by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation.

THERE was no denying that by the end of the war in Vietnam, the American armed forces were undergoing an institutional crisis of major proportions. Never in its modern history had the military establishment been subject to such internal turmoil or public criticism. Its problems were legion and closely tied to mass media revelations: atrocities and ecological devastation in Southeast Asia, widespread drug abuse among troops, breakdowns in discipline, corruption in service clubs, military spying on civilian activists, and much more. Yet, the most rooted and pervasive problem confronting the military was essentially independent of America's global policies and derived instead from the perpetual American dilemma—race. By the end of the 1960s, the military establishment found itself plagued by the new challenges of black consciousness as well as the persistence of white racism. That black servicemen may find they owe higher fealty to each other than to the United States military is a possibility that haunts commanders. The ability of the armed services to cope with these forces will have impact not only on the capability of the nation's armed might, but also on the direction of American life in other social arenas.

#### FROM SEGREGATION TO INTEGRATION TO POLARIZATION

Blacks have taken part in all of this country's wars.<sup>1</sup> An estimated five

1. Materials covering racial matters in the military are quite extensive. A partial bibliography follows: Leo Bogart, *Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army* (Chicago: Markham Press, 1969); Richard M. Dalfiume, *Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969); Eli Ginzburg, "The Negro Soldier," in his *The Negro Potential* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956); Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, Special Studies on the United States Army in World War II by the Office of the

thousand blacks fought on the American side in the War of Independence. (But over twenty thousand black slaves—on the promise of manumission—joined the British as soldiers, supply handlers, and scouts.) Several thousand blacks saw service in the War of 1812. During the Civil War one hundred eighty thousand blacks were recruited into the Union army and served in segregated regiments. Following the Civil War, four Negro regiments were established and were active in the Indian Wars on the Western frontier and later fought with distinction in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. In the early twentieth century, however, owing to a general rise in American racial tensions and specific outbreaks of violence between black troops and

Chief of Military History (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966); David G. Mandelbaum, *Soldiers Groups and Negro Groups* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Minority Groups in Military Organization," in Roger W. Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971), pp. 271-89; Lee Nichols, *Breakthrough on the Color Front* (New York: Random House, 1954); Richard J. Stillman, II, *Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces* (New York: Praeger, 1968); Samuel A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), vol. 1, pp. 486-599; John A. Williams, *Captain Blackman* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972); and Adam Yarmolinsky, "Military Service and Race," in his *The Military Establishment* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 340-54. Invaluable sources of information are the racial composition rates periodically issued by the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Defense.

The information for this article, in addition to the sources cited above, is based on my personal observations as a researcher in military units over the past ten years. During this period I have conducted countless formal and informal interviews with white and black servicemen of all ranks and assignments on matters pertaining to race relations in the armed forces.

whites, official opinion began to turn against the use of black soldiers. Evaluation of black soldiers was further lowered by events in World War I. The combat performance of the all-Negro Ninety-second Infantry Division came under heavy criticism. Yet it was also observed that black units operating under French command, in a more racially tolerant situation, performed well.

### *Army policy*

In the interval between the two world wars, the army not only remained segregated, but also adopted a policy of a Negro quota which was to keep the number of blacks in the army proportionate to the total population. Never in the pre-World War II period, however, did the number of blacks approach this quota. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, blacks constituted 5.9 percent of the army; and there were only five black officers, three of whom were chaplains. During World War II, blacks entered the army in larger numbers, but at no time did they exceed 10 percent of total personnel. Black soldiers remained in segregated units, and approximately three-quarters served in the quartermaster, engineer, and transportation corps. To make matters worse from the viewpoint of "the right to fight," a slogan loudly echoed by Negro organizations in the United States, even black combat units were frequently used for heavy-duty labor. This was highlighted when the Second Cavalry was broken up into service units owing to command apprehension over the combat qualities, as yet untested, of this all-Negro division. The record of those black units that did see combat in World War II was mixed. The performance of the Ninety-second Infantry Division again came under heavy criticism, this time for alleged unreliability in the Italian campaign.

An important exception to the general pattern of utilization of black troops in World War II occurred in the winter months of 1944-45 in the Ardennes battle. Desperate shortages of combat personnel resulted in the army asking for black volunteers. The plan was to have platoons of blacks serve in companies previously all white. Some 2,500 blacks volunteered for this assignment. Both in terms of black combat performance and white soldiers' reactions, the Ardennes experiment was an unqualified success. This incident would later be used to support arguments for integration.

After World War II, pressure from Negro and liberal groups coupled with an acknowledgment that black soldiers were being poorly utilized led the army to reexamine its racial policies. A report by an army board in 1945, while holding racial integration to be a desirable goal and while making recommendations to improve black opportunity in the army, concluded that practical considerations required a maintenance of segregation and the quota system. In light of World War II experiences, the report further recommended that black personnel be assigned exclusively to support units rather than combat units. Another army board report came out in 1950 with essentially the same conclusions.<sup>2</sup> Both reports placed heavy stress on the supervisory and disciplinary problems resulting from the disproportionate number of blacks found in the lower mental and aptitude levels as established by army entrance examinations. From the standpoint of the performance requirements of the military, such facts could not be dismissed lightly.

2. The 1945 and 1950 army board reports are commonly referred to by the names of the officers who headed these boards: respectively, Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., and Lieutenant General S. J. Chamberlin.

After the Truman desegregation order of 1948, however, the die was cast. The President followed his edict by setting up a committee, chaired by Charles Fahy, to pursue the implementation of equal treatment and opportunity for armed forces personnel. Under the impetus of the Fahy Committee, the army abolished the quota system in 1950 and was beginning to integrate some training camps when the conflict in Korea broke out. The Korean conflict was the coup de grace for segregation in the army. Manpower requirements in the field for combat soldiers resulted in many instances of ad hoc integration. As was true in the Ardennes experience, black soldiers in previously all-white units performed well in combat. As integration in Korea became more standard, observers consistently noted that the fighting qualities of blacks differed little from those of whites. This contrasted with the blemished record of the all-Negro Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment. Its performance in the Korean War was judged to be so poor that its division commander recommended the unit be dissolved as quickly as possible. Concurrent with events in Korea, integration was introduced in the United States. By 1955, two years after the end of the Korean War, the remnants of army Jim Crow disappeared at home and in overseas installations. At the time of the Truman order, blacks constituted 8.8 percent of army personnel. In 1972 the figure was 15.1 percent.

#### *Army air corps and air force*

In each of the other services, the history of desegregation varied from the army pattern. The army air corps, like its parent body, generally assigned blacks to segregated support units. (However, a unique military venture taken during the war was the formation of three all-Negro—including officers—

air combat units.) At the end of World War II the proportion of blacks in the army air corps was only 4 percent, less than half of what it was in the army. Upon its establishment as an independent service in 1947, the air force began to take steps toward integration even before the Truman order. By the time of the Fahy Committee report in 1950, the air force was already largely integrated. Since integration, there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of blacks serving in the air force, from less than 5 percent in 1949 to 10.8 percent in 1972.

#### *Navy and marine corps*

Although large numbers of blacks had served in the navy during the Civil War and for some period afterward, restrictive policies were introduced in the early 1900s, and by the end of World War I only about 1 percent of navy personnel were blacks. In 1920 the navy adopted a policy of total racial exclusion and barred all black enlistments. This policy was slightly changed in 1932 when blacks, along with Filipinos, were again allowed to join the navy, but only as stewards in the messman's branch. Further modifications were made in navy policy in 1942, when some openings in general service were created. Black sailors in these positions, however, were limited to segregated harbor and shore assignments. In 1944, in the first effort toward desegregation in any of the armed services, a small number of blacks in general service were integrated on ocean-going vessels. After the end of World War II, the navy, again ahead of the other services, began to take major steps toward elimination of racial barriers. Even in the integrated navy of today, however, black sailors are still disproportionately concentrated in the messman's branch. Also, despite the early steps toward integration taken by the

navy, the proportion of black sailors has remained fairly constant over the past two decades, averaging about 5 percent of total personnel.

The marine corps has gone from a policy of exclusion, to segregation, to integration. Before World War II there were no black marines. In 1942 blacks were accepted into the marine corps, but assigned to segregated units where they were heavy-duty laborers, ammunition handlers, and antiaircraft gunners. After the war, small-scale integration of black marines into white units was begun. In 1949 and 1950 marine corps training units were integrated, and by 1954 the color line was largely erased throughout the corps. Since integration began, the proportion of blacks has increased markedly. In 1949 less than 2 percent of all marines were black compared with 12.5 percent in 1972.

The 1948 Executive Order of President Truman abolishing racial segregation in the armed forces was an impressive instance of directed social change. By the middle 1950s this integration policy was an accomplished fact, thus bringing about a far-reaching transformation in the makeup of a major American institution in a remarkably short period of time. Indeed, extending through the middle 1960s, the degree and quality of racial integration in the armed forces stood in marked and favorable contrast with that of civilian society. It might be argued that relatively little adjustment on the part of the command structure was required when the infusion of blacks into the enlisted ranks occurred as the military establishment was desegregated. One factor contributing to the generally smooth racial desegregation of the military was the standard treatment—"like Negroes"—accorded to all lower-ranking enlisted personnel.

The too brief era of harmonious race relations in the military ended with the

end of the 1960s. The present period is characterized by polarization between the races within the context of formal integration. Engendered by real and perceived discrimination, near mutinous actions of groups of black servicemen in the early 1970s reached such proportions as to undermine the very fighting capability of America's armed forces. Less dramatic than race riots aboard ships or "fraggings" of officers and non-coms in Vietnam, but ultimately more significant, has been the emergence of race consciousness throughout the rank and file of black servicemen.

At one level, the new race consciousness takes the form of symbolic cultural behavior, for example, involving handshakes or the "dap," the wearing of "slave" bracelets, and rhetoric of "brother-me" and "nation-tie." In the same vein, self-imposed informal segregation—especially off the job—has become almost de rigueur on the part of lower-ranking black servicemen. At the organizational level, there has been the embryonic formation of black groups ranging from Black Panthers in the Seventh Army in Germany, to "brotherhood" social clubs in the air force, and even an association of black navy officers. Despite command pronouncements to the contrary, moreover, most of the rise in black consciousness within the armed forces seems to have occurred after service entry rather than as a spillover from civilian acquired values.<sup>3</sup>

Without in any way understating the amount of racial tension in the armed forces, it should also be made clear that military life is still characterized by an

3. Alvin J. Scheinder, "The Emergence of Brother Me: Symbols of Solidarity among Blacks in the Armed Forces" (Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 1972). See also Jonathan F. Borus et al., "Racial Perceptions in the Army: An Approach," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 128 (May 1972), pp. 1369-74.



interracial egalitarianism seldom found in the other major institutions of American society. Color barriers at the formal level are absent throughout the military community. Equal treatment regardless of race is official policy in such nonduty facilities as swimming pools, chapels, barbershops, post exchanges, movie theaters, snack bars, and dependents' housing, as well as in the work assignments and living conditions of members of the armed services. Efforts to remove off-post discrimination of black servicemen have also accelerated in the past few years. Moreover, white personnel are often commanded by black superiors, a situation rarely obtaining in civilian life. In their performance of military duties, whites and blacks typically work together with little open display of racial animosity. A sense of perspective requires that these facts also be kept in mind.

#### CHANGING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND BLACK PARTICIPATION

Although the various services are all similar in being formally integrated today, they differ in their proportion of blacks. As shown in Table 1, black membership in the total armed forces in 1972 was 11.1 percent; approximately the same as the 11 to 12 percent consti-

tuting the black proportion in the total population. It is certain, however, that among those *eligible*, a higher proportion of blacks than whites enter the armed forces. That is, a much larger number of blacks do not meet the entrance standards required by the military services. Over the past decade approximately four times more blacks than whites failed to pass the pre-induction mental examinations given to Selective Service registrants. Because of the relatively low number of blacks obtaining student or occupational deferments, blacks have been overproportionately drafted. Thus army statistics for 1960-70 show blacks constituted about 16 percent of those drafted.

There are also diverse patterns among the individual services as to the rank or grade distribution of blacks. Looking at Table 2, we find the ratio of black to white officers in 1972 was roughly 1 to 25 in the army, 1 to 60 in the air force, 1 to 70 in the marine corps, and 1 to 110 in the navy. Among enlisted men across all four services, blacks are underrepresented in the very top enlisted ranks—but, least so in the army. We also find a disproportionate concentration of blacks in the lower noncommissioned officer (NCO) levels in each of the armed forces. This is especially so in the army, where almost one out

TABLE 1—BLACKS IN THE ARMED FORCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF  
TOTAL PERSONNEL, BY SELECTED YEARS

| YEAR | TOTAL<br>ARMED<br>FORCES | ARMY | NAVY | AIR FORCE        | MARINE CORPS |
|------|--------------------------|------|------|------------------|--------------|
| 1945 | 7.3                      | 9.8  | 5.0  | 4.0 <sup>a</sup> | 3.6          |
| 1949 | 5.9                      | 8.6  | 4.0  | 4.5              | 1.9          |
| 1954 | 7.9                      | 11.3 | 3.2  | 7.5              | 5.9          |
| 1962 | 8.2                      | 11.3 | 4.7  | 7.8              | 7.0          |
| 1965 | 9.5                      | 12.8 | 5.2  | 9.2              | 8.3          |
| 1967 | 9.0                      | 11.2 | 4.3  | 9.1              | 9.6          |
| 1969 | 8.7                      | 9.9  | 4.8  | 9.3              | 10.7         |
| 1972 | 11.1                     | 15.1 | 5.6  | 10.8             | 12.5         |

SOURCE: Defense Department statistics.

<sup>a</sup> 1945 air force figures refer to army air corps.

TABLE 2—BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERSONNEL  
BY GRADE AND SERVICE, JUNE 30, 1972

| GRADE <sup>a</sup>              | ARMY | NAVY | AIR FORCE | MARINE CORPS |
|---------------------------------|------|------|-----------|--------------|
| <b>Officers:</b>                |      |      |           |              |
| 07-010 (generals)               | 0.7  | 0.3  | 0.2       | ...          |
| 06 (colonel)                    | 1.6  | 0.1  | 0.6       | ...          |
| 05 (lieutenant colonel)         | 5.1  | 0.4  | 1.4       | 0.2          |
| 04 (major)                      | 5.1  | 0.6  | 1.7       | 0.4          |
| 03 (captain)                    | 3.7  | 0.6  | 2.1       | 1.2          |
| 02 (1st lieutenant)             | 2.9  | 1.1  | 1.6       | 2.0          |
| 01 (2nd lieutenant)             | 2.5  | 1.6  | 1.6       | 2.9          |
| <i>Total officers</i>           | 3.9  | 0.9  | 1.7       | 1.5          |
| <b>Enlisted men:</b>            |      |      |           |              |
| E9 (sergeant major)             | 7.0  | 2.3  | 3.7       | 4.4          |
| E8 (master sergeant)            | 14.0 | 3.5  | 5.3       | 6.5          |
| E7 (sergeant 1st class)         | 19.6 | 6.0  | 7.3       | 10.9         |
| E6 (staff sergeant)             | 23.9 | 6.7  | 10.9      | 13.6         |
| E5 (sergeant)                   | 16.6 | 4.5  | 14.6      | 10.8         |
| E4 (specialist 4)               | 13.5 | 3.4  | 12.3      | 9.1          |
| E3 (private 1st class)          | 15.9 | 5.6  | 14.6      | 11.2         |
| E2 (private)                    | 17.9 | 12.3 | 15.6      | 15.6         |
| E1 (recruit)                    | 18.3 | 16.8 | 14.3      | 17.9         |
| <i>Total enlisted men</i>       | 17.0 | 6.2  | 12.6      | 13.0         |
| <i>Total military personnel</i> | 15.1 | 5.6  | 10.8      | 12.5         |

SOURCE: Defense Department statistics.

<sup>a</sup> Army titles given in parentheses have equivalent pay grades in other services.

of every four staff sergeants is a black. An assessment of these data reveals that the army has not only the largest proportion of blacks, but also the most equitable distribution of blacks throughout its ranks. Although the navy was

the first service to integrate and the army the last, in a kind of tortoise and hare fashion, it is the army that has become the most representative service for blacks.

TABLE 3—WHITE AND BLACK ARMY ENLISTED  
PERSONNEL IN COMBAT ARMS,  
BY SELECTED YEARS

| CATEGORY                                           | 1945 <sup>a</sup> | 1962 | 1970 |
|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------|------|------|
| Blacks as percentage of total personnel            | 10.5              | 12.2 | 13.5 |
| Percentage of total personnel in combat arms       | 44.5              | 26.0 | 23.8 |
| Percentage of total white personnel in combat arms | 48.2              | 24.9 | 23.4 |
| Percentage of total black personnel in combat arms | 12.1              | 33.4 | 26.0 |

SOURCE: Defense Department statistics.

<sup>a</sup> Excludes army air corps.

The trends toward greater technical complexity and narrowing of civilian-military occupational skills pervades the military establishment. An indicator, albeit a crude one, of these trends is the decreasing proportion of men assigned to combat arms. Given in Table 3, along with concomitant white-black distributions, are figures comparing the percentage of army enlisted personnel in combat arms—for example, infantry, armor, artillery—for the years 1945, 1962, and 1970. We find that the proportion of men in combat arms—that is, traditional military specialties—drops from 44.5 percent in 1945 to 26.0 per-

cent in 1962 to 23.8 percent in 1970. Also, the percentages of white personnel in traditional military specialties closely approximate the total proportional decrease in the combat arms over the twenty-five-year period.

For black soldiers, however, a different picture emerges. While the percentage of black enlisted men in the army increased slightly, the likelihood of a black serving in a combat arm was about twice greater in 1970 than it was at the end of World War II. (Yet, the 1970 figures compared to those of 1962 also show a discernible trend away from black overrepresentation in the combat arms.) Further, when impressionistic observations are made within the combat arms, the black proportion is noticeably higher in line rather than staff assignments, and in infantry rather than other combat arms. In many airborne and marine line companies, the number of blacks approaches half the unit strength. Put in another way, the direction of assignment of black soldiers in the desegregated military is testimony to the continuing consequences of racial differences in opportunities originating in the larger society. That is, even though formal integration of the military has led to more egalitarian assignments of black servicemen, the social and particularly educational deprivations suffered by the blacks in American society can be mitigated but not eliminated by the equal opportunity policies of the armed forces.

These findings, however, need not be interpreted as a reflection on the status of blacks in the integrated military. Actually there is evidence that higher prestige—but not envy—is generally accorded combat personnel by those in noncombat activities within the military. And taken within the historical context of the “right to fight” voiced by Negro organizations with reference to the segregated military of World War

II, the black soldier’s current overrepresentation in the combat arms might be construed as a kind of ironic step forward.

As is to be expected, the overconcentration of blacks in combat units is shown in the casualty reports from Vietnam. As documented in Table 4, during the 1961–66 period, blacks accounted for 16.0 percent of those killed in action in Southeast Asia. This reflects the high casualties suffered by the army and marine corps—about 95 percent of all American losses in Vietnam—compared to the navy and air force. Since 1967, however, the proportion of black combat deaths dropped substantially. The cumulative figures from 1961 through 1970 show blacks accounting for 12.5 percent of all American servicemen killed in action in Southeast Asia, a proportion only marginally different from the number of blacks in the total American population.

Despite the greater likelihood of blacks being assigned to combat arms, the fact remains that the military in the enlisted ranks has become a major avenue of career mobility for many black men. An insight into the motives underlying volunteer initial enlistments can be gained by looking at reasons given for entering the armed forces. Based on responses elicited in a 1964 survey, the motivations of volunteers were grouped into four categories: (1) *personal*, for example, to get away from home, to travel, for excitement; (2) *patriotic*, for example, to serve one’s country; (3) *draft-motivated*, for example, to increase options in choice of service and time of entry; and (4) *self-advancement*, for example, to learn a trade, to receive an education, to make the military a career. As shown in Table 5, reasons for service entry among volunteers are reported by race, holding educational level constant.

There are only slight differences be-

TABLE 4—BLACKS AS PERCENTAGE OF MEN KILLED IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA,<sup>a</sup> FOR EACH SERVICE

| TIME PERIOD                     | TOTAL ARMED FORCES | ARMY | NAVY | AIR FORCE | MARINE CORPS |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|------|------|-----------|--------------|
| 1961-1966                       | 16.0               | 20.0 | 0.5  | 1.5       | 11.0         |
| 1967                            | 12.7               | 13.5 | 2.9  | 5.2       | 12.8         |
| 1968                            | 12.9               | 13.0 | 2.4  | 1.1       | 14.9         |
| 1969                            | 10.8               | 11.5 | 2.4  | 2.6       | 10.3         |
| 1970                            | 8.8                | 9.1  | 4.5  | 3.3       | 8.8          |
| 1961-1970<br>(cumulative total) | 12.5               | 13.3 | 2.4  | 2.6       | 12.4         |

SOURCE: Defense Department statistics.

<sup>a</sup> Vietnam, Thailand, and offshore ships.

tween whites and blacks with regard to personal or patriotic motivations for service entry. The variation between the races is found almost entirely in their mentioning of draft-motivated versus self-advancement reasons. Within each educational level, black volunteers mention self-advancement almost twice as frequently as whites. Conversely, whites are markedly more likely to state they entered the service to avoid the draft. Most important, preliminary findings from data gathered in 1972 continue to show almost the same distinction between black and white servicemen. In other words, the draft serves as a major inducement for whites to

volunteer, while the belief that self-advancement will be furthered in the military is much more typical of black enlistees.

Moreover, once within the military the black serviceman is much more likely than his white counterpart to have "found a home." As noted earlier, in all four services there is an overrepresentation of black NCOs, especially at the junior levels. The disproportionate concentration of blacks at these grades implies a higher than average reenlistment rate, as such ranks are not normally attained until after a second enlistment. This assumption is supported by the data presented in Table 6. We

TABLE 5—SERVICE ENTRY REASONS OF ENLISTED VOLUNTEERS BY EDUCATION AND RACE (PERCENTAGES)

| CATEGORY              | PERSONAL | PATRIOTIC | DRAFT-MOTIVATED | SELF-ADVANCEMENT | TOTAL | NUMBER |
|-----------------------|----------|-----------|-----------------|------------------|-------|--------|
| Less than high school |          |           |                 |                  |       |        |
| White                 | 33.2     | 13.5      | 27.5            | 25.8             | 100.0 | 6,913  |
| Black                 | 26.7     | 17.8      | 12.5            | 43.0             | 100.0 | 911    |
| High school graduate  |          |           |                 |                  |       |        |
| White                 | 27.8     | 10.9      | 39.5            | 21.8             | 100.0 | 20,757 |
| Black                 | 28.8     | 7.1       | 25.5            | 38.6             | 100.0 | 2,440  |
| Some college          |          |           |                 |                  |       |        |
| White                 | 27.5     | 10.7      | 47.2            | 14.6             | 100.0 | 7,947  |
| Black                 | 30.8     | 7.7       | 34.0            | 27.5             | 100.0 | 701    |
| Total white           | 28.8     | 11.4      | 39.1            | 20.7             | 100.0 | 35,617 |
| Total black           | 28.7     | 9.6       | 24.5            | 37.2             | 100.0 | 4,052  |

SOURCE: 1964 NORC survey. Adapted from Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man* (New York: Russell Sage, 1970), p. 219.

find for the years 1964-70 that the service-wide black reenlistment rate is approximately twice that of white servicemen. Even in 1968 and 1970 when there is a sharp—but cross-racial—drop in reenlistments, the black rate remains well above that of whites. The higher proportion of blacks selecting a service career suggests that the military establishment is undergoing a significant change in its NCO core. The expansion of the armed forces arising from the war in Vietnam and the resulting “opening up of rank” undoubtedly accelerated this development.

Moreover, as reported earlier in Table 2, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of black enlisted men at the lower ranks in 1972. This is an outcome both of the major pay raises accorded these ranks in 1971 and the continued attractiveness of military service for America's underclasses: a state of affairs which will probably become even more pronounced with the advent of an all-volunteer force. That this development has occurred despite the anti-military appeals of certain black political groups reflects not only the “pull” of the military institution, but also the “push” generated by the plight of the black youth in the American economy. It is a commentary on our nation that many young black men, by seeking to enter and remain in the armed forces, are saying that it is even worth the risk of being killed in order to have a chance to learn a trade, to succeed in a small way, to get away from a dead-end existence, and to become part of the only institution in this society that seems really to offer the ordinary black any practical opportunities.

#### THE BLACK SERVICEMAN OVERSEAS

Some special remarks are needed concerning black servicemen overseas. Suffice it to say for prefatory purposes,

TABLE 6—FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT RATES  
IN THE ARMED SERVICES, BY RACE  
(SELECTED YEARS)

|       | ARMY | NAVY | AIR<br>FORCE | MARINE<br>CORPS |
|-------|------|------|--------------|-----------------|
| 1964  |      |      |              |                 |
| White | 15.6 | 17.3 | 32.8         | 11.5            |
| Black | 33.0 | 28.5 | 20.8         | 20.1            |
| 1966  |      |      |              |                 |
| White | 16.7 | 15.0 | 13.8         | 9.5             |
| Black | 39.9 | 19.8 | 23.1         | 16.3            |
| 1968  |      |      |              |                 |
| White | 6.1  | 14.2 | 13.5         | 9.4             |
| Black | 10.2 | 18.6 | 20.0         | 14.0            |
| 1970  |      |      |              |                 |
| White | 9.0  | 10.4 | 11.2         | 4.7             |
| Black | 12.8 | 11.0 | 18.6         | 6.8             |

SOURCE: Defense Department statistics.

American servicemen, white and black, are usually in a place where they do not understand the language, are received with mixed feelings by the local population, spend the greater part of their time in a transplanted American environment, sometimes play the role of tourist, are often affluent in relation to the local economy, take advantage and are at the mercy of a comprador class, and, in comparison with their counterpart at home, are more involved in military duties.

In general, the pattern of racial relations observed among soldiers in the United States—integration in the military setting and racial exclusivism off-duty—prevails in overseas assignments as well. This norm is reflected in one of the most characteristic features of American military life overseas, a bifurcation of the vice structure into groups that pander almost exclusively—or assert they do—to only one of the races. A frequent claim of local bar owners is that they discourage racially mixed trade because of the demands of their armed forces clientele. And, indeed, many of the establishments catering to American personnel that ring most military installations are segregated in prac-

tice. To a similar degree this is true of shore towns where navy personnel take liberty. Violation of these implicit taboos can often lead to physical threats or violence.

The pattern of off-duty separatism is most pronounced in Japan and Germany, and somewhat less so in Korea—though the Sam Gak Chi area in Seoul has long been a gathering point for black servicemen. Close living and common danger in Vietnam made the issue of off-duty racial relations academic for those combat troops in the field. In the cities, however, racial separatism off-duty was readily apparent. It is said that the river front district in Saigon, Kanh Hoi, frequented by black American soldiers was formerly patronized by Senegalese troops during the French occupation. In off-duty areas on Okinawa, racial separatism is complicated by interservice rivalries and a fourfold ecological pattern shows up: white-army, black-army, white-marines, and black-marines. A major exception to the norm of off-duty racial separatism occurred in the Dominican Republic during the American intervention of 1966–67. There, all troops were restricted, and leaving the military compound required collaboration to escape detection; such ventures were often as not interracial.

In Germany one impact of that country's economic boom has been to depress the relative position of the American soldier vis-à-vis the German working man. In the Germany of fifteen or twenty years ago—or the Korea and Vietnam of today—all American military personnel were affluent by local standards. This was—and is today in Korea and Southeast Asia—an especially novel experience for the black soldier. The status drop of American soldiers in Germany has particularly affected the black serviceman, who has the additional handicap of being black in a

country where there are no black women. The old "good duty" days for the black soldier in Germany have come to an end as he finds his previous access to other than prostitutes severely reduced. The German economic boom has affected black soldiers in another way. In recent years there has been some friction between foreign laborers—mostly from Mediterranean countries—and black soldiers. Both groups of men apparently are competing for the same girls. At the same time, the foreign workers have little contact with white American soldiers, who move in a different segment of the vice structure.

Nonetheless, overseas duty for black servicemen, in Germany as well as in the Far East, gives the opportunity, even if peripheral, to witness societies where overt racial discrimination is less practiced than it is in their home country. Although the level of black acceptance in societies other than America is usually exaggerated, the black soldier is hard put not to make invidious comparisons with the American scene. In interviews conducted with black servicemen in Germany, 64 percent said there was more racial equality in Germany than in America, 30 percent saw little difference between the two countries, and only 6 percent believed blacks were treated better in the United States.

Observers of overseas American personnel have often noted that black servicemen are more likely than whites to learn local languages—though for both groups this is a very small number. A 1965 study conducted by this writer in Germany revealed that black soldiers were five times more likely to know conversational German than were white soldiers.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, a study of American troops in Japan reported: "In general, Negro soldiers learned to speak

4. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man* (New York: Russell Sage, 1970), pp. 126–27.

Japanese more quickly and expertly than did white soldiers."<sup>5</sup> Yet it is also disturbing to note that racial conflict among American servicemen overseas has recently taken on a new dimension. This is in the growing incidence of violent altercations between black American servicemen and local populations.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, the general conclusion still seems warranted that black servicemen, perhaps because of the more favorable racial climate, are more willing to take advantage of informal participation and interaction with local residents.

#### RACE AND THE EMERGENT MILITARY

The polarization of the races which has come to characterize the contemporary military comes at precisely the same time that the American forces are moving toward an all-volunteer system. From one perspective it might be argued that the absence of servicemen serving under a form of duress would be a factor working toward a reduction of internal turbulence. On the other hand, an all-volunteer system will most likely result in a marked increase in the proportion of black and other minority personnel and therefore lead to even greater friction between the races. In either eventuality, the ability of the military to cope with its racial situation will directly affect the number and kind of personnel who will be attracted to the emergent military of the 1970s.

That the military establishment is taking steps to come to grips with its race problem is manifest. A Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI) was established in 1971 to develop course materials and train instructors. The

content of the instruction will focus on the dynamics of prejudice, studies of real-life interracial embroilments in the military setting, and black history. In time, the curriculum intends also to cover Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, and the impoverished whites of Appalachia. Once trained—at the planned rate of 1,400 a year—the instructors will branch out to all the services teaching a course that each member of the armed services will be required to take. The DRRI program is without doubt the most massive effort ever made by an organization to provide education in the field of race relations.

The new DRRI program is to be coordinated with a network of race relations councils previously existing on most major military installations. Such councils along with billeted equal opportunity officers and NCOs began to appear on a patchwork basis in the late 1960s. These ad hoc steps resulted from the attempts of local commanders to resolve race problems in their units. At a more centralized level was the Defense Department's 1971 modification of the efficiency reports given all officers. Henceforth, an officer is to be evaluated on his handling of race relations as well as on traditional leadership categories. In 1972 all enlisted supervisors were also to be ranked on this dimension. Under the new system, that is, a poor record in race relations could lead to denial of promotion or even removal from command. That the new evaluation standards are not entirely cosmetic was indicated by the formal rebukes from higher authorities given certain commanders deemed incapable of pursuing equal treatment policies.

To appreciate the extent of the military establishment's response to its race problems is not to ignore the formidable difficulties confronting the newly instituted race relations programs. The

5. William Caudill, "American Soldiers in a Japanese Community," unpublished manuscript, p. 34.

6. "South Koreans Clash with Black 'Raiders,'" *Chicago Sun-Times*, July 11, 1971, p. 4; and "Black U.S. Troops Clash with West German Police," *New York Times*, August 14, 1972, p. 24.

DRRI curriculum seeks to foster racial harmony through changing individual attitudes, the lasting effectiveness of which is yet to be determined. Moreover, private doubts exist even among some DRRI and other equal opportunity personnel as to whether they are attacking racism or engaged in a sophisticated "black pacification" program. Despite these conflicting pressures, it seems fair to generalize that the typical race relations officer or NCO displays a truly amazing sense of purpose coupled with the belief that the military is one of the few institutions where black opportunity can be significantly affected.

There are also some seemingly unavoidable stresses beyond the control of even the most enlightened race relations program. From an organizational standpoint, it is still unclear whether a race relations assignment is good or bad for one's military career. Race relations billets may be a precursor of an eventual "human resources" career specialty with attendant career enhancement, or it may be nothing more than a cul-de-sac position which is expendable once the command structure perceives a diminishment in the pressures of the moment. That the large majority of race relations personnel are black only compounds the insecurity of the occupants of these newly created positions.

Even more perplexing, the almost complete lack of trust of many black youth in the existing system easily extends to their questioning the credibility of black race relations officers and NCOs. For their part, many white servicemen believe that the military's race relations program is a form of reverse discrimination. White backlash is particularly evident in accusations that black soldiers use the defense of race discrimination to evade disciplinary action. (Blacks, on the other hand, re-

gard discrimination in punishment as one of the most insidious forms of institutional racism in the military.) More ominous, there is a real fear of black hooliganism on the part of many lower-ranking white enlisted men. In this context the effectiveness of a race relations program is seriously undermined.

This analysis leads to the conclusion that structural as well as attitudinal changes are required to eradicate racism—with its concomitant racial strife—in the military setting. More than just confronting the personal biases of individuals, sources of institutional racism must be frontally attacked. Despite more than two decades of formal integration, blacks are still overproportionately found in the less skilled military occupations and collectively lag behind their white counterparts in career advancement. New appraisals are required in testing and assignment procedures along with greater sensitivity to black cultural identity. At the same time, there can be no countenancing of racial intimidation in the living areas of lower-ranking enlisted personnel.

The American military establishment stands at a crucial juncture in its institutional development. In much the manner that it leaped ahead of civilian society with its integration policies of the 1950s, the military must now again take the lead in the contemporary racial climate of the 1970s. The next phase may well incorporate something along the lines of "beyond equality." There will have to be a tempering of universalistic standards to accommodate and take advantage of the cultural pluralism inherent in our nation's human potential. If our American society is ever to realize its democratic promise, the direction it ought to take in race relations will most likely have been set by its men and women in military uniform.



# The Utilization of Women in the Military

By NANCY GOLDMAN

**ABSTRACT:** In the decade of the 1970s there will be an increase in the number and percent of women in the United States military. Trends indicate that this rise will move steadily but gradually from less than 2 percent women in the armed services to approximately 4 percent. Although the number and percent of women in uniform will remain small, their increase will assist in meeting the expected "short fall" in manpower. The trend to expand the number of women in the military will continue in the 1980s, but it seems unlikely that a 10-percent level, which could be considered possible, will be reached. Historically in industrialized countries women have been excluded from armed combat roles and significant positions in administration. They have served as nurses, secretaries, and clerks and in routine types of communications. Each service has made plans and proposals to increase the number of women and the variety of jobs open to them and to deal with other expressed dissatisfactions, such as living quarters and regulations related to the retention of the careers of married women. Additional problems of protocol between the sexes and the integration of women in the military will have to be faced. Although it is likely that the military will continue its tradition of excluding women from direct combat positions, with an increased emphasis on deterrence there will be an increase in the number of positions in which the "fighting spirit" is irrelevant, many of which will become available to women.

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AS AN institution that manages violence, the military is a male-dominated organization which excludes women from direct combat roles and from significant assignments in administration. Nevertheless, with the prospect of an all-volunteer force, the number of women in the armed forces has gradually increased, and their assignments have steadily broadened. Although this trend is likely to continue, there is no reason to believe that the proportion of women in the military and the range of their employment and responsibility will increase rapidly or dramatically.

The encountered and projected increase of women in the armed forces reflects, first, external social change in the United States and the conscious effort of the military to recognize and incorporate such change. Second, because of the relatively low status of the profession, the traditional anti-military attitudes in the society, and the negative impact generated by the war in Vietnam, the movement to an all-volunteer force requires the military to intensify its search for sufficient manpower. The armed forces have traditionally recruited disproportionately from the margins of American society; they have recruited heavily from the rural areas, particularly the South, where unemployment and underemployment are most prevalent; and more recently, personnel have been sought among the black community.<sup>1</sup> Women also are a potential source of labor. Third, the changing character of the military establishment, together with its great emphasis on administration, logistics, and the like, plus its increas-

ing emphasis on deterrence,<sup>2</sup> alter the organizational milieu of the armed forces and potentially broaden sex roles in a direction favorable to women.

In his study of *The Professional Soldier*, completed in 1960, Morris Janowitz did not find it necessary to deal in any depth with women personnel because of their derivative role and lack of impact on the organizational climate of the profession.<sup>3</sup> While Janowitz foresaw the end of the mass army and the movement toward a more contractual system, he did not anticipate an increased emphasis on the recruitment of women into the military. Charles Moskos, a decade later, still had to point out that the position of women in military organizations is almost completely unresearched.<sup>4</sup> This paper seeks to assess the available data and draw some inferences about the changing context of women in the military.

#### TRENDS IN UTILIZATION

Because Great Britain has had an all-volunteer force for the past ten years, it is relevant to compare the percentage of women on active duty there with that in the United States. Since converting to a fully volunteer service, Great Britain has expanded the concentration of women to meet its personnel requirements. In 1970, it had 14,000 women out of 372,500 in the services, or 3.8 percent.<sup>5</sup> This percentage figure is much higher than that for the United States—in fact, it is three times greater, since

1. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960, 1971), pp. 79-101; Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), pp. 108-18.

2. Henry Kissinger, *Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

3. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*.

4. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Minority Groups in Military Organization," in Roger W. Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971), p. 286.

5. Britain, 1971: *An Official Handbook* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971), p. 120.

in 1970, there were 41,000 women, or 1.35 percent, on active duty in the United States. This difference cannot be accounted for by any difference in age structure.

In the United States since the end of World War II and as of spring 1972, the armed forces had not even filled the 2-percent authorized quota for women, despite the fact that women are entirely volunteers. In Table 1, the trend in the use of women in the armed forces is presented for the period from 1945 to 1972. In 1945, the military reached a high point of over 12,000,000 active officers and enlisted persons, with 265,006 women. As part of a process of "total" mobilization, the percentage of 2.18 women in the armed forces was the high point in their utilization. By 1950, the total number of women in service had declined to 22,069 or 1.51 percent of the forces. As a result of the Korean War, the number of uniformed women rose to 35,191 in 1955—but only 1.27 percent. From 1960 to 1966, the number of women in the forces remained fairly constant, approximately 30,000, and the percentage decreased slightly—from 1.27 to 1.05—because of a limited increase in total personnel.

In 1967, under the impact of Vietnam hostilities, recruitment was intensified and the number of women increased slowly from 35,173 to 44,305 in 1972, with the percentage moving steadily up toward the 2-percent level. On November 8, 1967, Public Law 90-130 removed the 2-percent quota in anticipation of a demand for more female personnel, but the expansion in the numbers of women, as can be seen from Table 1, has been very gradual and slow.

Table 2 shows that for the past decade the army has employed the largest number of women. As of 1971, the number of women on active duty totaled 42,813: 16,365 army, 8,801 navy,

TABLE 1—MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY 1945 TO SPRING 1972, PERCENT FEMALE OF TOTAL PERSONNEL

| YEAR        | TOTAL      | FEMALE  | PERCENT FEMALE |
|-------------|------------|---------|----------------|
| 1945        | 12,123,455 | 265,006 | 2.18           |
| 1950        | 1,460,261  | 22,069  | 1.51           |
| 1955        | 2,935,107  | 35,191  | 1.27           |
| 1958        | 2,600,581  | 31,176  | 1.20           |
| 1960        | 2,476,425  | 31,540  | 1.27           |
| 1965        | 2,653,142  | 30,610  | 1.15           |
| 1966        | 3,091,552  | 32,589  | 1.05           |
| 1967        | 3,376,511  | 35,173  | 1.04           |
| 1968        | 3,547,429  | 38,397  | 1.08           |
| 1969        | 3,459,423  | 39,506  | 1.14           |
| 1970        | 3,067,052  | 41,479  | 1.35           |
| 1971        | 2,840,165  | 42,814  | 1.58           |
| Spring 1972 | 2,425,051  | 44,305  | 1.80           |

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 93rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

2,298 marines, and 14,850 air force. However, on a percentage basis the air force had the highest concentration. An indication of projected trends can be seen in a comparison of the figures for 1970, 1971, and 1972. Although the number of men was markedly reduced through demobilization, the total number of women was not. In fact, in 1970 there were 41,479 women on active duty, and the number rose to 44,305 in 1972; thus, as of 1972 the overall percentage of women on active duty was 1.8 percent, with corresponding increases over 1970 in all three services and in the marines. There were 16,814 in the army, 8,993 in the navy, 16,225 in the air force, and 2,273 in the marines.

Although the ratio of women to men in the military is very low, it is interesting to note that the ratio of officers to enlisted men is about twice as high for women as for men. Among male active duty personnel in 1970, 13 percent were officers, as compared with 36 percent of the women. Of course, these women officers had a strong concentration of

TABLE 2—MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY, 1960-1972 (SPRING)  
BY SERVICE AND BY SEX

|                    | ARMY      | PER-<br>CENT | NAVY    | PER-<br>CENT | AIR<br>FORCE | PER-<br>CENT | MARINE  | PER-<br>CENT | TOTAL     | PER-<br>CENT |
|--------------------|-----------|--------------|---------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------|--------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1960               |           |              |         |              |              |              |         |              |           |              |
| Men                | 860,536   | 98.6         | 609,913 | 98.7         | 805,426      | 98.9         | 169,010 | 99.1         | 2,444,885 | 98.7         |
| Women              | 12,542    | 1.4          | 8,071   | 1.3          | 9,326        | 1.1          | 1,611   | 0.9          | 31,540    | 1.3          |
| Total              | 873,078   | 100.0        | 617,984 | 100.0        | 814,752      | 100.0        | 170,621 | 100.0        | 2,476,425 | 100.0        |
| 1965               |           |              |         |              |              |              |         |              |           |              |
| Men                | 955,987   | 98.7         | 663,156 | 98.8         | 814,792      | 98.9         | 188,606 | 99.2         | 2,622,546 | 98.8         |
| Women              | 12,326    | 1.3          | 7,862   | 1.2          | 8,841        | 1.1          | 1,581   | 0.8          | 30,610    | 1.2          |
| Total              | 968,313   | 100.0        | 671,018 | 100.0        | 823,633      | 100.0        | 190,187 | 100.0        | 2,653,156 | 100.0        |
| 1970               |           |              |         |              |              |              |         |              |           |              |
| Men                | 1,305,135 | 98.7         | 684,199 | 98.7         | 778,346      | 98.3         | 257,893 | 99.2         | 3,025,573 | 98.7         |
| Women              | 16,724    | 1.3          | 8,683   | 1.3          | 13,654       | 1.7          | 2,418   | 0.8          | 41,479    | 1.3          |
| Total              | 1,321,859 | 100.0        | 692,882 | 100.0        | 792,000      | 100.0        | 260,311 | 100.0        | 3,067,052 | 100.0        |
| 1971               |           |              |         |              |              |              |         |              |           |              |
| Men                | 1,200,513 | 98.6         | 635,442 | 98.6         | 738,469      | 98.1         | 222,927 | 98.9         | 2,797,351 | 98.5         |
| Women              | 16,865    | 1.4          | 8,801   | 1.4          | 14,850       | 1.9          | 2,298   | 1.1          | 42,814    | 1.5          |
| Total <sup>a</sup> | 1,217,378 | 100.0        | 644,243 | 100.0        | 753,319      | 100.0        | 225,225 | 100.0        | 2,840,165 | 100.0        |
| 1972               |           |              |         |              |              |              |         |              |           |              |
| Men                | 868,965   | 98.1         | 586,200 | 98.5         | 731,774      | 97.8         | 193,807 | 98.8         | 2,380,746 | 98.2         |
| Women              | 16,814    | 1.9          | 8,993   | 1.5          | 16,225       | 2.2          | 2,273   | 1.2          | 44,305    | 1.8          |
| Total <sup>a</sup> | 885,779   | 100.0        | 595,193 | 100.0        | 747,999      | 100.0        | 196,080 | 100.0        | 2,425,051 | 100.0        |

SOURCE: Same as Table 1.

<sup>a</sup> February.

specialists, particularly nurses. Nevertheless, within the military, with its manifest rank system, the high proportion of female officers has the effect of giving greater visibility to women than if they had the same concentration of officers as found among male personnel.

While the proportion of these women will remain limited, the armed forces anticipate in the decade of the 1970s an increase in their number and percent from less than 2 percent to approximately 4 percent. The air force alone has, for example, a goal of tripling its number of WAF (Women in the Air Force). To meet these labor needs, the forces have instituted study groups on required organizational and professional changes and have instituted new recruiting programs. The army, navy, and air force have opened their Reserve Officers Training Programs to a limited number of women. Both symbolically and in terms of a professional

role, the incorporation of women into the military establishment will result in pressure for women graduates from the military academies. Senator Jacob Javits, in the fall of 1971, and Congressman Jack McDonald sought to have a young woman appointed to the United States Naval Academy from their states.

In September of 1971, the United States Army undertook a staff study, in connection with the advent of the volunteer armed forces, which called for the permanent elimination of the ceiling of 2 percent on female personnel, a ceiling which was labeled "unrealistic and debilitating."<sup>6</sup> The study showed that between 20 and 35 percent of army

6. Personnel and Administrative Services Agency, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army, United States Army Combat Developments Command, "The Personnel Offensive (Phase I)," a substudy of "The American Soldier in the 70's" (1971), p. 93.

positions could be filled by women, and it is also emphasized the necessity of training women in army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) units. An advisory commission of fifty civilian women, first established in 1951 to investigate the position of women in the military and called the Defense Advisory Commission on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), although relatively inactive during most of its existence, has in recent years participated more fully in the debate on the role of women in the armed services.

Although the opportunities for women to become more directly involved in new types and in a wider range of military assignments is increasing, women are not likely to be trained and armed for assault or direct combat operations. The institutional need for such deployment is slight, and the larger society does not believe such an equality is an essential demonstration of women's equality. It does not even find it appropriate to draft them into the military.

#### ROLES OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

The historical record, during the last century in industrial societies, indicates practically no institutionalized arming of women even in nations under the gravest national security threat, with only the most isolated exceptions.

During World War I, England, with a shortage of personnel, organized women's auxiliary groups to a much greater extent than other nations—the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), Women's Royal Air Force (WRAF), and Women's Royal Navy Service (WRNS). Previously, as in the United States, women had served only as nurses.<sup>7</sup> Although these auxiliary

groups constituted a uniformed women's corps, they were not given full military status; that is, they did not "enlist," they "enrolled" and were regarded as civilians.

During World War II, the Western Allies mobilized women both in uniform and in civilian war production far more than did the Axis powers, particularly Nazi Germany. About the possibility of employing German women to reduce the labor shortage during World War II, Speer reports, "Sauckel laid great weight on the danger that factory work might inflict moral harm upon German womanhood; not only might their 'psychic and emotional life' be affected but also their ability to bear."<sup>8</sup> In Great Britain, in addition to inducting women into uniformed auxiliary services, the army employed females in the Auxiliary Territorial Army in air control and as radar operators, and they manned anti-aircraft weapons—roles which involved defensive combat.<sup>9</sup> The Soviet Union trained and gave extensive publicity to a very limited number of women pilots in order to dramatize the need for wartime mobilization and commitment. The Soviet approach can be called tokenism rather than an institutionalized use of women in the armed forces. Women have also been used as parachutists behind enemy lines. In Communist China, throughout the whole guerrilla war of national liberation, women were not armed but were used as auxiliaries. Occasionally women have been armed as a result of accident or happenstance, and they have been found in small detached

8. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 220–21.

9. Hubert Essame, "The Second World War: The Years of Retreat, 1939–49," in Peter Young and J. P. Lawford, eds., *History of the British Army* (London: Barker, Ltd., 1970).

7. Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane, *The British Nurse in Peace and War* (London: J. Murray, 1923).

guerrilla forces, but there is little evidence that they have been deployed as a significant part of main-line guerrilla forces. Che Guevara in his diary gives his view on the masculinity of the guerrilla status: "This type of fight gives us the opportunity of becoming revolutionaries, the highest level of human species, and it also permits us to graduate as men."<sup>10</sup>

The case of Israel is particularly noteworthy. In Israel, the large and highly respected Women's Corps is given training in arms, namely with rifles and submachine guns. However, they are not regularly deployed with arms or mobilized as an armed formation during war.<sup>11</sup> They are attached to combat units in training and in the reserves as educational officers.<sup>12</sup>

In the United States during World War II, women in uniform filled mainly nursing, administrative, and clerical jobs, although a small minority held more varied posts, especially in naval intelligence and communications. After World War II, for a time their assignments narrowed, and in all three services women were employed mainly as clerks and secretaries and in routine types of communications. Continuously since 1945, the U.S. military operated on the notion that women would be excluded from "armed combat," and this concept is applied to military planning for the future. Even the most innovative proposals and staff plans maintain this formal assertion.<sup>13</sup>

10. Ernesto Guevara, *The Diary of the Che in Bolivia, November 7, 1966–October 7, 1967* (Calcutta: National Book Agency, 1968), p. xiii.

11. Samuel Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army* (Cranbury, N.J.: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1970).

12. Moshe Bar-On, *Education Process in the Israel Defense Forces* (Jerusalem: Israel Digest, 1964).

13. Personnel and Administrative Services Agency, "The Personnel Offensive," p. 95.

Both the army and the air force have not departed from that decision.<sup>14</sup>

However, the effect of deterrence is to expand the number and variety of sedentary noncombat tasks in which the "fighting spirit" is irrelevant. Potentially women could perform many deterrence tasks such as surveillance by radar equipment, but they are still restricted. In this connection it is important to note that as of spring 1972, the air force, which has the smallest number of traditional combat roles, had the highest concentration of women personnel. In Great Britain, naval experiments with women aboard ship were terminated partly because the added manpower advantages seemed trivial and outweighed the personal inconveniences. The U.S. Navy has been engaged in the limited use of women aboard ship, and they expect to allow women to fly some types of naval aircraft.

14. It is interesting to note the difference in opinion between Melvin R. Laird and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. Laird refers to this as a "limiting factor in the utilization of women. Another factor which limits the conversion of job assignments away from military men is the need to maintain a high capability to react to emergencies. Military men in support type jobs can be quickly reassigned to fighting units and deployed over seas" (*Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All Volunteer Force*, Report to the President and the Chairmen of Armed Services Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives [P.L. 92-129] [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972], p. 33). However, Admiral Zumwalt, Jr., has stated he has as a goal, in the utilization of WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service), their assignment to combat ships once the Equal Rights Amendment is passed. He sees no difficulty in this position and forty WAVES were assigned to the hospital ship *Sanctuary* as a pilot program. By law, women have only been allowed to serve as nurses on hospital and transport ships. In addition, the Admiral has authorized the limited entry of women into all ratings of the navy.

Until World War II, women in the United States who served as military personnel did so as nurses. The only exception was the "Yeomanettes" who, during World War I, were organized as a woman's naval auxiliary to free men for sea duty. However, this service was dissolved in 1919 after the Armistice. Civilian women first served as military nurses in 1854, when Florence Nightingale was asked to organize a group of nurses to care for the wounded in the Crimea.<sup>15</sup> In the United States, women served similarly during the Civil War. However, the history of women as uniformed personnel in the armed forces began in 1902 during the Spanish-American War, when the Army Nurse Corps was formed. In 1908, the Navy Nurse Corps was established. It was not, however, until after World War I that nurses were granted military rank. During World War II one-fourth of all American professional nurses volunteered for service. Following the format of the nursing profession in civilian life, the military nurse became rapidly institutionalized and distinct from the women's military corps.<sup>16</sup>

At this time, each of the armed services also established a women's auxiliary unit which has gradually become more and more a permanent and integral part of the service. The navy spelled out its initial, temporary intentions when in 1942 it labeled its women personnel WAVES, namely, Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service. The army established the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) in 1942, and a year later re-

designated it the Women's Army Corps (WAC) indicating the trend from an auxiliary service to a regularized component. With the establishment of an independent air force in 1947, Women in the Air Force (WAF) automatically came into being—from 1943 to 1947 they were called Air Wac. Both the marines and the coast guard (SPAR) created women's auxiliaries in 1942, although the SPAR corps was dissolved after World War II, except for a small group of reserves. These wartime measures were designed to mobilize effective manpower and to be a symbolic device for representing the inclusion of women in the larger national war effort.

Although the introduction of women into the military during World War II was seen as a short-term wartime measure, even the most male-oriented officers were satisfied with the ability of the forces to use female personnel. However, after the Korean conflict in the late 1950s, the position of women in the armed forces remained doubtful and their future problematic with the prospect that they might become a vestigial element. In the late 1960s, changes in the civilian social structure and the advent of the all-volunteer force made reevaluations by the military necessary and resulted in a limited trend toward the revitalization of the women's element.

#### SOURCES OF DISSATISFACTION

The new recruits—both officers and enlisted personnel—think of themselves as entering a service that has a strong emphasis on equal opportunities for men and women, and this is emphasized for them by the fixed and uniform pay rates. Likewise, they assume that women in the military have better job security than in civilian employment. Sources of dissatisfaction are mainly with living quarters, irritation over ad-

15. Woodham Smith and Cecil Blanche, *Florence Nightingale* (London: Constable, 1950).

16. Elizabeth Marion Jamieson, Mary F. Sewall, and Eleanor B. Suhrie, *Trends in Nursing History: Their Social, International, and Ethical Relationships* (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1966).

ministrative details, and the quality of specific supervisors. There have been continual rounds of official staff discussions, preparation of special internal staff papers, plus pressure to change administrative regulations, and even individual court suits, as in the cases of women who have become pregnant and are faced with dismissal.

Women in the military mainly want a broader range of assignments. The formulation is that—potentially—women should be able to serve in the broadest range of assignments, depending on the requirements of the service and of the task to be performed. Married women concerned with change are interested in administrative arrangements that would facilitate the utilization, retention, and careers of married women. In this regard, the key demands center around the issues of pregnancy and acceptance of the right of female military personnel to have children and pursue their careers. With respect to child-rearing, the demands of new arrangements are grounded in a highly matter-of-fact assertion, offered by both males and females and incorporated into planning documents, that effective birth control is available, and, therefore, there is a real alternative to the disruptions associated with unplanned child-bearing.

Concern about high personnel turnover because of marriage and pregnancy has been expressed by military personnel officers. However, a period of three to five years of active duty service is more and more seen as meeting the costs of training and assignment. Also, special arrangements are being slowly developed for married women. Since court cases on issues of pregnant military personnel are under way, it is likely that maternity leaves will be instituted.<sup>17</sup> Military women who have

children are allowed to remain in the service as long as arrangements are made for the children's care. Since the effective dissemination of birth control information is probably more extensive in the military than in comparable civilian groups, because of the high quality of medical services available, unwanted pregnancies are not a major problem.

#### PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE SEXES

With an increase in the proportion of women in the armed forces, the problem of protocol between the sexes will also have to be faced together with that of integrating the women personnel into the social life of the military. The new female recruit finds herself in a situation in which there is strong emphasis on appropriate form and protocol. The services, in fact, conduct seminars on "social maturity" and personal style in the military. In this community as in the civilian society, the role relations and protocol between the sexes are being redefined. The new age cohorts, both men and women, entering the military have passed through a coeducational high school and college system, which appears to reduce the salience of segregating work and sex roles. While the consequences of new trends in socialization cannot be anticipated and may produce strong reactions, there does seem to be a reduction in overt sexual competition, while the new generation are prepared for "coeducational" existence in most segments of their daily life. The military will not be able to differentiate itself sharply from civilian

cause they are no longer "assignable," they may reapply for service within twelve months of their discharge or they may request a waiver of their discharge. Each case is considered on an individual basis, and no differentiation is made between married and unmarried personnel.

17. Although the air force, for example, dismisses women who become pregnant be-



society in this respect, except in highly specialized units.

The coeducational format has already been introduced in important aspects of military training, with notable implications. The impact, even if limited to the specific training situation, has been to render the organizational climate more pragmatic and less ritualistic. For example, during the period 1966-70, which included expansion of Vietnam hostilities, the Officer Training School of the Air Force contained a small but regular percentage of WAF. In 1968 there were 7 percent in the class, a percentage large enough to make a direct impact.<sup>18</sup> Gary Wamsley's analysis of this training institution concluded that the presence of women added a "measure of decorum and realism" and generally dampened the zeal and ferocity with which particular activities such as drill, discipline, and even room arrangements were approached. The impact of the presence of women should not be exaggerated, but in this case, some coeducational training was compatible with military requirements, as it would appear to be for a force committed to a deterrence philosophy. Likewise, leading educational officers in the Israeli Defense Forces emphasize that the presence of girls in the army is responsible for a polite atmosphere and the maintenance of more appropriate language and behavior among soldiers. It does not in any fashion affect battle performance and probably contributes to the sense of civility found in the Israeli forces. In the ROTC in the United States, which in the fall of 1972 expanded to include women, the women were making the adjustment; the ROTC made no changes in its method of operation once

women were admitted to the program, and the men in the program typically felt that it was a logical move to include women whose roles in society in general were increasing.

Despite the ability of the services to readily incorporate more women personnel, their integration into the social life of the base presents a problem. Military life is a form of communal living; most military activities are carried out on the base, which is also the locus of military family life—although housing shortages require that an important percentage of the military live elsewhere. Family life and the importance of family ties are dominant in the military.<sup>19</sup> Careful research by Williams on the air force notes the lower divorce rate as a reflection of the culture of the military family.<sup>20</sup> One is struck by the relative absence of unmarried male officers, the few divorced personnel, and the very few childless families. Therefore, the unmarried female military personnel occupy an ambiguous position in the social life of the base. Women officers are, to some degree, incorporated into its formal social life and thereby come into contact with the wives of officers; but the gulf between enlisted women and the wives of non-commissioned officers is much wider.

#### CONCLUSION

In the decade of the 1970s the military will not pioneer in the changing role of women, but women will be increasingly utilized and constitute a potential pool to meet the expected "short fall" in personnel. Looking for-

19. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*; Roger W. Little, "The Military Family," in Little, *Handbook of Military Institutions*.

20. John Williams, "Divorce and Family Dissolution" (Paper presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, September 1971).

18. Gary Wamsley, "From Tigers to OT's. A Bellwether Change in Patterns of Military Socialization," an unpublished working paper, University of Chicago, November 1971.

ward to the decade of the 1980s one can anticipate a small expansion beyond the current expectation of approximately 4 percent women. There does not seem to be a basis for predicting that the feasible level of 10 percent will be reached unless the armed forces are subject to severe external pressure.

The military is likely to deal with its manpower problems by substituting civilians for military personnel. Therefore, additional women in the military will be civilians. The range of assignments open to women will continue to expand, but they will not fill direct combat roles.

# Military Research and Development: Implications for the Civil Sector

By DAVIS B. BOBROW \*

**ABSTRACT:** Military research and development (R & D), whatever its national security contribution, allegedly imposes substantial opportunity costs on the civil sector. A factual analysis does not support the view that military R & D has recently been or in the future will be a dominant reason: for funding and manpower shortages in civilian R & D, for the lack of technological supremacy in American industry, for the lack of technological solutions to major problems of domestic society, or for the emphasis on externally funded research in U.S. colleges and universities. Instead, financial trends suggest that an absence of demand for R & D in the civil sector and multiple funding opportunities for research in academic institutions are and will be more important causes of these problems. Military R & D can also provide learning for civil sector R & D. The experience of the Defense policy analysis organizations is particularly pertinent. It suggests that such organizations will be of continuing value to the civil sector to the extent that they serve several masters and release their results to legislative as well as executive officials. However, they are likely to encounter inadequate demand for their work as compared with that for hardware and suffer as their sponsors experience funding restrictions and sharp criticism of their programs.

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MILITARY research and development (R & D) relates to the civil society in a number of important ways aside from its net national security contribution. Resources consumed by military research and development, both of money and skill, can impose an opportunity cost on the civil sector. We will address some evidence on the magnitude and nature of that cost recently and in the foreseeable future. Obviously, the net cost is not only a function of resources consumed, but also of the extent to which the results have or do not have civil uses. The amount of military research and development resources and the patterns of use also relate to civil society in another important if less tangible way. For historical reasons, the military research and development experience provides learning about the advantages and disadvantages of different forms of R & D organization. Civil R & D programs can benefit from that experience. In particular, we will discuss the implications of the experience with the organizational alternative of Federal Contract Research Centers and their most controversial subset, the so-called "think tanks."

Before we turn to these two topics, some limits on the scope of this essay should be made explicit. The military utility of military R & D expenditures will not be discussed, nor will the way in which they shape procurement and military operations. We will not address military procurement of technological items, even though that has substantial implications for scientific and technical manpower employment. Although military R & D resources go to a variety of performing organizations—government laboratories, industry, universities, and nonprofit R & D organizations—we will deal only with the last of these at any length. Finally, R & D is a shorthand label which also embraces

test and evaluation efforts and should be thought of accordingly.

#### OPPORTUNITY COST

Critics of military R & D claim that it imposes the following costs on the civil society: (1) diverts funds from civil R & D; (2) drains skilled manpower away from civil problems and functions; (3) as a result of the above consequences, fundamentally hampers the productivity of U.S. industry and critically retards the application of science and technology to domestic social problems; and (4) undermines the integrity of science and the freedom of the university. As often put forward, the claims are that if military R & D were substantially trimmed, then and only then: would civil R & D be adequately funded and manned, would U.S. industry become technologically competitive, would civil technologies flourish—for example, transportation—and would the universities be the bastion of the free and inquiring scholar.<sup>1</sup> Because the claims are extreme, they require support well beyond the prima facie facts of military R & D spending in the billions. Because we are interested in the present and the future rather than the past, we want to assess the current and future applicability of the criticisms just summarized. Are we likely to incur such opportunity costs in the future without strong corrective actions? Accordingly, we do not need to show that military R & D programs have had or will have the opposite im-

1. Testimony of Seymour Melman in *Hearings on the Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1973*, Senate Committee on Appropriations, beginning February 1, 1972, pp. 291-92; F. A. Long, "Science and the Military," Peace Studies Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., Occasional Papers, no. 1, June 28-30, 1971; Michael Klare, comp., *The University-Military-Police Complex* (North American Congress on Latin America, n.d.), pp. 3-12.

TABLE 1—SOURCES OF U.S. R &amp; D FUNDS BY SECTOR (DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)

|                              | 1953  | 1958   | CALENDAR YEARS |        | 1972 <sup>a</sup> |
|------------------------------|-------|--------|----------------|--------|-------------------|
|                              |       |        | 1963           | 1968   |                   |
| Federal government           |       |        |                |        |                   |
| Defense-related              | \$2.5 | \$ 5.7 | \$ 7.1         | \$ 8.5 | \$ 8.1            |
| Space-related                | ...   | 0.1    | 2.4            | 3.3    | 2.9               |
| All other                    | 0.2   | 1.0    | 1.8            | 3.1    | 4.2               |
| Total                        | \$2.8 | \$ 6.8 | \$11.2         | \$15.0 | \$15.0            |
| Nonfederal                   |       |        |                |        |                   |
| Industry                     | \$2.2 | \$ 3.7 | \$ 5.4         | \$ 9.0 | \$11.3            |
| Universities and colleges    | 0.2   | 0.3    | 0.5            | 0.8    | 1.1               |
| Other nonprofit institutions | 0.1   | 0.1    | 0.2            | 0.3    | 0.4               |
| Total                        | \$2.4 | \$ 4.1 | \$ 6.2         | \$10.2 | \$12.8            |
| Summaries                    |       |        |                |        |                   |
| Defense-related              | \$2.5 | \$ 5.7 | \$ 7.1         | \$ 8.5 | \$ 8.1            |
| All other                    | 2.7   | 5.2    | 10.3           | 16.6   | 19.9              |
| Defense-related and space    | \$2.5 | \$ 5.8 | \$ 9.4         | \$11.8 | \$11.0            |
| All other                    | 2.7   | 5.1    | 7.9            | 13.3   | 17.0              |
| Total, U. S. R & D           | \$5.2 | \$10.9 | \$17.4         | \$25.2 | \$28.0            |

SOURCE: *The Economics of Defense Spending*, Department of Defense (Comptroller), July 1972, p. 42. These and most of the data used in subsequent tables are drawn from National Science Foundation, *National Patterns of R & D Resources, 1953-1972*, NSF 72-300 (Washington, D. C., December 1971), pp. 32-34.

<sup>a</sup> Estimated.

plications from those put forward by the critics or that the criticisms have no historical foundation.

#### *Starving civil R & D*

Let us begin with the total amounts of U.S. R & D funds. As shown in Table 1, the total national effort increased more than five times in the last

twenty years. During the 1958-72 period, defense-related R & D grew 42 percent, space-related grew 2,800 percent, and other R & D grew 233 percent. The percentage allocations shown in Table 2 indicate that by 1972 civil R & D exceeded that for defense by more than two to one—space expenditures excluded.

TABLE 2—PERCENT OF TOTAL U.S. R &amp; D EFFORT

|                 | 1953  | 1958  | 1963  | 1968  | 1972  |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Defense-related | 47.5% | 52.0% | 40.6% | 33.9% | 29.0% |
| Space-related   | 0.8   | 1.0   | 13.7  | 13.2  | 10.4  |
| Subtotal        | 48.3  | 53.0  | 54.3  | 47.1  | 39.4  |
| All other       | 51.7  | 47.0  | 45.7  | 52.9  | 60.6  |
| Total           | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

SOURCE: *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 34.

TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF U.S. R & D FUNDS BY SECTOR  
(IN BILLIONS OF CALENDAR-YEAR 1958 DOLLARS)

|                           | 1953  | 1958   | CALENDAR YEARS |        | 1972 <sup>a</sup> |
|---------------------------|-------|--------|----------------|--------|-------------------|
|                           |       |        | 1963           | 1968   |                   |
| Defense-related           | \$2.8 | \$ 5.7 | \$ 6.6         | \$ 7.0 | \$ 5.5            |
| All other                 | 3.1   | 5.2    | 9.6            | 13.6   | 13.5              |
| Total, U.S. R & D         | \$5.9 | \$10.9 | \$16.2         | \$20.6 | \$19.1            |
| Defense-related and space | \$2.8 | \$ 5.8 | \$ 8.8         | \$ 9.7 | \$ 7.5            |
| All other                 | 3.1   | 5.1    | 7.4            | 10.9   | 11.6              |
| Total, U.S. R & D         | \$5.9 | \$10.9 | \$16.2         | \$20.6 | \$19.1            |

SOURCE: *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 44.<sup>a</sup> Estimated.

The picture becomes more striking if we use constant prices to establish the distribution of R & D purchasing power. The relevant figures are shown in Table 3. If we compare the 1958 and 1972 defense figures, we see that military R & D is absorbing none of the real growth in R & D funds. Even if we combine space with defense-related R & D allocations, we see substantially less growth than in funds for civil R & D.

The starvation argument as a guide for future action seems even less compelling when we introduce in Table 4 the distribution of increases in R & D spending power for time intervals during the last twenty years. The table shows that the most rapid growth in domestic/industrial R & D occurred during the period of greatest defense increases (1953–58) and the second most

rapid growth during the war buildup period (1963–68). The least growth occurred during the recent years of cut-backs in defense R & D purchasing power. These facts do not support the inference that resources for defense R & D are given at the expense of the civil sector. They do suggest that defense R & D allocations are not the dominant factor constraining civil sector R & D.

Of course, starvation may also be a function of personnel shortages. Does this argument seem compelling for the present and future? It hardly seems compatible with employment problems currently faced by scientists and engineers and the policy of “academic birth control” now being increasingly practiced by graduate departments of science and technology. Nor can we attribute to military R & D the declining

TABLE 4—INCREASES IN U.S. R & D SPENDING  
(DOLLARS IN BILLIONS AT CALENDAR-YEAR 1958 PRICES)

|         | DEFENSE        | DEFENSE AND SPACE<br>COMBINED | ALL<br>OTHER R & D | TOTAL U. S.<br>R & D |
|---------|----------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 1953–58 | \$+2.9 ( 104%) | \$+3.0 ( 107%)                | \$+2.0 (65%)       | \$+5.0 ( 85%)        |
| 1958–63 | \$+0.9 ( 16%)  | \$+3.0 ( 52%)                 | \$+2.3 (45%)       | \$+5.3 ( 49%)        |
| 1963–68 | \$+0.4 ( 6%)   | \$+0.9 ( 10%)                 | \$+3.5 (47%)       | \$+4.4 ( 27%)        |
| 1968–72 | \$-1.5 (-21%)  | \$-2.2 (-23%)                 | \$+0.7 ( 6%)       | \$-1.5 (-7%)         |

SOURCE: *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 45.

enrollment in many schools of engineering. It may well be the case that substantial numbers of students were attracted to technical specialties relevant to aerospace and advanced electronics technologies in the past and that these specializations are not well-suited to civil sector problems. However, the funding trends noted earlier should have modified the financial incentives for such career choices some years ago. If that did not happen in a timely fashion, it seems to reflect the need for more than cuts in military R & D. More specifically, the problem seems to call for national manpower policy with regard to the production of scientists and engineers and for educational administrators to alter their curricular and financial incentives to fit more closely with the emerging shape of national priorities and career opportunities. These actions are badly needed, if difficult, but certainly not the province of the military R & D community.

In a period of tight national, or at least federal government, R & D funding, the starvation argument may still merit emphasis if we foresee substantial increases in military R & D spending. That is hardly the expectation of leading Department of Defense R & D officials. For example, the deputy director of Defense Research and Engineering, Leonard Sullivan, Jr., observed recently that the "size of the Federal till and the national interest in defense are limited."<sup>2</sup> Scientists and engineers should, if anything, expect a further reduction in military R & D purchasing power. And this forecast seems to be supported by factors well beyond the preferences of the scientific community. Military

R & D will feel the effects of an effective decline in the national priority accorded to defense spending in general. For fiscal year 1973, defense accounts for the lowest share of public spending and gross national product (GNP) in more than twenty years.<sup>3</sup> At the same time the major competitors with R & D for military funds are increasingly burdensome. Acquisition or procurement costs have gone up by a factor of 10 in the last twenty years;<sup>4</sup> military personnel costs have gone up by over 100 percent in the last ten years.<sup>5</sup> Inflation, technological complexity, the financial incentives required for the all-volunteer force, and the inflexible civil service salary trends all operate to constrain military R & D resources. Progress in arms control and disarmament may eventually add an additional constraint. In sum, the starvation argument will have even less foundation in the future than it has had in the recent past.

Parenthetically, it is important to note that the starvation argument in strong form can be rejected without considerations of civil sector benefits, "spin-off," from military R & D. If we accept any particular estimate of the share of military R & D which benefits the civil sector, we should deduct that share in our opportunity cost calculation. We probably do not favor the proponents of military R & D by using a critic's estimate, in this case Franklin A. Long, of 20 percent of military and space expenditures.<sup>6</sup> Such aggregate estimates do not reflect the possibility that programs constituting a tiny share of military R & D, in particular human

3. *The Economics of Defense Spending*, Department of Defense (Comptroller), July 1972, pp. 190-93.

4. Sullivan, *News Release*, p. 5.

5. Office of the President of the United States, *Budget Highlights, Fiscal Year 1973* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 28.

6. Long, "Science and the Military," p. 8.

2. Address by Leonard Sullivan, Jr., Principal Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, before the American Society of Engineering Education, Washington, D.C., October 26, 1972, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), *News Release*, no. 737-72, October 26, 1972, p. 7.

TABLE 5—GNP AND CIVIL SECTOR R & D GROWTH  
(IN BILLIONS OF CALENDAR-YEAR 1958 DOLLARS)

|         | INCREASE IN GNP,<br>EXCLUDING DEFENSE<br>AND NASA | INCREASE IN<br>DOMESTIC/INDUSTRIAL<br>R & D | PERCENT OF INCREASE<br>ALLOCATED TO R & D |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 1953-58 | \$ 50.3                                           | \$2.0                                       | 4.0%                                      |
| 1958-63 | 89.8                                              | 2.3                                         | 2.6%                                      |
| 1963-68 | 134.1                                             | 3.5                                         | 2.6%                                      |
| 1968-72 | 84.8                                              | 0.7                                         | 0.8%                                      |

SOURCE: *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 51.

resources programs, can have massive advantages for the civil sector.<sup>7</sup>

#### *Decline of U.S. industry and society*

The starvation argument leads to the conclusion that the relative decline in the technological superiority and productive efficiency of U.S. industry reflects a lack of supply of R & D resources. Similar reasoning attributes the increasing malfunctions of domestic society, for example, in electrical supply, to a supply problem. Military R & D can only be a prime source of these unwanted phenomena if we can establish that the bottleneck is one of the supply of, rather than the demand for, R & D resources.

If one will accept the presence of sufficient scientific and technical manpower, the problem of supply for the present and future seems to be one of money. In fact, the data presented below suggest that the problem is not primarily one of absolute money shortages for industrial and domestic concerns, but of declining growth in the priority given to R & D. Table 5 presents information on the increases in the U.S. gross national product and in domestic industrial R & D during the last twenty years. As the Comptroller's Office of

the Department of Defense observes, economic slowdown does not account for the sharp changes in the allocation of the GNP increment to R & D. "Corporate profits after taxes rose from \$20.4 billion in 1953 to \$22.2 billion in 1958—a rise of \$1.8 billion, or 8.8%. From 1968 to the first quarter of 1972 (at annual rates), the rise was from \$47.8 billion to \$52.5 billion—\$4.7 billion or 9.8%." Yet in the first period the share of the increase allocated to R & D was four times that allocated in the most recent period. In real terms, domestic/industrial R & D grew 65% from 1953 to 1958 and only 6% from 1968 to 1972.<sup>8</sup>

Relevant data about federal social and economic spending—all federal spending less defense, debt interest, Veteran's Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and international affairs—also suggest the possible weakness of R & D demand. The items in Table 6 show a declining tendency to allocate financial increments to R & D. If the relevant federal agencies had maintained their 1953-58 rates of increase in R & D spending, the fiscal year 1973 level would approximate that for military purposes.

7. This possibility is developed more fully in my "Adaptive Politics, Social Learning, and Military Institutions," in M. R. Van Gils, ed., *The Perceived Role of the Military* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), pp. 293-308.

8. *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 51; for an example of the decline in industrial demand, see Deborah Shapley, "Industrial Laboratories: Withier Basic Research?" *Science* 174, no. 4015 (December 17, 1971), pp. 1214-15.



TABLE 6—CIVIL SECTOR SPENDING AND R &amp; D GROWTH (DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)

|         | INCREASE IN<br>FEDERAL SOCIAL AND<br>ECONOMIC SPENDING | INCREASE IN<br>R & D SPENDING,<br>SAME AGENCIES | PERCENT OF INCREASE<br>ALLOCATED TO R & D |
|---------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 1953-58 | \$ 9.8                                                 | \$0.8                                           | 8.2%                                      |
| 1958-63 | 15.6                                                   | 0.8                                             | 5.1%                                      |
| 1963-68 | 32.6                                                   | 1.3                                             | 4.0%                                      |
| 1968-72 | 55.2                                                   | 1.1                                             | 2.0%                                      |

SOURCE: *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 50.

Our discussion does not show that with less military R & D, American industry and society would still have the problems now commonly recognized. It does show that insufficient levels of domestic industrial R & D, should they exist, are not primarily a function of the size of military R & D. If we choose to believe that R & D increases are a necessary condition for improved industrial performance and social services, we had best turn our attention to the reasons why managers in those areas have assigned declining relative priorities to R & D.

#### *Corruption of academia*

At least since President Eisenhower's farewell address, it has been argued that federal R & D funding in general, and military R & D funding in particular, are responsible for a decline in the pursuit and transfer of knowledge in universities and colleges.<sup>9</sup> Even if we choose to accept that such adverse changes have taken and are taking place in American higher education, we still need to assess the extent to which military R & D funding seems to be a major

present and future cause of those changes. Table 7 bears on this question. The data indicate that military R & D now provides not only a small, but a declining, share of federal funding to higher educational institutions and of the total R & D resources.

Once again, the discussion does not imply that military R & D funding has beneficial consequences. It does throw doubt on those who attribute great effects of a negative kind to it. If one wishes to reverse the direction of development of higher education in this country, it seems that the problem goes much deeper than military R & D, which is increasingly less important.

To summarize our discussion of opportunity cost, we suggest that military R & D spending has less substantial import now than before the Vietnam War and that the problems attributed to military R & D noted earlier are not of fundamental importance for the future. Monitoring and concern remain appropriate. However, the assumption that reductions in military R & D are a sufficient condition for increases in civil sector R & D does not seem warranted.

#### AN ORGANIZATIONAL INVENTION

We can now turn to lessons for civil sector R & D from the military R & D experience. We will restrict ourselves to the experience of the "think tank" units which are some of the Department of Defense related Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRCs). De-

9. President Eisenhower's speech is quoted in Long, "Science and the Military," pp. 12-13. Senator Fulbright has contended that "... the adherence of professors is not greatly surprising. No less than businessmen, workers, and politicians, professors like money and influence. Having traditionally been deprived of both, they have welcomed the contracts and consultancies offered by the Military Establishment" (*Congressional Record—Senate* [December 13, 1967], p. S18485).

TABLE 7—MILITARY R & D FUNDS TO COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES  
(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)

|                                                         | 1953              | 1956  | 1961  | 1964   | 1968   | 1972   |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| <i>R &amp; D Performed in Colleges and Universities</i> |                   |       |       |        |        |        |
| Federal government                                      |                   |       |       |        |        |        |
| Defense                                                 | \$NA <sup>a</sup> | \$122 | \$198 | \$ 295 | \$ 307 | \$ 246 |
| Space                                                   | NA                | 1     | 15    | 90     | 138    | 105    |
| All other programs                                      | NA                | 90    | 287   | 531    | 1,127  | 1,399  |
| Total, federal government                               | 138               | 213   | 500   | 916    | 1,572  | 1,750  |
| Industry                                                | 19                | 29    | 40    | 41     | 55     | 65     |
| Universities, colleges, and state and local government  | 151               | 204   | 371   | 555    | 841    | 1,060  |
| Other nonprofit institutions                            | 26                | 34    | 58    | 83     | 131    | 175    |
| Total R & D performed in colleges and universities      | 334               | 480   | 969   | 1,595  | 2,599  | 3,050  |
| <i>Defense as Percent of</i>                            |                   |       |       |        |        |        |
| Federal funding                                         |                   | 57.3% | 39.6% | 32.2%  | 19.5%  | 14.1%  |
| Total R & D at colleges and universities                |                   | 25.4% | 20.4% | 18.5%  | 11.8%  | 8.1%   |

SOURCE: *Economics of Defense Spending*, p. 46.<sup>a</sup> No account.

fense FCRCs consume only a small fraction of military R & D funds—in fiscal year 1972, only about 3 percent. Why is such an emphasis warranted when in-house organizations receive about 29 percent and for-profit industrial and commercial organizations about 65 percent of military R & D funds?<sup>10</sup> The reason lies in the relatively unique functions which the FCRCs concerned with systems engineering and with policy studies and analyses serve. These functions will increasingly matter for civil sector progress. How useful is the Department of Defense's "invention" for civil purposes?

It seems useful to begin by noting

10. U.S., Congress, Senate, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Statement by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., On the Federal Contract Research Centers," 92nd Congress, mimeographed, April 5, 1972, pp. 3-4.

the characteristics of Defense FCRCs. They exist primarily to perform work for Defense; they have no commercial affiliations; they are funded in a manner that makes them especially dependent for continuance and stability on Defense and the congressional committees for Defense authorizations and appropriations; they have access to privileged government and industrial information; they are an alternative to carrying on R & D in-house or with for-profit firms. Defense FCRCs are of three types: laboratories; systems engineering organizations; and studies and analysis institutions.<sup>11</sup> These labora-

11. For reviews of the history and current activities and management of the Defense FCRCs, see "Statements by FCRC Users," and "Letters and Statements from FCRC Board Chairmen and Trustees," in U.S., Congress, Senate, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Armed Services Committee, "Supplemental Submissions to the Record at a Hearing on Federal Con-

tories are four in number, all university operated (Lincoln Laboratory—Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Applied Physics Laboratory—Johns Hopkins University; Ordnance Research Laboratory—Pennsylvania State University; Applied Physics Laboratory—University of Washington). These have not been particularly controversial and are not institutionally unique. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Atomic Energy Commission sponsor analogous organizations. There are two systems engineering organizations—Mitre and Aerospace. Their purpose is to guide, integrate, and evaluate the host of tasks involved in realizing complex communications, radar, missile, and space systems. For this purpose they require highly skilled manpower, access to information held by a number of competitive for-profit firms, rather full knowledge of expected military uses, and no interest in follow-on production contracts. In the civil sector, the increased interest in complex-man-machine systems, whether it be for health or transportation, suggests the need for similar organizations. Indeed, the use made by the Office of Economic Opportunity of the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin to manage and evaluate the New Jersey income maintenance experiments bear some similarity to the role of Defense's systems engineering organizations.<sup>12</sup> The value of Mitre and Aerospace seems to be relatively agreed

tract Research Centers," 92nd Congress, mimeographed, April 5, 1972.

12. Institute for Research on Poverty, "Institute for Research on Poverty Description," mimeographed (Madison, Wisconsin, March 1971); *Policy and Program Research in a University Setting*, Report of the Advisory Committee for Assessment of University Based Institutes for Research on Poverty (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences, 1971).

upon. The role of the policy studies and analysis organizations, the major survivors of which are RAND, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), has been and is much more controversial.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the House Appropriations Committee attempted to write their obituary in 1971 by directing a 25 percent cut in the funds requested for them and calling for an "orderly phase-down" of their operations.<sup>14</sup>

#### *Tied policy analysis organizations—missions and issues*

The policy analysis organizations are justified on the grounds that they provide an independent and skilled appraisal of basic alternatives and their long-run consequences, and generate management instruments which increase the rationality of decision-making. Their proponents describe them as "informed sceptics and devil's advocates," and as engaging in "particularly sensitive studies that affect the central issues" of the sponsor.<sup>15</sup> Maynard Keynes has stated well the assumption which makes such studies from outside an operating organization desirable for the men who run it. "Practical men who believe themselves quite exempt from any intellectual influence are usually the slaves of some defunct economist."<sup>16</sup> With regard to military matters, the argument is that the influence is usually of

13. RAND has been the most discussed. See: Bruce Smith, *The RAND Corporation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

14. "Thumbs Down on Think Tanks," *Science* 174, no. 4015, December 31, 1971, p. 1008.

15. Grant L. Hansen, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (R&D), and Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R&D), in "Statements by FCRC Users," section 3, p. 4; section 2, p. 7.

16. Quoted in *Policy and Program Research*, p. 3.

the last war or the doctrine for the previous generation of military technology.

A number of criticisms of the tied policy analysis organizations have been made with increasing strength and support. These can be divided into issues of policy role and of administrative efficiency. The role issues merit noting first. According to their critics, the types of institutions in question are: (1) rationalizers and puppets of the source of their funds;<sup>17</sup> (2) disloyal to their funders and to national policy;<sup>18</sup> (3) unduly influential in shaping policy while in no sense accountable or officially responsible for the consequences of their recommendations. The first two arguments are difficult to reconcile except in a coalition of opposition to the policy analysis groups. As an anonymous air force informant told *Science* magazine, "The hawks think these places are full of Ellsbergs and the doves think they are full of sycophants and don't do anything useful anyway."<sup>19</sup> The third objection follows from the nature of the studies in which the policy analysis organizations engage, the fact that their members are not directly accountable either to executive branch superiors or to Congress, and the general suspicion that if their staffs are not pursuing money, they must be pursuing power.

Administrative efficiency charges include: (1) special access to military R & D funds regardless of competitive merit; (2) high costs, especially salaries; (3) no competence unavailable in the civil service and the military. In sum, the critics conclude that the De-

fense policy analysis organizations have outlived whatever usefulness they may have once had and that necessary tasks can be performed more inexpensively and responsibly inside the government.

#### *Are the charges warranted?*

The administrative criticisms of tied policy organizations are relatively subject to conclusive evaluation. There is little evidence that work has been awarded to the remaining policy analysis organizations which could equally well have been done by other external performers. No operating bureaucracy is going to share its "most fundamental problems, aspirations, and plans" with a large number of here today and gone tomorrow outsiders.<sup>20</sup> Given the congressional sensitivity to work done by these organizations, and the rather prevalent bureaucratic desires for secrecy and control, there is little reason to believe that Defense officials still regard assigning work to the tied policy analysis organizations as the course of least resistance. Salary costs were once in excess of those in the civil service and in the universities, but that is no longer the case. Indeed, professional personnel who joined RAND from the U.S. government in 1971 incurred on average a 5 percent reduction in pay, and those joining the U.S. government received on average an 11 percent increase.<sup>21</sup> This is not to argue that salaries are appropriate or costs as low as they should be. They are not out of line with major comparison groups. The case for a loss of *raison d'être* with improved internal competence in Defense is more multifaceted. Military and civil service competence in policy analysis, especially

17. For example, see Philip Green, "Science, Government and the Case of RAND: A Singular Pluralism," *World Politics* 20, no. 2 (January 1968), pp. 301-26.

18. The recent furor over Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers marks a high point, but a number of instances occurred earlier.

19. Quoted in "Thumbs Down on the Think Tanks," p. 1008.

20. Assistant Secretary Frosch in "Statements by FCRC Users," section 2, p. 10.

21. Newton N. Minow, "Statement for the Secretary of Defense," in "Letters and Statements from FCRC Board Chairmen and Trustees," p. 5.

those aspects related to applied economics and operations research, is now substantial. However, other reasons to doubt the ability of members of the operating bureaucracy to fulfill the independent, long-run assessment mission retain their earlier force. In-house personnel are too subject to pressures of day-to-day needs and of command responsiveness. And these pressures are not limited to members of the military. As a National Academy of Science report for the Office of Economic Opportunity observes,

... if closeness to policy shapes focus, it also shortens and narrows perspective. There is no evidence that closeness to policy enhances perception of important long-run questions. Commitment to a policy strengthens commitment to the values and perceptions that generated it. . . . From the point of view of a policy-maker with a tight budget and time constraints, research within a particular framework is relevant; research outside that framework is not.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, civil service personnel cannot be changed with the rapidity appropriate to changing policy issues. For example, for the period 1967-70, RAND and IDA personnel turnover averaged 15 to 20 percent per year; in-house military laboratories averaged 1 to 5 percent per year.<sup>23</sup>

The issues involving the content of the products of the tied policy analysis organizations are less clear. In part the criticisms reflect the almost inevitable strain between independence and loyalty or responsiveness to the needs of the funder. As long as the organizations in question have a single source of funds, for example, a particular military service, they are inhibited from persistently attacking the preferences of their sponsor. Retribution is particu-

larly likely if they disseminate their analyses to competitors or superiors of the sponsoring organizations. For example, one air force criticism of RAND has been that its personnel were too close to the office of the secretary of defense during the MacNamara period.<sup>24</sup> Independence was enhanced at the price of suspicions about loyalty. Congressional treatment of organizations such as RAND reflects the inherent stress between the desires for independence and for privileged access with its corollary of secrecy. Whatever the specific charges, their combined effect is to decrease confidence in the tied policy analysis organizations. The response of Defense funders to undue independence and to congressional attention has been the normal bureaucratic defense of tightened control. Control measures do operate to increase the involvement of accountable government officials and the relevance of work to the agenda of military funders. In the words of a high navy official, such measures inject a "splash of cold salt water into theoretical analyses."<sup>25</sup> However, they also lessen the ability of the study groups to operate as an "assistant secretary in charge of questioning assumptions."<sup>26</sup>

### Lessons

The Defense experience does not warrant any particular degree of confidence in the ability of operating bureaucracies to engage in tough assessment of their

24. "RAND Revamps for a Civilian Future," *Business Week*, no. 2226, April 29, 1972, p. 36.

25. Assistant Secretary Frosch in "Statements by FCRC Users," section 2, p. 8.

26. Advisory Committee on the Management of Behavioral Science Research in the Department of Defense, National Academy of Sciences, *Behavioral and Social Science Research in the Department of Defense: A Framework for Management* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1971).

22. *Policy and Program Research*, p. 48.

23. "Statement by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering," p. 16.

current commitments. The fate of the Defense tied policy analysis organizations clearly does not provide a positive precedent for the civil sector. We can conclude with several observations pertinent to the equally great need in the civil sector for policy analysis.

First, any particular outside organization will probably have an effective life not in excess of fifteen years. It may be inadvisable to try and extend its life much beyond that in its original role.

Second, a reputation for objectivity will suffer if results are not shared within the executive branch and with the Congress. The difficulty experienced by Senator Fulbright in securing an IDA study on the Tonkin Gulf crisis illustrates the proprietary attitude which, in the long run, undercuts the credibility of policy analysis organizations in general.

Third, the costs of a loss in privileged access are probably less than the vulnerability to preemptive bias which dependence on a single source of funds can induce. For the civil sector, it seems desirable legislatively to require either multi-agency funding or, still better, some sort of public corporation arrangement which lessens dependence on the affability of bureaucracies with a vested interest in particular findings.

Fourth, the viability of the more hardware-oriented Defense FCRCs compared to those concerned with policy analysis suggests some problems are relatively unique to the latter. I suggest that these center on the nature of consumer demand. High government

officials in both the executive and Congress may well attach greater priority to technological assistance than to policy analysis stimulation. After all, they are the policy experts and do not claim to be technological experts. The hardware organizations provide products which are tangible and supposedly instrumental for achieving policy goals. The policy analysis organizations provide papers which make intellectual and time and worry demands on the reader. The shifts in status of the Defense tied policy analysis organizations show them booming during a time of major innovation in policy and management, at least affluent during a period of financial growth and political popularity on the part of their sponsor, and in decline as the resources of the sponsors become tight and popularity wanes. If we extrapolate this pattern to the civil sector, we come to the following conclusions. Tied policy analysis organizations suffer from a demand problem and will continue to do so unless civil program leadership differs from that for defense policy. The type of organization in question will flourish most when civil bureaucracies are "new" or under new leadership shaping and implementing sharp policy and management changes. Policy analysis organizations are least likely to flourish and be in demand when their sponsor is under heated criticism and pressure to strongly justify all resources. If the civil sector wishes to have independent, long-run advice, it may be necessary to establish as initial conditions, leadership demand and program support.

# The Military Man in Academia

By AMOS A. JORDAN AND WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR.

**ABSTRACT:** The officer education system is in a period of overdue, dynamic change in military curricular substance and approach. Although departures from time-tested procedures are not generally welcomed in the military, this is a time of serious introspection for the armed services. They are prepared to innovate. The challenge to the officer education system is to produce the required number of officers with expertise in the management and application of military resources in deterrent, peacekeeping, advisory, and combat roles in the context of rapid technological, social, and political change. This educational system must provide training to develop specific skills and military professionalism; it must also develop broadly applicable analytical skills and critical judgment. The officer education system can define the parameters of the former far more closely than the latter. It is time for an overall assessment of training requirements for the future based upon the tasks the nation wants its military to perform and a forecast of technological change. Equally important, it is time for an assessment of the values which the nation wishes its military officers to hold and development of personnel management systems which facilitate education designed to produce and promote imaginative officers capable of balanced judgment concerning issues of priorities and trade-offs among resources and values.

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PROFESSIONAL education can be discussed sensibly only in terms of how and how well it prepares those being educated for roles in that profession. Accordingly, we begin with a sketchy description of the profession of arms and the roles and skills essential to its practitioners.

#### THE MILITARY PROFESSION

The military has many of the same characteristics as the other professions; namely, a specialized body of knowledge acquired through advanced training and experience, a mutually defined and sustained set of standards, and a sense of group identity and corporateness.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the military profession has several characteristics not shared by such other professions as law, education, or medicine; it is, for example, bureaucratized, with a hierarchy of offices and a legally defined structure;<sup>2</sup> it is a uniquely public profession marked by its members' commitment to unlimited service, extending to the risk of life itself; it is singular, too, as a profession which trains its members to perform many tasks that one hopes it will never have to perform.<sup>3</sup> These characteristics have important implications for military education.

The particular expertise of the military profession has been defined in various ways. Traditional definitions such as Harold Lasswell's familiar formulation of it as the "management of violence" will no longer suffice. In the context of the likely national security

environment of the 1970s and beyond, a better definition of the expertise which the military education system should develop is "the management and application of military resources in deterrent, peacekeeping, and combat roles in the context of rapid technological, social, and political change."<sup>4</sup>

Military expertise, so defined, necessarily implies a broader set of roles for the military officer than has traditionally been expected of him. Included are (a) helping to define the nature of the nation's security tasks, especially their politico-military dimension; (b) applying scientific and technological knowledge to military matters; (c) advising foreign military establishments as required; and (d) training, supplying, deploying, and—if necessary—employing the fighting capability of military units in complex changing environments. The model of a modern major general—or major, for that matter—must not only master the broader dimensions of this fourth, traditional role, but also develop a competence in one or more of the other roles as well. He must do so, that is, if he expects to rise in his profession, for the politico-military and scientific-technological dimensions of security problems interact with the narrowly tactical-technical ones in a complex and continuing way. Mastery of the traditional role alone is not adequate for the increasingly broad range of tasks required of the military professional since World War II. This multiple role requirement has, of course, been based upon the assumption that the traditional military system of pro-

1. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 5-7.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 16.

3. Morris Janowitz, "The Emergent Military," in Charles C. Moskos, ed., *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 258.

4. Amos A. Jordan, "Officer Education," in Roger W. Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 212. One should add the advisory role, the objectives of which may be other than deterrence, peacekeeping, or combat, for example, "civic action" and "pacification support."



fessional development which produced the Marshalls, Eisenhowers, and Taylors—generalists par excellence—was adequate for the nation's security requirements for the future. Fundamental changes in recent years have called that assumption increasingly into question for the future.

#### DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

First, the traditional linkages between military force and political objectives were cast into doubt by the implications of the nuclear balance of terror and the painful lessons of revolutionary warfare. Growing awareness of the practical limitations of American power and a shift in emphasis to domestic priorities—the dimensions of which are yet to be clearly defined—have, for example, deemphasized the military's role in intervention and focused instead upon its security assistance task.<sup>5</sup> Second, the continuing sociological revolution in the United States, one manifestation of which has been a reappearance of virulent anti-militarism, has expanded significantly the number and difficulty of the problems with which the professional military officer is confronted. Drugs, racism, and dissent have impacted upon the military, raising challenges on moral, philosophical, and ideological grounds to established traditions, policies, and practices.<sup>6</sup> Third, the continued technological advance that has been reshaping American society has had its impact upon the military services. The highly technical economy of the United States and its shift from production of goods to production of

services has had important implications for the skill composition and educational requirements of the society from which the military services draw their manpower. The computer and information processing revolutions have multiplied the potential for weapons and communications systems, logistics systems, and organization and management techniques. And as nature would have it, the new potentials have led to an almost inexorable drive in defense research and development to realize those potentials.<sup>7</sup> Technological advance has inevitably increased the number of professional specialties and subspecialties required to handle new bodies of knowledge. This, in turn, means that the military services must turn toward greater specialization to develop and maintain essential officer expertise.<sup>8</sup> Increasingly, these considerations have derogated the traditional concept that every officer must be a generalist and, to the extent that this is true, necessitate fundamental changes in officer education, career patterns, and management.

#### MILITARY RESPONSE TO CHANGE

The facts of technological and societal change have indeed been perceived within the military services, the former more clearly and more rapidly than the latter. Given the inherent tendencies of large bureaucratic organizations to respond slowly to fundamental change, the services have been surprisingly

5. President Richard M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 5, 14, 16, 183–85.

6. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Political Soldiers: Perspectives on Professionalism in the U.S. Military," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 2 (May 1972), pp. 241–42.

7. See Bernard Udis, "The End of Overrun: Prospects for the High Technology Defense Industry and Related Issues," *THE ANNALS* 406 (March 1973), pp. 59–72; Davis B. Bobrow, "Military Research and Development: Implications for the Civil Sector," *ibid.*, pp. 117–28.

8. For an opposite view related primarily to the enlisted ranks, see Charles C. Moskos, "Armed Forces and American Society: Convergence or Divergence," in Moskos, *Public Opinion*, pp. 283–84.

quick to recognize the potentials of technology. Qualitative "improvements" abound in the hardware associated with weapons systems, logistical support systems, and communications and management techniques. The services' educational programs required to provide the skills needed to keep pace with technological innovation are broad indeed.

The assumption of an increased requirement for officer involvement in the politico-military dimension of the nation's security tasks and the trauma of the nation's social revolution, as it has manifested itself both within the military and in civil-military relations, have led to an increasing emphasis upon officer education in liberal arts fields.<sup>9</sup> In the 1960s, for example, the number of positions in the services defined as requiring civilian graduate school preparation in the social sciences nearly quadrupled.

Projecting officer educational requirements for the various services years into the future has always been difficult; it is particularly so now. What will be the tasks the nation will call upon the military services to perform in the late 1970s and 1980s? What will be the geographical and substantive parameters of U.S. interests which will require military resources in deterrent, peace-keeping, advisory, or combat roles? What will be the nature and scope of the threat to the security of the United States? How can answers to these questions be applied in military budget and force level figures in five-year defense programs? What will be the education level, education potential, and retention rate of the officers attracted to serve in an all-volunteer force?

9. See Morris Janowitz, "The Emergent Military," in Moskos, *Public Opinion*, p. 265. President Kennedy was explicit about the growth of politico-military tasks for military officers in his June 1962 speech to the class being graduated at West Point.

Difficult for all the services, these questions are particularly onerous for army planners, who are confronted by a continued draw-down in force levels, basic organizational changes, and institution of a new Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). At approximately 810 thousand in the fall of 1972, army troop strength is likely to be reduced further. Reduced force levels in army divisions obviously will decrease the number of officer positions and inevitably will lead to demands for a much smaller army staff. What will be the criteria for consequent officer elimination? What will be the consequences for morale and retention of quality personnel? These questions have become critical for many young officers at mid-career who seek some degree of certainty from their profession in an increasingly uncertain world.

The new Army OPMS represents the army's reaction to changing attitudes and goals among the younger career officers. The basic concept seeks to increase professional competence, improve productive competition, and provide greater career satisfaction by encouraging officers to focus their careers according to individual talents and interests along command lines, functional lines (for example, personnel, operations, plans, recruiting, and project management), or specialist lines (for example, automatic data processing, research and development, logistics, and information).

It is clear that OPMS will have a significant impact upon officer education requirements for the army. How many officers with what academic backgrounds will be attracted into the functional or specialist fields will be a critical variable in the operation of OPMS.<sup>10</sup>

10. Some observers conclude that young men in the service already see themselves increasingly as specialists first and military pro-

The institutional value orientation of army officers has always placed a premium on "command."<sup>11</sup> The command ethic will likely remain strong for the foreseeable future under the concept of "one army" which fulfills both the combat function and the support function. To the extent that "selection" for command smacks of elitism, those not selected and whose skills are transferable may well be attracted to the civilian job market. Since selection for command, that is, "command designation" under OPMS will not normally occur for most officers until the fifteenth or sixteenth year of service, one might expect that those not selected would not "resign," but more might "retire" at twenty years of service. However, given the probability of further reductions in force levels and consequent reductions in the number of "line command slots" available, young officers who perceive that their records do not place them at the top among their contemporaries may see themselves as second-class citizens who will be forced into an area of specialization. Such perceptions might lead to more early resignations at the end of obligated tours.

With this necessarily unclear picture of where they are heading, the services are attempting to adapt their officer education systems to perceived technological and societal changes.

#### OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN THE 1970s

The armed forces have become the world's largest educators. By 1968 the

professionals second. See Richard F. Rosser, "American Civil Military Relations in the 1980's," in *Naval War College Review* 24, no. 10 (June 1972), p. 19.

11. Janowitz, "Emergent Military," pp. 264-65.

army alone was operating thirty-seven schools with five hundred separate curricula.<sup>12</sup> Another gauge of the scope of the services' educational efforts is the Department of Defense estimate that about 40 thousand resident officer students were enrolled in service and joint school educational courses in fiscal year 1967. By fiscal year 1972 there were about 12 thousand cadets in the three service academies and over 7 thousand military officers enrolled full time in postgraduate programs, either fully funded in civilian institutions or in the navy's and air force's own equivalent, postgraduate schools.<sup>13</sup> Tens of thousands of other officers were enrolled in off-duty programs and nonresident courses at the various military schools and colleges or through correspondence school centers throughout the world which offer hundreds of college and postgraduate courses.

As they have evolved, the services' educational systems can be described structurally as a combination of generalist and specialist subsystems, the former category comprising three types: preprofessional, entry, and professional levels; and the latter category consisting of courses offered in both military and civilian educational institutions in managerial, politico-military, scientific, and technological fields, as well as in more narrowly military subjects, such as procurement and intelligence.

#### PRECOMMISSIONING EDUCATION

The first precommissioning rung of the military education ladder is occupied primarily in two educational programs: the service academies and Re-

12. Amos A. Jordan, "Army Service Schools," *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1971, pp. 362-63.

13. Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

serve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). Each service also draws on various officer candidate school or officer training program sources for commissioned recruits. Although these other sources tend to be more significant and expand when wartime needs necessitate a large-scale, rapid force buildup, they decline in significance and contract during post-war force reductions. They focus essentially on short-term training and indoctrination and are not basically educational in character. Although officers from these latter sources tend to be highly committed to the services, they generally have considerably lower educational qualifications.<sup>14</sup>

#### *The service academies*

Although numerically far from the dominant source of newly commissioned officers, the service academies are generally viewed as a key source of career officers because of the relatively high degree of career commitment by their graduates and the distinctive ethos inculcated by them. In 1970 the three academies furnished only about 5 percent of all new officers entering the services—2,300 out of 58,000.<sup>15</sup> When both the Military (army) and Air Force Academies complete the expansion of their student bodies in the early 1970s to the 4,417 strength figure long authorized for the Naval Academy, the annual output of all three will still be only about 3,000.

The academies have been criticized occasionally for too much of a "lockstep" approach to education, with too little attention to individual cadet's in-

terests and abilities and too great an emphasis on conformity and uniformity.<sup>16</sup> Certainly, it is true that by retaining the view that they are responsible for character development as well as for intellectual growth, the academies maintain a controlled environment more akin to the nineteenth-century college than the modern university. It is also true that this climate has extended to the curriculum. Perhaps it is natural that institutions that prepare men explicitly for a profession charged with defending society should not leave the form of preparation purely or even mainly to chance or individual choice.

In recent years all three academies have increased the proportions of electives in their curricula, the Air Force Academy having gone somewhat further than its sister academies in this respect, so that the lockstep charges of the past are less true now.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the rapid evolution of the profession, stemming from scientific advances and the deepening complexity of the politico-military environment, assures that the curricular trend toward diversity and adaptation to student abilities and interests will continue.<sup>18</sup> The trend, too, in major academic extracurricular activities at the academies clearly is toward recognition of diverse interests and views

16. David Boroff, "West Point: Ancient Incubator for a New Breed," *Harper's Magazine* (December 1962), p. 56; "Air Force Academy: A Slight Gain in Altitude," *Harper's Magazine* (February 1963), p. 92; and "Annapolis: Teaching Young Sea Dogs Old Tricks," *Harper's Magazine* (January 1963), p. 49.

17. Laurence I. Radway, "Recent Trends at American Service Academies," in Moskos, *Public Opinion*, pp. 14–18.

18. W. E. Simons, *Liberal Education in the Service Academies* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965), p. 148. The degree to which cadets and midshipmen perceive this trend could impact significantly on retention rates at the service academies.

14. Mayer N. Zald and William Simon, "Career Opportunities and Commitments among Officers," in Morris Janowitz, ed., *The New Military* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 264.

15. Rosser, "American Civil Military Relations," p. 17.

on contemporary public policy issues.<sup>19</sup> Even so, the academies will not become typical liberal arts or engineering colleges—nor is it clear that, in view of their mission, they should so become. Their educational climate will undoubtedly remain too “directed” for the tastes of many, though their products measure up well when compared with other college graduates—not only in performance in the profession, but by such educational yardsticks as graduate record examination scores, scholarship and fellowship competition, and achievement in postgraduate studies.<sup>20</sup>

### *Reserve Officers Training Corps*

Recently, the services have experienced difficulty in attracting through ROTC a fair share of the nation's talent into a military career, particularly in a climate of economic boom and social and political disaffection. The ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 has helped, for it enabled the army and air force to match the navy's already attractive program with 5,500 competitive full-tuition, fees, books, and allowance scholarships. Partly as a consequence of the Vitalization Act's stimulus, and even more because they furnished college students an alternative to the Vietnam draft, the service ROTC programs were apparently flourishing as recently as the late 1960s. In 1971, the statistics were still impressive; in that year the navy commissioned 1,330 officers from NROTC units at 57 colleges; the air force figures were 4,411 from more than 170 institutions; and the army 13,970 from over 280 cam-

puses.<sup>21</sup> Two new measures approved by Congress in 1972 to induce larger ROTC student enrollments increased the amount of subsistence from fifty to one hundred dollars per month and increased the number of scholarships that each service can offer—6,500 each for the army and air force and 6,000 for the navy.

Despite these evidences of apparent health, the ROTC programs have been the subject of increasingly sharp questioning as to their necessity, curricula, faculty, and relationship to the college and university community. From 1966 to 1972, enrollment in Army ROTC programs dropped from 177,422 to 50,234, and several of the Ivy League colleges dropped ROTC altogether.<sup>22</sup> To some degree the problem stems from the critics' failure to realize how important the programs are to national defense. Yet the facts are clear: since the academies provide but a minor part of the new officers needed each year, and since only about 60 percent of the short-term officer candidate school graduates are college-educated officers, even in “normal times” the bulk of second lieutenants—including half or more of the regulars—must come from the ROTC or something like it.

Although the services have sought to make ROTC curricula challenging, they have had great difficulty in bringing many of the subjects to an intellectual level comparable with many other college courses. Since the military background and skills needed by a *new* officer do not have a high intellectual content, the services have developed courses with less immediate applicability to

19. Radway, “Recent Trends,” pp. 26–27 and Note 54.

20. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Service Academies, Report and Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1967, pp. 10261, 10297.

21. U.S., Department of Defense, “The Status of the Reserve Officers Training Corps,” *Commanders Digest*, December 23, 1971, pp. 6–7.

22. See “Army Seeks Halt in ROTC Decline,” *New York Times*, September 14, 1972, p. 21.

post-commissioning service, but with more mental challenge, such as the army's "American Military History" or the air force's "World Military Systems," or have permitted substitution of related normal college courses for part of the ROTC program. Both these broad approaches call into question the viability of the ROTC goal of preparing a new officer for active duty; the former also raises the subject of the competence of the military faculty to handle such courses.

In the more narrowly military courses the uniformed instructors typically assigned to ROTCs by the services are undoubtedly competent. But broader courses, such as military history or the "Role of the United States in World Affairs," require a background and sophistication often lacking in the military instructor. The army, for instance, while increasingly appointing only highly rated and experienced officers to the most senior ROTC posts, has found that it can supply men with advanced degrees for only about 60 percent of these positions. The army's problem is common to all the services; by the time higher priority needs have been met, there are not enough officers with the proper credentials for ROTC faculties.<sup>23</sup> It is likely that the customary priority given the ROTCs in a quieter era when their mission was to prepare reserve officers will have to be upgraded in light of

their new situation and responsibilities. Recruiting for the ROTC in the absence of a draft will be a formidable challenge.<sup>24</sup> Educating sufficient numbers of good officers who accept extended ROTC instructor assignments and ensuring that these officers as a group are competitive for promotion will constitute in the 1970s and '80s one of the foremost challenges to be faced by the services' personnel managers.<sup>25</sup>

#### ENTRY LEVEL

Virtually all new air force, army, and marine corps officers, and, in a few cases, navy officers attend basic or technical schools immediately after commissioning. The emphasis in the relatively brief—generally two- to four-month—courses taught at the basic schools is on training, but they also contribute importantly to the indoctrination and socialization functions of military education. Apart from the significant but too-brief association with his ROTC instructors and the glimpse of military life afforded by summer camp, the typical new officer, other than the academy graduate, gets his first sustained exposure to the profession and fellow officers at basic schools which vary in length from nine weeks (army) to twenty-six weeks (marine corps).<sup>26</sup> The air force relies primarily on technical schools; the navy relies on on-the-job training and does not generally use basic schools. At these entry-level schools, instruction is chopped into small blocks and given at

23. The Army Education Requirements Board (AERB) for 1972 concluded that not all ROTC instructor positions require advanced degrees fully funded by the army; that the army's Advanced Degree Program for ROTC Instructor Duty—under which an officer programmed for ROTC duty obtains a graduate degree by full-time study at the institution to which he is to be assigned—is providing a significant number of ROTC instructors with advanced degrees and that the number will increase to approximately five hundred by 1976. *Army Educational Requirements Board Proceedings*, 1972, pp. 5-6.

24. See Morris Janowitz, "The Social Demography of the All-Volunteer Armed Force," *THE ANNALS* 406 (March 1973), pp. 86-93.

25. One wonders, for example, how an ROTC tour of duty involving two years of graduate school preparation and three years on the job will impact upon an officer's chances for "command designation" under OPMS.

26. Some of the army basic schools are to be extended to twelve weeks in 1973.

rapid-fire tempo in lectures and demonstrations; there is little time or inclination for students to philosophize about "why," for attention is centered on their engaging in practical exercises devoted to "what" and "how."

To the degree that "military training" in ROTC is reduced in the search for a *modus vivendi* on campus between the services and university administrations, the tasks of the basic schools will become more difficult and even more important.

#### PROFESSIONAL LEVEL

The next step in officer education brings us to a multi-tiered system of "general military professional" education. At all levels, professional courses are a mixture of training and education, with the former tending to predominate at the lower levels. Even the higher professional schools devote some attention to developing skills and techniques and to imparting doctrine, but the higher up the ladder, the more dominant the educational content of the courses.

##### *First professional level*

After three to eight years of line and staff duties, career officers in three of the four services (the navy generally excepted) return to school for "advanced" or "career" courses. These courses are designed to prepare their relatively junior students for duties at the intermediate level in the military hierarchy, for example, command of a battalion or squadron, and for staff work at the next two or three higher headquarters. They seek to deepen the officer's competence in his career field, to bring him up-to-date, to widen his understanding of his own service's roles, missions, and doctrines, and to introduce him to subjects that transcend his own service. Although instruction of this last type is limited, explicit attention is often paid, generally for the first

time in a typical officer's schooling, to the other services and the armed forces as a whole.

While the contribution of these first professional level courses to developing military expertise is important, their focus tends to be more on training than on education. Instruction tends, as in the basic courses, to be rapid-fire and the subjects numerous and compressed. The emphasis at this level is again clearly on imparting techniques and military doctrine rather than on generating independent thinking and analysis. The army is a partial exception; for, in the wake of the Haines Board criticism that students were not being sufficiently challenged at this level,<sup>27</sup> increasing numbers of elective courses have been introduced into the curricula in such fields as systems analysis, logistics management, military history, and international relations.

##### *Second professional level: command and staff colleges*

Sometime between their ninth and fifteenth year of service, about one-half of all eligible army and marine officers, one-quarter of eligible air force officers, and one-sixth of eligible navy officers are selected for the command and staff college of their service, for the Armed Forces Staff College, or for one of the other services' schools at the same level. The colleges are about ten months in length except for the Armed Forces Staff College (Norfolk, Va.) which is half that. Since this will be the highest general military educational experience for most of these officers, the colleges have traditionally focused attention on bringing all of them to a uniform level of staff competence and to a common understanding of the principles of military leadership and com-

<sup>27</sup> *Report of the Department of the Army to Review Officer Schools*, February 1966 (hereafter noted as Haines Board Report).

mand of forces in the field. Inevitably, this "leveling" objective has resulted in instruction below the potential of the abler students; it has also necessitated stultifying attention to drill in doctrine and techniques, and stress on the "approved solution." Many students are "turned off" by this approach after the first few weeks and learn to coast through the remainder of the course.

The army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, the oldest and best known of these second professional level colleges, has moved to meet these problems,<sup>28</sup> most of which were identified in two recent major studies of the army officer educational system.<sup>29</sup> For the 1,102 students in the Class of 1973, the common professional curriculum and one "associate" elective course have been compressed into the first of two semesters. The student is then given a choice of four (of twenty-three) professional electives and at least one (of thirty-one) other associate elective offerings in the second semester. Some of the associate electives are taught at Fort Leavenworth by CGSC military faculty and some by contract civilian professors; others may be taken on civilian campuses through cooperative programs with three local universities. The number of classroom hours has been reduced to meet justified complaints of "overstuffing." Clearly, the army is attempting to make the CGSC a challenging, intellectually stimulating, and exciting experience for its officers at mid-career and, simultaneously, to adapt its curriculum through elective offerings to the army's career areas of specialization. Whether or not these objectives are

achieved will depend largely on the quality of the teaching faculty. (But as of August 1972, only 30 percent of the CGSC faculty had graduate degrees, although many others were at various stages of progress toward such degrees.)

### *Third professional level: war colleges*

At the peak of the military education system stand five coequal institutions: two joint colleges—the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces—and the Army, Navy, and Air War Colleges. Their goals are roughly the same: to prepare carefully selected officers for the highest level command and staff positions within their own services and with national and international forces and headquarters. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) has a somewhat different mission and curricular emphasis; it focuses on the economic and industrial aspects of national security and resource management in the context of both national and world affairs.

All the colleges have students from each service; additionally, civilian agencies with defense-related responsibilities, such as the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), send students to them. All have traditionally examined the military and international environment, the strategic threats to the nation, allied and U.S. capabilities to meet those threats, and optimal strategies and programs to use those capabilities. Too, all have shared a number of problems. The typical war college faculty member has been a highly qualified military professional, but he was not tenured, he often lacked any formal academic preparation or sometimes even wide experience in the politico-military or resource management fields on which the college curricula center, and he was frequently serving a terminal tour of duty.

28. Ivan J. Birrer, "The New CGSC Curriculum," *Military Review* 52, no. 6 (June 1972), pp. 20–26.

29. Haines Board Report; and *Review of the Army Officer Educational System* (Norris Study), December 1, 1971.



A related problem has been over-reliance on guest lectures, which forces the student into a largely passive role. Only limited use was made of the few highly qualified civilian professors on the faculty who could provide continuity to lecture programs. Also, the "self-teaching" student committee (seminar) approach of all the colleges, which seeks to capitalize on the diversity of backgrounds among senior professional officer-students, frequently resulted in superficial treatment of complex issues. Perhaps the range of problems was best summarized by Admiral Stansfield Turner, new president of the Naval War College at the college's first academic convocation on August 24, 1972: "... there has been a creeping intellectual devitalization in all of our War Colleges since World War II. Rarely does one meet a graduate of any War College who said that he had been intellectually taxed by a War College course of instruction."<sup>30</sup>

The basis for these familiar criticisms of the past may soon disappear, for the senior colleges have moved into a period of rapid transition. Based upon a series of in-depth studies and a college commandant determined to place the institution at the center of politico-military doctrinal development, the Army War College envisions a number of important changes.<sup>31</sup> The college will adopt a tri-semester curriculum involving a greatly expanded electives program. Students with doctorates and teaching experience will take only part of the common curriculum and will be asked to design and teach electives for their fellow-students. Guest lectures will be kept to a minimum; the most

qualified of the senior faculty will move from a coordinating-monitoring role to a teaching role; and, to the extent that military expertise is not available, civilian professors under contract will teach the expanded electives program.

The National War College (NWC) in Washington, D.C., long the most prestigious of all the war colleges, has launched into a three-year program to adapt its curriculum to the changing times. The essential ingredient of the program is the faculty; the NWC intends to enter in earnest the competition for the services' most scarce resources—relatively young, highly competitive for promotion, lieutenant colonels or colonels with sound academic credentials and expertise in certain subjects who will share the teaching task with the faculty. Although electives will remain within the realm of U.S. national security policy studies, they will be increased, while guest lectures will be decreased. The more technically oriented electives, such as operations research/systems analysis or economics of national security, are left to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. There is an aura of excitement and momentum at the National War College.

In the summer of 1972 the new President of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, abruptly scrapped the planned curriculum for academic year 1972-73 and turned to reform, somewhat along the lines of the Army and National War Colleges—except that he was determined to accomplish the task *now* rather than over a three-year period. He largely abandoned the contemporary issues approach for one which focuses largely on recurrent, historical politico-military lessons. There is no longer the leisurely course, where the student saunters through concept-oriented collections of articles; instead, he reads—and is tested on—complete

30. "Convocation Address," *Naval War College Review* 25, no. 2 (November-December 1972), pp. 2-3.

31. Haines Board Report, 1966; *Mission Curriculum Study*, 1970; and *Long Range Development Concept Study*, 1972.

volumes—Thucydides, Napoleon, Bismarck. Guest lectures—over two hundred in academic year 1971–72—are drastically reduced to four to five per month. All three major portions of the course, Strategy, Management, and Tactics, share a common thread—resource allocation with emphasis on marginal analysis.

Though in some ways different, all three approaches are designed to provide a greater intellectual challenge for the student, to broaden his perspectives, and to stretch his imagination in politico-military affairs. One must conclude that the winds of change at the senior colleges are blowing very strong—and, perhaps prematurely, that they are favorable winds. However, quality faculty is a major short-term limiting factor at all the war colleges, as well as the command and staff colleges. One obvious solution for removing this constraint is to expand the services' graduate-level civil schooling programs; another may be found in implementing new educational technology. Expanded use of television, computer-based programmed instruction, and other multi-media methods are possible alternatives.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps these methods could be linked to a variation of the "university without walls," geared to guided, officer "self-study" programs with "comprehensive" examinations at various stages of officers' careers to measure achievement. (The British Army ties such examinations closely to qualifications for promotions.)

#### SPECIALIST MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

When confronted with a major development for the profession, such as a

32. See, for example, Edward B. Roberts and Henry B. Weil, "Implementing New Educational Methodology for the Military," *Naval War College Review* 23, no. 8 (April 1971), pp. 12–28.

scientific breakthrough or a significant shift in strategy, the services have tended both to orient *all* professionals about the new development through the general military education schooling system and to prepare a small number of officers to focus directly upon the development through more intensive and specialized schooling arrangements. Thus, the development of battlefield nuclear weapons necessitated the introduction of material on nuclear warfare throughout the basic, advanced, and professional schools of the army in the late 1940s and, in addition, resulted in intensive courses on nuclear weapons and their application at certain of the specialist schools—these latter courses leading to military occupational specialty designations such as "nuclear weapons officer" for any one completing them.

Similarly, by the late 1960s, the army had concluded, largely from its experience in Vietnam, that it needed to improve its ability to deal with insurgency and "stability operations" in less-developed areas. Consequently, it not only increased the amount of attention to such subjects throughout its general military education courses, but also instituted in 1969 a new career field, the "Military Assistance Officer Program" (MAOP), to develop officers in civil affairs, psychological operations, and related politico-military affairs. As it became apparent that some of the education requirements and many of the functions of MAOP officers were related to those of officers in another program, the Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP), the army decided in the spring of 1972 to merge the two. Selected officers will prepare for this specialty field by receiving graduate schooling in one of the social science disciplines at a civilian university and by attending specialized military courses yet to be spelled out in an army regulation.

In addition to service-conducted specialist courses, there are also a number of joint or defense schools for specialist training and education, for example, the Defense Language Institute, the Defense Information School, the Defense Computer Institute, Defense Intelligence School, Defense Race Relations Institute, and so forth. Both the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have responsibilities for joint training and education in areas of specialization that affect more than one service. But despite the expanding reach of OSD and the statutory responsibility of the JCS to "formulate policies for the joint training of the armed forces and . . . for coordinating the military education of members of the armed forces," the services retain the bulk of the responsibility for specialist as well as generalist education. In fact, the individual services usually operate the joint or defense specialist schools with only broad guidance from OSD or the JCS. Given the different personnel management systems of the services, this appears to be a necessity.

#### *Civilian higher education*

Impelled by the deepening complexity of the tasks facing the profession, the services have steadily enlarged their programs for sending military officers to civilian institutions for postgraduate courses, ranging in length from a few months to three or four years. Prior to the 1960s, service interest in civilian schooling focused on scientific and engineering studies. However, the services now prepare their officers in political science, economics, international relations, psychology, sociology, business administration, and so forth. By 1971, the number of validated (approved) positions requiring graduate or professional degrees had grown to over

27,000—12,472 for the air force; 9,421 for the army; 4,844 for the navy; and 471 for the marine corps.<sup>33</sup>

The army, in particular, turned increasingly to social science-type graduate specialization, as it became interested in stability operations in less-developed countries and as its resource management tasks grew more complex.

The number of positions throughout the army structure designated as requiring graduate preparation grew from 4,461 in 1964 to 8,628 in 1967; the physical and biological sciences and engineering positions grew by roughly 70 percent in the period, while the business figures more than tripled, and the social sciences positions nearly quadrupled. Assignment to graduate school—probably sometime in the first decade of service—is becoming part of the expectations of large numbers of career officers. Projections are not available across the services, but the fact that about two-thirds of the Military Academy's graduates of the past two decades have gone to graduate school is one indication of the pattern. If the trend continues, the West Point figure will probably grow to three-fourths or five-sixths in the next few years.

The navy and air force offer graduate-level academic programs in their own fully accredited institutions as well as in civilian universities. The Naval Postgraduate School focuses primarily on scientific, engineering, and management fields, but also offers limited work in such social science subjects as economics and political science. In contrast to the navy, which leans heavily on its own postgraduate training facilities, the air force depends essentially on civilian institutions for the postgraduate education of its officers. But the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)

33. Norris Study, p. I-4; figures include positions for medical schooling.

does conduct a limited postgraduate program—in addition to undergraduate and non-degree programs—in such subjects as engineering, systems management, and business administration.<sup>34</sup> The army does not have a postgraduate institution authorized to grant advanced degrees.<sup>35</sup>

Each service also provides tuition assistance for personnel pursuing higher education on an off-duty basis. Any university near a military post will have dozens, perhaps hundreds, of officers so enrolled on a part-time basis. Another form of off-duty study, namely correspondence courses, should be noted. Whether out of a desire for self-improvement, hopes for quicker promotion, preparation for a second career, or sheer boredom, thousands of officers are among the hundreds of thousands of servicemen enrolled at any one time in correspondence courses. The services have their own voluntary programs in addition to the correspondence and group study programs of the U.S. Armed Forces Institute, an enterprise under the direction of the assistant secretary of defense for manpower and reserve affairs.

The army's Degree Completion Program—Bootstrap—provides an 18-

34. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Manpower), *Officer Education Study*, July 1966, vol. 3, chap. 6.

35. In 1963 the army instituted a master's degree program at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. The program was duly endorsed by the necessary accrediting organizations, but failed to secure from Congress the authorizing legislation needed by federal institutions before they can grant degrees. Accreditation was withdrawn temporarily in 1966. By 1972 over 150 officers had completed the College's stringent requirements, but the institution was still awaiting authority to grant its first "Master of Military Arts and Sciences." The consequent, and understandable, image of the program held by many young officers deters their enrollment.

month leave of absence with pay and varying degrees of financial assistance to officers and enlisted men who can complete the requirements for a bachelor's degree. In 1971, 325 officers received baccalaureates under the program. Although statistics are not available across the services, it is well known that officers perform well in civilian higher education. As mature professionals, they look upon civilian education as an important aspect of their duty commitment and treat their courses accordingly. The academic failure rate in civilian education is extremely low.

Judgments differ as to whether so much civilian higher education is necessary or desirable. In addition to anti-military critics who would prefer to see professional military men fenced off from all civilian contact in their own enclaves, there are military traditionalists who fear the contaminating effect of too much graduate education and who are concerned lest soldiers be seduced into straying from the paths of duty. The latter view implies a lack of confidence in the validity and viability of the military institution per se. If the institution is incapable of retaining the allegiance of its young officers in a clash of values, it is indeed in trouble. But it is hard to take this view seriously. For one thing, military men are universally skeptical of the intellectual community with its characteristic anti-military values. For another, military officers are fully aware of the perpetual tension between "thinkers" and "doers," between the academician's "why?" and the military man's need to make and act on decisions, even when judgments differ and all the facts are not available.

Although widespread graduate schooling is only about two decades old, there is already substantial evidence that traditionalist fears are simply unwar-

ranted. Apparently the role of the "military executive," with attendant civilian graduate school preparation, and the role of the "combat leader," with the usual generalist and specialist military schooling, are not generally antithetical; for, in terms of combat record, retention in the service, promotion to high rank, and selection for senior service schools, officers with higher education backgrounds are proving to be outstanding professionals. Thus, the navy has discovered that an astonishingly small fraction of the eight thousand naval officers who have completed postgraduate training since 1948 have resigned before completing twenty years of service;<sup>36</sup> the army has noted that the resignation rate among its regular army officers with advanced degrees is low and that a large share of its officers currently being selected for colonel's and general's ranks and roughly half of those being chosen to attend the Army War College have graduate degrees.<sup>37</sup> Almost half the officers selected for the National War College also have graduate degrees.

Yet, the services' civil schooling programs have been subject to recurrent challenge by members of Congress and the General Accounting Office over the years.<sup>38</sup> The Department of Defense is eventually going to have to prove the case for higher civilian education for its officers through a comprehensive assessment. The case for higher education will have to rest on three pillars.

The first of these is the technical component of officer education, which

develops scientific and management skills to keep pace with technological advance. The second pillar is the critical component of officer education, which develops the capability for human judgment on difficult questions of priorities and trade-offs among resources and values. There is not only a need to develop this capability in officers; there also is a crying need for personnel management systems which both identify those officers who are best at making such judgments and which promote them rapidly to the higher positions of military responsibility and authority. In some cases this may mean bypassing one or more assignments considered integral to "normal career progression." The third pillar must be an assessment of the values and attitudes which the nation wants its officers to hold. The values held by officers have recently been called into question.<sup>39</sup> This is an important issue which needs broader airing in American society.

Quantitatively, officer education has improved significantly. Department of Defense estimates show that in 1956 only 56 percent of all commissioned officers on active duty had baccalaureate degrees; by the end of 1971, the figure was over 76 percent. Similarly, the percentages of commissioned officers with graduate degrees had grown high by 1970—see Table 1.<sup>40</sup>

What the increased exposure to higher civilian education means qualitatively in terms of officer values is another matter—one that has for some time deserved serious study.<sup>41</sup>

36. Haines Board Report, p. 342.

37. Sixty-two out of eighty, or 75 percent, selected on the army's 1971 promotion list to general had a graduate degree. Norris Study, p. I-10.

38. U.S. Comptroller General Report to Congress, *Improvement Needed in Determining Graduate Education Requirements for Military Career Positions*, August 28, 1970, passim.

39. See, for example, Peter Karsten et al., "ROTC, Mylai and the Volunteer Army," *Foreign Policy*, no. 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 135-60.

40. Department of Defense, *Selected Manpower Statistics*, April 15, 1972, p. 41.

41. See John W. Masland and Laurence L. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 508-10.

TABLE 1—COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY WITH GRADUATE—  
OR PROFESSIONAL—DEGREES (END-1970 DATA IN PERCENTAGES)

| RANK                           | ARMY | NAVY | AIR<br>FORCE | MARINES | ALL<br>SERVICES |
|--------------------------------|------|------|--------------|---------|-----------------|
| 2nd Lieutenant/Ensign          | 3    | 3    | 6            | 1       | 4               |
| 1st Lieutenant/Lieutenant J.G. | 6    | 6    | 10           | 1       | 6               |
| Captain/Lieutenant             | 14   | 21   | 20           | 2       | 17              |
| Major/Lieutenant Commander     | 24   | 27   | 26           | 9       | 25              |
| Lieutenant Colonel/Commander   | 33   | 37   | 31           | 16      | 32              |
| Colonel/Captain                | 47   | 52   | 36           | 23      | 43              |
| General/Admiral                | 59   | 47   | 39           | 37      | 48              |
| <i>Total</i>                   | 16   | 21   | 21           | 4       | 18              |

SOURCE: Percentages aggregated from separate service data for end-1970 provided by Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations.

#### A PERSPECTIVE ON OFFICER EDUCATION

Judged by overall results, the military's educational and training system has, by and large, continued since World War II to serve the profession well. The leaders, managers, and specialists flowing from it have played a major role in deterring nuclear war and in safeguarding other national interests through the training, equipping, deploying, and—as needed—the fighting of military units of unprecedented complexity and power. As required, they have also served other national goals, been loaned to other government departments, trained foreign forces, administered military aid programs, and so forth. It is not self-evident, of course, that the educational system has always contributed to these accomplishments as effectively and efficiently as it might have; indeed, it would be surprising if schooling patterns which have emerged through evolution and accretion, as well as by overall design, were ideally fitted to the needs of the past, let alone to those of the future.

Aware of concern within the profession on this point, President Johnson, in 1964, announced that he was "directing the Secretary of Defense to review the educational systems and major

schools within the services—and the opportunities now offered for continued civilian education while in service—to broaden and strengthen these programs." That defense-wide analysis, shoved aside by Vietnam's mounting demands on top officials' attention, has yet to be undertaken, although a partial, small-scale review of current programs was made in 1965 as a direct consequence of the President's initiative, and a similar review has recently been undertaken by OSD. The various services and their schools review their own programs periodically, with 1971 being a vintage year in this respect. However, the military profession still awaits its Flexner or Conant.

Any total "systems" study of professional schooling must inevitably ask whether, in the interests of service cooperation and efficiency, there should not be more common, joint, or inter-service education—perhaps starting with the academies and ROTCs. The lack of enthusiasm within the services for this approach—or even for centrally directed studies of the question—is rooted in the virtually unanimous view among professionals that schooling should be keyed directly to service personnel systems, which are themselves based directly upon service tasks. Thus

the question is not merely one of service or joint schools, but of the very existence of the services themselves.

Yet the increasing interdependence of the services, which necessitated the first joint school—the Army-Navy Staff School—in 1943 and which has gained impetus in the quarter-century since, shows no sign of lessening. In fact, the trend has picked up momentum in the last decade, especially in combat support activities as exemplified by the creation of the Defense-wide agencies. In view of this trend, it may well prove impossible in the future, in contrast to the past and present, for an officer to rise to positions of high rank and responsibility without schooling or experience outside his own service.

Achieving the service integration needed in some functional fields may necessitate increasing the number of joint or defense schools. In many cases, however, a better approach may be interservice schools; that is, schools in which one service provides facilities, faculty, and curriculum for students from all the services. The respective roles and responsibilities of the services, the Joint Chiefs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense will undoubtedly need further sorting out and clearer delineation, if any of these approaches to the challenge of interdependence is to proceed further.

In addition to adapting to increasing service interdependence, future military schooling patterns will also have to cope with still more specialization. More schooling for more officers may be part of the answer, but part may also lie in

the army's approach of strengthening the line between specialists and generalists so that the latter need not try to be part-time specialists, and the former need not forego high rank and responsibility unless they also try to be part-time generalists. Whatever the personnel management approach to the specialization dilemma, the question of whether an increasingly complex profession necessitates officers' spending still more time in school must be faced.

Distillation of past experience and/or straight-line projections from military doctrine will continue to form an important part of military schooling in the future, but the military educational system of the future must also take responsibility for creating the kind of environment that will generate innovative and creative thinking among its students. The army's OPMS, cognizant of the important trade-off between service requirements and officer interest, appears headed in the right direction. But it remains to be seen whether the services' personnel management systems will indeed identify and advance to high positions of responsibility and authority significant members of officer specialists and functionalists whose educational experience has conditioned them to the kinds of imaginative and critical thinking increasingly required of the military profession. Indications are that the services have recognized the problem. But, lacking a comprehensive assessment of the purposes and objectives of the entire officer education system, one hopes that there will not be too many missteps in the right direction.

## Where Do They Go from Here?— Retired Military in America

By ALBERT D. BIDERMAN

**ABSTRACT:** As one heritage of an armed era, the United States will have for the foreseeable future a large—currently, almost one million—and growing population of retired military professionals. One resulting problem involves the sheer cost of military retired pay—\$4.8 billion in 1973 and rising rapidly. These costs would be even higher save for the assumption that most retirees can sustain themselves largely by earnings from second-career jobs. In the long run, the cost could be reduced by limiting armed forces size; by having fewer persons serve until retirement; and by having even longer service from the few who do. Any major short-term—within ten to twenty years—cost curtailment requires remunerative second-career employment for those already at or close to retirement eligibility. The nature of such employment also poses problems for public policy: potential conflicts of interests, the infusion of militaristic outlooks into institutions and localities in which retirees concentrate, and some opposition to job-competition from retirees. Although there may be legitimate qualms about jobs taken by ex-military, there are equal if not greater grounds for concern if many of them fail to get jobs. Second-career employment in the past has depended heavily on a thriving economy with substantial defense and aerospace sectors and growing opportunities for public service employment. Whether the military retirement system can remain viable under markedly altered economic conditions remains untested.

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SUPPOSE the Congress next week were to declare perpetual peace and the immediate disbanding of the armed forces. It would still find itself obligated a year hence to appropriate a few billion dollars to meet a military payroll for over a million soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. The obligation would be the contractual one to over a million retired members of the armed forces—a legacy of three decades of mobilization and semi-mobilization. For the remainder of this century and well into the next, there would continue to be a large population of retired professional military men in American society.

### COSTS

Instant disarmament is not the most realistic prognosis. The more likely course, for as far ahead as we can see, is a substantial professional military force generating yearly increments to the military retirement rolls. Without endorsing Defense Department assumptions on how much military manpower the nation will decide that it needs in future years, I will accept in this article, for want of better figures, the official projections of the numbers of retirees through and beyond the year 2000. There are about 900 thousand persons now receiving military retired pay. The Defense Department projects the total will reach 1.2 million persons in 1980.<sup>1</sup> The shift to the all-volunteer concept may give headaches to the Defense actuaries responsible for making such projections, however. Presumably, an important consequence of the new policy will be higher proportions of our uniformed services pursuing careers until retirement eligibility, although

1. Information on the size and cost of the retired military population is based on data provided by Mr. Joseph Glenn, Actuarial Consultant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD), Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA).

TABLE 1—RETIRED MILITARY POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES<sup>a</sup>

| YEAR <sup>b</sup> | RETIRED POPULATION<br>(IN THOUSANDS) |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1950              | 132.8                                |
| 1960              | 253.7                                |
| 1970              | 764.9                                |
| 1972              | 888.6                                |
| 1980              | 1,213.0 <sup>c</sup>                 |
| 1990              | 1,512.0 <sup>c</sup>                 |
| 2000              | 1,607.0 <sup>c</sup>                 |

SOURCE: Unpublished data from J. Glenn, Actuarial Consultant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

<sup>a</sup> Includes all persons receiving military retired or retainer pay with the exception of survivors receiving survivor's benefits.

<sup>b</sup> Actual military retired population for 1950 through 1972, projected military retired population for 1980 through 2000; population figures as of June 30 of indicated years.

<sup>c</sup> Projected.

plans for lump sum separation benefits to encourage intermediate periods of service can control this effect.

We have long been aware that bills for wars must be paid by generations still unborn at the time of the war. There has yet to be such awareness of what the future bills are like for an armed *era*. I am concerned here with that large part of this bill which involves payments to warriors when they are no longer needed or suited for warfare.

To keep the rank-seniority structure of the military in its traditional tidy pyramidal form, to maintain its youthful vigor, and to keep it up-to-date with regard to its continually changing needs for skills, most career personnel must be thrust out of the system at a fairly early age. Our armed forces retire the large majority of their career members at, or shortly after, they have served for twenty years, and practically all members before they have exceeded thirty years of service. A person who

TABLE 2—FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR  
INCOME SECURITY BENEFITS  
MILITARY RETIREMENT

| FISCAL<br>YEAR | OUTLAY<br>(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) |
|----------------|------------------------------------|
| 1960           | 698                                |
| 1967           | 1,824                              |
| 1968           | 2,086                              |
| 1970           | 2,843                              |
| 1972           | 3,928 <sup>a</sup>                 |
| 1973           | 4,796 <sup>a</sup>                 |

SOURCE: Years 1960 through 1970 are actual figures based on unpublished data from J. Glenn, Actuarial Consultant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Years 1972 and 1973 are estimates from *Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 200.

<sup>a</sup> Estimated.

has devoted the major portion of his adulthood to learning the arts of war may be substantially handicapped in assuming other remunerative arts when he leaves the armed forces.

Since the average career man is in his mid-forties upon retirement, with almost half of his working years still before him, the system assumes that he can meet the major part of his money needs by second-career work. Only relatively modest subsidization by retired pay should be needed to remedy the competitive handicap he suffers by virtue of his very late entrance into the civilian job market.

A full pension system would, in any event, be prohibitively costly. As it is, the costs of retired pay have become so staggeringly high that both the Congress and the executive are beginning to feel some urgency about finding some alternative to it. The costs of retired pay crossed the \$2-billion mark in 1968, reached \$3.9 billion in 1971, and were projected to reach \$4.8 billion in 1973<sup>2</sup>—see Table 2.

2. *Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 200.

In terms of a purely political calculus, contrasting the retired-pay appropriation with other items of the federal budget highlights its political unattractiveness. Retired pay in fiscal year 1968 was about one-tenth the amount needed to pay every one in uniform. It would have been even higher, relatively, had not the Vietnam War swelled the active duty ranks. Furthermore, the cost of retired pay is increasing disproportionately, so that by 1980, expenditures for retired pay are expected to be one-fifth the total budget for military personnel, and by the year 2020, almost 30 percent. And this, of course, involves Defense Department projections of active duty manpower needs, not those of arms control advocates.

Counting pay alone and not other benefits, the retired military required greater expenditures for 1973 than the total expenditures of the federal government on community development and housing and twice those for all natural and environmental programs. Looked at with a political eye cast toward constituencies, the retired military are just a handful of men, as compared with the over 25 million veterans in the population. But in 1970, retired pay was an amount equivalent to almost one-third that of the entire expenditure of the Veterans' Administration.<sup>3</sup>

The costs of retired pay constitute a special thorn in the side of those who worry about the federal budget because the amount needed for retired pay must be appropriated anew each year. Unlike most other modern pension plans, the uniformed services system is non-contributory, nonfunded, nonvested, and uninvested. Unlike funded plans, the annual appropriation character of re-

3. Military retired data from J. Glenn, OASD, M&RA. Data on expenditures for veteran's benefits from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971*, pp. 261-62.

tired pay gives it special and painful visibility. Had a fund continually been put aside which, actually or theoretically, accrued interest during the entire period of the active duty of these men from which payments could be made upon their retirement, the bite on the public purse would not appear as severe as it does at present. Most likely, provision will be made in the future for a funded, contributory system. Such a system would provide bookkeeping memoranda that would make clear to military retirees the current income they forgo in the interests of future financial security and would remind the country of the future money obligations it was accruing by keeping men in uniform now. Current official proposals would also bring financial provisions for former military personnel into more realistic alignment with the facts of second-career patterns.<sup>4</sup>

These proposals look to sharply reducing the proportion of military per-

sonnel that serve until retirement eligibility. Vested pension rights would contribute to this end. Although reductions in the absolute size of the armed forces are the surest route to future savings, the current plans for an all-volunteer force can complicate the problem by increasing reliance on long-term careerists rather than temporary soldiers. But, regardless of how much we curtail the flow of retirees into the civil society in the future, only the very slow processes of aging and mortality will erase the commitments that exist already to pay retirees.

### JOBS

While those with an anti-military animus find these large bills for ex-military professionals disconcerting, they are more vocally alarmed by the one thing that keeps these costs from being yet higher—that is, the remunerative employments of retirees. The majority of the retired military meet most of their financial needs from civilian jobs. To be sure, military retirement pay provides a substantial financial base for retirees, particularly those retired recently as officers of relatively high rank. For example, using the active-duty pay scales effective on January 1, 1972, a colonel would receive \$842 per month if retired with 20 years of active service, \$1,114 if retired with 25 years of active service, and \$1,450 with 30 years of service. The comparable figures for a major would be \$660, \$824, and \$989. Because of their lower active-duty pay, retired enlisted men fare less well. A man retired in the top enlisted pay grade (E-9—command or staff sergeant major in the army) would receive \$475 per month if retired with 20 years service and \$784 if retired with 30 years service. The equivalent monthly retirement pay for an army first sergeant

4. The Defense Department's "Hubbell Committee"—so-called after its Director, Rear Admiral L. E. Hubbell, U.S. Navy—which conducted the congressionally mandated First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, for example, recommended a funded, contributory, two-step annuity plan. The plan, predicted on the average second-career income loss of retirees surveyed in 1966, would provide a lower level of retirement pay until the end of a presumed normal working life and a higher level of pay in old age. U.S., Department of Defense, *Modernizing Military Pay*, vols. 4, 5, January 15, 1969. The Hubbell Committee's proposal, however, met with opposition from the military services. According to press reports, the Defense Department will submit new military retirement pay proposals to the Congress in early 1973. The new proposals are reputed to contain a two-step annuity plan for those retiring with less than thirty years active service, but the program would be noncontributory and nonvested. Randy Shoemaker, "Retirement Plan Unveiled," *Air Force Times*, October 25, 1972, p. 1; Ed Gates, "Retirement Proposal Enters 'Sell' Phase," *Air Force Times*, November 15, 1972, p. 13.

would be \$350 and \$630.<sup>5</sup> These monetary emoluments are buttressed by the substantial advantages that accrue to military retirees by virtue of their—and their dependents'—eligibility for medical care, use of military commissary stores and post exchanges, access to low-cost officers and non-commissioned officers clubs, in addition to other lesser benefits. But despite the comparative generosity of the current military retirement program, it does not adequately fulfill the economic needs of a great many men. In 1970, only 34 percent of all military retirees were officers, and roughly 88 percent of the retired enlisted men were first sergeants—or their equivalents in services other than the army—or below.<sup>6</sup> Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the labor force participation rates of military retirees exceed 90 percent.

As of 1966, when the Defense Department made its most recent survey of military retired employment, the second-career system was working fairly well. Although employment earnings of retirees averaged considerably below those of civilians of comparable age and educational attainments, and much below active duty income, retired pay usually more than made up the difference. Depending upon their ranks and years of service, retired officers' total income from all sources after retirement averaged from 9 to 19 percent more than their active duty income, and enlisted men, on the average, bettered their active duty income by from 6 to 40 percent, according to Defense Department calculations. But these figures were based only on officers who had completed four years of college and on enlisted men who had completed

high school.<sup>7</sup> Among the substantial minorities who experienced income losses after retirement, those who had not crossed these crucial educational hurdles bulked largest.

The favorable averages mask minority hardship. Unemployment and underemployment rates among military retirees in the mid-1960s were consistently more than twice those of comparable civilian age groups—and if the comparisons are restricted to white males, the difference is even more extreme.<sup>8</sup> To be sure, the cushion of retired pay makes the penalty of unemployment less severe for the military retiree than for the civilian.

Retired pay is a blunderbuss device for overcoming the sacrifices of earnings potential involved in military service. Such sacrifices obviously vary widely with the specific character of the career pursued in service, while retired pay rates vary only by ranks and length of service. Often, service experience may be an occupational advantage for which one should have been willing to pay a great deal. A system of variable pensions depending upon the civilian-job relevance of service experience is conceivable, although the data requirements for imparting equity to any such system are formidable. As it is, variability in potential income sacrifice makes it inevitable that any blunderbuss income-maintenance system must make average payments which substantially exceed average sacrifice if it is

7. U.S., Department of Defense, *Modernizing Military Pay*, vol. 4, pp. 2-9. Data from a survey of active and retired members of the armed forces conducted for this study will be cited here as the "Hubbell Survey."

8. Based on military retiree unemployment rates from unpublished Hubbell Survey data and civilian unemployment rates from U.S., Department of Labor, *Handbook of Labor Statistics 1969* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1969), p. 107.

5. From Lee E. Scharf, 1972 *Uniformed Services Almanac* (Washington, D.C.: Uniformed Services Almanac, 1972), p. 123.

6. Based on unpublished data from J. Glenn, OASD, M&RA.

to succeed in the objective of avoiding extreme hardship among substantial minorities. The tolerable size of such minorities is critical for evaluating the success of the retirement system.

### IMPACTS

Although the imminent prospect of over one million former military professionals in the civilian work force may appear formidable, the social impact of this development will probably be a relatively modest one. Retired professionals are a small group relative to the greater number of Americans who have had military service—they constitute only about 3 percent of all war veterans. But such impact as they have on the civil society is presumably more distinctively a product of their military lives than in the case of the ordinary veteran.

Of course, one million men is in abso-

lute terms not a small number of persons. To suggest the order of magnitude involved, there are already about as many retired military personnel in the labor force as there are engineers of all types; there are several times as many as there are butchers, bakers, and candlestick-makers, combined.

### HOMOGENEITY

We know, however, that the military calling is occupationally far more heterogeneous than butchers, bakers, or candlestick-makers, or even than engineers; indeed it encompasses all these occupations and many more. The callings of the retired in their civilian lives become yet more varied. (Table 3 shows occupations of retired military in 1966 and the most recent data on employers, 1963, are shown in Table 4.) Nor can we assume that the interests and ideologies represented among the

TABLE 3—CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS OF RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL, 1966 SURVEY<sup>a</sup>  
(IN PERCENTAGES)

| TYPES OF OCCUPATIONS                                              | OFFICERS<br>(N = 20,311) | ENLISTED<br>MEN<br>(N = 40,246) | TOTAL<br>(N = 60,557) |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Professional and Technical.....                                   | 27                       | 13                              | 18                    |
| Educator, College.....                                            | 3                        | <sup>b</sup>                    | 1                     |
| Educator, High School<br>and Elementary.....                      | 5                        | <sup>b</sup>                    | 2                     |
| Business and Managerial<br>(Including Public Administration)..... | 20                       | 6                               | 11                    |
| Clerical.....                                                     | 6                        | 11                              | 9                     |
| Sales.....                                                        | 13                       | 7                               | 9                     |
| Craftsmen, Skilled and<br>Semi-skilled, and Operatives.....       | 10                       | 31                              | 24                    |
| Protective Services.....                                          | 4                        | 9                               | 7                     |
| Other Services.....                                               | 2                        | 7                               | 5                     |
| All Other Occupations<br>(Including Farming).....                 | 11                       | 14                              | 13                    |
| <i>Totals</i>                                                     | 101                      | 98                              | 99                    |

SOURCE: Unpublished data from the 1966 "Hubbell Survey" of some 98 thousand military retirees conducted in connection with the U. S. Defense Department's First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation.

<sup>a</sup> Military professionals retired for nondisability reasons after twenty or more years of active service—longest civilian position held in 1965.

<sup>b</sup> Less than 1 percent.

TABLE 4—TYPES OF EMPLOYERS OF MILITARY RETIREES IN SEPTEMBER 1963<sup>a</sup>

| TYPES OF EMPLOYERS                            | PROPORTION OF EMPLOYED RETIREES<br>(IN PERCENTAGES) |                         |                      |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
|                                               | OFFICERS<br>(N = 830)                               | ENLISTED<br>(N = 1,900) | TOTAL<br>(N = 2,730) |
| Self-employed.....                            | 10                                                  | 8                       | 9                    |
| Large-business (over 2,500 employees).....    | 23                                                  | 18                      | 19                   |
| Medium business (50 to 2,500 employees).....  | 13                                                  | 16                      | 15                   |
| Small business (fewer than 50 employees)..... | 11                                                  | 14                      | 14                   |
| Educational institution.....                  | 9                                                   | 3                       | 5                    |
| Medical institution.....                      | 1                                                   | 2                       | 1                    |
| Federal government.....                       | 20                                                  | 26                      | 24                   |
| State/local government.....                   | 8                                                   | 8                       | 8                    |
| All other (including nonprofit).....          | 5                                                   | 5                       | 5                    |
| <i>Totals</i>                                 | 100                                                 | 100                     | 100                  |

SOURCE: Laure M. Sharp and Albert D. Biderman, *The Employment of Retired Military Personnel* (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., 1966), p. 139.

<sup>a</sup> Male, military professionals, fifty-two years of age or less, retired for nondisability reasons in the period 1960 through July 1963 after twenty or more years of active service. These data describe a segment of the sample used in the Defense Department's survey of 19 thousand military personnel conducted in September 1963 by the Defense Study Group on Health Care for Retired Personnel and their Dependents; the so-called MEDICARE Survey.

military population are as homogeneous as those of any given occupational group—that members of Retired Officers Association are as like-minded or more so than, say, members of the United Steel Workers or of the American Psychological Association. An important question that remains to be answered in assessing the impact of the retired military is the actual degree of homogeneity and concert of this population element.

#### INFLUENCE

The high-ranking officers who achieve positions of great influence and prominence in civil life are a very tiny fraction of the retiree population. Enlisted men form a large and growing majority of all retired personnel, and retired officers are predominantly majors or lieutenant colonels. To the extent that the general status levels of military and second-career jobs can be compared, those who move downward or laterally on retirement far out-balance those moving upward. The civilian organiza-

tions in which the retirees usually move, furthermore, operate on a far more modest economic scale than the military organization from which they come. In the positions they come to occupy when they leave the service, the retirees, high-ranking or low, usually occupy positions in which they each have at their command far less of the material and human capital of the national economy than they ordinarily had in their military jobs.

On a national scale, retirees are not now nor are they destined to be numerous enough to be an important economic factor in the national economy. Government is the only broad employment sector in which retirees constitute a major source of economic competition with civilian workers (see Table 4). Government is also the class of employer most often in a position to make direct use of special skills and experience commonly found among former military professionals. But in 1966, the most recent date for which the computation can be made, retirees com-

prised only about 3 percent of the federal payroll.<sup>9</sup>

In private business as well as in government, a large, although not accurately assessable, proportion of the jobs filled by military retirees serve the defense complex. This is not only because many retirees have Defense Department civilian jobs and jobs in defense industry, but also many of the ostensibly non-defense jobs service this sector indirectly. Retirees settle predominantly in areas in which defense is a major industry, if not the major one, and particularly in areas having large military installations.<sup>10</sup>

To the extent that military retirees are concentrated in localities and in organizations already in the defense orbit, however, they have added proportionately little additional militarizing influence to the military influence already present in these communities. In cities where they are most numerous, such as San Antonio, San Diego, and various Florida communities, they are outnumbered severalfold by the active duty military in the area. The Washington metropolitan area abounds with retired brass, but the brass in the Pentagon has a more powerful glare. What is true, however, is that there will be communities in the future with substantial military-oriented

populations, no matter how sharply active-duty components are cut back in the future. To the degree that retirees continue to concentrate in a relatively small number of communities, one would expect their influence, as well as their visibility, to be greater than would be the case with dispersion. There are reputed to be five hundred retired generals in the San Antonio area, for example. There are over twenty-five thousand military retirees in the National Capital area. Washington-area retirees are drawn particularly from those who have had repeated assignments in headquarters positions. In addition to their being politically experienced, the atypically high ranks and location at the political center of this group of retirees make it at least potentially of political importance.

Although several individual ex-military professionals have had political prominence in recent years, retirees as a group have not constituted a significant political force. Political activity by retiree organizations has been limited largely to matters of direct material concern, such as retired pay legislation. There appears to be important carry-over of the doctrine of apolitical neutrality from the active duty to the retired status. As a consequence, the high-ranking officer who gains prominence in the national political scene usually does so in a rather politically gray, elder-statesman role, such as was epitomized in recent years by General Lucius Clay. Deviance from the apolitical stance by entrance into electoral or mass-movement politics is usually associated with political deviance, as well. The deviant ideological politics of former General Edwin A. Walker or Captain John G. Crommelin or General Curtis LeMay are illustrative.

Morris Janowitz has observed that the number of retired military in key executive and administrative posts in

9. Based on unpublished Hubbell Survey data. See also, U.S. Civil Service Commission, "Report on the Survey of Members of the Uniformed Services, June-July, 1966 for the United States Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service," November 1966.

10. Spearman's rank-order correlation ( $\rho$ ) between retired military population as percent of state labor force and defense dependency ratio—defense employment as percent of work force—across all fifty states and the District of Columbia in 1968 equaled +0.54. Retired military population data from J. Glenn, OASD, M&RA; state labor force and defense dependency ratio data from U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1969), p. 249.

the nation was at a peak in the period following World War II.<sup>11</sup> Our subsequent wars have not served as well to establish prominent public reputations for military leaders. Barring some spectacular feat of historical revisionism, this should prove particularly true of the Vietnam War.

The transient lives of military men, and their national, rather than localistic orientations, are not conducive to the formation of strong positions in the state and local political apparatus which, in our federal system, are the usual entry points for the pursuit of political careers. This may account for the fact that it has been almost as likely at any time to find a retired officer in the White House as in the Congress. Only two regular retirees have served in Congress in recent years: Colonel Frank Kowalski, Jr., served as congressman-at-large from Connecticut in the Eighty-sixth and Eighty-seventh Congresses; and Captain William R. Anderson, until his defeat in 1972, represented a Tennessee district. Notably, both gained reputations as mavericks, as both gained prominence for attacks on aspects of the military status quo.

Nonetheless, there is doubtless considerable homogeneity of political outlook among the majority of retirees. The mobilization of retirees for political activity of a rightist character is conceivable under conditions where personally experienced disadvantage was seen by them as being accompanied by fundamental political decadence in national affairs. There are incipient themes of this character in the media directed to retirees.

We also cannot ignore the fact that ultranationalism, defense, war, and the

military itself are frequently matters at the center of political contention. In countless ways and on countless occasions, retired officers figure as spokesmen for "preparedness," and a "strong defense posture."<sup>12</sup> It is precisely the fact that these roles of political advocacy are generally carried off as non-partisan exercises of "simple patriotism" which frustrates opponents and may intensify their resentments regarding military influence on the political and ideological life of the nation.

When military matters themselves are salient political issues, as they have been during the Vietnam War and, to a lesser degree, during the Korean War, partisan political participation by retired officers is more visible. Notably, in the 1972 presidential campaign, Senator McGovern appeared to make more active use of prominent retirees than did President Nixon. With the full weight of the official military and foreign policy establishment supportive of the President's case, it was McGovern alone who had to gain military legitimacy for his position by associating with it such retired military leaders as General David M. Shoup and Lieutenant General James M. Gavin.

#### CONFLICTS

Those who would restrict the impact of the military on the society confront dilemmas in the case of the military retiree. On the one hand, there is concern because so large a number are moving from the military into the civilian sphere, bringing with them unwell-

11. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. xxvii.

12. In the words of the "Preamble to the Bylaws" of the Retired Officers Association: "To inculcate and stimulate love of our country and the flag; To defend the honor, integrity and supremacy of our National Government and the Constitution of the United States; To advocate military forces adequate to the defense of our country."



come influences from the former. On the other hand, there are concerns that arise because many retirees remain within the defense complex in their second career. They thereby constitute an added source of difficulty in attempts to reduce the size and influence of the military-industrial complex. Defense employment of retirees also generates alarm over conflicts of interest—the prospect that the military man will cater to private interests while on active duty in order to gain preferment in employment upon his retirement and the prospect of his improperly using information and personal contacts in post-retirement defense industry jobs.

Gary Spencer, who investigated the second careers of retired West Pointers, expressed this double-edged concern.<sup>13</sup> He found that retired Academy alumni were employed most frequently by large defense contractors (31 percent), by educational institutions (also 31 percent), or by financial organizations (15 percent). Spencer had equal dismay to express about the jobs outside the defense complex taken by those who had “. . . spent the past twenty or thirty years in caste system being saluted and obeyed without question . . .” as about the jobs taken within the defense complex.

The second-career patterns of West Point graduates are far from typical of all officer retirees in that higher proportions of the Academy men find jobs in colleges, universities, and with the major defense contractors. My own studies suggest, however, that an even greater proportion of all retirees, enlisted as well as officer, has been depen-

dent on defense-generated employment for second-career jobs than suggested by Spencer's data. The role of defense employment has been so great, in fact, that it raises some doubts about the viability of the present second-career system without a military-industrial complex to support it.

This is not because the facts are in accordance with the impressions created by Senator William Proxmire's recent investigations<sup>14</sup>—that is, that the largest defense contractors were the major employers of ex-military. My calculations from Senator Proxmire's figures indicate that about 8 percent of higher ranking regular retirees—colonel or general officer—were employed by the one hundred largest defense contractors, and if lesser contractors employed such men in the same proportion to their dollar volume, total employment in the defense contractor universe would be about 12 percent. Employment in defense industries of retired reservists and lesser ranking regulars seems somewhat less frequent—I can make no quantitative estimate.

While the statement “2,000 Ex-Brass Serve Defense Contractors” serves excellently for making “Ah, hah!”-type headlines, it does so because of what it implies rather than what it reveals. Judging from data on salaries of retired senior officers employed in defense industry, few of them hold jobs that are sufficiently well paid to suggest that peddling highly valuable inside dope or influence is involved.<sup>15</sup> Just how mis-

13. Gary Spencer, “Second Careers of West Point Officer Retirees” (Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Denver, Colorado, September 1971).

14. U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire, “Over 2,000 Retired High Ranking Military Officers Now Employed by 100 Largest Military Contractors,” *Congressional Record* S3072-3084, March 24, 1969.

15. Albert D. Biderman, “The Retired Military,” in Roger W. Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 157.

leading the criterion of numbers can be was shown by testimony regarding retiree employment in the firm which stood out in 1958 as the greatest hirer of retired officers in relation to its volume of contracts. The highest paid officer in the firm, testimony revealed, was a retired admiral at \$14,000 per year, and the median pay of all retired officers the firm employed was \$650 per month. A third of the officers held blue-collar jobs.<sup>16</sup>

The one hundred largest defense contractors, furthermore, include firms that account for much of the non-defense economy of the nation, as well. Any retiree employed by American Telephone & Telegraph, General Motors, International Telephone & Telegraph, or any one of several conglomerates is eligible for the list, whether his work has anything directly to do with defense or not. To date, there has been no systematic evidence developed on the extent and nature of activities of retired officers as a cement binding together the military and industrial segments of "the complex." The irrelevance of the employments of thousands of retired officers for the central issues posed by the concept of a military-industrial complex, however, does not dispose of the matter. The roles of a few score key figures are indeed more pertinent than are those of the rank and file retired colonel or general—there were in 1970 about 40,000 retirees at the O-6 (colonel, navy captain) level and 3,700 in the general and flag ranks.<sup>17</sup>

Attempts by Congress to legislate against improper business activities of

retirees have focused on "selling" to the armed forces. The nature of defense production and procurement is such that the concept of the man with an order book, or even that of the bid-writer or proposal-hustler, can cover only a minor portion of all the activities in which prior knowledge and current contracts of military men can lend sales advantage to a firm. It is hardly surprising that in the entire history of the laws against selling, they have rarely been invoked and, in the two cases in which adverse judgments against retired officers were made, the decisions were subsequently overturned.<sup>18</sup> The doctrine of conflict of interest can be logically extended, as Representative F. Edward Hebert would have it, to mean that it is "... unethical and unconscionable for a person to have anything to do in private life with a subject with which he was directly concerned while in public employment."<sup>19</sup> The purpose of any activity in a commercial organization is to contribute to sales. And, in the "contract state," there are few large organizations which are not in one way or another involved in doing business with the government. Complete control by statute of conflict of interest would have to ban not only selling, but all employment with firms doing business with the armed forces.

Although the implications of ill-deserved preferment and private gain help lend emotional tone to publicity about defense employment of ex-military, it is a subordinate issue for those

18. J. K. Taussig, "Post-retirement Selling Restrictions," *Retired Officer* 23 (October 1967), pp. 9-12; "Post-retirement Selling Restrictions—Conclusion," *Retired Officer* 23 (November-December 1967), pp. 9-11.

19. U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee for Special Investigation of the Committee on Armed Services, *Employment of Retired Commissioned Officers by Defense Department Contractors*, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1960, p. 20.

16. U.S., Congress, House, *Hearings before the Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, Retired Military and Civilian Personnel Employed by Defense Industries*, 86th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 535-43.

17. Unpublished data from J. Glenn, OASD, M&RA.

who worry about the military-industrial complex. As Senator Proxmire put it:

This danger does not come from corruption. Except in rare circumstances this is no more prevalent among military officers than among those with comparable civilian responsibilities.

The danger to the public interest is that these firms and the former officers they employ have a community of interest with the military itself. They hold a narrow view of public priorities based on self-interest. They have a largely uncritical view of defense spending. . . .

In too many cases they may see only military answers to exceedingly complex diplomatic and political problems. A military response or the ability to make one, may seem to them the most appropriate answer to every international threat.<sup>20</sup>

#### *Civil servants unions*

As compared with the situation in defense industry, there are stronger grounds for the complaint of the civil servants unions about unfairly subsidized and advantaged competition for their jobs from military retirees. In 1966, one-third of all retired enlisted men and reserve officers had held federal civil service jobs since their retirement, as had about 20 percent of retired regulars. Subsequently, civil service employment has become even more frequent among regular officers. Of federally employed retirees, almost two-thirds were employed in defense agencies.

Employment in industrial or government defense work does not exhaust the dependence of retiree second-career employment on defense. As noted earlier, retirees settle predominantly in areas in which defense is a major industry, if not the major one, and par-

ticularly, in areas having large military installations. Many of their ostensibly non-defense jobs in these areas are service jobs which have as their sole or major clientele defense organizations and their personnel. All in all, I would estimate that from 50 to 60 percent of retiree employment has been quite directly dependent upon the defense and aerospace economy.

Both formal rules and informal discrimination restrict retiree employment now as in the past, notably in the civil service or in selling to the services. Were there to be significantly greater impediments to the hiring of retired military, however, it appears likely that large numbers of military retirees would not be able to hold their own economically. Indeed, it is probably the case that there will have to be greater facilitation of second-career opportunities in the future, if financial hardship is not to become dangerously common among the retired military. The most important substantial statutory changes in recent years have, in fact, operated in the liberalizing direction. These were enacted in 1964.<sup>21</sup>

They allowed regular officers, retired for nondisability reasons, to hold federal civil service jobs from which they had, for the most part, previously been excluded. Moreover, the new law established formulas which set trade-offs between retired pay and earnings from federal, second-career employment for nondisability-retired regular officers that were less disadvantageous for the highest pay categories than had been the case under the rules that previously applied. Larger percentages of retired regular officers were soon found accepting federal employment.<sup>22</sup>

21. P.L. 88-448, effective December 1, 1964.

22. Data from U.S. Civil Service Commission, *Report on the Survey of Retired Mem-*

20. U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, March 24, 1969, p. S3074.

The success of the second-career system as of the time it was last assessed in 1966 appears to have been made possible by a full-employment economy with substantial and thriving defense and aerospace sectors. We have no direct data for evaluating what hazards may exist now that these conditions no longer obtain, nor what hazards there might be in the future, should a growing population of retirees continue to encounter a difficult employment market with a declining defense sector.

Retirees have been able to achieve economically and subjectively rewarding second careers, particularly in middle and lower managerial jobs in large organizations serving public purposes. The national commitment to defense economy has created such jobs, has validated the legitimacy of employing former military personnel in them, and has given retirees the sense of contributing to valued social purposes. Sharply reduced national commitments to defense would not only immediately restrict jobs available for retirees, but also could affect their acceptance by employers and their esteem.

#### PUBLIC SERVICE

Probably more than in the case of other workers, the situation of military retirees in the event of radical curtailment of defense expenditures will depend upon the growth of other public programs. Retirees have already constituted a useful manpower resource in a number of areas of public service where problems are becoming increasingly critical. These include technical training programs, medical services, and police and other protective services.

*bers of Uniformed Services, June-July 1966 for the United States Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service* (Washington, D.C., November 1966), p. 3.

#### CIVIL SERVICE

With over eighty thousand military retirees in civil service positions in 1966 and with apparently increasing proportions of retirees going into federal service, the impact of retirees on civil government may appear impressive. Even here, however, their numbers are actually modest when viewed in relation to the size of the government establishment—as noted earlier, about 3 percent of total federal payroll. In the Defense Department, their numbers are also small when considered relative to the total civilian component—about 6.5 percent in 1966. In no other federal agency are retirees as high a percentage of the employees.<sup>23</sup>

These simple comparisons, it is true, somewhat understate the significance of military retirees in the federal government in that they are represented in somewhat greater proportions in the middle and upper grade levels of the civil services. Retirees in the federal service also tend to have more important positions than those in the private sector. For example, in 1966, about 31 percent of the retired officers working for the federal government held professional or technical jobs, as compared with only 19 percent of all employed retired officers. But again, the professional level appointments were mostly in defense agencies.<sup>24</sup>

The major significance of the civil service for the second-career problems is that of a large and expanding employment market for the lower level, and even more particularly, for middle-ranking retired military personnel. In addition to the special features that make government jobs more congenial

23. Based on unpublished Hubbell Survey data.

24. Ibid.

to people with military backgrounds, the civil service is relatively open to lateral entry. It is relatively free from such barriers to entry as rigid seniority systems, closed unions, and nepotistic hiring.

As a consequence, the second largest government employer of retired military has been the Post Office Department. As a vast hirer of lower-level administrative, clerical, and blue-collar personnel, it affords jobs for 12 percent of the federally employed officers and 21 percent of those who retired as enlisted men. If we add together all low-level categories—retirees working in the postal field service, those in the lower-level general service white-collar categories, GS 1–7, and those holding blue-collar “wage board” positions—the bulk of all retiree civil service employment (70 percent) is accounted for. Even considering officers alone, almost 40 percent are in these categories.<sup>25</sup>

Morris Janowitz has proposed formalization of the circumstances that already make public service employment a natural and most frequent second-career route for military retirees.<sup>26</sup> Those who serve short periods in the prospective all-volunteer force, as well as those who continue in the military for the periods that currently make for retirement eligibility, could consider themselves as embarking on “a lifetime career in the public service, with the military . . . being the first portion and a second portion in the civil establishment.” He contemplates arrangements covering not only federal service, but state and local employment positions as well, through negotiated agreements between the national, state, and

local governments. Presumably, such a system would also serve for flexible lateral movements between uniformed and civilian roles, as national requirements changed. Such a plan, Janowitz reports, is already operating with effectiveness in the Federal Republic of Germany.

A number of elements of this kind of system would not be novel in the United States, although existing encouragements of military-to-civil service careers stem more from the favor accorded by civil service systems to the broad class of war veterans than to the special class of career military personnel. They include such things as veterans’ preference in hiring and some counting of years of military service for eligibility for civil service prerequisites. Full and formalized adoption of the Janowitz type of plan, however, would involve, for better or worse, radical blurring of lines between the civil and military components of government.

State and local governments, which have had a dramatically growing labor force, present what appear, on their face, to be many particularly good matches to common skills and aspirations of military retirees. As of the most recent surveys, however, few retirees were employed at the lower levels of government. Presumably, seniority rules afford some impediments to their hiring, but the relatively tenuous local ties and information of most retirees probably are greater sources of difficulty. Employment in higher and secondary education and in protective services are, to some extent, exceptions in employing fairly substantial numbers of retirees. Even in these two fields, however, employment rates are much lower than would be expected given the experience, skills, and preferences of retirees.

Police work would appear to be one

25. *Ibid.*

26. Morris Janowitz, “Adapting the Armed Forces to an All-Volunteer System: Recommendations for a Democratic Society,” unpublished manuscript, n.d., pp. 5–7.

of the most suitable types of jobs, but the general lack of provision for lateral entry into large police systems is a major barrier. If this condition persists, the switch of the talents of military men from international to domestic security will probably continue to take place in large measure within the expanding private protective services industry.

#### CONCERN WITH RETIREES' EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS

Mass media attention to retirees, including the most publicized expressions of the concerns of Congress, has been restricted almost exclusively to alarm about illicit and dangerously influential employment of former officers. While public attention is sporadically drawn to these concerns about the jobs retired military are getting, official attention is paid increasingly to concern about jobs retirees fail to get. Unemployment, underemployment, low-income employment, and ill-suited employment affect large proportions of the retirees. There are some indications that, with the increase in the retiree population, conditions may be becoming worse rather than better. The dangers to the retirees are not only that they may be competing increasingly with each other for the same kinds of jobs in the same kinds of localities in ever-tightening special labor markets, but also that political pressures against their employment will mount. The unpopularity of the military during an unpopular war doubtless facilitates such reactions. The defense industry, some spokesmen of which have already indicated their wariness toward hiring retirees because of public relations problems, may have become increasingly wary after the campaign conducted by Senator Proxmire in 1969. Publicized opposition of orga-

nized civil servants to retiree hiring by government also became more vehement at about the same time.

The United States has yet to experience a demobilization of its career forces on the same order of magnitude as has been the case in some other countries. Britain, France, and the Low Countries experienced an identical problem to that of the United States in having a World War II-generated hump of retirement eligibles in the late 1950s, but, in addition, they undertook major reductions of their military forces when they dissolved their empires. Each country had to institute special programs for accommodating retirees in the civilian labor force. An attempt by the Soviet Union in 1960 to handle its hump problems and force reductions by the retirement of large numbers of career personnel to such unattractive employments as Khrushchev's Virgin Lands program apparently generated such great backfire from the military as to force a reversal of the program. The military-political problem in France was so entangled with other aspects of the liquidation of the empire as to offer only dubious parallels to any prospective developments in the United States. Nonetheless, the objective situation of American military is such that the fortunes of its members, after as well as before retirement, are being directly affected by the American equivalent to the surrender of imperial dominions by the European colonial powers.

The traditional solution to the problem of civil control of the military in the United States was to have a very small professional military establishment and to keep military professionals sharply separated from the civil society. Neither condition now exists nor is likely in the near future. New and more elaborate forms for maintaining

civil supremacy have had to be sought. This need is also present with regard to the problems considered here. In the United States, unlike the case in many other countries, there has never been a large professional military class threatened by, or actually experiencing, severe problems of economic and status loss. Under such circumstances, an aggrieved military class might be impelled toward political involvement. For this reason, even those who most fear military influences on the civil society may see a stake in the occupational accommodation of retirees. Even with miraculous peace and instant disarmament, the question can no longer be one of excluding retired military men from major participation in civil institutions,

but only one of the nature of the participation they are to have.<sup>27</sup>

27. In addition to the sources already cited, this article draws on previous research undertaken or participated in by the author. Important insights into the post-retirement experience of retired military professionals emerged from a sample survey conducted by Laure M. Sharp and the author in 1964. Much of the author's research in this area was conducted in connection with the "Military Establishment Project" of the Twentieth Century Fund or was supported by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Bruce B. Dunning assisted in the preparation of the present article. An earlier brief version was published in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., *The Military Industrial Complex: A Reassessment* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972), prepared for the Center for Policy Studies, University of Chicago.

# Contemporary Professionalism and Future Military Leadership

By EDWIN A. DEAGLE, JR.

ABSTRACT: Once again the military establishment faces adjustment to peacetime. The process this time will be unusual, for several reasons. There is some evidence that the international environment is changing, and a large military force structure will not be needed. Domestic pressures to reduce defense budgets are stronger than they have been in the past. The situation facing the services may resemble the end of World War I. However, the officer corps is different. It is made up of men who have served in a large bureaucracy for the past thirty years—not the austere peacetime military forces that traditionally operated before the cold war. Bureaucratic management skills may run at cross purposes with military professional standards of competence and integrity, as a recent army study indicates. It may be that not only budgetary and political factors dictate a small military establishment in the future, but also the rebuilding of military professionalism as well.

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WITH American military involvement in the war in Vietnam drawing to a close, it seems appropriate to take stock of the future of the military profession. In the past, the genius of the American military has always been that it could sustain itself for the next war even though it had been abandoned and ignored once it had won the last one. The officers who fought World War II did not, for the most part, learn their lessons in World War I. They were a product of the professional institutions that nourished and protected doctrine and standards of leadership between the wars. Moreover, the development of strategy and tactics was kept abreast of both the rapid evolution of technology and changing patterns of international politics. Without exception, the kinds of military leaders provided by the services were appropriate to the times when they were needed.

It cannot be taken for granted that the services will continue to provide competent leadership for the nation's future needs. Both the services themselves and the circumstances they face are quite different from those in the past. The result is likely to be a major adjustment to peacetime, with uncertain implications for the kinds of leaders the military profession will produce for the future.

#### KOREAN ARMISTICE AND POST VIETNAM

Superficially, the end of the war in Vietnam resembles the armistice in Korea in 1953. The country was sick of three years of inconclusive war. Domestic pressures to reduce defense appropriations rose as wartime expenditures declined. At the same time, international tensions precluded anything like disarmament. The Eisenhower administration's response was the New Look: reliance on a strategy of massive retaliation and reduction in military

manpower from 3.5 million to 2.8 million.<sup>1</sup> The New Look reflected an effort to stabilize manpower, nuclear deterrence, and defense budgets at a level the country could support over the long haul.

Aside from the struggles over service budgets, the military was preoccupied with restoring the integrity and prestige of the military career. In his book, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington described the process:

The early postwar drive to civilianize the military services which had been symbolized by the Doolittle Board lost some of its momentum during the Korean War years. In its place appeared a fairly widespread concern in civilian as well as military circles for the declining prestige of the military career and the shaky morale of the officer corps. The Womble Committee report in 1953 and the persistent warnings of Hanson Baldwin and others called public attention to the plight of the military, the press generally reacting favorably to the military pleas, and even Congress manifesting a sympathetic interest. While this shift in intellectual environment did not reverse the tendencies in the opposite direction, it did enable a number of measures to be taken in 1953-1955 toward restoring the integrity of the officer corps and the attractiveness of the military career. Congress improved retirement benefits, liberalized promotion opportunities, and increased military pay. Within the services, more emphasis was placed upon developing combat leaders instead of technical specialists.<sup>2</sup>

It is possible that postwar adjustments by the services will follow the Korean pattern, but there are indications that they will not. First, the war in Vietnam has involved U.S. forces for twelve years. A generation of junior

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 75.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 460-61.

officers, particularly in the army, has never served in a peacetime force structure and has little experience outside the context of Vietnam. Senior officers have spent most of their careers in the relatively large forces of the cold war era. The junior officers who fought in Korea were trained by the veterans of World War II, themselves the product of the traditional military establishment of the 1930s. Although the war in Korea was vastly different from World War II, the leadership traditions and professional standards of the officers who fought it were identical to those of the World War II commanders. Vietnam, on the other hand, was fought differently, by officers raised in the context of a large military bureaucracy.

Second, the decision to end the draft has important budget implications that may make it impossible for the services to sustain anything like the post-Korean War force structure. Military pay increases in the past six years have drastically increased manpower costs. In 1972, manpower costs were \$42.8 billion—up \$18 billion from what the same manpower would have cost five years ago.<sup>3</sup> Retirement costs are running at \$4.9 billion and are bound to increase as more and more of the career officers who served during the high manpower levels of the cold war era retire. Given the pressure of domestic priorities on a strained federal budget, and the presumed high marginal cost of volunteer manpower, the services may be subjected to much more severe manpower cuts than they sustained after Korea.

The third indication that the future will be different is the changing evaluation of threats to the nation's security. In 1954, the New Look represented a balance between domestic and budget pressures and what appeared to be per-

sistent threats to the national security from a hostile Soviet Union. The balance emphasized nuclear deterrence at the expense of conventional forces, and it was adhered to despite the development of a Soviet nuclear force in the late 1950s.

Conventional forces were rebuilt only when the national security threat shifted from nuclear attack to revolutionary war. Although it is too early to be sure, the Vietnam experience seems to have precluded future American intervention in wars of liberation. Further, there are indications that cold war tensions are finally beginning to evaporate, with some prospects for international force limitations and perhaps reductions. If these trends persist, the justification for large standing forces will diminish.

Finally, the domestic mood was quite different after Korea than it is today. Controversy over the Korean War settled around whether it should be won or not—not over the ethics of bombing, or commanders' claims of success. No one had heard of My Lai, or protective reaction strikes. Although the war in Korea was not a popular one, it did not generate credibility problems for the military as Vietnam did. Twelve years of frustration and disillusionment have done incalculable damage to the prestige and esteem of the military in the eyes of its citizens.

All of these factors combined are likely to make the military adjustment to a postwar environment more difficult than that which faced the armed forces in 1953. The threat is less, the budget pressures worse, and the political climate less supportive than was the case after Korea. The prospects are for far deeper cuts into the force structure than in the New Look era—and the New Look strategy involved the deepest budget cuts since the years immediately after World War II.

3. *Washington Post*, August 26, 1972, p. A10.

## POST-WORLD WAR I ANALOGY

Better clues as to what the future holds for the military can be found in World War I. The analogy is surprisingly apt, given the enormous differences in technology and circumstances. Huntington described the military profession's adjustment to the First World War and its aftermath in terms of what he called the Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise—a development that looks surprisingly similar to the evolution of civil-military relations in the 1960s. The Neo-Hamiltonians, as Huntington defined them, were men like Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Elihu Root. They espoused a national security philosophy not unlike that of the Kennedy administration in 1961:

Like the military and unlike the liberals, the Neo-Hamiltonians saw international politics as basically a struggle among independent nations with interests which not infrequently brought them into conflict with each other. Contrary to the optimistic doctrines of business pacifism, they held to the military view that war was far from obsolete. Also, like the military and unlike the liberals, the Neo-Hamiltonians argued that national policy must primarily reflect not abstract ideals but a realistic understanding of the national interest. This was the first responsibility of the statesman. So long as nations exist, force is the ultimate arbiter. Consequently, nations must maintain adequate armaments to back up their national policies, the nature of national policy determining the size and nature of the forces required. . . . Peace was enervating and degrading. Man was born to struggle and triumph. Virility, adventure, the strenuous life, strife and combat—these were good in themselves.<sup>4</sup>

It is not difficult to see in these themes the same mood of excitement that sur-

rounded Kennedy's call for national sacrifice in his 1961 inaugural address. The Cuban Missile Crisis, counterinsurgency warfare, and the Green Berets swept the country along in fresh fascination with military values and martial spirit. Despite their liberal aura, the Kennedy years were distinctly Neo-Hamiltonian.

By 1920, Americans had lost their jingoistic outlook and replaced it with more narrow concerns for the fruits of peace and isolationism. The military, however, was still caught up in the excitement of close and very supportive ties with the American community. Although no one wanted to weaken the traditions of military professionalism and integrity that had been developed in obscurity and isolation before the war, there was widespread feeling that a democracy could not afford an army cut off from the mainstream of society. The military profession had to keep step with the citizens it served, reflecting their liberal values. Huntington described this movement in detail:

After 1918 the military made every effort to continue the wartime identification with American society and to expand the Neo-Hamiltonian link with the American community. Particularly in the Army, the war was viewed as ushering in a new era of civil-military relations. "The 'splendid isolation' of the Regular Army," proclaimed the *Infantry Journal*, "is a thing of the past." . . . "The character of our Army and Navy," a naval officer argued, ". . . must reflect the character of the American people—American ideas, ideals, and thoughts." The new outlook must embody the spirit of Washington's injunction: "When we assumed the soldier, we did not lay aside the citizen." Officers were told to abandon the appearance of exclusiveness and develop a "fellow-feeling for all citizens." In training the citizen soldier, the officer must rely upon "co-operative spirit" rather than discipline.<sup>5</sup>

4. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 271-73.

5. Ibid., pp. 282-83.

Even General MacArthur, who elsewhere championed the separation between soldier and society, supported in 1920 the new rapprochement:

It was essential, in the words of General MacArthur, that the officer have "an intimate understanding of the mechanics of human feeling, a comprehensive grasp of world and national affairs, and a liberalization of conception which amount to a change in his psychology of command.<sup>6</sup>

Although the setting is different, the services in 1973 appear to be moving in the same direction. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, has forced controversial changes in navy dress and disciplinary regulations, in an effort to make the navy reflect modern social values. The army's efforts to attract the manpower it needs for a volunteer force include wholesale reforms to make enlisted life more closely resemble civilian life. The media phrase, "Today's Army Wants to Join You," speaks for itself.

If the World War I analogy holds, the military's bid to keep its identification with civil society will fail, as it did in the 1920s. Huntington writes:

It was only slowly that the officers were disabused of this illusion. By the end of the decade, however, it had become impossible for them to maintain their identification with the community. The opposition to military ideals and the military program which was so strong within the government could no longer be blamed upon misinformation or the failure of Congress to reflect accurately the sentiment of the country. . . . Army expenditures were reduced far below that level which the officers believed necessary to carry out the purpose of the National Defense Act. The postwar reaction against navalism had reduced appropriations and produced the Washington arms conference. . . . Underlying all was American distrust of government and the belief that the military along with the civil

branches of the public service were inherently inefficient and largely unnecessary. It was time as one officer bluntly put it, to "face the facts." The military effort to bridge the gap to society had been a failure. . . . The Neo-Hamiltonian compromise was impossible in the postwar world. The opposition was not a few pacifists and radicals. It was America itself. Rejected again, there was nothing for the military to do but retreat back to their prewar isolation and find interest and satisfaction in the mundane duties of their profession.<sup>7</sup>

This may well be a blueprint for the military in the next decade. If the next round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations is productive, the prospect of American involvement in wartime activities looks more remote than at any time since the end of World War I. Even if the SALT effort is inconclusive, the containment strategy that justified the worldwide stationing of large American forces has lost much of its rationale. In 1953, containment emerged from the Korean War intact, and public support for large defense expenditures remained strong. In 1973, the Nixon administration successes in Moscow, Peking, and Paris have encouraged public expectations about peace for the foreseeable future. Support for heavy defense budgets is bound to diminish. Further, twelve years of exasperation in Vietnam have almost certainly exhausted whatever remains of Kennedy's Neo-Hamiltonian espousal of military values. The services are thus likely to face both social isolation and greatly diminished force structures.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Huntington observed that, in the past, both of these developments contributed to the development of military professionalism:

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 284-85.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 287-88.

The isolation, rejection, and reduction of the armed services after the Civil War have led historians to mark this as the low point of American military history. They speak of "The Army's Dark Ages" and the "Period of Naval Stagnation." These phrases are accurate, however, only with respect to the social influence and political power of the military. They describe only one side of the civil-military equation. The very isolation and rejection which reduced the size of the services and hampered technological advance made these same years the most fertile, creative, and formative in the history of the American armed forces. Sacrificing power and influence, withdrawing into its own hard shell, the officer corps was able and permitted to develop a distinctive military character. The American military profession, its institutions and its ideals, is fundamentally a product of those years. . . . The foundation of this advance was the absence of any significant threat to national security. The isolation of the military was a prerequisite to professionalization, and peace was a prerequisite to isolation. . . .

The withdrawal of the military from civilian society at the end of the nineteenth century produced the high standards of professional excellence essential to national success in the struggle of the twentieth century. If the officer corps had not been rejected, if the Army and Navy had not been reduced to the bone in the 1870's and 1880's, the United States would have had a far more difficult time of it in 1917 and 1942.<sup>8</sup>

If the analogy holds, then the services face a healthy, monastic existence cut off from society, in which professional traditions will be refurbished. And the country will presumably be better off for it. But does the analogy hold?

Any answer has to be speculative, but there is some evidence that perhaps it does. In the last part of *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argues that the old system of isolation which protected military professionalism and produced military leaders broke down in

the cold war period. He deplored the disequilibrium that characterized American civil-military relations after World War II, because it threatened to destroy the professionalism of the officer corps:

The leadership produced by the American officer corps has so far been extraordinary. Only a small handful of the hundreds of general and flag officers have proved incapable in battle, and the top commanders in all three twentieth-century wars have been men of exceptional ability. This success, however, was to a large extent the product of the old pattern of civil-military relations. Since 1940 the American people have been coasting on the quality of the past. Unless a new balance is created, the continued disruption of American civil-military relations cannot help but impair the caliber of military professionalism in the future.<sup>9</sup>

The balance that did result was fusionist. The military retained some power, but at the expense of its exclusive grip on professional doctrine. The power possessed by the military was not the partisan political power Huntington feared; rather it was bureaucratic power, which accrues to those who manage the activities of a very large organization—in this case the Department of Defense. That power was counterbalanced by increasing civilian intrusion into what was once the exclusive province of the military professional: strategy and tactics. Greatly strengthened civilian power over military operations came from the national importance of tactical matters in limited war, from the domestic political and budgetary implications of large standing forces, and from the president's role in command of nuclear retaliatory forces.

#### REPORT OF ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDY

The new fusionist balance of shared power was more stable than Huntington

8. Ibid., p. 229.

9. Ibid., p. 464.

anticipated, largely because of the persistent fears of threats to the national security that have endured up to the present. But Huntington's fears about a decline in military professionalism may have been justified nonetheless. In 1970 the chief of staff of the army directed the Army War College to conduct a study of military professionalism in the army. The report which resulted from that study bluntly portrayed a serious decline in professionalism:

1. *The Traditional Professional Standards.*

The traditional standards of the American army officer may be summarized in three words: Duty—Honor—Country. The Officer Corps of today espouses this statement of professional ideals. Junior officers—lieutenants and captains—as a group profess acceptance of the code of Duty—Honor—Country as strongly as do their seniors. Junior officers are deeply aware of professional standards, keenly interested in discussions about the subject, and intolerant of those—either peers or seniors—who they believe are substandard in ethical or moral behavior or in technical competence.

2. *The Existing Climate.* Officers of all grades perceive a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the Officer Corps. This perception is strong, clear, pervasive, and statistically and qualitatively independent of grade, branch, educational level, or source of commission. There is also concern among officers that the Army is not taking action to ensure that high ideals are practiced as well as preached. In fact, there is extensive preoccupation among the younger officers with this condition, but, fortunately, little evidence of cynicism or negativism on their part.

The climate, as perceived and described with uncommon similarity by the sample of 450 officers directly queried, as well as by other segments of the Officer Corps who had participated in recent surveys and studies on related matters, is one in which there is disharmony between traditional, accepted ideals and the prevailing institutional pressures. These pressures seem to

stem from a combination of self-oriented, success motivated actions, and a lack of professional skills on the part of middle and senior grade officers. A scenario that was repeatedly described in seminar sessions and narrative responses includes an ambitious, transitory commander—marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties—engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates.<sup>10</sup>

The study offered no explanation as to the reasons for the existing climate which damaged the attainment of professional standards. It did, however, rule out the changing social context, the impact of the war in Vietnam, and the increasing complexity of technology. The study concluded, however, that the prevailing climate was the creature of the senior officers who managed the army, and that it was unlikely to be self-correcting. The report also warned of the consequences of the prevailing climate:

... it is conducive to self-deceptions because it fosters the production of inaccurate information; it impacts on the long term ability of the Army to fight and win because it frustrates young, idealistic, energetic officers who leave the service and are replaced by those who will tolerate if not condone ethical imperfection; it is corrosive of the Army's image because it falls short of the traditional idealistic code of the soldier—a code which is the key to the soldier's acceptance by a modern free society; it lowers the credibility of our top military leaders because it often shields them from essential bad news; it stifles initiative, innovation, and humility because

10. This and other references to the study were derived from a report prepared by the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, dated June 30, 1970, and titled *Study on Military Professionalism*.

it demands perfection or the pose of perfection at every turn; it downgrades technical competence by rewarding instead trivial, measurable, quota-filling accomplishments; and it eventually squeezes much of the inner satisfaction and personal enjoyment out of being an officer.

The report then ventured some correctives that should be applied. The most important of these dealt with what was called the army's *appraisal* and *assignment* systems—the formal and informal procedures whereby officers are evaluated, rewarded, and punished, and the process of long-term officer development. Both of these systems operate in the context of a relatively large standing army—a development that began only after World War II. Officers are rated in terms of their ability to perform command and staff tasks, as has always been the case. However, ratings are based on the actual performance of these tasks during assignment to a specific job. Thus, a major general is considered to be an effective commander only after he demonstrates that skill by commanding a peacetime division.

In theory, this should be a more reliable system than rating an officer for high command without any evidence that in fact he possesses the skills—as was done of necessity prior to World War II. Yet there is no evidence that the present system produces more reliably competent officers than those who commanded in World War II. In fact, the professionalism study report indicates that the bureaucratic pressures built into the management of a large peacetime force structure tend to warp the professional values and standards of the officers who must compete for coveted command and staff positions. In World War II, command of a division or army was an end in itself—an opportunity to use skills developed in theory but never used. Today, compe-

tence is developed by a succession of assignments to actual field units and staffs. The system rewards not demonstrated competence in combat—as it did in World War II—but the kind of bureaucratic political skills which accompanies successful advancement in any large organization. Thirty years of this process have, as the army's professionalism study reveals, institutionalized it.

#### OFFICERS WITH BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATION SKILLS

The virtues of the old system were that it produced a body of trained but untested officers who could assume command of large forces mobilized in wartime. As Huntington pointed out, most of these officers were remarkably competent. The present system produces officers skilled in bureaucratic administration and politics, but not necessarily competent for combat. The war in Vietnam, since it did not involve very large scale mobilization of the kind required in World Wars I and II, did not interrupt the bureaucratic process of "ticket punching"—the accumulation of a good record by a succession of coveted command and staff assignments. Service in Vietnam was not the capstone of a career of preparation, but simply a more glittering stepstone in the progression to the top of the bureaucratic ladder.

Conduct of the war itself reinforced this attitude. The complex character of the war prevented the setting of clear goals for accomplishment, and it was difficult for the services to assign their officers to field commands "for the duration," as had been done before Korea. The resulting policy of one-year tours in the war zone debilitated officers' commitments to the competent completion of their units' mission. Granted, it is not clear that the old system of producing military leadership would

have borne the strain of war in Vietnam any better than the new.

However, the nation has learned difficult lessons about what it means to fight in conflicts like the war in Indochina. There is a high likelihood that the armed forces will not soon be asked to fight again under such difficult circumstances. If this be the case, then the question of restoration of military professionalism by a return to the old pattern of civil-military relations is a pertinent one. The present system may present a choice, as suggested by the professionalism report, between mission accomplishment—successful management of a large peacetime force—and professional ethics. If the large peacetime force is not needed, there clearly is no choice.

National security in the cold war period has required large military forces mainly because of the threat of nuclear destruction and the need to intervene where containment required it. One of the casualties of this policy may have been the professional standards of the officer corps. If those threats persist and the nation is required to maintain a large defense establishment, there may be little that can be done to restore military professionalism. On the other hand, the prospects for peace and the opportunities to break the present pattern appear to be better than at any time since the end of World War I.

Unfortunately, restoration of the old system is not likely to be undertaken by the services themselves. The officers who command the armed forces today are themselves products of the new rather than the old system. They rep-

resent a powerful political force, after years of successful bureaucratic survival in the rough politics of budget-making in the federal government. They cannot be expected to be willing participants in either the dismantling of the defense establishment that has existed for thirty years, nor the return to a system of preservation of military virtues many consider unsuited to modern times.

Yet if the domestic political climate and the evolving transformation of international relations develop as expected, the services will be forced to accept substantial force reductions. Budgetary politics and institutional survival instincts may not necessarily produce, however, effective restoration of military professionalism. Bitter fights to garner public and political support for existing force levels might do just the opposite.

What appears to be needed is the kind of civilian leadership politically powerful enough to break the existing political structure that supports the defense establishment, and sensible enough to require the restoration by the services of strong institutional commitment to professional standards of competence and integrity. If Huntington is right, that will be more important to the national security than a professional military closely tied to the society it serves. Democratic freedoms are threatened less in the United States by the undemocratic discipline of a thoroughly professional officer corps than they are by the insidious influence of an entrenched bureaucracy whose size makes it a major political force in society.



## SUPPLEMENT

# Continuity and Change in Recent Research on Social Institutions

By ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR.

OUR earlier review of studies of social institutions<sup>1</sup> noted increased emphasis on change and conflict,<sup>2</sup> comparative and systemic analysis,<sup>3</sup> and formalized models and research methods. These trends continued during the more recent period now to be examined.

Because of the enormous increase in the scientific and scholarly literature

since 1967, our token review must be limited to a few, not necessarily representative, illustrations. We will not deal with most of the studies that have been noted in other recent reviews in *THE ANNALS*, for example, political parties and elections,<sup>4</sup> structuralist analysis of marriage and kinship,<sup>5</sup> economic growth and fluctuations,<sup>6</sup> or recent developments in the study of American politics.<sup>7</sup>

1. "Recent Developments in Research on Social Institutions," *THE ANNALS* 374 (November 1967), pp. 171-84.

2. For example, Lance E. Davis and Douglas C. North, *Institutional Change and American Economic Growth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

3. Compare Stein Rokkan, ed., *Comparative Research across Cultures and Nations* (Paris, France: Manton, 1968); this work emphasizes data and methodologies and contains excellent bibliographies; see also Brigitte Berger, *Societies in Change: An Introduction to Comparative Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

### PARADIGMS, PERSPECTIVES, AND THEORIES

Debate continues concerning different sets of assumptions and perspectives often loosely called "theories": struc-

4. Vol. 402 (July 1972).

5. Vol. 401 (May 1972).

6. Vol. 393 (January 1971).

7. Vol. 391 (September 1970).

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tural functionalism, conflict theory,<sup>8</sup> "action" theory,<sup>9</sup> symbolic interactionism, "reflexive" sociology,<sup>10</sup> and the like. Considerable recent attention has been directed also to the "social construction of reality":<sup>11</sup> a central issue is the extent to which social behavior is regarded as shaped by "objective" situations or by actors' active interpretations or "definitions."<sup>12</sup>

A characteristic of the recent times of turbulence in academic life has been the proliferation of writings expressing "radical"—or "concerned," or "involved"—approaches to analysis and evaluation.<sup>13</sup>

Some efforts were made during the 1960s to develop a programmatic view of sociological theory that in effect would do away with the concept of institution. This approach developed interesting hypotheses in "exchange theory," as earlier proposed by George

8. Lewis A. Coser, ed., "Collective Violence and Civil Conflict," *Journal of Social Issues* 28, no. 1 (1972), pp. 1-212. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

9. Compare "Review Symposium," *Contemporary Sociology* 1, no. 5 (September 1972), pp. 387-401, reviewing Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971).

10. Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

11. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966).

12. Compare David Silverman, *The Theory of Organizations: A Sociological Framework* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

13. A few examples out of many: Jerome H. Skolnick and Elliot Curie, eds., *Crisis in American Institutions* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970); Charles H. Anderson, *Toward a New Sociology: A Critical View* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1971); Maurice Zeitlin, ed., *American Society, Inc.* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970); J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, eds., *Radical Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

C. Homans; later critiques explicated gaps and limitations that would result, were processes of institutionalization—and the resulting complex social structures—not taken into account.<sup>14</sup>

In their emphasis upon social relevance, some internal critics of social science appeared for a time to have abandoned the search for causality and conditional predictability. But the main thrust of empirical studies continued to be upon this research. For example, work on social indicators, systems analysis, and forecasting necessarily entailed attention to problems of prediction.<sup>15</sup> This attention was encouraged both by theoretical clarification and by examples of successful empirical forecasting and conditional prediction.<sup>16</sup> Some of these predictions refer to institutionalized social structures, but some are successful in dealing directly with such complex processes as migration,<sup>17</sup> population growth, and mobility.<sup>18</sup>

#### RESEARCH PROGRAMS, METHODS, AND TECHNIQUES

Numerous new applications of research techniques and approaches have

14. Compare Bengt Abrahamsson, "Homans on Exchange: Hedonism Revived," *American Journal of Sociology* 76, no. 2 (September 1970), pp. 273-85; Kenneth J. Gergen, *The Psychology of Behavior Exchange* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), esp. chap. 6; Herman Turk and Richard L. Simpson, eds., *Institutions and Social Exchange* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971).

15. Richard L. Henshel, "Sociology and Prediction," *American Sociologist* 6, no. 3 (August 1971), pp. 213-20.

16. Carl F. Christ, "Econometrics and Model-Building, 1967-1972," *THE ANNALS* 403 (September 1972), pp. 153-62.

17. Compare Omer R. Galle and Karl E. Taeuber, "Metropolitan Migration and Intervening Opportunities," *American Sociological Review* 31, no. 1 (February 1966), pp. 5-13.

18. Compare Ansley J. Coale, *The Growth and Structure of Human Populations: A*

appeared since the mid-1960s. Without supplanting prior tactics, these methodological developments are helping both to test and to generate new hypotheses.

The upsurge of work in the field of social indicators<sup>19</sup> reflects a convergence of methodological concerns and interest in public policy and applications of social science<sup>20</sup>—for example, “social accounts”—in macro-theory, and in assessment and evaluation procedures.<sup>21</sup> In contrast to these examples of promising development is the fact that, since the research during World War II that produced *The American Soldier*, there has not been support of any other comparable effort, despite the demonstrated productivity of a coordinated large-scale research program over a period long enough to permit cohort-studies and cumulative attack on major problems.

The uses of historical materials for developing conditional generalizations continues to be debated, but some scholars proceed meantime to demonstrate that substantial contributions are possible. Thus, Doherty's meticulous documentation shows that affluence, commitment to “the world,” and lack

of alienation characterized the Orthodox, but generally not the dissident, elements of the 1837 schism of the Hicksite Quakers in Philadelphia.<sup>22</sup>

New methods of analyzing social mobility have been applied to institutionalized organizations. An ingenious approach is to conceive of individuals' careers as shaped by the movement of status vacancies through social structures; a mathematical model based on this conception has given interesting results when fitted to data on church organizations.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, comparison of statistical models can clarify relations between institutional patterns and social processes. For example, individuals moving from lower social strata characterized by high rates of interaction with kinsmen to strata characterized by lower rates exhibit rates that are intermediate between the two points, that is, an additive model fits the data. But mobility from membership in one major religious “community” to another is associated with large decrements in interaction with kinsmen in the community of origin: the additive model does not fit. These findings give objective evidence of the relative sharpness—or thickness—of boundaries between social strata as compared with those between religious segments.<sup>24</sup>

*Mathematical Investigation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

19. See the extensive bibliographic material and substantive discussions in *THE ANNALS* 388 (March 1970).

20. For example, see: Francis G. Caro, ed., *Readings in Evaluation Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1971); Joseph S. Wholey et al., *Federal Evaluation Research: Analyzing the Effects of Public Programs* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1970); Leslie T. Wilkins, *Evaluation of Penal Measures* (New York: Random House, 1969); Donald T. Campbell, “Reforms as Experiments,” *American Psychologist* 24, no. 4 (April 1969), pp. 409–29; Peter H. Rossi and Walter Williams, *Evaluating Social Programs: Theory, Practice, and Politics* (New York: Seminar Press, 1972).

21. See *Social Science Research Council Items* 26, no. 3 (September 1972), pp. 25–26.

22. Robert W. Doherty, *The Hicksite Separation: A Sociological Analysis of Religious Schism in Early Nineteenth Century America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

23. Harrison C. White, *Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). Vacancies requiring an occupant are treated in terms of conditional probabilities of moving between strata in the organization. The focus thus is on created opportunities rather than on candidates.

24. Michael Aiken and David Goldberg, “Social Mobility and Kinship: A Re-examination of the Hypotheses,” *American Anthropologist* 71, no. 2 (April 1969), pp. 261–70.

### COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS AS LOCI OF INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

Main institutional sectors may be distinguished on the basis of the primary "functions" represented: for example, socialization, pattern-maintenance, and social placement (family and kinship); production and distribution of scarce, transferable values (economy); collective use and regulation of power (polity).<sup>25</sup> Modes of institutionalization, that is, forms of organization and relationships, cut across these sectors. A widely distributed mode of institutionalization is formal organization. Recent studies have been able to specify variables that produce major differences in such organizations. Thus, size is positively associated with both differentiation and complexity—but the relationships are affected in non-obvious ways by interaction-effects with other structural conditions.<sup>26</sup> Using longitu-

25. Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society*, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), chaps. 3, 11, 12, 14. For a similar approach to definition and analysis of institutions and of institutionalized organizations, see: Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Social Institutions: The Concept" and "Social Institutions: Comparative Study," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan, 1968), vol. 14, pp. 409-29.

26. Richard H. Hall, J. Eugene Haas, and Norman J. Johnson, "Organizational Size, Complexity, and Formalization," *American Sociological Review* 32, no. 6 (December 1967), pp. 903-12; Peter M. Blau, "A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations," *American Sociological Review* 35, no. 2 (April 1970), pp. 201-18 and "Errata," vol. 35, no. 4 (August 1970), p. 761; Norman P. Hummon, "A Mathematical Theory of Differentiation in Organizations," *American Sociological Review* 36, no. 2 (April 1971), pp. 297-303; Marshall W. Meyer, "Some Constraints in Analyzing Data on Organizational Structures: A Comment on Blau's Paper," *ibid.*, pp. 294-97; Peter M. Blau, "Comments on Two Mathematical Formulations and the Theory of Differentiation in Organizations," *ibid.*, pp. 304-7;

dinal data, Meyer shows that size<sup>27</sup> affects number of subunits, levels of hierarchy, and number of supervisors, but that size is itself unaffected by these characteristics. When size is statistically controlled, apparent relationships among the other variables disappear.<sup>28</sup> Important cumulative research rapidly is building a substantial base for analytical theory.<sup>29</sup>

Organization-environment relations increasingly are being examined.<sup>30</sup> Test-

Peter M. Blau and Richard A. Schoenherr, *The Structure of Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

27. Edward H. Holdaway and Thomas A. Blowers, "Administrative Ratios and Organizational Size: A Longitudinal Examination," *American Sociological Review* 36, no. 2 (April 1971), pp. 278-86.

28. Marshall W. Meyer, "Size and the Structure of Organizations: A Causal Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 4 (August 1972), pp. 434-41; Marshall W. Meyer, *Bureaucratic Structure and Authority: Coordination and Control in 254 Government Agencies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

29. George A. Hillery, Jr., "Freedom and Social Organization: A Comparative Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 36, no. 1 (February 1971), pp. 51-65; James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967); James L. Price, *Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1967); Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, *Organization and Environment: Managing, Differentiation and Integration* (Boston: Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 1967); E. J. Miller and A. K. Rice, *Systems of Organization: The Control of Task and Sentient Boundaries* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967); Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Organization and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968).

30. Herman Turk, "Interorganizational Networks in Urban Society: Initial Perspectives and Comparative Research," *American Sociological Review* 35, no. 1 (February 1970), pp. 1-18; Shirley Terreberry, "The Evolution of Organizational Environments," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (March 1968), pp. 590-613.

able hypotheses have developed concerning the effects of boundary-exchange relationships upon those organizations that act to classify persons and then to confer public status and to control access to social settings.<sup>31</sup>

Studies in sociology of science illustrate both institutionalized and non-institutionalized organization. Thus, organization within a scientific specialty in normal periods of consensus on basic approaches is a loose network of communication anchored around the highly productive "stars." But when radical changes in paradigms or methods of research are proposed, and arouse strong resistance, communication networks tighten and polarize: coherent activist groups arise,<sup>32</sup> marked by intense commitment, self-conscious tactics, focal centers and leadership, isolation from established scientists, and a single programmatic view of needed directions of activity.<sup>33</sup>

Many recent studies of institutionalized modes of supplying health and

welfare services describe unacknowledged ways in which treatment, care, or service may create or maintain conditions that such efforts are supposed to reduce or eradicate.<sup>34</sup> Thus, Scott shows how some private organizations for aiding blind persons stress an accommodative—rather than rehabilitative—approach, resulting in socialization of the blind into dependent roles within special occupational and social enclaves.<sup>35</sup>

Such processes may characterize whole networks of organizations linking several institutional sectors, for example, as in the vicious circle of responses that shunts the chronic victim of alcoholism from religious mission, to social work agency, to mental health clinic or hospital, to employment exchange, to job, to skid row, to jail, and so on.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, repeated experiences of arrests and imprisonment may be counterproductive in controlling alcoholism<sup>37</sup>—and other drug abuse.

31. Yeheskel Hasenfeld, "People-Processing Organizations: An Exchange Approach," *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 3 (June 1972), pp. 256–63. See Robert A. Scott, *The Making of Blind Men: A Study of Adult Socialization* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969).

32. Belfer C. Griffith and Nicholas C. Mullins, "Coherent Social Groups in Scientific Change," *Science* 177, no. 4053, September 15, 1972, pp. 959–64.

33. Studies of the broader aspects of institutionalization and change are illustrated by: Roger G. Krohn, *The Social Shaping of Science: Institutions, Ideologies, and Careers in Science* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1970); Robert Hahn, *The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution: The Paris Academy of Sciences, 1666–1803* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1971); Janice Beyer Lodahl and Gerald Gordon, "The Structure of Scientific Fields and the Functioning of University Graduate Departments," *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 1 (February 1972), pp. 57–72; Joseph Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971).

34. Compare William R. Rosengren and Mark Lefton, *Hospitals and Patients* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969); Milton Greenblatt, M. R. Sharaf, and Evelyn M. Stone, *Dynamics of Institutional Change: The Hospital in Transition* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971); Rodney M. Coe, ed., *Planned Change in the Hospital: Case Studies of Organizational Innovations* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

35. Robert A. Scott, *The Making of Blind Men: A Study of Adult Socialization* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969).

36. Jacqueline P. Wiseman, *Stations of the Lost: The Treatment of Skid-Row Alcoholics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Howard M. Bahr, *Disaffiliated Man: Essays and Bibliography on Skid-Row, Vagrancy, and Outsiders* (Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press, 1970); James P. Spradley, *You Owe Yourself a Drunk: An Ethnography of Urban Nomads* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970).

37. Compare the conclusions of the study stimulated by the Cooperative Commission on the Study of Alcoholism: Rupert Wilkinson, *The Prevention of Drinking Problems: Alcohol Control and Cultural Influences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

### STUDIES OF MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL SECTORS

Research illustrating approaches to analysis of each of the main institutional clusterings found in American society are noted below.

#### *Kinship and family*

Studies cover a very wide spectrum, from imaginative but untested hypotheses<sup>38</sup> to detailed descriptive work. There has been a marked upsurge in research on minority ethnic populations;<sup>39</sup> the findings highlight great variability, as well as the "open" character of family units in relation to external social environments. Another major development has been critical and synthetic in character.

As findings have accumulated, the unorganized and diffuse materials invite codification. A reasonable first response is a propositional inventory, and in the present instance the result is an indispensable, massive—over seven hundred double-columned pages—cross-indexed compilation of some fifteen thousand propositions.<sup>40</sup>

38. Bernard Farber, *Kinship and Class: A Midwestern Study* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

39. Andrew Billingsley, *Black Families in White America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968); Joseph Lopreato, *Italian Americans* (New York: Random House, 1970); Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldschneider, *Jewish Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968); Harry H. L. Kitano, *Japanese Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); John H. Scanzoni, *The Black Family in the Modern Society* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971); John H. Scanzoni, *Opportunity and the Family* (New York: Free Press, 1970).

40. William J. Goode, Elizabeth Hopkins, and Helen M. McClure, *Social Systems and Family Patterns: A Propositional Inventory* (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971), p. vii. Integrative work also appeared in monographic studies, for example, Bert N. Adams, *Kinship in an Urban*

### *Social stratification*

In a series of micro-analyses, Sewell and associates have traced intricate relationships between family, education, and social stratification. For example, the influence of parents' stratification position interacts with test performance—"mental ability"—of the child and thereby influences both performance and the evaluations by teachers, peers, and self; in turn, these outcomes affect educational and occupational aspirations, and finally, educational and occupational attainments.<sup>41</sup>

At the macro level, analyses of national data show that the notion of "family transmission of position" requires critical reexamination. The work of Duncan and Blau finds that there is, indeed, much mobility among occupational "classes," but most moves are between adjacent levels; intergenerational mobility in recent years results in net upgrading; upward mobility is primarily due to increases in middle-level occupations.<sup>42</sup> For popu-

*Setting* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968).

41. William H. Sewell, "The Educational and Early Occupational Attainment Process: Replication and Revision," *American Sociological Review* 35, no. 6 (December 1970), pp. 1014-27; William H. Sewell, Archibald O. Haller, and Alejandro Portes, "The Education and Early Occupational Attainment Process," *ibid.* 34, no. 1 (February 1969), pp. 82-92; William H. Sewell and Vimal P. Shah, "Parents' Education and Children's Educational Aspirations and Achievements," *ibid.* 33, no. 2 (April 1968), pp. 191-209; William H. Sewell and J. Michael Armer, "Neighborhood Context and College Plans," *ibid.* 31, no. 2 (April 1966), pp. 159-68.

42. Peter M. Blau and O. Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: Wiley, 1967). For additional bibliographies see Edward O. Laumann, Paul M. Siegel, and Robert W. Hodge, eds., *The Logic of Social Hierarchies* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970); and Edward O. Laumann, ed., *Social Stratification: Research and*

lations not severely restricted by systems of group discrimination, equalization of educational levels can occur rapidly, and intergenerational transmission of poverty as such is not the dominant pattern. But the negative consequences of racial category are far greater than those of the socio-economic position of the family of origin.<sup>43</sup>

A critical review<sup>44</sup> of studies of poverty and of dependency on "welfare"—public assistance of some kind—shows: (1) there are very few studies of actual intergenerational dependency; (2) poverty and absence of a male family head are associated with an educational and occupational position of children (sons) lower than those of children from intact families of higher income; (3) but, intergenerational transmission of poverty per se has not been accurately documented; and (4) available data have not established a clear relationship between psychological and economic dependency.<sup>45</sup>

*Theory for the 1970's* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970).

43. With regard to transmission of educational levels, Duncan and Duncan observe on the basis of data from 1962 National Census survey: "The rather sharp differentials in formal schooling by nationality that obtained in the parental generation did not persist among their native sons, who assimilated the American norms of school attendance" (Beverly Duncan and Otis Dudley Duncan, "Minorities and the Process of Stratification," *American Sociological Review* 33, no. 3 [June 1968], p. 360). See also: Otis Dudley Duncan, "Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Race?" in Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., *On Understanding Poverty* (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Beverly Duncan and Otis Dudley Duncan, "Family Stability and Occupational Success," *Social Problems* 16, no. 3 (Winter 1969), pp. 273-85.

44. Norman C. Weissberg, "Intergenerational Welfare Dependency: A Critical Review," *Social Problems* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1970), pp. 257-74.

45. On the above points compare further: Joel Handler, *The Deserving Poor* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971); Gilbert

Among recent studies of working-class populations, some have given special attention to *embourgeoisement*,<sup>46</sup> while others have focused on alienation and hostile reactions of workers to various other portions of their societal environment.<sup>47</sup> The most comprehensive review of American data from national surveys finds that differences in attitudes, information, and life-styles are not great between manual and non-manual workers—nor among broad occupational categories within these divisions.<sup>48</sup>

### Education

Disaffection with the alleged consequences of formal education in relation to avowed aims and claimed accomplishments is apparent in much of the recent literature.<sup>49</sup> At the same time, other research has been showing that both the inputs to and the outcomes of education can be well understood only through analysis that is both systemic and detailed.<sup>50</sup> Analyses deal not only

Steiner, *The State of Welfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1971).

46. For Great Britain: John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bekhofer, and Jennifer Platt, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

47. Edward Ransford, "Blue Collar Anger: Reactions to Student and Black Protest," *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 3 (June 1972), pp. 333-46.

48. Norval D. Glenn and Jon P. Alston, "Cultural Distance among Occupational Categories," *American Sociological Review* 33, no. 3 (June 1968), pp. 365-82.

49. Ivar Berg, with assistance of Shirley Gorelick, *Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

50. John D. Folger and Charles B. Nam, *Education of the American Population* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); Robert Dreeben, "American Schooling: Patterns and Processes of Stability and Change," in Bernard Barber and Alex Inkeles, eds., *Stability and Social Change* (Boston: Little,

with linkages of education with occupational and family sectors, but also with political,<sup>51</sup> religious, and stratification structures.

Stemming from the massive impact of the "Coleman Report," a searching reexamination of American educational systems is under way.<sup>52</sup> Initial public discussions suggest that over-generalized criticisms of education may result for a time—reflecting unrealistic prior assumptions as to what formal education conceivably could do to counteract effects of family, socio-economic class, racial and ethnic discrimination, peer groupings, and even the primary political and economic institutions.

### *Economic institutions*

Sociologically relevant research on economic processes have dealt with political conditions, national and international,<sup>53</sup> social class, ethnic discrimination,<sup>54</sup> the status of women, advertising, and a host of other particularized topics. In its broadest scope, the macro-analysis of economic institutions merges into comprehensive interpretations of change in total societal systems.<sup>55</sup>

Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 96-197; Robert Dreeben, *On What is Learned in School* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968).

51. David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

52. See especially Frederick Mosteller and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, eds., *On Equality of Educational Opportunity* (New York: Random House, 1972); Christopher Jencks et al., *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

53. THE ANNALS 403 (September 1972).

54. Gary S. Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

55. Compare Milton Mankoff, "Power in Advanced Capitalist Society: A Review Essay on Recent Elitist and Marxist Criticism of

Much of the research-based literature concerning formal organizations deals with business firms.<sup>56</sup> Meanwhile, some critical synthesis of data on labor unions has been accomplished,<sup>57</sup> and effort continues to be devoted to studies of occupations and professions.<sup>58</sup> The "new worker" has been identified and described in fairly specific terms: essentially he is affluent, conservative—and alienated.<sup>59</sup>

### *Political institutions*

Recent summaries and critical reviews<sup>60</sup> of work in political science and

Pluralist Theory," *Social Problems* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1970), pp. 418-30.

56. For reasons of space we must omit references to the many relevant articles concerning economic organizations that have appeared recently in *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *Human Organization*, *Journal of Industrial Relations*, *Human Relations*. For a useful general source of collected works—extending back into the 1950s—see Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller, *The Sociology of Organization: Basic Studies* (New York: The Free Press, 1970).

57. For example, Mark van de Vall, *Labor Organizations: A Macro- and Micro-Sociological Analysis on a Comparative Basis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970); John P. Windmuller, *Labor Relations in the Netherlands* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969).

58. Richard H. Hall, *Occupations and the Social Structure* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); Wilbert E. Moore in collaboration with Gerald W. Rosenblum, *The Professions: Roles and Rules* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970).

59. William A. Westley and Margaret W. Westley, *The Emerging Worker: Equality and Conflict in the Mass Society* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1971); George Katona, Burkhard Strumpel, and Ernest Zahn, *Aspirations and Affluence: Comparative Studies in the United States and Western Europe* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971).

60. Vernon M. Goetcheus and Harvey C. Mansfield, "Innovations and Trends in the Study of American Politics," THE ANNALS 391 (September 1970), pp. 177-87; Hugh A. Bone, "Selected Bibliography in American Parties



sociology render it unnecessary here to do more than refer to a few synthesizing studies.<sup>61</sup> Several important analyses trace influences from other sectors to the political,<sup>62</sup> and vice versa.<sup>63</sup> Some of the newer analyses emphasize educative and integrative effects of participation. Traditional and modern societies generate distinctive types of apathy or non-participation, although low or marginal social position and weak sense of efficacy are common features of non-participants in routine political processes. Assessment of the interplay between political values and ideologies and actual practices has been attempted.<sup>64</sup>

Along with many ephemeral commentaries, the 1960s brought substantial studies of institutionalization and change in military affairs.<sup>65</sup> Basic re-

and Elections, 1967-1971; A Brief Annotation," *THE ANNALS* 402 (July 1972), pp. 117-30.

61. A collection of some ninety-seven selections intended to emphasize comparative and historical approaches has been organized by S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Political Sociology: A Reader* (New York: Basic Books, 1971). See also Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: The Free Press, 1970); Morris Janowitz, *Political Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

62. Paul Burstein, "Social Structure and Individual Political Participation in Five Countries," *American Journal of Sociology* 77, no. 6 (May 1972), pp. 1087-1110; Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

63. Robert A. Dahl, *After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

64. Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Giuseppe Di Palma, *Apathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Societies* (New York: The Free Press, 1970); Dennis F. Thompson, *The Democratic Theory in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

65. For example: Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds., *On Military Ideol-*

search on military organizations necessarily contributes to and draws from generalizations applicable to other institutionalized collectivities—education,<sup>66</sup> socialization,<sup>67</sup> organizational structure and change.<sup>68</sup> Thus, careful analysis has exposed some of the oversimplified generalizations that had gathered around the vague notion of a "military-industrial complex" during the ideologically charged 1960s.<sup>69</sup>

ogy (Rotterdam: University of Rotterdam Press, 1971); Roger W. Little, ed., *A Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971); Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Charles C. Moskos, *The American Enlisted Man* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970); Jacques Van Doorn, ed., *Military Professions and Military Regimes* (Hague: Mouton, 1969); Kurt Lang, *Sociology of the Military: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography* (Chicago: Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Loyola University of Chicago, 1969).

66. Lawrence Radway, "Recent Trends at American Service Academies," in Charles C. Moskos, ed., *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1971).

67. Gary L. Wamsley, "Contrasting Institutions of Air Force Socialization: Happerstance of Bellwether?" *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 2 (September 1972), pp. 399-417; Klaus Roghmann and Wolfgang Sodeur, "The Impact of Military Service on Authoritarian Attitudes: Evidence from West Germany," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 2 (September 1972), pp. 418-33; see also, K. Roghman, "Armed Forces and Society in West Germany: Program and Reality," in Morris Janowitz and J. A. A. van Doorn, eds., *On Military Intervention* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971).

68. For example, Grant W. Childers, Bruce H. Mayhew, Jr., and Louis N. Gray, "System Size and Structural Differentiation in Military Organizations: Testing a Baseline Model of the Division of Labor," *American Journal of Sociology* 76, no. 5 (March 1971), pp. 813-30.

69. For example, Ritchie P. Lowry, "To Arms: Changing Military Roles and the Military-Industrial Complex," *Social Problems* 18, no. 1 (Summer 1970), pp. 3-16; Stanley

### Religion

The closing years of the 1960s were marked by intense controversy over the social role of organized religion and with indications of a substantial and perhaps widening difference in orientations of clergy and laity.<sup>70</sup>

Added empirical support and conceptual elaboration has been given to the hypothesis that religious pluralism—at least in the United States and most Western European nations—strengthens organized religion by providing a “quasi-ethnic” collectivity as a focus of identity and social location.<sup>71</sup> Because denominations represent institutionalized solutions to problems both of meaning<sup>72</sup> and of belonging,<sup>73</sup> it is predicted that denominational boundaries will be quite stable over time, that ecumenism will be supported by persons with strong intrinsic, rather than socially conventional religious commitments, and that secularism will be strongly limited.

The possible influence of strictly religious factors on social behavior remains

Lieberson, “An Empirical Study of Military-Industrial Linkages,” *American Journal of Sociology* 76, no. 4 (January 1971), pp. 562–84.

70. James M. Gustafson, spec. ed., “The Sixties: Radical Change in American Religion,” *THE ANNALS* 387 (January 1970); Jeffrey K. Hadden, *The Gathering Storm in the Churches: The Widening Gap between Clergy and Laymen* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1969).

71. Andrew M. Greeley, *The Denominational Society: A Sociological Approach to Religion in America* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972).

72. Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” *Daedalus* 96 (Winter 1967), pp. 1–21.

73. For example, Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier: A Study of Group Survival in the Open Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1967); John Kotre, *View from the Border* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1971).

elusive.<sup>74</sup> A review of all studies appearing in ten major sociological journals, 1960–69, found 182 articles that presented an empirical analysis of some aspect of religion as an independent variable. Only 5 articles were judged to clearly show—and perhaps 20 could be said to plausibly support—a causal connection. The primary influences appeared to be mediated through strongly institutionalized statuses and group boundaries, for example, restrictions on intermarriage, inculcation of behavioral norms through the family.<sup>75</sup>

### INTERRELATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS

Examples of analyses of interconnections of major institutional sectors are too abundant for adequate sampling. A recently developed technique of network representation of interlocked directorates illustrates a potentially useful approach for analyzing both intra- and interinstitutional linkages,<sup>76</sup> for example, military-industrial, church-state, inter-university, organized crime-polity. Some continuing analysis has been devoted to possible connections between education and economic growth. Thus, Machlup indicates that adult education and on-

74. David L. Featherman, “The Socioeconomic Achievement of White Religio-ethnic Subgroups: Social and Psychological Explanations,” *American Sociological Review* 36, no. 2 (April 1972), p. 220; Howard Schuman, “The Religious Factor in Detroit: Review, Replication, and Re-analysis,” *American Sociological Review* 36, no. 1 (February 1971), pp. 30–48; and Gerhard Lenski, “The Religious Factor in Detroit: Revisited,” *ibid.*, pp. 48–50.

75. Gary D. Bouma, “Is There a Religious Factor?” (Ph.D. diss., Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University, 1970). See further, Lawrence K. Kersten, *The Lutheran Ethic: The Impact of Religion on Laymen and Clergy* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970); Gary Schwartz, *Sect Ideologies and Social Status* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

76. Joel H. Levine, “The Sphere of Influence,” *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 1 (February 1972), p. 14–27.

the-job training seem to offer relatively quick returns, but that some types of educational expansion may be counter-productive in "developing" societies.<sup>77</sup>

Studies of the involvement of organized religion in public issues help to specify interrelations of religion to other institutions, as in the case of Supreme Court decisions—1962 and 1963—regarding Bible reading and prayer in public schools. Dolbeare and Hammond described very complex patterns of compliance, resistance, evasion, and contravention.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, issues of civil rights and equality of opportunity have elicited marked cleavages among clergy and members of organized religious bodies.<sup>79</sup>

### *Institutions and change*

The search for specified invariant patterns of societal change continues, aided by improved methodology but plagued by inadequate data. Partial support for Parsonian hypotheses of "universals" in social development has been found by Guttman-scaling applied to fifty countries.<sup>80</sup> Syntheses have brought partial order into the recent

proliferation of special theories of social change.<sup>81</sup>

The dual emphasis on stability and change runs through recent studies of all major institutional complexes, from law or education to total societies and intersocietal systems.<sup>82</sup>

Overwhelming in bulk and in variety are the writings, 1967–72, on change and conflict in educational institutions, especially on "crises" in universities: a recent compilation required two volumes, totaling over a thousand pages.<sup>83</sup>

Even in what appear to be the most highly purposive collective activities, major unanticipated changes arise from complex crisscrossing of institutions and relationships. Thus, unintended and unanticipated developments in science in the United States are clearly demonstrated by analysis of processes of role-differentiation and institutionalization.<sup>84</sup>

An emphasis upon *process*, it might seem, would be nearly inevitable in studies of conflict and conflict-resolution. Not so, however, for many studies have concentrated upon data that permit only essentially static models, that is, "initial conditions" and "outcome." Most recently, the processual approach has gained ground.<sup>85</sup>

77. Fritz Machlup, *Education and Economic Growth* (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).

78. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip E. Hammond, *The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

79. Jeffrey K. Hadden, "Clergy Involvement in Civil Rights," *THE ANNALS* 387 (January 1970), pp. 118–27.

80. Gary L. Buck and Alvin L. Jacobson, "Social Evolution and Structural Functional Analysis: An Empirical Test," *American Sociological Review* 33, no. 3 (June 1968), pp. 343–55. See the methodological development of an alternative of Guttman-type scaling for analyzing longitudinal processes by Robert K. Leik and Merlyn Matthews, "A Scale for Developmental Processes," *American Sociological Review* 33, no. 1 (February 1968), pp. 62–75.

81. Wilbert E. Moore, *Essays in Comparative Sociology* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967).

82. Bernard Barber and Alex Inkeles, eds., *Stability and Social Change* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

83. Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Starr, eds., *The University Crisis Reader*, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1971). Specific studies abound, for example, Max Heirich, *The Spiral of Conflict: Berkeley 1964* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

84. Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society*.

85. Compare Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Social Order and Social Conflict," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 114, no. 3 (June 1970), pp. 217–25; Lewis A. Coser, ed., "Collective Violence and Civil Conflict," *The Journal of Social Issues* 28, no. 1 (1972), pp.

As analysis of processes of change advances, the findings raise the possibility that society-wide institutions typically are greatly "overdetermined" by numerous, pervasive, intersupportive, and diverse interests, value-commitments, beliefs, and adaptive mechanisms. For this reason, many plausible efforts to reform this or that sub-sector produce initial changes that are quickly absorbed and modified by many small counteracting responses. To expose this "recalcitrance of complexity" in enough specificity for accurate assessment of public policies requires systems analysis of considerable sophistication. Difficult as the task is, serious analytical efforts are under way and will continue.

*Change in dominant institutional principles*

For most of the twentieth century the main thrust of change in American institutions has been to increase the importance of universalistic, individualistic, achievement-oriented norms, to weaken ascribed and particularistic criteria, and to emphasize procedural equality, for example, "equality of formal opportunity." In contrast, the

late 1960s and 1970s show increased demands for equality of *outcomes* for social *categories and collectivities*.<sup>86</sup> At the same time that nominal educational opportunity was being questioned as a major solution for economic inequality,<sup>87</sup> philosophical attacks upon the "meritocratic ethic" were coupled with proposals for its replacement by an "ethic of justice" that implies a sweeping egalitarianism.<sup>88</sup>

Although the long-run importance of these developments cannot now be accurately appraised, it is apparent that opposition between explicit principles has been injected into debates over national institutional policies.

86. Daniel Bell, "On Meritocracy and Equality," *The Public Interest*, no. 29 (Fall 1972), pp. 29-68.

87. Mosteller and Moynihan, *On Equality of Educational Opportunity*; Jencks et al., *Inequality: A Reassessment*.

88. Harvey A. Auerch et al., *How Effective is Schooling? A Critical Review of Synthesis of Research Findings* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1972); John E. Coons, William P. Clune, and Stephen D. Sugarman, *Private Wealth and Public Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1970); W. L. Hansen and B. Weisbrod, "The Distribution of Costs and Direct Benefits of Public Education: The Case of California," *Journal of Human Resources* 4 (Spring 1969), pp. 178-85; John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); compare W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).

1-212; Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); David Britt and Omer R. Galle, "Industrial Conflict and Unionization," *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 1 (February 1972), pp. 46-57.

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### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

RICHARD EELLS. *Global Corporations: The Emerging System of World Economic Power*. Pp. 242. New York: Interbook, 1972. \$8.95.

What is lacking in the growing literature on multinational business, Mr. Eells suggests, is a "mature theory" to place the multinational corporation "in the context of competing political economies in the world arena." Mr. Eells seeks to contribute to such a theory. To Mr. Eells, the multinational corporation represents "an organizational instrument," politically neutral, that is not an instrument of capitalist expansion. The multinational corporation can be understood in terms of "federalism," as an enterprise with "nuclei of independent entities." It is but one of many transnational organizations—governmental and private, profit and non-profit—that cross political boundaries.

Mr. Eells traces the background of the multinational corporation, finding that it has grown from the modern corporation, which leads him to relate that development from its expression in Roman law to today. He ranks the corporation with the family, church, state, and academy as basic institutions devised to govern human affairs.

While he deals briefly with these five "notably successful institutions," he returns to his main concern of the relationship between the multinational corporation and the national state in the contemporary world. Nationalism continues today. The multinational corporation contends with this "outdated" political system and uses economic power as the source of its strength; the multinational corporation is also buttressed by power in communications and by technological and moral power. With these powers, the multinational corporation can be expected to be (p. 151), may be (p. 172), or will be (p. 212), a contributor to solving world problems and a contributor to world peace.

Mr. Eells, however, presents little evidence to indicate that the national state will relinquish power to the multinational corporation. In the past, when there has been a dramatic clash between the nation-state and the multinational corporation—as in World Wars I and II, for example—the latter seems to have yielded to the decisions of the former. Can we be sure, this reviewer wonders, that the future will be different? As his title indicates, Mr. Eells thinks so. International law will or may—the author uses different formulations—follow on the needs of the multina-

tional corporation, which in turn will adapt to changing global structures.

Mr. Eells' work seems to be a melding of scissors-and-paste with insight. Our scissors-and-paste reaction comes from Mr. Eells' numerous summaries of the works of others. His insight lies in his perception of the multinational corporation in institutional terms and his thoughtful application of theories of political scientists and sociologists. That Mr. Eells also finds the ideas of Rachel Carson, Marshall McLuhan, Herman Kahn, and Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan relevant to a study of the multinational corporation indicates the breadth of his discussion.

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JOHN LEWIS GADDIS. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. Pp. ix, 396. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. \$12.50 Paperbound, \$3.95.

This distinguished volume in the Contemporary American History Series is a balanced, well-written, thoroughly documented narrative account and analysis of the much-discussed subject of the origins of the Cold War. It makes extensive use of new documents which throw fresh light on the evolution of United States policy toward the Soviet Union during and immediately after World War II, but which, unfortunately, do not penetrate far into the still dimly-lit recesses of the Kremlin. More attention is given to the impact of domestic influences and pressures in the United States in shaping policy toward Russia than is contained in most accounts of the period. Revisionist historians emphasize the responsibility of the United States for the onset of the Cold War, and the economic restraints on American foreign policy-makers; but, as Professor Gaddis points out, "by focusing so heavily on economics, they neglect the profound impact of the domestic political system on the conduct of American foreign policy" (p. 357).

Professor Gaddis' study covers the period "from the formation of the Grand Alliance

in 1941 to the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947" (p. vii). Franklin D. Roosevelt's "grand design" for cooperation with the Soviet Union could not overcome the gaps between Soviet and U.S. policies and objectives, both with regard to the conduct of the war and the desirable shape of the postwar world order. Toward the end of his life Roosevelt began to have reservations about the Soviet Union, and Truman soon came to have more, although for some time he did not abandon his hopes of effective cooperation with the Russians. Even before the end of 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes was criticized by Senator Vandenberg and other domestic critics of his "soft" policy toward the Soviet Union.

A combination of external events and domestic pressures led to "a fundamental reorientation of policy toward the Soviet Union" (p. 281) in the spring of 1946. The United States changed over to a policy of "patience with firmness," in Mr. Acheson's words, or of "get tough with Russia," to use the characterization of some of its critics. This change in policy was strongly supported by American public opinion, and the few challenges to it—notably by Henry Wallace in his Madison Square Garden speech of September 12, 1946—were generally ineffective. Rightly or wrongly, President Truman and his top advisers came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was a threat to the security of the United States; and in addition, as Professor Gaddis suggests, "it seems likely that Washington policy-makers mistook Stalin's determination to ensure Russian security through spheres of influence for a renewed effort to spread communism outside the borders of the Soviet Union" (p. 355). With the enunciation of the "containment policy" in the Truman Doctrine speech in March, 1947, the Cold War began to take on the contours of the kind of confrontation that characterized Soviet-American relations, and that affected international relations generally for many years thereafter.

The central conclusion of this study is that the Cold War "grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union" (p. 361), and that

"neither side can bear sole responsibility" for it (p. 360). It was not an irresponsible conflict, but the atmosphere of mutual misunderstanding and mistrust which underlay the "strange alliance" of World War II and especially the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early postwar years made real cooperation between the two new superpowers increasingly difficult. Certainly, as Professor Gaddis sagely observes, the Cold War "is too complicated an event to be discussed in terms of either national guilt or the determinism of inevitability" (p. 360).

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ROSS GREGORY. *The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War*. Pp. 157. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972. \$6.95.

This compact account of American intervention in the First World War, thoroughly grounded in the vast literature that the subject has inspired, leads one to believe that finally it may indeed be possible to put the question of the American declaration of war to rest. For this reviewer, at least, the author has succeeded in doing just that. Having established the sequence of events in broad strokes skillfully interwoven with selected detail, the author in the last chapter reflects on the record and produces an analysis that is altogether persuasive.

The problem is to depict the interaction between circumstance and policy. The opposing sides in the European war, struggling over control of the seaways, disrupted the accustomed channels of American trade, while each sought to assure its own access to the agricultural and industrial products of the American economy. Thus American trade and finance were quickly pulled into the maelstrom, posing an endless succession of dilemmas that Wilson sought to resolve through recourse to the law of neutrality and maritime warfare. But each side parried Wilson's interpretation of the law and was prepared to frustrate American policy as much as it dared.

Inexorably British sea power molded American trade to the almost exclusive advantage of the Allies, while our dwindling trade with Germany removed any positive constraint on the latter's resort to unrestricted submarine warfare. Prosperity, of course, encouraged American acquiescence in the asymmetrical impact of its trade on the war, but the lopsidedness was the more acceptable because it accorded with an unacknowledged bias in American policy. To be sure, on its face Wilson's use of international law as the measure of policy would seem to let the chips fall where they may. Yet had they fallen to the advantage of Germany rather than Britain, the shattering effect of technology on the traditional law would have afforded Wilson ample opportunity to apply the law of contraband, of search and seizure, and of armed merchantmen in such a way as to have had an incidence quite different from that of his choice in the actual circumstances. As to the basis of Wilson's preference for the Allies, if it was not prompted by fear, neither was it a matter of mere sentiment. To him and to dominant American opinion the future simply looked more secure in the event of a British rather than a German victory. However, in the War Address, where Wilson explicitly defined American interest in political rather than in legal terms alone, he did not proclaim support for Britain but for democracy and a future league of nations.

Such, briefly put, is Gregory's argument. No longer does one hear the shrill charges of the 1930s against bankers, munitions makers, and propagandists. Nor does Gregory subscribe simply to the view that the submarine's ruthlessness was the cause of American intervention, sensitive as he is to the fragility of the rules of maritime warfare, rendered all the more treacherous as a footing by the impact of technology on weaponry.

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MICHAEL ARTHUR LEDEEN. *Universal Fascism: The Theory and Practice of*

*the Fascist International, 1928-1936.* Pp. vii, 200. New York: Howard Fertig, 1972. \$9.50.

The author's purpose is to describe and analyze the attempt made in the late 1920s and early 1930s to transform fascism from a national to an international movement. He is interested in the appeal of fascism beyond the boundaries of Italy as well as the effort to reconstruct a Fascist International based on an ideology of corporatism and the cult of youth. In the process he seeks to reconsider the traditional accounts of fascism.

Using material recently made available in Italian archives, Dr. Ledeen gives special attention to the work of the young fascist generation, alienated by a regime it felt had failed to achieve any profound transformation of Italian society. Mussolini's government, said these young critics, had grown old and stale in power. From this fascist youth, contends the author, there emerged the doctrines of a Universal Fascism, which called for the restoration of a "truly revolutionary fascism, inspired by the spirit of youth, and committed to the transformation of European society." In essence, it was a movement within the body of fascism itself. In addition to its hypernationalist quality, it had a transnational appeal.

Universal Fascism, says the author, failed primarily because of the change in Italian foreign policy in the 1930s when Mussolini's involvement in Ethiopia and then in Spain meant that his propaganda activities had to be coordinated with foreign adventures rather than seek support from other fascisms. There were other factors involved, but this was the motivating one.

The author makes a valiant attempt to bolster his thesis in the face of the traditional view that fascism was dominantly the imposition of a regime of counterrevolutionaries and opportunists among the Italian people. He is convinced that fascism had sufficient appeal to draw together the representatives of similar movements. He, therefore, seeks assiduously for evidence in the Italian archives and press. He is especially impressed by the attempt to establish a Fascist International

at Montreux in 1934, a meeting which "needs to be taken with some seriousness despite its paucity of concrete results" (p. 163).

This effort to give validity to what was in effect a vague, ephemeral idea is not quite successful. Projected as a laudable goal by young Italians, "Universal Fascism" was never near implementation. It had some of the characteristics of such movements as pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, and pan-Asianism, all of which were limited to eloquent speeches, paper advocacy, and enthusiastic meetings. "Universal Fascism" never achieved reality. It deserves some attention as a historical oddity, but its role and influence should not be exaggerated.

The author is to be commended for his suggestive and challenging thesis as well as for his sense of scholarship and critical acumen. His book would have benefited from the attention of a hard editor, who would have eliminated split infinitives, dangling participles, and the plethora of such redundant phrases as "as we have seen" or "we shall see" and their variations.

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EVAN LUARD, ed. *The International Regulation of Civil Wars.* Pp. 240. New York: New York University Press, 1972. \$8.95.

If there is a single point Evan Luard is making in *The International Regulation of Civil Wars*, it is that in terms of international politics the occurrence of civil wars is not nearly as interesting as, and much less significant than, foreign interventions in domestic conflicts. The essays in this collection demonstrate why. They can be divided into four sections: (1) Luard's introductory piece; (2) seven case studies involving external interventions and attempts at regulation by international organization; (3) three essays on related topics; and (4) a concluding chapter.

Luard's introductory essay cogently lays out the significant issues for analysis. He argues that post-1945 civil wars can be



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classified according to four causes: *political* (the divisions in the conflict reflect those of the cold war—Western versus Communist political sympathies), *ideological* (revolutionary versus anti-revolutionary forces), *post-colonial* (power grabs by opposition forces or minority group disenchantment with newly-established regimes), *protest* (opposition to dictatorial or oppressive government): Luard finds that some of the conventional wisdom apropos intervention is incorrect—specifically that few of these conflicts have been proxy wars waged by great powers through obedient partisans. Rather they have resulted from tenuous political and economic structures of small, and frequently new, nations.

The question of defining intervention is no mean problem. Luard proposes various types or degrees of intervention ranging from the use of an external power's armed forces to training and support of revolutionary forces on outside territory to the sale of arms to forces of either side in the conflict.

With the exception of the piece on the Spanish civil war by Hugh Thomas the case studies deal with the activities of the United Nations organization in the civil wars in Greece (1944-1949) by John Campbell, Lebanon (1958) by Malcolm Kerr, Laos (1959-) by John Main, Congo (1960-1965) by Evan Luard, Yemen (1962) by Dana Schmidt, and Cyprus (1963-) by Anne Duncan-Jones. For the most part these brief reports are well done.

Three other essays plus Luard's conclusions comprise the remainder of the book. Rosalyn Higgins discusses the myriad problems of international law and civil conflict; Major General Henry Alexander—a veteran of the United Nations Congo operation—reflects on the difficulties of United Nations peace forces in civil wars; and Major General Indar Rikhye argues that there are more efficient ways to control peacekeeping operations from headquarters in New York than those generally employed. An interesting matter he considers is the problem of a peacekeeping operation using force when it has no enemy and no one to defeat.

Luard, in the final chapter, draws some

general conclusions from the case materials and observations on international law and the role of international organization in civil wars.

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J. C. MASTERMAN. *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945*. Pp. xxi, 203. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. \$6.95.

LADISLAS FARAGO. *The Game of the Foxes: The Untold Story of German Espionage in the United States and Great Britain during World War II*. Pp. xxi, 696. New York: David McKay, 1972. \$11.95.

Mastersop's book was originally written in 1945 as an official report on counter espionage in England during the war by one who was deeply involved in the top secret operation. The British were executing German spies caught in England until 1940 when they decided "that it was a senseless waste to hang or shoot every captured German spy. A place could be found for some of them in the war effort by utilizing the cream of the crop in a game the British would play with the unsuspecting enemy" (Farago, p. 176). So began the Double-Cross System which Masterman maintains was so successful that during much of the war the British were able to use the double agents to control the German espionage system in their country.

In his conclusion Masterman raises the question: "We are sure that we deceived the Germans and turned their weapons against themselves; can we be quite sure that they were not equally successful in turning our weapons against us?" (p. 186). It is to this much larger study of the whole pattern of German espionage in Great Britain and the United States that Farago addresses himself in *The Game of the Foxes*.

Ladislas Farago, a student of espionage who served in American Naval Intelligence during World War II, based his book upon the discovery in the national archives of a metal footlocker containing microfilms of

thousands of captured German intelligence documents. Here was found the complete story of the German Intelligence Service from the early 1930s to the mid-1940s. The German Intelligence formed an alliance with the Italian Intelligence and with the Japanese Intelligence years before the formal military alliance among the three governments was proclaimed.

In 1936 Germany began a fruitful five-year espionage system in the United States. Shortly before Pearl Harbor, the Federal Bureau of Investigation located German spies at every strategic point in the United States. There was, wrote Farago, at least one spy in every American armament factory and in every shipyard. Literally, the United States could not design a new ship or an airplane or introduce a new military device that the Germans did not know all about.

Although German spies in America were sending many photographs to Germany before the war began they did not succeed in gaining pictures of every defense project as they did in England. Hitler minimized espionage in the United States because he wanted to keep her neutral. After F.D.R.'s "quarantine the dictators speech" in 1937, however, Hitler thought of the President as his *bête noire*. It is amazing how many naive Americans were associated in one way or another with at least one German spy.

When the United States, after Pearl Harbor, made a massive arrest of over 1,000 German spies, at least two of Germany's best escaped the F.B.I. net. One to escape was Simon Koedel who had many contacts among American public leaders including Senator Robert Reynolds of North Carolina. In collecting valuable data Koedel was industrious; in gaining access to secret military information he was ingenious. After losing her spies Germany leaned more heavily upon her consuls for intelligence information until they too became *persona non grata*.

Farago was astonished at the laxity of those who worked in the United States Code Room at the State Department. Repeatedly, he reports, significant code keys and important secret documents were

stolen. Within a few days after the United States succeeded in breaking the Japanese complex secret code, a German spy sent the information to Berlin. This and many other equally amazing statements are carefully documented.

Both of these books have the suspense and excitement of a James Bond spy thriller, but they contribute much to our understanding of a complex problem in which scholars and general readers are perennially interested. The Masterman Report is an important historical document; the Farago book is monumental in its research.

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DAVID OWEN. *The Politics of Defence*. Pp. 249. New York: Taplinger, 1972. \$7.95.

David Owen, at the age of 27, was elected as a Labour Member of the British Parliament in 1966. From 1968 to 1970 he served as Minister for the Royal Navy.

"Working within a defence ministry," he writes, "one becomes increasingly aware that the military are reluctant to accept guidance in the detailed process of decision-making. Yet this is the very area which should be the major concern of a politician."

Dr. Owen explains that one afternoon in the Ministry of Defence he "faced the breakdown of a highly sensitive intelligence mission" which he had "only recently authorized." Suddenly he became aware of "how close to the knife edge so much of our military activity has become."

He has written this book, he says, to try to persuade the military, the politicians, and ordinary citizens that military affairs should be subject to greater outside scrutiny.

The book is much more than a mere recounting of the author's experiences in high political office. It is evident that he has researched many facets of the broad subject of defense. As a result, both the Labour and Conservative parties come in for criticism in their handling of British

defense problems in Africa and East of Suez. And Owen frankly discusses what he considers to be questionable decisions by the United States during the Cuban missile crisis and the Pueblo incident. He is especially critical in his analysis of the Gulf of Tonkin incident: "The warning implicit in the Tonkin incident should be clear to everyone. No democratic government should attempt to involve its nation in a major war on the basis of lies, half-truths and deliberate deception."

Since Owen strongly believes that nuclear war is conceivable, he devotes a considerable portion of his book to nuclear strategy. Because he holds that "the only way in which a credible Allied deterrent force can be established is for Britain, France and the United States to combine," he has been irked by France's hostility toward NATO.

Owen concludes that the existing controls over defense decisions are "insufficient and in many areas ineffective." One of the villains in the defense field, he believes, is the existing pattern of decision-making by committee. "The first priority must be to try to end existing inter-service rivalries." As a start in remedying the situation he would abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in the United States and the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Britain, and their counterparts in other countries. Instead, "The politicians should be advised by the Chief of Defence and his staff on all military planning and strategic issues."

Optimists who read this book may become pessimists.

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#### AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

LEONARD BARNES. *Africa in Eclipse*. Pp. 352. New York: St. Martins Press, 1972. \$8.95.

Many former critics of colonialism have now turned their sights to its aftermath, finding new targets to add to the old. The types of characters remain the same.

There are the same villains, the interests who dominated the imperial period and their collaborators in Africa; there are the same victims, the suffering peoples of Africa; but there are virtually no heroes. Alas, the African leaders who thrust aside the collaborators of the colonial period have become collaborators in turn, and a humane social order seems as far away as ever.

Leonard Barnes, former colonial officer, journalist, farmer and, most recently, administrator at Oxford University, has definite views on post imperial Africa. Thus "Black Africa" is now in the hands of "kleptocracies" who run "theft economies"; it is being squeezed between "Areas of White Supremacy"—which include Zaire—and "Areas of Moslem Ascendancy." The whole system operates along two (or three?) major axes: "the Washington-Kinshasa-Nairobi axis" and "the Moscow-Algiers-Lagos and the Moscow-Tripoli-Cairo-Khartoum-Ft. Lamy-Lagos axis." Furthermore, the continuity with the colonial period is explicit. For once the major villain is not the United States, which, incidentally, is about "to fade out as viable human agglomeration" (p. 307). Africa is dominated and exploited by NATO; the indictment is spelled out in three long chapters on the Belgian, French, and British domains. However, neo-colonialism is not everywhere victorious. In four areas—Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, and Southern Sudan—peasant revolts have begun, from which will come a truly liberated Africa.

The author has been writing provocative work on Africa since the First World War. In this book, however, provocativeness has taken the form of such recklessness that whole passages lack plausibility. Accusations of genocide are thrown about—for example, he casts the British High Commission in Lagos in the part of Lady Macbeth who, with Macbeth (the Northern Region), plotted the "effacement" of the Ibo people (p. 245). Furthermore, the terms "self-politics," "theft economy," "axis," "ascendancy," "domain," and so on, are not defined and much that should be argued is simply asserted. Moreover, there are some

bizarre interpretations such as the following: "France and Britain, dazzled by the triumphs of World War I ceased a-whoring after appeasement and as in 1914 succumbed to the allurements of a general conflagration" (p. 213).

This is not the first book to attempt to reinterpret international relations in the twentieth century, or to see in some part of the countryside the social base of a movement that will be both pure and viable. There have been coherent and plausible works by authors whose general views are not markedly different from those of Barnes, for example Ruth First's, *Power in Africa* (New York, Random House, 1970). While there is much room for criticizing post-independence regimes, and their relations with the developed world, little is to be gained by mere assertion. Although this work has some suggestive passages, notably those on a comparison of Africa with nineteenth-century Russia, on the pressures which lead East African governments to act against Asian groups, and on the growing interest of Moslem regimes in Black Africa, the general argument is unconvincing, largely because the relation between assertion and evidence would be satisfying only to the converted.

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RICHARD GIBSON. *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule*. Pp. vii, 350. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$9.75.

This is a highly useful series of short histories of all the main African liberation groups—an attempt to "place these complex struggles within their specific geographical, economic, social and historical context." Although the writer does not claim impartiality, he is by and large fair in his assessments and certainly does not try to hide the embarrassing problems of the side he backs—the liberation groups themselves. The faction-ridden character

of most of them, the petty and not so petty jealousies that must inevitably occupy exiles, who have none of the fruits of governmental office to divide up, are in full view.

Dealing with the movements of the various states and territories *ad seriatem* as he does, instead of comparatively, has a serious disadvantage, both from a practical and scholarly standpoint. There is, in fact, a great deal to be learned by comparing the groups: most of them have failed to benefit from the experience of others, in part, because like the author of this book they have not looked beyond the specific historical context of their struggle for general lessons that could be derived from comparative analysis. Even at the level of techniques of resistance, comparative analysis would be useful. On the uses of terror, for example, the author notes that "... its justification usually lies in the contribution it makes to panic and loss of public morale as a revolutionary movement tries to seize power," but nothing is said about which conditions are most conducive to its successful use and which are not.

About the only generalization, or proposition, advanced is that "If Africans have learned any lesson from their history, it is that revolutionary violence alone can break off their shackles." The author unfortunately has no systematic evidence—and the method of his analysis prevents such—as to the wisdom in the assertion. From the looks of the revolutionary groups and the present status of the oppressing societies in southern Africa at least, revolutionary violence is unlikely to be well organized and much less to be successful. Nor is it clear that revolutionary violence is the only way for black Africans to break off their shackles. The empirical evidence available at this point would suggest that at least in South Africa the normal working of economic forces will do much more. But that is the sort of unpleasant proposition that neither side in this controversy—neither the revolutionaries nor the theoreticians of apartheid in Pretoria—is willing to admit. Those in Pretoria, one can be sure, will be reading this book to see what they can

learn from it as will, hopefully, the exiles in Dar-es-Salaam.

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NICHOLAS S. HOPKINS. *Popular Government in an African Town: Kita, Mali*. Pp. xv, 246. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972. \$9.50.

Although new anthropological and political science titles dealing with African local politics continue to appear, they still fall far behind those which treat Asian societies. The author's plea for more micro work is well taken when we consider that repeated failures in development programs derive partially from the paucity of research on the local level.

A recurrent theme of this book is the high degree of popular participation in the government of Kita. Hopkins argues that the most important identities for political behavior were based on the local identity—that ethnic affiliation, social status, and religion were subordinated to the more general local loyalty. In Kita, factional conflicts, which characterize many African towns, were functional rather than dysfunctional since “factional rivalry made a physical community into a political community,” one which could act as a unit vis a vis the central government.

The author deals effectively with the complex mix of modern and traditional forces and the ethnic, religious, economic, and bureaucratic factors that impinge on who gets what, when, how and why. Although the chapter entitled “Ideology and Pragmatism” requires further thinking, Hopkins reveals an interesting contradiction in Kita's political life—that ideological propensity for consensus destroyed initiative and impeded development. Nonetheless, Kita's socio-political system was one in which power came from the people in a “very direct way,” power which was able to effect positive responses from the center.

Several conclusions can be gleaned from the work. On the broad level, the book indirectly invalidates some of the sweeping generalizations on such simplistic formulations as “patron versus mass parties” and “mobilization systems.” The work also nicely confirms the findings of many scholars that, under certain conditions, popular participation can obstruct economic and social development. And the position often argued by scholars<sup>†</sup> that developing areas do not have the physical and ideological bases needed to effect revolutionary change is affirmed by the Kitan experience. Finally, Hopkins points out that a disparity between local and national concepts and values can undermine government's legitimacy. These conclusions are convincing because they are shored up with sound empirical facts and are reinforced by one of the most thorough research analyses of an African community's politics that this reviewer has encountered.

A few caveats are in order. The author's prose is often tense and turgid and an excessive pendent style mars both content and readability. Second, while Hopkins makes a good effort at linking the local with the national, the inter-relationship is not fully defined. Unless this is done, we shall never know whether local popular participation can ultimately lead to a broader—nation-wide—democracy. Other studies which have sought to persuade us that one-party states are democratic remain unpersuasive precisely because they have failed to fill the micro-macro gap.

As a peripheral note, the book suggests that the literature on the politics of Africa would be in much better shape if our political scientists had utilized anthropology to the same sophisticated degree that Hopkins used political science. Finally, there is a permanent quality to the book in spite of the fact that the author does not deal with the period after the capitulation of the one-party regime to the military in 1968.

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ARTHUR LIEBMAN, KENNETH N. WALKER, and MYRON GLAZER. Introduction to *Latin American University Students: A Six Nation Study*, by Seymour Martin Lipset. Pp. vii, 296. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. \$11.75.

This book explores the role of Latin American universities and university students in the political lives of their nations. The major orientations of this work derive not only from the intellectual and areal interests of the authors, but also from their diverse political experiences, which are briefly described in the Preface (pp. vii-viii). Thus, the authors are not solely concerned with Latin America, but with how events on Latin American campuses fit into the worldwide student movement since 1964. At the risk of oversimplifying the argument of the book, they seem especially concerned with the following problem: Latin American university students, while they have a long *avant garde* tradition of protesting both dictatorial governments and stifling educational conditions in their universities, seem to lack the political capabilities for the kind of sustained political activity that would help the nations along the path to modernization. The problem of so much ideological heat combined with so little serious political action is a familiar problem to anyone cursorily familiar with the Latin American literature on universities or anyone who has been in the student movement here. The resolution of this problem for Latin America may thus be presumed to have implications for the same problem here.

To research this and related questions, the authors conducted opinion surveys at fifteen prestigious universities in six countries—Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Paraguay, Panama, Mexico, and Colombia—which they selected as representing the spectrum of socio-economic development in Latin America. Their questionnaire (reproduced on pp. 237-62) is designed to get a wide variety of biographical data on each student interviewed, as well as to sample their opinions on—and participation in—aspects of national political life and the universities. Additionally, there are some questions relating to the mental and physical

lives of the interviewees (for example, do you get nauseous?) which are not put to much use in the text.

Unfortunately, the authors do not solve their initial problem; nor do they advance its future solution one whit. The intellectual failure of this study can be captured by quoting from their conclusions; which again presumably apply to student politics everywhere:

While voicing the necessity of understanding and working with the least privileged strata in order to bring about changes, students infrequently seize the opportunity to expose themselves systematically to the deep-seated wishes, needs, and fears of the disadvantaged persons. Students, furthermore, are generally not interested in committing themselves to the long term organizational effort necessary to build an effective base for their position. Youthful elites often do not see the daily performances of such tedious tasks as part of their historic vision of themselves (p. 221). But this was the problem all along; now we want to know why this is the problem.

What is basically wrong with this book is its notion of politics which is never spelled out, despite the authors' claim to personal political histories and concerns. While it could take a ream of criticism to make all of this book's failings clear, I will limit myself to two major criticisms. First, there is no adequate conception of power in this book. Second, there is a continual confusion between ideology and action. That there should be no discussion of the evolution of power in Latin America, including a failure to assess changes since the Second World War in any systematic way, is inexcusable since the main thrust of the book is supposed to be about this. There is no serious discussion of how power is organized in Latin America, yet it is power that the students have to relate to. There is no evidence that the authors have any idea of the differences between the political possibilities of the old *caudillo* system and the contemporary authoritarian regimes, with their characteristic stresses on apolitical technocrats and popular political apathy. Additionally, some countries have a venerable history of populist manipulation, which creates all



manner of possibilities for the non-revolutionary demagogue who speaks of social justice *a la Peron*. The closest the authors come to dealing with this problem is in their discussion of the co-optive powers of the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in Mexico (pp. 171-78 *passim*). It turns out, not surprisingly, that the PRI, as the ideological heir of the revolution and confronted with continuing social problems, needs its resident leftists, just like some North American social science departments seem to.

This inadequate handling of issues of power is further compounded by the authors' continual confusion between ideology and action, a confusion that is further compounded by the interview sheets—which collect a lot of ideological responses. Nowhere is this clearer than in the authors' discussion of left, right, and center; thus, the PRI becomes a leftist authoritarian regime—a contradiction in terms—merely because of the ideology of the party (pp. 173-75) whose repression of other kinds of leftists become “deviations from a leftist orientation” or “inconsistencies” (p. 175). The American and Mexican capitalists who have long been the power behind the PRI will laugh all the way to the bank when they read that. The same sort of naivete informs their thinking about what happens to the leftist students “who, upon leaving the university, confront a hostile environment” (p. 133). For the ideological leftist whose leftism is concerned with raising hell on the campus in the name of the glorious proletariat, the hostile environment might well turn out to be a cushy job in a government bureaucracy. For the student leftist eagerly seeking alliance with the workers and/or peasants, the hostile environment is not likely to consist of frowning bosses at the graduate's new job, as the authors suggest, but rather the dismal back country swarming with the governments counterinsurgency forces. It is a pity that the authors did not follow up the subsequent careers of leftist university graduates, for they might have been spared this mistake.

In sum, the theoretical underpinnings of this book are so weak as to render the

authors' task all but impossible, and to minimize the results of the obvious hard work they have performed over the past six years. In a way, this work stands as probably one of the best expositions of what is wrong with American liberalism, modernization theory and the like. It is all well meaning and very ideological, but is in no sense rooted in the human condition in the Third World, including Latin America.

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SIMON OTTENBERG. *Leadership and Authority in an African Society: The Afkipo Village-Group*. Pp. xvii, 366. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1971. \$9.50.

This is a study of political organization in a group of Ibo villages with a common central market and elders' meeting place. As such it is largely concerned with the political functions of age-sets. West African anthropologists do not use the anachronistic term “warrior” for the grade which performs police and organizational duties, and something else has to be found. Ottenberg's “executive grade” is not altogether happy; it reflects a certain confusion between an aggregate of persons and a stage in the passage through life.

Ibo age-sets are not formally recognized until their members are about thirty, but of course men have been grouped much earlier by age in what would far better be called “informal sets” than grades. The executive grade is in fact the most politically active, and Ottenberg's account of its multifarious duties is admirably full and interesting. In the separate villages the elders, though the executives act on their authority, are largely concerned with matters of ritual. But for the village group as a whole they combine to “legislate and adjudicate.” For the purpose of all-group business the elders themselves are divided into three subgrades, with a residual category consisting of survivors in an older grade. This vocabulary plunges us into a

welter of references to senior, middle, and junior subgrades, and when *subgroups*—village clusters—are added to these the brain reels. The book would have been infinitely easier to understand if the subgrades had been called by their Ibo names.

Leadership is largely achieved, though members of the Aro lineages which once dominated the slave trade have an advantage. Ritual control, particularly over women, comes from the *egbele* cult association—"secret society" is a misnomer. Villages are free from conflicts because the issues that typically arise, concern men living in different villages. Ottenberg gives a full and interesting description of procedure in trying cases, with the significance of available alternatives, the Native Authority Court, and the Magistrate's Court.

Ottenberg's description of the elders as they were in 1960 shows how vain the attempt must have been to build a progressive government on traditional authorities where the traditional system places all authority in the hands of the old. This is a far greater obstacle than the large numbers sharing authority which the Nigerian government recognized as a difficulty. The younger men, however, formed improvement societies and even schoolboys' associations which—how unlike the really modern world—fined their members for untidy dressing or for disturbing the peace. Young men wanted to see village resources spent on modern amenities instead of ritual, to have the killing of twins finally prohibited, to allow greater freedom for women. By now they must have become elders in their turn; one wonders what a return visit would reveal.

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DAVID J. PARKIN. *Palms, Wine, and Witnesses: Public Spirit and Private Gain in an African Farming Community*. Pp. 113. Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1972. \$2.50.

IRIS ANDRESKI. *Old Wives' Tales: Life Stories of African Women*. Pp. 190. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. \$2.45. Paperbound.

*Palms, Wine, and Witnesses* is the first in a series devoted to the study of socio-cultural change, and deals with the way of life and customs of the African farming community of the Giriama.

The Giriama own palm orchards to produce and sell copra. They can sell and buy land and palms but need witnesses to do so, and palmwine is the sign of solidarity, the solidarity which hampers the beginning entrepreneur or "accumulator." The Giriama are one of the Mijikenda just behind the Kenya coast. Social classes are emerging with the younger household leaders becoming the wealth accumulators and the elders becoming the losers. The description (p. 74) of emerging social class as a process is perfect with its noticing of divergent marriage, "way of life" and education patterns at a barely incipient stage. The change is not acknowledged by the Giriama. It remains hidden by what is defined here as "paradox of custom." Traditional intergenerational differences cover up the growing cleavage between affluent young men and poorer elders; the very idea of the valued status of elders makes them necessary witnesses, and being a witness enhances their status. But they are witnesses to contracts because they were the first in the area and have the best memories. Yet the increasing transactions of land and palms by contract eliminate the status derived from agnation in this situation, and the Giriama recognize it. Finally the two main spheres of exchange—bridewealth and funerals—are preserved as buttresses of custom. In fact, bridewealth channels a good part of the flow of capital and funerals are a "service market" to assess relative wealth and find business partners for one's network of proposed contracts. Parkin concludes that very often mystical beliefs and ritual practices are most significant when they cloak not only institutional conflict but also institutional contradiction which by definition precipitates radical change.

Here is then a typical study of a social anthropologist with strong ties to the British school (Manchester subschool)—conscientious and competent. It exhibits some typical features of an anthropological approach. It is a micro-study since "the

universe" covers twenty-six homesteads and often runs into discussion of single tables. The tables are useful but the expression of percentages is ludicrous, given the small number of cases in most tables. It is almost as if the author is ashamed that he cannot quantify more. He need not be since the in depth observation of a limited number of cases does substantiate his points and these seem in turn to be so fundamental as to hold for a large section of the Mijikenda. Since anthropology is comparative, we find comparisons here and there—for examples, pages 73 and 78 with the Swat Pathans studied by F. Barth. In fact, Parkin compares with cases published by other members of the same general school. There is no systematic approach to the possibilities of comparison at all. The cases compared are not the only ones for which data are extant, and sometimes they are not appropriate—as in the references to Barth or to V. Turner in the conclusion. One feels that the argument for authority is subtly applied to bolster the point made. This is certainly so for the fleeting appearance of Max Weber in the conclusion. But why blame Parkin? All anthropologists are wont to do this. If the profession really wants to become more comparative, as it must, it will have to develop more scientific ways to compare. Finally, functionalism and a trace of theological explanation still underlie most of the arguments. The drawback is that in a study of change not enough thought is given to the possibility of alternatives to the solution proposed. Here the conclusions should be taken with some grains of salt.

The argument is lucid, presented in a puritanical compact style with the non-sense jargon of the school. Yet it contains a certain amount of repetition, not only in style, where clarity of expression might perhaps excuse it, but also in the argument, especially in the conclusions for each of the eight chapters. So that even while it is worth reading all, one wonders if a fifty page article might not have been sufficient.

Lest the reader believes this to be an unfavorable review, it is well to remember that this book constitutes in fact a significant contribution to the literature of how

development occurs. Since innovation turns around individuals and their immediate surroundings, the micro-study is the ideal approach. Later quantitative study can crosscheck the main results and perhaps amplify them, but this has to be done first. And it was done very well.

May the next studies in the series be as competent, modest and valuable as this one is. If, in addition, some of them could make progress in coping with the problems of functional and comparative reasoning, it will be a real treat. But even so, these little monographs are well worth more than many a voluminous treaty about economic change. And this one is well worth its price.

The Andreski selection comprises twenty-six biographies of Ibibio (Nigeria) women, translated into English by Miss Asari Edem, helped by the author. Some of the tales are followed by a short commentary. A long introduction describes Ibibio society, especially from the woman's point of view. It does not tell the reader that the biographies were obviously prompted by a questionnaire which included age, whether polygyny is good or not, what the most happy, the most depressing, and the most interesting moments were in these women's lives, whether the "old" times were better than now. Those questions one can deduce from the narratives themselves. There may have been others. So the biographies include only sporadically spontaneous material.

The introduction is a quaint mixture of fancy and reality. Almost all of the history and the anthropology is quite wrong. It oozes romantic thrills and stereotypes including even the notion that the Efik and Ibibio cultures represent "the collapse of a higher unrecorded culture, undermined by the traumatic shocks of warfare and famine" (p. 33). Here follow some typical "degenerate features." Assertions are never footnoted. Yet the author has to say things of interest concerning the life-cycle of the women, clitoridectomy and illness.

As for the biographies, they have no great literary value in translation although here and there a poignant description or a terse summation strikes the reader. Why

was the vernacular text not published, so one could judge the quality of the translation and the literary value of each piece? The sociological value of the texts derives from their being biographies of women. True, even these are not rare in Africa and many lie buried in mission archives, but these are one of the few published collections and likely to be the only one extant for the Ibibio. All the more one regrets the absence of notes and the redundant commentaries.

The stereotypes of the introduction make this book far too dangerous for the general public, for which it was, no doubt, intended. Rather, it will decidedly be found useful for the specialist whose concern is Ibibio history or society and who has gone over the other sources. He may glean some points of interest in the biographies and in the introduction.

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#### ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

R. S. CHAUHAN. *The Political Development in Nepal, 1950-1970: Conflict between Tradition and Modernity*. Pp. 336. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1972. \$13.50.

This book is an extensively revised and updated version of the author's doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Rajasthan. The title accurately summarizes the content, and since the book refers to events and literary sources as recent as 1970, it is as current as any work of its genre now available. Like most contemporary discussions of Nepalese politics, it values western, democratic, parliamentary, consensus politics. It therefore laments the demise of the democratic government elected in 1959 and criticizes the "royal scourge" which meddled with and ultimately destroyed the growth of democratic forces within the country over the two decades treated in the book.

Chauhan begins with the revolution of

1950, which terminated the autocracy of the Rana family and restored the King to power. Chapters 2 and 3 detail the game of political musical chairs that characterized the rise and fall of governments during the 1950s. Chapter 4 deals with the "progressive forces"—generally, the Nepali Congress Party—and chapter 5 takes King Mahendra to task for dismissing parliament in 1960 and imprisoning elected officials, including the Prime Minister. The remaining chapters describe the panchayat system, explain why the author regards it as an abysmal failure, and conclude with an unlikely-to-be-heeded appeal for the democratic and traditional forces to join hands "in the great task of nation-building." Chauhan seems unclear about the role of leaders of banned political parties, arguing simultaneously that the King chooses them for ministerial positions (p. 275) and that he avoids giving them such jobs (p. 225).

Dr. Chauhan draws on interviews with important politicians as well as original literary sources, including government publications and Nepalese newspapers, but much of the book covers familiar ground already surveyed by Joshi and Rose, Gupta, and others. What is new and original is the author's inclusion of data on the composition of selected village, district, and anchal panchayats. Without knowing the location of the panchayats it is difficult to evaluate this material. The author regards his data as evidence of the persistence of retrogressive traditionalism. But it is surely not surprising in a country where the vast majority of the population is engaged in agriculture that most panchayat leaders are farmers. And in a context of mass illiteracy, what is remarkable is not that so few panchayat leaders are highly educated, but that most panchayat leaders are literate.

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MICHAEL EDWARDES. *Nehru: A Political Biography*. Pp. 351. New York: Praeger, 1971. \$8.95.

Debunking hagiography has become a scholarly pastime and in this case may be useful in rectifying the mass of adulatory material that has been produced about Nehru and Gandhi. Nehru emerges from this book as a weak, uncertain leader whose political ideas were a mish-mash of socialism, anti-imperialism, Vivekananda-type Hindu mysticism, and British law-and-order fanaticism. His economic ideas were no better. India's economic plans revealed him both as economic czar and ignoramus. Moreover, Nehru is presented as an essentially weak character who had to lean all his life on strong, assertive male personalities ranging from his father, Motilal, to Gandhi, to Mountbatten—referred to as Nehru's "new guru"—and finally to Krishna Menon.

Gandhi is not treated much better. Instead of the stalwart spiritual hero of non-violence we have been taught to revere, Edwardes presents him as a cunning, shrewd politician who deliberately used his charisma over the Indian masses to achieve narrow and secular political ends. Even worse, he was a knowing patsy for the British who deliberately catered to him as their unofficial ally against the young radical activists in the Congress Party.

The development of the Congress Party itself is traced as a continuing struggle between revolutionary activists and conservatives with the latter winning at every turn. Edwardes asserts that this led to the defection and formation of the Socialist Party and eventually to a complete betrayal of the social revolution which independence was supposed to bring about. The "permanent non-revolution" he calls it.

The book, then, is not a political biography as the subtitle claims but more a political history with Nehru and many other Indian leaders popping in and out throughout the narrative. The author, a prominent and prolific writer on Indian affairs, intended his book for the general reader and therefore provides no footnotes or documentation aside from an afterword in which he gives a general description of his sources. This leaves the scholarly reader or reviewer in a quandary. The author's many assertions are challenging and even fascinating. Many, however, are at best

questionable and quite undocumented. One would like authoritative answers to many questions raised by the author such as:

What proof is there that the British administration considered Gandhi their ally against the young Indian radicals?

Is it correct and just to accuse Nehru of deliberate escape from domestic duties into irresponsible flights in foreign affairs? Did not Nehru—and others—by creating pro-Indian world opinion bring effective pressure on the British government and condition British public opinion favorably toward Indian freedom? And did Nehru not make a valuable contribution to the process of decolonization—one of the most significant political developments of the twentieth century?

What is the "evidence" (pp. 137, 154, 159) that the Muslim League was in effect a British ally and that Jinnah was encouraged—in his intransigence—by the Churchill Government and members of Wavell's Council?

What are the sources for the statement that a U.S. aircraft carrier was despatched to attack Chinese invaders during the Sino-Indian fighting and that the United States and Britain demanded a Kashmir settlement as a *quid pro quo* for military aid against the Chinese?

Any or all of these and many other questionable statements made in this book may be quite correct but one would like to have more concrete documentation than the author offers. If we were willing to accept these questionable statements at face value we could more easily be persuaded, as the author evidently intends, that Nehru, Gandhi and Co. were really not very admirable characters.

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HERBERT FELDMAN. *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan, 1962-1969*. Pp. 340. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$18.75.

J. A. NAIK. *India, Russia, China and Bangla Desh*. Pp. 165. New Delhi: S. Chand, 1972. Rs. 20.00.

With *From Crisis to Crisis* Herbert Feldman continues the excellent contribution as the chronicler of Pakistan he began with *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study in the Martial Law Administration* (Oxford, 1967). Feldman is an Englishman whose career in India began with World War II and who has lived in Karachi since partition not only as a businessman but as a close and keen observer of the local scene. He knows his subject intimately and in this book, as well as in the earlier work, he displays insights which can be missed both by the casual foreign observer and by the resident Pakistani who may be too close to the situation.

In the present work Feldman takes as his starting point the proclamation by Ayub Khan of a constitution for Pakistan, a document which in its preamble made no pretense of being evolved by the people of the country and instead declared its origin in presidential beneficence. Following this Feldman sees the career of Ayub as an approximation of a sine curve. Ayub in 1962 was still riding the crest of the popularity he achieved when he assumed national leadership in 1958 and the curve continued upward through his reelection as president in 1965. The author sees the apex of the curve in the summer of 1965 and then the ill conceived Kashmir infiltration and the resulting conflict with India began a steady and all but uninterrupted decline to the zero point in March 1969 when Ayub relinquished his office. Feldman credits a series of events in addition to the 1965 conflict as key points in the decline and fall and is particularly informative—and critical—on the rapid official rise of Gohar Ayub Khan, the son of the President. The author believes that Ayub showed a degree of tolerance toward Gohar's behavior, and that of some others close to the center of power, which led to a public view of the administration as lax although Ayub personally was not viewed as venal. Ayub's illness is also cited and is seen as an occasion during which those around the throne saw that the occupant was indeed mortal and they jockeyed among themselves for future power positions. The dismissal and alienation of the

Nawab of Kalabagh as Governor of West Pakistan, an important source of Ayub's power there, weakened the ability of the regime to withstand opposition. The culmination was the grandiose celebration of "the Great Decade of Development and Reform" at a time when economic conditions were turning downward and demands for political, as well as economic, participation were increasing. The celebrations were challenged in the street and in barely six months Ayub and his regime were gone.

Feldman's appraisal of Ayub is that "he failed because he was corrupted by power in the full and precise sense of Lord Acton's famous aphorism" (p. 296). The evidence which the author provides to support this conclusion is comprehensive and well documented. It is a portrait of Ayub which displays his admitted strengths but, unlike some of the sycophantic literature produced in Pakistan during the Ayubian period, also shows the warts. Appendixes give thumb nail pictures of two men who were for sometime at least close to Ayub—Information Secretary Altaf Gauhar and former Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The book should be part of any standard library on Pakistan. But one caution—if you have a friend in Karachi get the Pakistan edition, photographically reproduced and well bound. It costs about thirty rupees.

The Naik volume is an early attempt to evaluate the roles of China and the Soviet Union in the events of 1971 which culminated in the division of Pakistan. Naik, now at Simla, holds a doctorate in Soviet affairs and has studied in the Soviet Union.

He provides a rather uncritical background to the Bangla Desh movement in which he avoids the careful documentation one should expect in a scholarly study. Despite his rather poor beginning he has much to say which is informative on the place of India in Soviet policy since 1947 and the nature of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. He provides a careful analysis of the latter and compares and contrasts it with the Warsaw Pact on the one hand and the Soviet treaty with Egypt on the

other. Naik concludes that the treaty was helpful to the Soviet Union in furtherance of the Breznev plan for Asian security and to India in that it gave a measure of Soviet concurrence to Indian plans to aid in the liberation of Bangla Desh and perhaps served as a signal to China—and the United States?—that India might not be alone if it were seriously endangered.

Nonetheless, the author laments what he considers the disappearance of India's non-alignment policy with the signing of the treaty and pleads for an India which will be self-reliant and eschew pacts of any kind. He warms to this subject and suggests that foreign economic assistance should be dropped not only to encourage self-help but also because it is undependable—citing the U.S. cut off in 1971. He also appears to measure self-reliance—and respect from the world community—with an Indian nuclear capability: "India would be in a better position to . . . solve bilateral problems with China" (p. 94). Somewhat less drastic is his proposal that India, now in his view clearly the leader in South Asia, be given a permanent seat in the Security Council.

The book tends to be disorganized and repetitive in places but is helpful in its analysis of Indo-Soviet relations and contains as appendixes a useful set of documents ranging chronologically from Yahya's promise of democracy to the surrender of General Niazi in Dacca and including key Soviet and Chinese statements.

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FRANCES FITZGERALD. *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam*. Pp. 491. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1972. \$12.50.

This book adds nothing new to the information we already have about the Americans in Vietnam, does not present the Vietnamese point of view as the jacket implies, is confusing in its organization and lacks a clear and compelling argument. But more important this book lays out unmistakably the pattern of myth building

by both supporters and opponents of the American war in Vietnam; the fact that it is an American war and not a civil war among varied factions of a Vietnamese elite is inescapable. This book is essential reading for all Americans. It will not be easy for those whose background knowledge of events in Vietnam is limited or sporadic. For the author assumes a prior knowledge of all the relevant literature and participants in the myth building. Many readers, for example, will have to ignore the criticisms of the work of Douglas Pike and Robert Shaplen. Furthermore the book is not a narrative and pays little heed to chronological time or the relationship of events. The reader is dragged mercilessly from one scene to another and then is pressed by the author to accept these scenes as evidence of the thesis that revolution is still to come or alternatively that the Vietnamese conception of society and polity explain the actions.

The author has taken all relevant materials on Vietnam and a personal and apparently extensive study of Vietnamese society and rewritten the events of varied periods of American Vietnamese contact focusing on the effect of American policy on Vietnam society and politics. She shows over and over again the kind of misinterpretation of these events made by both those writing about them and those directing them.

Unfortunately the author seems to assume that the vague and general description of Vietnamese conceptions of political authority laid out in the first chapters is sufficient to explain relations between Vietnamese and Americans presently. But the logical linkage between the conception and the event is not made clear. For instance, the Confucian principles of social order, justice, and correct relationships which is embodied in Vietnamese political tradition, differ markedly from the American policy-makers' conception of political authority as consisting of electoral choice, efficient bureaucracy, and the satisfaction of economic interests. But what in effect do those differences mean in any given instance? What is the long lasting effect of those differences? How does the NLF (National

Liberation Front) respond to those Vietnamese political imperatives differently from the North Vietnamese? Suggestions are made throughout this volume but one would like to have a more explicit explanation of the meaning of those confucian principles in modern Vietnam. After reading this account, for example, one begins to wonder about the case of Diem and the case for Confucian values.

Another major difficulty with this monograph is the author's unexplained conviction that a real revolution is to come and, somehow or other, that elections eventually will work. In the end one sees a society completely corrupted, demoralized, removed from its history by an outside power, and thus inevitably compelled to remake itself out of some fundamental human desire for survival and national history.

Despite the difficulties posed for the reader, ordinary citizen or academic, this book is a major work on Vietnam and will make clear to the sensitive reader how far most of us, even the most fervent antiwar spokesmen, are from liberating our minds from the myths and legacies of centuries of imperialism.

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GEORGE S. HARRIS. *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*. Pp. 263. AEI-Hoover Policy Studies. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972. \$4.50. Paperbound.

This painstaking study of a *mariage de convenance* under the 1947 Truman Doctrine tells how and why the partners cannot get along with or without each other: during fifteen years of cooperation entailing six billion dollars in grants and loans with thousands of U.S. military and hundreds of civilian personnel in Turkey, cordiality has given way to patience, fact-finding to bargaining, and consultation to blackmail—no more planes if you attack Cyprus; bigger

loans or we'll turn to Moscow. The decline in American popularity and growth of problems reflect recipient psychology and benefactor arrogance. Gradual deterioration of mutual regard was seriously accelerated by President Johnson's demand that Turkey not invade Cyprus in 1964, hence one chapter covers this subject. Four-fifths of the book—apart from five documents in the Appendix—is on the military, the rest on economic and related matters.

Both the paradox of maintaining national independence at the cost of dependence on foreign aid and the problem of describing the situation appear in two of three sequent sentences (p. 204): "The . . . widespread, though ill-founded suspicion that the country has somehow lost a measure of its independence arouses deep resentment in Turkey. . . . To keep nationalist sensitivity within bounds, successive Ankara regimes have found it essential to cultivate at least the appearance of independent action."

"Perspective," in the title, apparently subsumes general-staff viewpoints—not Toynbee vistas. Chauvinism in the early years of the Republic, and warm respect for Americans when they enjoyed scarcity value and distinterested-friend status are barely alluded to. Almost overlooked is Turkish acumen for assaying in perspective the American role in Vietnam, and for querying whether CIA's involvements are, as Harris asserts, mythical. Neglected are the exploitation of events in Cyprus to divert attention from domestic malaise, and the cultivation by Greece and Turkey of ethnic separateness undermining Cypriot unity. The tendency of opposition politicians to criticize while any party in power defends aid programs and affairs is not overstressed.

The author is cautiously optimistic that, with transfers of responsibility to NATO, difficulties may diminish. At the outset he said, "What is *right* with the alliance would require another lengthy treatise to detail" (p. 4). Even if he be judged defensive of the U.S. position, he presents accurately his myriad sources. Furthermore, albeit without such intent, he provides an excel-



lent case study on the counterproductivity of military alliances and efforts.

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JAMES CHIEH HSIUNG. *Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice*. Pp. vii, 435. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972. \$12.50.

This study seeks to answer the timely question: "To what extent can Communist China, armed with a militant ideology, be expected to accept the existing rules of the game in international relations?" In answering this question, Professor Hsiung combines an impressive knowledge of the theory and practice of international law with an informed and scholarly appreciation of the history of China's international politics over the last two decades. The author leaves little doubt that, for the most part, the Chinese People's Republic can be expected to become a law-abiding member of the community of nations.

Hsiung carries his argument through fourteen well-documented chapters. Especially useful is his analysis of the various meanings and emphases Peking has applied to the term "peaceful coexistence" between nations, as opposed to "proletarian internationalism" between communist states. We are shown how the use of each term has served the practical needs of ongoing policy as well as ideological purposes. Elsewhere the author clarifies the background and precise meaning of China's insistence—since 1949—on respect for each nation's sovereignty, self-determination, and equality. These concepts, it is suggested, are generally compatible with more traditional systems of international law.

The author admits that a special problem arises with respect to China's insistence upon its *absolute* sovereignty; this would appear to run contrary to the overriding acceptance of an international law between nations. However, it is made clear that China has endorsed a form of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of individuals, as in the Nuremberg and Tokyo charters which condemn "crimes against humanity"

and "crimes against the laws of nations." Even beyond this theoretical acceptance of a form of international law, Hsiung demonstrates that in practice Peking has invoked international law for the protection of its interests abroad, and has used international law in the conduct of its foreign relations.

The most lively and instructive parts of this book are found in Hsiung's examination of Chinese conduct in various crises which involved its compliance with treaties and its attitude toward force in international relations. The Chinese are shown to be tough and unrelenting negotiators; but, once the terms of a treaty have been settled, they are described as diligent in carrying out their commitments. The author reviews four cases in which the U.S. Department of State has accused Peking of treaty violations; these include the Korean armistice agreement, treatment of captured American airmen, the Indian border agreement, and imprisonment of American civilians in China. We are shown that in each instance the Chinese were able to present a strong argument in terms of international law, and that objective judgment in these cases is nearly impossible.

The study also makes clear that in no way is Peking committed to the use of force in international relations. Peking has condoned the use of force only in self-defense and in wars of national liberation. Even then, Maoist doctrine holds that revolution is not exportable, and that national liberation struggles by their very nature must be self-reliant. Indeed, Peking has promised moral and material support for these national struggles; but, in practice, such aid has been limited.

The author concludes with guarded optimism. Citing the fact that Peking has used international law for pragmatic purposes, he suggests that, in the long run, international law may play an increasingly large role, as opposed to ideology, in charting China's foreign relations; this may follow from a "self-momentum" generated by the initial use of international law in contact with other states. Reciprocity between nations, which the author suggests is the true basis of international law, would prove

its essential utility. Hsiung argues his case well; but perhaps he places too much emphasis on the healing effects of international law. Questions of social and economic disequilibrium must be brought into the larger picture. The author is less reliable when he reaches for these broad generalizations. But this does not obscure the fact that we have here a landmark study which will be cited time and time again by scholars, international lawyers, and diplomats.

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JAMES B. MAYFIELD. *Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt: A Quest for Legitimacy*. Pp. ix, 288. Austin, Texas: The University of Texas Press, 1971. \$8.50.

Studies of non-Western societies are, generally speaking, easily divided along disciplinary lines: the political scientist above, in the councils and agencies of the government; the anthropologist below, in the tribe, village, or quarter; the economist in the national pocketbook. Findings, while frequently illuminating about the sector or subsystem examined and sometimes theoretically noteworthy, do not usually provide a reliable understanding of cumulative changes, a basic concern of the student interested in modernization. The reason for this is that none of the sectors or subsystems are independent of one another, and the development of each is integrally tied, albeit in complex and in some cases indirect ways, to the others. Not only have the broader patterns not been properly examined, but even the points of subsystem articulation have been neglected. For this, the specialized disciplines, with customary methodologies not always appropriate for unconventional studies, are partly to blame. Having divided up the social landscape, they are ill prepared to move beyond their turf in quest of the overall patterns and intersystem dynamics.

What, then, is required? Students must focus attention upon the points of articulation between subsystems and sectors, and must be shameless enough to appropriate

the necessary methodology, if need be, even for a mix of other disciplines. Thus, the political scientist must deign to leave the capital for the provinces, and the offices of officials for the meeting places of ordinary citizens. The anthropologist must gird himself to look beyond the traditional social life and exotic customs to the intrusions and influences of extra-local forces. The economist must look to the people behind and the political and cultural forces in tandem with economic institutions.

Professor Mayfield, a political scientist, attempts exactly this in his study of Nasser's Arab Socialist Union and its impact upon the peasants of rural Egypt. His background chapters on the political history of the fellahin, on personality and culture of the fellah, and on village politics, indicate a willingness to search beyond disciplinary boundaries for useful approaches and substantive clues. And that he visited 79 villages (p. 131, n. 30), interviewing 47 school teachers (p. 152, n. 1) and "250 . . . officials, fellahin, and private citizens" (p. 184), indicates that he made efforts to see what was happening on the ground. The basic purpose and approach of the study is just what is required.

All the more disappointing, then, are the results of this promising study. Most surprising is the complete lack of systematic data, the text instead consisting of references to the literature and official documents, anecdotes, and apt illustrations. Statements such as "after careful analysis of some 250 interviews . . . , I have come to the conclusion that . . ." reoccur, but are not documented by the presentation of data. The descriptions are almost wholly impressionistic, and this reader cannot but fear that they are superficial.

Perhaps the inadequate conceptualization and outmoded theoretical assumptions did not provide an effective stimulus. Legitimacy, political culture, socialization, communication, and modernization are invoked, but, never satisfactorily defined or related to begin with, they result in a hash of imprecise jargon. The search for political culture degenerates into an impressionistic grasp at attitudes. Assumptions of consensus as the basis of political systems, at-

tributions of institutional success to the filling of needs, assertions of the prime role of political socialization are all indications of functional theory ill used. This book is a sad primer on how an opportunity for studying the impact of national politics at the local level can be squandered.

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S. R. MEHROTRA. *The Emergence of the Indian National Congress*. Pp. 461. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1972. \$22.50.

JUDITH M. BROWN. *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915-1922*. Pp. 384. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972. \$19.50.

In his prefatory note, S. R. Mehrotra states that he has "written conventional political history" (p. v). Mr. Mehrotra is concerned with tracing *The Emergence of the Indian National Congress*, the first session of which convened in Bombay in 1885. What emerges from Mr. Mehrotra's study may best be termed a linear—and whig—interpretation of history. Mr. Mehrotra begins his work by focusing on the formation in Calcutta in 1838 of the Landholders' Society, "the first notable attempt at organizing a political association on western lines in India" (p. 14). What follows and fills the pages of this book are studies of organizations which may, in Mr. Mehrotra's mind, be termed "political" or "nationalistic," the implication being that all led inexorably and inevitably to the formation of the Indian National Congress. It is that implication which should have been proved; instead, it remains an assertion which has yet to be substantiated.

Mr. Mehrotra's study is filled with vague and often misleading terminology. Terms such as "politics" and "political associations" are used throughout but Mr. Mehrotra makes no attempt to define such terms or to place them in a nineteenth-century Indian context. He refers to the "Indian mind" (p. 91) and to "the people"

(p. 37, p. 111); what he means by the former is not entirely clear; what he means by the latter is, more precisely, the numerically small, English-educated strata of Indian society.

Further, Mr. Mehrotra's understanding of what "nationalism" constitutes seems poor indeed. Although he uses the term frequently, he never thoroughly defines it. Yet he seems to indicate what he takes it to mean when he discusses the role the British played in contributing to a growing "sense of national unity" (p. 118). He states, "A common yoke imposed common disabilities and occasioned common grievances. Common disabilities and grievances, in their turn, created common interests and sympathies, and served to unite the heterogeneous population of India in a common hatred of its foreign rulers" (p. 118). Mr. Mehrotra offers his readers an unsophisticated equation of xenophobia and nationalism, an equation which seems a gross misrepresentation of the era and the "politically" active Indians he has chosen to study.

With the possible exception of Briton Martin's *New India 1885*, there is no thoroughly satisfactory account of the emergence of the Congress. Such a study would need to provide the full picture of the complex activities and interactions which culminated in the first meeting of the Congress. Mr. Mehrotra's work falls short of fulfilling this very real need. It seems that that is beyond the scope of "conventional political history."

Judith Brown's *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915-1922* is a thoroughly-researched study aimed at clearing away some of the myths and nationalist hagiography which have developed and have been perpetuated by students of the Indian nationalist movement. Ms. Brown focuses on Gandhi and the period in which he affected major changes in the form and substance of the nationalist movement. She successfully destroys one myth—that it was Gandhian "charisma" which brought "the masses" into the nationalist movement—and offers in its place a more sober assessment.

Gandhi's entry into nationalist politics took place at a time when the "political nation" of India was dominated by a western-educated Indian elite. Most members of this elite lived in the presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras and many confirmed their nationalist activities to the terrain of the presidencies. It was Gandhi who was able and willing to mobilize new forces within Indian society. Gandhi discovered a "reservoir of latent political material" (p. 40), and it was Gandhi who helped to bring these previously apolitical groups into the nationalist movement. At the same time, these new sources of support helped to bolster Gandhi's own stature among the elite politicians.

As Ms. Brown notes, Gandhi did not attempt to bring in "the masses" on the basis of simple charismatic appeal. To argue that he did attempt to do so would be a gross over-simplification of the complexities of Indian society (p. 357). Instead, he very carefully selected prominent men in the previously apolitical regions and groups within India and had them work as his "subcontractors" (p. 107). They acted as his recruiters and they mobilized mass-support for Gandhi's campaigns. In this manner the formerly "dormant" regions of India were brought to the forefront of the nationalist movement; the Muslims allied with Gandhi as well; and these two sources of support forced the elite nationalist politicians to acknowledge Gandhi's all-India leadership (p. 308). Gandhi's prominence was based on his ability to hold the support of the newly politicized groups he had helped to bring into the political nation.

Ms. Brown has solidly substantiated her thesis, and those interested in the spread of nationalism and the rise of a nationalist leader would do well to read her work. Yet one objection must be noted: Ms. Brown provides almost every reason for involvement in a nationalist movement except one of the most vital, that is, simple ideological attraction. When discussing why Gandhi's subcontractors worked for him, she writes "Such men followed him for a variety of reasons—personal attraction, religious conviction, the prospect of economic

gain or increased local prestige, or for lack of anyone else" (p. 121). Many no doubt found the ideological underpinnings of the movement he led attractive as well. One flaw of the work considered here is that this important factor receives all too little consideration.

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J. D. LEGGE. *Sukarno: A Political Biography*. Pp. ix, 431. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$10.95.

The author, a distinguished history professor at Monash University in Australia, admits in his preface to this excellent work that "it is still too early for a definitive biography of Sukarno, "but this will serve the purpose until a better one is written. Professor Legge, who published two earlier books on Indonesia, follows a chronological format from boyhood to death (1901–1970) but includes at many points his commentary on the broader political issues raised by Sukarno's controversial career.

Sukarno was primarily a charismatic nationalist who always favored subordinating Islam, Marxism, and other ideologies to the goal of Indonesian nationalism. He balanced all factions, whether party or military, against each other but insisted that all had a legitimate role to play—except the non-Communist parties after 1958. Finally, however, the army and the PKI (Indonesian Communist party) plotted against each other and the army refused to tolerate Sukarno's superior, above-the-battle role by removing him from power in 1965. What are the limits of charismatic leadership that scorns pragmatic developmental policies such as Hatta favored? Sukarno believed in the supremacy of politics and continuous revolution over the nitty-gritty work of economic development, and his nation has done far better materially under the military regime that deposed him. But must the pre-independence leaders always give way to pragmatic military juntas?

Legge analyzes the peculiar talents and

philosophy of Sukarno as a rebel against Dutch colonialism and a collaborator with the Japanese occupiers of World War II. Collaborationism deserves a fuller treatment, especially to compare the Indonesian success with the failure of men like Wang Ching-wei in China (see John H. Boyle's *China and Japan at War, 1937-1945*, Stanford University Press, 1972). Could Vietnam have used a Sukarno and Hatta to win its postwar freedom? On the issue of Sukarno's indirect personal rule under his "guided democracy," Legge is critical of both the theory and method, but does not go very deeply into this or the 1965 coup, which remains shrouded in official secrecy beyond the government's version, blaming Sukarno for mild complicity in the PKI "plot." The final chapter details the events of October 1965 and the conflicting theories, concluding that the PKI played only a minor role in aiding an army faction in the bloody coup that killed six generals. Legge believes that Sukarno's refusal to condemn the murders or the PKI forced General Suharto to keep him in protective custody until his death in 1970.

Perhaps this reviewer's greatest regret is that Legge does not develop the economic story more fully to show the adverse effects of Sukarno's bravado adventurism—West Irian and Malaysian confrontation and expulsion of Dutch, English, and American interests. But it is still too early to say that the Suharto regime can perform better in the massive developmental task. Pending a study in greater depth of Sukarno's role before, during, and after World War II—and the bibliographical note shows how many works exist on both Sukarno and his nation—this work will remain a valuable source to all students of modern Indonesian nationalism.

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SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY. *Indian Economic Planning: An Alternative Approach*. Pp. 143. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1972. \$10.00.

BALDEV RAJ NAYAR. *The Modernization Imperative and Indian Planning*. Pp.

246. Delhi, India: Vikas Publications, 1972. Rs 30.

Professor Swamy is associated with one of the smaller political parties in India—the Jana Sangh—and his book, *Indian Economic Planning: An Alternative Approach*, explains how the economic plan which he has designed and which is supported by this party would work. The principal objective of his plan is to raise the annual rate of growth from 4 percent to 10 percent. Using input-output analysis, he shows how India's growth rate could be increased by shifting planning priorities to minor irrigation, small industry, and nuclear technology. In both minor irrigation and small industry, relatively small investment in capital would result in a relatively large increase in output, and large amounts of labor would be employed. His emphasis on nuclear technology is part of the militant platform of the Jana Sangh.

India's growth rate is also to be raised through increased saving, which the author expects would result from lower tax rates and higher tariffs on imports. A model is presented showing how increased saving would stimulate economic growth. In the model, increased saving always results in increased investment. The author rejects Keynesian theory, in which saving may be different from investment, as inappropriate for India.

Professor Swamy states that "the greatest policy obstacle to our progress is (directly or indirectly) foreign aid," and he advocates the stoppage of "all the (third-rate) foreign experts." One of the major objectives of his plan is "self-reliance," which includes self-sufficiency in defense production and foodgoods and dependence on domestic production as far as possible. Some widely used policies for stimulating growth such as encouraging exports, promoting foreign investment, and expanding the output of those products for which India has a comparative advantage are completely excluded from his plan. Instead, "A fiery spirit of nationalism can deliver the goods for India."

*The Modernization Imperative and Indian Planning*, by Baldev Raj Nayar, is a

carefully documented and informative study of economic planning in India. The central thesis is that the principal motivation behind the five-year plans in India has been military security and economic independence rather than higher standards of living and less poverty. This thesis is important because it runs counter to the prevailing impression of Indian character—a people dominated by the ideals of pacifism, humanism, and non-violence.

The modernization imperative is stated briefly in the slogan "Modernize or be subjugated." The author conceives of subjugation as political penetration and economic control in addition to physical occupation. It was because of the goal of military security that the development of heavy industry—rather than small industry and agriculture as proposed by Professor Swamy—became the principal objective of Indian planning.

Professor Nayar believes that India has made progress toward achieving greater national independence even though he shows that they have not attained their welfare goals. Over the years unemployment has been steadily rising, the rate of growth remains at about 4 percent per year, and famine still results whenever there is a slight decline in agricultural output. The performance of India's economy, the author believes, should be judged in terms of the country's political objectives rather than solely in terms of the usual economic criteria. A major theme in this book is that the necessity of economic planning to achieve national power may become inconsistent with the continuation of India's federal system of government, popular elections, and other democratic practices.

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NICHOLAS TARLING. *Britain: The Brookes and Brunei*. Pp. 578. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1971. \$21.75.

Imagine a chapter of 131 pages on "The Padas, the Trusan and the Limbang"!

How many in the American academic community could identify their location or are interested? This is but one-fifth of a detailed diplomatic tome on the origin, relations, and vicissitudes of the British presence in Brunei, a 2,226 square mile territory in northern Borneo. What redeems the Herculean effort for the weary reader is the knowledge that with a population of 135,000 the area exports tens of millions of dollars worth of oil annually. When neighboring Sarawak and Sarbah joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, Brunei retained its British connections. This study does not go that far, but concentrates on the nineteenth century.

Mr. Tarling, of the University of Auckland, New Zealand, has obviously pored over endless foreign office dispatches, official records and related materials. If it was a labor of love for him, the diligent reader may not be so enamoured. The book sorely needs intelligent synthesis. Such general remarks as one stumbles across in the text, except for a good final conclusion, ought to be strategically highlighted. Sub-headings would be helpful.

Tarling sees his work as illuminating the complex facets of British diplomatic history during the nineteenth century. The British restitution to Holland in 1814 of east Indian territories was "safe." Interest in northern Borneo remained, however, due to its strategic interest in trade with China; merchants, too, might want trading equality and this was secured in a 1824 treaty with Holland. The island of Labuan was taken for its coal. In return for assistance rendered to Brunei authorities, one of the more notable imperial "characters" of the nineteenth century, James Brooke, in 1841 was made raja of Sarawak—to the west of Brunei. Brooke claimed that he preferred to add to his reputation than to his fortune and looked to a reluctant British government to extend its influence. Early and mid-Victorian policy hesitated to add to the financial burden of the empire. Not until 1888 were Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo officially made protectorates. "The British Government had indeed recognized that, with the growing interest of foreign powers in the region, its relations

with Sarawak must be further formalized . . . .” In a word, the French were in Indo-China. These intervening years are covered in microscopic detail in what in some quarters would pass for scholarship, and in others, for poor editing. It is doubtful whether this book will have broad appeal. Its labyrinths are endless. For the specialist, however, oil may be struck.

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FERENC A. VALI. *The Turkish Straits and NATO*. Pp. xiii, 348. Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. \$9.50.

The recent build up of the Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean again focuses international attention on the Turkish Straits. Professor Ferenc A. Vali of the University of Massachusetts, in this new study of the legal status and strategic position of the Straits, shows their continued vital importance to both the East and West. His examination covers primarily the legal status of the Straits since the 1920s and the defense strategies of NATO and the U.S.S.R. in the eastern end of the Mediterranean since World War II. It is Professor Vali's thesis that the importance of the Turkish Straits has not decreased in spite of the revolution of nuclear missiles and the expansion of air power. In fact, with the growing strength of the Soviet naval presence in the Middle East the control and use of the Straits is more vital than ever, both to the Soviet Union and the West. The Soviet Union may have successfully "leap frogged" the southern defense barrier of NATO, provided by Greece and Turkey, but access to the new areas of Soviet interest must still be through this barrier. Therefore, the "Turkish Straits and thus the Turkish state hold a key role in the preservation of the balance in the Mediterranean and the Middle East" (p. 162).

Professor Vali, in analyzing the various policy alternatives for the NATO powers and the various forms a new convention for the Straits might take, stresses the importance of continued Western participa-

tion in the future of the Straits and not allowing them to slip under the Soviets' exclusive control. However, as this study shows, there is no pressing need at the moment to revise the Montreux Convention of 1936 under which the Straits are currently operating. Although the convention is technically out of date, particularly in regard to the need to update the technical protocols and the need to replace the role which the League of Nations was to have played with that of the United Nations, the political balance and accommodation provided by the treaty has successfully served to protect Turkish and Western interests without unduly restricting Soviet use of the Straits. The Straits are under Turkish sovereignty but are administered by Turkey to protect the interests of all powers, especially the Black Sea powers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the parties have not yet chosen to implement those articles which permit revoking or reversing the agreement.

Although Professor Vali is thorough in his discussion of the legal and strategic implications of the present regime of the Turkish Straits, he barely touches on the domestic and international forces and politics which influence the policies of the participants. As a result, this study provides a useful framework for discussion of the problem, but without the politics, an in depth understanding is not possible. In addition to outlining the legal and strategic conditions this volume is particularly helpful in collecting in the appendices all the pertinent documentation (pp. 165-324).

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WILLIAM W. WHITSON, ed. *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s*. Pp. xxxiv, 390. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$20.00.

This quite useful collection of eighteen papers, for an aborted conference on the role of the military in China, focuses on trends over the past and prospects for the next five years. Alternative Chinese policies have been analyzed for the following

issues: (1) the military's role; (2) execution of that role and authority professional commanders have over material and personnel; (3) selection criteria for generals; (4) the organization of military power; and (5) strategies and tactics. These issues are dealt with in four separate sets of papers: the first gives the historical overview of the role of the military; the second focuses on command and control; the next views the organization of military power; and the last surveys strategy and tactics.

In addition to presenting a varied array and analysis of salient information on the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the book's authors—who work in several governmental agencies including the CIA, private industry, several universities, research bodies, and so forth—happily put to rest some myths about the military designs of the People's Republic of China—for example, China's offensive and aggressive foreign aims—presenting a sophisticated look at the manner in which the PLA has been and is employed militarily and in civilian pursuits. Some of the authors' important generalizations which belie popular conceptions include: Communist military institutions and practices contain important continuities with the past; military and party leaders are often the same and the PLA's involvement in politics has been routine; and PLA forces and weapons systems have been oriented to defensive warfare.

The positive value of this set of papers is clear, yet the work suffers from the usual problems of this type of book as well as its own peculiar shortcomings. Getting a coherent, consistent book out of eighteen separate contributions is well nigh impossible even with conscientious editing. The levels of development and analysis, as well as the variety of approaches, present problems: contradictions arise, tone varies, analytic rigor differs, quality runs a wide range, and so on. These characteristics emerge in the book, though not to any extreme degree. It is rather another shortcoming that diminishes the usefulness of the book's rich set of data and description: the absence of an appropriate analytic framework for the entire work. The editor does pre-

sent an introduction that focuses on the major issues the authors cover but he does not put their contributions into a meaningful analytic context as, for example, the author of the last paper does his own study of military policy. The absence of an index will forestall the most effective use of the book by its readers.

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### EUROPEAN HISTORY AND POLITICS

T. W. ADAMS. *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*. Pp. ix, 284. Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1971. \$6.00.

The study of a communist party in a non-communist state is an important and fascinating undertaking. If successful, such a study reveals the composition, character, and tactics of a potentially powerful revolutionary force and sheds light on the impact of dogma, leadership, and history on today's social forces. It offers penetrating commentary on the society whose radical restructuring the communist party seeks to bring about. It also focuses on the conspiratorial relationship which often links such groups with the Soviet Union or some other fountainhead of world communism.

T. W. Adams' *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus* claims to be just such an undertaking. It attempts to study the history and organization of what the book's jacket calls, on a percentage basis, "probably the largest non-ruling communist party in the world." By reviewing such topics as AKEL's place in the "national environment," its "conflict and integration" with the domestic as well as the international setting, and the "principal determinants" of its behavior, the book also serves as a handbook on recent developments in the Republic's domestic and foreign affairs. Thus, it poses crucial questions about AKEL itself and about the strife-torn island generally.

While containing much information and



commentary, the book, nevertheless, falls far short of its stated objective. The author appears to remain too distant from his subject, not merely because AKEL's leaders are said to be hostile toward him but also because of his own preconceived notions regarding that movement. Moreover, the book is based on English-language journalistic and government sources—or official translations—and too often resorts to conjecture, unwarranted speculation, and unsubstantiated generalization. Frequent errors in the use of Greek words reveal a serious language obstacle to the kind of basic research required by the subject at hand. There are thus no carefully argued and supported answers to a number of fundamental issues: Is AKEL a genuinely revolutionary movement? What is the indigenous basis and long-range viability of its appeal in the Cypriot society? What is the nature of its relationship with President Makarios? What real influence does Moscow and the Greek and British communist parties exert over AKEL? Professor Adams is clearly aware of the importance of these questions and strives to deal with them. However, his answers need much more systematic research, objective analysis, and substantiation than is offered here.

Thus, for example, on the key question of Soviet influence one reads that in 1943 AKEL changed its policy on the issue of the war "probably on instructions from the Kremlin," (p. 26); that during 1949–1960 "the U.S.S.R. worked closely with the indigenous Communist Party . . ." in Cyprus (p. 159); that according to Grivas, and in its attitude toward EOKA, AKEL was "simply taking orders from behind the Iron Curtain," (p. 51); that in 1956 AKEL "reportedly . . . decided to become a communist party devoted to the dictates of the Soviet party . . ." (p. 79). All this needs to be substantiated and documented, and also reconciled with the author's apparent endorsement of the "widely held belief in the island that AKEL is not a foreign-directed apparatus and offers no threat to the island's accepted way of life. . . ." (p. 84). On a related matter, his refusal to concede the possibility that communist

and genuinely nationalist attitudes may under certain circumstances be fully compatible leads him to rather tortuous explanations of AKEL's shifts regarding *enosis*.

In sum, *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus* is a compilation of facts and comments on communism in Cyprus, and as such it is a useful addition to the growing literature on non-ruling communist movements. However, the paucity of research and of balanced material presented should indicate to the specialist the magnitude of the task that lies ahead in the study of this important subject.

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DENIS P. BARRITT and CHARLES F. CARTER.  
*The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations*. 2nd ed. Pp. 176.  
New York: Oxford University Press,  
1972. \$2.95. Paperbound.

DENIS P. BARRITT and ARTHUR BOOTH.  
*Orange and Green: A Quaker Study of Community Relations in Northern Ireland*. 3rd ed. Pp. viii, 71. Brigflatts, Sedbergh, Yorks, England: Northern Friends Peace Board (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee), 1972. No price.

*The Northern Ireland Problem* presents two pictures of that split province of the United Kingdom: one as of 1962, just after a rash of events between the Irish Republic Army and the Orange government, and the other as of today, after three years of disastrous three-sided conflict—among British soldiers and Orange and Green vigilantes. The authors have wisely reprinted the first picture as they gave it in their first edition and then have added analytical essays dealing with what has happened since.

Barritt contends, in their 1962 study, that from 1962 to 1967 or 1968 "the progress in good community relations outstripped the modest optimism of our conclusions" (p. ix). Then came a series of clashes that brought about "the decline from a promising era of co-operation into a state of near civil war" (p. xxviii). In the past

three years, approximately 600 people have been killed, and property damages have also reached frightening levels. To add to this disaster, emigration by those who could and would leave—including many of the well trained—has returned to high levels.

Dennis Barritt, the executive of the Belfast Council of Social Welfare, and Charles Carter, a social scientist who is vice-chancellor of the University of Lancaster, England, give a vivid sense of what divides the one million who identify themselves as Protestants from the one-half million who call themselves Roman Catholics. They trace this out in terms of contrasting views of history, fantasies about each other's religious organization and practices, social relations, segregated educational institutions, discrimination in employment and housing, political and legal maneuverings, trade union biases, and leisure-time activities. In a negative way, they make a tremendously effective case for the separation of church and state and for non-segregated schools, housing, and employment. Both in 1962 and even more in 1972, the two ethnic groups knew little that was accurate about each other. "The first change needed is that both Protestants and Catholics should be willing to learn more of the other's heritage and beliefs" (p. 155).

Barritt and Carter rehearse the variety of proposals that are being made to bring about some alleviation or even a degree of resolution of the current strife. In this, their chief recommendation is that the Northern Ireland constitution—regardless of relations with the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland—should "be constructed so as to entrench the position of both communities, and thus to assure basic human rights" (p. 169), something not hitherto the case.

The highest compliment that can be given to *Orange and Green* is that it was favorably received by the thoughtful leaders of both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant communities in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. The new edition has been completely revised to include relevant data on the developments of the past three

years. Its chief chapters set forth as succinctly as possible the "bones of contention," the efforts being made at bridge-building, pacification and reform, and the apparent possibilities for the future. The authors place their faith in the "thousands of reasonable and fair-minded citizens [who] . . . live with their extremist fellows. . . . Both Catholic and Protestant are Irishmen, and they deeply resent—as do the Welsh and the Scots—any suggestion that they are, or should be, English" (p. 3). These will be the Irishmen who eventually will prevail. It is they who are interested in the implementation of "British standards of justice and fair play" so long denied to the Green minority (p. 69).

In my estimation, these two books provide the most objective and balanced report and analysis of the struggle in Northern Ireland currently available. They reflect in printed form the courageous work of reconciliation being done by Barritt in the midst of Belfast during the whole period of the violent confrontations.

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BRIAN BOND. *The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914*. Pp. xv, 350. London: Eyre Methuen, 1972. Distributed in the United States by Barnes & Noble, New York, \$18.75.

The "new" military history—the military history that eschews the traditional focus upon battles and campaigns to emphasize instead the history of war and the military in a larger social context—has strangely given relatively little attention to the very pertinent issues of the evolution of professional military education. Samuel P. Huntington in his highly influential *The Soldier and the State* rightly makes the development of professional schools central to the development of the profession of arms, but we have few scholarly and analytical histories of the schools.

Brian Bond here takes a step to remedy this lack with a study of the transformation of the senior department of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, into the Staff

College, Camberley, and of the influence of that highest British Army school upon the Victorian army into the First World War. At the close of the Napoleonic wars British military staff procedures were so effective, thanks largely to the influence of John Gaspard Le Marchant, principal founder of the Royal Military College, that the French took them as a model when they formed their own staff school. By the time of the Crimean War, however, staff work had fallen into the same somnolence in which all the rest of the British army languished, and as part of the post-Crimean reforms intended to awaken the army a Staff College was founded in 1858, to be moved from Sandhurst to Camberley in 1862. At first the instruction contained little of direct military value and much of mathematics and modern languages on the familiar theory that such subjects exercise and discipline the mind. There were also numerous examinations, which critics thought merely encouraged cramming to the detriment of the reflective study that the Staff College should have stimulated in mature officers. Various reformers, including the faculty military historians Sir Frederick Maurice and G. F. R. Henderson and most especially Colonel H. J. Hildyard, commandant from 1893 to 1898, carried the curriculum toward greater military utility and reduced the number of examinations. Staff College students thus came to learn enough of the technique of staff work and of principles of war that the graduates slightly relieved the gloomy record of the Boer War. But the development of a British doctrine of war able to give genuine coherence to staff work awaited the creation of the General Staff among the post-Boer War reforms and the General Staff's formulation of a military strategy appropriate to Great Britain's national policies. As the General Staff took shape and began its work, the Staff College kept abreast of the new advance in strategy and theory between 1903 and 1913 under three outstanding commandants—Henry Rawlinson, Henry Wilson, and William Robertson.

Such in brief summary is the story of the Staff College as Bond tells it. Un-

fortunately, like so much writing about the nineteenth-century British army, by American historians as well as by British writers such as Bond, this book takes the Victorian army as seriously as it took itself—which is too seriously by far. There is too little acknowledgment here that the British army was close to being a façade without substance, that the British Empire's military reputation rested on past heroics of the ages of Marlborough and Wellington rather than on current realities, that even the best successes of the Staff College failed to remedy the ineptitudes that visited military embarrassments upon the British army in colonial campaigns from Afghanistan to Zululand. So despite Hildyard, Henderson, and the Staff College, the Boer War brought another series of embarrassments, and despite Rawlinson, Wilson, Robertson, and the improved Staff College, British command and staff performances in World War I were far short of outstanding. Bond says that the first battles in 1914 destroyed most of the accumulated capital built up by the Staff College; but why did German staff efficiency survive the first casualties so much better? Why did the German army continue to be better commanded and administered throughout the war? Brian Bond is a careful, painstaking historian, but he is himself too much a Victorian historian of the British army—still too bound by a Victorian kind of British self-satisfaction—to get to the bottom of the hard questions that might be asked about the quality of the Victorian army and its Staff College.

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ROBERT CECIL. *The Myth of the Master Race: Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology*. Pp. 248. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972. \$8.95.

Biographies of Nazi leaders have long been an important source of insight into the more enigmatic aspects of the Nazi phenomenon. In such recent studies as those of Bradley F. Smith they even ven-

tured into an exploration of the childhood of Hitler and Himmler with telling effect. The Rosenberg biography of Robert Cecil is not one of the most innovative of this genre, but it makes up with painstaking historical scholarship and inherent interest of its under-researched subject what it missed in penetration of the man's personality because of the author's inability to contact his relatives and friends. Thus we learn without comment, and half-buried in genealogical trivia, that Rosenberg's mother died almost immediately following his birth and that his father seemed "almost entirely withdrawn from human contact." With this kind of a childhood, the strange twists and mortal coils of the mind of the chief ideologist of the Nazi movement offer less surprise.

The author establishes convincingly the profound influence of the pseudo-intellectual Rosenberg on Hitler and Eckart during the early years in contrast to his seeming eclipse after 1925 and in various functions under the Third Reich. There is also a good deal of party history as seen through the frog perspective of the myopic editor of the *Voelkischer Beobachter*—translated by Cecil as "Racist Observer." The author is particularly penetrating in his analysis of the policies of the early Nazi regime toward the Christian churches, an object of great hostility to the hateful Rosenberg, and in his description of the foreign policy ideas of the latter. As a Baltic German born in Russian Reval, the racist ideologue hoped to undo the mighty Soviet Union by winning over some of the many Russian nationality groups to the side of the invading German armies. He also supported the unsuccessful wooing of the British by the likes of Hess and Ribbentrop. But in Russia, his cruder disciples and other Nazi Vulgarians, including Hitler himself, could see no differences between different kinds of Russians and, with senseless brutality, drove all under their occupation into the arms of hostile partisans. And so it came to pass that the high priest of racial hatred found himself cast in the unlikely role of a rearguard action against those who ruthlessly acted out his own ideology. Eventually he resigned his office, unable to stem

the fateful tide of violence he had helped to loose himself. But he never lost his perverse self-righteousness that his ideas were right and in no way responsible for the war and genocide for which the Nuremberg Tribunal condemned him to death by hanging.

Robert Cecil spins a good yarn and appears to be well aware of the infinite gradations of belief and attitudes at work among the Nazi leadership, including anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, he often seems to endow Nazi thinking with a rationality and logical cohesion which would have been worthy of a better cause. The prejudice of twisted minds can hardly be fathomed in this manner.

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PETER DENNIS. *Decision by Default: Peacetime Conscription and British Defence, 1919-1939*. Pp. 243. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1972. \$9.75.

After the carnage of the First World War there was a widespread view in Britain that never again must a large army be committed to a continental war. The War Office, it is true, continued to defend the established concept of a large army based upon infantry and even cavalry. Such an army could only be recruited on the basis of conscription. On the other hand, the advocates of mechanized warfare—the military historian and strategist Liddell Hart was the leading figure here—took the view that a continental commitment was unwise and that conscription was unnecessary. Their alternative was to offer France support chiefly through air power. Britain would therefore not make preparations for an expeditionary force on anything like the scale of that sent in 1914. There was the policy of limited liability which the new Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, helped push through his cabinet in 1937. Rearmament would concentrate on the air force and home defense. In France the British policy looked like a determination—

as the phrase went—to fight to the last French soldier. But though formally committed to other priorities, the British army did not in practice cease to regard the expeditionary force as central. And it was increasingly able to further its view on the ground that Britain's continental allies needed the reassurance which only a large expeditionary force could give.

This theme is unfolded by Mr. Dennis with restraint and authority. He brings a military expertise to bear in analyzing the strategy of the British government in the 1930s, and thus cuts through much empty phraseology about collective security, appeasement, and rearmament. In particular, he has used Liddell Hart's papers to good effect in expounding the nature of the issues at stake. The book makes it clear that while British policy at Munich in October 1938 was not simply an acknowledgment of military impotence, none the less, Munich brought home the full seriousness of the defense situation. Moreover, it made the French even more uneasy about the prospects of effective British assistance. The case against conscription remained strong. Labor was cooperating industrially in increasing rearmament and politically in promoting the voluntary National Service appeal; to force conscription would put all this at risk. While greater recruiting would bolster the infantry, it would disrupt the preparations for a mechanized army. But conscription was ultimately forced upon a reluctant Cabinet in April 1939. What proved decisive was the need for symbolic action to dispel fears that Britain's pledges to Poland in 1939 would be treated in the spirit of her obligations to Czechoslovakia in 1938. That there were more sides to the question than most previous accounts have suggested is one of the chief conclusions to emerge from this useful study.

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LOUIS FISCHER. *The Road to Yalta: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1941-1945*. Pp. xi, 238. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. \$8.95.

JOSEF KORBEL. *Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?* Pp. vii, 302. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$10.00.

Louis Fischer spent some fourteen years in the Soviet Union as a journalist, gaining the friendship of many Bolsheviks in the 1920s. For him, "Stalin was no riddle or enigma or puzzle" (p. 209). In *The Road to Yalta*, his second volume in a series on Soviet foreign relations, Fischer focused on the grand diplomacy of World War II—the interactions among the big three (Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill) which set the Cold War stage. Josef Korbel spent most of those war years in London with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. For him, "the story of negotiations with totalitarian powers is sadly familiar" (p. 39). Appropriately, *Détente in Europe* opens with the Yalta conference, although Korbel's main concern is to describe the slow motion dénouement of the postwar drama as it is now being played out in European capitals. Korbel concentrates on intra-European East-West relations, especially the years 1967-1971, but often sweeps back several decades to summarize the economic and political problems bequeathed by the big three—giving prime attention to the German question.

Fischer is by far the more exciting writer and, despite his love of extreme inference ("Stalin wished"; "Roosevelt realized"), by far the better historian. He has skimmed the cream off a rich set of verbatim records, archival documents and memoirs which chronicle the wartime diplomacy. His book provides the perfect basis for a television documentary series. But the script, however well revised, is the old script. The vignettes are familiar replays: Stalin, Churchill and those red ticks on a slip of paper to divvy up to Balkans at Moscow in 1943; poor Mikolajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, appears once again as the tragic victim of geopolitical circumstance. Many—and many of them excellent—volumes have taken us down this same road to Yalta. The most fascinating account is probably the records of the wartime conferences published in the U.S. Foreign Relations series. There is little

place on the shelves for recapitulation unless it be for the historical laboratory. Unfortunately, Louis Fischer died before completing his book and we are left with tantalizing suggestions, in the prologue and final chapter, of the thesis he would have developed in subsequent chapters dealing with the Yalta conference itself. Fischer apparently intended to present Yalta neither as—in the predominant right wing interpretation—F.D.R.'s sell-out to expansionist communism nor—in the predominant revisionist view—as a reasonable agreement required by legitimate Soviet defense needs, but instead as a confrontation between two emergent imperialist powers. Yet there is no reason to doubt that this posthumous volume will appeal to those who delight in Fischer's smoothly flowing narratives—for they offer personalized but competent history.

The piecemeal diplomacy of détente provides much less heady material for historian Korbel. Although significant events do stand out—the four power agreement on Berlin; the Polish-German treaty—the real consequences of tentative realignments for the future of Europe or America remain in the realm of speculation. Multilateral negotiations to convene an all-European conference on security and cooperation began only in November 1972 after this book went to print. But if we may sympathize with the difficulties of writing contemporary history, the blame for a bland and ambivalent presentation, leading to contradictory conclusions, still falls on the author. Détente is variously defined as a policy, an event, and a desire—it is sometimes real and sometimes illusory. Caution leads Korbel to hedge: everything "could conceivably" take place and "might be" justified. In the end, how are we to know whether "the principal obstacle to a policy beyond current détente remains continuing suspicion on both sides" (p. 248) or whether, on the contrary, it is the "West European mood of relaxation, which approaches complacency, that is the grave danger accompanying any further progress beyond détente, a danger that could destroy détente itself" (p. 249)? A

book intended to offer clarification resulted instead in obfuscation.

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JOSEPH T. FUHRMANN. *The Origins of Capitalism in Russia: Industry and Progress in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Pp. 376. Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle Books, 1972. \$12.50.

Professor Fuhrmann's book contains two maps, an introduction, thirteen chapters of text, three appendixes, notes relegated unfortunately to the end of the volume, a glossary, a note on sources, a selected bibliography, and an index. After the introduction devoted to the author's approach to his subject, the narrative takes up "the town life, artisanry, and commerce of early modern Russia," and proceeds, in succession, to "first steps toward industrial modernization, 1470's–1590's," "Andrei Vinus and the beginning of iron manufacturing," "the downfall of Andrei Vinus," "surging ahead: Russian iron manufacturing, 1648–1662," "crisis in the affairs of Peter Marselis," "iron manufacturing in the far northwest," "expansion and Russification, 1675–1690's," "other Russian manufactures of the seventeenth century," "the Russian state's industrial policy," and "activities of the foreigner in early modern Russia" to end with "manufacturing in early modern Russia: some generalizations and conclusions." The appendixes convert the Russian money and weights and measures of the period and provide a list of Russian manufactories during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with dates. The book is clearly written and attractively presented, although there are many small mistakes in transliteration and Russian endings.

*The Origins of Capitalism in Russia* is a rich, scholarly, intelligent, and useful book. The author is primarily concerned with the "fifty-seven manufactories of Western European type"—twenty-eight of them iron works and subjects of Professor Fuhrmann's doctoral dissertation—which "were

built in Russia from the early 1500's to the mid-1690's," and he also discusses other activities of foreigners in Russia as well as the broader problem of the emergence of Russian capitalism. Although the work is based on published documents and on secondary studies, rather than on new archival sources, it represents a considerable achievement and a distinct contribution to its field. The huge material on the manufactories is carefully and precisely organized, and it is treated with lucidity, balance, and common sense. More disputable is the author's handling of the larger issue of the coming of capitalism to Russia. Treating capitalism largely as a technological concept, Professor Fuhrmann emphasizes both the enormous importance of foreigners in bringing industry to Russia, together with the inability of Russian society itself, bound by serfdom, to sustain effectively a capitalist development, and the historical significance and, so to speak, legitimacy of this Russian version of capitalism. Specific criticisms might include the author's frequent preference for Soviet categories and terms, including a deplorable use of the concept of "feudalism" and its derivatives.

But on the whole this is a fine work, and it makes the reader look forward to Professor Fuhrmann's next book.

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THEODORE S. HAMEROW. *The Social Foundation of German Unification, 1858-1871: Struggles and Accomplishments*. Pp. 456. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$15.50. Paper-bound, \$7.95.

This volume concludes Mr. Hamerow's study of the genesis of the second German empire. It is not a continuation but a dealt with ideas and institutions. It is complement to the preceding volume which Mr. Hamerow's belief that the form of national unification assumed in Central Europe was profoundly influenced by the growth of industrial capitalism and the rise

of the liberal bourgeoisie. Admittedly this is neither a new nor a startling thesis; what is new, however, is Mr. Hamerow's research into the complexities and convolutions of the process, never before explored in full. The author has carried this out in an exemplary manner by consulting not only the bulk of public utterances in newspapers, magazines, and manifestos, but also by delving into the diplomatic correspondence of the German principalities and the statistics of election returns, commercial traffic records, and so forth.

The result is not only a history of German public opinion in the years preceding the foundation of the German empire, but a diplomatic history of Central Europe in so far as it was concerned with the solution of the German problem. As such, the book will become indispensable to scholars concerned with the affairs of Central Europe in this critical decade. More than anything else, its value lies in the details of changing and vacillating policies which liberals as well as conservatives and even socialists adopted on the thorny issue of German unification.

No brief estimate can do justice to the picture which Mr. Hamerow has drawn in these pages. The pivotal event in the long struggle between liberal and conservative forces was the constitutional conflict, or, as we term it, the conflict over army reform. More and more we have come to realize that conflict was as crucial an event as the end of the Prussian reform in 1819. Mr. Hamerow points out, quite correctly, that the Prussian liberals, despite their triumph in the elections of the early 1860s, "preferred the role of critic to that of performer" (p. 155). They knew what they did not want, but they had no clear idea of how the goal of German unification to which they subscribed could be achieved "without blood and iron." They were sadly lacking in foresight and daring, and as Theodor Mommsen put it, "There is no Cavour party among us." He might as well have said, "There is no Cavour among us." Had there been a statesman among the Prussian liberals he would have acquiesced to the king's program of army reform and used it to the advantage of his party in

completing the German unification under the liberal banner. As it turned out the liberals feared Prussian authoritarianism on the same plane that they feared the rise of proletarian radicalism, and while they abhorred Bismarck's dictatorial methods, they were willing to accept and even approve the economic measures which he proposed since they benefited their class interests.

Mr. Hamerow is very cautious in interpreting the material he has unearthed and assembled. Only on the last page does he venture to offer the conclusion that the triumph of blood and iron in 1871 led ultimately to the disaster of blood and iron in 1918. I do not believe that he means to imply that there was a historical fatality at work which turned victory into catastrophe. It is hardly fair to say that the outcome of World War I was the inevitable result of the German unification. One other observation occurred to me in reading this book: regardless of any reservations we may harbor in respect to Bismarck's "realpolitik," we cannot overlook the fact that his success was due in large measure to his superior political intelligence and daring which dwarfed all his opponents, whether to the right or to the left. The "kleindeutsche Lösung" was a necessity; the great Prussian solution to the German question which Bismarck achieved was not. But this was less Bismarck's fault than his adversaries' weakness—primarily the Prussian liberals who wanted to have their cake and eat it too.

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PAUL M. HAYES. *Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling, 1887-1945*. Pp. 368. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. \$12.95.

This meticulously documented study will probably stand as the definitive scholarly work on its subject. The author has sought to go beyond usual biographical detail and to develop an explanation of how a man with such an ardently nationalist record could have betrayed his country—

his name immortalized as the very synonym of "traitor." If the author's explanation of this paradoxical personality is not altogether complete—as indeed he concludes—the book does offer many insights.

Vidkun Quisling's strong sense of Nordic nationalism was shaped in his childhood. His father, a rural pastor, was a devoted student of early Norse history and instilled this interest in his son. Vidkun was an intensely studious boy, earning the highest marks on record in every school he attended; his brilliance of mind may account in part for the arrogance which marked his public life. Service as military attaché in Leningrad and Helsinki and later with the Nansen organization in Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution made him a leading Norwegian authority on Russian affairs. Newspaper articles and speeches pushed him into public notice and eventually into a short and controversial term in the cabinet as Minister of Defense.

Disgust with politics led him to organize his own miniscule Nasjonal Samling (National Union) party, which never won a seat in the Storting. His fascist inclinations were reinforced by hostility to the Norwegian Labor party, which dominated parliament after 1933. (The Labor party had actually joined the Third International in 1919 and though it withdrew in 1923 it still retained some public image of association with communism). With the outbreak of World War II, Quisling saw in the Nazis a force which could save Norway's pure Nordic heritage from Boleshevism. Thus there followed his visit to Hitler, his collaboration in the Nazi invasion and occupation of Norway, and his trial and execution after the liberation in 1945.

There is little to fault in this outstanding treatise. The author, immersed in his subject, perhaps takes too much for granted a close knowledge of Norwegian politics—the average non-specialist reader would be helped by a brief background sketch. A similar point is the author's frequent listing of individuals involved in a given incident without identification of the names at that point in his text. There are so many names involved—some prominent, many obscure—that the reader wishes for a "cast



of characters" for ready reference to the numerous Norwegians, Germans, and Russians who play parts in the complicated story. Fortunately the author does supply an exhaustive index which makes such identification possible.

The author devotes some attention to building a case that Quisling's trial and execution in 1945 were improper under Norwegian criminal law, since capital punishment was abolished in 1905. He makes no brief for Quisling's innocence, but feels that the tribunal was so composed as to make an impartial verdict impossible and that it strained due process in resurrecting a provision of Norway's military law, never used before, which retained the death penalty for military personnel in wartime and for treason. To this reviewer the argument seems rather forced. Given Quisling's extraordinary crimes it would have been impossible to obtain an "impartial" tribunal. The military law in question had not been used before simply because no comparable offense had been committed, except perhaps by some of Quisling's small coterie of collaborators.

These comments are not meant to detract from the excellence and thoroughness of the author's formidable research on a difficult topic. The book is an indispensable item in the history of World War II.

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ROBERT E. LERNER. *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages*. Pp. vii, 271. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1972. \$10.00.

The heresy of the Free Spirit had two attributes: pantheism, more often called autotheism, and antinomianism, a belief that not only can the soul become one with God, but in consequence of such a state it can ignore the moral law. Professor Robert E. Lerner skillfully shows that almost all charges of antinomianism against the Free Spirits were competely false and that most sects so labeled were on the contrary austere. Using writings by and

against them, and inquisitorial records which often produced stereotyped testimony, Professor Lerner convincingly shows that "the Free Spirits were motivated by pious desires for a truly apostolic life and communion with divinity . . . (p. 8). In his study he reinterprets old materials and introduces new sources. One is surprised, however, that the rich resources in Low Country archives and libraries were not used more.

The work as a whole is extremely valuable for all students interested in the social and cultural history of the late Middle Ages because of the many insights and conclusions which place the Free Spirits in the context of their own times. Because in medieval thought a heretic was naturally capable of the worst crimes, heretics in the Swabian Reis, Beguines, Beghards, Lollards, the Brethern of the Common Life, and preaching mystics were all charged with gross sexual immorality. As for the Adamites and Luciferans, Lerner shows that they were not Free Spirits but in fact were products of the early Middle Ages and at the time of the Free Spirits were figments of ecclesiastical and poetic imagination.

Many of the Beghards and Beguines if permitted would have entered religious orders. Being overly pious and rejected, they set up their own organizations. Consequently they and all mystics were strongly opposed by the established orders with which they had much in common. Furthermore, the mystics' criticism of each other in their attempts to prove their own orthodoxy hurt the position of all of them.

The ordinary reader will be impressed not only by the relatively large number of women in the Free Spirit movement, but also by the rather complete education that many of them undoubtedly had. Marguerite Porette, author of the *Mirror of Simple Souls*, Mechthild of Magdeburg, and Bloemardinne of Brussels had influence beyond their own tiny groups. That the heretics among the Free Spirits consisted of a disproportionate number of women is not surprising. There was a surplus female population and employment for them was difficult to come by. Thus in a beguinage

women could find occupation and a modicum of communal security. (The social significance of the beguinage allowed it to exist in Amsterdam for some time after the Reformation.) Furthermore, the medieval regulation of women to an inferior status turned many women to radical mysticism.

Professor Lerner shows that few beguines were of humble origin and that the heresy had a greater urban than rural appeal. Most of the members came from the landed aristocracy and the urban patriciate. He also points out that the majority of those in the Free Spirit movement were not necessarily searching for material or social benefits, but were striving for religious and social perfection. They were not a revolutionary force; they had no trace of communism in their doctrine. Few openly commiserated with the poor. They believed with unusual optimism in man's potential for union with God, and to them that was the ultimate end, not material and economic betterment. The heresy gradually disappeared in the fifteenth century, especially after some of the groups such as the Beguines and the Brethren became more respectable.

Professor Lerner has handled extremely well a complicated problem of social and religious history. Undoubtedly many of his conclusions—with which incidentally this reviewer agrees—will be questioned, but they cannot be ignored. The work is a real contribution to our understanding of the Middle Ages.

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HAROLD MACMILLAN. *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961*. Pp. viii, 504. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. \$15.00.

This enlightening volume, the fifth in Harold Macmillan's memoirs, opens with the Tory victory in the 1959 General Election and ends with Queen Elizabeth's journey to West Africa in November 1961. While revealing little of substance that is not already known about such issues as the

creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the abortive summit conference of May 1960, Berlin, the Congo, and Laos, Mr. Macmillan reflects with style and tact. He reveals himself both as a politician and statesman, able to observe events and men in a detached, yet sensitive manner. His descriptions of the leading figures of his time, men such as de Gaulle, Eisenhower, and Khrushchev, if not profound, are often brutally frank and ironical. While Mr. Macmillan is occasionally devious about his own errors, he adopts a very critical attitude toward American leadership during the U-2 crisis and the Berlin negotiations. His observations about German, Soviet and French leaderships are equally tart, occasionally condescending. Yet, it is all done with such culture and wit that one cannot but enjoy even that which is disagreeable.

Mr. Macmillan views his own role and that of Great Britain during this period as that of mediator, often between apparently unreasonable and unreasoning adversaries and allies. He pursues his theme with particular effect in discussing his efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban, hold a summit conference on Berlin, keep South Africa in the Commonwealth, and promote the Rhodesian Federation. He pleads convincingly for understanding of Britain's singular position as leader of a racially and ideologically heterogeneous commonwealth.

Mr. Macmillan's views about the "special relationship" between Great Britain and the United States in a period of declining British influence and increasing Soviet intransigence are particularly interesting, revealing his ambition that Britain might bridge both Soviet-American and European-African cleavages. While ignoring the difficulty for Anglo-European relations in continuing the "special relationship," Mr. Macmillan declares that "a British Prime Minister in a still divided Europe must inevitably look to Washington for support." But, he does not seriously contemplate the problems this must create for Britain in its relations with France, the Soviet Union, and even Africa. Thus, he was much relieved when, during his initial meeting with President Kennedy, "we

seemed immediately to talk as old friends." "It is curious," he continues, "how all American statesmen begin by trying to treat Britain as just one of many foreign or NATO countries. They soon find themselves relying on our advice and experience."

In conclusion, Mr. Macmillan's memoirs, while not entirely satisfying, are written with a skill rarely evident in the memoirs of American leaders and provide, from a literary and historical perspective, a useful resource for scholars of international relations.

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HAROLD MACMILLAN. *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*. Pp. 786. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. \$15.00.

This is the fourth volume of the Macmillan Memoirs and covers the period from just before the Suez crisis to the dissolution of Parliament in 1959. In the style of modern ex-prime ministerial autobiographies it is a long stringing together of diary extracts and descriptive passages which present the performance of the writer in the most favorable light. To the historians of the future, aware of this qualification, it will nevertheless be a valuable source of material.

The period covered is that of Macmillan's political zenith, before the almost unaccountable decay which followed. He became prime minister in the difficult aftermath of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 and succeeded in restoring the position of the Tory Party from the shock and divisions to which the traumatic disaster gave rise. On the origins of that fatal expedition he is less than honest; sticking to the official view and mentioning nothing of the tergiversations of Anthony Eden and Selwyn Lloyd which so shocked the House of Commons and the world.

For Macmillan the blame for the failure of the enterprise is put squarely on the

policy of the United States, and particularly of John Foster Dulles, and many pages are devoted to the work which he put in when it was all over to restore the "special relationship" which had, as it appeared to him, been temporarily destroyed. In fact, the main impression left by this long book is of a world in which Harold Macmillan, the experienced representative of a century of successful diplomacy, was using his influence with an aging president to correct the naivetés and short-sightedness of the United States foreign policy. As the Middle East was the one area of active conflict in the world in which both countries were jointly interested, the decision by the United States to send troops to support the government of Lebanon in July 1958 was the final proof of his success.

Macmillan's preferred attitude was that of a cynical, witty Whig and it was often a pleasure to observe his performance; but this attitude prevented him from coming to terms with the "winds of change" of which a few years later he was to speak. The over-attention to foreign affairs, while Britain's influence was being eroded by economic decline, was encouraged by remembered wartime associations with Eisenhower and de Gaulle. He never seems to have realised the difference between the achievements of personal friendship and those of national power. He describes the comfort he derived, after the humiliation of Suez, from successful but minor independent actions in the Gulf. The failure of his attempt to form a European Free Trade Area, of which the European Common Market was to be a part, is blamed wholly on de Gaulle, without any apparent understanding of the philosophy which distinguished the Community, of which the Market was but the first step, from a purely trading agreement.

This was the period in which Britain developed her own H-bomb; a rather breathless performance during which it was important to delay any international agreement on testing or supply of essential materials and which ended with the repeal of the McMahon Act, perhaps the biggest success of personal diplomacy. But this, of course, led not to British independence, but

further dependence on the United States. A large part of the book is devoted to relations with the Soviet Union and the author's attempt to take the lead in arranging a summit conference.

Macmillan belonged to the Tories who still believed in *noblesse oblige* and not the doctrines of nineteenth-century liberal economics. This was demonstrated by his acceptance of the resignation of three doctrinaire Treasury ministers and his emotional preference for expansionist policies. If he had only carried forward into his maturity some of the ideas of his youth when he wrote "The Middle Way" his premiership might have left a stronger mark. As it was, the overstretch of Britain's political and military power, although reduced, continued until her overseas commitments were belatedly and reluctantly brought into line with her resources by Harold Wilson's government in 1968.

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RICHARD PRICE. *An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working-Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War, 1899-1902*. Pp. xiii, 279. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. \$11.50.

For this study of the British working-class attitude toward the South African war the author has researched an imposing list of private papers, official records, newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and memoirs. In addition to the records of the political labor and socialist movement he has utilized those of the numerous working-class clubs that were primarily social. His conclusion is that instead of an uncritical support of an imperial war on the part of a jingoistic working class, the contrary was true, with indifference general and positive anti-war sentiment widespread. Working-class newspapers, such as *Reynolds' News*, *Morning Leader*, *Club Life*, the British Socialist party's *Justice*, and the Independent Labour party's *Labour Leader*, generally opposed the war. Yet the same club members who on the eve of the war would hold

protest meetings and during it pass anti-war resolutions could celebrate the relief of Mafeking and joyfully greet returning units of volunteers.

The author denies that the Conservative victory in the "khaki" election of 1900 was proof of working-class support for imperialism. There was no massive shift to the Conservatives. Attempts to defeat pro-Boer members usually failed and were successful only where seats had been shaky with the Liberal share in the vote declining since 1885. Where the issue was clearly defined as between imperialism and social reform the latter usually won, as in Derby and some London constituencies where Liberals replaced Conservatives.

An analysis of recruiting shows that working-class enlistments were fewer than others in proportion to numbers. It was largely a "gentleman's war" with such men as Lord Lovat, Lord Paget, and Sir Alfred Newton, Lord Mayor of London, raising semi-autonomous units for service in South Africa. In the Imperial Yeomanry the number of grooms and servants, closely associated with the landed and well-to-do and reflecting their views, exceeded those classed as laborers. Clerks and others, who tended to think of themselves as middle-class, likewise volunteered in disproportionate numbers. In 1901-1902, however, growing unemployment resulted in some increase in working-class enlistment. It was clear, nevertheless, that the British worker was concerned primarily with immediate and practical social reform at home and comparatively indifferent to what happened in the empire.

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R. WILLIAM RAUCH, JR. *Politics and Belief in Contemporary France: Emanuel Mounier and Christian Democracy, 1932-1950*. Pp. 351. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. 47.25. Guilders.

For those concerned with the development of French Catholic political thought

this detailed inquiry into the relationship between the work of Emmanuel Mounier and the rise and fall of Christian Democracy will be a valuable reference work. Rauch begins by describing the birth pangs of Christian Democracy and the emergence of Emmanuel Mounier as a leading proponent of communitarian personalism and the founder and editor of the Catholic journal *Esprit*. The remaining five chapters are devoted to tracing the parallel development of these two forms of left-wing Catholicism and the increasingly hostile relationship between the two.

This juxtaposition serves admirably to make clear the fundamental paradoxes in the work of Mounier. Deeply distressed by what he termed the "established disorder" of pre-war France, Mounier sought the creation of a new and Christian social system in which individual acts of humanistic concern and communitarian involvement would once again have their place. It was the duty of all Christians to become deeply *engagé* in the task of creating this new world. However, Christian Democracy was not the answer; it erred in being both too bourgeois and too political. Change would have to be via revolution, and Mounier was more sympathetic to Marxist interpretations of the causes and remedies of social injustice. But Marxism also disqualified itself on two grounds: (1) it was anti-Christian and (2) it too was too political. Here we find Mounier at the ultimate dead end: the Christian must be active, but he must always resist the politicization of the spiritual. *La mystique* must never degenerate to the level of *la politique*. All organized parties were thus inevitably anathema. The earnest readers of *Esprit* who believed they were answering its call for Catholic action by joining the ranks of Christian Democracy were the most misguided of all. The only spiritually safe route to revolution, and the only clearly permissible act of personal engagement, seems to have been to subscribe to *Esprit*.

On the whole, Rauch has done a good job of explicating the anguished purity of Mounier's political thought and placing it in contrast to the steadfast but ultimately

defeated pragmatism of the Christian Democrats. On occasion his reliance on secondary sources seems somewhat excessive—compare the development of the argument on Rauch's page 93 to pages 70 and 71 of Roy Pierce's essay on Mounier in his *Contemporary French Political Thought*—and the writing is rather mechanical. Certainly one must fault Rauch's own translations from Mounier's French as far too literal. Does anyone ever really say "the ones and the others" in English?

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JEFFREY BURTON RUSSELL. *Witchcraft in the Middle Ages*. Pp. 394. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. \$15.00.

Professor Russell has gathered and arranged in chronological order an impressively large compendium of ideas about witchcraft that have survived in the written sources of medieval Western Europe. He shows that by the later Middle Ages church authorities considered witchcraft to be a heresy and prosecuted it as such. For the reader interested in contemporary ethnic and racial stereotypes, it may be important to note that Jews and blacks, two long-disadvantaged groups in the West, were intimately connected by ecclesiastical writers in the practice of witchcraft. The conventicles or witches' gatherings were called synagogues and later they were called Sabbats. The Devil, whom witches worshipped in their synagogues, was frequently described as big and black with excessively large genital organs. The witches' rites of worship were said to have included intercourse with the Devil. It is unfortunate that Professor Russell does not provide a more than cursory mention of these two interrelated phenomena that seem to be so important in the development of European views on race and ethnicity.

Studies of marginal groups in society are often based upon what those in the main stream say about them. Russell's work is not an exception. What we know about

the ideas and practices of those men and women who were considered witches or even those who may possibly have considered themselves to have been witches comes almost exclusively from people who were the enemies of witchcraft. One exception of note is the "confession." Confessions of so-called witches, however, were acquired as a result of torture or the threat of torture. This evidence is surely flawed, and Professor Russell admits that it may well be more representative of the views of the prosecutors than of the views of the alleged witches.

Russell's work is strongest where he is content to recount and examine the ideas of the ecclesiastics who comment on witches. His efforts to relate these ideas to the dynamics of medieval society in a particular historical setting are unconvincing and often misleading. Russell evidences no serious grasp of quantitative methods yet he makes unsupported and unsupportable quantitative 'assertions' and uses pseudo-quantitative jargon such as "the quantum jump in theory," "most medieval people," and "this geometric progression of the witch phenomenon."

Russell's study contains a useful and up-to-date English introduction to witchcraft within the genre of the history of ideas. Russell's jargon and bold assertions, however, should not mislead the reader into taking this work seriously as a social history of medieval witchcraft.

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JACK M. SCHICK. *The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962*. Pp. xx, 266. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. \$9.50.

Dean Rusk, while Secretary of State, once commented, "When I go to sleep I try not to think about Berlin." Schick's book tells us why. American policymakers, he argues, seriously underestimated Khrushchev's intent, expressed in November 1958, to settle the Berlin issue before moving on to problems of general European security.

Confident that the Soviet leader generated a Berlin crisis merely to get a broader settlement along lines long advocated by the United States, Dulles bent every effort to get negotiations moving, even to the point of making prior concessions. The ensuing foreign ministers' conference in Geneva foundered upon such mistaken assumptions.

The 1959 Geneva conference gave way to summitry which clarified only the fact that the two sides' intentions were not nearly so congruent as each had supposed. This became apparent in May 1960 with the U-2 incident. It underlined not only Eisenhower's refusal to accept the Soviet position but also, by revealing the USSR's strategic vulnerability, the latter's inability to force such a solution upon the West. The Vienna meeting in June 1961 between Kennedy and Khrushchev, following hard upon the Bay of Pigs episode, failed to get the two countries back on a negotiating track. Instead, each acted unilaterally.

Kennedy's *démarche* was diplomatic. He enunciated "three essentials" designed to protect West Berlin—thereby implicitly conceding the end of quadripartite control over the whole city. Simultaneously he tried to put teeth into the earlier Dulles strategy. The goal remained the same: enlarging the area of confrontation to secure a Berlin settlement within a broader framework of general European security. The means, however, differed. Whereas Dulles' bargaining tactics had had no effective fallback position short of massive retaliation, Kennedy developed a range of graduated options. As a first step he built up conventional military strength in West Germany and elsewhere.

The East took bold action. With Khrushchev's blessing, the German Democratic Republic built a wall between East and West Berlin to stop the flow of refugees that was undermining its viability. This move caught the West flatfooted. A quick assessment of the situation, however, revealed that the GDR had not encroached upon Kennedy's "essentials" and, indeed, by ending the refugee problem had even reduced the likelihood of Soviet-American conflict over Berlin. Moreover, a stronger GDR was not contrary to "the administra-

tion's preference for a *de facto* policy acknowledging two Germanies."

The wall nevertheless increased tension to a dangerous level. Hostile rhetoric prevailed on both sides, and behavior was occasionally reckless. In this climate of mutual recrimination each side, seeing the other on the defensive, thought the time ripe for a new round of Geneva talks. But, once again, mistaken assumptions about one's own strengths and the other's goals—together this time with West German sabotage of Western policies—produced nothing of consequence. Only the hostility and miscalculations remained. Not until late 1962, when Khrushchev overplayed his hand by installing missiles in Cuba and met staunch American resistance, did the four-year Berlin crisis abate. The Soviet leader's decision to abandon a collision course in the Caribbean accompanied a tacit Soviet-American agreement to avoid exacerbating the Berlin situation.

Schick's account of the 1958–1962 Berlin crisis excels in presenting a broad picture of dramatic events and diplomatic exchanges. His interpretation is well thought out, if unexceptional; and the analysis itself, in the mode of traditional diplomatic history, shows how much can be gained from standard research methods and sources. It does not pretend to be a complete picture. Remaining for later examination are critical questions about why the major actors perceived what they did, the internal dynamics in each country of decision-making on Berlin, and the place of the particular crisis in the overall Berlin problem. In retrospect, for instance, we can see that Khrushchev's policies were not his alone. His tactics in 1961 gained major Soviet goals—without Western approval, significant concessions (except the "free city" notion), or much bloodshed. His successors doggedly pursued the same policy—minus its truculence!—and sought international legitimation for it. This came a decade later, by which time Western leaders too were willing to stabilize the political and territorial changes wrought by World War II, including those in Berlin, as a prelude to some general agreement on European security—and to permit the

world to sleep again without having to worry about Berlin.

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OTTO ULČ. *The Judge in a Communist State: A View from Within*. Pp. xiv, 307. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1972. \$8.75.

A useful addition to the literature on comparative judicial process is this work describing the experiences of a young provincial judge in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. It is an attempt "to recreate the atmosphere of an environment undergoing a transformation from one social order to another." The atmosphere in question is the embrace of this East European country, especially its legal institutions, by the Stalinism of the 1950s.

The chief value of this view from within lies not so much in any novelty of thesis as in the instances and insights that enrich and refresh the general body of knowledge about institutions and processes of that period. Ulč thus reveals a Czechoslovakia that represents but another attempt at institutional and ideological conformity mandated by the Soviet Union. He discusses both the class nature of the new Communist law and the double standard of justice that is its concomitant, a justice which even in identical crimes prescribes one kind of punishment for "misled proletarians" and another kind for "bourgeois vermin." The author elaborates on courtroom proceedings and on the responsibilities of judicial personnel, including those of lawyers, judges, and prosecutors. Especially useful are his observations on lay assessors, for example, how the professional judge can benefit from their experience and, if he so desires, minimize their role. Finally, the book contains ample information on the interference by the Communist Party in the work of the judiciary. It clarifies the nature, the extent, and the areas of this political intervention.

Occasionally Ulč digresses from the concerns of the legal profession to comment on general societal developments in postwar

Czechoslovakia. It is a depressing, if credible, commentary. The author feels that "totalitarianism maimed the soul of the nation."

Students of governments with totalitarian objectives will find in Ulč much that illustrates the self-induced mechanisms and psychological defenses to which individuals resort in order to facilitate their adjustment to new conditions. The book is also recommended to those who are interested in studying the results of authoritarian decision-making, for it reveals many of the disfunctional effects of these decisions that were thrust upon the people.

Regrettably, the many good qualities of this book suffer from its "informal and easy-going" style. Ulč piles up trivia, basks in indiscretion, and just loves to make fun of Bolshevism. He either failed to obtain competent editorial guidance or managed to evade it.

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#### UNITED STATES HISTORY AND POLITICS

PETE DANIEL. *The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969*. Pp. xii, 209. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1972. \$7.95.

Peonage or debt servitude has not received the attention accorded other Southern injustices. While neither as pervasive as disfranchisement and segregation nor as horrifying as lynching, it bears further testimony to the persistence of the old amid the rhetoric of the New South. Professor Pete Daniel in the first full length study of Southern peonage reminds us of the brutality of the institution.

An individual became a peon by accepting an advance in wages or by being released from jail into the custody of someone who paid his fine. Once in debt a peon's low paying job kept him tied to his employer. Although the author is unable to provide more than rough estimates on its

incidence, it is clear that the system flourished in the turpentine and saw mill camps of the pine barrens, the cotton fields of the rich black belt, and the railroad camps of the Deep South. Primarily its victims were blacks for whom peonage was the successor to slavery, but European immigrants and native whites also came under its brutal domination. According to Daniel, the system depended upon a combination of the ignorance, race, and poverty of the peons and the collusion between employers and law enforcement officials. He supports these conclusions with extensive documentation from the hitherto unexplored peonage collection in the U.S. Department of Justice files and presents his findings through a series of cogently delineated case studies.

Villains haunt every page, but there is no shortage of heroes, among them Southern born judges, U.S. attorneys, and Northern reformers. More noteworthy, considering the current reappraisal of his role in race relations, was the contribution of Booker T. Washington. Using material from the Washington Papers which he helped edit, Daniel depicts Washington as secretly raising funds and marshalling Southern and Northern white support for the case of Alonzo Bailey. Bailey's successful appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1911 resulted in the invalidation of the Alabama contract labor-law.

In Daniel's view his account is "the record of an American failure." Yet he mentions numerous defeats for the defenders of peonage in addition to the Bailey decision. And despite the book's subtitle, all but twenty-four pages treat the period before 1930, an emphasis which suggests a more successful attack on the institution than the author acknowledges. Also open to question is the emphasis on racial rather than class discrimination as the cornerstone of the system. Poor blacks were the most accessible laborers for the unpleasant tasks required by the South's extractive economy, but as Daniel himself demonstrates, when whites could be secured, they were as readily exploited. Finally, although it provides one of the main themes, Daniel never explains the Justice Department's unwilling-



ness to prosecute peonage cases. Who were the individuals responsible and what motivated them? How important were the manpower limitations of the Department? How significant was the influence of Southern congressmen? Was racism again the chief culprit as Daniel implies? The answers to these questions would further illuminate the federal government's reaction not only to peonage but to other violations of civil rights as well.

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FOSTER RHEA DULLES. *American Foreign Policy toward Communist China, 1949-1969*. Pp. ix, 273. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972. No price. Paperbound.

While virtually everyone with some sophistication in United States foreign policy knows, or feels he knows, a good deal about the Soviet Union and our relations with that country since World War II, the same is not true of Communist China or our relations with that country. Despite our having fought our last two wars on the doorstep of China, one of them involving direct engagement on a large scale with Chinese troops, the usual generalist in international affairs or United States foreign policy feels a certain uneasiness when his attention is directed toward China and the quite bizarre history of our relations with that country. What precisely was it that we did or failed to do, and when did it happen—or fail to happen? Most of us are irretrievably Europe-oriented, however willing we are to acknowledge the great importance of China.

That is the first reason why this posthumous book of Foster Rhea Dulles will be so useful and so much welcomed among a wide section of scholars. A book of the same size attempting a comparable task for our relations with the Soviet Union would seem old hat, as this one does not. The second reason is that this is such a very good book. The Dulleses seem to have been a family in which talent was more evenly distributed than zealotry. The au-

thor was first cousin to that other Dulles who did so much to bind us into a condition of unrelenting hostility toward Communist China, and who concluded in 1954 the alliance treaty with Taiwan which his predecessor, Acheson—no mean alliance former himself—had sedulously avoided and which continues at this writing to prevent our establishing normal diplomatic relations with mainland China despite President Nixon's visit there early in 1972. Foster Rhea Dulles was a vastly more objective and dispassionate person than John Foster Dulles, and he has in fact left us a portrait of the latter's policies concerning China, and concerning also McCarthyism and the China lobby at home, which seems not at all burdened with apologetics. Neither is it distorted by any trace of cousinly malice.

One cannot in this short space give a reasonable summary of the book, and it is probably also unnecessary. The organization is quite straightforward, carrying us forward chronologically over the time span indicated in the title. The style is easy and flowing, the knowledge projected in it cost substantial—with many good quotations most effectively used—and the insights and interpretation, while in no sense radical, are certainly perceptive. This is a solid book, but not a dull one. Teachers of university courses in American foreign policy will find this book most useful, not only to refresh and to improve their own understanding but also to provide a supplementary text for students.

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CHARLOTTE ERICKSON. *Invisible Immigrants: The Adaptation of English and Scottish Immigrants in Nineteenth-Century America*. Pp. vi, 531. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1972. \$17.50.

This book consists of three groups of British immigrant letters from the United States, complete with scholarly introductions by the author. The letters appear in print here for the first time, and, within

limitations carefully delineated by Professor Erickson, represent a rich addition to the literature of immigration and American social history in the last century.

The first and largest collection of letters was written by immigrants in American agriculture, virtually all in the first half of the nineteenth century. The second, somewhat smaller, collection represents "tramping artisans: immigrants in industry," whose letters were written mainly around the mid-century. The letters in the third and smallest group are from immigrants in trade and the professions, dated from the 1820s through the 1880s. In her introductions to each group, the author generalizes about the typicality of the immigrant letter-writers, their motivation in leaving Britain, their networks of immigrant information, and most importantly, their socioeconomic adaptation in America. Professor Erickson's findings present no radical departure from existing knowledge of British immigration to America, but her discoveries of letters and use of them enriches the color of the epic as well as the dimensions of present understanding.

For example, Ms. Erickson finds that to many agricultural immigrants, "a farm in the west was a means of escape for . . . frustrated people who did not want to come to terms with change in their own society"—a sort of Turnerian "safety-valve to discontents" (p. 29). Also, to these people "American liberty" usually meant freedom from taxation, tithes, and "oppression" by established clergy. There was little interest in United States politics among these agricultural newcomers, whose adaptation was achieved, like that of much more visible immigrants, among little colonies of fellow countrymen. The "enlarged family" was both the "principal means of distributing" these farmers, and their means of adjustment to the strange environment. Industrial immigrants were less often married men, less religious, less prejudiced against American ways of doing things, more mobile, more likely leftist, and more interested in American politics. Their adaptation involved much more contact with Americans and was apparently more difficult socially; but surviving collections

of letters are too short-term for a satisfactory generalization. Erickson's commercial/professional immigrants, while least typical and accounting for the smallest part of the book, provide the most human interest. The most successful in American adaptation, they were almost to a man profoundly unsuccessful in their personal lives, owing to family problems, alcoholism, egocentrism, consuming ambition. The series of Petingale family letters in this section is most engrossing.

Professor Erickson, an American, lectures at the London School of Economics and serves as secretary for the British Association of American Studies. She is also a persistent detective who has ransacked English and Scottish country archives for these fugitive letters of ordinary people. Occasionally she overintroduces series of letters, quoting them at length just prior to presenting them in full. But in the main Erickson is a highly literate, learned and efficient historian. My sole quarrel is not with her, but with the University of Miami Press, which has placed an excessive price tag on this fine book.

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GEORGE F. KENNAN. *Memoirs, 1950-1963*. Vol. 2. Pp. viii, 368. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1972. \$12.50.

As scholar and diplomatist, policymaker and critic of policy, George F. Kennan possesses a rare combination of expertise and experience. With these considerable talents, he reviews in this volume the account of his public life and the commentary on world affairs begun in an earlier volume which covered the period 1925-1950. Focusing now for the most part on the decade of the 1950s, and on the Kennedy Administration, Kennan presents his views on the evolution of United States-Soviet relations and the Cold War, with special emphasis on the Korean conflict and East-West relationships in Europe. Included is a detailed account of Kennan's brief am-

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bassadorship to the Soviet Union in the last year of the Truman Administration. Moreover, Kennan comments extensively on U.S. domestic politics as well as the policy-making process in the United States.

In this volume two basic themes are set forth: first, the danger in the early 1950s of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union as perceived by Kennan, and second, the prospects for agreement between the two superpowers.

The first theme can be illustrated by Kennan's views on nuclear weapons. "Considering such weapons to be suicidal in their ultimate implications, destructive to a degree which no purely national objectives could ever justify, and wholly unsuitable as instruments of national policy, I had always opposed the basing of our defense posture upon them, and particularly the adoption of the principle of their 'first use' in any major military encounter" (p. 110). Whether the world would have experienced fewer wars without nuclear weapons must remain an unanswered, and unanswerable, question. But the fact remains that because of, and in spite of, nuclear weapons, the two superpowers have avoided a military encounter. Conceivably, Kennan overestimates the danger inherent in a superpower strategic deterrent relationship and underestimates both the potentially stabilizing effects of such a relationship and the problems of achieving agreements for arms control and disarmament.

Kennan's second theme, the prospect for the U.S.-Soviet agreement, is apparent in his treatment of the Korean conflict, the postwar U.S. relationship with Japan, and the formation of NATO and European security. While he favored the American decision to defend South Korea against aggression from North Korea, he took issue with the U.S. pursuit of North Korean forces back across the 38th Parallel to the Yalu River. This ran the risk, he feared, of a U.S.-Soviet military encounter, for the Russians would "resist militarily before permitting us to establish ourselves in the region" (pp. 35-36). Yet it was not the Russians, but rather the Chinese, who responded with large-scale forces, although

this possibility apparently seemed less likely to Kennan than military action by the Soviet Union.

Kennan the diplomatist sought areas of accommodation with the Soviet Union. He hoped that the United States would not conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan providing for U.S. bases on Japanese territory. If the United States was prepared to agree to a neutralized Japan, the Soviet Union, he believed, might accept a neutralized Korea—"a state of affairs, that is, in which political forces might be left to find their own level, even if this had to be by armed strife, but all outside parties, ourselves included, would agree not to occupy portions of the territory or make use of it for their own military purposes" (p. 49). Kennan's proposal seems questionable on several grounds, not least among them the fact that the value of Japan as an ally to the United States was far greater than the value of Korea to the Soviet Union.

In Europe, as well, Kennan favored creation of a unified neutralized Germany. Since 1948, Kennan writes, he had favored negotiations for a unified Germany based on the possibility of an eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. Kennan's plan for European security is most fully developed in his famous and controversial Reith lectures of 1957. He believed that it was far more desirable to reach an agreement for the removal of Soviet forces from East-Central Europe than to create a West German army and to strengthen NATO for the purpose of opposing such Warsaw pact forces.

Kennan's analysis of European security is based upon two assumptions which, as he later admitted, were dubious: (1) that the United States and the Soviet Union as well as most European states really wanted a unified Germany except on mutually unacceptable terms; (2) that the Soviet Union, having withdrawn from East-Central Europe, would not reintroduce troops when deemed necessary to reverse trends toward "liberalization," as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Kennan's failure to grasp this possibility is all the more extraordinary in view of the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in 1956, just a year before his Reith lectures. But

Kennan possess the considerable virtue of acknowledging major flaws in his own thought.

As we contemplate in the 1970s negotiations with the Soviet Union for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe, this problem again arises. To what extent, and how, can the Soviet Union be prevented from invoking the Brezhnev Doctrine and re-introducing troops into East-Central Europe? Here, the "liberalization" of Communist regimes—one goal of Western policy in Europe—and the reduction of military forces stationed in Europe—another goal of Western policy—may be largely incompatible.

Kennan devotes considerable attention to U.S. domestic life in the 1950s. His "re-encounter with America," as he terms his return to this country after many years in the Foreign Service, is that of a man critical of much of American life. He notes the "obvious deterioration in the quality of both American life itself and the national environment in which it had its being, under the impact of headlong overpopulation, industrialization, commercialization, and urbanization of society" (p. 85). Kennan reveals little empathy with the common Americans whom he encountered in his travels in this country, in marked contrast with Yugoslavs and even Russians whom he met during his sojourns abroad. Nevertheless, if Kennan is critical of many of his countrymen, he finds the Soviet regime of Stalin so repugnant that, after a press conference in Berlin in 1952, he was declared "persona non grata" as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

This book is notable for its lucid style and for the verbal portraits which it presents of such persons as Acheson, Dulles, Truman, Eisenhower, Stalin, and Tito. Whether or not the reader finds himself in agreement with Kennan—not always the case with Kennan himself—this volume ranks as an important contribution to our understanding of American postwar foreign policy.

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LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY and ALAN G. BRAUN. *The Politics of Electoral College Reform*. Pp. 222. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. \$10.00. Paperbound, \$2.95.

As is usually the case with authors of books about the electoral college, Longley and Braun have a point of view. They have written a comprehensive treatise advocating a direct vote system. Anyone familiar with Neal R. Peirce's *The People's President: The Electoral College in American History and the Direct Vote Alternative* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968) will recognize the arguments; indeed much of the data in Peirce's book are reproduced in this volume. However, Longley and Braun have done more than update Peirce. For one thing they have brought together data from a variety of mathematical studies which lend depth and clarity to their critique. They also spend more time outlining competing alternatives to the direct election system presenting both pro and con arguments for each. Furthermore they reconstruct the events surrounding electoral reform activity during the 1960s, and the resulting case study not only justifies their title, but also makes the book very useful for American government courses because it provides considerable insight into the legislative process as well as the outside forces which impinge on legislative decision-making. It should also be mentioned that the book is very well written.

The book suffers, however, from its dogged attempt to convince. The authors often repeat nonarguments simply because they are part of the litany. For example, several times they note elections where a shift "of only a few thousand votes" would have resulted in an electoral college deadlock, and mention only in a footnote that any such shift would have required a trend affecting hundreds of thousands across the nation. Furthermore they often fail to note important niceties such as a 25,000 vote change in New York in 1860—which would have deadlocked the electoral college—actually represented at least a 5 percent shift in that state at that time.

Longley and Braun present results from their own research which attempts to assess

the relative voting power of various ethnic, residency, and regional groups under different electoral systems. The idea is a good one but when this research was first presented as a paper it was clearly pointed out that their results, showing among other things that blacks would be better off under a direct vote system, were probably an artifact of their mathematical model. The authors were unable to answer the charge then and publish the results now only with a statement indicating that "some modest questions might be raised about the basic voting power approach" (p. 128).

In short, a basically good book sometimes bears the subtle marks of a mere polemic. Certainly the case is strong enough to obviate the need for mixing good arguments with poor or overdrawn ones. The authors cover themselves by presenting their value system on page 75, but at the same time they fail to consider the possibility that disagreement with the direct vote system might not be based so much on factual matters as on value systems differing from their own. It would have been a much better book if they had noted the bases for divergent value systems, which may be just as concerned with democracy, rather than implying through their choice of words that Birch Bayh led the fight for truth against lukewarm liberals and obstructionist Southerners.

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PAUL L. MURPHY. *The Meaning of Freedom of Speech: First Amendment Freedoms from Wilson to FDR*. Pp. 401, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1972. \$14.50.

This is an excellent study. Those of us born around the turn of the century will welcome the thoroughness of Professor Murphy's research into the familiar world of the Wobblies, the American Legion, and the American Civil Liberties Union. For young scholars of the Wilson to Roosevelt period, this volume will prove invaluable.

Until the twentieth century the United States Supreme Court, as well as other

courts, state and federal, played no significant role in the protection of free speech and press. The Sedition Act of 1798, designed by a Federalist Congress to prohibit and to punish speech critical of the government and its officers, was allowed to expire by its own terms in 1801. Though individual justices enforced the act on circuit, its constitutionality was never tested by the Court. During the Civil War the Court played a passive role. It provided no check upon a president who suspended the writ of habeas corpus in certain areas and by executive order allowed trials of dissident citizens by military commissions. In the case of Vallandigham, one instance of a First Amendment violation, the Supreme Court refused to review the decision of a military tribunal.

Of course, the prohibitions of the First Amendment did not apply to the states. Following the assassination of President McKinley, New York adopted a criminal syndicalism statute which made it a felony to advocate by speech, writing, or teaching, the overthrow of government by force or violence. Other states followed New York's lead, the object being ultimately the restraint of undesirable labor leaders and agitators. As the late Professor Chafee pointed out, the states punished objectionable opinions because of "supposedly bad tendencies," imposed "severe penalties for the advocacy of small offenses as much as for serious crime," and established "a practical censorship of the press *ex post facto*."

In general, Americans gave little conscious thought to First Amendment rights until the First World War. Congress had adopted the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act as war measures, and if these were distasteful to thoughtful citizens, they were deemed to be necessary. There were libel, slander, and obscenity; but what was sedition? How and where was a line to be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of government? An attempt at clarification came with the "clear and present danger" test.

Professor Murphy discusses with great clarity the use of First Amendment rights in the struggle of labor to arrive at long-overdue goals—unionization, collective bar-

gaining, and higher wages—and the slow but formidable role of the Supreme Court in the realization of these goals, the power of the Court having been greatly enlarged by its acceptance of the doctrine that First amendment rights were to apply to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This volume might well have been subtitled "The Impact of Public Opinion upon the Courts," particularly the Supreme Court. The title of the book suggests that this is constitutional history replete with case and commentary, and so it is to a degree; but with a difference. "Assuming that the orientation of judges is a product," writes Professor Murphy, "not solely of precedents, but also of the values and general milieu of the times, it seeks to reconstruct that milieu by probing through the entire spectrum of public opinion on the proper meaning of free speech and its correct social utilization." Some lawyers, dedicated to precedents outworn or not, may object to this approach on the ground that it is topsy-turvy; but, as Professor Murphy holds, "the Supreme Court, which until the mid-twentieth century was nearly always a phase behind what was going on in society, did not play the molding role. Rather, it came ultimately to find new legal ways to validate a definition which the public had come to embrace."

Whether Professor Murphy has realized his herculean objectives—"probing the entire spectrum of public opinion," and discovering "the proper meaning of free speech and its correct social utilization"—will depend upon the views of each reader. To one, like the present reviewer, whose outlook on law and public opinion is conditioned by a stubborn skepticism, the proper and correct make him wary. Be that as it may, Professor Murphy's study may well stand in the highly respected company of A. V. Dicey's *Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century*.

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ROBERT L. PEABODY, JEFFREY M. BERRY, WILLIAM G. FRASURE, and JERRY GOLDMAN. *To Enact a Law: Congress and Campaign Financing*. Pp. x, 225. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$7.00.

This book confirms the old adage that nothing illuminates the congressional policy-making process quite so well as a solid case study. What the case study lacks in rigor and methodological sophistication is more than compensated for by a richness of detail and narrative flow that characterizes senators and representatives as real people rather than as impersonal entries in a statistical table. This study skillfully blends a description of the basic structures and functions of Congress with a detailed analysis of the Political Broadcast Act of 1970. Both of these features are valuable not only for the beginning students of Congress, but also for the seasoned observer who needs an up-to-date refresher on how Congress organizes to conduct its business. The book also contains reproductions of official records—the bill in its various versions, key debates, correspondence and press releases, votes, the President's veto message—which give the study the flavor of a documentary, much to its advantage.

The Political Broadcast Act of 1970 was a response to the astronomically high costs of campaign financing, particularly those costs incurred by using the medium of television as a primary campaign device. We have long been aware that campaign spending needs to be brought under control; and we have become increasingly fearful that candidates for major national office are not elected on the basis of a careful presentation of their positions to the electorate, but rather are sold like soap on the basis of imaginative packaging by skilled manipulators of the electronic media. The electoral advantage, therefore, goes not necessarily to the candidate who best expresses his views in consonance with those of the electorate, but simply to the one who can most afford to buy television exposure. This belief that the medium has become the message is perhaps best illustrated by the Case of Richard Nixon, who in 1968 had learned to use to best advan-



tage the medium of television, through whose poor use in 1960, most observers claim, he lost the presidential election.

Unfortunately, the Political Broadcast Act of 1970 was directed less at curing the basic corruption of the democratic electoral process than at making sure that more candidates could get in on the television act by requiring stations to charge the "lowest unit rate" for campaign broadcasts—that is, no greater amount for a specified period of time than was charged the station's best commercial users. Good commercial users might buy several hundred spots every year; by the terms of the act, politicians could get the same rate for a few spots every second, fourth or sixth year. The act was eventually vetoed by President Nixon on the grounds that the cure was worse than the sickness. The veto stuck when presidential appeals to party loyalty won over some crucial votes in the U.S. Senate. One has to agree with the President's criticism, and feel, although with some lingering doubt, that he really meant it. One of the most remarkable features of the election of 1972 was the President's abundant use of the forgotten medium of communication, the radio. The Democrats, for their part, did not make use of television either, but more as a function of impoverishment than desire. What would have happened in 1972 had the act passed is a matter of conjecture. Increasing availability of television time through lower rates for the Democratic probably would have forced the President to abandon the cheaper radio for the more expensive television, perhaps increasing the overall costs of the campaign. Since a different outcome from a Nixon victory can hardly be imagined, we would have ended up with the same result probably for more money. This is precisely what increasing numbers of people are coming to believe happens every time an act of Congress becomes a law.

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MICHAEL D. REAGAN. *The New Federalism*. Pp. 175. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$5.95.

ROBERT A. LEVINE. *Public Planning: Failure and Redirection*. Pp. v, 206. New York and London: Basic Books, 1972. \$6.95.

New Federalism, Professor Michael D. Reagan says, is reactionary. Instead of eroding national policy-making through revenue sharing, he proposes "permissive federalism." By this he means "a sharing of power and authority between national and state governments, but that the state's share rests upon the permission and permissiveness of the national government." Concisely and lucidly Reagan presents a reasoned argument that: the old federalism—federal-state independence—is dead; many grant-in-aid programs spawned in the 1960s during the period of "creative federalism" are bewildering and less than effective.

The "crisis of fiscal federalism" is the "fiscal mismatch." According to Professor Reagan, "it is relatively much easier for the national government to increase its tax revenues each year than for state-local governments to do so." Thus city services deteriorate. Moreover, states are unequal in their resources to generate tax revenues to meet community needs. Although noting national defense expenditures of \$70-\$80 billion annually, the author apparently sees no connection between "pentagon capitalism" and the unmet human needs when he rather cavalierly states: "The quintessential fact is . . . affluence lies with the national government, while the effluents are the responsibilities of the states and cities."

In debating the case for revenue sharing he points out that it would reverse the flow of some revenues back to the lower levels of government. No matching funds are required and it would be a more dependable source of funds than grant-in-aid monies. Most attractively, he asserts, "it appears to combine both the liberal desire for an enlarged public sector, and the conservative desire to avoid further enlargement of the federal government." Impressively noted on the other side are

shortcomings of revenue sharing: state legislatures are possibly too inept and corrupt to be given this much fiscal autonomy; state lobbyists wield too much influence; state government lacks professional talent and innovative abilities; and state policy-makers more status quo oriented would do less to prevent racial discrimination. Revenue sharing would hurt other programs which continually have sizable authorization-appropriation gaps, and it would be a cop-out as far as the national government's taking an active role in developing and implementing national planning. Reagan's alternative to revenue sharing is to establish national minimum standards of service functions for education and welfare. Recommended also are increased expenditures for public assistance with the federal government "nationalizing" public assistance.

Professor Reagan's limitations as a prophet are manifested in the following: "In addition to the good substantive reasons why revenue sharing should not be adopted, the efforts on its behalf are wasted because we can predict rather confidently that it will not be adopted or would not last if it were adopted." Revenue sharing was passed and the states and cities are in the process of gobbling up the federal bonanza.

Seemingly, he is overly sanguine about the U.S. Congress and the federal bureaucracy providing policy science planning. He ignores the charges of intimate ties of the executive branch with big business and that Congress has become a "sapless branch." If "the business of the U.S. is business," as Coolidge said, then profits will be placed first on high as well as on low levels of government. In fact, national planning may facilitate the workings of a business-run government.

According to Robert A. Levine, public planning does not work as evidenced by the continual gap between expectations and achievements. He identifies a number of reasons for the breakdown between planning and its execution; and prescribes solutions using the market system, conflict, and competition as strategies. Levine's failure

is not gauging the role of the private sector in preventing successful public planning and the concomitant privatization of the governmental sector. Moreover, the use of public services for counterinsurgency rather than achievement of alleged goals eludes his analysis. The myth of planning, Levine says, rather than its reality is generally accepted, but he does not indicate its functionality if the underlying purpose is pacification. Since implementation of public policy is generally through highly administered public bureaucracies, poor results are customary. Levine says this is caused by bureaucrats attempting to carry out policy through a series-connected chain of command. Problems come from trying to follow rules, from a disregard of rules, or from innovations on rules. Planning, programming, and budgeting (PPB) systems work only with the data being available and with cooperative officials. Trained personnel to follow PPB specifications often are lacking. Moreover, the profit principle, as in business systems, is lacking and as a consequence incentives are missing which could provide motivation. The bureaucratic ethos is difficult to change because of its "strength and sanctity of tenure in the civil service. . . ." Although acknowledging business interests cannot be relied upon to achieve distributive equity, he does not adequately evaluate how such interests impede public planning. Why would large business corporations want governmental planning to be efficient? The more wasteful and fumbling, the more likely that business itself will be called to play a surrogate role.

Levine would redirect public planning out of the muck by employing the marketplace, political bargaining, and bureaucratic competition. He attempts to distinguish governmental functions lodged in business from those in the market system. The Jobs Corps is illustrative of the former, and Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) of the latter. JOBS is supposedly closer to the market because of the large number of business firms involved and training on the job. Hence, he eschews business expertise in favor of a multiplicity of competing units of the

marketplace for educational and manpower training programs. But he steers away from the tough questions: What kinds of jobs? Education for what? Community Action under OEO (Office of Economic Opportunity) supposedly shows how poor people obtained political leverage. The "struggle is the message" since he never accounts for the miserable results. Moreover, it apparently does not occur to him to consider how many leaders of the black revolt were co-opted in this political process by receiving jobs in the poverty programs while their people remained substantially the same. Finally, the struggle between OEO's manpower programs and the U.S. Department of Labor is cited as one of several instances of bureaucratic competition enhancing agency operations. Nevertheless, conflicts developed, for example, in St. Louis between the Missouri Department of Labor and the local OEO agency which were actually counterproductive to a further justification that job finding and training could best be under private auspices.

As Professor Reagan, Levine questions that decentralization of spending through revenue sharing will improve public planning and execution. Both agree that private interests interfere more at the lower levels of government, but soft pedal their influence at the federal levels. They differ sharply in that Dr. Levine is quite pessimistic about public planning, and Reagan is seemingly oblivious to the kinds of issues that burden Levine's thinking. Since neither Professors Reagan nor Levine present a theory of governance, it is unclear what they posit regarding the interrelationship of public and private government or the interdependence of policy and ideology. Neither author confronts the basic question of whether or not state capitalism can yield a humanistic society.

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JON M. VAN DYKE. *North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival*. Pp. 336. Palo Alto, Cal.: Pacific Books, 1972. \$10.95.

RICHARD A. FALK, ed. *The Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context*. Vol. 3. Pp. xi, 951. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$25.00. Paperbound, \$9.50.

Van Dyke's book was published just days before the heavy United States resumption of bombing and the seeding of mines along the coastline and in the waterways of North Vietnam; yet coming from a little known publisher, it has attracted very little scholarly, not to say popular attention. The author's painstaking and detached scholarship on a facet of the war hardly touched by anyone else to date makes his work potentially a very useful case study of how an agrarian, industrially undeveloped country faced the heaviest systematic bombing and naval shelling between early 1965 and late 1968 by the United States, survived it, and in certain aspects was strengthened by it.

Political scientists will find passages on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) decision-making, political socialization and mobilization, decentralization of planning and control in a seemingly totalitarian regime of interest. Economists will be most interested in how a country both devastated by bombing and depleted in normal manpower supply makes itself viable not only through foreign aid—which hardly compared with that received by South Vietnam—but through sheer inventiveness and the development and training of alternate labor in agriculture, industry, and management. The result is a society going about repairing and rebuilding ceaselessly to produce and fight. Social psychologists may want to look into the motivation of a society which would have gained tremendous relief by giving up its cause of national self-assertion and unity, yet relentlessly refusing to do so under extraordinary punishment. Historians with much comparative perspectives and United States political leaders with little of the same may learn something by rethinking the question as to why unrestrained brute force may destroy a country, kill a people, reduce the first to rubble but not the latter to slaves.

These potential areas of further inquiry,

curiously enough, are elicited by a book largely devoid of social science jargon and polemics. And for those interested in knowing more about the technical, economic, environmental aspects of the U.S. bombing, the Cornell University Air War Study Group's *The Air War in Indochina*, rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972) is highly recommended. Moreover, two of its chapters, "The American Constitution and the Air War" and "The Air War and International Law" would add new dimensions to the 3-volume *The Vietnam War and International Law*, of which the third installment is reviewed below.

Richard Falk is a widely known antiwar legal scholar and activist, yet his work to date on the Vietnam War has been more of a conventional compiler than of explorer of new aspects of war, such as the ones tackled by the Cornell study. A special exception is an article by Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodely, "Legitimacy and Legal Rights of Revolutionary Movements with Special Reference to the People's [should read Provisional] Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam." The widening context referred to in the subtitle has to do less with points of international law than with the expansion of the war into Cambodia in 1970, the disclosure of the My Lai massacre, and the war powers debates as to the roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the United States government. Of course, it is understandable that a compendium of reprints has a normal lag time of a few years behind the new developments of the war. What is puzzling is the rather narrow-based list of contributors to all three volumes, almost all of them Americans, so that a more fitting title for the series to date would be "American Debates on Western Concepts of International Law as Applied to the Vietnam War."

As probably a fourth volume of the series is in preparation, may I presume to make a few suggestions, to wit: a truly international symposium on the legal aspects of air warfare and the automated electronic battlefield; of environmental

warfare such as defoliation, dike-bombing, rain-seeding, fire-storming, and the use of land clearing superbombs and Rome plows in foreign territories; of inhumane weapons such as napalm, white phosphorus, and cluster bomb-units; of responsibilities for such atrocities and genocidal crimes such as now being revealed in bits and pieces by Vietnam War veterans (see *The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam* [New York: Vintage Books, 1972] and *The Winter Soldier Investigation: Congressional Record, April 6-7, 1971* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1972]; and of the responsibility for restitution and reconstruction by the nation which wages a unilateral destruction against a people who have not committed any act of war against the former's territory.

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### POLITICAL THOUGHT

LEONARD BINDER, JAMES S. COLEMAN, JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA, LUCIEN W. PYE, SIDNEY VERBA, and MYRON WEINER. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*. Pp. xii, 326. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. \$8.00.

In an effort to formalize, synthesize, and systematize the wide-ranging scholarly literature on political development, the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council has sponsored this seventh volume in its Studies on Political Development series. A book of high intellectual quality, it contains numerous thought-provoking insights into conceptual issues that have in other hands often been worn into academic platitudes. The fact that future attempts to operationalize the book's proposed framework for the study of political development may well prove frustrating, should not overshadow its major heuristic contributions.

A primary concern of the author was to

dispense with such normative and teleological approaches to political development as those which conceive of it as a unilinear process moving from tradition through transition to modernity. Instead, they propose that development consists essentially of evolutionary changes—not always in a “progressive” direction—in political equality, capacity, and differentiation. As a corollary, they hold that the so-called development syndrome pursued by nations today consists of an effort to increase each of these variables, a task made all the more difficult by their inherent contradictions.

Having presented this theme, the authors proceed to examine five problems faced by all political systems—the problems of political identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration (or degree of central government control), and distribution (of control over income and wealth). A separate chapter is devoted to a carefully reasoned discussion of the nature of each of these problems—which are in each case revealed to consist of clusters of related problems—and to their implications with respect to the development syndrome and one another. Since the emphasis in this book is to develop orienting concepts rather than operational devices, no substantive findings emerge out of these discussions. While the authors consider the resolution of each problem functionally essential to the successful pursuit of the development syndrome, the specific structural aspects of such solutions are thought to vary from case to case in a largely unpredictable manner.

Though specifically limiting themselves to refining conceptual issues, the authors nevertheless consistently propose that, in fact, each of the five problem areas tends to swell to crisis proportions during certain phases of the development process. This unsubstantiated—and unsubstantiable—assertion leads them to suggest a stage-like development process, with the possibility that certain sequences in the emergence of these crises may have important implications with respect to the kinds of political systems that evolve. Fortunately, the closing chapter of the book, an exercise in self-criticism, considers some of the

shortcomings of such a sequential crisis model of political development.

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JOHN DUNN. *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon*. Pp. xiii, 346. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972. \$14.50.

HARVEY WHEELER. *The Politics of Revolution*. Pp. xi, 305. Berkeley, Cal.: The Glendessary Press, 1971. \$6.95.

While these two books supposedly deal with the same phenomenon, the purposes of the authors and the conceptions of revolution employed are so different that the two works yield seemingly contradictory assessments. Harvey Wheeler claims that the United States is involved in a fundamental revolution while John Dunn asserts that there is little possibility for a serious revolution in American society.

Dunn's book, intended as a comparative analysis of political revolution in modern times, presents a description of eight revolutions—Russia, Mexico, China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Algeria, Turkey, and Cuba. Wheeler defines revolution in its broadest sense to critically analyze the American polity. Wheeler views revolution as a characteristic of societies that: (a) are in need of widespread reform, where systemic rather than incremental change is necessary; (b) have developed a dualistic nature—that is, the “second city” concept—in that two cultures are competing for dominance; and (c) include both an active struggle and institutional reform as components of change. Dunn's more limited view of revolution includes the specific characteristics of mass violence, a decaying political order, and the advent of new political elites. While Wheeler concentrates on social-political change, Dunn focuses on political-military actions.

Dunn's introductory chapter deals with Marxism as a revolutionary ideology, and his cases are examples of both successful revolutions and attempts to establish a Marxist system. Presenting each case in a

separate chapter, he describes the revolutionary events, explaining the reasons for developments occurring in each situation. He claims that the causes and consequences of revolutions are particular to each case, and that generalizations concerning the nature of revolutions are often artificial, ignoring the unique circumstances of each revolutionary situation. Given this view, his final chapter quite naturally deals with the difficulties of systematic analysis that attempts to generalize about phenomena. Dunn's cases are biased since they include neither unsuccessful revolutions or non-Marxist attempts; moreover, no real framework for understanding this phenomenon is presented. His book is useful as an analysis of eight revolutions but not as a primer on political revolutions today.

Wheeler's book is a devastating critique of the American polity, combined with major proposals for change. He offers a brilliant analysis of Marxism, concluding that it is inapplicable to contemporary socio-political change; he also explains why capitalism—which did not create the antagonistic class structure envisioned by Marx—managed to plunder our resources. Wheeler asserts that our "bankrupt" political system does not meet the needs of our society, and that the benefits of democracy and our two-party system are non-existent. The result has been the emergence of the "second city," the counter elite who are aware of the crisis in our social order and political structures, producing the contemporary erosion of consensus and the emerging American revolution.

Wheeler offers us proposals for change by describing the "intentional society" of the future, including both legal and constitutional reform designed to change the attitudes and the behavior of both elites and mass. His description of an American "Walden Two" includes intentional structural reform but minimizes freedom and democracy as popularly conceived; his society provides for real human needs—both material and psychic—and will emerge through a coalition of radical activists and radical scientists. Wheeler's description of the present and his proposed revolution is disturbing, forcing us to grapple with some

uncomfortable realizations about our present system. While I anxiously await his intentional society, others might desperately hope it never arrives. This book merits the close attention of anyone concerned with social order and change in the American society.

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MURRAY EDELMAN. *Politics As Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence*. Pp. 188. Chicago, Ill.: Markham, 1971. (University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research on Poverty.) No price. Paperbound.

We who have immersed ourselves for years in an approach to public opinion study that marvelled at consistencies and resistance to change and posited a substantial body of theoretical formulations to explain them, might think we were in the same old social psychological "ball park" if we were to begin this book on page 174:

The man who sees himself as a fighter in the war against a Communist conspiracy, as a bulwark in the movement for civil rights or as one who recognizes that welfare measures promote sloth and moral softness has strong reason to cling to the political role that is gratifying. He will shape and select other perceptions to accord with the central, salient one. . . .

But it is the next paragraph that lets the end-of-book browser see what's new: "Government," says Edelman, "plays such an important part in *shaping* cognitions about political issues as to make such impact, in many cases, the principal consequence of political activity."

In the first chapter of this persuasive new look at what politics is all about—a more appropriate place for the present commentary to have begun!—Edelman points to increasing evidence that political cognitions are often unstable, ambivalent, and highly subject to symbolic cues, and he notes that opinion researchers are asking themselves more often about the extent to

which supposed stabilities may be artifacts of measurement procedures. The book then provides a thoroughly documented and illustrated series of observations and speculations about the ways in which governments and politicians manipulate symbols, create myths, foment mass tensions, and behave in other ways unlikely to be perceived readily by those who have been socialized "into the belief that enduring individual values shape the course of government policy."

Edelman's study of the dynamics of mass tensions is especially insightful, above all when he argues that the social and symbolic interaction involved in the definition of enemies depends, though unconsciously, on which adversary will "most potently create and mobilize allies." The reader is shown how government "shapes and reflects" the myths that sustain the prosperous and the powerful, and he also deals with the ways in which the myths of unified nation-states in conflict with one another actually mask the fact that the hawks in state A are in a sense allies of their counterparts in state B, with the rewards for both groups producing a tendency toward increased escalation.

The book as a whole is instructive and thought-provoking and it proved particularly pertinent reading at a time—in pre-campaign 1972—when many political commentators were impelled to observe once more that an incumbent leader can use his office to shape events in a way impossible for his opponent. There was a kind of *déjà vu* flavor to the analysis of the ways in which the surprise elements provided by the information in innovative speeches produces anxiety in audience which are more likely to support a politician whose "banality" seems to signal belief in commonly held values!

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CLARENCE MORRIS. *The Justification of the Law*. Pp. 214. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. \$12.50.

Clarence Morris, Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, has put together in one volume a collection of mostly previously published essays and scholarly articles on several diverse topics. The topics do not seem to fall precisely under a general heading. The eight chapters have such varied titles as "Law, Justice and the Public's Aspirations," "The Austerity of the True and the Sociality of the Just," "On Liberation and Liberty: Marcuse's and Mill's Essays Compared," "Law and Logic," "Enacted Law: Eighteenth Century Hopes and Twentieth Century Accomplishments," "Law, Reason and Sociology," "The Board of Punishments' Interpretations of the Chinese Imperial Code," and "The Rights and Duties of Beasts and Trees."

With this array of subjects one can well discern the reviewer's plight in attempting to generalize about the scholarly contents of this book. Professor Morris roams around through many topics. His catholicity is impressive but it nevertheless contradicts the imperative of a legal scholar, that is, orderly and systematic analysis. The book shows that the author is a most widely read man and, for a legal scholar, most broad.

The book has a strong moral tone—its central theme is about justice. But at the same time some of its hypotheses can be questioned. At the beginning Morris writes "my theory of justice is this: the more that law implements the public's genuine and important aspirations, the more just the legal system becomes." This reminds one of the doctrine "Vox dei, vox populi." In the area of mass political manipulation, is the will of the Hitler-led masses or the Lenin-inspired populace necessarily the basis of justice? Professor Morris does not wrestle with this variation of the problem but he does give a good analysis of Herbert Marcuse, the philosopher of Marx in revolution, and John Stuart Mill, the champion of unrestrained political liberty. He rightly points out that "Mill and Marcuse are both wrong"; Morris correctly looks upon the law as the interpretation force for justice. He is a strong believer in the teachings of John Dewey—that is, only when man lives in a free society can he enjoy justice. But reason is necessary

to the establishment of a just society through law.

It would be enjoyable to take a seminar with Professor Morris, who indicates in these published essays anything but a limited legalistic approach to the examination of key questions of jurisprudence.

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### SOCIOLOGY

JOHN W. BALDWIN and RICHARD A. GOLDTHWAITE, eds. *Universities in Politics: Case Studies from the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period*. Pp. 137. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972. \$8.50.

The recently and rapidly growing literature on higher education has not been particularly distinguished by an overabundance of scholarly studies. Accordingly, it is good to take in hand a volume which represents original research and creative analysis.

The volume under review consists of four studies of university-governmental relations in Italy, France, Bohemia, and England from the twelfth through the mid-seventeenth century. The editors, who are members of the department of history at the Johns Hopkins University, have brought together these case studies of four universities which had been presented as the Schouler Lectures at their institution.

The senior editor's brief introduction serves as a backdrop for the four essays. Unlike the latter, it is undocumented, and it also assumes the distinctiveness and significance of structure and organization—that is, the university—as against the higher education dispensed in Athens, Alexandria, Baghdad, and elsewhere prior to the European Middle Ages. As a general source of information and enlightenment, this preliminary chapter is somewhat less than impressive.

The essay on Bologna by J. K. Hyde of the University of Manchester, reveals

clearly the close relationship between town and gown in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, notwithstanding the periodic confrontations and conflicts. It stresses political history in the first part, and there is appropriate documentation except for statements containing the verbs "must have" and "would have" (pp. 23, 26, 32).

Jacques Verget, Ecole Française de Rome, presents a penetrating account of the University of Paris during the early fifteenth century in the context of the times. He delineates the differences between Bologna and Paris, as well as the struggle for academic freedom against the royal powers and other forces. It was unfortunate that the university was unable to adapt itself to the changing era. In "... trying to conceal its impotence and to gratify, at least verbally, its pride of caste, it sought shelter in great traditional themes and in a phraseology whose insanity became ever more evident" (p. 78).

The dramatic account of the German-Czech conflict at the fifteenth-century University of Prague is not unfamiliar, but the additional details and analysis are welcome. The author, Howard Kaminsky of the University of Washington, draws upon sources in Latin and Czech and monographs in German, French, and English.

The last essay, by Christopher Hill of Oxford, deals with the efforts at the secularization and modernization of Oxford and Cambridge in the 1650s. It demonstrates that such radical critics as William Dell and Gerrard Winstanley "... were looking forward in the seventeenth century to the modern secular and scientific university as well as to the secular modern state" (p. 132).

The volume is a worthwhile addition to the secondary literature on the history of European higher education. Not the least of its virtues is the tendency of authors to refer to contributions of their colleagues in this book.

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
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KENNETH B. CLARK. *A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attainment of High Academic Achievement for Inner-City Students*. Pp. 176. New York: Emerson Hall, 1972. \$6.95.

The distinguished psychologist, Kenneth Clark, a man of wisdom and courage, has written a book which attempts to block out an educational design "for the attainment of high academic achievement for inner-city students." The book represents a frank statement in its emphasis on will-power and determination as the key to improving education in the inner city. But what is offered here constitutes an exhortation to action, not a definitive refutation of skepticism which has arisen concerning the possibility of reforming entire urban school systems. A tough-minded and skeptical approach is probably appropriate for a researcher interested in finding out the truth about the results of various types of intervention, but this has seldom satisfied the policy-oriented administrator or the reformer who is impatient for action for humanitarian or political reasons. The difficulty in reviewing this book is that I happen to agree with what the author and his staff are recommending as a formula for change in urban school systems. But my agreement in this case is based on faith, not on definitive scientific evidence from controlled longitudinal studies.

The author and his staff are convinced that inner-city school children in places like Washington, D.C.—who are 90 percent black—need to be equipped with the tools for achieving success in American society and that they must be given competence in reading and arithmetic as a first step. Dr. Clark may be regarded as a reactionary in some circles, since he is satisfied with standardized achievement tests in reading and arithmetic as an important indicator of an individual's life-chances and an important focus for action by the schools in affecting those life-chances. I agree with him completely concerning the significance of such tests in appraising school systems and in fostering their accountability, and his proposals constitute a refreshing antidote to some of the passionate denunciations of all testing as culturally-biased. Yet, part

of this book consists of dozens of citations of programs in dozens of schools which are offered to the reader as evidence of the correctness of the formula developed by Dr. Clark—a formula which has been accepted by the Washington, D.C. schools as a basis for the reform of their system. The evidence offered by the author and his staff in support of his design for Washington, D.C. schools is not convincing. It is, however, extremely suggestive and represents some of the best information available at the present time. His proposals for changes in the context of teaching and the creation of new ladders for promotion and salary differentials based on distinguished teaching are constructive and creative.

But this book appears to be addressed to a very large mass audience indeed, since the research reports which are offered as the scientific foundation for the design barely give us the information we need to assess the arguments. Percentages are offered without reference to absolute numbers; experiments are cited without indicating criteria for sampling; and there are no follow-up studies of many of the crash programs mentioned to see whether the increases in reading or arithmetic scores reported were followed by back-sliding once the program was over. We are told that such back-sliding does occur in many early intervention programs at the pre-school level, unless students are followed up with special elementary school enrichment programs. In cases where test scores are given, as in the Bereiter-Engelmann experiment (p. 65), we are never told how many children participated, how they were chosen, or what happened to them after 1967, when the last test took place. Vague evaluations of programs based on citations from the *New York Times* (for example, p. 134) are a substitute for hardheaded analysis of what was actually done. In the chapter optimistically entitled "Effective Systems," a San Diego performance contract is described—the description was prepared by the contractor himself!—but it is acknowledged that "performance contracts remain to be adequately evaluated." The author asks of performance contracting: "Will the contracts be spaced over a

long enough period of years to achieve sustained advance?" This question has not been raised with respect to many of the experiments cited in other sections of the book.

There are many good ideas in this book, but from a research point of view, it might be wise to read it in conjunction with the recently published re-study of the Coleman Report, edited by Moynihan and Mosteller (*On Equality of Educational Opportunity*, New York: Random House, 1972). In education, faith and determination mean a great deal. It remains to be seen, as Dr. Clark concedes early in this book (p. 16), whether faith and determination can transform entire urban school systems.

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JON GOWER DAVIES. *The Evangelistic Bureaucrat: A Study of a Planning Exercise in Newcastle upon Tyne*. Pp. 239. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. \$10.00.

The evangelistic bureaucrat for whom this book is named is the contemporary British planner, who, perceiving himself as "perpetually embattled, misunderstood" amidst a host of enemies, defends his mission with evangelistic zeal. He must measure public gain against private loss, upholding no less a goal than "maximizing human happiness."

While spicing his analysis with humor, the author takes a seriously critical view of planning today. Planners are obsessed with technology and "incurious about society," applying inappropriate policies to complex urban areas. They by-pass democratic participation in decision-making in the name of their own technical expertise. They seldom reverse decisions, even when proved erroneous, because professional and political face would suffer. Further, the author believes, the British Planning Acts support the inegalitarian socio-economic order, granting deference to big-money interests and influence, while they pillory the small man.

In contrast to this broadly-conceived interpretation of planning ideology and method, citing reference to journals and reports since 1910, the planning exercise with which Mr. Davies deals is a strictly limited one. Although he admits that planning for Newcastle upon Tyne has been famous for its ambition and scope, and much of it "very much worthwhile," his focus is upon Rye Hill, a small inner-city twilight-zone, with which as a resident he has gained intimate familiarity. Here "a tragic piece of bad planning" took place.

A description of Rye Hill, using data amassed by his university students before planning operations began, suggests some of the uses to which such a twilight area may be put. Among its residents three types predominate: "the immigrants" which include a hardworking group of Indians and Pakistani—many of them homeowners—who had sought haven and security there; "the respectables" left there from an earlier era as their fortunes declined; and "the deviants," petty violators of society's codes, to whose life styles the others had accommodated.

It was people such as these who suffered financial and personal damage as the ill-fated Rye Hill Scheme, slating the area for revitalization, led to progressing blight. Houses left empty under a rigid phasing system were vandalized, property values dropped, the area crumbled, residents' protests remained unheeded, and in the end most were forced to flee. The author's case well supports the claim that planning is most onerous and least advantageous to the relatively powerless and poor.

With a bachelor's in public and social administration from Oxford University and a master's in sociology from Brandeis University, Mr. Davies employs both perspectives in his book, and digs into economic aspects in some depth. In a final section entitled "Policy Alternatives" he comes up with some practical suggestions of how problems might be eased. Although important points are sometimes buried in a mass of detail, his book is lively and stimulating. Its value for the American reader would be increased if a Glossary of unfamiliar terms—CDA, CPO, MALG, and so

forth—and an Appendix summarizing British programs and procedures could be added.

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RICHARD C. LARSON. *Urban Police Patrol Analysis*. Pp. 289. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1972. \$12.50.

The thrust of this book intimately affects and concerns each person who depends upon police protection at some time during his urban experiences. Its main aim is to establish workable, valid criteria to assist urban police departments in determining how effective and efficient their patrol policies and programs are in motion. There are two distinct, yet related, levels employed by the author: the first uses straight, technical terms in narrative, whereas the second explores advanced mathematical models so as to test the validity of various assumptions and the practicality of possible changes in current operations.

Overall, the entire presentation is heavily intensive and demands close-up reading. Illustrations, graphs, and statistics provide a working command and deep insights into what many citizens may take as a matter of course. The potentials of asking hard questions as flexible experimentalists is bound to produce practical dividends for departments and communities.

More and better services remain a constant public demand. This book underscores the point that improvement is not always a result of added numbers. It is essential to spot and judge alternative methods for performance improvements. What is written about the police process has overtones for other routine and emergency urban services to various publics. Patrol is the largest single element of personnel in police organizations; its budget usually represents one-half total costs. Since probing analysis of police operations is increasing at various levels, the lessons are crucial to both trained analysts and operating line officers. Quantification is indispensable in planning and management.

The unmistakable issue is to construct meaningful measures of system success. And the police response in respect to definition of the problem, underlying objectives, spelling out options, comparing choices, and measuring results covers all bases.

Admittedly this political scientist was smothered by technical, mathematical presentations, but admits they may help develop sound intuition and provide insights into operating behavior. The reader is provided with in-depth, backstage views of police operations: roles and problems of the dispatcher, specialists in preventive patrol, police diaries of daily tours, among others. To assist in understanding problems, a first-rate glossary is included. On balance, the book should easily strengthen an administrator's awareness of system interactions and the vital need for new performance criteria. If the name of the game is change, citizens should know the efforts invested to provide better services developed by the best minds working on solutions to police problems.

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WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN. *The Big Foundations: A Twentieth Century Fund Study*. Pp. 475. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972. \$10.95.

ARNOLD J. ZURCHER. *Management of American Foundations: Administrations, Policies, and Social Role*. Pp. 184. New York: New York University Press, 1972. \$6.95.

These books contain portraits of American philanthropic foundations and analyses of their place in American society. The substantial difference in length is due to Nielsen's inclusion of detailed histories of twenty-nine foundations and his extensive documentation. Despite the length difference, the books are surprisingly similar. They both cover foundation programs (patterns of great awards); financial management of endowments; public responsi-

bilities of foundations; government regulation of philanthropy; relationships between foundations and grant-giving government agencies; and relationships among donors, trustees, and professional foundation staffs.

The similarity between the books extends to topic content and conclusions. For example, Nielsen refers to a widespread impression that "... the large foundations in general are sophisticated, energetic, and innovative." But, he says, they are not. "The majority are unprofessional, passive, ameliorative institutions. . . ." Zurcher would agree with this conclusion; he devotes considerable space to foundation staff weaknesses and the resulting insensitivity of most foundations to social change. This insensitivity is reinforced by the predominantly affluent, elderly, WASP composition of foundation trustee boards. But both authors argue that, despite these defects, foundations play an important and useful role in American society.

While these volumes are very informative, they are far from perfect. Nielsen devotes 272 pages to detailed histories of individual foundations which is probably more than the average reader will care to absorb, although the specialist may find them interesting. Also, Nielsen makes many normative judgments concerning various foundations and governmental activities, but he reveals the bases for his judgments only gradually like a stripper wearing fourteen veils; it is not until the 15th chapter that we reach the bare bones of analysis. The reader should begin with chapter 15, read to the end, and then move to the beginning. Perhaps the worst quality of the Nielsen book is that it is filled with irritating literary nettles. The first sentence of the Preface is a good example: "The writing of this book is primarily the result of a desire to produce some plain honest talk about foundations and their problems." You were expecting dishonest talk? Furthermore, the book is loaded with gratuitous insults which are either unsupported or documented ten or more pages after they are launched. For example, "... it began to appear that Patman's crusade [against foundations] was running out of steam; it had produced no signifi-

cant legislation, and Congress and the public were becoming fatigued by his antics." Note the sarcasm of "crusade," and the "antics" are never specified. Despite these drawbacks, Nielsen has produced a thoughtful and well documented work.

Zurcher's book is not irritating, but it is often vague and poorly documented. For example, in discussing the important and demanding responsibilities of foundation trustees, Zurcher states that "... far too many board members are unwilling or unable to discharge such responsibility. Some of these may become complaisant and ratify what they do not understand allowing the staff expert to carry the real if not the formal responsibility for the decision." The discussion continues for several paragraphs in the same vein. The phrases "far too many" and "some of these" are nearly meaningless, and the discussion is not documented in any way. This is typical. The chapter entitled "Committing a Foundation's Resources" contains only three citations. This is very thin documentation for an extremely complex subject.

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ALFONSO ORTIZ, ed. *New Perspectives on the Pueblos*. School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series. Pp. xiv, 340. Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1972. \$11.00.

Eleven essays on selected subjects, an introduction by the editor, and a summary by Fred Eggan comprise this volume. Few new field data are presented, and the merits of the essays rest primarily on the often sophisticated and stimulating reanalysis of existing data and the suggestions for new research approaches. Emphasis is on the Eastern or Rio Grande Pueblos, although two papers deal primarily with data from Zuni.

To me the most rewarding papers are those on ecology, ritual and world view, the ritual clown, social organization, litera-

ture, and acculturation. Each of these re-analyzes data from new points of view. A paper on prehistory presents there contrasting views but does not reconcile them, while a paper on ethnohistory is primarily a classified guide to sources. Shorter papers on Pueblo religion and ethnomusicology are competent reviews of the present state of our knowledge with suggestions for future research. The paper on linguistics is primarily a plea to train native speakers to do linguistic analysis of their own languages with examples from the Papago. The short section on the Pueblo languages appears to be an afterthought.

Readers with some knowledge of Pueblo culture perhaps will profit from these essays, but researchers in any area will find the more analytical papers well worth reading for the new approaches they illustrate.

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STEPHEN M. ROSE. *The Betrayal of the Poor: The Transformation of Community Action*. Pp. 199. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1972. \$7.95.

JOEL F. HANDLER. *Reforming the Poor: Welfare Policy, Federalism, and Morality*. Pp. 168. New York: Basic Books, 1972. \$5.95.

These two slim volumes add both hard data and sharp analysis to a further understanding of the eternal—the word is used advisedly—problem of the poor. After all “poverty” is degree and if the ante is continuously upped?! Rose, an avowed exponent of the New Left philosophy, sees little hope for any poverty alleviation program given our capitalist institutions, traditionalist bureaucracy and deep popular conviction that poverty stems largely from personal/family pathology. He states that he is “committed to revolution in the social structure of American society” and wishes, it would appear, to ferment class struggle conceivably resulting in a mild touch of violence; “we must anticipate conflict.”

He uses the Community Action Program (CAP) of the Office of Economic Opportunity as his vehicle, since its initial goals were aimed at enlisting the active participation of the poor in a restructuring of society; this position Rose shows was rooted in Paul Ylvisaker's ideas at the Ford Foundation and in the President's Task Force on Urban Areas created by Lyndon Baines Johnson. After a very searching and illuminating quantified study of the 350 cases of CAP, he has sufficient evidence to conclude that the existing local bureaucracies administering the program co-opted and negated any far reaching “structural-changes” in our society;—in short, the poor had precious little to say. His solution, above more programmatic tinkering, goes beyond “advocacy planning” to develop an authentic “counter-ideological” thrust; a shift in ideology which will no doubt solve everything! Just how it will be solved from the hard-nosed point of view of the so-called policy sciences is left to the gentle reader's imagination.

Handler, a more conventional type with his training and viewpoint rooted in law, uses the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as his main exhibit to arrive after a most carefully reasoned analysis of most of our major existent welfare programs (and including projected modifications to the Family Assistance Act or Plan (FAP II) and further modifications to this in the House Ways and Means (H.R. 1) bill that the all-pervasive moralistic attitude controls U.S. action in this area: either to reform the poor by instilling the work ethic or “to hold down costs, to root into the cheats and chiselers, to chase absent fathers and to prosecute fraud.” Actually Handler in far milder terms agrees with Rose that there is little hope to be seen for correcting the basic sad fact that “the present welfare system has been a failure.” Handler, addicted to a gradualist approach, actually has little faith.

Both authors have further nailed down this already very widely held conclusion, but neither has, in my estimation, come

up with a valid policy, program and strategy that is even remotely politically feasible. They will both argue quite correctly that neither set out to accomplish that. Agreed, but someone has to take those next necessary steps in the real world of urgently needed programming.

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ROSS V. SPECK et al. *The New Families: Youth, Communes and the Politics of Drugs*. Pp. 288. New York: Basic Books, 1972. \$6.95.

HARRISON M. TRICE and PAUL M. ROMAN. *Spirits and Demons at Work: Alcohol and Other Drugs on the Job*. Pp. ix, 268. Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1972. \$6.50. Paperbound, \$4.75.

The recent proliferation of publications on drug use is one of the more conspicuous features in the new profile of American social science literature. Following the Second World War, the central concern of investigation into addictive behavior was alcoholism. Research at the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies led to a considerable number of monographs and reports that provided the foundation for our understanding of drinking as a social problem. In the decade of the 1960s, however, the research focus shifted to the illegal mood and mind-altering drugs, an inevitable consequence of the emergence of marijuana, hashish, and heroin in the youth culture during that period.

Both books reviewed here developed out of foundation support for team projects. The research staff for *The New Families* consisted of a psychiatrist and colleagues from the fields of social work, sociology, social psychology and anthropology. Supported by an NIMH (National Institute of Mental Health) grant, the study covered 500 young persons in Philadelphia during the three-year period from 1966 to 1969. *Spirits and Demons at Work* was based

primarily on the authors' firsthand research as sociologists operating through the Alcoholism and Occupational Health Program at Cornell and supported by the Smithers Foundation.

Their methods and specific foci, on the other hand, differed. Speck and his associates, concentrating on non-alcoholic drug use by college and other youth, combined participant-observer with therapist roles in "the natural total social contexts." They visited youth social networks—pads and communes—for extended periods up to 24 hours' duration. Trice and Roman chose to combine library research with their own detached observations and interviews in industrial settings. Their focus was alcohol because, in their judgment, it persists as America's major drug behavior, especially in work situations.

Although the Cornell study was, in academic terms, the more conventional and systematic of the two, the Philadelphia study was more imaginative not only in methodology but also in the interpretation of its findings. The mind-altering drugs, according to Speck, represent a political protest movement. The premise supporting their use by young people is that one must change the inner man to be able eventually to affect the outer world. These drugs offer a training process for a new society, a revival of humanism. To youthful drug users, it is not drug use but the lack of relatedness—dehumanization—that is the crucial social problem. In their experiments with drugs and communes, youth is preparing for the tribalization of the future, with new values and life styles.

Trice and Roman evaluate alcohol as more important than psychedelic drugs for two principal reasons. First, it comes closer to fitting their "ideal dependency pattern" than do other drugs. Secondly, what might well occur with the mobility from the university to the work place, and with corresponding passage from the age status of youth to that of adulthood, is a replacement by alcohol of drugs. This, they maintain, would be in conformity with the dominant normative system.

Both volumes are obviously welcome additions to the literature on deviant be-



havior and drug use in contemporary American society.

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LIONEL TIGER and ROBIN FOX. *The Imperial Animal*. Pp. vii, 308. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971. \$6.95.

Upon first hearing about *The Imperial Animal*, my reaction was to fear yet another book of wishful analogies between animal and human behavior. This fear was moderated by respect for the authors, Lionel Tiger (who authored *Men in Groups*) and Robin Fox, both professors of anthropology at Rutgers and both social scientists—that is, knowledgeable about the scientific study of human social relationships. The respect was well deserved, for this book is a very well-formulated and intelligent attempt to look at the social relationships of the human species in “biological perspective.”

The authors’ approach is biological in the sense that it attempts to understand human behavioral tendencies in terms of the adaptive pressures operative in human evolution and in the sense that it assumes that there are fundamental complex behavioral tendencies that inhere in the biology of the species. These assumptions are in no way novel in books of the *genre*, what is novel is that the biological program is not assumed to take the form of specific behavioral responses but rather of tendencies to acquire certain types of culturally-determined responses. Thus, they fully concur with the position that the specific response tendencies of any human being are determined by the culture in which she or he happened to be raised, while at the same time maintaining that the tendency to acquire a culture that will inevitably contain certain elements—language, status differences, marriage rules, child-rearing, and so forth—is inherent in the biological inheritance of the species. (Their position is thus similar to that of Chomsky who maintains that despite the obvious fact that humans must learn to

speak a language and that the particular language learned with its particular vocabulary and grammatical rules are a function of exposure to a particularly linguistic tradition, all humans possess common propensities to acquire a language with a grammatical structure.) I do not mean to imply that this conception of Fox and Tiger is unique as a conception; it is unique as a conception in a contemporary work attempting to relate non-human primate and human primate behavior, and represents a major conceptual advance in works of this type.

Having formulated biological tendencies to acquire culturally determined responses as the cornerstone of their concern in the initial chapter, the rest of the book is concerned with elaborating what the authors believe to be some of the more important and interesting of these tendencies. In each case their basic approach is to define a problem of human relationships as it exists in contemporary Western society, to then look at the conditions that prevail with regard to that relationship in one or more non-human primate species, proceed to look at that relationship as it exists in pre-agricultural-technological hunting and gathering societies, and then return to contemporary Western society in the light of their prior considerations. At each point they consider changes in the relationship(s) in question and discuss the pressures and problems pertaining thereto. In this manner they discuss male-female bonds, mother-infant bonds, female-female friendship bonds, male-male cooperative and competitive tendencies, et cetera. An important thread in their argument is that *homo sapiens* by dint initially of language and later by technology has become increasingly a political animal. They view man’s basic primate “bio-grammar” as programming him for forming ruling oligarchies; modern technologies and bureaucracy make this tendency increasingly dangerous. It is important to construct political institutions which guard against this prevalent tendency.

The authors’ intellectual explorations certainly lead them to many interesting and refreshing comments and suggestions

on topics ranging from modern medical care—lacking because it increasingly omits the basic satisfactions of primate grooming—to women's role in politics (the "biogrammar" makes political struggle a primarily male concern; it also leads men to do some pretty absurd things in the name of politics which are no longer functional—it is well past time for women to get into the game). Fox and Tiger certainly are not viewing the world through any of the familiar ideological glasses. Social scientists, whatever their political-intellectual persuasion, are bound to encounter challenges to some of their beliefs and come away with some new angles from which to view old problems.

This book strikes me as soundly conceived in its basic quest and worthwhile reading for its insights. However, I do not consider it a real scientific success for the primary reason that the authors' insights about biogrammar are just that—no more and no less. A different set of authors, reviewing the vast primate and cultural anthropological literature and selecting therefrom, might well come up with radically different insights. Their review of primate studies particularly, as discussed in the book, is by no means convincing. Had they not relied as heavily on baboon troops—which do happen to be among the most thoroughly studied groups around—some of their theses might well have been different. Thus, their hypotheses are intriguing, interesting, and in many cases probably even correct but in no sense compelling. To make them compelling would of course be an order of large magnitude.

The book is footnoted with some 30–50 items per chapter and has upwards of 700 references from all the behavioral sciences, with heavy emphasis on primate studies and ethnography.

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SIDNEY VERBA, BASHIRUDDIN AHMED, and  
ANIL BHATT. *Caste, Race, and Politics:  
A Comparative Study of India and the*

*United States*. Pp. 278. Beverly Hills,  
Cal.: Sage, 1971. \$12.50.

Here is a welcome addition to the field of comparative government. With thoughtful analytical skill the authors provide a seminal framework for the examination of the political activity of the deprived, and fresh information about the political behavior of blacks in the United States and harijans in India. Neither the framework nor the techniques are simple, yet with careful reading the scholar who does not possess sophisticated statistical knowledge can grasp the findings by studying the diagrams and the prose.

The book integrates historical and cultural information with personal interview responses from at least 2,500 whites, 260 blacks, 1,700 caste-hindus, and 350 harijans. The key conclusions come out of a statistical analysis relating social status to six political orientations and then to four types of political participation. It is discovered, for instance, that each kind of political activity—voting, campaigning, cooperative activity, and the contacting of government officials—is generally associated with a different kind of political orientation, and that the strength of the relationship varies with each of the four groups. The many specific findings are too numerous to present in this brief review.

This is not a book with comprehensive theoretical or practical import. The authors state that it is a "preliminary to a more general analysis of the politics of deprivation and . . . of the politics of participation." They make no predictions; nor do they attempt to evaluate the ability of democratic institutions to promote social and economic equality. They conclude that the political system is more "open" for deprived groups than the socio-economic system, but they show only that the deprived and dominant groups are more similar in their political activity than in their socio-economic characteristics, and do not show that the political activity of the deprived actually ameliorates the unequal social and economic conditions.

Although the procedures are generally imaginative and quite sophisticated, a few technical anomalies did manage to creep in.

In chapter 5 they used representation ratios to indicate dominant and deprived differences, but distorting percentage differences were used instead in chapters 3 and 6. In the early part of the book an SES (socio-economic system) scale was used, but in the crucial chapter entitled "Paths to Politics" a simpler education scale was substituted—without explanation. Also the coding categories for American voting and campaigning were not inclusive of all possibilities. It is not clear how those who voted in exactly two of the three elections, or how those who campaigned in exactly three of the four possible ways, were coded.

This reviewer was disappointed to find that no attempt was made to determine the level of class consciousness among the various groups to see how that might relate to their group consciousness, any socio-economic factors, or various political activities. These deficiencies notwithstanding, the authors have revealed much about the behavior of dominant and deprived groups in two major democracies. The book deserves widespread attention among serious scholars.

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RUPERT WILKINSON. *The Broken Rebel: A Study in Culture, Politics and Authoritarian Character*. Pp. 390. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. \$12.95.

The classic study by T. W. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, is the point of departure for Rupert Wilkinson's own analysis of authoritarianism as it relates to culture and politics. It is Mr. Wilkinson's contention that most scholarly discussions of authoritarian personality traits barely, if at all, endeavor to uncover the cultural correlates and contexts out of which authoritarianism emerges. *The Broken Rebel* is really a social, psychological, political treatise, rather than a purely psychological or sociological one, because of Mr. Wilkin-

son's efforts to articulate and hold in tension the collective, as well as the individual, dimensions of authoritarianism.

Part one treats authoritarianism as a Weberian ideal type and is a summary of the main points of the Adorno study. The authoritarian personality is known by a cluster of traits, such as submissiveness, punitive aggressiveness, toughness, self-censorship, superstition, stereotyping, morbid fascination with sex, and paranoid projections. The authoritarian type is also intolerant of persons "different" from himself and frequently resorts to scapegoating as a means of handling frustration.

In part 2 Mr. Wilkinson discusses some of the social causes of authoritarianism. He begins with a treatment of the rigid parental model, where the young child internalizes the repressive, punitive, and domineering characteristics of his father or mother. At this point the terminology and understanding of the psychodynamics of authoritarianism are expressly Freudian. In addition, some of the main social determinants are social disorganization, social mobility pressures, and economic depression.

The essence of the argument here is that these forms of social change are unsettling to the personality and give rise to the need for security. Into the social confusion steps the authoritarian personality who will bring order out of the chaos with an appeal to puritan creeds and to the necessity of returning to or establishing reliable patterns of authority.

At the same time, Mr. Wilkinson holds that authoritarian types do not usually make good leaders because of their tendencies toward submissiveness and ambivalence over power. Hung Siu-Tshuen, leader of the Taiping rebellion, and Hitler are exceptions to the rule.

While authoritarian tendencies are associated with many ideologies, most authoritarian types tend to be right wingers. Authoritarian types on the "left wing," according to Mr. Wilkinson in part 3, are "rigid rebels." They are not known for their identification with authority figures, but rather for their sympathy for the underdog and their antipathy toward authority. "Rigid rebels" are usually social

reformers, who possess many of the same tendencies toward rigidity as their counterparts on the right wing.

Parts 4 and 5 deal explicitly with authoritarianism in Nazi Germany and in recent America respectively. Most of the data presented here and in the book as a whole appear in "case study" form, much as a clinical psychologist would discuss the past history of a client. There are occasional references to statistical studies, but tables are not duplicated anywhere in the book. The authoritarian personalities discussed, in addition to Hung and Hitler, are the character, Jack, in *Lord of the Flies*, Ann Putnam, Jonathan Edwards, Heinrich Himmler, Rudolph Hess, Joseph Goebbels, and Hans Frank. Anthony Comstock and Tom Watson are included among the "rigid rebels."

The epilogue includes some of Wilkinson's own reflections on the pros and cons of potential increase in authoritarianism in the Western World and ways in which this might be avoided.

This reviewer's overall impressions of this book are mixed. Since the Adorno volume there have been a number of important studies on the authoritarian personality. Mr. Wilkinson's efforts to incorporate an examination of this "type" into a broader understanding of culture is very suggestive. There is much food for thought here. At the same time, very little of the factual information is truly innovative. If this book has any strength or uniqueness, it lies in Mr. Wilkinson's interdisciplinary approach toward his subject matter. Eclectics and generalists may find inspiration in Mr. Wilkinson's endeavors.

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FREDERICK M. WIRT and MICHAEL W. KIRST. *The Political Web of American Schools*. Pp. xv, 285. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1972. \$7.95.

On the first page of their study, the authors state that "the purpose of this book

is to trace the ways in which American schools can be viewed as political." To accomplish this goal, they first demonstrate that education is not isolated from politics as is often claimed, but instead involves a multitude of political decisions made on various governmental levels by professionals, laymen, and political leaders. They then suggest a framework for studying educational politics: the systems approach patterned after a model formulated by political scientist David Easton. By utilizing this schema, the authors argue, it is possible to take "input factors" such as pressure group activities and voting behavior, and "outputs" such as decisions on use of particular textbooks of curriculum content and place them in their appropriate political context.

Perhaps the most useful and innovative feature of this study is that it provides data and a framework for analysis in many areas where virtually no comprehensive research has been done. An example of this is schoolboard elections. The authors point out that over 85 percent of the school board positions in the United States are elective, and yet "the politics of these elections are a great unknown" (p. 62). By raising questions concerning who gets elected, the effect of socio-economic characteristics on the electoral process, and what policy implications result from the election of particular board members, they suggest particularly fruitful areas for future research.

Three case studies that further demonstrate the interrelationship between education and politics and illustrate the utility of the systems approach are also included. These deal with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Southern school desegregation, and development of school curricula. The concluding portion of the study discusses the value and limitations of systems analysis in understanding the educational process, and emphasizes the importance of the trend toward increased politicization of our schools.

One of the book's shortcomings is its lack of in-depth coverage of some topics. In attempting to cover virtually the entire field of education, many issues of con-

temporary importance have received only a brief notice. These include disputes over community control, racial disparities, conditions of ghetto schools, and the role of students in influencing educational policy.

Another problem involves the use of the systems approach for relating education and politics. Experience with this technique has led many political scientists to question its utility in a number of situations concerning human behavior. Although the authors quite skillfully respond to possible attacks on this approach, it still has not been shown that other conceptual models might not be equally or more valuable.

Most scholars will probably find, however, that the study's deficiencies are outweighed by its virtues. The authors have produced a book that is clearly written, amply documented, and represents a major step in the direction of encouraging interdisciplinary research in the fields of education and political science.

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### ECONOMICS

G. C. HARCOURT. *Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital*. Pp. viii, 272. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972. \$10.50.

The title of this book is inspired by the on-going hot war mainly between Professors Samuelson and Solow at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Professors Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor at the University of Cambridge, England. Hovering in the background is the pronounced influence of their colleague, Professor Piero Sraffa; disciples Passinetti and Garegnani, with important contributions of their own, must be included in even a short list.

A real analytic rumpus of major importance for economics has erupted. Ultimate

consequences are as yet only dimly perceived by the profession but they promise to be profound. The serious economist can only neglect the conflict at the peril of early obsolescence of his customary outlook.

This book has much to recommend it for conveying some sense of the subtlety, intricacy, and breadth of the dispute. The bibliographical list contains over 200 entries, seldom dating before 1955, with only peripheral omissions. The author has striven valiantly to impart some perspective to the cluttered battleground.

What is capital? Mrs. Robinson once defined it as a "who's who" of productive equipment. This much is clear. Thereafter, so much becomes obscure because economists have sought to aggregate the mass of capital without benefit of a suitable unit of measurement. It is in this context that insuperable problems abound; a century ago Marx could perpetrate the fiction that capital was merely congealed labor, thereby evading the same formidable complications.

What determines the changes in the capital stock? What are the effects of the changes on income distribution, economic growth, economic well-being? Are technological developments, which comprise the dynamics of capitalism, induced by the profit motive, or are they largely autonomous? The latter has been a common view prior to the Cambridge, England challenge.

Caught in the middle of the controversy is the validity of the marginal productivity theory of distribution. This textbook fixture may fall victim to the new hammer blows despite the touching M.I.T. rear-guard defense of ideas of English lineage.

Harcourt has had some fun in writing this book, and the mood is communicated to his readers. Although he has sought to suppress the mathematics, the subject inherently invites symbols. The exposition of Sraffa's somewhat neglected, potentially important ideas is particularly laudible.

The author informs us that he has tested the material on first-year undergraduate students in Adelaide, Australia. They must be the brightest and the best trained in the world. The United States market is more

likely to be confined to specialists and upper level graduate students.

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WILLIAM B. NEENAN. *Political Economy of Urban Areas*. Pp. xix, 344. Chicago: Markham, 1972. No price.

The subject of this book encompasses one of the most serious problem areas confronting contemporary American society—the social performance of urban America. The interdisciplinary complexity of this problem is readily apparent. Yet, much of the attention given to the urban crisis by researchers and policymakers has been disappointingly narrow in its failure to recognize the interdisciplinary dimensions of the problem. Such omission is especially serious when the ignored discipline is economics, a fundamental component of the overall urban issue. William B. Neenan, in his book the *Political Economy of Urban Areas*, is in no way guilty of such oversight. This well-researched, well-written, well-documented, and up-to-date book ties an integral economic thread through the multi-faceted urban issue while, at the same time, demonstrating an appreciation for the involvement of other disciplines in the problem.

The opening chapter provides a well-balanced overview of urban America today. This is followed by a theoretical chapter which describes the economic functioning of an urban public sector in an isolated community without intergovernmental fiscal interactions. The next three chapters present an empirical study of a non-isolated city, Detroit, and the intergovernmental benefit and cost spillovers which flow between it and six suburban cities. The benefit flows are estimated in both "cost-of-service" terms (chapter 3) and in a more sophisticated "value-of-service" or "willingness-to-pay" context (chapter 4). Intergovernmental revenue flows between Detroit and her neighbors are estimated in chapter 5, and it is concluded that Detroit is a victim of "fiscal exploitation" by the suburbs. Interestingly, however, chapter 6

demonstrates that suburban residents who commute to jobs in Detroit "more than pay" via a Detroit nonresident income tax for the Detroit-provided benefits which they consume. This chapter also provides a model state revenue sharing program which, it is argued, would help to alleviate the fiscal exploitation of the Detroit central city. Chapter 7 returns to the level of theoretical abstraction by developing a normative "efficiency-equity" criterion for evaluating the public sector interaction of metropolitan governments. This is followed in chapter 8 by a description of existing intergovernmental revenue sharing programs. An evaluation of revenue sharing techniques is presented in chapter 9. In chapters 10 and 11, emphasis moves back to the isolated city with an appraisal of the alternative revenue sources available to municipal governments. A strong endorsement of municipal income taxation emerges from this analysis.

The final chapter, while admitting to a somewhat pessimistic outlook for the future of American cities, nonetheless advocates "continuing efforts" to improve their performance. Indeed, studies such as this one by Neenan will help to make such improvement possible. This effective presentation of theoretical, empirical, and institutional materials within an interdisciplinary framework, all of which is held together by a mainstream of economic analysis, should prove useful to both the researcher and government administrator to whom the constructs of urban policies are assigned.

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WILFRED OWEN, with the assistance of INAI BRADFIELD. *The Accessible City*. Pp. 150. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972. \$6.50.

Wilfred Owen, that wise experienced battler for sane, holistic, urban transportation systems, has come up with a sparkling short treatise on the fact that it is bad cities, not bad transportation, that lead to the advanced constipation of people-movement and goods-movement in urban places.

Unsurprisingly, Owen suggests that what we need most is a sorted-out land use which would reduce purposeless shuffling back and forth of people and goods. Nodes of residence, shopping, work, recreation, education, and so forth in some rational relationship to each other would save both amenities and costs. Restructuring of existent urbanism and the control of new urbanism along the above general lines are the near-at-hand solutions.

Owen's predictable *bête noire* is the private automobile—with its  $1.5 \pm$  occupants—but he makes an important fresh point that the provision of adequate underground transport merely drives bus-users below the surface, giving more room in the streets for the ubiquitous private car. Europe, the sophisticated Orient, and even the developing countries seem doomed to repeat our sad history in automobile worship. Thus, positive, fine public transportation must be matched by negative controls over private vehicles. One is reminded of Lewis Mumford's nugget "public wheels and private feet." Owen does not have much truck with gadget solutions as "people movers" or very much with "the wired city" although he bows briefly to an alternate possible future of idea-movement replacing to a degree the physical transport of things and people. In short, *The Accessible City* is an excellent realistic, wrap-up based on the world scene of the urban transport situation today by an urbane urbanist.

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JACQUES RUEFF. *The Monetary Sin of the West*. Pp. 214. New York: MacMillan, 1972. \$6.95.

This is a rather frightening book about the American dollar. It reads as though a seer told you a disaster was going to befall you in three stages and now all but the final one have occurred as predicted. Jacques Rueff, economic advisor at times to the late President Charles de Gaulle, publicly foretold the downfall of the dollar

during the 1960s as well as recommending a remedy. This book is partly an account of what took place but it is even more a documentary of Rueff's warnings and the reasoning that prompted them. It is a sophisticated "I told you so" (p. 100). The "monetary sin of the West" was trying to operate an a gold exchange after experience with it in the 1920s had shown it would lead to disaster. And in the case of the United States, it was inflating the dollar on which other nations had confidently based their currencies.

The gold exchange standard, now a century old, was used by poorer nations prior to the 1920s. These nations had their own reserve accounts—deposits not borrowed—in London or New York. Payments into or out of these accounts had exactly the same effects as gold movements did for gold coin standard nations. The more permissive version of the gold exchange standard in the 1920s allowed simultaneous credit expansion by both parties. In 1934 the United States adopted what was sometimes called a "qualified gold bullion standard"—it was not a gold exchange standard. Foreign central banks or treasuries might demand gold of the United States for dollars but individuals might not. In Europe after World War II both gold and dollars were scarce, so foreign central banks and treasuries treated dollars as if they were gold reserves and thus built their credit expansion in part on what was already our own credit expansion. This was clearly reminiscent of the gold exchange standard of the 1920s. Especially after 1949 American indebtedness to foreigners grew rapidly, much of it in the form of dollar deposits, some even in paper dollars, all redeemable in gold on demand by foreign central banks and treasuries. Dollars were no longer scarce. By the late 1950s nations began to prefer gold and our gold reserves fell off sharply. Likewise in October of 1960 the price of gold went above \$40 an ounce on the "free" London gold market. To alleviate the concern this incident caused, the United States and other nations quietly formed a pool to sell enough gold at \$35 on the London market to keep the price at that official U.S. level.

It was in 1958 that France "stabilized" her franc and in June of 1961 that Rueff "first sounded the alarm" in three articles published in *Le Monde* which he draws on in opening this book dealing with the 1960s. During that decade Germany, Holland, and Switzerland up-valued their currencies one or more times, the United States sought to restrict new investments abroad, and we took many other steps to limit the outflow of American gold. But it kept on flowing. Given our spending propensities and the opportunity our monetary system offered, this was inevitable, Rueff says. Fortunately for the United States, nations with large holdings of dollars as part of their reserves or nations that were militarily beholden to the United States, were reluctant either to jeopardize their own currencies by sounding the alarm or offend us by demanding large amounts of gold. But a growing number bought gold with dollars on the London market. In March of 1968 the members of the 1960 pool suspended their agreement to keep gold at \$35 on that market. The "two tier" system began, that is, the United States would redeem dollars in gold at \$35—if it could not talk its way out of doing so—but leave it to the forces of demand and supply to set the price of gold on London's "free" market (pp. 182–85). American deficits, debts, and dollars kept on increasing. Finally on August 15, 1971 the United States suspended redeeming dollars in gold at \$35 altogether. It had severed its last tie with the gold standard and had cast grave doubts on the further reliability of the dollar as a reserve currency.

What did Rueff recommend? During most of the 1960s he urged that we revalue gold at \$70 an ounce (p. 112) and use the profits only to "reimburse dollar balances" held abroad and that we return to a gold (bullion?) standard. He now says that \$105 is a more realistic price for gold (p. 210). He does not consider Special Drawing Rights a viable solution (p. 169–73). And the world should forever eschew the gold exchange standard. The penalty for not heeding this advice: a returning flood of dollars and another great

depression (pp. 205–f), the last stage of his prediction.

The book is so closely reasoning that it is not light reading yet it is highly important because it deals with a major economic error of our century. Also it demonstrates that an observant economist can foretell with amazing accuracy what a faulty economic policy will produce. The reader would greatly benefit from an index.

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HAROLD L. SHEPPARD and NEAL Q. HERRICK. *Where Have All the Robots Gone? Worker Dissatisfaction in the 1970s*. Pp. 222. New York: The Free Press, 1972. \$7.95.

This is a provocative book, with many interesting questions asked about worker dissatisfaction. The robot issue is not developed, perhaps because the authors have enough to occupy them with the subject of dissatisfaction. Through the use of questionnaires of blue-collar union members—United Automobile workers and Steelworkers—the authors discovered a considerable degree of dissatisfaction, especially among the younger workers, and those with relatively low incomes. These alienated workers have a measure of dissatisfaction that is surprising considering the tremendous industrial advancement of the United States during the last century. It is true that standards of living have been pushed higher and higher during the past one hundred years. Nevertheless, alienation continues. It may be as suggested by Marx, Erick Fromm, and many other writers, that industrialism carries with it, like a great weight on a giant's back, the burden of alienation, and that the weight grows more than proportionately with the advancement of industrialism.

It is not shown, in this study at least—in fact this is not its central thesis—that alienation is growing more than proportionately with the development of industrialism, or equal to it, or less than its development, or that it is spreading into new areas, or receding from some. The au-



thors do point out that it should be of concern to union people, business leaders, and government leaders. There are murmurings in the news media that "times are out of joint," but generally this attitude is not traced to alienation. Nevertheless, alienation on a widespread scale means that cynicism is rampant among a large section of the people, especially the youthful population.

A large part of the book deals with the classification of job dissatisfactions and the reactions of workers of various groups to these situations. This makes it possible, to a degree, to weigh, measure, and evaluate job situations to workers of various groupings. And so alienation is measured in terms of its various attributes, with reference to age, education, race, experience, expectations when hired, hopes of advancement, relations with management, union officers, and hopes for another and better job, early retirement, and many other factors. The total make up the job-task, and how it affects the worker. The job-task results in a considerable number of workers with blasted hopes, cynical attitudes, and without expectations for anything better. Some of them, the authors found, voted for Governor Wallace in 1968, whatever that means.

The authors recommended that considerably more experimentation be devoted to the job-task to attempt to overcome the impact of alienation.

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
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## PREFACE

This volume on blacks and the law barely scratches the surface of the subject, and it could not do more. Although most of the topics treated in this issue of THE ANNALS were legal abstractions twenty years ago—one year before the decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*—today a number of the subjects fill volumes of law books and have had major impact on society that has not even begun to be analyzed. For example, there are now six or more large volumes consisting only of fair employment decisions, regulations, and other law. There is a comparable body of legal materials in the fair housing area. There have been hundreds of school integration decisions. Capital punishment as a racial issue was barely perceived two decades ago, and the capital punishment litigation, as well as the Supreme Court decisions outlawing it, could not have been foreseen. Although the Fifteenth Amendment and implementing legislation are more than a century old, the right to vote became reality only following the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and now there are hundreds of southern black elected officials; the number in the North has grown greatly as well.

There is no space to consider the criminal law, except in the most general way, or to discuss welfare, or equalization of municipal facilities, or prisoners' rights, or the immense changes in the law governing public demonstrations that came out of the sit-ins and freedom rides, or innumerable other areas where law is significant with regard to race. Nor could any of the treated areas be covered with the detail it deserves. Moreover, there has been no opportunity to approach the issues we dealt with from all of the perspectives that might be interesting or instructive. The volume is heavily weighted with the views of lawyers, although they are not the conventional private practicing lawyers. And the rhetoric of some of the pieces is less detached than is conventional in academic journals. A comprehensive treatment would have views from the various social sciences, government officials, civil rights leaders, and others. A study of blacks and the law today, if really comprehensive, would constitute an encyclopedia of virtually all of American life today.

Nevertheless, this volume does give a good indication of how much race relations has changed in two decades and where some aspects of it stand today. Judge Higginbotham's article describes the predisposition of many judges on racial questions from 1619–1896. It was they who wrote much of the law we are still trying to change. Judge Hastie's article describes the legal campaign, in which he was a participant, that led to the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*. Marian Wright Edelman writes of how the *Brown* decision, interacting with political developments in the country, has affected desegregation of the schools. She, too, is a participant in the developments of which she writes. And Robert L. Herbst describes the litigation strategy involved in the effort to apply *Brown* to northern, often called de facto, school segregation. Albert J. Rosenthal and William B. Gould tell of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They have worked on some of the important cases in which it has developed. Originally placed in the 1964 Act over the objections of the Kennedy administration, Title VII may be having considerable force in upgrading the status of blacks in employment, although this assessment is admittedly one of general impression, and there has not yet been a statistical measure of the difference. Robert McKay details the history of voting rights, the impact of the 1965 legislation, and the spinning out of the implications of voting law for black

electoral participation. There can be no doubt of the difference that the law has made here. Yale Rabin looks at the meaning of governmental highway construction programs for race, which is but one aspect of a complex of forces—racial prejudice, black economic status, zoning law, urban renewal, and other governmental programs, to name a few—that determine where black people live and work. His article gives another example of how racial issues of great importance lurk in seemingly non-racial contexts. Further, it shows once more that *Brown v. Board of Education* was only the beginning of a process that has been stripping away seemingly non-racial covers from governmental action of great consequences for race.

Marvin Wolfgang's study of capital punishment treats part of a campaign that started because the death penalty fell with uneven incidence on black citizens. Yet, to right that wrong, all of capital punishment had to be outlawed in the process. His subject suggests what so often appears: to right wrongs committed against black Americans we make changes that affect everyone else, and, I would argue, to the general benefit of all. But Haywood Burns reminds us that many black Americans are not complacent about the gains law has achieved; they are much more distressed about the wrongs they perceive in the legal system.

Those wrongs in part may be affected by the activity of lawyers, and Walter Leonard writes of how the black bar has been undermanned since the first black lawyer came to practice. Indeed, in this editor's experience, there have been times when only a single black lawyer practiced in the states of Louisiana, Georgia, and Delaware, and only a handful more practiced in other states in the South. Law has limited utility without lawyers to implement it, particularly where society chooses to violate it, and government will not enforce it. Fortunately, the number of black law students today exceeds the size of the entire contemporary black bar. Kellis Parker and Betty Stebman describe the growth and distribution of the black law student body, and the considerable problems attendant upon the production of black lawyers. Even with this rapid growth, however, the size of the black bar in proportion to black population will be a small fraction of the white bar, viewed comparably.

Finally, Louis Claiborne reminds us that we are dealing with a problem and its legal ramifications which extend beyond the United States. The space limitations of this issue of *THE ANNALS* are once more apparent when we consider that similar studies could be made of most countries in the world, though the identity of the minorities would vary.

Perhaps this is the time to undertake an encyclopedic study of race and law, from all the viewpoints we have taken in this volume and the many more we have been unable to take. This may be a time to gather the data that will tell us what law can and cannot do and what we can learn from what we have attempted. This is a period in which some social scientists are telling us that little or nothing can be done about many social conditions, particularly those associated with race. I think that the law has been an immense force for social change with regard to race—and social change of a salutary sort. But an in-depth inquiry might give a somewhat definitive answer, at least with regard to some sectors of living, and now might be the time to start. It is hoped that through this volume of *THE ANNALS* a wide audience will be stimulated to further pursuit of these issues.

JACK GREENBERG

# Racism and the Early American Legal Process, 1619-1896

By A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.

ABSTRACT: An understanding of the early American legal process is central to dealing with the racial disparities of today. From 1619 to 1860 the American legal process was one which expanded and protected the liberties of white Americans—while at the same time the legal process became increasingly more harsh as to the *masses* of blacks, with a steady contraction of their liberties. The United States Constitution sanctioned slavery, so that under federal law the slave “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”

Though the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments significantly expanded the actual rights and options of blacks, nevertheless from 1865 to 1896 the legal process failed to effectuate the full potential of the rights intended and assured under the constitutional amendments.

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This Fourth of July is yours, not mine. . . .  
The sunlight that brought light and healing  
to you, has brought stripes and death  
to me.

—Frederick Douglass<sup>1</sup>

Good gracious! Anybody hurt? No'm.  
Killed a nigger. Well, it's lucky, because  
sometimes people do get hurt. . . .

—Mark Twain<sup>2</sup>

Under the United States Constitution a black man had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; . . . the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race.

—Chief Justice Roger B. Taney<sup>3</sup>

ONE of the tragedies of today's racial polarization is that blacks, who have been the major victims of historic racial deprivations, are now in some strange way being held accountable for those very conditions which they did not create, which they did not want, but were forced to take. Today's paradox is that great political capital is made over busing or open housing and the black crime rate. Yet there is scarce recognition that these problems have reached their present volcanic level partially because of the massive racist deprivations which the American legal system sanctioned through slavery, in the words of Chief Justice Taney, "whenever a profit could be made." Further, few are willing to recognize that today's problems are also related to the failures of the American legal proc-

ess to fully implement the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in the post-Civil War era.

#### RACISM AND LEGAL HISTORY<sup>4</sup>

Because of its appropriate efforts to assure equal justice to blacks, the great Warren Supreme Court was steadily barraged by irresponsible diatribes; many of the critics inferred that "all would be well" if the legal process could turn back to those good old days of "strict construction" and purported neutrality.<sup>5</sup> As to the racial issues,

4. This article is a condensation of some of the materials in chapters 1-8 of an unpublished monograph, *Race and the American Legal Process in the United States*, by A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., and David Rigney, Esquire, as used at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. I am greatly indebted to David Rigney for his scholarly efforts in our joint research projects; however, he is not responsible for the conclusions which I have reached herein. In addition to its development in *Race and the American Legal Process in the United States*, the theme of this article has been further developed by A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., in chapters in several books including: "The Black Prisoner: America's Caged Canary," in Hugh Davis Graham, ed., *Violence, The Crisis of American Confidence* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), chap. 7; "Is Yesterday's Racism Relevant to Today's Corrections?" in *Outside Looking In*, monograph (Washington, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1970), pp. 1-21; and William C. Menninger Memorial Lecture, Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kansas, 1969; also, "Law Enforcement and Justice," in H. B. Yoshpe and F. R. Burdette, eds., *National Urban Problems* (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1970), chap. 8.

5. For a collection of cases and articles involving the northern and southern resistance to *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), see T. I. Emerson, D. Haber, and N. Dorsen, *Political and Civil Rights in the United States* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1967), vol. 2, pp. 1264-68, 1273-76. See also the "Southern Manifesto," *Congressional Record* 102 (March 12, 1956), pp. 4459-64, as signed by nineteen senators and seventy-seven representatives.

1. "On the Meaning of the Fourth of July to the Negro, 1852," in Philip S. Foner, *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass* (New York: International Publishers, 1950), vol. 2, p. 189.

2. *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1884), pp. 306-7.

3. *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393, 412 (1857).

many of the diatribes were concocted by unprincipled individuals who knew better the facts of history. For this latter group, no writing or scholarship placing the racial issue in true historical perspective will have any impact. This group can only be dealt with through non-racist victories at the ballot box. However, for those Americans of purported good will, a probe into America's racial legal history might be of value in helping us to understand the multifaceted factors that have caused the current malaise.

In this article I will analyze the operation of the early American legal process which, in the words of Frederick Douglass, brought slavery, "stripes and death" to blacks, while bringing liberty, "light and healing" to whites. The American legal process from 1865 to 1896 will also be analyzed as to its failure to fully effectuate the rights intended and assured for blacks under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.

Speaking of the post-Civil War period, Professor C. Vann Woodward has said: "I am convinced that law has a special importance in the history of segregation, more importance than some sociologists would allow, and that the emphasis on legal history is justified. At the same time I want to stress that law is not the whole story."<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, I recognize that legal history does not tell the "whole story" of slavery. For the scope of this article, the problem will be viewed through the legal lens,<sup>7</sup> but it is conceded that for

a full dimensional view the perspectives of historians, economists, sociologists, theologians, and others must also be utilized.<sup>8</sup>

#### DID BLACKS CREATE THE SYSTEM?

To understand our present dilemma we have to come to grips with this conclusion of the National Commission on Civil Disorders:

What white Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply im-

Columbia University Press, 1959); Loren Miller, *The Petitioners* (New York: Pantheon, 1956). Earlier treatises are John C. Hurd, *The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the U.S.*, 2 vols. (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1858); George M. Stroud, *Sketch of the Laws Relating to Slavery*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Henry Longstreth, 1856); Charles S. Mangum, Jr., *The Legal Status of the Negro* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940); William Goodell, *The American Slave Code* (1853; reprint ed., New York: New American Library, 1969); Richard Bardolph, *The Civil Rights Record, Black Americans and the Law, 1849-1970* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970).

8. For general background, see John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom, A History of Negro Americans*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1969); Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the Making of America*, rev. ed. (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1969); Winthrop Jordan, *White over Black* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968); Kenneth Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution* (New York: Random House, 1956); Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma, The Negro Problem in a Modern Democracy* (New York: Harpers, 1944); Carter G. Woodson and Charles H. Wesley, *The Negro in Our History*, 11th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Associated Publishers, 1966); George M. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Lorenzo Green, *The Negro in Colonial New England* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942); C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951). For the best bibliography, see Alton Hornsbury, Jr., *The Black Almanac* (Woodbury, N.Y.: Barren, 1972), pp. 169-86.

6. C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. ix.

7. For a contemporary legal analysis of the twentieth century, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., "Racism in American Courts," *California Law Review* 61 (1973), p. 165. See also Derrick A. Bell's scholarly treatise, *Race, Racism, and American Law* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., forthcoming, 1973); Jack Greenberg, *Race Relations and American Law* (New York:

plicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.<sup>9</sup>

The Commission's conclusion is unchallengeable. For blacks were not the ship owners who transported twenty million slaves through the tragic "middle passage" where millions died of suffocation and disease, or went insane.<sup>10</sup> Blacks neither sought nor supported the separate but equal doctrine of the North as announced in Puritan Massachusetts, in *Roberts v. The City of Boston* in 1850.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, blacks did not devise that unwarranted<sup>12</sup> federal constitutional doctrine of "separate but equal," pronounced in 1896 by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Plessy v. Ferguson*<sup>13</sup>—the federal doctrine which thereafter most often resulted in total separateness and total inequality for blacks.<sup>14</sup> Blacks did not perpetuate the fraud and violence that caused thousands of blacks to be cast off the voting lists in almost every major southern state.<sup>15</sup> Blacks did not lead

the lynching parties and vigilante movements which killed thousands and intimidated millions.<sup>16</sup> Blacks were neither the captains of industry<sup>17</sup> nor the

secret that there has not been a full vote and a fair count in Mississippi since 1875—that we have been preserving the ascendancy of the white people by revolutionary methods. In plain words, we have been stuffing ballot boxes, permitting perjury and here and there in the state carrying the elections by fraud and violence until the whole machinery for elections was about to rot down." (Quoted in Burke Marshall, *Federalism and Civil Rights* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1964], pp. 13–14.) See also "Political Participation," A Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1968, pp. 1–10.

16. Walter White, *Rope and Faggot* (1928; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1969); Gunnar Myrdal: "The pattern of lynching Negroes became set during Reconstruction. No reliable statistics before 1889 are available. Between 1889 and 1940, according to Tuskegee Institute figures, 3,833 people were lynched, about four-fifths of whom were Negroes. The Southern states account for nine-tenths of the lynchings. More than two-thirds of the remaining one-tenth occurred in the six states which immediately border the South . . ." (Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, p. 560). See the comment of a black woman, Ida Wells-Barnett, on the hostile reaction of New Orleans whites in 1892 to a black newspaper editorial condemning lynching: ". . . the leading citizens met in the Cotton Exchange Building the same evening, and threats of lynching were freely indulged, not by the lawless element upon which the deviltry of the South is usually saddled—but by the leading business men, in their leading business center" (Ida Wells-Barnett, *On Lynchings, Southern Horrors, A Red Record Mob Rule in New Orleans* [reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1969], p. 5). In response to Ida Wells-Barnett's paper, *On Lynchings*, Frederick Douglass wrote on October 25, 1892, to Miss Wells: "It sometimes seems we are deserted by earth and Heaven—yet we must still think, speak and work, and trust in the power of a merciful God for final deliverance" (ibid., p. 3).

17. See the following volumes published in Philadelphia by the University of Pennsylvania Press: H. R. Northrup et al., *Negro Employment in Basic Industry* (1970); *Negro Employment in Finance* (1970), vol. 2; *Negro Employment in Public Utilities* (1970), vol. 3;

9. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 1.

10. See Daniel P. Mannix, *Black Cargoes* (New York: Viking Press, 1962); E. Donnan, *Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade to America* (reprint ed., New York: Octagon Books, 1965); W. E. B. DuBois, *Suppression of the Slave Trade* (1896; reprint ed., New York: Schocken, 1969); Warren S. Howard, *American Slavers and the Federal Law* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); G. F. Dow, *Slave Ships and Slaving* (1927; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Negro University Press, 1970); J. R. Spears, *The American Slave Trade* (New York: Kennikat Press, 1900).

11. 59 Mass. 198; see also Leon Litwack, *North of Slavery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 143–50.

12. See Miller, *The Petitioners*, pp. 165–82.

13. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

14. See note 87.

15. Judge Chrisman of Lincoln County, Mississippi, described his state experience in his speech to the Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890 as follows: "Sir, it is no



leaders of unions<sup>18</sup> which closed the door to minorities. Blacks were not the realtors and power brokers who created rigid racial ghettos to preclude open housing options for the black masses.<sup>19</sup>

*Negro Employment in Southern Industry* (1970), vol. 4; *Negro Employment in Land and Air Transportation* (1971), vol. 5. See House Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. Rep. no. 718, 89th Cong. 1st sess. 1965; Herbert Hill, "Racial Inequality in Employment: The Patterns of Discrimination," *THE ANNALS* 357 (January 1965), pp. 30-47.

18. Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, *The Black Worker* (1931, Columbia University Press; reprint ed., New York: Atheneum, 1968); Herbert R. Northrup, *Organized Labor and the Negro* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944); Robert C. Weaver, *Negro Labor* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946).

19. Charles Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbors, A Study of Discrimination in Housing* (New York: Harper and Row, 1955); Robert C. Weaver, *The Urban Complex* (New York: Doubleday, 1964); Kenneth Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); K. Taeuber and A. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965); *Shelly v. Kramer*, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See the *Restatement of Property* (1944), section 406, comment L; Robert Ming, "Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases," *University of Chicago Law Review* 16 (1949), p. 203; E. Grier and G. Grier, "Equality and Beyond: Housing Segregation in the Great Society," *Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 95 (1966), pp. 77, 82-85: "Federal policies and policies in housing reinforced and increased the separation between the 'Negro' cities and the white suburbs. In part, this was intentional. From 1935 to 1950—a period in which about 15,000,000 new dwellings were constructed—the power of the national government was explicitly used to prevent integrated housing. Federal policies were based upon the premise that economic and social stability could best be achieved through keeping neighborhood populations as homogeneous as possible. Thus the Underwriting Manual of the Federal Housing Administration [FHA] (oldest and largest of the Federal Housing agencies, established by the Housing Act of 1934) warned that 'if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that property shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial group.' It advised appraisers to lower their valuation of

And, despite the higher black crime rate, blacks have not been the captains of international and national crime syndicates which have saturated the urban community with heroin and dangerous drugs to create a plague which at times seems almost uncontrollable.

#### THE GROWTH OF THE NATION AND THE SOUTHERN EXPERIENCE

The setting opens in 1619, when John Rolfe, secretary of the Virginia colony, reported that "about the last of August there came to Virginia a Dutchman of Warre that sold us twenty negers."<sup>20</sup> As John Hope Franklin and others have noted, "during this early period the Negro was looked upon as an indentured servant, a bondsman for a period who could look forward to his freedom after a term of years."<sup>21</sup> An analysis of the early cases in Helen Catterall's superb volumes<sup>22</sup> corroborates the thesis of Franklin,<sup>23</sup> the Handlins,<sup>24</sup> and others<sup>25</sup>

properties in mixed neighborhoods, 'often to the point of rejection.' FHA actually drove out of business some developers who insisted upon open policies. . . ."

20. Maurice R. Davie, *Negroes In American Society* (New York: Whittlesey, 1949), p. 17.

21. United States Commission On Civil Rights, *Freedom to the Free* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1963), p. 7.

22. Helen Catterall, *Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), vols. 1-5.

23. John Hope Franklin, in *Freedom to the Free* (note 21 above), p. 71: "There could be little doubt that the earliest Negroes in Virginia occupied a position similar to that of the white servants in the Colony. They were listed as servants in the Census enumerations of 1623 and 1624, and as late as 1651 some Negroes whose period of service had expired were being assigned land in much the same way that it was being done for white servants. The record of Virginia contained many indentures of Negro servants during the forty year period following their introduction; and during the same period there are records of free Negroes in the Colony."

24. Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, "Origins

that at the early stage, 1619 to the 1660s, the American legal process was far more supportive of freedom for blacks; or, phrased differently, the early legal process was less harsh.

In Georgia's original charter there were three precise prohibitions: no free land titles, no alcoholic beverages, and no Negro slaves. However, by 1750, because of the "leadership" of men like the Reverend George Whitefield, the prohibition against Negro slaves was repealed.<sup>26</sup>

It was not until 1662 that references were made in the statutes of Virginia noting that some Negroes were slaves.<sup>27</sup> As late as 1672 and 1673, several Virginia cases reported instances of Negroes serving limited terms as indentured servants rather than being sentenced to the eternity of slavery.<sup>28</sup>

In March of 1641, in the Virginia case, *Re Graweere*,<sup>29</sup> a black was referred to not as a slave, but as a Negro servant. Pursuant to an early agreement with his "master," Graweere was permitted to keep one-half of the hogs raised and "make the best benefit thereof," and to use the funds therefrom to purchase the freedom of his child. The court entered a decree that Graweere's child was free from the master and would remain free "at the disposing and education of the said Graweere [the servant father] and the

child's godfather, who undertaketh to see it brought up in the Christian religion as aforesaid."

One must contrast the holding in *Graweere* in 1641 and other early cases with the legal process fifty, one hundred, and two hundred years later.<sup>30</sup> In 1856, in his *Sketch of the Laws Relating to Slavery*, George M. Stroud<sup>31</sup> captioned his major chapter, "Slaves Are Things." As authority he cited the Louisiana Code that

... a slave is one who is in the power of

30. Jordan, *White over Black*, p. 82: "By about 1700 the slave ships began spilling forth their black cargoes in greater and greater numbers. By that time, racial slavery and the necessary police powers had been written into law. By that time, too, slavery had lost all resemblance to a perpetual and hereditary version of English servitude, though service for life still seemed to contemporaries its most essential feature. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century the trend was to treat Negroes more like property and less like men, to send them to the fields at younger ages, to deny them automatic existence as inherent members of the community, to tighten the bonds on their personal and civil freedom, and correspondingly to loosen the traditional restraints on the master's freedom to deal with his human property as he saw fit. In 1705 Virginia gathered up the random statutes of a whole generation and baled them into a 'slave code' which would not have been out of place in the nineteenth century."

As time went on, Virginia made manumission of slaves more difficult and passed more harsh laws even as to free blacks. For example: chapter XXXII of 1823—"Henceforth when any free Negro shall be convicted of an offense now and by law punished by imprisonment for more than two years, such person instead of confinement shall be punished by stripes at the discretion of the jury, and shall moreover be adjudged to be sold as a slave and banished beyond the limits of the United States" (quoted by Guild, *Black Laws of Virginia*, p. 101); chapter LXV of 1853—"The sum of \$30,000 is appropriated for five years for the removal of free Negroes from the Commonwealth. The Colonization Board of Virginia was given power to act under this law. The annual tax of \$1.00 is levied on every male free Negro of 21 years and under 55 years and collected as other taxes on free Negroes are collected. The funds arising from

of the Southern Labor System," *William and Mary Quarterly* 8 (1950), pp. 199-222.

25. See *The Negro in Virginia* (New York: Arno Press, 1969), pp. 1-17; June Purcell Guild, *Black Laws of Virginia* (reprint ed., New York: Negro University Press, 1969).

26. Franklin, *Freedom to the Free*, p. 83; see also, Ralph B. Flanders, *Plantation Slavery in Georgia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1933).

27. 2 Hen. 117. See McIlwaine 382 (1674); and Catterall, *Judicial Cases*, pp. 59, 80.

28. See Catterall, *Judicial Cases*, p. 60; and *Negro Mzingo v. Stone*, McIlwaine 316 (Oct. 1672); *Moore v. Light*, McIlwaine 354 (Oct. 1673).

29. McIlwaine 477 (March 1641).

a master to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry and his labor: he could do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but what must belong to his master.<sup>32</sup>

Stroud analyzed the twelve propositions of slavery, which included:

- III. The master may, at his discretion, inflict any punishment upon the person of his slave.
- IV. All the power of the master over his slave may be exercised not by himself only in person, but by any one whom he may depute as his agent.
- VI. The slave, being a *personal chattel*, is at all times liable to be sold absolutely, or mortgaged or leased, at the will of his master.
- VII. He may also be sold by process of law for the satisfaction of the debts of a living or the debts and bequests of a deceased master, at the suit of creditors and legatees.
- VIII. A slave cannot be a party before a judicial tribunal, in any species of action against his master, no matter how atrocious may have been the injury received from him.
- IX. Slaves cannot redeem themselves, nor obtain a change of masters, though cruel treatment may have rendered such change necessary for their personal safety.
- X. Slaves being objects of *property*, if injured by third persons, their owners may bring suit, and recover damages, for the injury.
- XI. Slaves can make no contract.
- XII. Slavery is hereditary and perpetual.<sup>33</sup>

After this analysis, Stroud noted a couple of incidentals, such as:

this source shall be applied to the removal of free Negroes" (quoted by Guild, *Black Laws of Virginia*, p. 119).

31. George M. Stroud, *Sketch of the Laws Relating to Slavery*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Henry Longstreth, 1856).

32. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

33. Stroud noted that there were some modifications of these propositions, but there appears to be substantial legal authority by statute or cases for most. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39.

. . . it may be added that a slave cannot even contract matrimony . . . the association which takes place among slaves, and is called marriage, being properly designated by the word *contubernium*—a relation which has no sanctity, and to which no civil rights are attached.<sup>34</sup>

Evidence of the legal impotence of the male slave and the lack of status of the slave marriage was demonstrated by the opinion of Daniel Dulany, Esquire, the attorney-general of Maryland, that "a slave has never maintained an action against the violator of his bed."<sup>35</sup>

It is indeed an intriguing irony to observe the growth of America in the late 1600s, 1700s, and 1800s as thousands of whites came to the promised land for freedom and increased opportunities: almost simultaneously the rights of blacks were shrinking and the legally sanctioned hardships of slavery were expanding for the masses of blacks.<sup>36</sup>

34. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 99; 1 Maryland Reports 561, 563.

36. As an example, in 1723, Virginia prohibited manumissions except those specifically permitted by the governor and council for meritorious service. As late as 1804, Virginia prohibited night time religious meetings of slaves. Georgia forbade slaves working or transacting business for themselves, and the restrictions set such a repressive mood that the English visitor, John Lambert, noted in 1807 that in Charleston, South Carolina, Othello and other plays where a black man is the hero of the piece are not allowed to be performed for the reason that the whites feared that ". . . Negroes in Charleston should conceive, from being represented on the stage, and having their color, dress, manners, and customs imitated by the white people, that they were very important personages," (Lambert, *Travels through Canada and the U. S.*, vol. 2, p. 138, as quoted by Jordan, *White over Black*, p. 405, n. 8). See also Jordan, *White over Black*, pp. 124, 404-405, and at p. 403: "Shortly after the Revolution, Americans began haphazardly but with detectable acceleration to legislate Negroes into an ever-shrinking corner of the American community."

The debates are endless in identifying the cause of these ironic events. Was the growth of slavery and its expanding legal sanction attributable solely to economic, non-racial reasons?<sup>37</sup> Or, was it attributable to the prejudices of Englishmen against black Africans as a "natural and almost innate [quality] in the white men?"<sup>38</sup>

Viewing this panoply of factors from which some try to isolate the primary cause as either economic or racial, Winthrop Jordan has suggested that:

The concept of Negro slavery . . . was neither borrowed from foreigners nor extracted from books, nor invented out of whole cloth, nor extrapolated from servitude nor generated by English reaction to Negroes as such nor necessitated by the exigencies of the New World. Not any one of these made the Negro a slave, but all.<sup>39</sup>

Yet, whatever the reasons for the development of slavery and its concomitant harsher legal process, it is clear that by 1800 the law had so "progressed" that the slave had few, if any, fundamental rights which his master or "the white man was bound to respect."<sup>40</sup>

37. Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

38. A. Weinstein and F. Gatell, eds., *American Negro Slavery, A Modern Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 14. Marvin Harris, in E. Genovese and L. Foner, eds., *Slavery in the New World* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 40, says: "What we call prejudices are merely the rationalizations which we acquire in order to prove to ourselves that the human beings whom we harm are not worthy of better treatment." See, generally, Higginbotham and Rigney, *Race and the American Legal Process*, chap. 3.

39. Jordan, *White over Black*, p. 72.

40. *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393, 412. For a contrast as to the more liberal treatment of slaves and the earlier abolishment of slavery in England, see Higginbotham and Rigney, *Race and the American Legal Process*, chap. 4, and as to the more liberal

It was left to a Princeton University graduate, Judge Thomas Ruffin, to make the most definitive statement of the non-rights of a slave, in *State v. Mann*, 13 N.C. 263 (1829). Before the Court was a simple issue as to whether it was a criminal offense to subject a slave woman to "a cruel and unreasonable battery" (shooting her). Some historians have implied that slavery was a paternalistic institution wherein masters treated their slaves as if they were children.<sup>41</sup> Counsel had argued that a master's relation to the slave was analogous to the principles that restrain the authority of a parent over the child, a tutor over the pupil, or a master over the apprentice. The Court unanimously rejected those analogies and said:

There is no likeness between the cases. They are in opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf between them. The difference is that which exists between freedom and slavery—and a greater cannot be imagined. . . . *With slavery. . . The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person and his posterity, to live without knowledge and without the capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits.*<sup>42</sup>

The Court went on to emphasize that a slave was to "labor upon a principle of natural duty," to disregard "his own personal happiness," and that the purpose of the legal system was

to convince slaves they had no will of their own and they must surrender [their] will in implicit obedience to that of another. Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body.

Latin American experience, see *ibid.*, chap 6; see also Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen* (New York: Random House, 1946); and Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black Nor White* (New York: Macmillan, 1971).

41. Ulrich B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (1918; reprint ed., Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966).

42. 13 N.C. 263.

There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect.

The Court emphasized that for the slave

there is no remedy, [that] [w]e cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave must be made sensible that there is no appeal from his master; that his power is in no instance usurped; but is conferred by the laws of man at least, if not by the law of God.<sup>43</sup>

Then, finally and most paradoxically, the Court concluded that the law's impotence in protecting slaves from cruel batteries was designed to "effectively secure the general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves."<sup>44</sup>

Ruffin's views were not atypical as to the rights of slaves. Representative Summers of the Virginia Legislature stated in 1832,

when, in the sublime lessons of Christianity, he [the slave holder] is taught to do unto others as he would have others do unto him, he never dreams that the degraded Negro is within the pale of that holy canon.<sup>45</sup>

In reply to some members who had proposed abolition, Mr. Gholson of the Virginia Legislature said in 1831:

Why I really have been under the impression that I owned my slaves. I lately purchased *four women and ten children* in whom I thought I obtained a great bargain, for I really supposed they were *my property*, as were *my brood mares*.<sup>46</sup>

43. 13 N.C. 263, at 266, 267.

44. 13 N.C. 263, at 268. For an analysis of Judge Ruffin, his ownership of slaves, his commercial interests and political activities, see Higginbotham and Rigney, *Race and the American Legal Process*, chap. 2.

45. William Goodell, *The American Slave Code* (1853; reprint ed., New York: New American Library, 1968), p. 35.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

I am not unmindful that there are some antebellum cases where the courts imposed some limitation on the extent to which blacks could be beaten, mutilated, prosecuted, and killed. Professor A. E. Keir Nash has written a series of articles generally extolling the treatment of blacks by the "State Supreme Courts of the Old South."<sup>47</sup> After reviewing a relative paucity of cases, he was so impressed that he said:

Yet, it is not quixotic to ask whether the black's existence was better aided by the judicial fairness and integrity of [antebellum] judges such as Pearson and Green minus the mandate of the fourteenth amendment than by that mandate unaided by judicial compassion.<sup>48</sup>

My answer to Professor Nash is: even with their degraded status after the termination of slavery and the impotence of the Fourteenth Amendment, blacks were inestimably better off than in their prior existence when slavery was a way of life and a few southern appellate judges made the chains a bit less cutting. It seems strange that one hundred years after the emancipation some scholars have to be reminded of Professor Litwack's comment that "... the inherent cruelty and violence of Southern slavery requires no further demonstration, . . ." <sup>49</sup> The denial of marriage, the denial of the right to own property, the debasement of a man and his chil-

47. A. E. Keir Nash, "Fairness and Formalism In the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the Old South," *Virginia Law Review* 56 (1970), p. 63; "A More Equitable Past? Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the Antebellum Negro," *North Carolina Law Review* 48 (1970), p. 197; "Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extraordinary Chief Justice John Belton O'Neil," *South Carolina Law Review* 21 (1969), p. 141.

48. *Virginia Law Review* 56 (1970), pp. 99-100.

49. Litwack, *North of Slavery*, p. vii.

dren living as slaves in perpetuity cause Professor Nash's findings to have minuscule significance in evaluating the justice in slavery. With millions enslaved and denied the above rights, there is only slight solace in Professor Nash's findings that a few southern appellate courts were concerned about procedural fairness to the relatively few slaves who were charged with crime or in the relatively few cases where whites—usually strangers—were prosecuted for brutalizing slaves. Further, as to the fate of the masses of slaves, Stroud seems far more persuasive than Nash when the former stated in 1856 that even when the applicable law prohibits certain violence by the master:

The evil is not that laws are wanting, but that they cannot be enforced; not that they sanction crime, but that they do not punish it. And this arises chiefly, if not *solely*, from the cause which has been more than once mentioned,—the exclusion of the testimony, on the trial of a *white* person, of all those who are *not white*.<sup>50</sup>

#### SLAVERY, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

If historians from Mars were to read the *final* draft of revolutionary documents such as the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms<sup>51</sup> or the Declaration of Independence, they would search in vain to find the word "slavery" or any explicit statement that racial slavery either existed or was tolerated by the American legal process in the 1780s.

As Thomas Jefferson commented on the Declaration of Independence, his draft of July 2 included a clause "... reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa, [which] was struck

out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still wished to continue it."<sup>52</sup>

The U.S. Constitution did not mention slavery by name until it was abolished in 1865 by passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Yet several clauses within the original Constitution were included to assure the perpetuation of slavery<sup>53</sup> and the maximization of political power for southern slaveholders.<sup>54</sup>

When the issue of ratification of the Constitution was before the South Carolina House of Representatives, one of the framers of the Constitution, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, spoke to that body on the issue of slavery. He said:

I am of the same opinion now as I was two years ago, when I used the expression the gentleman has quoted . . . that while there remained one acre of swamp land uncleared of South Carolina, I would raise my voice against restricting the importation of Negroes. I am as thoroughly convinced as that gentleman is, that the nature of our climate and the flat, swampy situation of our country, obliges us to cultivate our lands with Negroes, *and without them South Carolina would soon be a desert waste*.<sup>55</sup>

52. As quoted in Louis H. Pollak, *The Constitution and the Supreme Court: A Documentary History* (New York: World Publishing Company, Meridian Books, 1968), vol. 1, p. 9.

53. Article I, section 2, clause 3; art. I, sec. 9, cl. 1; art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 3; see generally, D. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1971); Staughton Lynd, *Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

54. Article I, section 2, clause 3; see Higginbotham and Rigney, *Race and the American Legal Process*, chap. 5.

55. Max Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), vol. 3, pp. 253-54.

50. Stroud, *Sketch of the Laws*, p. 55.

51. See Henry Steele Commager, *Documents of American History*, 8th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 92.

Perhaps some of today's tensions are attributable to increasing black awareness that General Pinckney was accurate in stating that without them South Carolina and most of the southern states would have been a desert waste for years.

I still find it shocking that the U.S. Constitution, created by revolutionaries, sanctioned a process which made the following advertisements legal for those traders who profited from the sale of human flesh:

The subscriber has just arrived from Petersburg, Virginia, with one hundred and twenty likely young Negroes of both sexes and every description, which he offers for sale on the most reasonable terms. The lot now on hand consists of plough-boys, several likely and well-qualified house servants of both sexes, several women with children, small girls suitable for nurses, and *several small boys without their mothers*. Planters and traders are earnestly requested to give the subscriber a call previously to making purchases elsewhere, as, he is enabled to sell as cheap or cheaper than can be sold by any other person in the trade.

Benjamin Davis

Hamburg, S.C., September 28, 1838<sup>56</sup>

The advertisement of Benjamin Davis in 1838 was not unique; it was typical of thousands of advertisements posted in newspapers and bulletin boards throughout our land. In the *New Orleans Bee* an advertisement noted:

Negroes for sale—A negro woman, 24 years of age, and her two children, one eight and the other three years old. Said negroes will be sold SEPARATELY or together as desired. The woman is a good seamstress. She will be sold low for cash, or EXCHANGE FOR GROCERIES. For terms apply to Matthew Bliss and Company, 1, Front Levee.<sup>57</sup>

56. As quoted in Goodell, *The American Slave Code*, pp. 54-55.

57. Ibid., p. 54.

Looking at these tragic, though routine, events of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, one must ask what happened to the rule of law? How could a legal system sanction this cruelty, cruelty which permitted the sale, as Benjamin Davis bragged, of "several small boys without their mothers," cruelty which permitted a mother, twenty-four years of age, to be sold in exchange for groceries and separated from her eight- and three-year-old children? Have we often disregarded our legal history to keep from our full consciousness the extraordinary brutality of our past? This process, which permitted the sale and ownership of human flesh, was sanctioned by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.<sup>58</sup>

#### *U.S. Supreme Court justices*

My review of the history of the justices on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1789 to 1865 indicates that the majority had been slave owners; further, in a series of cases *when they had options*,<sup>59</sup> the Court as a whole declined to vote in favor of liberty for slaves. In 1842 in *Prigg v. Pennsylvania*,<sup>60</sup> the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court supported the concept that established a presumption that any black was a slave even if found in a free state. Thus, by *Prigg*, a black could be taken by a bounty hunter from a non-slave state to a slave state with the non-slave state having no power to require a judicial hearing to ascertain whether the black was in fact a slave. In his dissent, Justice John McLean

58. I am not suggesting that under the U.S. Constitution the Supreme Court had the power to declare slavery unconstitutional in *all* of its aspects; tragically that was the then rule of law. See, however, the section of this article *U.S. Supreme Court justices* as to the Court's declining its option to free some slaves.

59. The most dramatic examples are *Prigg v. Pennsylvania*, 41 U.S. 539 (1842), and *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

60. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).

condemned the majority for failure to recognize that the black "as a . . . human being" should be entitled to a hearing in the jurisdiction where he was found if that jurisdiction's state law set up a procedure to contest the claim. McLean suggested that "in a state where slavery is allowed, every colored person is presumed to be a slave; and on the same principle in a non-slave holding state, every person is presumed to be free without regard to color."<sup>61</sup> Despite the fact that Pennsylvania law established a procedure where blacks found in the state could contest the validity of a bounty hunter's claim, Justice Joseph Story<sup>62</sup>—a part-time Harvard Law School professor—writing for the majority, would not approve for blacks captured in Pennsylvania the elementary right to challenge the claim in Pennsylvania. I think that Story and the majority were wrong and that the dissenting Justice McLean was correct.

In *Dred Scott*, Justice McLean, again dissenting, noted that the majority's opinion was "a mockery of law and an outrage on [the] rights of Scott." Justice McLean noted that "in this case a majority of the court have said that a slave may be taken by his master into a territory of the United States, the same as a horse, or any other kind of property."<sup>63</sup> Some of the reactions to the majority's opinion in the *Dred Scott* case included Senator William F. Seward of New York, saying to

. . . the Senate and the listening North that the decision was the result of a conspiracy between Buchanan and a Taney-led majority of the Court. The *Boston Atlas*

shrieked that "the names of the judges will go down in history with Arnold, the traitor." And the *Boston Chronicle* agreed that "a majority of the court are great scoundrels." Greeley's *New York Tribune* put it that the majority opinion was "entitled to just so much moral weight as would be the judgment of a majority of those congregated in any Washington bar room."<sup>64</sup>

From my view, even from the most strict construction perspective, McLean was right and Taney was wrong. These cases exemplify the fact that, during the time of slavery, *when there were options*, the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court chose the positions most restrictive to blacks.

The other branches of government were as conservative as the Supreme Court on the slavery issue. The *Congressional Record* indicates that the majority of the U.S. Congress had no qualms of conscience about the depravity that was permitted through the continuance of slavery.

In the U.S. House of Representatives, one congressman said, "slaves have no more right to be heard than horses and dogs."<sup>65</sup> On February 11, 1837, the House of Representatives resolved, by a vote of 162 to 18, "that slaves do not possess the right of petition secured to the people of the United States by the Constitution."<sup>66</sup>

A study of the actions of the presidents during the time of slavery reveals an interesting paradox. We find that President Washington seldom spoke about the immorality of slavery; however, in his will he provided for the emancipation of his slaves upon the death of his wife.<sup>67</sup> Jefferson spoke far

61. *Id.* at 678.

62. For a most perceptive analysis of Justice Story on the issue of slavery, see 1972 paper by Richard T. Andrews III, on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Library: "Justice Joseph Story: An Appraisal."

63. 60 U.S. 549.

64. As quoted in Miller, *The Petitioners*, p. 81.

65. Goodell, *The American Slave Code*, p. 36.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

67. George Washington's will provided:



more eloquently about the immorality and hypocrisy of slavery, but at most he freed only one of his slave families.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless, Jefferson wrote more movingly than any other president about the "unremitting despotism" of masters and the "degrading submission" of slaves. He emphasized that the parents' involvement in slavery makes an impact on the white child, developing

... the worst of passions, and thus nursed, educated and daily exercised in tyranny [the child] cannot but be stamped by it with odious peculiarities. A man must be a prodigy who can retain his manners and morals undepraved by such circumstances.<sup>69</sup>

After assessing this horrid legal process which sanctioned slavery, Jefferson concluded: "*Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever.*"<sup>70</sup>

"Upon the decease of my wife, it is my will and desire that all the slaves which I hold in my own right shall receive their freedom. To emancipate them during her life, would, though honestly wished by me, be attended with such insuperable difficulties on account of their inter-mixture by marriage with the Dower Negroes, as to excite the most painful sensations, if not disagreeable consequences from the latter, while both descriptions are in the occupancy of the same proprietor, it not being in my power, under the tenure by which the Dower Negroes are held, to manumit them." As quoted in Robert McColley, *Slavery and Jeffersonian Virginia* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 144-45.

68. Jordan, *White over Black*, pp. 4-31. For an analysis of later presidents, see George Sinkler, *The Racial Attitudes of American Presidents* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1971).

69. Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), pp. 162-63.

70. Ibid. When empathizing with the slave, Jefferson said: "For if a slave can have a country in this world, it must be any other in preference to that in which he is born to live and labor for another; in which he must

## ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AND THE NORTHERN STATES

I am not unmindful of the good work of abolitionists.<sup>71</sup> I recognize that the legal process showed some flexibility in limiting the deprivations for a relatively small number of blacks—probably less than 10 or 15 percent. As an example, after the adoption of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights in 1780<sup>72</sup> and by subsequent judicial decisions declaring the freedom of Quock-Walker,<sup>73</sup> slavery was abolished in Massachusetts in the 1780s where blacks were less than 2 percent of the population. Professor Donald L. Robinson has commented,

Massachusetts was the first of the original 13 states to be rid of slavery. Its undermining there was such a significant event, it made little immediate difference in the actual status of black people, but it did demonstrate that the "contagion of liberty," to use Bernard Bailyn's phrase, could reach the institution of Negro slavery when social and economic conditions, particularly relating to the number of blacks and slaves, were not prohibitory . . . [F]or the nation as a whole, the more significant meaning of the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts was the difficulty with which it was achieved. Massachusetts was free of slavery by 1790, but its example was of little value to men for whom

lock up the faculties of his nature, contribute as far as depends on his individual endeavors to the evanishment of the human race, or entail his own miserable condition on the endless generation proceeding from him" (ibid., pp. 162-63).

71. See Arthur Zilversmit, *The First Emancipation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Louis Filler, *The Crusade Against Slavery* (New York: Harpers, 1960); Philip S. Foner, *Frederick Douglass* (New York: International Publishers, 1964); Foner, *Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass*, 4 vols.; Benjamin Quarles, *Black Abolitionist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

72. See Commager, *Documents of American History*, pp. 107-10.

73. Ibid., p. 110.

slavery was the pervasive future of their social and economic lives.<sup>74</sup>

To the slave it is probably irrelevant as to whether the primary force for abolition is moral, political, or economic. Freedom is more important than the reasons for its birth. However, when viewing the New England experiences, the letter of John Adams as written from Quincy on March 21, 1795, is a significant commentary on the economic and political factors:

I was concerned in several causes in which negroes sued for their freedom, before the Revolution. The arguments in favour of their liberty were much the same as have been urged since . . . arising from the rights of mankind, . . . Argument might have some weight in the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, *but the real cause was the multiplication of labouring white people, who would no longer suffer the rich to employ these sable rivals so much to their injury.* This principle has kept negro slavery out of France, England, and other parts of Europe. The common people would not suffer the labour, by which alone they could obtain a subsistence, to be done by slaves. *If the gentlemen had been permitted by law to hold slaves, the common people would have put the negroes to death, and their masters too, perhaps. . . The common white people, or rather the labouring people, were the cause of rendering negroes unprofitable servants.* Their scoffs and insults, their continual insinuations, filled the negroes with discontent, made them lazy, idle, proud, vicious, and at length wholly useless to their masters, to such a degree that the abolition of slavery became a measure of economy.<sup>75</sup>

Pennsylvania was the first state in America to pass a law for the gradual abolishment of slavery. Yet in Pennsyl-

74. Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery and the Structure of American Politics, 1764-1820* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 29. See also Litwack, *North of Slavery*, p. 10.

75. As quoted in Catterall, *Judicial Cases*, vol. 4, p. 467.

vania, slaves were still reported in the census of 1840.<sup>76</sup>

Professor Leon Litwack notes that "by 1800 some 36,505 northern Negroes still remained in bondage, most of them in New York and New Jersey, but almost every northern state had either abolished slavery outright or had provided for its gradual abolition."<sup>77</sup> Abolition of slavery did not mean full citizenship for the black since "until the post-Civil War era . . . most northern whites would maintain a careful distinction between granting Negroes legal protection—a theoretical right to life, liberty and property—and political and social equality."<sup>78</sup>

#### THE DEMISE OF THE THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH, AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS

Some might assert that to review this past history in 1973 is an act of total irrelevance. They might ask, Why doesn't he look at the operation of the rule of law after the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution have been passed? True, those amendments were designed to eradicate slavery and, in the words of Charles Sumner—the conscience of the U.S. Senate—were designed so "that hereafter in all of our legislation, there

76. Robinson, *Slavery and American Politics*, p. 29. For a scholarly analysis of racism and the legal process in early Pennsylvania, see unpublished monograph of Geraldine Segal, "Race Relations in Early Pennsylvania," on file at the University of Pennsylvania, Department of Sociology, pp. 1-58, 61-72.

77. Leon Litwack, *North of Slavery*, p. 3. "Slavery was abolished by the Constitution of Vermont (1777), Ohio (1802), Illinois (1818), and Indiana (1816); by a judicial decision in New Hampshire; and by gradual abolition acts in Pennsylvania (1780), Rhode Island (1784), Connecticut (1784 and 1797), New York (1799 and 1817), and New Jersey (1804)" (*ibid.*, p. 3, n. 1).

78. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

shall be no such words as 'black' or 'white,' but that one shall speak only of citizens."<sup>79</sup>

From my reading of the history of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and the related Civil Rights Acts, it is clear that the framers of the Constitution and the authors of the related statutes concurred with Charles Sumner's hope. They believed that with the enactments, as Loren Miller has said:

The long sickness had come to end; now the majestic rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence had full meaning: "All men are created equal [and] are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, *Liberty* and the pursuit of Happiness." The "Government . . . instituted among men" in the United States of America was committed to "secure these rights" and to safeguard them against the aggressions of individuals, of the states, and of their agents and servants. By constitutional fiat and statutory direction, the national writ would run to guarantee privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection of the laws for every man, white and black. In spirit, "in all of our legislation," there was "no such word as black or white . . . only . . . citizens."<sup>80</sup>

Tragically, by the 1880s it was apparent that the "original understanding" of these amendments was being steadily emasculated by a hostile Supreme Court. The judicial and executive abdication had caused Frederick Douglass, in 1889, to wonder whether American justice, American liberty, American civilization, American law, and American Christianity could be made to include and protect alike and forever all American citizens in the rights which have been guaranteed to them by the organic and fundamental laws of the land.<sup>81</sup>

The last rung of hope for blacks dropped out in *Plessy v. Ferguson*<sup>82</sup> with the federal birth of the separate but [un]equal doctrine in 1896. There, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to pass a statute providing for separate railway carriages for the white and colored races. In the opinion, they gave implied approval of the right of a state to legislate separate school and other facilities for blacks and whites, saying:

. . . we think the enforced separation of the races, . . . neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .<sup>83</sup>

In an eloquent dissent, Justice John M. Harlan said:

. . . [I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.

In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the *Dred Scott* case.

79. 2 *Congressional Record* 948, as quoted in Miller, *The Petitioners*, p. 97.

80. Miller, *The Petitioners*, pp. 100-101.

81. As quoted in Rayford W. Logan, *The*

*Betrayal of the Negro* (London: Colliers, 1965), pp. 9-10.

82. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

83. 163 U.S. at 548.

Finally, he concluded:

*The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law.*<sup>84</sup>

#### *Results felt today*

Think of the type of nation we would now have if in 1896 our leaders had really followed the message of Justice Harlan that ". . . the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law."

If this message had been implemented, subtle or blatant racism would not be one of the underlying issues in the current political campaigns. There would be no problems of busing today; nor would there be the extensive racial ghettos now existing in the inner cities of our nation. The striking racial gaps between black and white economic, health, and educational attainment would be either nonexistent or significantly diminished.

But we have these tragic disparities<sup>85</sup> today because moral leadership and the legal process did not support the concept of an open society. Blacks were abandoned by the 1876 Hayes-Tilden Compromise<sup>86</sup> and the 1896 capitulation in *Plessy v. Ferguson*,<sup>87</sup> for decades no substantial moral leadership was pro-

vided in this field by the White House, by the courts, by the schools, by the Congresses, by the state governments, and often, not even by the churches.

The catastrophic backlash in education because of the 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* doctrine seems almost unbelievable.<sup>88</sup>

In *Berea College v. Kentucky*,<sup>89</sup> in 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a 1904 Kentucky statute which prohibited a college from teaching white and Negro pupils in the same institution.

Berea College was established in 1854 by a small band of Christians in the Kentucky mountains who began their charter with the words: "God hath made of one blood all nations that dwell upon the face of the earth." After the Civil War it admitted students without racial discrimination and by 1904 had 174 Negroes and 753 white students. It was a private institution supported by those who subscribed to their religious tenets, and it neither sought nor received any state aid or assistance. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court held that

that *law* could not function in that sphere of human affairs! . . . although the South had lost the war it had conquered constitutional law . . . the Supreme Court had revived some of the dogmas of the Dred Scott case. . . . The Negro, under the Court's guardianship, was reduced to a despairing second-class citizenship: voteless in the South; helpless in the face of constant and brutal aggression . . . denied access to places of public accommodation; represented in public office by those whose very elections were dependent upon their promise to white voters to double and redouble his [the black's] disabilities; forced to scrounge and cage for an education; segregated in every phase of his life; condemned to separate and unequal schools and public facilities of every kind; and with no place to turn for redress of his grievances except to the Courts that had approved the devices used to reduce him to his helpless and almost hopeless degradation" (pp. 170, 178, 180).

88. *Ibid.*, chap. 11.

89. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).

84. 163 U.S. at 559-560.

85. See generally, *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, chaps. 4-9.

86. Logan, *Betrayal of the Negro*, pp. 15-47.

87. See generally, Miller, *The Petitioners*, chap. 11, where Judge Miller concludes that the majority ". . . reduced the Fourteenth Amendment to little more than a pious goodwill resolution . . . [and] . . . had smuggled Social Darwinism into the Constitution and had armed future generations of segregationists with the cherished doctrine that they could protect racial discrimination *through law* while preserving it against change with the fiction

a state could deprive any private institution from promoting the cause of Christ if it did so through integrated education. What a tragic ruling!—a nation that pronounces loudly its faith in freedom of religion, yet sanctions a state's denial of the day to day application of religious concepts when practiced in an integrated school.

In *Berea College*, Justice Harlan wrote another eloquent dissent, and tragically, Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes—the darling of legal liberals—concurred in the majority's repressive opinion.

Harvard Law School's distinguished Professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr., in commenting on this period, has said:

And as the gains made by blacks—political, legal, and social—were erased in the 1870's the Supreme Court and the lower courts confirmed in their decisions what blacks had feared, that the citizenship they had been granted, which indeed they believed they had earned through the blood of thousands of blacks who had died fighting on the Union side during the War, was citizenship in name only. . . .

In the process, blacks were damaged. But with faith and that grace that some of us still sing about, that Amazing Grace, we survived.<sup>90</sup>

Of course, since the *Berea College* case and *Plessy v. Ferguson*, there have been many noble advances to eradicate some of the injustices sanctioned by the earlier legal process.<sup>91</sup> However, it is

90. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., "Black Faith in a Racist Land," *Journal of Public Law* 20 (1971), pp. 414, 415.

91. Some of the most significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions were in:

(1) Voting—*Smith v. Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (primary elections); *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (one man—one vote); *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (implementation of 1965 voting rights act).

(2) Education—*Missouri ex rel Gaines v.*

appropriate, with some frequency, to look down the corridor of history and recognize that so many for so long failed to deal with the racial injustices around them. Maybe if we are aware of the painful failures of the legal process in yesterday's history and the racial injustices perpetuated thereby, we will find the wisdom today to resolutely press for the eradication of racial disparities and to work together for a truly open society where racism, hatred, and violence are solely memories of our tragic past. These goals must become a task for all Americans, white and black, rich and poor, powerful and weak. For in the 1970s we must not act as if we believe in the folly of the lines from Gilbert and Sullivan:

The Law is the true embodiment of everything that's excellent. It has no kind of fault or flaw, and I, my Lords, embody the Law.<sup>92</sup>

*Canada*, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); *Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

(3) Housing—*Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); *Jones v. Mayer*, 392 U.S. 409 (1968); *Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc.*, 93 S.Ct. Rep. 1090 (1973).

(4) Employment—*Steel v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad*, 323 U.S. 192 (1944); *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

(5) Public accommodation—*Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority*, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); *Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States*, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); *Katzbach v. McClung*, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

(6) Prohibition of racial violence—*U.S. v. Johnson*, 390 U.S. 563 (1968); *Pierson v. Ray*, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); *Griffin v. Breckenridge*, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).

(7) In addition to the role exerted by the Supreme Court, the passage of the following civil rights statutes were of profound significance: The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1964, 1965, and 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974, 1975, 1993, 1995, 2000, 3601–3619, 3631.

92. Gilbert and Sullivan, *Iolanthe*, act 1, song—Lord Chancellor.

## Toward an Equalitarian Legal Order, 1930-1950

By WILLIAM H. HASTIE

ABSTRACT: Though the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution promised black Americans that thereafter their rights and opportunities would not be demeaned because of race, the ensuing fifty years witnessed the comprehensive institutionalization of racial segregation and subordination by force of law. During the first quarter of this century the racist legal order was so firmly established, with the support or acquiescence of most whites, that struggle against it seemed futile. But beginning about 1930, under the leadership of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a nationwide legal campaign was planned and undertaken with an equalitarian legal order as its goal. Early lawsuits served to arouse public interest and support as well as to win significant peripheral changes in the segregated legal order. Social scientists and educators were persuaded to re-examine the segregated order critically. The federal government moved from a posture of neutrality to forthright assertion that laws requiring racial segregation could not be squared with the Constitution. Responding case by case, the Supreme Court progressively eroded antecedent constitutional doctrine that sanctioned American apartheid until, by 1950, the Court appeared ready to strike down all statutes and all other governmental action that imposed racial segregation or discrimination.

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**D**URING the decade immediately after the American Civil War, the newly enacted Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and implementing federal and state legislation held out to blacks the promise of a dawning era in which the rights and status of the individual and his access to the ever increasing opportunities and privileges of American life would not be demeaned on the basis of race. To the recent slaves and their descendants, even as to immigrants and their descendants, this was to be the land of equality where all could live in dignity, and achievement would not be obstructed by barriers of caste. But less than fifty years later, this lofty promise had been repudiated by national, state, and local government with the sanction of the courts and with the acquiescence of most Americans.

Scholars of competence in the fields of law, political science, and education have told and retold the story of the subordination and isolation of the Negro and the effective nullification of his citizenship rights, as willfully accomplished during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.<sup>1</sup> That sordid chapter in American history will not be recounted in detail here. Our present concern is the twenty-year struggle toward an equalitarian legal order that immediately preceded and made possible the school desegregation cases of the

1950s and the constitutional invalidation of all state required or enforced racial segregation and discrimination. But that struggle can be viewed in perspective only if the antecedent status of the Negro is comprehended. And such realization is not easy today, particularly for the many millions of Americans who have reached maturity since 1950.

#### THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO IN 1930

Throughout the first third of this century, the effective institutionalization of racism was the common experience of most Negroes. "Settled" American law required and sanctioned such rigid and comprehensive segregation and subordination of blacks that, to most people, even talk of any significant movement toward an equalitarian legal order seemed visionary, or even foolish.

Most blacks were disfranchised. Though in 1915 the Supreme Court had invalidated the cruder forms of state legislation that restricted the franchise of those whose ancestors had not been eligible to vote, some years later the Court had sanctioned the use of party regulations to exclude blacks from voting in Democratic primary elections, usually the only seriously contested elections in the southern states where most Negroes lived.<sup>2</sup> Obviously, the Negro could not achieve political power nationally, or even in most local communities, so long as this barrier stood.

At the same time about half of the states, among them those with the largest black population, either required separate schools for whites and blacks by statute, or gave legislative sanction to the maintenance of racially segregated schools by counties and local

1. For example, Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper, 1944), vol. 1, pp. 573-82, 618-39; Paul Lewinson, *Race, Class, and Party* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922), passim; Charles S. Mangum, *The Legal Status of the Negro* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), passim; Gilbert F. Stephenson, *Race Distinctions in American Law* (New York: Appleton & Co., 1910), passim; E. Franklin Frazier, "The Status of the Negro in the American Social Order," *Journal of Negro Education* 4 (July 1935), pp. 293, 298-300.

2. See notes 11, 12, and 13.

school districts.<sup>3</sup> And in almost every district gross discrimination notoriously characterized the niggardly public provision made for the separate education of blacks.<sup>4</sup> Sporadic legal attacks upon this system had failed in both federal and state courts.<sup>5</sup>

Segregated public education was but the most conspicuous manifestation of community insistence, effectuated by law, that from early childhood and throughout their lives blacks should be isolated, subordinated, and disabled from functioning in the mainstream of American life. Intermarriage of whites and blacks was prohibited, and often made a serious crime as well, throughout the southern and border regions and in some other states. By law, blacks were segregated from whites in trains and other public carriers. Local laws required or authorized the denial to blacks of access to hotels, restaurants, theaters, parks, and a broad range of other places of public accommodation and resort. Segregation in places of worship was mandated in Tennessee. Interracial boxing matches were prohibited in Texas. It was illegal for Negroes to use public telephone booths in Oklahoma. The catalog of whimsies was long.<sup>6</sup>

3. See Gladys T. Peterson, "The Present Status of the Negro Separate School as Defined by Court Decisions," *Journal of Negro Education* 4 (July 1935), p. 351.

4. In the middle 1930s the average annual expenditure in the southern states for the education of each white pupil was about \$45, while less than \$20 was spent for each black pupil's education. See U.S. Office of Education, "Statistics of the Education of Negroes," Bulletin 1938, no. 13, p. 15.

5. See Peterson, "Present Status as Defined by Court," pp. 356-62.

6. For informative state by state compendiums of laws imposing racial restrictions, see Pauli Murray, *States' Laws on Race and Color* (Women's Division of Christian Service, Methodist Church, 1950); Milton R. Konvitz, *The Constitution and Civil Rights*

Although a 1917 decision of the Supreme Court had invalidated statutes and ordinances that directly prohibited blacks from owning or occupying residences in particular areas, the courts continued to enforce restrictions in deeds against the future sale of property to, or its future occupancy by, other than white persons.<sup>7</sup> It became routine, outside of the South no less than within that area, to "protect" white neighborhoods, both new subdivisions and settled areas, with these strictly enforced proscriptions. And once title to a tract or parcel became encumbered with such a prohibition, the courts enforced the restriction as "running with the land" and permanently precluding nonwhite ownership or occupancy of the premises.<sup>8</sup>

In sum, as it existed during the first third of this century, apartheid seemed as irradicable and almost as pervasive a feature of the American legal order as it now appears to be in South Africa; for most whites either advocated or complacently acquiesced in the legal subordination and isolation of the Negro. And following the lead of the late Booker T. Washington and his disciples, most blacks had become convinced that there would be no major reshaping of the racist legal order during their lives, or at any time in the calculable future. So, however hateful they found the status quo, there seemed nothing that they could do but accept it and make their lives somewhat more rewarding within it.

True, a few persisted in uncompro-

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), pp. 230-41.

7. Contrast *Corrigan v. Buckley*, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), sanctioning racial restrictive covenants, with *Buchanan v. Warley*, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), invalidating racial zoning ordinances.

8. See W. Robert Ming, "Disabilities Affecting Negroes," *Journal of Negro Education* 8 (July 1939), pp. 406, 408-11.



misgiving condemnation of all racial proscriptions and demand for fundamental change. Most celebrated among them was W. E. B. Du Bois. His following was substantial both because of his eloquence and extraordinary scholarship<sup>9</sup> and because of his strategic position as editor of the *Crisis*, the official journal of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Equally uncompromising were a few other public figures; for example, W. Monroe Trotter, editor of a less well known Boston weekly. But Trotter became a tragic suicide. And by 1930, Du Bois was moving toward the Booker Washington camp.

#### TOWARD AN EQUALITARIAN LEGAL ORDER: A PROGRAM PLANNED AND INITIATED

In retrospect, it is clear that, even in this worst of times, the essential organizational base for planning and mounting a renewed attack upon the racist legal order was provided by the NAACP. The Gideon's band of distinguished whites and blacks who constituted the early national leadership of that organization, supported by small groups of equally determined if less well known citizens who were the voices of the NAACP in local communities, refused to be frustrated by the seeming hopelessness of the struggle for an equalitarian order.<sup>10</sup> During the darkest days of World War I the French commander, General Foch, informed his government that his lines could no longer hold and, therefore, he had no choice but to attack. The plight of the

American Negro was worse. His subordination in the legal order was so great that he had no lines to hold. Yet, with the NAACP rallying such meager forces as could be assembled, a concerted drive to change the racist character of the American legal order was mounted.

In 1930 the NAACP retained Nathan Margold, a young white lawyer who was gaining recognition as one of the most brilliant members of the New York bar, to prepare a comprehensive professional study of the legal status of the Negro and of possible legal strategy for constructive change. That study, though its teachings were substantially modified and elaborated by others as the program developed, served as a starting point and as an invaluable early tool.

In the meantime, Charles H. Houston, an outstanding young black lawyer and a friend and Harvard Law School classmate of Margold, had left his promising practice in Washington, D.C., to head and develop the existing small law school at Howard University, the institution that had been established in Washington after the Civil War primarily to facilitate the higher education of the freedmen. At that time there were not ten Negro lawyers, competent and willing to handle substantial civil rights litigation, engaged in the practice in the South where 80 percent of the black population lived. And it was almost impossible to find a white lawyer who dared to represent black clients in controversial litigation, even if he were so disposed. Already associated with the leaders of the NAACP and professionally involved in their legal program, Houston quickly found that civil rights activism and formal legal education neatly supplemented each other. It was his conviction that the accomplishment of major nationwide change in the legal

9. Formally trained at Harvard and in Germany at Heidelberg, DuBois is still respected as one of the early masters of sociological research and analysis.

10. The early history of the NAACP has been recounted by one of its founders. Mary White Ovington, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1947).

status of the Negro required the training of cadres of zealous young lawyers, equipped with superior professional skill and specially knowledgeable in the civil rights field. This would require not only the motivation of a generation of law students, but also the reorientation and supplementation of parts of the conventional legal curriculum without sacrifice of the broad based professionalism that students acquired in the best American law schools. For the better accomplishment of this task, Houston surrounded himself with a small faculty of able lawyers, most of them young Negroes, who shared his vision and zeal. The dean and the members of this faculty served not only as teachers and as researchers with particular concern for changing the Negro's legal status, but also as competent advocates available on occasion to represent litigants in the most critical test cases in this field. Moreover, during the next twenty years the students they had trained would become key members of a legal strike force against racial proscription.

Having devoted less than ten years to the establishment of the Howard Law School as a vital legal center and resource, Houston himself moved on to become full-time counsel for the NAACP, a post in which he served both as chief of staff in the New York headquarters and as leader in the field of the small but slowly growing group of lawyers whom the NAACP employed or retained to represent litigants whose cases seemed likely to contribute to an effective systematic attack upon the racist features of the law.

As the NAACP legal program was planned and developed in the 1930s with meager financial support, it seemed desirable to move most aggressively against racial restrictions and discrimination in public education. This did not mean the abandonment of long-time commitment to combat disfranchise-

ment and racial restrictions that confined black residents to urban ghettos. Rather, undertakings in the field of public education would be a major enlargement of ongoing effort to combat racism in the legal order. The Association also was already committed to providing such assistance as it could in combating racial injustice in the administration of the criminal law.

#### DISFRANCHISEMENT AND IMPOSED RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

At the outset it was not contemplated that it would become necessary to attempt the removal of a new barrier that had been raised to make the franchise meaningless to Negroes in most southern states. It already has been mentioned that as early as 1915 the Supreme Court had invalidated the crude and blatant "grandfather clause" legislation as adopted in most southern states to extend the franchise without limit to those whose ancestors were voters and at the same time to place burdensome restrictions upon the qualifications of all others, mostly blacks, as voters, before the Fifteenth Amendment accorded the Negro the right to vote.<sup>11</sup> But thereafter, another disfranchising device proved equally effective in most southern states, where the overwhelming dominance of the Democratic party had long made the Democratic primary the only stage in the election process at which there was any meaningful contest. Primary elections were elaborately regulated and controlled by statute. In order to disfranchise the Negro, provisions were inserted in these statutes, at first directly excluding blacks from

11. *Guinn v. United States*, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). A modified form of "grandfather clause" was invalidated in a subsequent case. *Lane v. Wilson*, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). It is noteworthy that the *Guinn* case was the first litigation of national importance in which the NAACP played a leading role.

voting in primaries of the Democratic party, and later permitting the governing bodies of the party to restrict voting in party primaries to white citizens.

For years Texas Negroes, employing local black lawyers, had challenged the "white primary" scheme in the courts, with apparent success.<sup>12</sup> But unexpectedly, in 1935, the Supreme Court sustained the most recent variation of the white primary scheme under which the state permitted the general statewide convention of the party to exclude blacks from participating in the affairs of the Democratic party or voting in party primaries.<sup>13</sup>

At this juncture, high priority in the recently launched national campaign to make the legal order equalitarian had to be accorded to persuading the Court to reverse its sanction of the white primary. For without political power, the black community had no effective means of self-help. Accordingly, the legal campaign then focusing upon educational restrictions, had to be expanded without delay to include removal of this catastrophic impediment to meaningful voting. Fortunately, after time-consuming NAACP supported litigation through the lower courts, the Supreme Court did reconsider the white primary device and invalidated it.<sup>14</sup> But even then the bitter-enders were not quite through. In Texas a white "pre-primary" was organized to select candidates who would be supported in the Democratic primary. The Supreme Court found this no more tolerable than the schemes that had preceded it.<sup>15</sup> At about the same time, South Carolina also attempted to set up a constitutionally acceptable variant of earlier

schemes of primary exclusion. This effort at racial exclusion was invalidated by the federal trial court in South Carolina, and that decision was sustained throughout appeals up to the Supreme Court.<sup>16</sup> Thus, by 1950 the recurring efforts of the southern states to devise constitutionally valid means of disfranchising the Negro finally had been decisively defeated. Thereafter the remaining recourse of the disfranchiser would be to plainly fraudulent and arbitrary refusal to register blacks and to brute force and intimidation. But the invalidation of the white primary was attended by an increase in southern black participation in southern voting from less than a hundred thousand to more than a million. It would not be until the enactment and implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that effective means would be provided for curbing outright fraud and intimidation of black electors.

Residential segregation, developed and intensified as a characteristic of twentieth-century American urban life, has both fed and reflected racial antagonism and antipathy. It has exposed blacks as an isolated group to neglect and discrimination. It has facilitated the growth of all kinds of segregated institutions. It has been the cornerstone of the racist structure of American society. Thus, the imposition of racial residential zoning in our cities through the device of restrictive covenants in deeds that forever excluded nonwhites from ownership or use of the restricted properties was a basic and far-reaching evil which had to be attacked in the course of any comprehensive campaign against institutionalized racism.

Of all the pervasive racial restrictions, this was, in an objective constitutional

12. *Nixon v. Herndon*, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); *Nixon v. Condon*, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).

13. *Grovey v. Townsend*, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).

14. *Smith v. Allright*, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

15. *Terry v. Adams*, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).

16. *Elmore v. Rice*, 72 F. Supp. 516 (1947), *aff'd. sub. nom. Rice v. Elmore*, 165 F.2d 387 (1947), *cert. denied*, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).

view, the most difficult to outlaw on constitutional grounds through judicial decision. For government is not involved in the contractual making of such covenants, but only in their enforcement. Thus, responsible courts might well adhere to an earlier judicial view that this type of restriction was a "private" imposition and for that reason not covered by constitutional restraint that in terms controlled only racially discriminatory action by those exercising the power of government. However, in 1948, frustrated Negro purchasers, supported by a veritable "Who's Who" of civil libertarian organizations, persuaded the Supreme Court to hold that courts could not enforce restrictive covenants by precluding Negro purchasers from acquiring covenanted property from willing sellers.<sup>17</sup> Though racial residential segregation would continue to be a major problem in our cities, the way was now open to confront its supporting complex of economic, political, and social forces without the legal bar of exclusionary court orders.

#### JIM CROW PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE DECISIVE CAMPAIGN

Public education, the originally contemplated new major focus of effort, presented quite different problems. In the professional judgment of the lawyers concerned with the launching of a campaign against "Jim Crow"<sup>18</sup> public education, the Supreme Court was not ready in the 1930s to repudiate the doc-

trine, authoritatively stated in its 1896 decision in *Plessy v. Ferguson*,<sup>19</sup> that racial segregation imposed by law could be squared with the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment that the state must accord all persons "equal protection of the laws." True, it was common knowledge that in every state where segregation was required, provision for blacks was in fact obviously and grossly unequal to provision for whites. But beyond that, there was simply no likelihood at that time that judges could be persuaded to rule that separate provisions and facilities for blacks, even if physically equivalent to those for whites, would, by virtue of separateness alone, offend the Constitution. In the then most recent pronouncement on the subject, Chief Justice William Howard Taft, speaking in 1927 for a unanimous Supreme Court, had found the issue so free from doubt that he summarily dismissed it saying merely that the requirement of segregated schools "has been many times decided to be within the Constitutional power of state legislatures."<sup>20</sup>

But though the ultimate outlawry of the entire system of Jim Crow education was not in immediate prospect, the system was vulnerable to attacks that would erode it and might lead to its destruction sooner than most people thought possible. The South, where in-

17. *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); *Hurd v. Hodge*, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). Somewhat later, even an award of damages for breach of a racial restrictive covenant was held constitutionally impermissible. *Barrows v. Jackson*, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).

18. It is noteworthy that the phrase "Jim Crow," commonplace in speech and writing a generation ago, has now all but disappeared from contemporary usage since the invalidation of the complex of segregation law it connoted.

19. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For a more elaborate discussion of the *Plessy* case and others that applied its rationale, see Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., *De-segregation and the Law* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Press, 1957), pp. 95-103; Herbert Hill and Jack Greenberg, *Citizens' Guide to De-Segregation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 9-11, 49-52.

20. *Gong Lum v. Rice*, 275 U.S. 78, 86 (1927). Earlier decisions handed down after the *Plessy* case were no more encouraging. See *Cumming v. Board of Education*, 175 U.S. 528 (1899); *Berea College v. Kentucky*, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).

sistence on segregation was greatest, was the poorest section of the country. Public funds were insufficient to maintain a system of separate schools for blacks from kindergarten to university that would substantially equal the white schools, poor though most of the latter were. Therefore, wide-ranging litigation to eliminate major disparities in financial provision, if successful, might yield important immediate benefits in improving education for blacks and ultimately make separate schools financially intolerable.

State-supported graduate and professional training for blacks was essentially nonexistent in the states where most Negroes lived. This made possible an attack calculated to have immediate impact upon segregation; for courts might be persuaded that a black applicant for graduate or professional training was entitled, no different from a white applicant, to the benefit of such training when he qualified for it—not years later after new funds should be appropriated, physical facilities provided, and a new faculty assembled for the separate training of blacks. In this view, the only meaningful remedy would be the admittance of qualified black applicants to “white” state universities so long as no equivalent separate facilities were provided for blacks. In so ruling, an otherwise reluctant court could breach the state-erected wall of segregation without ruling at all on the validity of the separate but equal concept. And once blacks should be admitted, the effort to keep the doors open could be made from a strategically advantageous position.

#### *Suits against financial discrimination*

The analysis and strategy outlined in the preceding paragraphs led to a variety of lawsuits in various states where individual black teachers, students, and parents, assured of the support of the

NAACP and counsel it would provide, were willing to risk economic reprisal and even violence by bringing suit against state and local officers and institutions of public education. Suits to equalize salaries of black and white teachers were an obviously advantageous starting point. Discrimination in this regard was gross and overt to the extent that some southern states and school districts published and enforced separate salary schedules for white and black teachers, with the black scale providing less than half of the salary to which whites with equivalent training and experience were entitled. And where no formal scale existed, the practice was essentially the same.<sup>21</sup>

Accordingly, black teachers in Maryland, Virginia, and Florida filed suits against the counties that employed them demanding salaries equal to those paid white teachers with the same qualifications. Some counties and school districts, most notably in Maryland, capitulated without contesting suits through appeals to the bitter end. However, suit against Norfolk, Virginia, was unsuccessful in the trial court and was carried before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals which had territorial jurisdiction over Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and North and South Carolina. That court required less than a week after the matter was argued to issue a forthright reversal of

21. Statistics compiled periodically during the 1930s by the United States Office of Education showed that the average annual salary of a black teacher was less than \$250 in Mississippi and less than \$400 in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and South Carolina. White teachers' salaries ranged from \$600 in Arkansas to more than \$900 in the Carolinas. In an unreported suit for salary equalization in Montgomery County, Maryland, it was proved that the plaintiff, a black principal, received a salary of \$612 per annum, while a white teacher of equal qualifications would be entitled to \$1,125 and an equally qualified white principal, \$1,475.

the trial court.<sup>22</sup> In effect, racial discrimination in teachers' salaries could no longer be maintained in five important border and southern states. And the elimination of similar salary discrimination in other states followed within a few years.

This initial success in eroding the financial disparities that characterized the separate school systems was important, not only because of the relief it provided impoverished black teachers, but also because of its effect on the black community. The earliest suits had found much of the black community apathetic or fearful. Indeed, numbers of black school officials who enjoyed a vested interest in the segregated system were openly or covertly hostile. "The time simply does not seem to me ripe for general court action" wrote the Dean of the college of Tuskegee Institute.<sup>23</sup> In North Carolina, where the black teachers had a well-organized professional association, pressure and persuasion by black school administrators effectively prevented teacher support of contemplated salary litigation, though thereafter North Carolina teachers were among the beneficiaries of successful litigation undertaken by Maryland and Virginia teachers.

From the beginning of the campaign, Charles Houston and those associated with him urged local NAACP sponsors and local lawyers who worked on particular cases to treat every case not only as a controversy in litigation, but also as a focal point of public interest that created an opportunity to rally dispir-

22. *Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk*, 118 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940). To the same effect, see a district court's opinion in *Mills v. Board of Education of Ann Arundel County*, 30 F. Supp. 245 (D.Md. 1939).

23. W. T. B. Williams, "Court Action by Negroes to Improve Their Schools, A Doubtful Remedy," *Journal of Negro Education* 4 (July 1935), pp. 435, 440.

ited and discouraged Negroes to fight again for that equality and human dignity which blacks had been deprived of over so many years. This opportunity was exploited in connection with case after case. And once the ordinary black citizen learned that litigation to vindicate his rights was being pursued openly, with determination and with some success, community reaction was electrifying. Fear and frustration were replaced by boldness and hopeful eagerness to be identified with the struggle. It may reasonably be doubted whether impetus essential to radical change in the status of the Negro would have developed without this initial stimulation and mobilization.

#### *Graduate and professional school admission demanded*

Simultaneously with the attack on financial discrimination in provisions for the separate schools and those who taught in them, black applicants for graduate and professional training began demanding that they be admitted to the then "white" state institutions, the only ones that existed for such training. A number of states attempted to parry this thrust by offering black applicants scholarship aid, niggardly in some cases and substantial in others, to enable them to attend institutions of their choice in other parts of the country. Some applicants accepted these offers, particularly where the out-of-state institution offered better training than the local state university. But others refused to be exported.

The issue thus raised was joined in two history-making suits, one for the admittance of a black student to the University of Maryland Law School and the other for admittance to the University of Missouri Law School.<sup>24</sup> Both

24. Two earlier suits for the admittance of black applicants to the schools of pharmacy of

suits were filed in state rather than federal courts. For, beyond then-unresolved questions of federal jurisdiction, it was believed that any favorable decision of a state court would win speedier and less grudging local acceptance than a similar mandate issued by a federal court. Indeed, this preference for a local forum was vindicated by its first fruits. In Maryland, the state trial court ordered the Negro applicant admitted to the state law school, and, on appeal, the highest court of the state handed down a clear and forthright opinion, affirming the trial court and holding the tendered out-of-state scholarship constitutionally inadequate as a substitute for the Maryland legal education provided for white citizens of that state.<sup>25</sup> As a result of this local suit, Negroes have been freely admitted to the University of Maryland Law School without controversy for more than thirty-five years.

In contrast, the Missouri courts refused to order the admittance of the black applicant who had rejected an out-of-state scholarship. The matter was appealed to the United States Supreme Court which reversed the Missouri courts<sup>26</sup> and thus took its first step along the road that was to lead to the invalidation of all separate school laws twenty years later. No one could then be sure where the road led, but, convinced of significant movement in the right direction, the black community would continue and intensify its drive in the years ahead.

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the state universities of North Carolina and Tennessee were discontinued for tactical reasons after unfavorable rulings by the trial courts. *Hocutt v. University of North Carolina* (1933) and *Redmond v. University of Tennessee* (1936), neither officially reported.

25. *Pearson v. Murray*, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 592 (1936).

26. *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada*, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).

### *University of Oklahoma*

With the out-of-state scholarship device invalidated, the suits litigated in the 1940s were directed against the remaining legal barriers to the general admission of black students to state graduate and professional schools throughout the South. The Oklahoma courts had refused to order the admission of Ada Sipuel, a young black woman, to the law school of the state university on the effectively frustrating and cynically unrealistic theory that she should have sued to require the state to establish a law school for Negroes. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected and invalidated that sophistry in language that was clear and far reaching: "The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution. . . . The state must provide it for her . . . and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group."<sup>27</sup>

As a practical matter, this mandate could be obeyed only by admitting Miss Sipuel to the existing law school of the state university. But even then Oklahoma made one last effort. The state legislature hastily amended the separate school law to permit black candidates for degrees not offered in black institutions of higher learning to matriculate at the University of Oklahoma, but at the same time required that black students' "programs of instruction . . . shall be given . . . [at the state university] in separate classrooms, or at separate times."<sup>28</sup> Miss Sipuel was admitted to the University of Oklahoma Law School where the faculty and student body simply ignored the newly en-

27. *Sipuel v. Regents of the University of Oklahoma*, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948), further considered in *Fisher v. Hurst*, 333 U.S. 147 (1948).

28. Oklahoma Laws of 1949, chap. 15, p. 608.

acted requirement of intra-institutional segregation.

But the University as a whole did not follow the lead of its law school. The Sipuel suit was almost contemporaneous with a suit by G. W. McLaurin, a black teacher, for admittance to the University of Oklahoma as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Education. He was admitted but required, as the Supreme Court later was to find, to sit in a classroom row "specified for colored students" and at similarly segregated tables in the library and the cafeteria. The lower court refused to order the removal of these restrictions. However, the Supreme Court concluded and held that "the conditions under which this appellant is required to receive his education deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws."<sup>29</sup>

#### *University of Texas Law School*

On the day that this disposition of the Oklahoma controversy was announced, the Supreme Court also passed upon the demand of Herman Sweatt, a Texas Negro, that he be admitted to the law school of the University of Texas. In one aspect this was the beginning of the final phase of the campaign against segregated public education.

It already has been pointed out that a decade earlier judicial commitment to the separate but equal doctrine was such that a direct attack on that concept would in all likelihood have resulted in a harmful current judicial reaffirmation of that old doctrine. As late as 1946, lawyers committed to the overall campaign were carefully avoiding the presentation of this ultimate issue to the Court. During the argument of a 1946 case challenging a Vir-

ginia statute requiring the racial segregation of interstate passengers on buses as an unreasonable interference with commerce,<sup>30</sup> Mr. Justice Rutledge from the bench invited counsel to argue the constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine, an issue which the Court had found undeserving of discussion twenty years earlier.<sup>31</sup> The invitation was declined on the ground that this issue had not been raised in the complaint or litigated in the lower court.<sup>32</sup> In addition, the Justices were told that their predecessors in 1896 had made the mistake of deciding this issue without the benefit of any showing whatever in the record of the consequences of imposed racial segregation and that this mistake should not be repeated fifty years later. And the Justices were assured that some case would come before them within a few years in which the record would contain the best available evidence and documentation of the actual consequences of such segregation.

The beginning of the fulfillment of this prediction occurred in the suit of Herman Sweatt for admittance to the University of Texas Law School.<sup>33</sup> At the trial of that case the plaintiff's proof included a type of evidence that had not been introduced in earlier litigation. For the plaintiff undertook to

30. *Morgan v. Virginia*, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). The favorable decision in this case sounded the death knell of racial segregation in public transportation. See thereafter, *Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan*, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) and *Henderson v. United States*, see note 39.

31. See note 20.

32. In the judgment of counsel, only two members of the then Supreme Court, Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley Blount Rutledge, were ready in 1946 to overrule *Plessy v. Ferguson* and invalidate all state imposed racial segregation. A current reaffirmation of that old decision would have been catastrophic. Such an occurrence could not be risked until circumstances should be as favorable as possible.

33. *Sweatt v. Painter*, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

29. *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents*, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).



show, not only that the hurriedly organized small state-supported law school for Negroes which he refused to attend was demonstrably an institution much inferior in fact to the outstanding University of Texas Law School, but also, and for the first time, that, even if physical inequalities should be overcome, the educational experience and professional training of a proscribed minority in a segregated school could not be equal to the training and experience in an unsegregated law school environment comparable to that with which a practicing lawyer must deal in the courts and in his professional relationships with other lawyers. To support the latter contention, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of nationally distinguished legal educators and law school administrators competent to inform the court of the essential characteristics of effective professional education and the crippling effect of racially segregated legal training.

Though the trial court was not persuaded by this evidence, on appeal the Supreme Court decided in substance that for the state to impose segregated legal education upon its black citizens was to deny them the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection of the laws, regardless of physical comparison of the segregated institutions.

#### AN EQUALITARIAN LEGAL ORDER:

##### A GOAL IN SIGHT

Thus, on a day in 1950, the Supreme Court came within one step of invalidating all required racial segregation in public education. For the *Sweatt* case could be denied general application to all public education only if training for the profession of law was in constitutional contemplation essentially different from other education. And if required racial segregation within a single institution was unconstitutional, as held

in the *McLaurin* case, there could be no sensible basis for sustaining racial segregation imposed through a requirement of separate institutions.

By this time three other developments had become very significant. Throughout the 1940s the interest and concern of professional educators, psychologists, and other social scientists had been increasingly aroused by the growing controversy over racially segregated education. The consequences of segregation at elementary and secondary school levels, even more than at graduate and professional levels, were seen as matters that deserved the most careful and sophisticated research and evaluation that experts in the relevant disciplines could provide. And a number of highly competent educators and social scientists were addressing themselves to these tasks. The results of their research and analysis would be available to inform judges in the climactic cases of the 1950s<sup>34</sup> even more comprehensively than legal educators had done in the *Sweatt* case.

The second development was that early in the 1950s it was an observable fact that hundreds of black graduate and professional students, and in a few cases black undergraduates, had been admitted to state universities in several southern and border states without dire consequences that had been widely predicted.<sup>35</sup> In Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas, law suits had been necessary to accomplish this result. But in Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia black applicants had been accepted without

34. For a discussion of the role played by social scientists and educators, see Kenneth B. Clark, "Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence," *Journal of Social Issues* 9, no. 4 (1953), pp. 2-8.

35. See Walter White, *How Far the Promised Land?* (New York: Viking Press, 1955), p. 40.

resort to protracted adversary litigation. The South was facing up to the inevitability and tolerability of unsegregated public education, at least at the college and university level.

And finally, the position of the national government had changed. In 1944, the disfranchisement of most Negroes for the indefinite future was all but certain unless the Supreme Court should outlaw the white primary in the then-pending case of *Smith v. Allright*.<sup>36</sup> Yet the Attorney General refused to file a brief in the Supreme Court supporting the position of the disfranchised blacks. The national administration deemed it expedient to maintain a posture of neutrality.<sup>37</sup> But by 1950, under the bold leadership of President Harry S. Truman, the government of the United States had for the first time become committed to the elimination of government imposed racial segregation. The initial broad commitment was the President's adoption of the 1947 report and recommendations of the Commission on Civil Rights,<sup>38</sup> an action that split the Democratic party, but did not prevent President Truman's reelection in 1948 and his persistent recognition and implementation of federal responsibility in the civil rights area. Thus, in the *Sweatt* and *McLaurin* cases and in a third case argued before the Supreme Court the same day,<sup>39</sup> the United States,

in formal briefs and in oral presentation, urged that the time had come to reconsider and overrule the "separate but equal" doctrine. The position of the United States was presented clearly and emphatically:

Racial segregation is itself a manifestation of inequality and discrimination. . . . The "separate but equal" theory of *Plessy v. Ferguson* is wrong as a matter of law, history and policy. The United States . . . urges the Court to repudiate the "separate but equal" doctrine as an unwarranted deviation from the principle of equality under law . . . [incorporated in] the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .<sup>40</sup>

In 1930 a few persons had planned and initiated the campaign to change the racist character of our legal order. By 1950, the black community, a substantial part of the white community, and the government of the United States had joined in support of this effort. And, in its 1950 decisions, the Supreme Court responded by making clear its willingness to reexamine the fundamental question of the constitutionality of imposed racial segregation without predisposition in favor of the rationale of *Plessy v. Ferguson*.

The road ahead lay short and straight to the objective, an equalitarian legal order, that had been set twenty years earlier.

Saint Francis of Assisi is said to have

36. See note 14.

37. Disagreement on this course within the Department of Justice has been reported by the then chief of the department's Civil Rights Section. Robert K. Carr, *Federal Protection of Civil Rights* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947), pp. 96, 143.

38. Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, *To Secure These Rights* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1947).

39. *Henderson v. United States*, 339 U.S. 816 (1950). Technically, this case did not raise or decide a constitutional issue. The Court held merely that the practice of a railroad in segregating black passengers within a railway

dining car violated the Interstate Commerce Act, a federal statute that required equality of treatment for all passengers holding tickets of the same class. Yet, after the holding that this practice constituted a denial of equal treatment under the statute, it would be much more difficult to argue that any other imposed racial segregation did not deny constitutional equal protection of the laws.

40. Brief for the United States, filed by Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman, covering both *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents* and *Sweatt v. Painter*, in the Supreme Court, p. 9.

prayed: "God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can and the wisdom to know the difference." But at times it may be better for the

Omnipotent One to give men the wit and the will to continue to plan purposefully and to struggle as best they know how to change things that seem immutable.

# Southern School Desegregation, 1954-1973: A Judicial-Political Overview

By MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN

ABSTRACT: Following the *Brown* decisions of 1954 and 1955, the Supreme Court refrained from ordering immediate dismantlement of the dual school system, leaving formulation of specific orders with regard to school desegregation in the hands of district courts. Obstruction and delay resulted, with massive southern resistance and a weak federal response. It was not until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when federal desegregation standards were adopted, that substantial desegregation could begin. Soon both the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the federal courts took a unified stand behind the law, attacking "free choice" and southern delay. Progress finally seemed at hand. However, under the Nixon administration, federal enforcement efforts have been undercut. Major responsibility for enforcing school desegregation has been shifted from HEW to the slower judicial efforts of the Justice Department. Negative executive leadership has set a tone of national retreat. The current issue of busing and neighborhood schools threatens to erase desegregation progress already made in the South as well as to defeat efforts at making *Brown* a nationally applied policy. However, strong national and local leadership could maintain desegregation progress.

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In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the State has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. . . . We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.

*Brown v. Board of Education*  
347 U.S. 483 (1954)

The judgments below . . . are reversed and the cases are remanded to the district courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit the parties to these cases to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed.

*Brown v. Board of Education*  
349 U.S. 294 (1955)

THE *Brown* decisions stripped legitimacy from racial segregation in American public education and set in motion the quest to ensure millions of black schoolchildren equal educational opportunity. The post *Brown* years have been ones of struggle to make real the Court's promise. Black plaintiffs and their lawyers, after their long battle to outlaw racial discrimination in schools through the courts, found they still had to confront the hostile racial attitudes of the politically powerful South, federal inertia, and the deeply entrenched principle of local control of education. Ten years of case-by-case litigation after *Brown* left almost 99 percent of the black schoolchildren in segregated schools. A significant breakthrough occurred only in the middle 1960s when the federal government began to apply its massive resources through the enforcement machinery provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Almost two decades later, *Brown's* mandate remains unfinished business as millions of schoolchildren, South and North, despite significant southern progress, continue in racially segregated schools. In the eleven southern states during the 1971-72 school year, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) found 44 percent of black students attending majority white schools.<sup>1</sup> The previous year, HEW found only 32 percent of the black schoolchildren in the six border states and the District of Columbia in majority white schools. In the 32 northern and western states during the same school year, only 28 percent of the black students were enrolled in public schools in which a majority of students were white.<sup>2</sup>

The questions before the nation now are: (1) whether the drive of the middle '60s to dismantle totally the southern dual school structure will continue; and (2) whether *Brown's* promise will be construed to cover the widespread and equally damaging, though more elusive, segregation in the North. The answer to the second question may substantially affect the answer to the first. The outcome of the national debate over busing and neighborhood schools could result in erasure of the

1. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office for Civil Rights, conducts a biannual survey of nationwide school enrollment by racial and ethnic groups. Annually, it gathers this information for the seventeen southern and border states. As white students often are assigned to schools in which they are in the minority, HEW examined the makeup of majority white and majority black school systems separately. In 1971-72, it found that in majority white southern systems, 68 percent of the black students were in majority white schools; in majority black school systems, 49 percent of the white students were in majority black schools.

2. Enrollment figures for the 1972-73 school year are not yet available.

significant southern desegregation progress, as well as defeat of the efforts to make *Brown* a nationally applied policy.<sup>3</sup>

When *Brown* was decided in 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States stood virtually alone. Congress had not passed a civil rights bill in this century. No lower court had held the dual public school system unconstitutional. Although a majority of Americans endorsed the principle of the *Brown* decision,<sup>4</sup> there was no national force sufficient to overcome local resistance.

Faced with a lukewarm executive and a large number of governmental units over a wide geographic area which were hostile to its decision, and lacking its own enforcement mechanism, the Court refrained from ordering immediate dismantlement of the dual school system. During the *Brown II* argument, Thurgood Marshall, on behalf of the black plaintiffs, urged the Court to give firm directions to lower court judges and to set a specific date, either September 1955 or September 1956, by which district judges should order school districts to abolish segregation. United States Solicitor General Simon E. Sobeloff took a middle ground in urging that the Court order district judges to require school boards to submit within ninety days desegregation plans with gradual steps. If school boards refused, he proposed that district judges be required to order immediate desegregation. Under this arrangement, Sobeloff felt all school districts would initiate desegregation within a year at least.

3. Harvard Center for Law and Education, "Perspectives on Busing," *Inequality in Education*, no. 11 (March 1972).

4. See brief discussion of Gallup polls in Gary Orfield, *The Reconstruction of Southern Education: The Schools and the Civil Rights Act* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1969), p. 15.

The southerners argued for either (1) reversal of the 1954 decision; (2) assignment of the solution to Congress for appropriate legislation where the power to filibuster assured inaction; and/or (3) complete authority to district judges to determine when and how a school system should be desegregated.<sup>5</sup>

The Court's decision reflected a clear concession to the South. It chose to remand the cases to district court judges to formulate specific orders because "[f]ull implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems."<sup>6</sup> The Court was evidencing a belief that only a gradual process overseen by local southern judges would be enforceable.

While the Court did set boundaries on district court actions, a great deal of discretion remained in the hands of local school officials. The door was open to obstruction and delay.

#### 1955-1960—MASSIVE SOUTHERN RESISTANCE AND WEAK FEDERAL RESPONSE

Not surprisingly, most southern school officials and politicians resisted, and on March 12, 1956, southern congressional leaders issued the Southern Manifesto. This statement, signed by 101 congressmen and senators from the South, denounced *Brown* as "contrary to established law and to the Constitution."<sup>7</sup> Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia said it heralded the initiation of organized opposition to the 1954 ruling through-

5. J. W. Peltason, *Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 15-17.

6. *Brown v. Board of Education*, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

7. The Southern Manifesto, Declaration of Constitutional Principles, in *Integration vs Segregation*, Hubert H. Humphrey, ed. (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1964), pp. 22-35.

out the South, "part of the plan of massive resistance we've been working on."<sup>8</sup>

Some southern and border state school officials had made some beginning efforts at moderation and compliance, but these were undercut by the Southern Manifesto and the action of state legislatures. By 1957, well over one hundred new laws and constitutional amendments designed to delay or prevent desegregation were on the books. The most common device was "the pupil assignment law" giving local school boards power to establish criteria for assigning students to schools. Other resistance devices included prohibitions on expenditures of state funds for desegregated education, authorization for transfer of public school property to racially exclusive schools, modification of compulsory attendance laws, weakening of teacher tenure provisions, school closing bills, interposition resolutions, and a variety of attempts to curb the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the leading advocate for black schoolchildren. These segregationist attacks, arrayed against a proponent force consisting only of private litigants and the courts, made progress almost impossible.

The federal government did little to curb the growing resistance. It remained inert in the fall of 1956 when the Governor of Texas called out Texas Rangers to maintain segregated schools in the town of Mansfield, saying he was preserving the peace and preventing violence. It was only after Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus used the National Guard to block a handful of black students sent by court order to a previously white school that President Eisenhower finally acted and sent in federal troops. The Supreme Court,

8. Ibid.

in its first pronouncement since *Brown*, said in the Little Rock case<sup>9</sup> that community opposition was not a ground to postpone compliance with constitutional obligations. This decision was an important encouragement to lower federal courts confronting endless southern efforts to evade or delay compliance with the law.

By 1960, *Brown* was still virtually ignored in southern rural areas, and there was still no federal compliance policy. Private litigants fought case by case in the courts with all too infrequent success. However, change was beginning. Federal judges were beginning to tire of the snail-like pace of desegregation and to order more than "grade a year" desegregation plans.<sup>10</sup> In 1964 the Supreme Court in the *Prince Edward County* case said "there has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed" in the desegregation process.<sup>11</sup>

But it was not until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and adoption of federal desegregation standards under Title VI that substantial desegregation would occur.

#### 1960-1964—MOVEMENT TOWARD FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN THE DESEGREGATION PROCESS

During the 1960 presidential campaign, John F. Kennedy publicly endorsed the principles of *Brown* as President Eisenhower had never done, and he criticized Eisenhower's handling of the school desegregation issue: "There is more to the Presidency than just letting things drift and then calling out troops. We lost valuable years by the failure of the President to assert leader-

9. *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1, 18, 19 (1958).

10. See discussion of Orfield, *Reconstruction of Southern Education*, at pp. 18, 19.

11. *Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County*, 377 U.S. 218, 264 (1964).

ship."<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately his campaign rhetoric was not matched by executive action in aid of school desegregation once he was elected.

A major issue before, through, and after the Kennedy years was the propriety of cutting off federal funds to local school districts which discriminated. The NAACP had early recognized that the courts alone were unable to force the drastic racial and political change necessary at the local levels if the rights under *Brown* were to have meaning. Only with some broader mechanism that engaged the vast federal bureaucracy in compliance efforts could the forces of resistance be overcome.

The NAACP argument was not new. Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., had argued for a policy of cutting off federal funds to discriminating local school districts for a generation, throughout the long debate over federal aid to education. Indeed, it was southern fears of just such racial blackmail—along with the issue of aid to religious schools—which had effectively blocked all significant federal assistance proposals. The *Brown* decision strengthened the Powell position by giving it a constitutional base. And when the post-Sputnik enactment of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) showed that federal education legislation could be passed, the stage was set for a key debate of the 1960s on federal nondiscrimination enforcement.<sup>13</sup>

President Kennedy was not responsive to fund cutoff advocates. He did not consider the civil rights movement a strong enough counter-force to the tradition of local control of education

or to the power of southern congressmen. But Powell persisted. He became chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee and gained decisive control over new education legislation and over the operations of the Departments of HEW and Labor. He used his position to push for nondiscrimination provisions in education bills. By using his committee power to check upon the nondiscrimination efforts in education of HEW bureaucrats, he was able to force HEW Secretary Abraham Ribicoff to insert a nondiscrimination clause in contracts with colleges receiving NDEA money. He later pushed Ribicoff to announce that HEW would not fund school districts that segregated children who lived on southern military bases.<sup>14</sup> The precedent had been set.

The black protest movement grew. Federal acquiescence in local discrimination became embarrassing enough to force President Kennedy to finally send Congress a civil rights message. A mere gesture, the Kennedy legislative proposals were totally lacking in provisions to enforce school desegregation. The President even went on record against using the federal purse strings to promote racial change and thought such power "might be dangerous."<sup>15</sup>

In the spring of 1963, the confrontation between blacks led by Martin Luther King, Jr., and Eugene "Bull" Connor's police force in Birmingham, Alabama brought public shock and horror. The dramatic shift in public opinion was felt by Congress and the Administration. The President sensed that his civil rights proposals were inadequate and ordered his staff to prepare a new, more comprehensive civil rights package. In June he submitted new

12. Quoted in Reed Sarratt, *The Ordeal of Desegregation: The First Decade* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 52.

13. For a fuller discussion of the political events surrounding Title VI development, see Orfield, *Reconstruction of Southern Education*, chap. 1.

14. Ibid.

15. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 951, quoted in Orfield, *Reconstruction of Southern Education*, p. 32.



proposals to Congress which added, among other things, tools to dismantle dual school structures: (1) a provision authorizing the attorney general to initiate school desegregation suits, and (2) a weak fund cutoff provision which provided that federal program officials would be permitted, but not required, to withhold funds upon a finding of discrimination. The latter had been included only at the behest of congressional leaders and was not strongly favored by the Kennedy administration.

Massive civil rights demonstrations continued, including the March on Washington with 250 thousand people on August 28, 1963. With the Birmingham church bombing in September, moral outrage came to a peak. President Kennedy's assassination and President Johnson's determination to pass a strong civil rights bill added to the momentum, which finally, in July 1964, produced a law stronger than anyone would have thought possible even a year earlier.

The education provisions were no exception. Title IV authorized the attorney general, upon complaint, to file suit against discriminating school districts and authorized the Office of Education to provide technical and financial assistance to school districts preparing for desegregation. Title IX authorized intervention by the attorney general in equal protection suits "of general public importance" brought by private parties. Title VI provided that federal financial assistance could not be used to discriminate.

Title VI was the "sleeper." The public accommodations and employment provisions of the bill had evoked far more debate than the education sections in general. Title VI was viewed, by the Kennedy administration and others, as a minor tool for achieving school desegregation. Attorney General Robert

Kennedy, during the Senate hearings on the bill, minimized its importance and argued for a permissive approach to fund terminations.<sup>16</sup> Many liberals thought the fund cutoff provisions unimportant because of the limited federal money going to support local schools. They chose, instead, to place reliance on increased Justice Department authority to pursue desegregation through the courts. Southerners, while opposing Title VI, fought more vigorously against the public accommodations provisions of the bills. Title VI passed with minor alterations.<sup>17</sup>

One aspect of the House committee debate on Title VI is worth noting in light of the current national debate on busing. Concern was expressed by northerners that the Title VI provisions which referred to "racial balance" would apply to de facto segregated neighborhood schools in the North as well as to de jure segregated schools in the South. Northerners clearly did not want black children bused to white schools, nor vice versa, and thus removed the reference to "racial balance." In another section of the bill, Title IV, a specific prohibition also was added against desegregation to bring about racial balance. The busing controversy of the 1970s could find some of its origins in this 1963 debate.

#### THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964—NEW VEHICLE FOR ENFORCING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

At the time the Act was passed, only 2 percent of the black schoolchildren in the eleven southern states were in desegregated schools despite ten years

16. Orfield, *Reconstruction of Southern Education*, p. 36.

17. Attempts to make fund cutoffs permissive rather than mandatory were defeated, but judicial review of fund terminations was written in.

of litigation.<sup>18</sup> The Act put the law and the federal bureaucracy firmly behind school desegregation. But it took the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) to give the Civil Rights Act, particularly Title VI, the political bite to override southern resistance by infusing major new amounts of federal money into poor southern school systems.

In January 1965, the U.S. Office of Education began negotiating with local school systems to submit voluntary desegregation plans. A few months later, it issued the first set of uniform school desegregation standards, generally referred to as "guidelines" under Title VI.

The courts had never spelled out what a desegregated school system should look like, and many local districts had adopted the minimum possible method of compliance, the most popular of which was "freedom of choice." "Free choice" placed the burden on black parents and schoolchildren to seek desegregation, often at great personal risk. Many blacks, seeking to exercise their constitutional right to desegregated education, were met with violence, intimidation, and harassment.<sup>19</sup> The result was very little desegregation.

The Title VI guidelines required desegregation of at least four grades by September 1965. Most court-ordered districts were operating under one grade a year "free choice" desegregation plans.<sup>20</sup>

The new requirements did not immediately, nor greatly, increase the rate

of desegregation. And they brought forth new southern resistance, including massive firing and demotion of black teachers and administrators.<sup>21</sup> By the fall of 1966, only 14 percent of black children were in predominantly white schools. This disappointing showing provoked HEW to require that free choice plans operate effectively, with effectiveness measured in terms of specific increases in the percentages of black students in desegregated schools. In October 1967, HEW warned that free choice was on its way out and required comprehensive plans to eliminate the dual school structure completely, which were to be fully implemented by September 1969, fifteen years after the first *Brown* decision.<sup>22</sup> In March 1968, new Title VI guidelines were issued, setting a target for full desegregation and providing that "[i]f under a free choice plan, vestiges of a dual school structure remain . . . additional steps are necessary to complete the desegregation of its schools"<sup>23</sup> including geographic attendance zones, reorganization of school structure, school closing, consolidation, or construction, all methods requiring some busing.

The courts meanwhile upheld HEW's Title VI desegregation requirements and deferred to HEW expertise in effectuating desegregation.<sup>24</sup> Like HEW, the

21. On this issue President Johnson made his only public personal intervention into federal school desegregation activities. In a 1965 speech before the National Education Association, he announced he had directed the Commissioner of Education to pay special attention to this problem. Title VI guidelines in 1966 spelled out the prohibition against dismissing teachers on account of race.

22. The first warning occurred in a speech given by HEW, Office for Civil Rights Director, Peter Libassi.

23. See "Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."

24. This was a very important occurrence as southerners had claimed Title VI guidelines

18. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Southern School Desegregation, 1966-67*, July 1967, p. 5.

19. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Federal Enforcement of School Desegregation*, September 11, 1969, pp. 21-22.

20. Title VI guidelines permitted districts operating under court-ordered desegregation plans to submit an assurance to abide by the order as sufficient for federal fund release, no matter how weak the order.

courts also began to lose patience with free choice and continuing southern delay. In *Green v. County School Board of Kent County, Virginia*, the Supreme Court held: "The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."<sup>25</sup>

It found that the school board's freedom-of-choice plan was not

a sufficient step to "effectuate a transition" to a unitary system [and said] if there are reasonably available other ways . . . promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, non-racial school system, freedom of choice must be held unacceptable.<sup>26</sup>

The goal, the Court said, was "to convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."<sup>27</sup>

Completion of the task started by *Brown* now seemed finally in sight with the unified stand of the federal executive and judicial systems behind the law. While many problems persisted in the desegregation process and new ones occurred,<sup>28</sup> they were largely problems of transition and change. At long last blacks saw, they thought, the end of the tunnel. By the 1968-69 school year, 20 percent of southern black students were attending majority white schools.<sup>29</sup>

lacked the effect of law. See *U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education*, 372 F. 2d 836 (5th Cir., 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F. 2d 385 (1967) cert. den. sub. nom. See also *E. Baton Rouge Parish School Board v. Davis*, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).

25. 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968).

26. Id. at 440.

27. Id. at 440.

28. Black students were often resegregated, within "desegregated" schools, expelled and suspended, and otherwise subjected to harassment.

29. When the Democrats left office in January 1969, all three school desegregation tools of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been put to use. More than two hundred Title VI

## THE 1968 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

The 1968 presidential campaign found three contenders for the office. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, and a long time civil rights advocate, supported federal school desegregation efforts. Third party candidate, former Governor of Alabama, George Wallace, bitterly attacked the federal involvement with civil rights efforts, especially school desegregation. Republican candidate, Richard M. Nixon, following Wallace's lead, attacked the school guidelines; endorsed free choice—later qualifying that to only when it was not a subterfuge for continued segregation; denounced busing, a long widespread and accepted practice in American education; and abhorred the withholding of federal funds to achieve "racial balance," which HEW was not requiring. Nixon would be the next president.

## A NEW ADMINISTRATION AND RETREAT FROM PROGRESS

The first hint of federal executive retreat on school desegregation came swiftly in the Nixon administration. In late January 1969, six noncomplying southern school districts reached HEW Secretary Robert Finch's desk for fund terminations under Title VI. Rather than sign the termination orders, Finch granted a sixty-day delay for the districts—already fifteen years late—to submit an acceptable plan. This was the opening move in what was to become virtual administrative repeal of the Title VI authority to desegregate

fund terminations had occurred and had proved particularly effective in southern rural areas and small cities. The Justice Department used Title IV authority to sue the most recalcitrant school systems; and the Department intervened, under Title IX, in a number of suits brought by private litigants seeking further desegregation.

schools.<sup>30</sup> There shortly followed rumors of impending changes in the Title VI desegregation guidelines which culminated in a joint statement by HEW Secretary Finch and Attorney General John Mitchell modifying the guidelines and shifting major responsibility for school desegregation enforcement from HEW to the Justice Department. The goal was to undermine the effective administrative fund cutoff requirements and return the burden, politically as well as actually, to the courts for compliance—a slower and less effective method.

Civil rights proponents, after all the years of delay, viewed the Nixon moves with dismay. They were equally dismayed when the federal government intervened in pending court actions against black schoolchildren. On August 25, 1969, the U.S. Department of Justice asked the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to delay desegregation of thirty-three Mississippi school districts from 1969—as recommended by the HEW Title IV technical assistance unit—until September 1970.<sup>31</sup> The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the delay request but was unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court which stated: "The obligation of every school district is to terminate the dual school system at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools."<sup>32</sup>

Despite the Court's rejection of delay, and despite Attorney General Mitchell's<sup>33</sup> and President Nixon's<sup>34</sup> immediate pledge to obey the Court's ruling, they sought to further delay de-

segregation in other southern districts and publicly stated their disagreement with the Court's decree.<sup>35</sup>

The Administration's vacillation did incalculable harm to the southern desegregation efforts: recalcitrant districts were encouraged and law abiders undercut. Most importantly, the failure of executive leadership set a tone of national retreat.

Of 145 school districts in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, and South Carolina which were supposed to take substantial steps under their desegregation plans in the fall of 1969, 47 (35 percent) reneged on their commitments. Of 300 such school districts in the eleven southern states, 95 reneged.<sup>36</sup>

The Nixon strategy had a third element. Besides abdicating executive efforts and shifting responsibility to the courts, it set out to alter the Supreme Court. Two nominees, Clement Haynsworth and J. Harrold Carswell, were defeated in part because of their weak and negative civil rights records. Four successful nominees had generally conservative records. But despite this alteration of the Court, it has since unanimously upheld dismantlement of the dual school system in the South. In *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*,<sup>37</sup> the Court reaffirmed the affirmative constitutional duty of school authorities to dismantle the dual system and upheld busing as an acceptable desegregation tool. "Desegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school."<sup>38</sup>

30. Title VI fund cutoffs in previous years had averaged over sixty per year. After a handful of fund terminations during the first Nixon year, it fell into nonuse.

31. *Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education*, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).

32. *Id.* at 19.

33. "Decision Denounced in the South," *Washington Post*, October 31, 1969, p. 1.

34. *Washington Post*, December 9, 1969, p. 12.

35. Transcript of President Nixon's News Conference, October 31, 1969. See also Statement by the President on Elementary and Secondary School Desegregation, March 24, 1970.

36. U.S. Senate, "Toward Equal Educational Opportunity," Report of the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, December 31, 1972, p. 199.

37. 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971).

38. *Id.*, p. 1283.

## POLITICIZING THE BUSING ISSUE

Southern politicians correctly perceived the vulnerability of the North on the school desegregation issue.<sup>39</sup> Their tactic was to push for nationwide rather than regional enforcement of school desegregation requirements and to concentrate on busing and threatened alteration of neighborhood assignment patterns to divide the opposition. Many Republicans, in the so-called southern strategy, joined the southerners. The politicization of the busing issue became a convenient smoke screen to hide administration enforcement failures and to create a political basis for inaction.

Attorney General John Mitchell counseled the American public in April 1970 that everyone has "the right to reject unreasonable requirements of busing and to send their children to neighborhood schools." He further said this is "just as important as the right of all of our citizens to be assigned [to schools] without regard to their race."<sup>40</sup> President Nixon later joined him in speaking "against busing as the term is commonly used in desegregation cases"<sup>41</sup> and ordered the Justice Department and HEW to carry out school desegregation responsibilities "whenever possible without the use of busing."<sup>42</sup>

Amidst a deteriorating national climate stimulated by negative presidential leadership, the U.S. House of Representatives, in the fall of 1971, adopted three anti-busing amendments. In March 1972 the Senate also adopted an anti-busing measure, albeit a compro-

mise version. The President signed it into law and attacked the Congress for not taking stronger action.

Earlier, in February 1972, he had met with congressional proponents of a constitutional amendment to prohibit busing. While he declined to endorse such an amendment for the time being, he said, according to his press secretary, "We do have a national problem, we are not going to leave the situation as it is . . . we are looking for a remedy."<sup>43</sup>

On March 17, 1972, President Nixon went on national television to announce that he was sending to Congress the Student Transportation Moratorium Act and the Equal Education Opportunities Act which, among other things, sought to freeze all new busing orders until July 1, 1973, and prescribe when courts could order busing. These proposals were a flagrant challenge to the Supreme Court's ruling in *Swann* and to the courts' ability to remedy constitutional violations by all reasonable means.<sup>44</sup>

As the summer wore on, the President continued to attack alleged congressional inaction on the busing question. On August 18, 1972, the House passed a version of the President's Equal Education Opportunity bill, certainly unconstitutional, that prohibited virtually all busing for purposes of desegregation, regardless of the pupils' ages or grades, and permitted the reopening of previously settled cases involving court-ordered desegregation. In October, the Senate took up the bill, and for the first time in recent history liberal Senators had to mount a filibuster<sup>45</sup> to block anti-civil rights legis-

39. They had attached various anti-civil rights orders to appropriation bills without success for a number of years. Johnson administration leadership and liberals had always successfully opposed them.

40. "GOP cheers Mitchell on 'Anti-Busing' Right," *Washington Post*, April 17, 1970.

41. White House Press Release, August 3, 1971.

42. "Nixon Order Warns Aides on Busing," *Washington Post*, February 15, 1972.

43. "Nixon Voices 'Remedy' for Busing Drive," *Washington Post*, February 15, 1972.

44. While he purported to provide federal funds to compensate minority children for continuing unequal educational opportunity, he asked for no additional money with which to do so.

45. The entire "filibuster" took only four or five days and was not the lengthy delay usually associated with this term.

lation. After three attempts, the anti-busing proponents failed to invoke cloture, and the President's bill died for that session of Congress. However, new anti-busing legislation has been introduced in the current session of Congress, and those who seek to complete what *Brown* started and took so long to accomplish, are on the defensive.

#### CONCLUSION

The busing debate has poisoned the national atmosphere and clouded the issue of southern school desegregation. More blacks now attend desegregated schools in the South than in the North, though a majority of black children nationwide still attend racially identifiable schools. Despite the apparent national retreat, recent public opinion polls show that Americans continue to favor the concept of school desegregation—while apparently rejecting busing to achieve it.<sup>46</sup> This may suggest that with positive national and local leadership, the feared retreat in school desegregation need not materialize.

The courts, despite increasing executive and public criticism, have stood strong in vindicating the constitutional rights of southern black schoolchildren to a desegregated education. From 1954 until *Swann*, the Supreme Court has acted unanimously and unwaveringly to bring about a unitary school system in the South. A recent split in *Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia*,<sup>47</sup> when the Court ruled five to

four—with the four Nixon appointees dissenting—that the City of Emporia could not operate a new system separate from the county system of which it had previously been a part, raises a question about whether, how long, and how far the Court will persist in enforcing *Brown*, particularly if it is increasingly isolated politically. Chief Justice Warren Burger was careful, however, to reaffirm the dissenters' basic support for *Brown* while disagreeing with its application in this particular case.

It is plain from the last two decades that the courts alone cannot complete the job of ending racial discrimination in public education. I agree with J. W. Peltason's earlier statement about southern federal court judges that:

In the future as well as in the past, what the judges will do and the significance of their actions will be determined not so much by what goes on inside their courtrooms as by what happens outside. . . . The effectiveness of their decisions and their ability to bring about fundamental alterations in the operation of the schools rest basically on the power that can be mobilized behind the value of equal rights.<sup>48</sup>

It is to be hoped that the present national uncertainty over the false issue of school busing will not let us ignore the thousands of black and white schoolchildren in scores of southern school districts that are successfully desegregated and who are pointing the way for the rest of us.<sup>49</sup> They, and the nation, have a right to be free of the shameful blight of public school segregation. Strong national and local leadership must come forth in support of *Brown*'s promise for one nation.

48. Peltason, *Fifty-Eight Lonely Men*, p. 250.

49. See Thomas F. Pettigrew et al., "A Critique of Evidence on Busing," *Public Interest* (Fall 1972).

46. In March 1971, a Harris poll of 1,600 families found 47 percent of parents willing to have their children bused for desegregation under court order, and only 41 percent opposed. But by March 1972, only 25 percent were willing; and 60 percent were opposed. Ironically, however, 83 percent of parents whose children were bused for all reasons were "satisfied with busing," and 89 percent found busing "convenient."

47. 92 S.Ct. 2196 (1972).

# The Legal Struggle to Integrate Schools in the North

By ROBERT L. HERBST

**ABSTRACT:** The struggle to integrate public schools in the North has been conducted largely in the federal courts. While the landmark case of *Brown v. Board of Education* and its progeny have clearly outlawed "de jure" or state-imposed school segregation, the Supreme Court has not yet clarified whether its constitutional proscription extends to racial imbalance which results from the application of neighborhood school principles to racially imbalanced residential areas—so-called "de facto" segregation. In the early phase of northern litigation, the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) lawyers who led the legal struggle sought, largely unsuccessfully, to vindicate their theory that racial imbalance in the public schools, whether caused directly by state officials or not, unconstitutionally deprived black children of equal educational opportunity. Recently, the NAACP has changed its strategy and has attempted to prove in every case that school officials have taken at least some intentionally discriminatory actions which have helped isolate black children in black schools, and its lawyers have managed to convince a more sympathetic judiciary to grant comprehensive integration relief.

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This article is based in part upon an earlier unpublished paper on the same subject written at the Yale Law School by the author and Bruce M. Freedman (J.D. 1972).

AFTER several studies in the last decade had all concluded that the racially imbalanced public schools of Denver, Colorado, were providing black children with inferior educational opportunities, the city's school board took a deep collective breath and finally resolved in early 1969 to integrate its schools. In an atmosphere of increasing community controversy, the board bravely shed its "neutral" neighborhood school policy, under which it had theoretically ignored race in administering the school system, and began to make the boundary changes which would obliterate the "black schools" of Northeast Denver and stabilize the racial composition of schools in surrounding areas which were fast becoming black schools.

Unfortunately, the school board did not have long to display its new badge of courage. In a scenario that has been repeated in a number of American cities outside the South, the next school board election was bitterly contested by two candidates who pledged to rescind the integration resolutions if elected, and elected they were. In June of 1969 the new board carried out their pledge, and a group of aggrieved black children and parents finally turned to the federal courts for relief. Their lawsuit, which was argued in the Supreme Court this term,<sup>1</sup> is the first case involving racially imbalanced schools in the North to reach the Court, eighteen years after *Brown v. Board of Education*<sup>2</sup> ordered an end to racial segregation in public education.

The Denver experience was not at all unique. In most cases in recent years where a black community has been able, without resorting to legal action, to con-

vince a school board to promulgate a desegregation plan, a fearful and angry white community has succeeded in nullifying the board's decision by legislative action or by electing a new board.<sup>3</sup> These nullifications demonstrate how vulnerable a school board is to the political pressure of the white community even when the board is convinced that the racial imbalance in its schools is responsible for the inferior education being offered black children. In the one northern state, Massachusetts, where integration proponents were able to capitalize on hostility between Boston and the rest of the state and to enact a school imbalance law in 1965 applying almost exclusively to Boston, enforcement has been lax.<sup>4</sup> Federal and state administrative efforts to integrate public schools in the North have been minuscule. The recent passage by Congress of the 1972 Education Amendments attempting to restrict the ability of federal courts to use busing as a tool to integrate the schools, and the statements and actions of President Nixon and the Justice Department to the same end, are further indications that in the foreseeable future the American political system will probably not respond to the problem of racially isolated public schools without court intervention. Thus, the struggle to integrate public

3. See *Bradley v. Milliken* (Detroit), 433 F. 2d 897 (1970), 338 F. Supp. 582 (1971); *Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education* (Kalamazoo, Michigan), No. K88-71, Western District of Michigan, oral opinion of August 19, 1971; and *San Francisco School District v. Johnson* (San Francisco), 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P. 2d 669 (1971).

4. For an account of the passage and the enforcement of the Massachusetts statute, see Frank Levy, *Northern Schools and Civil Rights* (Chicago: Markham, 1971). That experience prompted the author to conclude that under ordinary circumstances, "if a legislature is to pass a civil rights bill, the bill must be effective in only a small number of the legislature's districts" (p. 21).

1. *Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, Colorado*, 313 F. Supp. 61, 313 F. Supp. 90 (1970), 445 F. 2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 LW 3335, No. 71-507, 71-572, argued October 12, 1972.

2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).



schools in the North has been and will be, like the corresponding battle in the South, one conducted largely in the federal courts.<sup>5</sup>

#### DE FACTO VERSUS DE JURE SEGREGATION

There is little question that the extent of racial isolation in northern public schools has for many years approached that of schools in the South.<sup>6</sup> The con-

5. This article attempts to explain how the law and the courts have been enlisted in the struggle by black children and parents to integrate northern schools. It is of course well known that some segments of the black community believe that it is more important to control schools in black communities than to push for integration. While it is not possible in this article to discuss at length the wisdom of integration as a social and political policy, it is not amiss to make three observations. First, the goals of integration and decentralization are not mutually exclusive or fundamentally antagonistic in all contexts. Second, rarely, if ever, have black children and parents intervened in the lawsuits we are about to discuss *against* the plaintiffs seeking desegregation relief. Third, experiments in decentralization and community control have not been remarkably successful for various and complex reasons not yet completely analyzed. While this is not necessarily cogent proof of the relative strength of black support for integration or community control, on the one hand, nor of the relative wisdom of these two goals on the other hand, more will have to be shown to convince the author that the legal battle about to be described is not a battle worth fighting, or that it is fought in the name of the black community but without its support.

6. For example, in 1966 the U.S. Office of Education reported that 72 percent of black students in the North attended public schools with a minority group enrollment of at least 90 percent. See James S. Coleman et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1966), p. 3, and U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Racial Isolation in the Public School* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 2-7. The Office of Civil Rights Statistics of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reports a slightly different figure in recent

text in which that isolation has arisen, however, is markedly different in the two regions. In the South, the racial imbalance was directly caused by a rigid racial classification imposed upon the school system by state law. It mattered little where blacks and whites lived, for they were funneled into separate school systems by the state. Indeed, housing patterns in some parts of the South were often more integrated than those in the North because schools and other public services segregated by law kept blacks at a safe psychic distance.

In most states outside the South, however, segregation by law was abolished long before 1954, and a neighborhood school policy was substituted in its place under which students attended the school closest to their homes. Most northern communities profess to maintain such a policy today. Typically, each school is supposed to be centrally located for the convenience of its attending students, who normally must attend the school to which they are assigned. Attendance boundaries are fixed by "neutral" factors such as the size of the school, the current and projected size of the pupil population in the attendance area, the distance to be traveled from home to school, and the existence of natural boundaries like major parkways and thoroughfares, rivers, and railroad tracks, which might make the trip to school difficult or hazardous.

As blacks migrated to the metropolitan areas of the North, housing patterns in those areas took on a sharply defined racial cast. When a neighborhood school policy is applied to racially im-

years from their studies based on larger statistical samples. In thirty-two northern and western states, 57 percent of the black student population attended schools with a minority group enrollment of at least 80 percent for each school year from 1968 to 1971.

balanced residential areas, the result naturally is racially imbalanced schools. It is sometimes recognized that the racial housing patterns have been aggravated by private racial discrimination and the peripheral public discrimination in the housing market which often accompanies it. But those who defend the neighborhood school system in the North maintain that the state is not implicated in the resulting racial imbalance in the schools, since the imbalance is mandated neither by state law nor by the actions of local school officials, who purport to carefully administer the school system without making race a factor in their decisions.<sup>7</sup> The racial imbalance that results from the neutral application of the neighborhood school system in the North is called "de facto" school segregation to distinguish it from the racial imbalance that is rooted in state law or the racially motivated administrative decisions of state or local officials, which is labeled "de jure" school segregation.

The legal distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* segregation arises from the ambiguity of *Brown*. Lawyers have continued to argue over its scope and applicability outside the South. *Brown* held that the maintenance of "racially segregated public schools" is unconstitutional because such schools deny black children equal education opportunities, but the Court never made clear whether its definition of "racial segregation" includes racial imbalance that is not the product of deliberate racial classification by the state. The Court's decision was based primarily on its belief that

segregated schools left black children with feelings of inferiority which scarred them psychologically and retarded their ability to learn. But its language did not clarify whether the critical harm with which it was concerned came from racial separation in the schools per se or only from racial separation enforced by the state and bearing its imprimatur:

To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . "Segregation of white and colored children has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The *impact is greater* when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."<sup>8</sup>

This language, and the Supreme Court cases attempting to implement *Brown* in the South,<sup>9</sup> leave no doubt that where the state maintains a racially imbalanced school system by law or by discriminatory administrative action overt or covert, the "impact" and the "detrimental effect" on black children are harmful enough to contravene their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Where such "dual" school systems exist, or where they have existed, they must be eliminated "root and branch," so that there are no longer "white schools" and "Negro schools"

8. 347 U.S. at 494, emphasis added.

7. On the other hand, critics of the neighborhood school system argue that it is usually a smoke screen for a considerable amount of conscious discrimination by school officials and that the racial imbalance prevalent in most northern settings is not quite so innocent. See note 33 and accompanying text.

9. See, for example, *Green v. County School Board*, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); and *Swann v. Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) and the cases cited therein.

but just "schools."<sup>10</sup> But the question which the Supreme Court has not yet addressed is whether racial separation in the schools per se, which the Court in the language quoted above seemed to recognize does have a harmful impact without regard to the cause of the separation, is unconstitutional.

#### EARLY LITIGATION IN THE NORTH

*Brown* was decided when most of the nation thought of civil rights as a southern problem. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund, then the legal arm of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the organization of civil rights lawyers which had brought and argued the case, continued in the years thereafter to confine its attention to the South and to pursue all over that region the implementation decrees which would give flesh to the bones of the Court's mandate. No attempt was made to apply *Brown* in the North until the early 1960s, when public attention began to focus on urban ghettos there for the first time.

In 1956, the NAACP divested itself of its Legal Defense Fund in order to protect its tax exemption and hired its own general counsel, Robert L. Carter, who began to accumulate a modest new legal staff. The new staff soon had its own tax exemption so that it, too, could bring major lawsuits without endangering the tax-exempt status of the parent organization. While the Legal Defense Fund sought school integration in the South, the NAACP began to examine how best to attain the same end in the North. From 1961 to the present, northern schools litigation has been the special preserve of the NAACP in New York, assisted by its local branch counsel. Independent individual lawyers

have never stayed active in the field, largely because of the scope, complexity, and expense of the lawsuits.

The NAACP lawyers began by making a direct assault on de facto school segregation. In a series of lawsuits in both state and federal courts in the East and in the Midwest, they pressed for rulings that racial imbalance in the public schools, whatever the cause, deprived black children of equal educational opportunity. They hoped to dispense with the difficult and expensive task of proving, in each community under scrutiny, that the school officials who administered a racially imbalanced school system had made their decisions with an intent to isolate blacks in black schools. They reasoned that black communities already strapped for resources could not afford to prove on a case by case basis that school officials had acted in bad faith in order to get relief. Without the history of a dual school system prescribed by state law from which to presume invidious intent, northern plaintiffs would have to analyze past decisions of the board in an effort to discern a pattern of racial animus. They would have to depose former and present school board members, collect and scrutinize the minutes of their meetings, and search for sympathetic informers or school administrators who might have evidence that race was considered in policymaking.

In short, they would have to engage in extensive discovery before trial to get inside the collective mind of the school board, and they would have to do so in every case they brought, since each community would initially be entitled to the presumption that their school system was administered "neutrally," without regard to race. Each lawsuit would be a huge and expensive undertaking, dissipating the resources and morale of black parents and chil-

10. *Green v. County School Board*, *supra*, 391 U.S. 430, 438, 442 (1968).

dren who felt that *Brown* entitled them to integrated schools in the North as well as the South. If a showing of discriminatory intent were required, progress in integrating the schools of the North would be slow indeed. By proving that racially imbalanced schools necessarily deprived black children of an equal education, without regard to whether school officials had deliberately placed them in black schools, the NAACP hoped to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's protections and place upon state and local school officials the affirmative duty, in providing public school services to the citizenry, of insuring that the schools are racially balanced.<sup>11</sup>

Central to this undertaking, of course, was convincing the courts that racially imbalanced schools, even without the sanction of state law or the stigma of the racial discrimination of school officials, should be conclusively presumed to be harmful to black children. Law-

11. While the Fourteenth Amendment has usually been interpreted to require some modicum of state involvement in the harm complained of before its protections can be invoked [see Charles Black, "Forward: State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14," *Harvard Law Review* 81 (1967), p. 69], the NAACP lawyers hoped the courts would find the requisite state involvement merely in the state's provision of public school services rather than require that the state be shown to be actively and purposefully involved in isolating blacks in black schools. In proposing that this narrow notion of state action be sufficient to bring the Fourteenth Amendment into play, they were encouraged by the following language from *Brown*, 347 U.S. at 493:

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. . . . Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms."

yers of the NAACP argued that black children were inevitably harmed by racially imbalanced schools in two ways. First, they sought to show that racially imbalanced school systems were often accompanied by tangible inequalities between the black and white schools in expenditures, age and condition of the school buildings, experience and quality of the teachers, and curricular offerings. Second, they sought to demonstrate that children in black schools had significantly lower achievement test scores than children in white schools and that these scores were indicative of the academic, psychological, and emotional difficulties which stemmed directly from racial isolation in the schools. They buttressed this last contention with expert testimony of psychological damage very much akin to the psychological evidence which proved so persuasive to the Supreme Court in *Brown*.<sup>12</sup> Apart from the deficiencies in academic quality in the black schools, which the NAACP argued were reflected in the test scores, the failure of those schools to integrate their pupils into the mainstream of American middle-class life and to teach them how to relate to and compete with whites was emphasized.<sup>13</sup>

12. See "New Perspectives on Court Ordered Busing," *Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems* 8 (1972), pp. 321, 322-24, and authorities cited therein, for a brief description of the psychological evidence offered in *Brown*, its effects on the Supreme Court, and the nature of the psychological difficulties caused by de facto rather than de jure segregation.

13. "The Negro's isolation from the main stream of educational development in a school, regarded as inferior by the community, labels him as not good enough; it prevents his learning from and through his peers in the dominant majority and adjusting to, understanding and knowing the kind of competition he must face in later life when he attempts to make a worthwhile place for himself as an American. It is the isolation—the separation—effected by de facto segregation that makes educational equality impossible. . . . Despite the dedica-

*De facto theory: Success in the East*

In the first half of the 1960s, Carter and his NAACP staff pressed these contentions in both the state and federal courts in the East, and in the federal courts in the Midwest. In New York and New Jersey, they brought administrative proceedings before the powerful State Commissioners of Education and convinced them that racially imbalanced schools were necessarily "educationally inadequate." The Commissioners therefore ordered the local school boards against whom the proceedings had been brought to reorganize their school boundaries to correct the imbalance. In the highest courts of those states, the NAACP won decisions upholding the absolute power of the Commissioners to substitute their judgment with regard to racial balance for the judgment of local school boards and to mandate increased racial balance in local school districts.<sup>14</sup>

In 1962, the NAACP lawyers also successfully challenged in federal court the racial imbalance in the three elementary schools of Manhasset, Long Island, a small, affluent suburb of New York City. Plaintiffs conceded that the 94 percent black school offered facilities and programs equal to those offered in the two white schools, and they abandoned their contention that the school board intentionally drew pupil attendance boundaries to keep the races apart. They relied solely on their claim that racial separation "inherently" harmed the

black children. The district court agreed, not on the theory that black schools were shown to be causally related to underachievement by black children, but that they instilled in those children a self-perception of inferiority and failed to prepare them for "participation in the mainstream of our society." The board was ordered to permit the black children to transfer to the two white schools.<sup>15</sup> Although this relief was more limited than that requested by the plaintiffs, most of the children did transfer, and the board eventually closed the black school and redistributed the children. There was no appeal.

In attacking racial imbalance in Springfield, Massachusetts, the NAACP relied primarily on evidence that children from black schools scored consistently lower on achievement tests than children from white schools, and on testimony from a social psychologist that imbalanced schools were not conducive to learning even if they were tangibly equal and even if they were produced by a neighborhood school system with no intentional school board discrimination. Plaintiffs' lawyers also alleged, but failed to prove, that the imbalance was caused in part by the purposefully discriminatory actions of school officials. The district court held that de facto segregated schools inevitably offered black children unequal educational opportunity and ordered the school board to eliminate the black schools.<sup>16</sup>

15. *Blocker v. Board of Education of Manhasset, New York*, 226 F. Supp. 208, 228, 229 F. Supp. 709, 229 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).

16. *Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee*, 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the order largely because the school committee was already formulating a desegregation plan when plaintiffs brought their lawsuit. 348 F. 2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). Although the reviewing court softened the holding of the lower

tion of educators or facilities that are equal, racial imbalance carries a negative implication for the child" (R. L. Carter, "De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Questions Presented," *Western Reserve Law Review* 16 [1965], pp. 502, 516).

14. *Vetere v. Allen*, 15 N.Y. 2d 259, 206 N.E. 2d 174 (1965); *Booker v. Board of Education of Plainfield*, 212 A. 2d 1, 45 N.J. 161 (1965).

*De facto theory: Defeat in the Midwest*

The NAACP also forayed into the Midwest during this same period to bring three major suits against the imbalanced schools of Gary, Indiana; Kansas City, Kansas; and Cincinnati, Ohio.<sup>17</sup> These cases, like those litigated closer to home, were based primarily on de facto doctrine, but unlike the others, were all bitterly unsuccessful. The cold reception of judges in America's heartland to de facto theory ultimately forced schools lawyers to discard it.

*Gary, Indiana*

The schools of both Gary and Kansas City had been segregated by law as recently as 1947 and 1954, respectively, and they were still seriously racially imbalanced at the time of suit.<sup>18</sup> In Gary, as early as 1927, the school board had capitulated to anti-integration strikers and agreed to racially gerrymander the school boundaries.<sup>19</sup>

court by suggesting that the school committee's duty to integrate its schools must be tempered by a consideration of the educational and social benefits of a neighborhood school system and the corresponding costs of busing, the Springfield litigation was on the whole a vindication of plaintiffs' de facto theory.

17. *Bell v. School City of Gary*, 213 F. Supp. 819 (1963), 324 F. 2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 924 (1964); *Downs v. Board of Education*, 336 F. 2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 914 (1965); *Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education*, 224 F. Supp. 572 (1965), 369 F. 2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966); cert. den., 389 U.S. 847 (1967), 419 F. 2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 402 U.S. 962 (1971).

18. In 1962, 16,000 of the 23,000 black pupils of Gary went to schools that were more than 95 percent black. In Kansas City in the same year, 73 percent of the 7,500 black pupils attended predominantly black schools.

19. For a lengthy account of the Gary litigation, see John Kaplan, "Segregation Litigation and the Schools—Part III: The Gary Litigation," *Northwestern University Law Review* 59 (1964), p. 121.

So while there were past instances of intentional official discrimination which could have been exploited by plaintiffs' lawyers, they placed major emphasis in their 1962 lawsuit on the argument that de facto racial imbalance was itself unconstitutional. They relied on evidence of tangible inequalities between the black and white schools and on disparities in achievement and other evidence of psychological damage to persuade the court that de facto segregation necessarily offered unequal educational opportunity. But neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals was persuaded. The plaintiffs proved that less money was spent for each child in black schools, and that blacks had to endure larger classes, teachers with less experience, and schools that were generally more crowded than their white counterparts. But the school board convinced the courts that the schools in black areas were larger and therefore cost less per capita to give approximately equivalent instruction; that although the black schools were growing faster, the board was making a good faith effort to stem the overcrowding; and that the need to hire more teachers for these schools accounted for the disparity in teacher experience. Furthermore, the court was not convinced that black pupils' lower achievement test scores were caused primarily, or even in part, by "inferior" schools. Rejecting the scanty evidence offered in support of the allegation that school officials were intentionally discriminating on the basis of race in their boundary decisions, the court refused to ascribe to the board an affirmative duty to balance the races.

*Kansas City, Kansas*

The courts in the Kansas City case also rejected the plaintiffs' de facto theory, but the case is additionally noteworthy because it seems to be the only

case litigated in this period in which the NAACP seriously tried to prove alternatively that the school board was intentionally keeping black and white pupils apart. They demonstrated that the board had a minority to majority pupil transfer policy which allowed a student to transfer out of any school in which he found himself in the racial minority. They also showed that black schools were staffed by black teachers and white schools by white teachers and that certain suspicious boundary changes made by the board had the obvious effect of transferring substantial numbers of black children from integrated to black schools. Nevertheless, while the district court<sup>20</sup> enjoined the minority to majority transfer policy as unconstitutional, it refused to find that the school board administered the school system in bad faith or in a racially discriminatory manner, and it therefore refused to grant plaintiffs the comprehensive desegregation relief they sought.

#### *Cincinnati, Ohio*

The Kansas City defeat in 1964 engendered a change in strategy in the Cincinnati litigation, which had been filed one year earlier and was still in the pretrial stages. The NAACP lawyers were again relying primarily on their theory that racially imbalanced schools per se were constitutionally unequal; they had even expressed the hope that they would not have to prove, through an analysis of academic ratings and teacher quality, that black schools in Cincinnati offered their children tangibly inferior educational opportunities.<sup>21</sup> They were clearly not plan-

ning to prove gerrymandering or other intentionally discriminatory decisions or policies. After Kansas City and the second big rejection of de facto theory, however, these same lawyers were forced to recognize that the school board's "intent" was now the threshold issue. Nevertheless, perhaps because of the difficulties in Kansas City of trying to convince the court of the school board's bad faith directly—by proving gerrymandering and a patently racial transfer policy—the NAACP decided to forgo that kind of direct assault on the board's intent. They resolved instead to demonstrate such pervasive differences in facilities, staffs, programs, and services between black and white schools that the court would be forced to infer that the board was setting lower educational standards in the black schools and was therefore deliberately discriminating against the children who populated them. They commissioned experts to testify about these tangible inequalities and to prepare studies of the speech and psychological difficulties allegedly caused by these inequalities and by the feelings of inferiority they engendered. But the trial judge rejected this evidence and suggested in his opinion dismissing the lawsuit at the close of the plaintiffs' case that the plaintiffs were in effect asking him to hold that the board had an affirmative duty to balance the races because racially imbalanced schools, though not of the board's making, were unequal. This he refused to do.<sup>22</sup>

file in the New York offices of the NAACP, whose kind assistance is acknowledged.

20. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court in all respects.

21. The early strategy of the lawsuit was laid out in a letter Carter wrote in March 1964. This brief analysis of the Cincinnati case is based upon an examination of the case

22. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this total rejection of de facto theory, but remanded the case to give the plaintiffs another chance to prove gerrymandering or other intentional discrimination by the board directly. It pointed out that there were obviously suspicious boundary lines appearing in the record without explanation. Instead of accepting this opportunity

The defeats in these Midwest cases were bitter and demoralizing. The rejection of the *de facto* argument by three circuit courts of appeals was an ominous indication that the evidence of psychological damage caused by black schools and the evidence of their inferior facilities, services, and curricular offerings would have to be bolstered before the courts would declare that a school system must abandon the advantages of its neighborhood school system. Just as demoralizing, however, were the implications of the Kansas City decision for a change in strategy and an attempt to prove on a case-by-case basis that each school board was intentionally discriminating on the basis of race. The case seemed to indicate that the plaintiffs could not be assured of general desegregation relief even where they could prove that school policy or decisions had occasionally encompassed invidious racial considerations—by proving, for example, a racial transfer policy like Kansas City's or a few instances of racial gerrymandering of school boundary lines. The court might merely enjoin the particular racial policy challenged or correct the distorted features of the gerrymandered boundaries and allow the school board to revert to a truly neutral neighborhood school system. Unless the plaintiffs could show that the school board's decisions were generally permeated by racism or bad faith, the expensive and time-consuming effort to prove intentional discrimination might leave black children ensconced in black schools.

to offer new evidence, the NAACP unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and then failed to supplement the record in the trial court. That court merely reissued its finding that no *de jure* discrimination had been proved, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied a second petition for certiorari as untimely filed.

These doubts about the inclination of judges to integrate big city school systems upon finding occasional instances of intentional discrimination are magnified when one considers the theoretical underpinnings of *de jure* theory. For if the Supreme Court in *Brown* was truly concerned only with the harm to black children caused by the stigma of segregation mandated by law or of segregation caused by the pervasively discriminatory decisions of school officials, a court following the Supreme Court's edict would logically correct only that racial imbalance which can be traced to the stigmatic state law or discriminatory official action. In the southern context, a court expounding this *de jure* theory can grant system-wide relief, since the extremely rigid dual school systems of southern communities can clearly be said to have caused most or all of the racial imbalance in the schools of the South in 1954. Only by completely balancing the races in those schools can all traces of the unconstitutional school system of the past be obliterated.<sup>23</sup> But in the North, it is very difficult to discern discriminatory school board actions, past or present, as significant causes of the present racial imbalance in light of the overwhelming effects of the great migrations and the economics of, and discrimination in, the housing market which have caused blacks to concentrate in the central city ghettos.<sup>24</sup> Dwarfed

23. I note in passing that the logical implications of strict *de jure* theory might make it permissible for southern communities to adopt strictly neutral neighborhood school systems even if the result is imbalanced schools—so long as the decision were not motivated by racial animus—after their schools have been completely balanced for a few years to remedy the effects of past segregation by law. Southern communities would then be in the same position as northern communities.

24. Some have tried to argue that schools



in importance by the apparently inexorable population movements within metropolitan areas, the occasional misstep by school officials in drawing boundaries or selecting sites for new schools would not move a court expounding de jure theory to grant comprehensive relief.

The Midwest campaign thus proved to be largely unfruitful. While the NAACP had enjoyed substantial success in the East, the school systems, challenged there were relatively small ones. The Midwest lawsuits were the first substantial challenge to racial imbalance in the large cities outside the South. The wintry reception accorded that challenge effectively interred the foremost weapon in the NAACP arsenal, de facto theory, and also cast doubt on the ultimate utility of de jure theory outside the South.

The NAACP's litigation campaign to integrate northern schools, already bleeding from these wounds, collapsed in the last half of the 1960s because of internal problems which beset the organization and ultimately resulted in the resignation of Carter and his entire legal staff in 1968. They had done so much of the work in this area that their absence had an obvious impact. In the years 1966 to 1969, only one significant lawsuit was brought and pressed to a conclusion by independent counsel in the not-quite-northern setting of Washington, D.C.<sup>25</sup> But the hiatus was not all time wasted. A quiet debate took place among schools lawyers on how best to proceed,<sup>26</sup> new strategies and

are a significant factor in influencing whites to abandon residential areas into which blacks begin to move, but they have as yet adduced very little evidence in support.

25. *Hobson v. Hansen*, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967), affirmed *sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson*, 408 F. 2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), appeal dismissed 393 U.S. 801 (1969).

26. See Clark and Burns, "The Realpolitik of Racial Segregation in Northern Public

tactics were formulated, and despite the negative implications of the Kansas City case, they centered around de jure theory.

#### RECENT LITIGATION IN THE NORTH

The NAACP hired a new general counsel, Nathaniel Jones, in late 1969. Although he made no substantial effort to build up a new legal staff, Jones, who had been an active trial lawyer before accepting his new post, was eager to bring school cases; and active local NAACP branches, notably in Michigan, were ready to renew the legal battle to integrate northern schools in their own communities. With little staff and no real experience in this field, Jones discussed possible strategies with the Legal Defense Fund. Primarily because of the furor and sustained resistance raised by *Brown* in the South, lawyers at the Fund had believed for some time that the Supreme Court was not yet ready to hold de facto racial imbalance unconstitutional and thereby face a second and potentially greater challenge throughout the entire nation to its authority and popular support. Despite the expense and difficulties of proof, Fund lawyers felt that an attempt should be made in every case to demonstrate discriminatory conduct by school officials, and Jones decided to commit the NAACP to this litigation strategy.

In the last two or three years, a second and more successful phase of the legal struggle to integrate northern schools has been inaugurated. The NAACP has again played the leading role in initiating, financing, and controlling the course of the lawsuits. A few cases, mostly in the West, have been brought by independent counsel; and the Legal Defense Fund has re-

Schools: Some Pragmatic Approaches," *Howard Law Journal* 14 (1968), p. 217.

cently helped out in several northern cases, as its cases in the South have begun to move faster and with less difficulty to final implementation of court decrees mandating integrated school systems.

The lawyers in the recent cases, convinced that they had to rely on *de jure* theory, sought to convince the courts, as the lawyers in Kansas City had failed to do, to integrate whole school systems merely on a showing of *some* acts of intentional discrimination, past or present, even if these acts did not add up to a pattern of "bad faith," and even if a neutral neighborhood school system would still have produced substantial racial imbalance had these discriminatory acts not occurred. They hoped that the realization that school boards which had uniformly proclaimed that they administered a "strictly neutral" neighborhood school system had actually stooped to intentionally racist conduct would drive the courts to grant full relief, even if it meant softening the strict logical constraints of the legal theory they were using.

Much had happened in the last half of the 1960s to focus attention on the covert racism and the festering ghettos which made northern America just as divided as its southern counterpart. Southerners, who had always bitterly pointed their finger at the northern hypocrisy which denied this fact, were now sitting back smugly as their thesis was confirmed by Watts, Newark, and Detroit. The new northern schools lawyers were hoping that the events of these tumultuous years had sensitized the judiciary in the North to the notion that where official, intentional racial discrimination reared its ugly head, it could not be explained away as inconsequential in the more complex northern context. Southern judges, ever more insistently prodded by the Supreme Court, were demanding complete racial balance

in their schools and were finally beginning to enforce this demand with far-ranging remedial decrees. The NAACP hoped northern judges would sense that to demand anything less in their own communities, once intentional official discrimination had been shown, would be too embarrassingly hypocritical to stomach, despite the availability of logical and legal distinctions with which they could rationalize differences in judicial treatment in the two regions.

These considerations were not always articulated in this manner, but that they were absorbed in the courtrooms in which northern black children again sought relief from black schools cannot be denied. Their lawyers sought to prove all the intentional discrimination they could, and the warm reception they received, even where they could not come up with much, is an indication of the crucial importance of timing to a litigation campaign. As long as they could hang their hat on undeniable incidents of intentional discrimination, northern judges showed themselves willing to tinker with *de jure* theory to make it applicable in the northern context, so that it could be used to grant comprehensive relief.

### *Detroit*

The NAACP's attention was drawn to Detroit in the spring of 1970 when school officials there developed a decentralization plan which would also desegregate the high schools—in sharp contrast, for example, to New York City's plan which increased race and class concentrations. In late 1968 or early 1969, a black legislator had introduced an enabling bill into the Michigan Legislature, which quickly passed it thinking that "decentralization" meant separatism. But the Legislature had not reckoned with the Detroit superintendent of schools, who felt morally and educationally obligated to press for de-

segregation despite clear community sentiment against it. When the board of education passed the plan and the expected storm broke, the local NAACP branch supported the board, other black groups remained quiescent, the Mayor said he was "confused," the Governor had "reservations," and the Legislature began to stir. The NAACP mobilized to do legislative battle, and federal education and civil rights officials descended on Detroit to proclaim their support for the board, all to no avail. The Legislature passed a statute nullifying the board's plan, and the board, which was conceded by NAACP lawyers to be one of the most progressive in the nation, was recalled and replaced with more conservative members.

The NAACP filed its lawsuit in the federal district court in August 1970, joining the Governor and the state and local boards of education as defendants. They sought a declaratory judgment holding the state nullification act unconstitutional and a stay of all new school construction until desegregation was completed according to the old board's original plan.

Judge Stephen J. Roth denied the injunction and dismissed the state defendants in September.<sup>27</sup> He said a court may intervene in the administration of a school system only if the board has made decisions with invidious racial motivation, while in fact the Detroit board had continuously tried to promote integration. But the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed him in part, holding the nullification statute unconstitutional and putting the state defendants back into the case.<sup>28</sup>

We should pause to reflect briefly on this doctrine—which has been used in several of the recent northern school

cases<sup>29</sup>—that the nullification of school board plans to desegregate the schools whether by state legislative action or by a newly elected board's rescission,<sup>30</sup> is unconstitutional. Little question has been raised about a school board's *right* to use racial considerations to integrate its schools even by those courts, like the court of appeals in the Cincinnati case, which have insisted that there is no *duty* to do so.<sup>31</sup> To permit school officials to depart from strict neutrality with regard to race so long as they use race "benevolently" is itself an interesting position, for were the courts really convinced that there was nothing wrong or harmful about de facto racially imbalanced schools, there would be little reason to sanction a deviation from official color-blindness as a preferred constitutional principle.<sup>32</sup>

29. See the cases cited in notes 1 and 3 above.

30. An example of rescission by a new school board occurred in Kalamazoo, Michigan, in 1971. With the assistance of the state superintendent, the local school board drafted and sought to institute a comprehensive desegregation plan. The resulting community hostility produced a new school board which rescinded the plan and replaced it with a voluntary open enrollment plan. The NAACP went into federal court and obtained a preliminary injunction ordering the new board to institute the old board's plan, on the basis that the nullification was unconstitutional. *Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education*, No. K88-71 (W.D. Mich. August 19, 1971) (oral opinion). After the court of appeals affirmed, classes were desegregated without incident.

31. "Although boards of education have no constitutional obligation to relieve against racial imbalance which they did not cause or create, it has been held that it is not unconstitutional for them to consider racial factors and take steps to relieve racial imbalance if in their sound judgment such action is the best method of avoiding educational harm." *Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education*, 369 F. 2d 55, 61 (6th Cir. 1966). [Citations omitted.]

32. Professor Ely has warned that there are severe moral and practical dangers lurking in government action based on clear albeit benevolent racial motivation. If the state con-

27. *Bradley v. Milliken*, unreported decision on September 3, 1970 (E.D. Mich.).

28. *Bradley v. Milliken*, 433 F. 2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970).

Now, if a school board decides to take advantage of this discretion to increase the racial balance in its schools, what logic is there in holding that a subsequently elected board or the state legislature is foreclosed from putting a stop to this benevolence and returning to what was before a permissible neutral status quo? The courts that have made this ruling have justified it on the ground that such nullification is intentional state action which "causes" racial imbalance in the sense that it prevents its diminution. On the surface, it is. But logically, if a school board may run a neutral neighborhood school system in the first place without impermissibly harming its pupils, it certainly should be permitted to experiment benevolently and then return to its neutral position. That such a return is not permitted is really an indication that the courts intuitively perceive that a neutral neighborhood school system which results in racial imbalance is not really neutral or benign. They must be focusing on what they conceive to be the underlying harm of the imbalance itself and using as the most convenient handle the fact that superficially the return from benevolence to neutrality involves intentional state action which seeks to decrease the amount of racial balance in the school system. In effect, they are holding that once a school board resolves to integrate, it is stuck with that resolution,

siders race in dispensing its burdens and benefits, it may fritter away the moral imperative that a man is to be judged as a man, and that race has nothing to do with his merit. Ely also points out that the benevolent use of race by government officials is a genie that may be difficult to control, for benevolent racial criteria may easily be turned to malevolent use or improper ends. It is better to have color-blind officials, he argues, for they are more trustworthy. J. H. Ely, "Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law," *Yale Law Journal* 79 (1970), pp. 1205, 1259.

even though it was not forced to integrate in the first place. In so holding, the courts are betraying notions of harm and school board responsibility which are really more congenial to the de facto theory which in the same opinions they say they are rejecting.

On April 6, 1971, the Detroit trial began, and the plaintiffs' lawyers began the long and difficult effort to prove to a rather hostile judge that the state and local boards of education, which had recently been progressive enough to produce a desegregation plan, nevertheless were practicing de jure racial discrimination in Detroit. To find evidence that the boards had considered race in their decisions, the NAACP had scrutinized the minutes of their meetings, legal opinions rendered to them, school records, construction plans, recommendations to planning boards on school site selection, and other sources too numerous to mention.<sup>33</sup> For forty-one days Judge Roth heard testimony and examined documents, and he emerged from the trial an educated man. He found that in the 1950s the Detroit board of education had created optional attendance zones in neighborhoods undergoing racial transition. These optional zones provided elementary school pupils in selected areas with the choice of a black or a white high school, in effect allow-

33. In a personal interview at his NAACP office in New York City, Nathaniel Jones added that in cases like these, some members of the school board will occasionally relate what was discussed in executive sessions if they are examined before trial.

This search for proof, and the lengthy trial which results, is unquestionably expensive. By March 1971, the NAACP had run up \$30 thousand in legal expenses; by September 1971, after the trial, \$100 thousand; and at this writing, in excess of \$150 thousand. While the costs of uncovering evidence are high, Jones may be right in saying that if sufficient proof of de jure segregation could be found in progressive Detroit, it can be found anywhere the effort is made.

ing white pupils to escape integrated schools. Although most options were eliminated in 1959, one was still in effect in 1971. The board also admitted transporting black children by bus past white schools closer to their homes with available space to black schools. This busing continued in some areas despite a board policy instituted in 1967 to use busing to increase racial balance. Furthermore, the board had never bussed white children to black schools even where those schools had enormous available space. Judge Roth said the board had intentionally created the optional zones and bussed the black children to segregate blacks in black schools, and he found that those actions had "aggravated" the pattern of racially imbalanced schools which had developed primarily from pervasive housing discrimination.

The court also found that both the city and state boards had *omitted* to take action that would have diminished the racial imbalance in the Detroit schools, thus implying that they had an affirmative duty to do so. The city board had "manipulated" attendance zones, grade structures, and feeder school patterns in a manner whose "natural and predictable effect" was the "perpetuation" of segregation. The state board had failed to enforce its own guidelines on racial balance and had refused, until 1971, to provide the same financial assistance for bus transportation in Detroit which it provided in the suburbs. This disparity of treatment cemented the neighborhood school system and its accompanying racial isolation in Detroit.<sup>34</sup> On the basis of the state nullification statute and this evidence implicating the state defendants in the de jure segregation of the Detroit schools, and after extensive hearings had

demonstrated that Detroit could not desegregate itself, Judge Roth ordered the state to integrate schools throughout the tri-county metropolitan area.<sup>35</sup>

In holding that school officials had committed de jure racial discrimination in Detroit, Judge Roth was applying a rather emasculated formulation of de jure doctrine. He held that it was not

35. *Bradley v. Milliken*, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The court of appeals affirmed on the issues of de jure segregation and the need for metropolitan relief, but remanded the case to give the suburban school districts an opportunity to be heard. — F. 2d — (6th Cir. December 8, 1972).

Judge Roth's order followed shortly the landmark decision of Judge Merhige in Richmond, Va., holding for the first time that metropolitan consolidation of school districts was one of the arrows in the sling of equitable powers which the federal courts may invoke to remedy de jure segregation. *Bradley v. School Board*, 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972). While the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge Merhige, 462 F. 2d 1058 (1972), the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to consider the question.

Limitations of space preclude the lengthy discussion here which the issue deserves. When the responsibility of northern school officials to desegregate their schools is finally fixed, the question of the acceptability and scope of metropolitan relief will be the next battle in the war. In Detroit, the NAACP decided to press for it after the court of appeals had held the state nullification act invalid. The fact that the entire Detroit school system was 65 percent black rendered evanescent the hope that its black children would have an opportunity to go to truly integrated schools, even if all the city's schools were racially balanced. With the state already implicated in an unconstitutional act, the NAACP argued that school districts and school boards are only instrumentalities of the state and that the state must exercise its responsibility over public education to integrate schools in the entire metropolitan area even if school district lines had to be redrawn. With several American cities predominantly black and others heading that way, desegregation decrees confined to central city school districts may only accelerate the white flight to the suburbs and will fail to bring white and black children together.

34. *Bradley v. Milliken*, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).

necessary to find that school officials had acted in complete bad faith or with perniciously evil intention in order to force them to integrate their schools. All that was necessary was for them to have taken "some action" with an intent to segregate and that their action have "aggravated" the racial imbalance. This action need not have been a "but-for" cause of the imbalance. Furthermore, in premising his holding in part upon the knowledgeable omissions of the defendants, Judge Roth seemed to indicate that he felt *de jure* doctrine could be watered down even further by scrapping even the requirement of some intentional segregative board action! Other courts have indeed taken this tack. Instead of finding "action" which "aggravates" the racial isolation, they have required only "knowledgeable omissions" which merely "perpetuate" it. In proscribing merely the failure to act, these courts have imposed an affirmative duty upon school boards to integrate the schools—exactly the result sought by proponents of *de facto* theory—in the name of *de jure* theory!

#### *Pontiac*

The best example of this virtual obliteration of the *de facto*-*de jure* distinction is the decision of the district court in the lawsuit filed in Pontiac, Michigan.<sup>36</sup> Emphasizing that the school board had admitted that the racial imbalance in its schools was harmful to its black children, Judge Damon J. Keith said that someone must act to mitigate its effects, and the board was the "someone" to do it. He candidly stated that he was looking for omissions and failures by the board, not merely for affirmative action. Since each new school was located only in accordance

with housing developments and with no consideration by the board of the effects of its decisions on racial isolation, the board had "cemented," "fixed," or "perpetuated" segregation. The court's choice of words leaves the impression that the board "caused" the segregation, but in pointing to the board's knowledgeable state of mind rather than any direct evidence of purposeful intent to perpetuate segregation, all the court really found was that the board was running a neutral neighborhood school system knowing that such a system produces racially imbalanced schools and failing, when it had the opportunity, to do anything about them. The court calls this *de jure* segregation, but it really is virtually a pure *de facto* formulation. And surprisingly enough, Judge Keith was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the same circuit which only a few years before had decided the *Cincinnati* case. The appeals court did its best to dress up the *de jure* aspects of the case and to twist the district court's findings into a "purposeful pattern of racial discrimination." But at most, all there was in the record was a pattern of boundary and site selection decisions each of which could be justified by valid neighborhood school considerations but which did nothing to stem the obviously rising tide of racial imbalance in the schools. On this small "quantum of official discrimination," the court of appeals concurred in Judge Keith's order that the school board integrate its entire school system.<sup>37</sup>

36. *Davis v. School District of Pontiac*, 309 F. Supp. 734 (1970), *affirmed* 443 F. 2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971), *cert. denied* 404 U.S. 913 (1971).

37. Two recent California cases have similarly emasculated *de jure* theory. In *Oxnard*, Judge Harry Pregerson relied merely on a showing of an open enrollment program, some busing transfers, and a few boundary and school site decisions which perpetuated segregation; that is, which did not significantly desegregate the school system when the school board had an opportunity to do so. He called these knowledgeable omissions "*de jure* overtones." *Soria v. Oxnard School District Board*

If this is enough to constitute discriminatory intent, then every northern school board with racially imbalanced schools in effect has an affirmative duty to balance them. When Nathaniel Jones says that with enough time and resources, plaintiffs can prove enough de jure action by school officials to integrate schools in every city in the country,<sup>38</sup> it is a very different, much more elastic kind of de jure action than that which Robert Carter, his predecessor at NAACP, thought—probably correctly—had to be proved in the early 1960s.

### Denver

The case that the Supreme Court chose for its first examination of racial imbalance in northern schools is a perfect vehicle for an examination of the issues discussed above. It has everything: a nullification, disputed findings of de jure discrimination, and even an interesting variant of de facto theory which depends upon the old notion of "separate but equal" which *Brown* supposedly had laid to rest.

Plaintiffs first won a preliminary injunction holding unconstitutional the new school board's rescission of the integration resolutions governing the North-

east Denver black schools.<sup>39</sup> Then, in a two-week trial on the merits in early 1970, they broadened their attack to include the "core schools"—the predominantly black schools in the rest of the city. They introduced very compelling evidence of racial motivation in the administration of both the Northeast schools and the core schools. Blacks had moved into the area of the core schools along an eastward corridor in the 1950s and along another eastward corridor in the Northeast in the 1960s. In both periods, the evidence demonstrated that the school board had drawn and periodically changed school boundaries and built new schools of just the right size in the right places to trap in black schools the black children at the cutting edge of the eastward migration. In both cases, boundary lines were occasionally drawn within one-half block of the school, thus allowing white children one block away to escape the black school and go eight or ten blocks east to a white school. Manipulation of optional zones had the same effect.

The district court found the Northeast segregation to be de jure and that of the core schools to be de facto. Obviously straining to explain how he could draw two different inferences of intention on virtually identical evidence, Judge William E. Doyle emphasized that the decisions with regard to the core schools had come before *Brown*, at a time when neither the black nor white communities felt integrated schools were important. He felt that the core schools decisions were therefore made without the invidious racial animus which characterized the more recent decisions in the Northeast, made when vocal black opposition alerted the board to their racial implications. Of course, the fact

*of Trustees*, 328 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affirmed — F. 2d — (9th Cir. 1972). In Pasadena, Judge Manuel Real more boldly refused to dress up his findings in a de jure formulation. He imposed an affirmative constitutional duty upon the school board to overcome the effects of a purely neutral neighborhood school system if it is imposed over segregated housing patterns. He held that if the board knows that a neighborhood school policy will result in racial imbalance and fails to assign pupils and build schools in such a way as to decrease the imbalance, a court may order relief, including extensive busing, to force the board to do its duty. *Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education*, 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

38. See note 33 above.

39. See the introductory paragraphs of this article.

that they were made with good will, even if true, does not really meet the argument that they were intentionally made to separate the races.

Even if the core school actions had been intentional, the court observed, more would have to be shown to spell out a constitutional violation. The challenged actions of the board must have been a significant cause of the racial imbalance. Since housing discrimination and neighborhood population movements were the real culprits in the core schools area, there was no de jure segregation. Obviously constrained by the early decision of its court of appeals in the Kansas City case,<sup>40</sup> the district court adhered to a very strict formulation of de jure theory, refusing to modify it as the Detroit and Pontiac courts have.

Although refusing to hold the de facto segregated core schools unconstitutional per se, Judge Doyle did rule that the board had a constitutional duty to equalize the educational opportunity offered by the white and black schools.<sup>41</sup> He found black schools in Denver to be unequal in terms of achievement, morale, and teacher experience and turnover. Since plaintiffs' experts had convinced him that compensatory education programs in black schools across the country had proved unworkable and wasteful, he held as a matter of fact that the only way to equalize the Denver schools was to integrate them. Thus he did manage to grant comprehensive relief in a rather ingenious display of fancy

footwork: declaring that there is no substantive legal duty to racially balance de facto segregated schools, but in fact there is no way to equalize them except by balancing them.

While affirming the district court on its finding of de jure segregation in the Northeast schools, the court of appeals would have none of its equal educational opportunity theory, labeling it as a mere variant of the de facto theory which the appeals court had rejected in Kansas City. It reaffirmed that a school board may administer a neutral neighborhood school policy even if it results in racially imbalanced schools with unequal educational opportunity, as long as the state has not intentionally caused the racial imbalance.<sup>42</sup>

In its brief in the Supreme Court, the Legal Defense Fund asked the Court to adopt the district court's de facto equal educational opportunity theory or, in the alternative, to reject its strict formulation of de jure theory. The Fund argued that the very fact that the school board was implicated in intentional segregation in one section of the city should impose upon it the duty to integrate its entire school system or, at the very least, to come forth with a "compelling non-racial state interest" which makes it impractical or unwise to do so. In effect, they have asked the Court to follow the lead of the lower courts in Detroit and Pontiac in watering down de jure theory to dispense with the causation requirement which constrained Judge Doyle not to find a constitutional violation.

#### CONCLUSION

At this writing, the long-awaited Supreme Court edict on northern school segregation has not yet been handed down. However, the recent trend of

40. See note 19 above and accompanying text.

41. The court noted that de facto segregation today stands in the same position as did de jure segregation prior to *Brown* under the separate but equal doctrine of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The school board is not required to integrate its schools, but if it does not, it must at a minimum ensure that they provide equal educational opportunity. 313 F. Supp. at 83.

42. 445 F. 2d 990 (1971).



lower court decisions reviewed here narrowing the de facto-de jure distinction is ground for optimism. If the Court does not dispense with that distinction or, at a minimum, substantially water down de jure theory so that northern courts may continue to use it to grant comprehensive relief, schools lawyers will have to redouble their efforts to clarify certain matters upon which the ultimate success of their legal struggle may depend.

First, although a number of judges seem to be disposed to accept without hard evidence the conclusion that black schools are significantly responsible for their pupils' lower levels of achievement, that proposition remains to be convincingly documented. It is true that the Coleman Report concluded that the socio-economic status—and therefore race—of a pupil's classmates is an important determinant of his academic achievement, and that a recent review of the Coleman data has reaffirmed that conclusion.<sup>43</sup> The reliability of these studies and the data upon which they are based, however, is a matter still hotly disputed among the experts, and they are probably too weak a foundation to support a firm conclusion on the relation of racially imbalanced schools to the achievement disparities.<sup>44</sup> Perhaps the fact that many people, including many black children and parents, *believe* that black schools are inferior is enough to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps the obvious failure of black schools to bring their pupils into the mainstream of

white society and to teach them to relate to the middle-class whites with whom they will have to live and compete may also be enough to condemn them. Were, however, northern schools lawyers able to prove that segregated schools actually caused their pupils' academic harm, their cause would be materially advanced.

Second, it is natural for judges unfamiliar with educational problems to be reluctant to intervene in the administration of a school system. This reluctance is heightened by the fact that there are legitimate values inhering in the neighborhood school system. To what extent should a court subordinate proximity of school to home, or safety in travel, to the value of racial balance? Although they may use school experts to assist them, why should judges be the people making these policy choices?

The fundamental answer to this last query has become more apparent with each incident of nullification of desegregation plans in cities across the country. White Americans appear to act very cohesively to ensure racial isolation in their schools by placing enormous pressure on school boards not to ameliorate it. A practical political analysis of the situation reveals that black children are a disadvantaged minority at the mercy of a unified majority antagonistic or indifferent to their educational welfare. They have virtually no remedy through normal political action outside the courts. There is no higher duty devolving upon a judge than to protect the fundamental interests of minority groups who cannot protect themselves in the political process.<sup>45</sup>

43. See Frederick Mosteller and D. P. Moynihan, eds., *On Equality of Educational Opportunity* (New York: Vintage, 1971); and C. Jencks et. al., *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

44. See Godfrey Hodgson, "Do Schools Make a Difference?" *Atlantic* (March 1973), pp. 35-46.

45. In *Reynolds v. Sims*, the landmark apportionment case, a similar analysis disclosed no real political remedy to break the stranglehold of rural interests on state legislatures. When warned that the "political thicket" would tax judicial capacities, Chief Justice Earl Warren said, "Our answer is this: a

Even where intervention to protect those interests would tax judicial capacities to the limit, it must be done.

But the choice of a prudent constitutional standard to guide the courts in their case-by-case elucidation of the extent to which the competing values of the neighborhood school system should be reflected in their desegregation decrees should prevent the judicial circuits from overloading. It is undoubtedly unreasonable for a child to spend three hours on a bus each day. Where a school board can demonstrate a compelling interest of this kind which makes impractical complete racial balance, it should not be required. But if this

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denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us." 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).

litigation campaign has demonstrated anything, it is that both state and local school officials make a great many decisions which have racial implications. They adjust boundaries, build new schools, acquire sites for them, and have at their disposal a great number of sophisticated techniques for planning and administering an integrated school system. With a small sacrifice of competing values, especially over several years, northern school officials *can* integrate their schools. What is important now is to require the effort to be undertaken. *Denver* may do it. If not, northern schools lawyers will continue to hammer home these considerations until they prick the consciences of the men who expound our Constitution and move them to perform their highest duty: to bring us together.

## Highways as a Barrier to Equal Access

By YALE RABIN

**ABSTRACT:** There is a widening gap between growing concentrations of blacks and other minorities in the central cities, and whites and the expanding supply of employment opportunities in the suburbs. While exclusionary zoning controls have been seen by many as the most immediate barrier to suburban opportunities, transportation facilities and the lack of them play an important role. The federal highway program in particular, while a powerful stimulus to dispersed development, has, in its implementation, failed to protect equal access to the benefits of development such as housing and employment—benefits often made possible entirely by the provision of highway access where none existed before. As a result the comprehensive planning of metropolitan areas is seriously undermined, and new barriers are erected which threaten to perpetuate the burdens and disadvantages which a long history of racial discrimination has produced. Regional planning agencies are needed with adequate authority to make and implement integrated land-use and transportation decisions based on a clearly expressed metropolitan development policy that includes the goal of eliminating all barriers to equal access. In the interim the discriminatory aspects of current transportation policies and projects should be challenged.

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THE sprawling decentralization of this nation's metropolitan areas in the period since World War II has opened new opportunities for improved housing, employment, and schools for millions of Americans, predominantly whites, while restricting both the range of opportunities and the quality of life for blacks and other minority groups who are being relegated in steadily increasing numbers to a growing dependence on the diminishing resources of the central cities. The result is a growing polarization—racially and economically—which is persistently self-reinforcing, and which threatens to perpetuate the burdens and disadvantages which a long history of racial discrimination has produced. Many, if not most, of the great concerns generally characterized as urban problems are probably attributable to the nature of these metropolitan changes.

This polarization is a pervasive aspect of the continuing process of metropolitan decentralization and is a major condition resulting from that process. It therefore appears reasonable to assume that an effective strategy for altering this condition must deal directly with the process by which it continues to be generated. While it is recognized that a great many diverse forces contribute to the process of decentralization, there is much evidence to suggest that transportation policies, programs, and facilities play an important role.

Based on the judgment that the effects of racial and economic polarization are grave enough to require effective remedial action, this article examines the decentralization-polarization process and those aspects of the process that are transportation related, and discusses the implications of that relationship for present and future strategies for change. The elements of the discussion are:

1. The extent of black<sup>1</sup> concentration in central cities, and the dispersal of whites and jobs to the suburbs, are increasing. This process has resulted, and continues to result, in reduced access to growing employment opportunities in the suburbs for inner-city blacks.

2. This reduced access is caused by both the dispersed locations of jobs in relation to black central city concentrations and the dependence for access to those jobs on automobile ownership. These in turn derive from the transportation policies and programs of the federal government, and in particular the authorization and funding of the multi-billion dollar system of metropolitan area highways, which have exerted a major influence on metropolitan dispersal.

3. State highway departments, in designing and constructing the highway systems financed by federal and state funds, have played a major role in determining the spatial distribution of suburban development. Decisions by government agencies at the federal and state levels which determine and approve the locations of highways and their points of access have been and continue to be made without regard to their impact on the redistribution of housing and employment opportunities or the comprehensively planned development of metropolitan areas.

4. In implementing these highway programs, agencies of government have, by providing new or improved access, created billions of dollars in new land values, enriching land owners and developers, and adding substantially to the tax revenues, and consequently the amenities, of countless suburban municipalities; but have failed to take any steps to protect equal access to benefits

1. In this article the term "black" is used to describe blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, and American Indians.

such as housing and employment. Pending projects should be reexamined in this light.

5. While restrictive land-use controls are the most apparent obstacle to low- and moderate-income housing in the suburbs, their removal will not of itself produce housing accessible to low-income blacks, or halt the decline of central cities, or alter the pace and pattern of employment and population dispersal, or create access between existing housing and existing jobs. These changes will require a metropolitan mechanism capable of: making and implementing land-use and transportation decisions in order to locate and provide new low- and moderate-income housing in relation to and in proportion to job opportunities; channeling the growth of centers of employment and residence; and improving transportation access between those centers.

While these circumstances require changes in plans and planning, there are immediate problems that must be the concern of lawyers and lawmakers. Vigorous attempts need to be made to protect the rights of low-income and minority groups under existing transportation programs; and new laws must be enacted that enable the necessary changes in planning to take place.

It is recognized that transportation facilities and policies are not an isolated force and that other public programs have facilitated dispersed development.<sup>2</sup> The focus is on transportation because it is a major factor in dispersal and because transportation facilities are shaped by government policies and paid for by public funds.

2. Probably the most significant of these have been the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance program and the water and sewer grants program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

It is not intended here to make a qualitative judgment about decentralization per se. The ecological and other considerations necessary for such an evaluation go far beyond the scope of this article. Nor is it intended to suggest that racial and economic polarization are inevitable consequences of decentralization. Decentralization, assuming the ability to alter some of the underlying forces, could conceivably result in patterns of spatial, social, and economic distribution substantially different from those that characterize the changes now taking place.

#### METROPOLITAN DECENTRALIZATION AND POLARIZATION

##### *Racial concentration*

The most persistent aspect of metropolitan change is the growing concentration of blacks in the central cities and the continuing exodus of whites and jobs to the surrounding suburbs. The percentage of central city population that is black has doubled since 1950. Between 1950 and 1960, the percentage of blacks living in the central cities of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) increased from 12 percent to 18 percent. In the decade between 1960 and 1970, in the sixty-six SMSAs having populations of 500 thousand or more, the central cities lost 1.92 million whites, while black population there increased by 2.811 million to 10.82 million. In the suburban rings, white population grew by 12.468 million to 54 million, while black population increased by 762 thousand to 2.577 million. The percentage of black population in suburban rings increased from 4.2 percent in 1960 to 4.5 percent in 1970, while the percentage of blacks in the central cities increased from 18 percent in 1960 to 24 percent in 1970. Of the 2.5 million blacks who lived in the suburbs, almost a quarter live in cities

of 50 thousand or more which are located within suburban rings.<sup>3</sup>

In the Philadelphia SMSA, for example, the number of blacks in the suburban ring rose by 48 thousand, increasing the percentage from 6.1 percent in 1960 to 6.6 percent in 1970. However, the suburban ring in the Philadelphia SMSA includes the older cities of Burlington, Camden, and Gloucester in New Jersey; and Bristol, Chester, Coatesville, Conshohocken, and Norristown in Pennsylvania. These cities, some of which have higher rates of unemployment than does Philadelphia, accounted for almost two-thirds of the increase in black population in the seven suburban counties in the SMSA. Consequently, the black population that gained access to the newer developing communities of the suburban counties comprised less than 3 percent of the over half a million increase in those places.<sup>4</sup>

In the thirty-one SMSAs with a population of 1 million or more in 1970, 85.5 percent of all black households earning under \$4 thousand per annum lived in the central cities. For whites, 53.6 percent of households earning under \$4 thousand a year lived in the suburban ring. In the category of \$10 thousand or more annually, 30.9 percent of whites and 76.8 percent of blacks remain in the central cities.<sup>5</sup> The high percentage of low-income white households in suburban areas is not necessarily an indication that barriers of cost do not deter whites. It is more likely the case that a substantial portion of this low-income white group are long-time residents of the older cities located within the

suburban ring and not recent arrivals to the newer expanding suburban communities.

Between 1960 and 1970, the increase in the proportion of city population that is black was almost five times as great as the increase in the proportion of suburban population that is black. And, much of the small gain in the suburbs is offset by the many blacks whose new "suburban" housing is in places like Camden, New Jersey, or East St. Louis, Missouri.

### *Dispersal of jobs*

The continuing departure of whites for the growing opportunities of the suburbs has been accompanied by a steady flow of industrial and commercial employment. In a study published in 1968, John Kain of Harvard University concluded:

By any measure metropolitan growth, since World War II, has been rapid but unevenly distributed. Outlying portions of metropolitan areas have been growing quickly while the central areas have been growing very little and, in an increasing number of instances have actually declined. During this period, what began as a *relative* decline became an *absolute* decline for a lengthening list of central cities. Losses in retail trade and property values, declining profits for central city merchants, and falling tax bases have usually followed from these employment and population declines. Moreover, depopulation was selective; the young, employed, well-to-do, and white moved to suburban areas leaving behind the aged, the unemployed, the poor, and the Negro.<sup>6</sup>

Kain found that between 1954 and 1963 the central cities of the forty largest metropolitan areas lost an average of 25,798 manufacturing jobs and

3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statement of Dr. George H. Brown, Director, before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Hearings on Barriers to Minority Suburban Access, Washington, D.C., June 14, 1971.

4. U.S. Census of Population, 1970.

5. Statement of George Brown.

6. John F. Kain, "The Distribution and Movement of Jobs and Industry," in *The Metropolitan Enigma*, James Q. Wilson, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 1.

that this loss was almost exactly offset by an average growth of manufacturing jobs in the suburbs of 25,948 jobs.<sup>7</sup> Significant declines were also found in retailing and wholesaling employment with the greatest percentage of decentralization occurring in wholesale employment.<sup>8</sup> Kain found that the data "... suggest an *acceleration* of postwar trends toward metropolitan dispersal."<sup>9</sup>

This forecast has certainly been borne out by more recent data. According to an analysis of 1970 census data published by the *New York Times*, the fifteen largest SMSAs in the country provided about 19 million jobs in 1960. Of these approximately 12 million were located in the central cities and 7 million in the suburbs. During the decade between 1960 and 1970, employment in the suburban areas of those SMSAs rose by over 3 million for a gain of 44 percent. During the same period, employment in the central cities declined by 836 thousand or 7 percent, and the central cities' share of total SMSA employment fell from 63 percent to 52.4 percent. By 1970, in nine of these fifteen SMSAs the number of suburban jobs exceeded the number of jobs in central cities; and for all fifteen SMSAs, 72 percent of all workers who lived in the suburbs were also working in the suburbs.<sup>10</sup>

When examined in greater detail, these changes are even more dramatic. In New York City between 1960 and 1970, the number of jobs dropped by almost 10 percent, a loss of almost 340 thousand, while employment in the suburbs increased by 353 thousand. In six

other cities employment fell by over 10 percent. In Detroit employment within the city fell by 23 percent, or 156 thousand jobs. In the Philadelphia SMSA the number of jobs in the city fell by 98 thousand or 11.3 percent between 1960 and 1970. By contrast, jobs in the suburbs increased during the same period by 61.4 percent, a gain of 314 thousand jobs.<sup>11</sup>

Adjusting for the one-year difference in time, omitting the disproportionate impact of New York, and assuming conservatively that only 75 percent of the loss was in manufacturing, the average job loss in the remaining fourteen cities for the 1960-70 period was over 20 percent greater than the average job loss that Kain found for the 1954-63 period.

More recent data covering the period from January 1970 to December 1972 indicate that the trend continues unabated. In each case there has been a decline in the city's share of SMSA employment, and in each case the rate of decline has been equal to or greater than that of the 1960-70 period.<sup>12</sup>

### *Inaccessibility*

The nature and extent of racial polarization and employment dispersal are widely recognized, and disparities between the unemployment rates of blacks and whites are well known. Unemployment rates among blacks have for many years been approximately double the unemployment rates for whites. There are strong indications that, while a number of other factors including poor education, lack of skills, and racial discrimination contribute to higher unemployment rates among blacks, the inaccessibility resulting from polarization and dispersal plays an important role.

11. Ibid.

12. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings* 17, no. 9 (March 1971); *ibid.*, vol. 19, no. 8 (February 1973).

7. Ibid., pp. 19, 20.

8. Ibid., p. 16.

9. Ibid., p. 22.

10. Jack Rosenthal, "Large Suburbs Out-taking Cities in the Number of Jobs Supplied," *New York Times*, October 15, 1972. These figures appear to exclude employment in state and local governments.

Several examinations of this relationship provide compelling evidence that this is so.

Kain, in a study published in early 1968, examined these relationships for the cities of Chicago and Detroit and found that distance imposed unreasonable cost burdens on centrally located blacks, and that public transit, because it focused on the central business district, was badly oriented for traveling from the ghetto to outlying centers of employment.<sup>13</sup> He examined the effects of residential segregation on black unemployment and the effects of dispersal on black unemployment and concluded:

While the estimates presented in this paper of Negro job loss due to housing market segregation are highly tentative, they nonetheless suggest that housing market segregation may reduce the level of Negro employment and thereby contribute to the high unemployment rate of metropolitan Negroes.<sup>14</sup> [Furthermore] . . . the empirical findings do suggest that postwar suburbanization of metropolitan employment may be further undermining the position of the Negro, and that the continued high levels of Negro unemployment in a full employment economy may be partially attributable to the rapid and adverse (for the Negro) shifts in the location of jobs.<sup>15</sup>

Subsequent conclusions by others have not been couched in such cautious terms.

A paper presented to the Conference on Poverty and Transportation in 1968 also acknowledged that existing public transit facilities were designed primarily to bring residents of outlying areas to the employment concentrations to be found in the central business district

and then noted:

In contrast suburban employment concentrations are being developed during an era of widespread private ownership of automobiles. They rely on their employees to commute to work by private automobile and generally are poorly serviced by transit, if at all. Central city residents, particularly low income residents and Negroes, may find suburban employment centers difficult or expensive to reach, because their incidence of private-automobile ownership is relatively low. A normal expedient would be to relocate one's residence near the area of current or prospective employment. However, non-whites may be deterred from doing so by residential segregation. These factors interact so as to limit the number of job opportunities available to lower income Negroes.<sup>16</sup>

The author also found that distance reduced the level of information about job availability and that the scattered nature of suburban employment was a deterrent to job seeking.<sup>17</sup>

The National Commission on Urban Problems appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967 examined five metropolitan areas: Baltimore, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco; and found that "commuting from the central cities of these five metropolitan areas to suburban jobs is both time consuming and costly."<sup>18</sup> They also found that "existing in-and-out commuter public transit systems are generally not suited to 'reverse commuting.'"<sup>19</sup>

A study of the Philadelphia area done at Villanova University in 1971 to ex-

13. John F. Kain, "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 82 (May 1968), pp. 180, 181.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

16. Edward Kalachek, "Ghetto Dwellers, Transportation, and Employment" (presented at the Conference on Poverty and Transportation, Brookline, Massachusetts, June 7, 1968), pp. 3-5.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 13.

18. "Building the American City," Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems to the Congress and to the President of the United States, December 12, 1968, p. 48.

19. *Ibid.*



amine accessibility of suburban employment by public transportation found that only 11 percent of the trips from low-income, inner-city residential zones to suburban industrial parks can be made in less than forty-nine minutes and that 42 percent would take between seventy and eighty-nine minutes. In addition, 63 percent of all trips had weekly costs between \$3.50 and \$8.37. The remaining 37 percent ranged in cost from \$10.20 to \$16.00 per week.<sup>20</sup> Because the rate of automobile ownership in inner-city residential zones was 11.4 persons per automobile, most residents were dependent on other means of transportation.<sup>21</sup> It was concluded that "... people who reside in low-income residential areas of Philadelphia are virtually trapped because of lack of mobility in reaching regional industrial parks."<sup>22</sup>

Data on distribution of employment by place of residence in the fifteen largest SMSAs for 1970 also suggest that central cities are more accessible from the suburbs than the suburbs are from the central cities. Workers who live in cities hold 70.0 percent of all city jobs and 14.4 percent of all suburban jobs, while workers who live in suburbs hold 85.6 percent of all suburban jobs and 30.0 percent of all city jobs. Suburban residents hold more than twice the proportion of city jobs that city residents hold of suburban jobs; and 70 percent of all employment-related commuting between city and suburbs is by workers living in the suburbs. In addition, the share of city jobs held by suburban residents has increased at a much greater rate

than the share of suburban jobs held by city residents.

While it is not possible here to assign specific dimensions to the role played by inaccessibility in increasing the employment disadvantages of black city residents, it appears clear that access to suburban employment opportunities is substantially reduced.

#### *Some related effects*

The consequences of this seemingly inexorable polarization process produces secondary effects which tend to compound and reinforce disparities in opportunity and tendencies toward dispersal. Thus the departure of commerce, industry, and middle-class residents to the suburbs may reduce the city's tax revenues. To offset this loss, new taxes are levied or rates raised, adding further to the impetus to leave. Such cities, faced with the need to spread declining tax revenues over an expanding demand for services and facilities, are unlikely to be able to compete with the more affluent suburbs for competent personnel and may be forced to hire less-qualified applicants, or reduce the number of their employees. These cutbacks result in reductions in the level and quality of services—for example, in increased classroom sizes, less frequent street maintenance, or restricted library hours.

These effects simply add to the pressure for leaving and at the same time reduce the quality of life for those who must remain. The exodus of middle-class households then hastens the further departure of retail and consumer services establishments, once again reinforcing the cycle.

The situation in the city is further compounded by the scattered successes achieved in attempts to lower suburban cost barriers. Since these have the effect of slightly lowering the income

20. John Collura and James J. Schuster, "Accessibility of Low-Income Residential Areas in Philadelphia to Regional Industrial Parks," Institute for Transportation Studies, Villanova University, 1971, pp. 6, 7, 28, 29.

21. Ibid., p. 41.

22. Ibid., Abstract.

thresholds necessary for access to the suburbs, they enable some households at the upper level of the economically restricted population in the city to leave, thereby increasing the proportion of low-income households which remain.

#### HIGHWAYS AND DECENTRALIZATION

##### *Highways and suburban development*

The forces at work in the process of decentralization, while diverse, appear to fall for the most part into two general categories: (1) those that tend to create pressures to disperse and (2) those that enable or limit decentralization and influence its characteristics. The first may include, among others, lack of space for expansion, high land costs, obsolete facilities, changing transportation needs, new transportation options, high taxes, poor services, inadequate housing, poor schools, fear of violence, and racial discrimination.

The second category includes suitable and affordable land to which necessary services are available, or can be reasonably made available, and which is accessible to necessary support services such as labor, materials, markets, housing, schools, shopping, and employment.

Transportation facilities are significant factors in both categories. However, it is in the second category that they assume a dominant role; for no matter how inexpensive or suitable land may be, and no matter how adequate the supporting services and facilities may be, to make development feasible, the land must be accessible. Adequate access, or the reasonable expectation that it will be provided, is essential if development is to take place.

The relationship between land use and transportation has long been understood, and the principle that both should evolve from a planning process that fits transportation facilities to travel needs generated by planned pat-

terns of land use is a basic element of planning theory. However, as is so often the case, practice is another matter. In metropolitan areas it is the highway system which stimulates development. The National Commission on Urban Problems was emphatic on this point:

Probably there is no more important single determinant of the timing and location of urban development than highways. Highways in effect "create" urban land where none existed before by extending the commuting distance from existing cities. The low-density pattern found in most of the Nation's suburban areas would never have been possible without the effect of high-speed highways in reducing the importance of compact urban development. As highways stretch out from existing urban areas, development quickly follows, with even the most carefully considered plans and zoning ordinances rarely providing a match for the development pressures generated. The phenomenon of strip commercial development along non-limited access roads is one example of the irresistibility of such pressures.<sup>23</sup>

An understanding of the development potential of highways has not been limited to planners. Highway departments across the country have, over the past twenty years, produced dozens of studies that demonstrate the "beneficial" role of highways in stimulating development and increasing land values.<sup>24</sup>

A striking example of highway impact is to be found in Parsippany-Troy Hills, N.J., where five highways, three of them new interstates, will intersect. Population since 1950 has increased from 15,290 to 55,112 in 1970. The value of all property in the town has risen from \$107 million to \$483 million in the past ten years.<sup>25</sup>

23. "Building the American City," p. 231.

24. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, *Highways and Economic and Social Change* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 204-21.

25. David K. Shieler, "New Highways

The principal incentive behind this growing system of metropolitan highways is the U.S. Highway Trust Fund<sup>26</sup> which provides about \$5.5 billion annually in funds whose use is restricted by law to highway construction. These funds pay 90 percent of the costs for highways that are elements of the interstate system and 50 percent of the cost of U.S. primary highways, state highways, and urban highways.

Between 1956 and the end of 1972, over \$55 billion in Highway Trust funds had been spent on the interstate system alone. By comparison, the 1970 Urban Mass Transit Assistance Act, with its authorization of \$3.1 billion over a five-year period, appears as little more than a token gesture to placate the critics of poor transportation planning.

These restricted Trust Fund subsidies, and principally the 90 percent interstate contributions, are powerful incentives to the continuing construction of highways; and in the absence of adequate funding for mass transit or control by regional plans, they are also powerful incentives for continuing uncontrolled dispersal.

### *Highways and public transit*

It has already been noted that existing public transit systems are generally not capable of meeting the journey-to-work needs of those who live in the inner city who might work or seek work in the suburbs. In addition, the great volume of auto commuting generated by highway-oriented patterns of dispersal has resulted in substantial reductions in

patronage on existing public transit facilities.

Public transit reached its peak patronage of 23.3 billion passengers per year in 1945. By 1970 this figure had declined to 7.3 billion, 40 percent less than the 12.1 billion passengers per year recorded in 1912.<sup>27</sup>

Faced with greatly reduced revenues, some transit companies have ceased to operate, thus eliminating service entirely. In most cases the result has been severe cutbacks in service and substantial increases in fares—often by as much as 400 percent since 1950—burdens that are most heavily borne by low-income inner-city residents who are most dependent on public transit for access between home and workplace.

Not only does widespread affluence intensify the traffic problem by substituting automobiles for buses but this very reaction ricochets back and intensifies the poverty problem. With the majority of the urban area residents, and practically all of the suburbanites, commuting by car, too few mass transit users remain to support good service. Thus an increase in per capita income has improved the transportation position of the majority, except perhaps in the peaks of traffic congestion but has left the poor worse off. Elderly residents, physically unable to drive, are also left worse off. . . . Simultaneously with the decline of mass transit, manufacturing, retailing, and other activities have been suburbanizing. With suburban densities far too low to support the extension of the lines of even a healthy mass transit system, the elderly, those financially unable to own a car, those unable to drive and others find that dependence on the central city mass transit system has narrowed their employment opportunities very appreciably.<sup>28</sup>

Shaping Future of City's Suburbs," *New York Times*, August 19, 1971.

26. For more detailed discussion of the Trust Fund see Alan Mowbray, *Road to Ruin* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969); Helen Leavitt, *Superhighway, Superhoax* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970); and Ben Kelley, *The Pavers and the Paved* (New York: Donald W. Brown, Inc., 1971).

27. Wilfred Owen, *The Accessible City* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 27.

28. Wilbur R. Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 375.

### *Highways and planning*

The planning of highways is carried out, not by metropolitan planning agencies as might be reasonably expected, but by state highway departments whose officials have repeatedly contended that they have neither the responsibility nor the authority to deal with land-use matters. Thus highway officials do not include among their considerations the developmental impacts of the routes, access points, and inter-sections of the systems they design.

This attitude has persisted, with the tacit approval of the Bureau of Public Roads which must approve all federally funded projects, in spite of a provision in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 that:

after July 1, 1965, the Secretary shall not approve . . . any program for projects in urban areas of more than fifty thousand population unless he finds that such projects are based on a continuing comprehensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively by States and local communities in conformity with the objectives stated in this section.<sup>29</sup>

Procedures for compliance with this provision were developed by the Bureau of Public Roads, and their effect was to preserve, virtually unchanged, the prerogatives of state highway departments.

As transportation planning processes were organized in metropolitan areas, planning agencies at both local and metropolitan levels were bypassed by state highway departments which deal directly with local governing bodies and elected officials.<sup>30</sup>

The Bureau of Public Roads made no requirement that highway plans be

consistent with land-use plans, even where such plans had been adopted by local authorities. Even the refusal of a local government to participate in cooperative planning, or to approve of highway elements within its jurisdiction, was not considered evidence that the process was ineffective, or grounds for disapproving a project. All that was required was that the state highway department make "scrupulous efforts" to obtain a local government's cooperation.<sup>31</sup>

Recognition of the need for comprehensive planning was not limited to the 1962 Highway Act. Subsequent highway and mass transit legislation in 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 has repeated and expanded the concerns of Congress and instructed highway officials to coordinate roads with other forms of urban transportation, give due consideration to the impact of highways on the future development of metropolitan areas, and, in consultation with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), "assure that urban transportation systems most effectively serve both national transportation needs and the comprehensively planned development of urban areas."<sup>32</sup>

In compliance with the 1962 Highway Act and subsequent legislation, many regional transportation agencies were established, but these were limited to advisory roles, thus leaving the authority of the state highway departments intact. All of the initiatives in the "continuing comprehensive transportation planning process" were maintained by those who allocate and spend the resources of the Highway Trust Fund. Having observed this process for several years, the National Commission on Urban Problems also found that state

29. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Public Law 87-866, section 9(a).

30. Thomas A. Morehouse, "The 1962 Highway Act: A Study in Artful Interpretation," *AIP Journal* 35, no. 3 (May 1969), p. 164.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

32. Department of Transportation Act, Public Law 89-670, 1966, section 4(g).

highway departments

... are able to ignore totally the desires of local officials; and no State agencies—outside the legislatures and Governors—are established to reconcile differences. The result is that State highway departments to a considerable extent go their own way, leaving local officials “holding the bag” after a poorly planned and designed highway has damaged sections of built-up areas (and left the job of relocating displacees to already hardpressed local housing officials) or completely ignored and effectively destroyed development plans. . . . In practice, then, highways are seldom used as affirmative tools for development guidance.<sup>33</sup>

While the Congress wisely urged comprehensive planning, the states took care to see that the light shed by planning studies should not adversely affect existing commitments. In California, for example, the legislature in compliance with the 1962 Highway Act established the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission (BATSC), but

... wisely provided that the Commission's existence should not interfere with or in any way impede “execution by Federal, State, or local public agencies of any projects in the Bay Area which have already been planned by such agencies, or which might be planned during the course of the study.”<sup>34</sup>

The BATSC report, issued in 1969, was frank in conceding that the highway-dominant system proposed failed to deal with problems such as the isolation of racial minorities from employment owing to lack of public transportation and low rates of automobile ownership.<sup>35</sup> The report explained that, “BATSC analysis and projections are based largely on extension of current

policies and planning as it exists in the Bay Area.”<sup>36</sup> The major reason for this is that “no enforceable general regional plan to which transportation might be fitted exists.”<sup>37</sup>

Meanwhile, new regulations issued by the Department of Transportation in 1968 required that public hearings on highway proposals include consideration of twenty-three possible effects of highways including social, economic, and environmental impacts.<sup>38</sup> However, since the new regulations contained no criteria or guide lines by which these impacts were to be judged, no enforceable requirements were produced other than that these factors be “considered.” During the four years that the new public hearing regulations have been in effect there is no record of a single instance in which the U.S. Department of Transportation, *on its own initiative*, rejected a highway project proposed by a state highway department because of its adverse social, economic, or environmental impact.

Approved highway plans are by definition enforceable, and their developmental consequences, in the absence of meaningful standards and enforceable regional plans, have been and continue to be determined by private developers and sanctioned by the zoning powers of local municipal governments.

Congressional concern for the comprehensively planned development of urban areas and the coordination of all forms of urban transportation is unmistakable. It seems inconceivable in these circumstances that the implementation of the highway program to date can

36. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 74, emphasis added.

33. “Building the American City,” p. 231.

34. Bay Area Transportation Study Commission, “Bay Area Transportation Report,” May 1969, pp. 3, 4, emphasis added.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

38. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8 BPR, January 17, 1969. Original hearing requirements relating to the interstate system required only that a hearing be held on the “economic effects” of the proposed highway.

be construed as complying with their wishes. Development is guided not by plans, comprehensive or otherwise, but by private investment decisions; and a major result of the process has been the erection of massive new economic barriers to overcoming the disadvantages produced by a long history of racial discrimination.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE

Edward Banfield, writing recently in this journal, skillfully disposed of "the several factors widely held to be the principal causes of the 'urban crisis,'"<sup>39</sup> and concluded with a characteristic flourish:

If these are not the principal causes of the "urban crisis," what are? My answer is that they are mainly changes in the way things are perceived, judged, and valued, and in the expectations that are formed accordingly—in a phrase, changes in the state of the public mind.<sup>40</sup>

While this point of view serves as a convenient rationale for the further conclusion that "... the 'urban crisis' is not to be solved or alleviated by government programs, however massive,"<sup>41</sup> it ignores both the increasing polarization which is taking place and the role played by "massive government programs" in bringing it about.

#### *Efforts to date*

Urban economic problems, real not imagined, underlie every aspect of the "urban crisis" and are largely a consequence of the inequitable distribution of metropolitan resources and opportuni-

ties. Efforts, to date, to alleviate racial and economic polarization have been directed primarily at the exclusionary barriers to the construction of low- and moderate-income housing in suburban communities. These efforts have taken several forms. There have been numerous law suits attacking the restrictive provisions of local zoning ordinances; a few states have enacted legislation that establishes procedures for overriding local zoning restrictions; a few regional planning agencies have prepared "fair share" plans for allocating low- and moderate-income housing among suburban communities; and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has revised its site location criteria in order to promote racial integration. The immediate goal of most of these efforts has been the production of moderate- rather than low-income housing.

These measures, while producing scattered instances of success, have, nevertheless, had no material effect on the gap between the growing concentrations of minority groups in central cities and the steady departure of employment opportunities to the suburban hinterland.

This is true because zoning suits generally affect only one municipality. State "anti-snob" zoning statutes depend on the initiative of developers who have been denied permission to build, and their reluctance has rendered these statutes ineffective. In New York State, a state housing agency has the authority to override local zoning and build low- and moderate-income housing; but there has been a marked reluctance to do so in wealthy suburbs of New York City such as Westchester County. Fair share plans, while they serve a useful purpose in quantifying disparities and developing allocation models, lack any authority to require compliance. New HUD site location

39. Edward C. Banfield, "A Critical View of the Urban Crisis," *THE ANNALS* 405 (January 1973), pp. 8-14. The factors that Banfield considers and dismisses are: overcrowding, white flight to the suburbs, the physical environment, white racism, and the multiplicity of metropolitan governments.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

criteria have resulted in a virtual halt to the construction of inner-city subsidized housing<sup>42</sup> and have resulted in the construction of some units in the suburbs, the great majority of which have been occupied by whites.

Highway projects have also been challenged in the courts. And, a few of these challenges have succeeded in halting individual projects, either on the grounds that relocation resources were inadequate or that public parkland was being improperly taken. No attempt, however, has yet been made to invoke the wishes of Congress and challenge highway proposals because the auto-dominant pattern of dispersal which they generate reduces both the mobility and the basic opportunities of low-income inner-city residents. Highway proposals should be vulnerable simply on the grounds that they subvert "the comprehensively planned development of urban areas."

In the light of growing national support for mass transit, it is also important to understand that new rail transit systems such as Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in California and the Lindenwold Line in New Jersey are equally ineffective for improving access for inner-city residents to opportunities in the suburbs. Both systems are designed to bring suburban residents to their places of employment in the offices and stores of the central business districts. The same is also true of the rail transit systems approved for Washington and Atlanta. Both focus on the central business districts and government centers.

*Metropolitan development policy, equal opportunity, and regional planning*

While it is important that immediate attempts be made to insure that the

benefits of present programs are more equitably accessible, long-range improvements will require more fundamental changes. If disparities in opportunity are to be effectively reduced, and hopefully eliminated, there must be intervention in the process itself to alter the forces that generate, shape, and sanction racial and economic polarization. Such intervention must be regional in character and must be based on a functional rather than a political definition of the region. That is, it must not be arbitrarily restricted by state boundaries.

Regional planning agencies could effectively meet this need if granted additional authority in the context of a national urban growth policy, or more appropriately, a national metropolitan development policy. Such a policy should include, among many others, such goals as:

- the elimination of transportation barriers to and between employment and housing;
- the development of patterns of land use which can be efficiently served by public transportation;
- the development of integrated multi-mode transportation systems which fit travel mode to type and intensity of land use, and permit convenient interchange between modes;
- the provision of low- and moderate-income housing in relation to and in proportion to existing and potential opportunities for employment throughout the region.

None of the goals is in any way inconsistent with the policies set forth in existing metropolitan development and transportation legislation. Goals such

42. The more recent moratorium on spending imposed by President Nixon has halted the

construction of all subsidized housing for which funds had not already been committed.

as these merely express a recognition of the widespread effects of narrowly conceived programs that have been implemented in isolation from each other. Based on that recognition, they incorporate other dependent goals such as equal access to opportunity.

Such a metropolitan development policy should, of course, also include goals directed at guiding growth, protecting and improving the environment, preserving open space and natural resources, providing public services and facilities, conserving energy, and so on. All of these goals will then require the development of reasonable standards against which the performance of regional planning agencies and local governments can be evaluated.

We have both the experience and the expertise to formulate such standards. It is as feasible to establish standards for equal access to employment and housing as it is to establish standards for clean air or pupil-teacher ratios. And, more important, we have learned through experience that the injunction to "consider," in the absence of standards, is an empty gesture which has failed to provide any protection at all. The following are a few examples of equal-opportunity related standards which might be employed in evaluating transportation proposals:

- New transportation systems and facilities should improve accessibility between centers of low-income minority-group housing and centers of employment.
- New transportation facilities must support and reinforce existing public transit systems.
- Access points to new transportation facilities may not be located within jurisdictions which do not provide housing opportunities for minority-groups and low-income households.

In order to implement such policies, regional planning agencies must be granted powers which they do not now have:

1. The planning function must be made both meaningful and objective by transference of all responsibility for the planning of transportation facilities from state highway and transportation departments to the regional planning agencies. The state agencies would of course continue to build, maintain, and operate transportation facilities and conduct research in the areas of technology and safety.

2. The regional planning agencies must be granted limited development control powers in order to meet clearly defined regional goals: as in areas where it is necessary to control growth stimulated by transportation facilities, or where low- or moderate-cost housing sites are not provided by local authorities; or to protect regional resources, provide regional facilities, or prevent the development of land not suitable for development.<sup>43</sup>

3. The regional planning agencies should function as regional relocation agencies to provide the maximum opportunities for access to employment-related housing for households displaced by public actions.

4. The regional planning agencies should be authorized to function as a housing authority of last resort—that is, to be able to condemn land and

43. The political feasibility of delegating development control authority to a regional planning agency is considerably enhanced by the continuing trend toward increased revenue sharing. As long as municipal services must be financed primarily out of property taxes, local zoning prerogatives will be jealously guarded. However, the transfer of any substantial portion of this burden to revenue sharing funds should reduce the opposition of those who view local zoning control primarily as a tool for controlling municipal expenditures.



construct low- and moderate-income housing where local authorities fail to meet regional needs for such housing.

An early step toward the provision of improved access should be the extension of control over the locations of regional employment growth. This could be accomplished by selecting several existing suburban commercial or industrial centers which have the best access to inner-city residential areas, and which have room for expansion, and directing new development to them by restricting the further growth of the other less accessible centers. In this way a concentration of employment could be achieved which would warrant the provision of bus service to inner-city residential areas.

An analysis should also be made of land adjoining the rights-of-way of all existing rail lines in the region to identify sets of locations that have the potential for development capable of supporting rail transit service. Relocating or adding stations along existing commuter rail lines may serve to reinforce improved access policies and generate additional transit patronage. There may be instances in which relatively short extensions to these lines may serve to establish viable links between inner-city housing and suburban employment.

#### *Current policies should be challenged*

In the interim, to the continuing attacks on restrictive zoning should be added widespread efforts to bring the federal highway and transit programs into compliance with the wishes of Congress as expressed in the highway, transit, and metropolitan development

legislation of the past ten years and the provisions of existing civil rights legislation. The restriction of funds to financing a single mode of transportation which discriminates against low-income persons should be challenged. Similarly, challenges should be raised to any project, road or rail, that has the effect of reducing the travel options of low-income persons—depriving them of access to basic necessities such as employment and housing. The construction of pending projects should be halted until a determination is made that each proposal meets equal opportunity criteria and “most effectively serves both national transportation needs and the comprehensively planned development of urban areas.”

It is no longer reasonable to accept the conclusion that:

We are not yet able to plan transportation networks or systems with adequate sophistication to preclude the occurrence of unanticipated results in land use patterns, nor have we been able to plan and implement land use patterns that assure the continuing adequacy of installed or proposed transportation facilities.<sup>44</sup>

We have been able to do so for a long time. We have, however, been unwilling, perhaps because “the state of the public mind” has attached insufficient importance to the burdens imposed on some by decisions made by those who experience only the benefits of public programs.

44. Max L. Feldman, “Transportation: An Equal Opportunity for Access,” in *Environment and Policy*, W. R. Ewald, Jr., ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 186.

## Black Workers Inside the House of Labor

By WILLIAM B. GOULD

ABSTRACT: While both construction and industrial unions have made some efforts to remedy racial discrimination in employment, their failure to come to grips with systematic practices of discrimination has made the federal judiciary the main forum for the resolution of such disputes. Institutional practices that can have a discriminatory impact upon black workers and racial minorities remain in effect. Contrary to public belief about rank and file and local union resistance to national union policies that promote civil rights, it is the official policy of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) not to alter such procedures which are negotiated in the collective bargaining process—and which screen out blacks disproportionately to whites. Even unions with a substantial black membership continue to have lily-white executive boards at the national level. More blacks are moving into leadership positions—especially in the United Auto Workers (UAW) and some of the public employee unions. However, in the interim the phenomenon of black workers in white-led unions is bound to produce discontent, black worker organizations, and, in some instances, industrial strife.

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AMERICAN trade unions have been a significant factor in the development of racial discrimination patterns in employment in this country.<sup>1</sup> The support that many unions gave to President Nixon's reelection and the anti-black policies which that Administration has furthered, George Meany's benign neutrality during the 1972 campaign, and the appointment of construction union leader Peter Brennan as secretary of labor are all signs pointing ominously to the conclusion that the labor movement's instinct in the '70s may be to thwart equal employment opportunity and not advance its cause.<sup>2</sup>

Yet paradoxically, some elements in the labor movement are playing a role in undoing past discrimination—a role which may become more significant as blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans gain a more secure political position in the blue collar unions that have bargaining rights in industries where the influx of minority group workers has been substantial during the past decade.

Some unions, like the United Auto Workers (UAW), have attempted to press employers to alter discriminatory hiring patterns and to induce their white members to work alongside of blacks on the production line.<sup>3</sup> Unions in both construction and manufacturing, along with employers, have made some efforts to integrate the skilled job classifications from which blacks and other racial minorities have been traditionally excluded.

Moreover, the fact that some of the most rampant racial discrimination exists where unions are weak is often ignored. Not only does the American trade union movement represent a much smaller percentage of the work force than do their counterparts in most Western industrially advanced countries,<sup>4</sup> but in industries such as utilities—particularly the electric power industry—the unions are deprived of effective economic power in the form of the strike weapon because technological innovation permits the employer to operate with a supervisory work force. Yet despite the absence of an influential or dominant work group, racial discrimination flourishes.<sup>5</sup>

The industrial unions, like the United Auto Workers, the United Steelworkers, and the United Rubber Workers, have had the least discriminatory of union policies inasmuch as economic realities permitted blacks to penetrate the mass production industries in which those unions bargained in the 1930s and during World War II—the time at which such unions were coming into existence and gaining their first bit of muscle power. But, until very recently, blacks have remained virtually absent from skilled trades and better-paying jobs in such industries—usually with union acquiescence and sometimes through local union urging. The emergence of black caucuses in many locals as whites have begun to leave the industry and the re-

1. See generally Arthur Max Ross, "The Negro in the American Economy," in Arthur Max Ross and Herbert Hill, eds., *Employment, Race and Poverty* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967).

2. See William B. Gould, "Moving the Hard-Hats In," *Nation* 216 (January 8, 1973), p. 41.

3. See Irving Howe and B. Jack Widick, *The UAW and Walter Reuther* (New York: Random House, 1949), pp. 207-34.

4. International Labour Office, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* (Geneva, 1967), Table 3, pp. 276-95.

5. Equal Opportunity Commission, *Promise versus Performance: A Study of Equal Employment Opportunity in the Nation's Electric and Gas Utilities* (June 1972). See particularly *Willie Stamps, et al., v. Detroit Edison, et al.* Civil No. 36515 and 38479 (E.D. Mich., filed May 17, 1971); *U.S. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.*, 327 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.Va. 1971).

tention of lily-white international executive boards in all major unions except the United Automobile Workers, the American Federation of Teachers, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, have fanned the fires of discontent and sometimes triggered industrial strife.<sup>6</sup>

The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, with a minority membership of more than 10 percent, has no black executive board members. Blacks are excluded from the lucrative over the road driving jobs—often because whites have refused to ride with them in sleeper cabs.<sup>7</sup> With a minority membership of approximately 30 percent, the Steelworkers has no black or Chicano on the executive board. The same pattern prevails in the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. Thus far, however, the issue of political power for black caucuses inside the unions has begun to emerge in the courts only where there have been previously segregated locals. Two of the principal unions receiving attention are the American Federation of Musicians<sup>8</sup> and the International Longshoremen Union (not to be confused with the West Coast ILWU)—both of which have a tradition of segregated locals.

However, it is the multi-union industries, such as railroads, and construction

which represent the most flagrant instances of racial discrimination in the unionized sector of the economy—and here labor has played a very active role. On the railroads, blacks have been limited to menial classifications, such as train porters, and have been systematically driven from the industry by unions which, in some instances, have had constitutional color bars. The pattern in construction is different because in sharp contrast to railways, it has been a growth industry. Accordingly, while blacks have been locked in—and in this instance to a laborer's position where they are represented by the Laborers Union—the exclusive question has been one of penetration to other trades, particularly the near lily-white mechanical trades: plumbers and pipefitters, sheet metal workers, electricians, iron workers, and operating engineers.

### *Restrictive practices attacked*

Two important themes run through all disputes and litigation arising out of employment discrimination practiced by the unions. The first is restrictive practices; that is, mechanisms which are geared to protect union member job security have been the vehicles for racial discrimination and have been successfully attacked in a series of cases in the federal court decisions. With the industrial unions, the seniority system is most often the subject of litigation. Seniority systems have been struck down where they limited and interfered with the promotion and transfer rights of black employees previously restricted in all or predominantly black job departments or lines of progression. Where the construction unions have been involved, the matter has been considerably more complex. Recruitment methods: nepotism in the selection of both journeymen and apprentices, written and oral examinations in apprentice selection, reliance upon arrest and conviction records as

6. See generally William B. Gould, "Black Power in the Unions: The Impact upon Collective Bargaining Relationships," *Yale Law Journal* 79 (1969), p. 46; Herbert Hill, "Black Protest and the Struggle for Union Democracy," *Issues in Industrial Society* 1 (1969), p. 19.

7. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Initial Statement before the Interstate Commerce Commission, December 1, 1971.

8. See, for example, *Pittsburgh Black Musicians v. American Federation of Musicians, Local 60-471*, Civil No. 71-1008 (W.D.Pa., filed October 22, 1971).

the basis for exclusion, high school diploma and course requirements, limited membership size and the duration of the apprentice programs, the hiring hall and referral seniority credits utilized to determine who is to be referred out first—all of these mechanisms, arguably legitimate and reasonable in vacuo, have been the subject of employment discrimination litigation and in many circumstances have been declared to be at odds with the strictures of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Trade union resistance*

The second important point is that there has been near total trade union resistance to the voluntary resolution of disputes that arise out of protests against systematic discrimination involving large groups of employees. What is not recognized is that this rigidity is not simply an attitude expressed by the rank and file which takes a form of local union leadership resistance to national policy. This is national policy itself.

The public's understanding is reflected in what the Civil Rights Commission said in 1961: "Within the labor movement itself, civil rights goals are celebrated at the higher levels, but fundamental internal barriers tend to preserve discrimination at the working man's level."<sup>10</sup> Whatever its truth in 1961—when the Commission's study of employment discrimination was published—it is clearly inaccurate in 1973. Indeed, it has been inaccurate ever since the effective date of Title VII.

George Meany, the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress

of Industrial Organizations) leader, supported the passage of fair employment practices legislation in 1963, while the Kennedy administration still equivocated about including job discrimination proposals as a part of its civil rights legislative package. But this pro-civil rights position of the AFL-CIO evaporated when it came to the actual implementation of Title VII.

In 1966, a solid phalanx of AFL-CIO union representatives (including the UAW—then still a member of the AFL-CIO) appeared before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to say that industrial seniority was a complex matter, that seniority procedures were under no circumstances to be tampered with—even though the failure to modify them meant limiting the advance of black union members—and that the Commission and courts should not interfere with sanctified collective bargaining agreements which protected union members from "the bad old days." Subsequently, the Building and Construction Trades Department expressed the view, in its Statement of Policy on Equal Employment Opportunity at the 1969 AFL-CIO Convention, that a three-pronged attack on racially exclusionary practices was appropriate: (1) the "acceleration and extension" of Department of Labor sponsored Apprenticeship Outreach programs; (2) the "flat and unqualified" recommendation to locals that they for a "stated period of time" invite qualified minority journeymen into membership; and (3) training programs for the upgrading of minority workers no longer of apprenticeable age. But these proposals have been relatively insignificant because both the Department of Labor-sponsored Outreach Apprenticeship programs and "hometown plans," which purport to upgrade workers beyond apprenticeship age, are slow-moving and ineffective. The gains achieved by both of

9. *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); *Rowe v. General Motors Corp.*, 457 F. 2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); *U.S. v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36*, 416 F. 2d 123 (8th Cir. 1968); *Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler*, 407 F. 2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).

10. United States Civil Rights Commission Report, "Employment," vol. 4 (1961), p. 151.

these programs have been, to put it euphemistically, modest indeed. Moreover, there are very few skilled minority journeymen who can take advantage of invitations to join when they are given—and they are given rarely. When invitations have been forthcoming, they are qualified with a “Catch 22” process, which requires in some instances the loss of economic benefits—often specifically in the form of being placed at the bottom of the seniority referral ladder where one exists.

Accordingly, despite the protestations of innocence for them by their apologists,<sup>11</sup> the unions are in the federal courts a great deal these days. Like the employers, they have lost practically all of the major cases to either private plaintiffs or the Department of Justice.<sup>12</sup> The fact that the practices attacked are provisions of collective bargaining agreements means little if anything at all. As Judge David W. Dyer said two years ago:

That hoary collective bargaining agreements now mandate perpetuation of past aberration from the government policy backing [against racial discrimination in employment] does not affect the propriety of judicial action. . . . Such agreements do not, *per se*, carry the authoritative imprimatur and moral force of sacred scripture, or even of mundane legislation.<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, even where legislation, like the Railway Labor Act, has established separate crafts and bargaining units for employees, previously excluded minor-

ity employees have been held to have promotion and transfer rights despite the existence of such statutory and contractual walls. Judge Dyer, once again speaking from the Fifth Circuit, has said the following:

In many respects the Union arguments in favor of the *status quo* echo the Terminal's. Implicit in their briefs is the additional *in terrorem* prediction that imposition of Title VII remedies would precipitate the demise of craft and class seniority systems, which had their genesis in General Order No. 27 and have been nurtured through a half century by myriad collective bargaining agreements. These labor representatives fail to perceive that their pre-Act discriminatory policies, practices, and “understandings”—whether formal or informal—have compromised the racially neutral integrity of that venerable order and its interpretative supplements. . . . At the terminal today, blacks continue to experience the effects of pragmatic injustice; certainly this situation contravenes the avowed purpose of the Order and the Railway Act.<sup>14</sup>

#### *Industrial union security*

Seniority, as I have indicated, is important in the industrial union context, since it determines what the worker's competitive status is against another worker, that is, where a worker stands for the purpose of promotion, transfer, or layoff. America's trade unions adopted the seniority principle not only because it eliminates the playing of favorites among employees, but because it also removes the union from the inevitable political crossfire that it would be caught in if it had to continuously choose among each individual worker's competing claims on his merits. While seniority is not the only basis for choosing employees competing for promotions—qualifications play a role as well—in some industries, such as steel,

11. One of the most uncritical of recent efforts is contained in Derek Curtis Bok and John T. Dunlop, *Labor and the American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 116–37.

12. The Department of Justice has won every Title VII case at the Circuit Court of Appeals level.

13. *U.S. v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.*, 451 F. 2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), *cert. denied*, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).

14. *Id.* at 454.

the junior employee cannot be promoted over a senior worker unless he is "head and shoulders" better.

This tradition accounts for the proviso, which Congress tacked onto Title VII's broad prohibitions against racial discrimination in employment, to the effect that Congress did not intend to eliminate so-called bona fide seniority systems. The courts, however, were quick to say that a seniority system which had its genesis in the past segregation of the races in different jobs and departments was unlawful and therefore not to be regarded as bona fide. The first court of appeals decision was by the Fifth Circuit, *Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States*.<sup>15</sup> In that case, Judge John M. Wisdom, speaking for the court, concluded that departmental or job seniority violated Title VII where it denied to blacks seniority credits which might have been theirs had they formerly had access to previously all-white jobs into which they were now permitted to transfer. Said Judge Wisdom:

The defendants assert, paradoxically, that even though the system conditions future employment opportunities upon a previously determined racial status, the system is itself racially neutral and not in violation of Title VII. The translation of racial status to job-seniority status cannot obscure the hard, cold fact that Negroes at Crown's Mill will lose promotions which, but for their race, they would surely have won. Everytime a Negro worker, hired under the old segregated system, bids against the white worker in his job slot, the old racial classification reasserts itself, and the Negro suffers anew for his employer's previous bias.<sup>16</sup>

*Local 189*, however, was one of the easier cases. In the paper industry,

black employees had often worked as helpers to white workers, filled in for them during vacations and absence, and generally possessed a substantial portion of the experience and skill that was a prerequisite for the job to which the seniority credit was to be applied. In this situation, however, black employees were paid a low wage rate and were in a separate seniority district. A step removed from this example was one in which blacks were in a different department and performed work that was roughly similar in terms of skill content. Whites who had gone into the previously white department did not require special training, but rather an on-the-job "learning by doing" procedure.

The most difficult of the seniority disputes relates to the situation where there is a difference in the skills required for the jobs and where the employee transferring from one department would require special training to remedy his lack of preparation. One court has ordered such training as a remedy for past discrimination in order to permit black employees to make a transfer and to carry seniority credits with them. In *U.S. v. San Francisco Railway Company*,<sup>17</sup> the Eighth Circuit has held that the training may be provided—although it has severely undermined the remedy by awarding black porters only 50 percent of their previously accumulated seniority to be carried over to the brakeman's classification, and more important, it did not award back pay. (In the most comprehensive decree fashioned by any federal court under Title VII, Judge William Lindberg, in *U.S. v. Local 86, Ironworkers*,<sup>18</sup> ordered the establishment of a special training program for black apprentices in the Seattle construction industry.)

15. 416 F. 2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919. Cf. *Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp.*, 429 F. 2d 498 (5th Cir. 1970).

16. Id. at 988.

17. 464 F. 2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972).

18. 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D.Wash. 1970), affirmed, 443 F. 2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).

The federal courts have held that blacks may transfer to previously all-white jobs and take seniority with them even though a majority of the employees in the jobs which blacks have previously occupied have been white.<sup>19</sup> However arbitrary the reasons may be, the reason that the whites are in low classifications is not racial discrimination, and therefore their presence in these circumstances in such jobs is irrelevant to both the finding of discrimination and the relief to be fashioned. Accordingly, even in such circumstances, both the no-transfer and seniority systems have been overridden.

Moreover, the primary reason for the obstinate attitude in the trade union movement, that is, white rank and file resistance to change, has thus far been uniformly rejected by the court defense as discriminatory seniority systems. Chief Justice Earl Warren's comment, in *Brown v. Board of Education II*,<sup>20</sup> to the effect that "it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of this disagreement with them,"<sup>21</sup> has been followed by the federal courts in Title VII litigation.

19. *Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.*, 431 F. 2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), *cert. denied*, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); *Wiltherspoon v. Mercury Freight Lines*, 457 F. 2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972); *Bing v. Railway Express*, 444 F. 2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971); *Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines*, 458 F. 2d 443 (5th Cir. 1972); *U.S. v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.*, 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D. N.C. 1971). See also *U.S. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.*, 5 F.E.P. Cases 308 (4th Cir. 1972); *U.S. v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.* (note 13 above); *U.S. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway* (note 17 above). See generally William B. Gould, "Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and its Implications," *Texas Law Review* 47 (1969), p. 1039; William B. Gould, "Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," *Howard Law Journal* 13 (1967), p. 1.

20. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

21. *Id.* at 300.

tion. As Judge Wilfred Feinberg has said:

Assuming arguendo that the expectations of some employees will not be met, their hopes arise from an illegal system. Moreover, their seniority advantages are not indefeasibly vested rights but mere expectations that arise from a bargaining agreement subject to modification. . . . If relief under Title VII can be denied merely because the majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the act is directed.<sup>22</sup>

Accordingly, an employer cannot defend a discriminatory seniority system on the ground that unilateral modification would have triggered a strike.<sup>23</sup>

What is troubling, however, is the case of the all-white establishment or union. Apparently, Congress did not want incumbents to be displaced by unemployed blacks. Under *Local 189*, it seems plausible that a black employee who was discriminated against and never hired prior to the effective date of the statute cannot assert seniority rights against whites who were hired later and then began to accumulate credits. However, it seems as though the *Local 189* remedy would be provided for a black who was discriminated against in connection with hire subsequent to the effective date of the statute to the extent that fictional seniority, that is, credit for time not actually worked, could be utilized to take work opportunities away from incumbent whites. But here the difficulty is class relief for the entire black community rather than specific individuals, and this may make the courts more sensitive to the argument that preferential treat-

22. *U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.*, 446 F. 2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971), at 663.

23. *Robinson v. Lorillard*, 444 F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), at 799, *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).



ment is involved. The reasoning is that the black was not harmed individually and for him to receive seniority credits superior to employed whites would be a remedy with windfall dimensions because it is necessarily speculative. The accuracy of this conclusion, however, must await future litigation inasmuch as all seniority remedies, in varying degrees, suffer from the same defect.

### *Segregated locals*

Most segregated or auxiliary locals appear to be something of the past. The dominant view of the federal judiciary is that existence of segregated locals is a per se violation of Title VII.<sup>24</sup> However, when segregation has been eliminated, blacks who are in a minority often have not been able to obtain any kind of political representation. This is because whites generally will not vote for blacks—especially where there has been segregation. Accordingly, they are either less or no better able to protect themselves than they were prior to the elimination of segregation, since discrimination against them is very often continued in the employment relationship, and they are without political representation in the integrated local.

Accordingly, several courts have ordered transitional agreements which allocate seats to each local so as to provide for representation for local unions and thus minimize unfairness in employment.<sup>25</sup> Can the courts order such arrangements? And more important, where transitional agreements expire without any substantial changes of the employment conditions that led to such a special remedy, can the courts reinstate the merger arrangement?

The leading case is *Long v. Georgia Craft Co.*,<sup>26</sup> where the Fifth Circuit rejected such relief requested by black employees. The court did so for two reasons: (1) a black had been elected by the merged local to one of seven union offices, and the appointment of other blacks had taken place; (2) the merger was not court-ordered, but undertaken voluntarily. Thus, the court indicated that there are circumstances that warrant a revival of such racial classifications where the first transitional agreement had expired. Limitations to such an approach become evident when one considers the following: (1) that the courts are concerned that an order more sweeping which would purport to establish a permanent allocation of positions on the basis of race would run afoul of the racial classification or reverse discrimination prohibitions in both the Constitution and Title VII; and (2) that some defendants have therefore simply waited out the transitional period and resumed discriminatory practices at a more propitious time, a time at which minorities would be excluded from the political process. Accordingly, the answer to this problem may require that the courts make their orders transitional but avoid providing for a specific period of time after which the agreement providing for an allocation of leadership positions will expire. An appropriate approach might be to preserve the transitional merger agreement until blacks get a certain share of employment opportunities under the union's jurisdiction. After all, discrimination in employment is one of the principal justifications for a division of leadership positions between blacks and whites. After employment discrimination ceases, presumably both groups could take their chances in the political process together.

24. *U.S. v. International Longshoremen's Association*, 460 F. 2d 497 (4th Cir. 1972).

25. See, for example, *Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.*, 310 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.La. 1970).

26. 455 F. 2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972).

### *Construction unions*

As the wage increases negotiated in the building and construction industry in the past four years attest, the construction and building trades are among the most powerful unions—if not the most powerful—in the United States. Their authority is in part explained by their control over both the labor market and referral systems; and it is exercised through apprenticeship programs (usually jointly established by both unions and employers—but often dominated by the unions), the hiring hall, and the closed shop. The closed shop was made unlawful by the Taft-Hartley amendments, but it has thrived in this country on a de facto basis. The 1959 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act have helped the building trades to defy the closed shop prohibition: by permitting the parties in that industry to make apprenticeship training experience a condition of employment; by authorizing recognition agreements before workers have actually come on the job and been able to express their free choice; and by permitting the employer to contract with the union about filling job vacancies.<sup>27</sup> The Supreme Court has held that the negotiation of an exclusive hiring hall through which workers are referred is not per se unlawful under Taft-Hartley.<sup>28</sup> However, non-union workers are hardly ever referred except in time of labor shortage—despite the fact that Taft-Hartley prohibits discrimination against nonunion workers.<sup>29</sup>

27. See section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act.

28. See *Local 357, Teamsters v. N.L.R.B.*, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).

29. *U.S. v. Local 86, Ironworkers*, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D.Wash. 1970), *affirmed*, 443 F. 2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); *U.S. v. Plumbers, Local 638*, 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); *U.S. v. Local 46, Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers*, 328

The mechanical trades are among the most racially exclusionary in the country. During the past six years, the unions have dropped their formal color bars and instituted Outreach Programs funded by the Department of Labor which affirmatively attempt to recruit minorities into the apprenticeship programs. Two immediate problems with this effort are that (1) most of the building trades journeymen acquire their status through routes other than apprenticeship, and (2) Outreach affects a very small percentage of apprenticeship opportunities throughout the country—according to AFL-CIO estimates, approximately 5 percent. Nevertheless, Outreach is of some significance and has provided more jobs for racial minorities than there would have been if the program had not existed.

In this connection it should be noted that the winds of Philadelphia have been felt throughout the country. Once the Department of Labor indicated that it might impose goals and timetables upon unions and contractors throughout the country, as it did in Philadelphia in 1969 under Executive Order 11246, the unions began to negotiate plans themselves. To be sure, the primary reason was both to defend themselves against an imposed plan and to use the hometown approach as a hedge against future litigation. Nevertheless, the negotiation of such plans indicated a willingness on their part to accept the principle of quotas. Also, the hometown plan was preferable in some respects to the government's contract compliance efforts under the Executive Order—the attempt to require government contractors to affirmatively recruit minorities—inasmuch as it affected unions directly, that is, the quotas

F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), *motion to stay denied*, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), *affirmed*, 5 F.E.P. cases 318 (2nd Cir. 1973).

imposed requirements on union programs rather than on contractors. The latter might only affect union practices indirectly. To the extent that hometown plans have brought minorities onto construction sites—Boston seems to be the best effort undertaken yet—minority laborers who are employed are more likely to obtain union membership cards and to be on a job ladder which leads to permanent employment security, that is, the possession of a journeyman's card.

Nevertheless, the hometown plans contain many deficiencies and have generally not worked well.<sup>30</sup> In the first place, the goals or quotas to which the unions became committed were carefully qualified so as to make them inoperative where economic conditions were not suitable. This meant that whenever white journeymen—and in many unions apprentices cannot even vote—became concerned about work opportunities or began to fret about the kind of work that was available, black entry into the trades would cease. Since in the past three years we have witnessed a downturn in both the economy in general and in the construction industry in particular, such clauses have assumed a fair amount of importance. Second, the plans were voluntary and were privately negotiated—albeit with the assistance in many instances of the Department of Labor. Accordingly, there was less of an incentive for the unions to behave. Finally, and perhaps most important, the plans, as well as Outreach, left intact so many of the basic assumptions behind union practices that discriminate against racial minorities.

These practices take a number of forms. First, some unions restrict membership and apprenticeship opportunities

to the sons or relatives of the members. Where this happens, the obvious result is that the racial composition of the incumbent work force is perpetuated. While nepotism or practices that involve the recruitment of friends best prove the traditional craft union argument that they discriminate against the world as distinguished from blacks, the effect is to exclude blacks along with others—and where the exclusion is in part racial, it is unlawful. Accordingly, courts have struck down such practices as unlawful—at least when there is a showing of past discrimination.<sup>31</sup>

Second, many apprenticeship programs require that an applicant have a high school diploma and pass a written examination. In such circumstances the Supreme Court has said that where educational or examination requirements screen out blacks disproportionately to whites, and where there is no showing that the test or educational qualification is necessary for performance on the job, a violation of Title VII may be made out.<sup>32</sup> Interestingly enough, such barriers all too often only let in the black youngster who is college oriented, leaving out the ghetto dropout who could perform the work but who lacks the formal credentials. Accordingly, it is difficult to find black applicants for the apprenticeship program, in large part because of artificially high barriers.

Third, the apprenticeship programs exclude applicants who are over a certain age—generally between twenty-five and twenty-eight. Where black employees have been discriminated against in the past, they cannot qualify for programs such as Outreach, since many of them may be too old. To some extent,

30. See William B. Gould, "Blacks and the General Lockout," *New York Times*, July 17, 1971, p. 23.

31. *Asbestos Workers v. Vogler* (note 9 above); *U.S. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 73*, 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.Ind. 1969).

32. *Griggs v. Duke Power* (note 9 above); *U.S. v. Local 86, Ironworkers* (note 29 above).

the hometown plans tend to remedy this by creating special trainee classifications for workers who cannot qualify for the apprenticeship program because of age. Yet the deficiencies in the hometown approach have made the federal judiciary the main forum for resolution of such inequities.

Fourth, the oral interview is generally included as part of the admission criteria. The job seeker who knows nothing about the trade and has no friends or relatives in the trade to look to as models is at a disadvantage. Such an applicant is more likely to be black than white. Moreover, the applicant will often be asked whether he has an arrest or conviction record. If he indicates that he does, he may be disqualified automatically, or, at a minimum, this will count against him. Yet the courts have indicated that in many instances reliance upon such criteria to screen out minority workers from employment opportunities violates the law.<sup>33</sup>

The duration of apprenticeship programs—in many instances four or five years—may result in a higher dropout rate for blacks than for whites, since blacks know less about the trade and, more important, less about the importance of sacrifice for future opportunities. One court has held that where past discrimination is evidenced, the burden is upon the defendant to show that there is a business necessity for the program's duration—even without a showing that blacks are more adversely

affected by the program's duration than whites.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, none of the voluntarily negotiated programs has dealt with reliance upon seniority referral to journeyman work opportunities. Such procedures put blacks who have worked for nonunion contractors outside the collective bargaining agreement at a disadvantage—and accordingly they violate Title VII.<sup>35</sup>

One point which neither the parties to collective arrangements nor the courts have focused upon is the extent to which members of the Laborers Union—many of whom are black, and who quite often perform some of the functions involved in the sheet metal and plumber's classifications—may be upgraded. The Laborers Union has not had a great interest in this matter—probably because (1) they fear that the departure of their more skilled members may erode the union's jurisdiction in an industry that is plagued with such disputes; and (2) the fringe benefit schemes for the various unions are separate, and the worker who moves gives up what he has. Presumably, the sacrifice involved in the promotion is itself unlawful under Title VII, since the courts have been careful to preserve benefits that workers have so that they

33. The leading cases are *Carter v. Gallagher*, 452 F.2d 315, 327 (8th Cir. 1972) and *Gregory v. Litton Systems*, 5 F.E.P. Cases 267 (9th Cir. 1972). See generally Herbert Hill, "The New Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," *University of Colorado Law Review* 63 (1962), p. 243.

34. *U.S. v. Operating Engineers, Local 3*, 4 F.E.P. Cases 1088 (N.D.Cal. 1972). See generally Dennis R. Yeager, "Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Construction Industry, and the Problems of Unqualified Minority Workers," *Georgetown Law Journal* 59 (1971), p. 1265.

35. Rates have been "red circled" in industrial seniority litigation so that employees would not be deterred from exercising Title VII promotion rights. See, for example, *U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel* (note 22 above). See also William B. Gould, "Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," *Howard Law Journal* 13 (1967), p. 1.

will not be deterred from taking promotions that open up in a higher paying classification.

#### CONCLUSION

Contrary to public belief, both the industrial and construction unions at the national as well as the local level are wrongdoers insofar as racial discrimination in employment is concerned. The industrial unions adopt a more progressive posture toward fair employment practices legislation and other policies that will improve the lot of low-income workers of both races. This is primarily because industrial unions are more likely to represent such workers in the semiskilled and unskilled classifications.

The labor movement generally has a considerable way to go before its house can be said to be in order on the issue of racial equality. What tends to be dominant as of this time is a narrow, parochial, and selfish point of view, which has been historically associated with the American craft unions. Despite the fact that the percentage of union membership which is black is higher than the Negro portion of the population, this has made the labor movement look inward and away from the plight of minority working people—many of whom are unorganized (particularly in service jobs) and consciously disregarded by the AFL-CIO.

One of the more interesting and encouraging developments in the future will be in the public sector, where both trade unionism and industry are growing at a breakneck rate. The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees has an extremely able and articulate black Secretary-Treasurer, William Lucy. On the other hand, the American Federation of Teachers has been in a number of controversies with the black community

about the relationship between black children and white teachers—Ocean Hill Brownville in New York being the most prominent among them. Police and fire departments and the unions with whom they bargain have been on the receiving end of a number of lawsuits.<sup>36</sup> The American Federation of Government Employees, while it represents a substantial number of minority groups, has only one out of twenty minority executive board members.

The public employee unions, while they are to be envied inasmuch as so many of them have a fresh slate to write on because of their recent arrival on the scene, are in a sector of the economy that will produce litigation and charges of employment discrimination for years to come. One reason for this is the prevalence of civil service examinations that have a discriminatory impact upon minorities. Another factor in all of this is that Title VII now applies to federal, state, and local governments; the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has the authority to hear complaints of discrimination involving state and local, and the Justice Department has the right to sue in this area.

Persistent obduracy on the part of the industrial and craft unions is triggering the emergence of black workers' organizations which, while not challenging trade union exclusive bargaining rights, seek to fill the void that the unions themselves have ignored, that is, employment discrimination. Two recent and successful examples of this are the

36. See, for example, *Castro v. Beecher*, 459 F. 2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); *Chance v. Board of Examiners*, 458 F. 2d 1167 (2nd Cir. 1972); *Western Addition Community Org. v. Alioto* 340 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D.Cal. 1972); *Commonwealth v. O'Neill*, 4 F.E.P. Cases 970 (E.D. Pa. 1972), *vacated and remanded*, 4 F.E.P. Cases 1286 (3rd Cir. 1972), *remanded to*, 5 F.E.P. Cases 277, 279, 280 (E.D.Pa. 1972).

United Construction Workers Association in Seattle and the Association for the Betterment of Black Edison Employees in Detroit. The former has recruited black workers whom the Seattle mechanical trades would not recruit for a court-ordered special apprenticeship program. The latter has represented the interests of black union members where the Utility Workers Union in Detroit was unwilling to do so. The same phenomenon has appeared in some of the public employee unions.<sup>37</sup>

There is trouble in all segments of the house of organized labor today.

37. See the statements of William Lucy in *Government Employment Relations Reporter*, Jan. 22, 1973 (No. 487, BB-11, BNA).

The most important thing on the minus side is the adherence by national trade union leadership to policies which perpetuate the racially discriminatory past. What gives cause for hope, however—particularly in the industrial and public employee unions—is the emergence of a substantial number of minority employees with a strong political base. Trade unionism will be the first major private institution in American life in which minority workers have a substantial share of political leadership. It may well provide the forum in which the proposition that a multi-racial society dominated by whites can provide justice for all races will be tested most thoroughly.

# Employment Discrimination and the Law

By ALBERT J. ROSENTHAL

ABSTRACT: While there have been prohibitions, by the federal, state, and local governments, against racial discrimination in employment since the 1940s, the major legal weapon against such discrimination has been Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The largest part of the burden of enforcing this statute has not been borne by the federal government, but rather by civil rights organizations, whose resources have been limited. A remarkable record of favorable judicial decisions has been achieved in cases brought under this statute. Nevertheless, the disparities between blacks and whites in average income and in proportionate unemployment have not been markedly reduced. Stronger legislation and a greater commitment on the part of all branches of government as well as the public seem necessary if there is to be more significant progress toward truly fair employment practices.

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ALTHOUGH discrimination based on religion, national origin, and sex are all morally indefensible and socially harmful, racial discrimination—especially that against blacks—dwarfs all other forms in the cruelty of its consequences and the damage it inflicts upon our nation.

Legal prohibitions against employment discrimination go back at least to World War II.<sup>1</sup> Since 1941, there have been a series of executive orders prohibiting discrimination by federal government contractors. During the same period there was a trickle and later a flood of state statutes forbidding employment discrimination, as well as a number of municipal ordinances on the same subject. Nevertheless, the total effect of all of these measures was disappointing.

#### TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

The landmark legislative attempt to provide something more than an illusory commitment to fair employment practices came in 1964, with the adoption by Congress of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of that year.<sup>2</sup> An early version of the bill would have provided for cease and desist powers in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) modeled upon the powers granted the National Labor Relations Board to order discontinuance of unfair labor practices and to turn directly to the U.S. courts of appeals for enforcement of its orders. But it was deemed necessary, perhaps because of the threat of a Senate filibuster, to depart significantly from this pattern when it came to controlling discrimination in employment.

Instead of authorizing the EEOC to make its own rulings which would be judicially enforced if supported by substantial evidence, that agency was permitted only to investigate, make findings as to the presence or absence of "reasonable cause" to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred, and to attempt to end the practice by conciliation and persuasion. If these efforts failed, however, the powers of the EEOC ground to a halt. All it could then do was to inform the aggrieved party of its failure to achieve compliance, and authorize him to start a civil action in a United States district court against the employer, labor union, or both, complained of. The trial of such an action is *de novo*—in other words, the plaintiff has to prove his case on his own, without the aid of any presumption in his favor based upon favorable findings of the EEOC.

This means that the burden of enforcing what purports to be a serious expression of government policy of highest priority was placed largely upon the shoulders of individual black victims of illegal discrimination. While there is also a provision in Title VII, sec. 707, authorizing the attorney general to commence such actions where he finds a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, this authority has been invoked rather sparingly, particularly in the first few years of Title VII. A 1972 amendment authorizing the EEOC to sue—although here too only in *de novo* actions in district court—is discussed below; this change may prove helpful, but it is too soon to appraise its effect.

Since in most instances applicants denied jobs and incumbent employees barred from promotion have been unable to secure counsel and handle their cases through their own resources, the bulk of the burden for enforcing the act has devolved, of necessity, upon civil

1. For example, Executive Order 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).

2. P.L. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e *et seq.*



rights organizations. The largest part of this responsibility has been assumed by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.

With limited financial resources and commitments in many other areas of anti-discrimination litigation, the Legal Defense Fund has been obliged to allocate its efforts carefully. Proof of employment discrimination is in most cases a complicated, expensive, time-consuming process. Rather than attempt to fight it whenever it appears, the Legal Defense Fund has had to concentrate on cases that are likely to give rise to precedents of widespread applicability and in some instances on industries especially notorious for their unfair treatment of blacks.

#### *Procedural problems*

Apart from the complexity inherent in many employment discrimination cases, procedural barriers added to the difficulty of enforcing Title VII during the period immediately following its effectiveness.<sup>3</sup> The volume of complaints that descended upon EEOC swamped its small staff. Its difficulties were multiplied by the inclusion in the statute of a prohibition against sex discrimination, in addition to those based on race, color, religion, and national origin. While there could be no such thing as a bona fide occupational qualification justifying keeping blacks from a job, and almost no circumstances in which such a requirement could legitimately be applied in cases of discrimination based on religion or national origin, the same was not true of sex discrimination; EEOC had to deal with a large number of genuine borderline cases that required it to expend a large fraction of its limited resources in determining when sex qualifications were or were not reasonable.

3. The effective date of the act was July 2, 1965.

For all of these reasons, the backlog of unprocessed complaints grew rapidly. In particular, EEOC did not have the staff to determine, in each case, whether or not there was reasonable cause to find racial discrimination; and there was little time to attempt to conciliate cases in which affirmative findings had been made. In desperation, it adopted the policy of issuing "thirty-day letters" to aggrieved parties authorizing the commencement of suit both in cases in which it had not found reasonable cause and in cases where it had found such cause but had not even been able to begin the process of attempting to achieve voluntary compliance. The statute was not clear as to whether an actual unsuccessful attempt at conciliation was a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action or whether inability to achieve compliance through sheer lack of resources in EEOC would serve as sufficient failure to achieve compliance to trigger off the right to sue. Similarly, there was uncertainty as to whether a finding of reasonable cause by EEOC was necessary in order for suit to follow. A few adverse district court decisions brought several cases to a halt pending appeal,<sup>4</sup> and in a larger number of other cases substantial effort had to be devoted to defeating motions to dismiss based on one or the other of these theories, at the expense of preparing the cases for trial. Ultimately, however, both of these questions were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs in one U.S. court of appeals after another, without exception; and where defendants sought Supreme Court review, it was denied.<sup>5</sup>

4. For example, *Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.*, 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967); *Miller v. International Paper Co.*, 290 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Miss. 1967).

5. *Dent* was reversed at 406 F. 2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969), and *Miller* at 408 F. 2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). See also *Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co.*, 405 F. 2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).

These barriers have thus been removed, although at a significant price in lost time and manpower.

In another respect as well, a favorable line of decisions on procedural questions has helped to move the enforcement program forward. In order to maximize the effect of the limited number of actions it could bring, the Legal Defense Fund has, as a matter of course, brought each case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf not only of the named plaintiff or plaintiffs who had themselves filed charges with the EEOC, but also on behalf of all others similarly situated. Recognizing that racial discrimination is inherently class discrimination, the courts have generally been quite receptive to this approach.<sup>6</sup> Not only has injunctive relief been afforded against continuation or renewal of discriminatory practices against black applicants and employees generally, but in several cases back pay has also been awarded to all members of the aggrieved class, rather than being limited to the named plaintiffs.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the class action has served as insulation against the possibility of settlement with the named plaintiff at the expense of other victims of similar discrimination by the same employer<sup>8</sup> and has, in some instances, facilitated the introduction of a wider range of evidence of employer practices that might otherwise have been thought irrelevant.

#### *Substantive issues*

The successes of this litigation program with respect to procedural issues have had their counterpart in decisions broadly construing the prohibitions of

the statute and facilitating the proof of violations. With the adoption of Title VII, overt discrimination against blacks rapidly diminished but was often to be replaced by more subtle devices with much the same effect. The use of such apparently objective criteria as a high school diploma or a designated score on a psychological test often serves to bar from employment or promotion blacks who have been the victims of unequal educational opportunities throughout their lives. Objective measures of skill may, if properly employed, serve as a safeguard against discrimination by reducing the discretion available to bigoted personnel officers, foremen, and the like; yet, when such tests serve to exclude disproportionately large numbers of blacks as compared with whites, and further, where the skills or background required are not essential to the job applied for, the net effect is to force blacks to overcome what the Supreme Court has referred to as "built-in headwinds."<sup>9</sup> Indeed, in some instances such requirements may well have been innocently imposed, in the mistaken belief of their necessity; yet the effect on job opportunities for blacks was as disastrous as when the standards were racially motivated.

It was therefore quickly recognized that if the use of such tests was allowed to continue, in circumstances in which they served to keep out blacks but where they could not be justified by business necessity, a loophole would be carved out of Title VII that would enable every employer or subordinate official who wanted to discriminate to do so with impunity. This issue was vigorously fought up to the Supreme Court, which unanimously held in *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*<sup>10</sup> that the

6. For example, *Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.*, 398 F. 2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).

7. For example, *Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.*, 416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).

8. Compare *Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.*, 400 F. 2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).

9. *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).

10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

use of tests that barred more blacks than whites and could not be validated as job-related, and thus not supported by business necessity, violated the Act.

While objective barriers to employment, such as tests, have been made to conform to the business necessity requirement, this has not meant a free ride for employers who have developed no objective criteria for hiring or promoting and who rely entirely on the subjective judgment of their supervisory employees. This, too, has been recognized as a readily available device for discrimination and in several cases has been held at least presumptively unlawful by the courts.<sup>11</sup>

Another potentially damaging loophole appeared: the use of seniority systems that tended to perpetuate the effects of discrimination that had occurred before Title VII became effective and to extend its consequences into the present and future by limiting the opportunities for promotion or transfer of incumbent blacks. Here, too, the courts have recognized the danger to the effectiveness of Title VII if such practices should be permitted to continue and they have in a number of situations—discussed more fully in Professor Gould's article<sup>12</sup>—provided remedies so that a whole generation of blacks would not be frozen into dead-end jobs.

Another important judicial development has been the rule that if the conduct of the defendant has a discriminatory effect, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the discrimination was intentional.<sup>13</sup> The opposite conclusion would in many instances have imposed upon plaintiffs the extremely diffi-

cult burden of having to prove that the mental state of employers was sufficiently sophisticated to mask their true intentions.

Other practices, theoretically neutral but discriminatory in actual effect, have also been forbidden. These include, among others, giving preference to relatives of present employees where the latter are almost entirely white,<sup>14</sup> word-of-mouth recruiting among whites with no corresponding efforts in the black community,<sup>15</sup> and the use of arrest records and similar standards that tend to bar more blacks than whites with no showing of business necessity to justify the practice.<sup>16</sup>

In addition, the courts have accorded great weight to statistical evidence as to the number of blacks employed, the types of jobs to which they are assigned, and so forth, as sufficient to establish at least a *prima facie* case of discrimination, even as against individual claimants.<sup>17</sup>

#### *Judicial remedies*

While the major remedy provided by Title VII is an injunction against further discrimination, the act also permits back pay and other forms of relief in appropriate cases. Since the statute contains no criminal sanctions, and since an injunction operates only prospectively, back pay may well serve as the principal deterrent against violation. An employer required to pay the difference, between the actual earnings of an aggrieved employee and what he would

14. *Local 53 v. Vogler*, 407 F. 2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).

15. *Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, 433 F. 2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).

16. *Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.*, 472 F. 2d 631, 5 E P D para. 8089 (9th Cir. 1972).

17. For example, *Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, (note 15); *Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co.*, 457 F. 2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, — U.S. — 93 S. Ct. 319 (1972).

11. For example, *Rowe v. General Motors Corp.*, 457 F. 2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).

12. William B. Gould, "Black Workers Inside the House of Labor," *THE ANNALS* 407 (May 1973), pp. 78-90.

13. *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, (note 9 above), at 432.

have earned if he had not been discriminated against, incurs a significant expense with no corresponding business advantage in return. If, in addition, back pay is awarded to a large number of applicants or employees who are members of the class on whose behalf the suit was brought, the back pay award may assume substantial dimensions indeed. The scope of this remedy has been somewhat diminished by the 1972 amendment to Title VII, which henceforth will limit back pay to that referable to a period of two years before the bringing of the charge.<sup>18</sup> Even so, the remedy of back pay retains considerable clout.

The range of remedies permitted by the statute is not limited, however, to those specifically referred to in it, and a court of equity has inherent power to tailor a remedy to meet the needs of a particular situation. Thus, even though the substantive provisions of the statute disclaim the imposition of any obligation to employ on the basis of a racial quota,<sup>19</sup> this does not exclude the possibility of the use of quotas as a temporary measure to redress the effects of earlier discrimination.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, both as a deterrent to violators, and even more importantly as an incentive to attorneys to undertake Title VII cases on behalf of aggrieved plaintiffs, the act permits the award of counsel fees to the prevailing party. While there has been a wide variety of judicial attitudes as to the propriety of awarding counsel fees and the measure to be used in computing them, a significant body of precedent is developing that is

likely to result in their being awarded as a matter of routine and perhaps in sums adequate to reflect the skill of the attorneys, the amount of work involved, and the fact of contingency.<sup>21</sup>

#### THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866

Meanwhile, an entirely different development began to contribute to the strengthening of rights against employment discrimination. In 1968 the Supreme Court decided *Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.*,<sup>22</sup> holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U.S.C. sec. 1982, forbade discrimination against blacks in the purchase or rental of property, although the discriminator was a private party and no state action was involved. The theory of the Court was that this statute implemented the Thirteenth Amendment—which, in forbidding slavery, applied to individuals as well as governments—rather than the Fourteenth (which required state action), and that it was an appropriate vehicle to remove a badge or vestige of slavery. It was apparent that a similar argument might be made with respect to another clause of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that forbade discrimination in the making of a contract—now 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981—as an alternative statutory prohibition against employment discrimination, at least with respect to blacks.

This alternative suggested a solution where plaintiffs were confronted with adverse decisions as to some of the procedural roadblocks under Title VII discussed above; but even after these problems had been solved by appellate court

18. Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by P.L. 92-261, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(g).

19. Section 703(j) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(j).

20. *Vogler v. McCarty, Inc.*, 451 F. 2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971); compare *Carter v. Gallagher*, 452 F. 2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).

21. For example, *Clark v. American Marine Corp.*, 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970), affirmed, 437 F. 2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971); *Lea v. Cone Mills*, 438 F. 2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971); compare *Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.*, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).

22. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).

decisions, section 1981 offered a remedy for those aggrieved parties who might have failed to meet time deadlines in proceedings under Title VII either in the filing of charges with EEOC or in the institution of an action in court. Section 1981 also permitted reaching back to an earlier point of time to obtain redress for violation; instead of the relatively short ninety-day limit set forth in Title VII, the most nearly applicable state statute of limitations—usually from two to ten years—applied to section 1981. Indeed, it was even possible to secure redress for discrimination that had occurred long before the effective date of Title VII,<sup>23</sup> since section 1981 had been on the books in substantially its present form since 1866.

Thus, it became standard practice for the Legal Defense Fund to assert section 1981 routinely as a second statutory basis for all of its employment discrimination cases. While there was a sprinkling of disagreement at the district court level, a series of decisions of U.S. courts of appeals, which in several instances the Supreme Court refused to review, appear to have established the availability of section 1981.<sup>24</sup> Further reinforcement for this line of decision may be found in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, in which congressional committee reports referred with approval to cases upholding the use of section 1981 and expressly rejected attempts to make Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for employment discrimination.<sup>25</sup>

#### GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Title VII did not include a right of action against government agencies that

discriminated. In the case of state or local government, the procedure employed has been the use of an 1871 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, forbidding state action depriving persons of constitutional rights. The theory is that the public agency, by discriminating in employment, has violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pursuant to this statute, both injunctive and monetary relief may be awarded. The 1972 amendments to Title VII have now broadened it to make it applicable to state and local government employers as well, thus affording an additional route to relief.<sup>26</sup>

While there is no equal protection clause specifically applicable to the federal government, it is generally assumed that discrimination by the latter violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.<sup>27</sup> There is, however, no express statutory provision, analogous to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, authorizing an action against the federal government where it breaches constitutional rights. Although executive orders have for many years required nondiscriminatory employment practices by federal agencies,<sup>28</sup> compliance by government officials has been unsatisfactory, particularly with respect to higher-level positions. The right to challenge discrimination by the federal government in court has been unclear, with government lawyers invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the substantial evidence rule, and requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as roadblocks to prevent these cases from even

23. *Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Co.*, (note 17 above).

24. For example, *Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works*, 427 F. 2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).

25. H. R. Rep. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st sess. 18-19, 66 (1971).

26. Section 701(b) of the Act, as amended by P.L. 92-261, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(b).

27. Compare *Bolling v. Sharpe*, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

28. The most recent is Executive Order 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969).

reaching trial.<sup>29</sup> Here too, a remedy has been provided by the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which specifically authorize a cause of action against federal employing officials for violation of either the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII itself or those of the executive order.<sup>30</sup>

#### ACTUAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The litigation record in Title VII—and sec. 1981—cases has been remarkably successful. Over a wide range of issues, some of which are discussed above, the federal courts have been construing the statute in such fashion as to strengthen the rights of victims of discrimination and to eliminate potential loopholes. Yet the latest census figures appear to indicate comparatively little progress, in overall terms, for blacks in the United States. The unemployment rate for blacks is still almost double that for whites, and the average income of blacks is still barely above 60 percent of that of whites.<sup>31</sup>

It is difficult to judge whether the striking score of favorable decisions in court has resulted only in paper victories, or whether the actual employment

situation of blacks has been significantly improved. Some statistics do suggest a dramatic shift toward equality in income levels in one particular segment—married couples outside the South in which both spouses work.<sup>32</sup> It is not clear, however, whether these conclusions are distorted by a difference in culture patterns whereby a much larger fraction of working black wives work full time. In any event, where figures for the entire white and black labor forces are compared, the gap remains depressingly large and, even more important, apparently almost intractable.

We do know that the actual cases litigated and won have resulted in increased employment and greater access to higher level and better paid jobs in the plants involved. The total number of persons directly affected, however, cannot have been more than a tiny fraction of the employable black population. We can also assume that awareness of such decisions by other employers or their lawyers, the threat of legal action, the mere existence of the laws, and even voluntary recognition of the moral duty to treat people equally must have had some cumulative impact. Why, therefore, has the statistical impact not been greater?

It is quite possible that in a period in which there has been a proportionate drop in demand for unskilled labor, and in which the opportunity for blacks to acquire equal skills has not yet been realized, the disparities between black and white average income and unemployment figures would have become substantially worse, rather than held even or improved slightly, had there been no anti-discrimination laws on the

29. See Sen. Rep. 92-415, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. 16 (1971).

30. Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by P.L. 92-261, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-16.

31. For example, in 1960, unemployment among blacks was 2.1 times that among whites. In April 1972 the ratio had declined slightly to 1.8. U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 221. In 1970, the median income of blacks was \$6,279, or about 61 percent of \$10,236, that of whites. *Ibid.*, p. 323. While income figures for blacks alone were not compiled for 1960, the statistics for non-white families show a rise, between 1960 and 1970, from 55 percent to 64 percent of the median for white families. Compare *ibid.*, p. 322, with *ibid.*, 1962 ed., p. 331.

32. See Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Schism in Black America," *The Public Interest*, no. 27 (Spring 1972), p. 3. See also Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard M. Scammon, "Black Progress and Liberal Rhetoric," *Commentary* 55, no. 4 (April 1973), p. 35.

books. In short, there seems to be no truly satisfactory way of determining the quantitative effect of anti-discrimination laws upon the employment position of black Americans.

It should be added that the mere fact of a differential between blacks and whites, with respect to average income, unemployment or any similar criterion, does not necessarily prove that employment discrimination persists. Inequality in education and discrimination in housing will prevent blacks from obtaining equal employment opportunities even in the complete absence of discrimination in employment itself. The employment problem will not be completely solved until equality is achieved in these other areas as well. Meanwhile, there is still much to be achieved in connection with employment discrimination itself.

It does seem clear that the nation's commitment to eliminate racial discrimination in employment has been far short of adequate. An enforcement program based primarily upon case-by-case, or even class action-by-class action, litigation is bound to be of limited effect, at least in its direct consequences. The failure of Congress in 1964 to provide EEOC with cease and desist powers has undoubtedly been a significant factor in reducing the number of instances of discrimination that could have been directly corrected by Title VII. The action of Congress in 1972, permitting EEOC itself to bring enforcement actions in U.S. district courts,<sup>33</sup> should prove of some value; its extent, however, may depend upon the staff size that appropriations will permit. But the failure of Congress once again to give EEOC cease and desist powers—this time at least partly in response to pressure from the Nixon administration upon Congress—will probably serve to

prevent any dramatic increase in the impact of the statute.<sup>34</sup>

The blame for the fact that, despite victory after victory in court, the goal of equality still seems so remote cannot in fairness be placed upon one administration or one part of government or society. Fair employment is still not an unequivocal national goal. The United Steel Workers of America may have fought valiantly over the years for civil rights at the national level; this has not, however, prevented the Steel Workers locals in Birmingham—and indeed in many places outside of the South—from vigorously resisting every effort to protect black workers from discrimination.

Title VII does contain authority in the attorney general to bring actions where he finds a "pattern or practice" of discrimination,<sup>35</sup> thereby picking up some of the burden that is obviously too large for individual litigants or civil rights organizations to carry. When Title VII was enacted, Dean Sovern predicted that its success might well depend upon the extent to which the attorney general invoked this authority.<sup>36</sup> By that yardstick, the record has been unimpressive. Particularly in the early days of Title VII, when one might have expected great things from "liberal" attorneys general such as Nicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark, very few "pattern or practice" actions were started. The first annual reports of

34. Apart from reducing the effectiveness of anti-discrimination legislation, this refusal results in loss of an opportunity to alleviate the caseload of the already overburdened federal district courts. See Henry J. Friendly, *Federal Jurisdiction: A General View* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 86-87.

35. Section 707, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-6. Under the 1972 amendments, this function will shift to the EEOC in 1974.

36. Michael I. Sovern, *Legal Restraints on Racial Discrimination in Employment* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1966), p. 80.

33. Section 706(f)(1), as amended by P.L. 92-261, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(f)(1).

EEOC, in enumerating landmark judicial decisions favorably construing Title VII, included remarkably few attorneys general's actions. Fortunately, the role of the Justice Department has been greatly expanded in this respect under the Nixon administration, and a significant fraction of the most important Title VII litigations in more recent years have been those brought by the government. In addition, the government, either through EEOC or the Department of Justice, has intervened or written *amicus curiae* briefs in support of plaintiffs' positions in important private cases. This trend toward enlargement of the federal role in enforcing Title VII is most welcome. Nevertheless, in view of the comparative resources available to the government as contrasted with those of individual blacks or civil rights organizations, the share of the burden assumed by the government still seems grossly inadequate.

Other parts of the executive branch have also been delinquent in carrying out what might have been extremely valuable enforcement powers. Discrimination by government contractors has been forbidden by a succession of executive orders going back thirty-two years. Theoretically hanging over the heads of recalcitrant contractors has been the threat of termination for default of existing contracts and of being barred from receiving new ones—a financial disaster for many employers for whom the government is an important customer, and of a magnitude dwarfing any remedy possible under Title VII or other legislation. Yet, this power has been invoked scarcely at all. Contractors flagrantly in violation have continued to receive new contracts. Attempts by aggrieved employees to enforce the executive order, either by suing contractors as third-party benefi-

aries of the contracts which themselves embody the anti-discrimination provisions of the executive order, or by compelling government officials to apply the executive order or their own implementing regulations, have thus far been defeated in the courts.<sup>37</sup>

In this connection, certain comparisons are striking. Substantially identical seniority practices at the Sparrows Point, Maryland, and Lackawanna, New York, plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company were challenged, respectively, under the executive order and under Title VII. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the Title VII case, granted broad relief.<sup>38</sup> The Office of Federal Contract Compliance resisted taking similar action over a much more extended period of time, until the Secretary of Labor finally granted some relief—not including contract termination—more than a year after the decision of the Second Circuit. And even this action was so unusual that it was deemed front-page news in the *New York Times*.

Another comparison might be drawn between the government's tolerance of employer intolerance where industrial contractors were concerned, as contrasted with the draconian measures threatened against universities within the last two years, to terminate research and other contracts for failure to adopt affirmative action programs deemed satisfactory by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. While the difference might be ascribed to differences in personnel responsible for administer-

37. For example, *Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc.*, 375 F. 2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); *Hadnott v. Laird*, 463 F. 2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

38. *United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.*, 446 F. 2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).



ing defense and other industrial contracts on the one hand, and contracts with educational institutions on the other, a cynic might suspect that the executive branch regards industry as among its constituents and universities as among its antagonists. Whether or not this conclusion is unfair, it seems clear that if the authorities charged with enforcing the antidiscrimination provisions of government contracts had attempted to invoke them against business concerns as vigorously as they did against educational institutions, great steps toward reduction of racial discrimination in employment would probably have been achieved.

#### CONCLUSION

In any event, the remarkable victories achieved in court in construing Title VII and section 1981 should provide a firm foundation for further and greater efforts to translate victory in the law books into genuine equality for black employees. Unless and until the federal government plays a major part in pursuing this goal, the main part of the burden will have to continue to be borne by individuals and civil rights organizations; further progress may reasonably be expected, but it is also likely that the rate of improvement will continue to be agonizingly slow.

## Racial Discrimination in the Electoral Process

By ROBERT B. MCKAY

ABSTRACT: Nearly a century ago the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged that the right to vote is "a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights." A Court thus armed with lofty ideals might have been expected to apply the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to strike down racially discriminatory restrictions on the franchise that were adopted by many states after the Reconstruction period ended with the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1876. However, the Supreme Court largely confined its efforts to rhetoric and for many decades closed its eyes to the use of the white primary, literacy tests, the poll tax, and other devices to deny black citizens the vote. The white primary was at last outlawed in 1944, but Congress did not act until 1957. The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 were well intended but not very effective. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1970, is now the principal vehicle for protection of the franchise against racial discrimination. It forbids literacy tests and other discriminatory tests and devices and requires federal approval of any changes in voting qualifications or procedures in states with a history of voting discrimination.

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OF all the discriminations endured by black citizens of the United States, none has more fully revealed the intent of the white majority to suppress the black minority than the pervasive and long-enduring efforts to limit access to the ballot. Without even the thin pretense of "separate but equal" facilities that long sustained the practice of segregation, racially discriminatory denial of the right to vote has no purpose but to limit control of government to the favored class. The theme persists in South Africa today where denial of the right of franchise to non-whites is the centerpiece of a system of massive exploitation and suppression of freedom.<sup>1</sup> A measure of the difference between South Africa and the United States is that in this country it has been official policy for more than a century that such discrimination is intolerable. A measure of our own imperfection is the fact that it should have taken so long in the United States to bring practice into line with aspiration, a task still not completely accomplished. What follows is a statement of the effort to perfect the American dream of democracy through freedom of access to the electoral process.<sup>2</sup>

Neither the original Constitution of the United States, as ratified in 1789, nor the Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, forbade discrimination in the electoral process. Nothing was specified as to the qualifications of voters in federal elections; and in article I, section 2 the states were authorized to fix the qualifications of voters.<sup>3</sup> The same section

of the Constitution included an almost explicit invitation to deny the vote at least to those blacks who were slaves, specifying that the apportionment of representatives in Congress should be determined "by adding to the whole Number of free Persons . . . three fifths of all other Persons." This provision was not eliminated until 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.<sup>4</sup>

When the states were given primary responsibility for fixing the qualifications of voters, it was entirely clear that in most states this meant restriction of the franchise to a handful of property owners.<sup>5</sup> It was not until well into the nineteenth century that property qualifications for the exercise of the franchise were largely removed.<sup>6</sup>

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fix voter qualifications in the original Constitution was the proviso in article I, section 4, applicable only to elections for U.S. senators and representatives, that Congress could "make or alter such Regulations." Moreover, until ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, U.S. senators were elected by state legislatures rather than by popular election.

4. The franchise was not extended to women as a matter of federal right until 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified.

5. When the Constitution was ratified, not more than a quarter of the adult males were entitled to vote. See Albert McKinley, *The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1905), p. 488.

6. In New York State, for example, property qualifications were eliminated for white voters in 1826 for the election of state officials, but not until 1874 for black voters. 1821 Const., art. II, sec. I, as amended in 1826; 1846 Const., art. II, sec. I, as amended in 1874. Other property qualifications for limited purpose elections have been invalidated more recently in *Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15*, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); *Cipriano v. City of Houma*, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); and *Phoenix v. Kolodziejski*, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). But compare *Gordon v. Lance*, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); *Salzer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District*, — U.S. — (1973); *Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District*, — U.S. — (1973).

1. Joel Carlson, "South Africa Today: The Security of the State vs. the Liberty of the Individual." *Human Rights* 2 (1972), p. 125.

2. There are parallel stories to be told of voter discrimination in relation to women and non-English-speaking citizens. But here the emphasis will be on the experience of black citizens.

3. The only limitation on state power to

Congress did not attempt in any significant way to alter state voting qualifications for senatorial, congressional, vice-presidential, and presidential elections until the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 lowered the voting age to eighteen.<sup>7</sup>

Nearly a century ago the Supreme Court acknowledged the central importance of equal access to the franchise, noting that the right to vote is "a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights."<sup>8</sup> Ironically, however, that statement was dictum in a case involving the right of aliens to equal employment rights.

Although the franchise was accorded verbal protection by constitutional amendment, by statute, and by judicial utterance, the reality was very different in the late nineteenth century and during the early decades of the twentieth century. However familiar that story of unfulfilled promise and effective disfranchisement of millions of citizens, summary restatement is necessary here as a prelude to a review of more recent efforts to overcome long-standing patterns of discrimination.

Before the Civil War racial discrimination in exercise of the franchise was not limited to slaves. Free black citizens were also disfranchised in all except five New England states.<sup>9</sup> At the conclusion of the Civil War, the Thir-

teenth Amendment was quickly approved by Congress and ratified by the states; but it was not clear whether its straightforward prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude was sufficient authorization for the body of civil rights legislation that a Reconstruction-minded Congress desired to enact. Even though Congress was able to pass the 1866 Civil Rights Act<sup>10</sup> over the veto of President Andrew Johnson, some doubted the adequacy of the constitutional base. The more explicit Fourteenth Amendment, ratified two years later, was "undoubtedly directed at the Black Codes in the southern states . . . restricting the right of nonwhites to hold property, enter into contracts, and to have access to the courts."<sup>11</sup> But it was not clear, even in the minds of some proponents, that the amendment gave the right to vote to black citizens.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, after the election of 1868, in which the temporizing policies of President Johnson were decisively repudiated, Congress went on to the Fifteenth Amendment, which was submitted to the states in February 1869 and ratified by the required number of states in March 1870. This allowed enactment of the Enforcement Act in 1870,<sup>13</sup> fixing penalties for acts in limitation of the franchise by intimidation, force, or bribery, and further legislation in 1871 to strengthen the 1870 act,<sup>14</sup> plus a criminal statute—the so-called Ku Klux Klan Act—authorizing the president to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the process of suppressing organizations charged with conspiring to deprive citizens of their rights.<sup>15</sup>

7. 84 Stat. 314, 318 (1970). When Congress sought to lower the voting age to eighteen for state elections as well as federal, the Supreme Court read section 4 of article I to permit that result as to federal elections, but to deny that power as to state elections because of section 2 of article I. *Oregon v. Mitchell*, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The Twenty-sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, lowered the voting age for all elections, state as well as federal, to eighteen.

8. *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

9. See *Oregon v. Mitchell*, 400 U.S. 112, 156 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).

10. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).

11. Earl Warren, "Notre Dame Law School Civil Rights Lectures," *Notre Dame Lawyer* 48 (1972), pp. 14, 32.

12. *Ibid.*

13. 16 Stat. 140 (1870).

14. 16 Stat. 433 (1871).

15. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).

*Nation's mood changes*

The mood of the nation changed quickly, however; and the ardor of the Reconstructionists was soon thwarted in a variety of ways. During the balance of the nineteenth century, Congress enacted only one further piece of civil rights legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1875,<sup>16</sup> which was largely emasculated by the Supreme Court in 1883 in the *Civil Rights Cases*.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, however, the Court had acknowledged that the three post-Civil War amendments had

one pervading purpose . . . lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppression of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.<sup>18</sup>

But in the same case—where the issue was property rights, not individual rights—the Court so narrowed the interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that it has never since been useful as a protection against racial or other discriminations.<sup>19</sup>

The Enforcement Act was not received sympathetically in the Supreme Court. In *United States v. Cruikshank*<sup>20</sup> and in *United States v. Reese*<sup>21</sup>

the Court voided some provisions of the statute and read others restrictively, with the practical result of making the act inoperative.<sup>22</sup>

The judiciary was not alone in its hostility to the Reconstruction legislation and the attitudes that prompted those laws. The nation's enthusiasm for vindication of Negro rights cooled quickly; and the executive and legislative branches were entirely willing to cooperate. In 1876, the same year as the *Cruikshank* and *Reese* decisions, the Reconstruction period was effectively ended when the Hayes-Tilden Compromise accomplished the withdrawal of federal troops from the South.<sup>23</sup> After a brief interval of relative freedom in exercise of the franchise and in other respects, white dominance again became a fact of life in large areas of the nation.<sup>24</sup>

By the early years of the twentieth century, access to the ballot was generally restricted in the South—and limi-

22. In *Reese* the Court invalidated provisions of the statute on the ground that the statutory language was overbroad, permitting punishment of conduct not based on race. Other provisions of the civil rights legislation of this period were invalidated on the ground that the statutory language was too broad, reaching private action not coupled with state action. See *United States v. Harris*, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); *Civil Rights Cases*, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); *Baldwin v. Franks*, 120 U.S. 678 (1878); *James v. Bowman*, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).

23. For discussion of these events, see J. H. Franklin, *Reconstruction: After the Civil War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957); C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951).

24. For an extraordinarily vivid judicial recounting of the experiences in a single state, see the opinion of Judge John Minor Wisdom in *United States v. Louisiana*, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).

16. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). For a discussion of the fate of the civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction period, see Eugene Gressman, "The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation," *Michigan Law Review* 50 (1952), p. 1323. The next civil rights legislation was in 1957, discussed below at notes 66-68.

17. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

18. *Slaughter-House Cases*, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (16 Wall. 1873). See also *Minor v. Happersett*, 88 U.S. 162 (21 Wall. 1875).

19. *Id.* at 74-80.

20. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).

21. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).

tations were not unknown in the North. All of the original Confederate States adopted the poll tax, and seven enacted revisions of the so-called Mississippi Solution, in which reliance was placed on poll taxes, literacy and "understanding" tests, and residency requirements designed to assure disfranchisement of black voters. In *Williams v. Mississippi*<sup>25</sup> the Supreme Court upheld the Mississippi program in 1898 in a strikingly narrow reading of the apparently explicit language of the Fifteenth Amendment.

The other principal instrument of disfranchisement was the white primary. By 1915 white primaries controlled access to the ballot in all southern states.<sup>26</sup> As Professor Woodward has observed,

if the Negroes did learn to read, or acquire sufficient property, and remember to pay the poll tax and to keep the receipt on file, they could even then be tripped by the final hurdle devised for them—the white primary.<sup>27</sup>

The courts were of little assistance. The white primary was not invalidated until 1944.<sup>28</sup> Redistricting to deny effective participation in the electoral process was not forbidden until 1960.<sup>29</sup> Early in the twentieth century the Supreme Court had denied the use of its equity power to protect purely politi-

cal rights such as the right to vote;<sup>30</sup> and when the black plaintiffs sued at law, the Court denied recovery on technical grounds.<sup>31</sup> The path to judicial relief was slow, and the assistance of Congress came even later. The judicial and legislative developments, although of course related, are separately described below.

#### JUDICIAL VINDICATION OF THE FRANCHISE

##### *White primaries*

The right to vote free of racial discrimination received little assistance from the federal courts until the third decade of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court held invalid a state law that explicitly excluded Negroes from participation in Texas Democratic primaries.<sup>32</sup> Thus rebuffed, the state legislature gave the party's executive committee the power to fix membership qualifications. The not surprising racial exclusion that followed was also found unconstitutional.<sup>33</sup> Un-

25. 170 U.S. 213 (1878). See Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (rev. ed. 1968), pp. 84–85.

26. Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (rev. ed. 1968), pp. 85–97.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

28. *Smith v. Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649 (1955), overruling *Grovey v. Townsend*, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), in which the Court had upheld a racial exclusion by the Texas Democratic Convention.

29. *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). But compare *Wright v. Rockefeller*, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), rejecting a claim that congressional districts in New York City were racially gerrymandered.

30. *Giles v. Harris*, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in effect acknowledged the racial discrimination, but thought the courts powerless to act. His words, which now sound archaic, were long accepted as the justification for judicial—and even legislative—impotence. He said: "Equity cannot undertake now, any more than it has in the past, to enforce political rights. . . . The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting. To meet such an intent something more than ordering the plaintiff's name to be inscribed upon the lists of 1902 will be needed. . . . Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that state by officers of the court, it seems to us that all the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form." *Id.* at 488.

31. *Giles v. Teasley*, 193 U.S. 146 (1904).

32. *Nixon v. Herndon*, 273 U.S. 536 (1924).

33. *Nixon v. Condon*, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). Interestingly, both *Nixon* cases were grounded on the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the more explicit wording of the Fifteenth

abashed by these rulings, the state convention of the Texas Democratic Party developed its own rules of racial exclusion, which survived constitutional challenge in *Grovey v. Townsend*,<sup>34</sup> a 1935 case that was not overruled until 1944 in *Smith v. Alwright*.<sup>35</sup> In the latter case the Court relied on an intervening decision in *United States v. Classic*,<sup>36</sup> which held that article I, section 4 of the Constitution authorizes congressional control of primaries "where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery."<sup>37</sup>

The white primary was not dead even then. Bearing in mind the literal words of *Smith v. Alwright*, but none of its significance, proponents of discrimination attempted other evasions. Lower federal courts invalidated efforts to preserve the white primary by repealing all state laws dealing with the subject, leaving the fixing of racial restrictions entirely to the "private" party organizations. In *Rice v. Elmore*<sup>38</sup> the Fourth Circuit concluded: "Having undertaken to perform an important function relating to the exercise of sovereignty by the people, [the party] may not violate the fundamental principles laid down by the Constitution for its exercise."<sup>39</sup>

The final attempt to preserve the white primary arose out of the "pre-primary" elections of the Jaybird

Democratic Association in Texas, which was a "voluntary club" of white Democrats. Since candidates winning the Jaybird preprimary contests usually ran unopposed in the Democratic primaries, the Supreme Court concluded that the Fifteenth Amendment was violated.<sup>40</sup>

In all these cases, and others now to be mentioned, the federal courts were performing the essentially negative role assigned them by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court had long before said—and had not since denied—that the Constitution "does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone."<sup>41</sup> As recently as 1959 the Court stated that the right to vote referred to in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was a right "established by the laws and constitution of the State."<sup>42</sup>

Despite the decades-long dominance of the view that the political process was largely beyond the reach of legislative and judicial supervision, almost from the first a more affirmative note was sometimes expressed by the Supreme Court. In *Ex parte Yarbrough*,<sup>43</sup> the Court noted that the Fifteenth Amendment "clearly shows that the right of suffrage was considered to be of supreme importance to the national government, and was not intended to be left within the exclusive control of the States."<sup>44</sup> The Court recognized that the words of negation also carried the seeds of affirmation, the confirming of a right to vote. Conceding that the

Amendment. Although reliance on equal protection was certainly logical enough, the Court did not again base its judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment in a voting case until the legislative apportionment cases in the 1960s. See *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

34. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).

35. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

36. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).

37. *Id.* at 318.

38. 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).

39. *Id.*, 165 F. 2d at 391. See also *Baskin v. Brown*, 174 F. 2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).

40. *Terry v. Adams*, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).

41. *Pope v. Williams*, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904).

42. *Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections*, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959), quoting from *McPherson v. Blacker*, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892).

43. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).

44. *Id.* at 664. See also *Ex Parte Siebold*, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); *Neal v. Delaware*, 103 U.S. 370, 389 (1881).

Fifteenth Amendment had originally been construed as giving "no affirmative right to the colored man to vote," and as having been "designed primarily to prevent discrimination against him," the Court for the first time saw that "under some circumstances it may operate as the immediate source of a right to vote."<sup>45</sup>

What was long thought to be the limited potential for judicial intervention in protection of the right of franchise against racially motivated restriction is emphasized by the fact that there are only three provisions in the Constitution of the United States that "deny plenary and exclusive power to the States to determine voting requirements and give special protection to a citizen against discrimination in the electoral process."<sup>46</sup> The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments offer grounds for judicial intervention for violation of their prohibitions as well as a basis for congressional action to enforce through appropriate legislation. Article I, section 4, on the other hand, provides no basis for judicial intervention in the absence of congressional action.

#### *Literacy tests*

The most important—and most explicit—is the Fifteenth Amendment:

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

The phrase "on account of race" has made it possible to strike down even laws fair on their face that in fact concealed devices of a racially discriminatory nature. The promised availability of the Fifteenth Amendment as an af-

firmative instrument in vindication of the franchise was, however, long delayed. Literacy tests were upheld against a claim of scarcely disguised racial application.<sup>47</sup> In fact, literacy tests were not finally eliminated until the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970<sup>48</sup> barred the use of such tests in all elections, state and national, for a five-year period, on a congressional finding that literacy tests had been used to discriminate against voters on account of their color in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. This congressional move to enforce the provisions of those two amendments was unanimously upheld by the Court in *Oregon v. Mitchell*.<sup>49</sup>

#### *Poll Taxes*

Poll taxes proved similarly difficult to challenge on grounds of racially discriminatory purpose or effect. The Court was unanimous in 1937 in upholding a Georgia poll tax applicable to men between the ages of twenty-one

47. *Williams v. United States*, 170 U.S. 213, 220 (1898). In 1959, in *Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections*, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the Court would go no further than to acknowledge that "a literacy test, fair on its face, may not be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot." *Id.* at 45. The Court gave as an example of that kind of discrimination the case of *Davis v. Schnell*, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), *aff'd*, 336 U.S. 933 (1949), in which the test was the citizen's ability to "understand and explain" a provision of the Constitution. That case was a forerunner of *Louisiana v. United States*, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), more fully discussed below at notes 57-60.

48. 84 Stat. 314 (1870). See also section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, denying the use of literacy-in-English tests in certain circumstances. 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1965). This provision was upheld as the basis for striking down the English literacy test applied in New York State to exclude certain Spanish-speaking citizens from voting. *Katzenbach v. Morgan*, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).

49. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

45. 110 U.S. at 665.

46. *United States v. Louisiana*, 225 F. Supp. 353, 358 (E.D. La. 1963), *aff'd*, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).



and sixty and to women only if they should register to vote.<sup>50</sup> When the poll tax at last fell in 1966, the invalidation was not for reasons of racial discrimination on the face of the Virginia statute there at issue, or as applied, but because the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by a provision that "makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard."<sup>51</sup> But there were strong dissents even to that proposition, including Justice Hugo Black's insistence that the poll tax could be abolished by Congress pursuant to its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not by the judiciary on its own.<sup>52</sup> Ultimately, the Twenty-fourth Amendment was adopted to proscribe the poll tax in all federal elections, and by 1966 all but four states had abolished the poll tax in state elections.<sup>53</sup>

#### *Other discriminatory devices*

Discrimination at the polls was not limited to the white primary, literacy tests, and poll taxes. Other devices, even more frankly racial, included the notorious "grandfather" clauses in state

election laws and the requirements that applicants for voter registration be able to "interpret" provisions of state constitutions or statutes. Even these remarkably candid devices of racial discrimination long escaped successful challenge.

The grandfather clause was an ingenious solution to an embarrassing problem for the dominant white community. A literacy test would, to be sure, deny most black citizens the vote at the turn of the century; but, if fairly applied, the test would also eliminate many white citizens. Hence, in a number of states white voters were exempted from the literacy test by establishing that their grandfathers had voted, while blacks were excluded because their grandfathers had been nonvoting slaves. Not until 1915 was this pernicious device struck down in *Guinn v. United States*,<sup>54</sup> invalidating an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution that exempted from the literacy test all persons entitled to vote on January 1, 1866, and those whose ancestors were entitled to vote on that date—before ratification of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

Except for the white primary cases discussed above, there were few other cases between 1915 and the Civil Rights Act of 1957 in which the federal courts intervened to protest against continuing racial discrimination in the exercise of the franchise. Only *Lane v. Wilson*,<sup>55</sup> in which the Court forbade continued use of unreasonable procedural barriers erected against the vote, is of any significance. And that case may be remembered more for the aphorism of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter than for any vital contribution to doctrine or

50. *Breedlove v. Suttles*, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).

51. *Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). See also *Carrington v. Rash*, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)—striking down a Texas constitutional provision denying the vote to any member of the armed forces who moved to the state during his military service; *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)—striking down Tennessee's one-year residence requirement for voting. But compare *McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners*, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)—upholding an Illinois statute denying absentee ballots to individuals detained in jail awaiting trial; the classification, said the Court, was not based on race or wealth and was not shown to have impaired the right to vote (only the right to receive absentee ballots).

52. 383 U.S. at 670 (Black, J., dissenting).

53. *Id.* at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

54. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). See also *Myers v. Anderson*, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); *Lane v. Wilson*, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).

55. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).

practice. His memorable phrase was that the Fifteenth Amendment was intended to nullify "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."<sup>56</sup>

*Louisiana v. United States*

Apart from the white primary cases, the most significant judicial contribution to the protection of the franchise from racial distortion was the decision in *Louisiana v. United States*.<sup>57</sup> The case involved the so-called interpretation test for voter registration which had long been available in Louisiana as a means to defeat registration of black citizens who stubbornly overcame all other barriers to the vote. The provision was written into the state constitution in 1921 after the grandfather clause was invalidated; and it was widely used in the 1950s after the white primary was held unconstitutional. In 1960 the state constitution was amended to require an applicant to "be able to understand and give a reasonable interpretation" of any provision of the Louisiana or United States Constitution. The provision was attacked for violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and section 1971 of title 42 of the United States Code. Judge John Wisdom, writing for the three-judge federal district court, examined the history carefully; and he demonstrated convincingly that the test was designed to disfranchise black voters and was administered with the same unacceptable objective. He wrote:

[T]his wall, built to bar Negroes from access to the franchise, must come down. The understanding clause or interpretation test is *not* a literacy requirement. . . . [I]t is evident that the test is a sophisticated scheme to disfranchise Negroes. The test

is unconstitutional as written and administered.<sup>58</sup>

The Supreme Court was equally explicit in affirming the judgment of the district court. Although violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 was alleged, it was apparent that the force of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was entirely adequate for the task at hand. Mr. Justice Black, for a unanimous Court, stated:

This is not a test but a trap, sufficient to stop even the most brilliant man on his way to the voting booth. The cherished right of people in a country like ours to vote cannot be obliterated by the use of laws like this, which leave the voting fate of a citizen to the passing whim or impulse of an individual registrar.<sup>59</sup>

Although the district court and the Supreme Court found in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments adequate basis for invalidation of the challenged provisions of Louisiana law, the additional allegation of violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 was useful in the framing of a decree to prevent evasion of the judicial mandate. After the suit was filed, but before decision in the district court, Louisiana had already adopted a new voter-qualification test, requiring each applicant for registration to answer correctly four to six multiple-choice questions on one of ten cards drawn by the applicant. The district court did not pass on the validity of the new test, but took it into consideration in formulating the decree. The court found that past discrimina-

58. *United States v. Louisiana*, 225 F. Supp. 353, 356 (E.D. La. 1963).

59. *Louisiana v. United States*, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965). More than fifteen years earlier a similar provision in Alabama had been invalidated in *Davis v. Schnell*, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949); but the "interpretation and understanding" device was not decisively excised until the 1965 decision in *Louisiana v. United States*.

56. Id. at 275.

57. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).

tion against black applicants had reduced their number of registered voters, while the number of white voters was increasing. Accordingly, to allow application of the new test only to new applicants without retesting those already registered would be to disadvantage all those required to take the more vigorous test. Accordingly, the district court ordered postponement of the new test in the affected parishes until a complete reregistration of voters was instituted so that, as the Supreme Court noted in agreement, "the new test will apply alike to all or to none."<sup>60</sup>

With the decision in *Louisiana v. United States*, *supra*, the courts had gone about as far as they were likely to go in their essentially negative role of reacting to and invalidating the more blatant forms of voter discrimination on racial lines. Federal courts had often indicated the potentiality, and indeed the need, for legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to make possible the next step: affirmative support for voter registration and effective use of the ballot. That is the subject of the following section, in which will be related the successes and failures of legislation enacted by Congress between 1957 and 1971.

#### CONGRESS ACTS TO EXTEND THE FRANCHISE

Interest in protection of the rights of blacks to vote following the Civil War was brief. The Enforcement Act of 1870<sup>61</sup> made it a crime for public officers and private persons to obstruct exercise of the right to vote. In 1871 the statute was amended<sup>62</sup> to provide for detailed federal supervision of the electoral process, from registration to

the certification of returns. But enthusiasm for the venture soon waned, enforcement became spotty,<sup>63</sup> and most civil rights laws were repealed in 1894.<sup>64</sup> Meanwhile, beginning as early as 1890, a number of states began to use tests designed to deny the franchise to their black citizens.<sup>65</sup> Congress made no attempt to restrain these discriminatory practices, and efforts to seek judicial intervention were few and not very successful. Astonishingly, it was not until 1957 that Congress again attempted to protect the democratic heritage of millions of citizens against the most blatant abuses. The Civil Rights Act of 1957<sup>66</sup> authorized the attorney general to seek injunctions against public and private interference with the right to vote on racial grounds. But the enforcement provisions proved cumbersome and evasion relatively easy.<sup>67</sup> Probably the most important contributions of the 1957 Act were the creation

63. *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966).

64. 28 Stat. 36 (1894). By 1957 only a brief general provision, derived from the 1870 Act, remained applicable to voting rights [42 U.S.C. sec. 1971(a)(1)]: "All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified to vote at any election by the people in any State . . . shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage or regulation of any State . . . or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding."

65. See discussion at notes 23-26 below. See also *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301, 310-12 (1966).

66. 71 Stat. 634 (1957). The 1957 Act drew heavily upon the recommendations in the 1947 Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, *To Secure These Rights*.

67. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was upheld, the frustrations of enforcement are clear in the validating decision. *United States v. Raines*, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). See also *United States v. Thomas*, 362 U.S. 58 (1960); *Hannah v. Larche*, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).

60. 380 U.S. at 155. On the remedies question, compare *Gaston County v. United States*, 395 U.S. 385 (1969).

61. 16 Stat. 140 (1870).

62. 16 Stat. 433 (1871).

of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the establishment of a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice. The Commission has not only provided significant information on progress—and lack of progress—in the entire area of civil rights; it has also served as conscience for the public in general and for government in particular.<sup>68</sup> The Civil Rights Division provided a vehicle in the Department of Justice for much of the significant litigation for the protection of civil rights.

The Civil Rights Act of 1960<sup>69</sup> added perfecting amendments that permitted the joinder of states as party defendants, gave the attorney general access to local voting records, and authorized courts to register voters in areas of systematic discrimination. Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964<sup>70</sup> expedited the hearing of voting cases before three-judge courts and outlawed some of the tactics still being used to disqualify black voters from participation in federal elections. Despite conscientious application of each remedy provided by an ever-hopeful Congress, the results in terms of voter registration were disappointing<sup>71</sup>; and resist-

ance remained strong in many areas. Only 23 percent of the voting age blacks were registered in the nearly fifty counties in which the Department of Justice had brought law suits between 1957 and 1964.<sup>72</sup>

In response to the continuing difficulties in the way of voter registration, President Lyndon Johnson, on January 4, 1965, proposed in his State of the Union Message that "we eliminate every remaining obstacle to the right and the opportunity to vote."<sup>73</sup> Two months later, on March 7, 1965, civil rights marchers, who sought to dramatize their appeal for the vote by marching from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama were attacked by Alabama law enforcement officers. A week later the President appeared before a special session of Congress to urge the prompt enactment of voting legislation. "No law we now have on the books," he said, "can ensure the right to vote when local officials are determined to deny it."<sup>74</sup>

#### *Voting Rights Act of 1965*

After extensive debate the Administration's proposal was modified, approved, and signed by the President on August 6, 1965. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 sought to reach and prevent discrimination in a variety of ways. Central to the scheme was the formula in section 4(b)–(d) defining the states and political subdivisions to which the new remedies would apply. As a first remedy section 4(a) provided for the suspension of literacy tests and similar voting qualifications in the areas within the Act's coverage for a period of five years from the last occurrence

68. For a discussion of the contribution of the Commission, see Earl Warren, "Notre Dame Civil Rights Lectures," *Notre Dame Lawyer* 48 (1972), pp. 14, 43–47.

69. 74 Stat. 86 (1960).

70. 78 Stat. 241 (1964).

71. The number of blacks registered to vote in the eleven southern states rose from an estimated 1,238,038 in 1956 to 2,174,000 or 43.3 percent of the voting age black population in 1964. See Margaret Price, *The Negro and the Ballot in the South* (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1959), p. 9; and 1959 Report of the Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 110. See also "Voting Rights: A Case Study of Madison Parish, Louisiana," *University of Chicago Law Review* 38 (1971), pp. 726–51; Sen. Rept. No. 162, Part 3, 89th Cong., 1st sess., *Joint Statement of Individual Views re S. 1564, The Voting Rights Act of 1965*.

72. United States Commission on Civil Rights, *The Voting Rights Act: The First Months* (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 9.

73. 111 Cong. Rec. 28 (daily ed., Jan. 4, 1965).

74. 111 Cong. Rec. 4924 (daily ed., March 15, 1965).

of substantial voting discrimination.<sup>75</sup> Section 5 prescribed a second remedy, the suspension of all new voting regulations pending review by federal authorities to determine whether their use would perpetuate voting discrimination. The third remedy, in sections 6, 7, 9, and 13, provided for the assignment of federal examiners by the attorney general to list qualified applicants who would thereafter be entitled to vote in all elections. A related provision in section 8 authorized the appointment of federal poll-watchers in places to which federal examiners were assigned. Section 10(d) excused those made eligible to vote in sections of the country covered by section 4(b) of the Act from paying accumulated past poll taxes for state and local elections. Section 12(e) provided for balloting by persons denied access to the polls in areas where federal examiners had been appointed.

In addition to these central provisions, the Act provided a number of subsidiary remedies for special problems, including limitations on the franchise in other parts of the country. Section 2, for example, broadly prohibited the use of voting rules to abridge exercise of the franchise on racial grounds anywhere in the nation. Section 4(e) excused citizens educated in American schools conducted in a foreign

75. Section 4 was made applicable to any state or political subdivision where any such test or device was in effect in November 1964 and where less than 50 percent of the black voting age population had voted in the November 1964 election. The following states were originally covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and twenty-six counties in North Carolina. Under the 1970 amendments the following areas were covered: nine counties in Arizona, two in California, three in New York, one in Wyoming, and four election districts in Alaska. "Voting Rights," *Civil Rights Digest* 31, (December 1971).

TABLE 1—PERCENT OF NONWHITE REGISTRATION

| STATE          | PRIOR TO 1965     | SPRING-SUMMER 1968 |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Alabama        | 19.3              | 51.6               |
| Arkansas       | 40.4              | 62.8               |
| Florida        | 51.2              | 63.6               |
| Georgia        | 27.4              | 52.6               |
| Louisiana      | 31.6              | 58.9               |
| Mississippi    | 6.7               | 59.8               |
| North Carolina | 46.8              | 51.3               |
| South Carolina | 37.3              | 51.2               |
| Tennessee      | 69.5              | 71.7               |
| Texas          | 53.1 <sup>a</sup> | 61.6               |
| Virginia       | 38.3              | 55.6               |

<sup>a</sup> Percentages by race were not available.

language from having to take English-language literacy tests. And other sections provided civil and criminal sanctions for interference with the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.

The success of the 1965 Act is demonstrated in at least two ways: first, by the dramatic increase in the proportion of nonwhite voting registration in the period immediately following enactment of the legislation; and second, by the intensity of the attacks on its constitutionality and by the substantial effort to prevent renewal in 1970.

The fact of success is supported in Table 1, showing the significant gains made in the southern states.<sup>76</sup> Opposition to the 1965 Act was expressed in the congressional debates over renewal of the Act as its expiration date neared in 1970. However, the Act was ultimately renewed in 1970 and even strengthened in minor ways.<sup>77</sup> The Act also survived early tests of its constitutionality in *South Carolina v. Katzen-*

76. *Political Participation: 1968 Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1968), pp. 12-13.

77. 84 Stat. 314 (1970).

bach<sup>78</sup> and *Katzenbach v. Morgan*.<sup>79</sup> Additional questions have been resolved in subsequent Supreme Court decisions,<sup>80</sup> while other issues still await final answers. The issues already resolved and those that remain under judicial inquiry, involve important questions of federalism and the extent of federal power that may be exercised by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the national government. These issues will be examined in the remaining portions of this paper.

### *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*

*South Carolina v. Katzenbach* is the most important of the cases that arose out of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because in that litigation the Supreme Court sustained the Act in all its principal provisions. Congress had acted boldly and inventively in defining the coverage of the Act, suspending literacy tests and other suspected devices in the covered areas, and in forbidding unapproved changes in voting qualifications or procedures in effect on November 1, 1964. Thus, at one stroke the new legislation sought to outlaw existing devices for voter discrimination and to discourage circumvention of the Act by the creation of new techniques of discrimination.

The legislative thrust was both more far reaching and more particularized in its impact than anything previously attempted. The affected areas argued that Congress could do no more under the authority of section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment than forbid violations of that amendment in general terms, leaving to courts the task of

fashioning specific remedies applicable to particular localities where abuse was found. The Court answered the contention in sweeping terms with the direct statement that "Congress is not circumscribed by any such artificial rules under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment."<sup>81</sup> The Court recognized that the congressional formula was at best blunt and imperfect, omitting from coverage some areas in which voter discrimination occurred, while including some in which there was no proven discrimination. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that Congress had acted within permissible limits, particularly since relief from coverage could be secured upon an adequate showing of nondiscrimination in exercise of the franchise.<sup>82</sup> The decision is significant not only for its validation of the new methods for attacking voting discrimination, but also for the expansive interpretation there confirmed of the flexibility of the affirmative powers entrusted to Congress in enforcing the negative provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment.

### *Katzenbach v. Morgan*

*Katzenbach v. Morgan*<sup>83</sup> dealt with a narrower aspect of the Voting Rights Act but was no less sweeping in its affirmation of congressional authority, in this case pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case involved the validity of section 4(e) of

81. 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966).

82. Only Mr. Justice Black dissented, and he disagreed only with the Court's approval of section 5 relating to the suspension of tests and devices in covered areas except with the approval of the attorney general or the federal district court in the District of Columbia. He believed that section unconstitutional in providing for a judicial proceeding in the absence of a justiciable case or controversy and for intrusion into the power of the states in requiring approval by federal authorities for the enactment of voter qualification laws.

83. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).

78. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).

79. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See also *Cardona v. Power*, 384 U.S. 672 (1966).

80. *Allen v. State Board of Elections*, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); *Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States*, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); *Perkins v. Matthews*, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).

the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which in effect eliminated the literacy-in-English test as administered in New York State for individuals who had successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the instruction was not in English. The Court acknowledged that literacy tests had not at that time been held to violate the equal protection clause; but, that was found to be no bar. This was "appropriate" legislation "plainly adapted" to furthering the aims of the equal protection clause.<sup>84</sup>

In combination, the *South Carolina* and *Morgan* cases offer Congress a strong arsenal of powers from which to choose in providing effective affirmative enforcement of the negatively worded provisions in the substantive clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Without recognition of that principle, the drive to end discrimination in the exercise of voting rights would have been greatly handicapped.

#### *Allen v. State Board of Elections*

After this strong initial thrust, the next series of cases may not have seemed as difficult, but they, too, are important. *Allen v. State Board of Elections*<sup>85</sup> involved applications of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in which the Court held that four changes in state election provisions—three in Mississippi and one in Virginia—were subject to the approval requirements of section 5. Under the

84. Justices John Harlan and Potter Stewart dissented, believing the Court had "confused the issue of how much enforcement power Congress possesses under section 5 with the distinct issue of what questions are appropriate for congressional determination and what questions are essentially judicial in nature." 384 U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

85. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). See also *Hadnott v. Amos*, 394 U.S. 358 (1969).

Mississippi amendments (1) county supervisors were to be elected at large rather than by districts; (2) superintendents of education in certain counties were made appointive rather than elective; and (3) ballot-access requirements for independent candidates running in general elections were stiffened. Virginia had adopted new procedures for casting write-in ballots which had the effect of barring the use of printed labels by illiterate voters.

The Court concluded that section 5 reached "any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way,"<sup>86</sup> including, most controversially, changes from district to at-large elections. Mr. Justice John Harlan, dissenting, argued that section 5 should be read "to require federal approval only of those state laws that change either voter qualifications or the manner in which elections are conducted."<sup>87</sup> Asserting that "Congress did not attempt to restructure state governments,"<sup>88</sup> Harlan raised the basic issue whether the states should be left free to change their formulas for the drawing of district lines and the use or not of multimember districts. Despite the majority's conclusion that Congress did indeed intend this federal supervisory presence, and that it was a permissible exercise of power, later cases leave the issue in doubt.

In *Perkins v. Matthews*, the majority in effect reaffirmed the *Allen* ruling, holding that federal approval was necessary for (1) changed locations of polling places, (2) changed boundary lines through annexation, and (3) a changed method of electing aldermen from election by wards to an at-large election. Mr. Justice Harlan again dis-

86. 393 U.S. at 566.

87. *Id.* at 591 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).

88. *Id.* at 585.

agreed with the requirement for federal approval as to the changed boundary lines and the at-large election, and Mr. Justice Black dissented in all respects, as he had in *Allen*.<sup>89</sup> Chief Justice Warren Burger and Mr. Justice Harry Blackmun concurred, "[g]iven the decision in *Allen* . . .,"<sup>90</sup> which had been decided before either was a member of the Court. Their apparent doubts crystallized in *Holt v. Richmond* in 1972—by now joined also by Mr. Justice William Rehnquist—in which they expressed their willingness in an "appropriate case" to "reconsider the holding in *Allen* and *Perkins*."<sup>91</sup>

89. 400 U.S. at 397, 401.

90. *Id.* at 397.

91. *Holt v. Richmond*, 406 U.S. 903 (1972). Justices Byron White and Lewis Powell did not participate, suggesting the possibility of a majority willing to reconsider *Allen* and *Perkins*.

*Georgia v. United States*, 351 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Ga.), probable jurisdiction noted, — U.S. — (1972), a case argued before the Supreme Court on February 21–22, 1973, raises these issues. The issue was whether the Georgia 1972 reapportionment act, which changed the boundaries of nearly all election districts within the state, was covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The claim of coverage was based on *Allen* and *Perkins* as well as the assertion that the redistricting, including changes in multimember and single-member districting arrangements, had the effect of diluting the voting strength of Negro voters. See Brief Amici Curiae for NAACP et al., *Georgia v. United States*, No. 72–75 (Oct. 1972 Term, U.S. Sup. Ct.).

*NAACP v. New York*, — F. Supp. — (D. D.C.), probable jurisdiction noted, — U.S. — (1972), argued before the Supreme Court on February 27–28, 1973, raises other issues under the 1965 Act. In this case the State of New York sued to obtain exemption for three counties in New York that had been brought within the coverage of sections 4 and 5 of the 1965 Act by the 1970 Amendments Act. The specific question before the Court, when the United States declined to defend the action, was whether the NAACP could intervene to do so. See Brief for Appellants, *NAACP v. New York*, No. 72–129 (Oct. Term 1972, U.S. Sup. Ct.).

Despite the apparent doubts of some members of the Court as to the validity of a requirement for federal approval of changes in voting qualifications and procedures by the states, the Court continued to find literacy tests suspect. *Gaston County v. United States*<sup>92</sup> involved an application to reinstate a literacy test previously suspended under the automatic suspension provision. With only Mr. Justice Black dissenting, the majority held that it was proper to consider whether such a literacy test would be racially discriminatory in light of the long pattern of separate and inferior schools for black residents now of voting age. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that even "'Impartial' administration of the literacy test today would serve only to perpetuate these inequities in a different form."<sup>93</sup>

Racially discriminatory restrictions on the right to vote come in many packages, some blatantly direct and others beguilingly wrapped in the paraphernalia of apparently routine aspects of the political process. As already noted, the most outrageous interferences with the franchise have sometimes fallen as a result of judicial action grounded squarely on the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment. More often, legislative assistance is needed, of which the most important has been the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Its most important weapon—once literacy tests had been eliminated by the 1965 and 1970 legislation—was the provision in section 5 requiring federal approval of proposed changes in voting qualifications and voting procedures. By the spring of 1973 there had been more than 2,500 submissions under section 5. The nearly 150 objections by the attorney general were responsible for protecting

92. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).

93. *Id.* at 297.



voters against discriminatory changes without litigation.<sup>94</sup>

The first judicial review of an objection by the attorney general resulted in Supreme Court endorsement of his objection in a *per curiam* affirmance of a three-judge federal district court judgment in *Petersburg v. United States*.<sup>95</sup> The case involved a proposed annexation by the City of Petersburg of areas that would have increased the white population of the city by nearly half, while eliminating the black majority. When the city submitted its annexation proposal to the attorney general, as required by section 5 and *Perkins v. Matthews*, *supra*, the attorney general, acting through the assistant attorney general, civil rights division, objected. The ground was dilution of the black voting proportion, particularly in view of at-large elections for city councilmen. In combination, these provisions had a discriminatory effect on voting. The city's suit in challenge of that ruling was rejected by the district court. Although that court found a legitimate governmental purpose for the annexation, it concluded that the city did not sustain the "heavy burden for a community in a state with Virginia's history of past racial discrimination" of proving that the change "would not have the effect of discriminatorily depriving Negroes of the franchise on account of race or color."<sup>96</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States provide the basis for a considerable judicial role in protecting against interferences with the right to vote.

94. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Report no. 10 (March 1973).

95. — U.S. — (1973), affirming — F. Supp. — (D.D.C. 1972).

96. — F. Supp. at —.

For many decades after the adoption of these two amendments, however, the courts were more inclined to rhetoric about democratic values than judicial protection of the franchise, even when assisted by moderately strong congressional action. With more recent recognition by the Supreme Court of the United States that the franchise cannot be limited except for a compelling state interest,<sup>97</sup> there no longer should be any doubt about the willingness of the courts to use prohibitions in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to forbid restrictions on the right to vote that have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect.<sup>98</sup>

When Congress has acted pursuant to its enforcement powers under these amendments and pursuant to its revisory power over state voting laws in article I, section 4, the Supreme Court has been generally willing to endorse legislative proposals to deal with covert as well as overt discrimination. Even here uncertainties remain. As already noted, the crucially important decisions in *Allen* and *Perkins*, without which sec-

97. *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See also *Reynolds v. Simms*, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); *Carrington v. Rash*, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965); *Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); *Cipriano v. City of Houma*, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969); *Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15*, 395 U.S. 621, 626-25 (1969); *Evans v. Corman*, 398 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1970).

98. One exception, beyond the range of this discussion, is the apparent unwillingness of the Supreme Court to limit the gerrymander, frequently employed as a device for racially discriminatory legislative districting. Although the Court is ostensibly willing to strike down racially motivated districting plans [*Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); *Fortson v. Dorsey*, 379 U.S. 437 (1965)], the Court demands a burden of proof that seems impossible to meet [*Wright v. Rockefeller*, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); *Mahon v. Howell*, — U.S. — (1973)].

tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would lose much of its force, are under attack.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, efforts to end discriminatory restrictions on the franchise, by court and by legislature, tell only part of the story. Even where there are no racially motivated restrictions on access to the ballot, problems of securing increased voter participation remain discouragingly difficult. Voter participation is much lower in the United States than other Western countries, especially among black citizens, North as well as South. It is ironic that efforts to dismantle discriminatory devices in the South have been somewhat more successful than efforts to encourage voter participation in areas where discrimination is absent.<sup>100</sup> Efforts to secure

broader participation in elections for community school boards and neighborhood planning boards, for example, have not been notably successful, particularly in urban areas.<sup>101</sup>

Efforts to eliminate discrimination and to broaden the franchise must not be relaxed because of apparent success in the courts and in legislative bodies. Victories there will be transitory, unless the will for broadened exercise of the fundamental prerogative of a democratic society is implanted deep in the hearts and minds of citizens.

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League, concludes that the right to vote is still "abridged by a web of antiquated regulations that discriminate against the black and the poor, a web that affects the entire country." Vernon Jordan, "Barriers to Black Political Participation," *Civil Rights Digest*, (October 1972), p. 2.

101. See, for example, Lewis Kaden and Michael Schwartz, "Election of Community Boards" (unpublished manuscript, 1972).

99. See notes 89-91 above.

100. In mounting a renewed drive for voter registration outside the South, Vernon Jordan, executive director of the National Urban

# Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty

By MARVIN E. WOLFGANG AND MARC RIEDEL

ABSTRACT: The record of executions in the United States has long shown that black defendants are disproportionately subjected to this sanction. But racial differentials in the use of the death penalty may not alone reveal the existence of racial discrimination. The Supreme Court in the *Furman* decision ruled that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it is a "cruel and unusual" punishment. Some allusions to racial discrimination appeared in the opinions, but more evidence seems called for. Some earlier studies of racial differentials in sentencing are reviewed, followed by a summary of the research procedure and conclusions from an elaborate study of sentencing for rape in states where that offense has been a capital crime. Strong statistically significant differences in the proportions of blacks sentenced to death, compared to whites, when a variety of nonracial aggravating circumstances are considered, permit the conclusion that the sentencing differentials are the product of racial discrimination.

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IN *Furman v. Georgia*, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four decision, ruled that "the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."<sup>1</sup> The three petitioners referred to in the decision are black; one had been convicted of a felony murder, while the other two had been convicted of rape. In each case the decision to impose the death penalty had been determined by a jury.<sup>2</sup>

#### SOME MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FURMAN CASE

Civil rights and civil liberties organizations view the *Furman* decision "as the watershed in its long struggle against capital punishment," but many of the consequences of the decision are unclear.<sup>3</sup> Although each of the five concurring justices filed separate opinions, and none joined in the opinion of any other, there was agreement that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it is imposed infrequently and under no clear standards. In addition, the opinions of Justices William O. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall suggest that the death penalty may have been imposed in a discriminatory manner. Inseparable from these latter considerations, however, was the central issue of whether the death penalty for felony murder and rape, when imposed by a jury having discretion to mete out death or imprisonment, is constitutionally permissible.<sup>4</sup>

1. 408 U.S. at 239-240.

2. The convictions and sentences were affirmed, *Furman v. State*, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E. 2d 628 (1969); *Jackson v. State*, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E. 2d 501 (1969); *Branch v. State*, 447 S.W. 2d 932 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1969).

3. Hugo Adam Bedau, *The Case against the Death Penalty* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1973).

4. Bedau, *Case against the Death Penalty*.

The Court concluded that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment partly because it is infrequently and arbitrarily applied. However, that very infrequency could support both concurring and dissenting opinions and therefore really supports neither. Moreover, although the death penalty may be infrequently imposed, it is not imposed arbitrarily. Focusing on previously unpublished studies of rape and the death penalty, this paper will conclude that racial variables are systematically and consistently related to the imposition of the death penalty.

#### *The Furman decision and jury discretion*

According to Justice Douglas, the Court's view of the sentencing discretion of juries was stated in *McGautha v. California*: "In light of history, experience and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammelled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution."<sup>5</sup> The Court could find no constitutional dimensions in the argument that juries that have the discretion to send a person to death should be given standards by which this discretion can be exercised.

Although the Court did not conclude that standards should be given to juries in the exercise of their sentencing discretion, Justice Douglas did indicate that such jury discretion serves the function of preventing punishments for laws that are "totally repugnant to the feelings of the community. . . ." <sup>6</sup> Chief Justice Warren E. Burger also emphasized that the exercise of jury discretion expresses the conscience of

5. 408 U.S. at 247.

6. 408 U.S. at 245.

the community. Drawing upon the *Witherspoon v. Illinois* decision, the Chief Justice concluded that juries are given sentencing discretion in death penalty cases because their selections maintain a link between community values and the penal system, "a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'"<sup>7</sup>

If the Court had previously held that the exercise of jury discretion in death penalty cases was not unconstitutional, how could it rule in *Furman v. Georgia* that imposition of the death penalty by a jury exercising their sentencing discretion is in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? It would appear that the dissenting opinion of Justice Lewis F. Powell is correct: "Having so recently reaffirmed our historic dedication to entrusting the sentencing function to the jury's 'untrammelled discretion' . . . , it is difficult to see how the Court can now hold the entire process constitutionally defective under the Eighth Amendment."<sup>8</sup> However, the basis for inferring cruel and unusual punishments in the imposition of the death penalty hinged on the interpretation and relationship between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Both *McGautha* and *Witherspoon* were rulings focusing on due process and equal protection clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Douglas maintained that there is "increasing recognition of the fact that the basic theme of equal protection is implicit in 'cruel and unusual' punishment."<sup>9</sup> Where a penalty is imposed with extreme rarity or is arbitrarily or discriminatorily administered, it should be considered imposed "unusually."

Justice William J. Brennan pointed out that the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is fully applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."<sup>10</sup> Justice Brennan concluded that because of the *McGautha* decision, procedures have not been "constructed to guard against the totally capricious selection of criminals for the punishment of death."<sup>11</sup> This conclusion is based on the infrequency and apparent lack of selectivity of executions.

Among the other concurring opinions, Justice Potter Stewart simply concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."<sup>12</sup> Justice Byron R. White recognized the right of juries to exercise their discretion in imposing the death penalty, but pointed out that it is exercised with such infrequency that "the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice."<sup>13</sup> Justice Marshall claimed that the death penalty was cruel and unusual because it was excessive and unnecessary. Giving juries "untrammelled discretion" to impose a sentence of death was "an open invitation to discrimination."<sup>14</sup>

The concurring opinions concluded that the exercise of jury discretion in imposing the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment because of its infrequency, its arbitrariness, or the opportunities it afforded for discrimination. The dissenting opinions, on the other hand, pointed out that these were due process arguments outside the purview of the "cruel and unusual punish-

7. 408 U.S. at 388.

8. 408 U.S. at 449.

9. 408 U.S. at 249.

10. 408 U.S. at 257.

11. 408 U.S. at 295.

12. 408 U.S. at 310.

13. 408 U.S. at 313.

14. 408 U.S. at 365.

ment" provision of the Eighth Amendment. In addition, three of the four dissenting justices held that the Court's decision infringed on legislative prerogatives.

From the available literature, as well as what is given in the opinions of the justices, there seems little doubt that the death penalty is infrequently or rarely imposed.<sup>15</sup> It is unclear, however, what infrequency of imposition per se can demonstrate. Where juries are given discretion to mete out the death penalty or imprisonment, infrequency of imposition may mean only that the jury feels there are very few cases that warrant the extreme penalty; cases receiving the death penalty, it could be claimed, may involve circumstances that raise no issue of cruel and unusual punishment.

In part, this is the position taken in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, infrequency of imposition may mean that cases are selected randomly<sup>17</sup> or on constitutionally impermissible grounds such as race,<sup>18</sup> a point of view suggested by the concurring opinions. Thus, infrequency of imposition appears to be supportive both of the interpretation that the exercise of jury discretion constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and the interpretation that it does not.

Two of the majority opinions characterize the jury's discretionary behavior in imposing the death penalty as "random," "capricious," "wanton," and "freakish."<sup>19</sup> We noted previously that the *McGautha* decision established that juries could act with "untrammelled discretion"; but the lack of standards to guide the jury in imposing the sentence

of death raised no constitutional issue. If a jury exercises that discretion, it may do so in a way that is unconstitutional, but historically the behavior is not random, capricious, wanton, or freakish. As will be seen when the empirical evidence is reviewed, there are very distinct patterns of behavior which show that racial variables *are* influential in the imposition of the death penalty.

Both Justices Douglas and Marshall recognized the existence of discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty. Justice Douglas stated that

the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position. . . . Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on "cruel and unusual" punishment.<sup>20</sup>

If the discretionary statutes are "pregnant with discrimination," then Chief Justice Burger correctly pointed out that

legislative bodies may seek to bring their laws into compliance with the Court's ruling by providing standards for juries and judges to follow in determining the sentence in capital cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes for which the penalty is to be imposed. If such standards can be devised or the crimes more meticulously defined, the results cannot be detrimental.<sup>21</sup>

As a possible clue to such standards for jury use, Chief Justice Burger referred to motive or lack of motive of the per-

15. 408 U.S. at 291-292.

16. 408 U.S. at 389.

17. 408 U.S. at 295, 310.

18. 408 U.S. at 256-257, 365.

19. 408 U.S. at 295, 310.

20. 408 U.S. at 256, 257.

21. 408 U.S. at 400-401.

petrator, degree of injury or suffering of the victim or victims, and the degree of brutality in the commission of the crime as prominent factors in the decision of the existing jury system.

With regard to the issue of discrimination, Justice Powell suggested that an argument

not presented by any of the petitioners today, premised on the Equal Protection Clause, might well be made. If a Negro defendant, for instance, could demonstrate that members of his race were being singled out for more severe punishment than others charged with the same offense, a constitutional violation might be established.<sup>22</sup>

Putting the dissenting views of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell together suggests an interesting approach to the research literature. Even if the suggestions of the Chief Justice were to be followed, if statutory provisions were very specific, and if standards were constructed to guide juries, racial discrimination might still be demonstrated as an overriding consideration in sentencing. In other words, racial discrimination could be demonstrated if it were shown that variables like "amount of injury to victim" and committing a "contemporaneous offense" had no significant relation to death penalty sentencing when the race of the defendant was taken into account and while significantly higher proportions of one racial group compared to others were sentenced to death.

In the following sections the material which is presented in summary form is addressed to this very issue.

#### IS DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION?

Of the 3,859 persons executed for all crimes since 1930, 54.6 percent have been black or members of other racial minority groups. Of the 455 executed

22. 408 U.S. at 449.

for rape alone, 89.5 percent have been nonwhite.<sup>23</sup> As census data clearly reveal, blacks in American society have consistently represented approximately 10 percent of the United States population.

These statistics alone, of course, do not reveal elements of judicial bias in the administration of criminal law. It is also well recognized that blacks in American society, with variations in time and place, have a criminal homicide rate that is between four and ten times greater than that of whites. Age, sex, and regional variations within the country are regularly taken into account when studies of homicide are made. There can be little argument about the fact that official police arrest and court adjudication records show a higher proportion of blacks than of whites arrested and convicted for criminal homicide. We are not here questioning the process of the differential arrest of blacks compared to whites nor the issue of varying degrees of evidentiary material for indictment of blacks compared with whites. What is at issue is whether, among persons who have been convicted of capital crimes, a statistically significantly higher proportion of blacks than of whites, all other things being relatively equal, are differentially sentenced to death. One of the important phrases in this statement is "relatively equal," for we need to know much more than is currently available about the circumstances of the crime, the previous record of the defendant, and the relationship between the victim and the offender before assertions of racial discrimination and bias can be made with utmost validity.

Many of the studies that have examined racial disparities in sentencing

23. Testimony of Marvin E. Wolfgang at hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, March 16, 1972.

have attempted to control for one or more nonracial variables which might explain the differential imposition of the death penalty. The studies have been fragmentary and localized in particular states, but the findings have been in a consistent direction: blacks are disproportionately sentenced to death.<sup>24</sup>

24. Hugo Adam Bedau, "Capital Punishment in Oregon 1903-1964," *Oregon Law Review* 45 (1965), p. 1, and "Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960," *Rutgers Law Review* 19 (1965), p. 1; William J. Bowers, *Discrimination in Capital Punishment: Characteristics of the Condemned* (unpublished transcript from The Russel B. Stearns Research Center, Northeastern University, 1972); Robert M. Carter and A. LaMont Smith, "The Death Penalty in California: A Statistical and Composite Portrait," *Crime and Delinquency* 15 (1969), p. 62; George E. Danielson, *Facts and Figures Concerning Executions in California 1938-1962*, prepared with the assistance of the Assembly Legislative Reference Service, Sacramento, 1963; Harold Garfinkel, "Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides," *Social Forces* 27 (1949), p. 369; Frank E. Hartung, "Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment," *THE ANNALS* 284 (1952), p. 8; Rupert C. Koeninger, "Capital Punishment in Texas 1924-1968," *Crime and Delinquency* 15 (1969), p. 132; Charles S. Mangum, *The Legal Status of the Negro* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940); Maryland Legislative Council, Committee on Capital Punishment, *Report*, 1962; Donald H. Partington, "The Incidence of the Death Penalty for Rape in Virginia," *Washington and Lee Law Review* 22 (1965), p. 43; James A. McCafferty, "The Death Sentence," in H. A. Bedau, ed., *The Death Penalty in America*, rev. ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1967); Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Staff Research Report, no. 46, *Capital Punishment*, 1962; Pennsylvania Joint Legislative Committee on Capital Punishment, *Report*, 1961; Thorsten Sellin, "A Note on Capital Executions in the United States," *British Journal of Delinquency* 1 (1960), p. 6; "A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Trials," *Stanford Law Review* 21 (1969), p. 1297; Texas Department of Corrections, Division of Research, *A Synopsis of Offenders Receiving the Death Sentence in Texas*, Research Report no. 8, 1972; United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights,

As an example of research done to determine the effects of race while taking into account the effects of non-racial variables, Wolfgang, Kelly, and Nolde analyzed the records of 439 persons sentenced to death in Pennsylvania between 1914 and 1958 for first degree murder.<sup>25</sup> Of 147 blacks, only 11 percent had their sentences of death commuted to life imprisonment; whereas of 263 whites, 20 percent had their sentences commuted. The statistical association between being executed and being black was statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 4.33$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ). As was asserted, something more than chance has operated over the years to produce this racial difference . . . because the Negro/high-execution association is statistically present, some suspicion of racial discrimination can hardly be avoided. If such a relationship had not appeared, this kind of suspicion could have been allayed; the existence of the relationship, although not "proving" differential bias by the Pardon Boards over the years since 1914, strongly suggests that such bias has existed.

In this study there was no significant difference between race and the commission of felony murder. That is, the proportion of blacks and whites who had committed felony murder was not statistically different, yet 94 percent of black felony murderers were executed

*Capital Punishment in the Republic of South Africa*, unpublished working paper, 1964; Franklin H. Williams, "The Death Penalty and the Negro," *The Crisis* 67 (1960), p. 501; Edwin D. Wolf, "Abstracts of Analysis of Jury Sentencing in Capital Cases," *Rutgers Law Review* 19 (1964), p. 56.

25. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Arlene Kelly, and Hans C. Nolde, "Comparisons of the Executed and the Commuted among Admissions to Death Row," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science* 53 (September 1962), p. 301. The variables included in the study were type of murder, offender's age, race, occupation, marital status, whether native- or foreign-born, type of counsel, and reasons for commutations.



compared to 83 percent of white felony murderers. This latter was also a statistically significant difference, indicating that among offenders who had been sentenced to death and who had committed felony murder, blacks were executed more and commuted less than whites. Finally, it was noted in general that offenders with court-appointed counsel were more likely to be executed and offenders with private counsel more likely to be commuted to life imprisonment, but even among the court-appointed counsel, a statistically significantly higher proportion of blacks was executed than whites ( $\chi^2 = p < 0.05$ ). The authors concluded:

... any empirical verification of previously assumed differences among persons who received society's ultimate sanction should be of value in understanding the operation of our legal principles. That race is one of these significant differences constitutes a social and political violation of the principle of equal justice. . . .<sup>26</sup>

In one of the early significant studies on race and capital punishment, Guy B. Johnson pointed out that the race of both the victim and the offender may be an important variable in understanding the penalties applied to homicides.<sup>27</sup> Using 220 homicide cases from Richmond, Virginia, from 1930 to 1939, and 330 homicides from five counties in North Carolina from 1930 to 1940, Johnson hypothesized that cases of black offenders whose victims were white would be viewed as the most serious homicides, followed by white offenders/white victims, black offenders/black victims, and white offenders/black victims.

Johnson found that of the 141 black/black cases, there were only 8 sentences

of life imprisonment and no death sentences. Of the 22 cases of black offenders and white victims, 7 defendants received life imprisonment and 6 received the death penalty. Although the quality and quantity of data precluded further analysis, Johnson did conclude that "Negro versus Negro offenses are treated with undue leniency, while the Negro versus white offenses are treated with undue severity."<sup>28</sup>

The effects of the race of the offender, as well as racial combinations of offender and victim, on the imposition of the death penalty become more clear when studies on rape offenses are examined. Among persons sentenced to death for rape in North Carolina from 1909 to 1954, Elmer Johnson found that 56 percent of blacks compared to 43 percent of whites were executed.<sup>29</sup> A Florida study of sentences for rape between 1940 and 1964 noted that only six cases, or 5 percent, of white males who raped white females received the death penalty. But of the eighty-four black males who raped white women, forty-five, or 54 percent, received the death penalty, while none of the eight white offenders who raped black females received the death penalty.<sup>30</sup>

Data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons suggest that racial differentials are most clear among death sentences for rape. As we noted, 405 of the 455 persons executed for rape since 1930 were black; only 2 were from other racial minorities. All of the executions for rape were in southern or border states or the District of Columbia.<sup>31</sup> In

28. Ibid., p. 98.

29. Elmer H. Johnson, "Selective Factors in Capital Punishment," *Social Forces* 36 (December 1957), p. 165.

30. *Rape: Selective Electrocutation Based on Race* (Miami: Florida Civil Liberties Union, 1964).

31. Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics, *Capital Punishment 1930-1968*, Bulletin no. 45, August 1969.

26. Ibid., p. 311.

27. Guy B. Johnson, "The Negro and Crime," *THE ANNALS* 217 (September 1941), pp. 93-104.

Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia not a single white man was executed for rape over the forty-two-year period from 1930 to 1972. Together, these jurisdictions executed 66 blacks. Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, and Missouri each executed 1 white man for rape since 1930, but together they have executed 71 blacks.

Findings of racial discrimination in previous studies, as well as suspicions of racial discrimination raised by the data from the Bureau of Prisons, have been reinforced recently by more conclusive findings based on refined and detailed analyses of rape convictions in several states where rape has been a statutory capital crime. Differential sentencing has required further examination to determine whether racial discrimination exists.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE  
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH  
PENALTY FOR RAPE IN THE  
SOUTH, 1945-1965

During the summer of 1965, research was initiated to examine in detail the relationship between race and sentencing for rape in eleven southern and border states in which rape was a capital offense. The study was sponsored by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and conducted by the Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law at the University of Pennsylvania by Professors Anthony Amsterdam and Marvin E. Wolfgang.

At each step in the development and implementation of the research design, from selection of the sample to analysis of the data, the emphasis was on the use of research criteria that would increase the reliability and objectivity of the data while minimizing sources of bias and subjectivity. Interfacing with

scientific demands was the selection of dimensions of inquiry that would increase understanding of racial discrimination, if it existed, in a judicial system and that would also be of possible use in subsequent litigation.

The research findings were presented as evidence in six states to support petitioners' claims of racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty. They were part of the brief in the *Maxwell* case argued before the U.S. Supreme Court<sup>32</sup> and part of the testimony offered before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives considering bills to suspend the death penalty for two years or to abolish it.<sup>33</sup>

Although eighteen American jurisdictions allowed the imposition of the death penalty for rape, substantial numbers of persons have been executed for this crime during the past thirty years in only twelve: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. It was decided that the study could be profitably confined to these twelve states.

In order to form an empirical basis for conclusions about the effect of racial factors on capital sentencing for rape, it was necessary to gather data about a substantial number of rape cases in each state. Moreover, a sufficiently long period of time covered by the research was necessary in order to satisfy the notion of "custom," or of an institutionalized, systematic judicial norm of sentencing behavior; hence the twenty-year period used in this study.

To meet the demands of proper statistical analysis, cases could have been obtained by seeking every rape conviction in each state for a decade, or by selecting counties by standard statistical

32. *Maxwell v. Bishop*, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).

33. Wolfgang, Testimony, p. 165.

sampling techniques over a twenty-year period. This latter process was used. For each of the twelve states, a sample of counties was chosen to represent the urban-rural and black-white demographic distributions of each state. The counties chosen comprised more than 50 percent of the total population of the twelve states.<sup>34</sup> For the counties included in each state sample, every case of conviction for rape from January 1, 1945 to the summer of 1965 was recorded. Maryland was initially included in the survey, but time limitations precluded full data collection in that state. Therefore, data were gathered for a twenty-year period for over 3,000 rape convictions in 230 counties in eleven states.<sup>35</sup>

The states included in the study were not only those that most often executed persons for rape; they also displayed an apparent racial disparity, for black offenders were more frequently executed than were white offenders. In seeking to explore the meaning of this apparent racial disparity in capital sentencing, only rape *convictions* were considered. It might be asserted that blacks more frequently than whites commit rape, are more frequently arrested, or are more frequently charged with that offense. Whether these or any combination of these assertions were true was not questioned in this study. Instead, the focus was on the reliable and objectively ascertainable fact that defendants had been convicted for the crime of rape. Using this point of departure meant that the effect of racial factors on the

criminal process prior to conviction could not be explored. There would be no way of knowing—if blacks were disproportionately sentenced to death for rape—whether the pattern could be accounted for by a disproportionate frequency in the commission of rapes by blacks or by a disproportionate frequency in the conviction of blacks for rape. However, *among convicted defendants*, it was possible to determine whether black defendants were disproportionately frequently sentenced to death and, if so, whether the disproportion could be explained by nonracial variables.

In order to explore the effect of racial as well as nonracial variables on the imposition of the death penalty, it was necessary to determine which variables could be obtained from the county records of rape convictions. In addition to collecting information on the race of the defendant and the victim and on the type of sentence, information was gathered about many nonracial variables that could be construed as mitigating or aggravating circumstances. If standards were sought for sentencing in capital cases, some of the nonracial variables listed below might be seriously considered. These were the variables included in the study reported here.

1. Offender characteristics
  - a. age
  - b. marital status
  - c. prior criminal record
  - d. previous imprisonment
  - e. employment status
2. Victim characteristics
  - a. age
  - b. marital status
  - c. dependent children
  - d. prior criminal record
  - e. reputation for chastity

34. The sampling plan for each state in the study was developed with the assistance of John Monroe.

35. Deposition of written interrogatories to Marvin E. Wolfgang re *Willie Awkwright v. Asa D. Kelly, Jr. and Lamont Smith*, Case No. 5283 in the Superior Court of Tattnall County, Georgia.

3. Nature of relations between victim and offender
  - a. offender known to victim
  - b. prior sexual relations
4. Circumstances of offense
  - a. contemporaneous offense
  - b. type of entry—authorized or unauthorized
  - c. location of offense—indoor or outdoor
  - d. display of weapon
  - e. carrying of weapon
  - f. amount of injury to victim
  - g. threatened victim
  - h. degree of force employed
  - i. victim made pregnant by offense
  - j. one or multiple offenders
  - k. date of offense
5. Circumstances of the trial
  - a. plea
  - b. defense of insanity
  - c. appointed or retained counsel
  - d. length of time of trial
  - e. defense of consent
  - f. whether defendant testified

An elaborate twenty-eight-page research schedule was constructed to obtain reliable and uniform data from records of widely varying quality in geographically dispersed locations. To reduce the amount of subjective or judgmental variation recorded by field investigators, each variable was described in a manner that focused the investigators' attention on objective facts or quantities that could be recorded on a check list.

There is little difficulty in establishing accurate schedule categories when the information to be obtained, like race or plea, is unambiguous. More difficulty occurs in obtaining reliable and objective data for items like "injury sustained by victim, companion victim, or other persons." To make reliable comparisons from case to case, a check-

list of categories of predescribed injuries was developed, using brief phrases that focused the recorders' attention on specific, significant, objective details and the consequences of injuries. For example, categories for the latter item included recording whether the victim suffered "minor injury requiring no medical treatment," suffered "physical injuries requiring medical treatment, but not requiring hospitalization," or suffered "physical injuries requiring hospitalization."<sup>36</sup>

Thirty law students were recruited from different parts of the country to serve as field investigators. Before going into the field, the students were given a two-day orientation by the two principal investigators. The instruction process outlined in detail the research design and the legal components of the task. Emphasis was placed on the importance of providing reliable data which depended upon uniformity in the observation and recording of data. It was particularly emphasized that the investigators should not let their personal assumptions about the probable results of the study influence the manner in which they recorded the data. The field investigators were instructed to call central personnel for advice if instances arose in which they had trouble classifying their observations while in the field. After completion in the field, the schedules were forwarded to the Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law for coding and statistical analysis.

The method of analysis used to determine whether the death penalty is given disproportionately frequently to blacks

36. These particular categories were developed in an earlier study where a system of standardized description and evaluation of the degrees of injury was constructed. See Thorsten Sellin and Marvin E. Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

TABLE 1—RACE OF DEFENDANT BY TYPE OF SENTENCE

|       | DEATH  |         | OTHER  |         | TOTAL  |         |
|-------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
|       | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| Black | 110    | 13      | 713    | 87      | 823    | 100     |
| White | 9      | 2       | 433    | 98      | 442    | 100     |
| Total | 119    |         | 1146   |         | 1265   |         |

NOTE: States included are Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee.  $\chi^2 = 41.9924$ ;  $p < 0.001$ .

employed the null hypothesis and the chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ) statistical test, for which  $p < 0.05$  was chosen as the level of significance. One major null hypothesis stated that among all defendants convicted of rape there is no significant association between the race of the defendant and the type of sentence imposed. The second major null hypothesis stated that among all defendants convicted of rape there are no significant differences between the proportions of black defendants with white victims and all other classes of rape defendants sentenced to death. Both of these hypotheses were rejected in each state analyzed.

The data were compiled and analyzed in seven states—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Tennessee—for purposes of submitting testimony in litigation conducted by the Legal Defense Fund. Each state was separately reviewed with its own set of tables and conclusions. The findings were uniformly similar for

each state and the conclusions the same. In future analyses planned by the Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, all states for which data are available will be comprehensively reviewed. In the present article, only a brief summary with an illustration of the procedure can be presented. In the tables that follow, the total number of cases varies by the particular factor analyzed because of differences in the availability of information over the twenty-year period in each of the states.

Among 1,265 cases in which the race of the defendant and the sentence are known, nearly seven times as many blacks were sentenced to death as were whites. Among the 823 blacks convicted of rape, 110, or 13 percent, were sentenced to death; among the 442 whites convicted of rape, only 9, or 2 percent, were sentenced to death. The statistical probability that such a disproportionate number of blacks could be sentenced to death by chance alone is less than one out of a thousand. More

TABLE 2—RACIAL COMBINATIONS OF DEFENDANT AND VICTIM BY TYPE OF SENTENCE

|                                                       | DEATH  |         | OTHER  |         | TOTAL  |         |
|-------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
|                                                       | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| Black defendant and white victim                      | 113    | 36      | 204    | 64      | 317    | 100     |
| All other racial combinations of defendant and victim | 19     | 2       | 902    | 98      | 921    | 100     |
| Total                                                 | 132    |         | 1106   |         | 1238   |         |

NOTE: States included are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee.  $\chi^2 = 275.7192$ ;  $p < 0.001$ .

TABLE 3—CONTEMPORANEOUS OFFENSE BY TYPE OF SENTENCE

|                            | DEATH  |         | OTHER  |         | TOTAL  |         |
|----------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
|                            | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| Contemporaneous offense    | 53     | 22      | 133    | 78      | 236    | 100     |
| No contemporaneous offense | 92     | 8       | 840    | 92      | 921    | 100     |
| Total                      | 125    |         | 1023   |         | 1148   |         |

NOTE: States included are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee.  $\chi^2 = 39.4915$ ;  $p < 0.001$ .

particularly, a statistically significantly higher proportion of black defendants whose victims were white were sentenced to death. From a total of 1,238 convicted rape defendants, 317 were black defendants with white victims, and 921 were all other racial combinations of defendant and victim—including black/black, white/white, and white/black. Of the 317 black defendants whose victims were white, 113, or approximately 36 percent, were sentenced to death. Of the 921 defendants involved in all other racial combinations of defendant and victim, only 19, or 2 percent, were sentenced to death. In short, black defendants whose victims were white were sentenced to death approximately eighteen times more frequently than defendants in any other racial combination of defendant and victim. Again, the probability of such a distribution, or such a relationship between the sentence of death and black defendants with white victims is, by chance alone, less than one out of a thousand.

But the obvious fact that there is differential sentencing by race, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, does not alone permit a conclusion of racial discrimination in sentencing. We may hypothesize, for example, that, as a group, black rape defendants more often than white defendants commit another offense along with the commission of the rape offense. It could generally be asserted that the commission of a contemporaneous offense, like burglary or robbery, is an aggravating circumstance and could account for the disproportionate frequency with which black defendants receive the death penalty.

Because of these considerations, all the nonracial variables previously listed were introduced in a further examination of the associations between race and the imposition of the death penalty.

First, each nonracial variable was examined relative to type of sentence. If no significant relationship existed between the nonracial variable and type of sentence, further analysis of that variable was not undertaken for it could

TABLE 4—CONTEMPORANEOUS OFFENSE BY RACE OF DEFENDANT

|                            | BLACK  |         | WHITE  |         | TOTAL |
|----------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-------|
|                            | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |       |
| Contemporaneous offense    | 150    | 26      | 45     | 15      | 195   |
| No contemporaneous offense | 422    | 74      | 264    | 85      | 686   |
| Total                      | 572    | 100     | 309    | 100     | 881   |

NOTE: States included are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee.  $\chi^2 = 15.1583$ ;  $p < 0.001$ .

TABLE 5—CONTEMPORANEOUS OFFENSE BY RACIAL COMBINATIONS OF DEFENDANT AND VICTIM

|                            | BLACK DEFENDANT<br>AND WHITE VICTIM |         | ALL OTHER RACIAL<br>COMBINATIONS OF<br>DEFENDANT/VICTIM |         | TOTAL<br>Number |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----------------|
|                            | Number                              | Percent | Number                                                  | Percent |                 |
| Contemporaneous offense    | 58                                  | 40      | 81                                                      | 14      | 139             |
| No contemporaneous offense | 88                                  | 60      | 480                                                     | 86      | 568             |
| Total                      | 146                                 | 100     | 561                                                     | 100     | 707             |

NOTE: States included are Florida, Georgia, Tennessee.  $\chi^2 = 45.3139$ ;  $p < 0.001$ .

at that point be concluded that no significant difference in type of sentence occurred because of that variable. Table 3, however, illustrates that there is a significant association between offenses committed contemporaneously with the rape offense and type of sentence.

If there was a significant association between the nonracial variable and sentence, the nonracial variable was then cross-tabulated with the race of the defendant. If the resulting chi-square was not significant, no further analysis was performed. There could be, however, a significant association between the nonracial variable and race, as is shown in Table 4. This table indicates that among 572 black defendants, 150, or 26 percent, had committed contemporaneous offenses, while among white defendants 45, or 15 percent, had committed contemporaneous offenses.

Table 5 would seem to add one more piece of evidence that the nonracial variable of contemporaneous offenses is a contributory factor producing a more frequent imposition of the death penalty for blacks, particularly those with white victims. Data from this table indicate a significant association between the presence or absence of contemporaneous offenses and racial combinations of defendant and victim. Among the 146 black defendants with white victims, 40 percent had committed contemporaneous offenses, whereas only 14 percent of the 561 cases making up all other racial combinations involved contemporaneous offenses.

Although it might appear that the presence or absence of contemporaneous offenses is a contributory factor, more refined procedure shows that it does not play a significant part in explaining the association between black defendants

TABLE 6—RACIAL COMBINATIONS OF DEFENDANT/VICTIM BY TYPE OF SENTENCE AMONG ALL CASES IN WHICH DEFENDANT COMMITTED A CONTEMPORANEOUS OFFENSE

|                                                   | DEATH  |         | OTHER  |         | TOTAL  |         |
|---------------------------------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
|                                                   | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| Black defendant and white victim                  | 22     | 39      | 36     | 61      | 58     | 100     |
| All other racial combinations of defendant/victim | 2      | 3       | 79     | 97      | 81     | 100     |
| Total                                             | 24     |         | 115    |         | 139    |         |

NOTE: States included are Florida, Georgia, Tennessee.  $\chi^2 = 27.3231$ ;  $p < 0.001$ .

TABLE 7—RACIAL COMBINATIONS OF DEFENDANT/VICTIM BY TYPE OF SENTENCE AMONG ALL CASES IN WHICH DEFENDANT COMMITTED NO CONTEMPORANEOUS OFFENSE

|                                                   | DEATH  |         | OTHER  |         | TOTAL  |         |
|---------------------------------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
|                                                   | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| Black defendant and white victim                  | 34     | 39      | 54     | 61      | 88     | 100     |
| All other racial combinations of defendant/victim | 9      | 2       | 471    | 98      | 480    | 100     |
| Total                                             | 43     |         | 525    |         | 568    |         |

NOTE: States included are Florida, Georgia, Tennessee.  $\chi^2 = 138.4186$ ;  $p < 0.001$ .

and the imposition of the death penalty. To perform this further analysis, the nonracial variable of contemporaneous offenses was split into two subgroups. The first subgroup included all cases in which the defendant had committed a contemporaneous offense—Table 6. Within this subgroup, chi-square analysis shows a significant association between racial combinations of defendant and victim and imposition of the death penalty. More specifically, among the fifty-eight black defendants with white victims, 39 percent received the death penalty, but among all other racial combinations of defendant and victim, only 3 percent of the eighty-one defendants received the death penalty.

For the other subgroup in which no contemporaneous offenses were committed, there is also a significant association between racial combinations of defendant and victim and the imposition of the death penalty. Table 7 indicates that among the 88 black defendants with white victims, 39 percent received the death penalty, whereas among 480 cases of other racial combinations, only 2 percent received the death penalty.

It is important to repeat the final descriptive assertion derived from these data: It is not the presence of the nonracial factor of a contemporaneous offense that affects the decision to impose the death penalty more frequently on blacks. Rather, it is the racial factor

of the relationship between the defendant and victim that results in the use of the death penalty. Whether or not a contemporaneous offense has been committed, if the defendant is black and the victim is white, the defendant is about eighteen times more likely to receive the death penalty than when the defendant is in any other racial combination of defendant and victim.

Over two dozen possibly aggravating nonracial variables that might have accounted for the higher proportion of blacks than whites sentenced to death upon conviction of rape have been analyzed. Not one of these nonracial factors has withstood the tests of statistical significance. That is, in none of the seven states carefully analyzed can it be said that any of the nonracial factors account for the statistically significant and disproportionate number of blacks sentenced to death for rape. This is a striking conclusion. It cannot be said that blacks are more frequently sentenced to death because they have a longer prior criminal record than whites, because they used more force on the victim, because they committed a robbery or burglary, because they entered premises without authorization, because they used a weapon or threatened the victim with a weapon, because they had an accomplice in the commission of the rape, because they impregnated the victim, because they more frequently at-



tacked persons under age sixteen, and so forth. All the nonracial factors in each of the states analyzed "wash out," that is, they have no bearing on the imposition of the death penalty in disproportionate numbers upon blacks. The only variable of statistical significance that remains is race.

#### CONCLUSION

In *Furman v. Georgia*, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional because it is a "cruel and unusual" punishment. That the history of this penalty has been marked by elements of racial discrimination was alluded to by at least two justices, but the Court has not directly ruled out the death penalty on this basis, which could be grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment and the "due process" dictum.

That blacks have been disproportionately sentenced to death and executed in the United States has long been noted. But general social differentials in sentencing may not alone denote racial discrimination, or failure of blacks to be given all due process in the administration of criminal justice. An elaborate research scheme, reported here, which collected data on capital rape convictions over a twenty-year period from 1945 to 1965 has now provided material on many nonracial variables to determine whether they, rather than race, could account for the disproportionately and significantly high frequency of blacks sentenced to death compared to whites.

Based upon a refined statistical analysis of rape convictions in states where rape has been a capital crime, this study shows that there has been a patterned,

systematic, and customary imposition of the death penalty. Far from being "freakish" or capricious, sentences of death have been imposed on blacks, compared to whites, in a way that exceeds any statistical notion of chance or fortuity. Moreover, the systems of criminal justice in the jurisdictions studied have inflicted the death penalty on blacks in such disproportions without statutory or other legally acceptable bases. Thus, with the benefit of a carefully designed and objectively analyzed study of these conditions, it can be concluded that the significant racial differentials found in the imposition of the death penalty are indeed produced by racial discrimination.

The study has shown that racial discrimination has long existed and exists with currency above the conviction stage of the judicial process. That there may be more systematic features of racial differentials, from which discrimination may be inferred, remains for future and further research to determine. Discretion at earlier stages in the administration of justice could also carry elements of racial discrimination: arrest, hearing, plea bargaining, decisions to prosecute or drop charges, and many others, when death is a permissible penalty. Neither mandatory sanctions nor the reduction of racial discrimination at the sentencing stage would eliminate the untoward systemic effects of racial discrimination elsewhere in the processing of defendants. By declaring the death penalty unconstitutional, and reaffirming this declaration if necessary, the Supreme Court at least and at last removes the consequence of finality which differential justice has produced.

# The Development of the Black Bar

By WALTER J. LEONARD

**ABSTRACT:** This article seeks to trace a certain pattern which exists, or appears to exist, within the history of black lawyers in America. Their story is relatively short, for American black lawyers have been part of our times for only 129 years. However, black lawyers in America, insofar as they constitute a "black bar," should not be considered exclusively as a group, generating certain patterns. Whatever the term "black bar" may mean, it can be defined adequately only in terms of every individual black lawyer. There have been periods in American history when there were too few black lawyers for any sort of group to be assembled at all. Because so distinct and limited a minority can have no significant power or influence, it is encouraging that the sheer numerical characteristic of black lawyers has increased. In 1844 there was one; in 1973 there are more than four thousand. But however many more are needed, and however influential the "black bar" may become, it is perhaps to our benefit that we are forced to consider certain individuals, isolated though they often were, as the total representation of the black legal profession. Those men and women served to maintain a tradition throughout some very bad times. Today, they serve to remind us that black lawyers, however constituted, defined, or studied, are nothing if not individuals, men and women of distinctive color, creed, and characteristic, and ultimately their own men and women, not those of any of their associations.

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IN any discussion of the black bar, or to be more precise, the past and present population of black lawyers, we are possessed with the unusual ability to predict the future with far more accuracy than we are able to chart the past. Our information about black lawyers diminishes as we look back in time. No one, for instance, is exactly certain who the first black lawyer in America was, or the exact number and nature of those who followed him until the 1940s.

What we do know is that black lawyers have stood before the American Bar for at least 129 years. During these years, however, there have been periods when there have been hardly enough of these brave, bright men and women to constitute what this article refers to as a "black bar." A review of American history in terms of the black lawyer reveals a rotating pattern of few and many, many and few. One can visualize this pattern as a roller coaster where the figures begin on the ground, at the lowest point with no black lawyers at all, then ascend toward a larger number, and descend again almost to the original point. A slow ascent is renewed, then picks up speed, and with only a few dips continues skyward, leading us to the present.

If we apply names and dates and demographic distributions to this roller coaster image, we find that before 1844, there were, to our knowledge, no American born black lawyers. After that, there were too few of them to form any kind of group or define any sort of trend among the American population. Our discussion is limited to a rather meager description of a few individuals, their careers, and experiences. Our conclusions, based on what evidence we have, lead us to treat these black lawyers as

isolated cases, exceptions to the rules of their contemporary society and profession. Thus the pre-Civil War period may be seen as the bottom level of the roller coaster.

However, during Reconstruction (1867-75) the number and influence of black lawyers increased significantly. Our method of describing this period is a complete reversal of the earlier one. Although certain individuals stand out as exceptional examples among their peers and profession, we are able to discuss black lawyers in terms of an influential group, which had a definite impact on the times.

The post-Reconstruction period (1875-1914) returns us to the original limits of discussion. Once again, black lawyers became few and far between and stand out as exceptions to societal patterns and the legal profession. We find black lawyers in isolation, and numerically near the bottom of the curved line we have envisioned.

A renewed ascent began in the post-World War I period (1917-45) and continued upward, although at a rather slow pace, until after the Second World War. The Civil Rights Movement, beginning in the late 1950s, marks the distinctly dramatic rise that continues today.

As for the future, all the evidence agrees that whatever else may happen, the number and influence of black lawyers will continue to go upward. Isolated individuals will no longer determine the nature of the black bar, although of course exceptional members will always be in evidence. The black bar as a whole has gathered a strength and momentum that will serve as an embodiment for black lawyers, but not as a boundary for their progress and success.

## BLACK LAWYERS' BEGINNINGS

We must begin our study in 1844. In that year, Macon B. Allen<sup>1</sup> was introduced to the state bar of Maine<sup>2</sup> by General Fessenden. Allen became the first black lawyer in America, or at least the first one we know of. We know nothing about his training, but it was certainly amassed in an apprenticeship program, the means of becoming a lawyer in his time. Furthermore, until 1878, admittance to a bar required sponsorship by a reputable lawyer, and we may say with confidence that General Fessenden's sponsorship of any lawyer was based on high qualifications and proven ability.

Not long after that, John Mercer Langston became a member of the Ohio bar.<sup>3</sup> There is dispute about the exact date of his admittance, but it seems to have been in the 1850s. Also in the 1850s, and again the date is unclear, Robert Morris was admitted to the Massachusetts bar.<sup>4</sup> In 1857, Garrison Draper became a member of the Maryland bar,<sup>5</sup> and a fifth black man, Jonathan J. Wright, was known to have been a member of the Pennsylvania bar before the Civil War.<sup>6</sup>

Most of these men achieved noteworthy careers on the basis of their legal training. Allen, a native of South Caro-

lina, returned to the South during Reconstruction. He was admitted to the South Carolina bar and later became an elected judge in Charleston.<sup>7</sup> Langston<sup>8</sup> became the first head of the new Law Department at Howard University in 1869, and later served as acting president and vice president of Howard University.<sup>9</sup> Wright served as a state senator and later as an associate justice of the supreme court of South Carolina.<sup>10</sup> Morris practiced law successfully in Massachusetts.<sup>11</sup>

However short, this list of black lawyers is remarkable in that it exists at all. These men do not constitute a discernible historical pattern, but they do indicate that the inhumanity and subjugation of slavery did not entirely bend and bind the minds and ambitions of black people.

## BLACK LAWYERS AS A GROUP

Reconstruction, on the other hand, produced a pattern. It was a time when American colleges and universities in general were establishing law schools, when a bar examination—instead of sponsorship—became a requisite for the practice of law, and most importantly for the black lawyers, when Howard University and several other southern schools founded law departments. All of these elements created—at least for a time—a new and welcome atmosphere for the training of black lawyers.

1. Referred to as "Malcolm" in some histories.

2. John P. Davis, ed., *The American Negro Reference Book* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 581.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Kenneth S. Tollett, "Black Lawyers, Their Education and the Black Community," *Howard Law Journal* 17, no. 2 (Winter 1972), p. 328.

5. Rayford W. Logan, *Howard University, The First Hundred Years 1867-1967* (New York: New York University Press, 1969), p. 6.

6. Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 718.

7. Davis, *American Negro Reference Book*, p. 581.

8. The *Howard University Magazine* (April 1961) states "... Dean John M. Langston of the School of Law, was ranking officer in residence at the University from 1873-1875; however, his official title was that of Vice President of the University." Later he was to serve as a congressman from Virginia and as the first president of Virginia State College.

9. Logan, *Howard University*, p. 48.

10. Morison, *Oxford History of the American People*, p. 718.

11. Tollett, "Black Lawyers," p. 328.

Several names from this period stand out and require notice. George Lewis Ruffin received a law degree from Harvard Law School in 1869, and became the first black graduate of that institution. He achieved eminence in Massachusetts by serving in the state legislature, and in 1882 he was appointed judge of the municipal court of Charlestown, Massachusetts—becoming the first Negro to hold a judicial position in the North. Three years after Ruffin became the first black graduate of Harvard Law School, three notable firsts were achieved by Charlotte E. Ray. Not only was she the first woman graduate of Howard Law School (1872), but tradition holds that she was the first woman to receive law training at a law school. Charlotte Ray's third first was to be before the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia where she is reputed to have been the first woman admitted to practice.<sup>12</sup>

In 1875, Josiah T. Settle received the bachelor of laws (LL.B.) from the new Howard University Law School and was admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Although he did not stay in Washington, he established a legal practice in Memphis, Tennessee, and in 1885 was named assistant attorney general of the Criminal Court of Shelby County.<sup>13</sup>

There were other men and women during this time, but as their number grew, as Reconstruction for a brief, bright time opened the doors of power and enfranchisement to black people, the individuals, though important, seemed not exceptional. Both state and federal legislative bodies reflected their constituencies, many of whose representatives were lawyers. In South Carolina for instance, where the population was principally black, the Constitu-

tional Convention was composed of a majority of black representatives, and in 1872, all three U.S. congressmen from that state were black.<sup>14</sup> One of these, Robert B. Elliott, though trained in England, was a lawyer.

The aims and possibilities of Reconstruction, however, were soon smothered when federal and state sights turned elsewhere. The South's recalcitrant attitude toward federal legislation and the southern states' determination to perpetrate their own ideals of inequality and discrimination spelled death to the pattern of natural emergence that was so clearly in store for black lawyers.

#### RENEWED NEMESIS

The end of Reconstruction, and the return to disfranchisement of black people in the form of Black Codes, marked the beginning of a phase more terrible in its way than slavery. It was proven that racism was far too deeply entrenched into the "American way" to be eradicated either by blood or the law. The details of the post-Reconstruction period are familiar and bear delineation here only insofar as legal opportunity for black people is concerned.

Along with all other opportunities for black people, the law diminished both as a source of hope for providing equality and as a possible profession. Even Howard Law School closed its doors in 1876 and 1877. When Howard recovered, it provided the only significant source of legal education for black men and women; the city of Washington, between 1877 and 1935, was the southernmost point where legal education, in any form, was available for blacks.<sup>15</sup> National opinion, consciousness, and educational legislation had reverted to the

14. Chuck Stone, *Black Political Power in America* (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 30.

15. Davis, *American Negro Reference Book*, p. 584.

12. Logan, *Howard University*, pp. 49–50.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

idea that black people were suited only for technical and agricultural trades and schools. Educational funds were limited to these schools whose role, though functional and necessary, was decidedly limited. Furthermore, the Second Morrill Act of 1890 which required federal funds for technical and agricultural schools to be equally divided between dual, black-white schools, may now be seen as a precursor for what in 1896 became the great segregationist ruling of *Plessy v. Ferguson*. The philosophy espoused and adopted by this landmark decision has been argued, discussed, condemned, and finally reversed, but its effect upon black people generally, and black lawyers in particular, continues to reverberate throughout the land. The dream that half emerged from Reconstruction was banished into the dark corners of men's hearts, cut off from their minds just as the schools for blacks were severed from the predominant educational pattern of American life.

Post-Reconstruction, like the Pre-Civil War phase, preempted the possibility for black people to assume their natural place in the legal system or profession. Between 1871 and 1876, sixty-two students received the LL.B. degree from Howard Law School, and for four years after that none was graduated.<sup>16</sup> Between 1881 and 1903, 319 students received the LL.B. from Howard.<sup>17</sup> These figures seem remarkably large, however, when compared with the estimated 194 blacks who graduated from northern colleges and who were thus eligible for legal training.<sup>18</sup>

Therefore, with these meager numbers, we must turn again to individuals. Many black lawyers during this time were eminent, but all were, again, exceptional. Harry S. Cummings was

16. Logan, *Howard University*, pp. 49-50, 94.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 94, 133.

18. Tollett, "Black Lawyers," p. 344.

graduated from the Maryland Law School in 1889 and achieved a successful legal practice in Baltimore.<sup>19</sup> Also in the 1880s, Edward H. Morris in Chicago and William H. Lewis in Boston were successful practitioners.<sup>20</sup> George H. White, a lawyer by the route of apprenticeship instead of law school, became in 1886 the last Negro U.S. representative in Congress until 1928.<sup>21</sup> He was elected from North Carolina where he had established a legal practice. James A. Cobb was graduated from the Howard Law School in 1899. After a successful practice, he served as judge of the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia from 1926 to 1936. Although others have been labeled the first civil rights attorney, William Henry Harrison Hart, who received the LL.B. from Howard in 1887 and the master of laws (LL.M.) in 1894, should certainly be among them. In 1905, in *Hart v. State*, he won one of the first cases against segregation.<sup>22</sup>

With the dawning of the new century, the black population began moving both geographically and intellectually. During the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, the urban black population had increased by approximately 11 percent<sup>23</sup> and would continue to grow by leaps and bounds. In both northern and southern cities, black people ran headlong into the problem that would require, in dramatic fashion, the services of lawyers. Housing, wages, inheritance, and other issues were assuming the complexities imposed by urban life and demanding legal skills for implementation and solution. Yet be-

19. Davis, *American Negro Reference Book*, p. 582.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 583.

21. Logan, *Howard University*, p. 95.

22. *Ibid.*; *Hart v. State*, Md. 595, 60 Atl. 457.

23. Davis, *American Negro Reference Book*, p. 57.

tween 1900 and 1940, when the problem grew in proportion to the enormous influx of black people into cities and toward the North, black lawyers represented between 0.6 and 0.8 percent<sup>24</sup> of the total number of lawyers in America. In the early years of the twentieth century, before the First World War, lynchings, rioting, and racial violence exploded in the face of laws and legalities stacked against black people. Black men and women were beginning to wage their own battles; in modern parlance, their consciousnesses were being raised. Yet their banners were held by only a few hands. The others were tied down by political impotence.

These elements of chaos in the early twentieth century began to coalesce finally into a voice—a voice more often than not tempered by the language of law. Like the American revolutionaries of the 1770s, black people began to demand implementation of preexisting rights. Like the American Revolution, the reemergence of black people was based on the recognition that their clearly delineated rights were denied, not unwritten. The Emancipation Proclamation, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Constitutional Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 1870, 1871, and 1875 were all there, demanding not rewriting, but re-institution in the minds and manners of all Americans. The times were beginning to catch up with their history.

The formation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1910 marked a new pattern whose stamp is still woven into the fabric of America. There were then, and continue to be, painfully few lawyers to take up the precedents and power of the land's law, but after the First World War, the black lawyer assumed a place within history and began

to abandon his solitary post outside it. For many years, the numbers did not increase significantly, but firm ground was held, stabilized, and assured.

#### REEMERGENCE OF THE GROUP

During the 1920s and 1930s, the individual black lawyers who bear notice stand out both as individuals and as part of a process—a phenomenon new to the history of black lawyers. Charles Hamilton Houston, who received the LL.B. from Harvard Law School (1922)—after serving as an editor of the prestigious *Harvard Law Review*—as well as the doctor of juridical science (S.J.D.) (1923)—was famous not only for his successful litigation of many civil rights cases and for his role in the accreditation of Howard University Law School,<sup>25</sup> but also for his outstanding work on behalf of and in conjunction with the NAACP. In fact, Houston was the first full-time attorney and chief counsel in the legal department of the NAACP,<sup>26</sup> which eventually became the NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund, Inc.<sup>27</sup> Houston was joined by some of the most brilliant black lawyers of his time: his cousin, William H. Hastie,<sup>28</sup> contributed time and effort—taken from his studies as a candidate for the S.J.D. at Harvard Law School; Leon Ransom; James M. Nabrit; Oliver W. Hill; George E. C. Hayes; and others. Some younger lawyers and students received inspiration and opportunities from the NAACP legal arm, too. Among them was Thurgood Marshall, who during the

25. Logan, *Howard University*, p. 268.

26. Walter White, *A Man Called White* (New York: Viking Press, 1948), p. 142.

27. On the basis of some criticism that the NAACP actually sought to stir up legal suits, and thus was not eligible for its tax-exempt status, the litigative branch of the organization separated from the parent body and incorporated itself.

28. White, *Man Called White*, p. 143.

24. Tollett, "Black Lawyers," p. 346.

infamous Crawford case—wherein a young black man was accused of murder in Virginia and his trial was subjected to a great deal of adverse publicity and hostility—was a student at Howard Law School where the defense prepared its case. Young Marshall was willing to contribute in any way he could. He played the devil's advocate to the attorneys, was a researcher for them, and was not above going for coffee.<sup>29</sup> The joining of powerful men and a powerful institution portended great things.

As the black lawyers grew in numbers and voice, the repression and exclusion from the white bar intensified. Consequently, twelve black lawyers met at Des Moines, Iowa in 1925 and organized the National Bar Association (NBA). Like many organizations born out of the need to develop some mechanism to further the aspirations and protect the rights of black people, the NBA is now being called separatist and, in some quarters, being called upon to dissolve and to become integrated into the previously exclusively white American Bar Association.

Nevertheless, the black lawyer population did not grow with anywhere near the speed for proper representation of black Americans. In 1940, there were approximately 1,925 black lawyers in the United States. This meant that there were 13,000 black persons for every single black lawyer. Although the number of black lawyers doubled within twenty years, their percentage of total lawyers increased only from 0.6 percent to 1 percent.<sup>30</sup>

29. Ibid., p. 154. [Ed. Note: Some of the future lawyers at the Howard Law School as students during that time were James A. Washington, Jr., Frank D. Reeves, Spottswood W. Robinson, Joseph W. Waddy, Sovel Richardson, William B. Bryant, and Robert L. Carter.]

30. Jerome Shuman, "A Black Lawyers Study," *Howard Law Journal* 16, no. 2 (Winter 1971), p. 230.

These numerical facts and another much-discussed fact about the black lawyer—that he continued to gain only a low degree of prestige among black people—should not be surprising. In 1930, for instance, there were only three institutions in the South where black people were assured of legal training: Simmons University in Louisville, Kentucky; Virginia Union University in Richmond, Virginia; and of course Howard University.<sup>31</sup> A few northern schools accepted black students as law degree candidates, but whatever burgeoning there was in the profession was counteracted by the white bar associations' exclusion of these lawyers from their ranks and therefore from the established paths to successful practice and prestige.

A strange paradox began to develop during this time. As black people generally grew more and more distrustful of institutions—both conceptual and physical—whereby white power structures had managed to deny them their rights, and concurrently, as black people began to assume effective, though limited roles within the institutions, an enormous credibility gap developed between what black people saw as an arm of oppression on the one hand, and the only means of gaining power on the other. The white bar association, for instance, provided the means of establishing legal practices through referral services and other tangible benefits, but they also provided the intangible mark of excellence which any person in need of legal service desires. These bar associations represented both oppression, in terms of their exclusion of blacks, and the only path to success.

We cannot, and must not, forget the millions of dollars spent on Amos 'N

31. Charles S. Mangum, Jr., *The Legal Status of the Negro*, The Basic Afro-American Reprint Library (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), p. 135.



Andy by white owned and controlled business to further belittle black professionals in the eyes of the world. The NAACP and the establishment of the National Bar Association have helped to bridge this gap, but it continues and forms the basis of many difficulties encountered by young blacks today. "How," many ask, "can I ally myself with the very forces that oppressed me?" The question is not new; it began to be asked in the 1930s when the ranks of black lawyers first showed signs of swelling.

However, in the early 1940s there came a time when litigation, precedent, and all other lawyering tools were forced to join in with, and at times to succumb to, other forces. The first utterance of true black power was heard in 1941 when Walter White, A. Phillip Randolph, and other civil rights workers threatened a massive march on Washington unless President Franklin D. Roosevelt required industries holding government contracts to ban discrimination in hiring.<sup>32</sup> The law had to be got by force. After World War II, these two approaches grew closer together and finally emerged as one in the 1960s.

#### GROUP SOLIDIFICATION

During the 1950s, when the civil rights struggle was beginning to take true shape, the black lawyers responsible for its effective formation may be seen as an integral part not only of the movement itself, but of the legal system in general. Robert Carter and Thurgood Marshall, for instance, though outstanding advocates of civil rights in their own right, need not be seen as separate entities in the way that George White and William Lewis stood apart

from the mainstream of their race and time three-quarters of a century earlier.

Between 1954 and 1964, the aging and decrepit Reconstruction civil rights acts were given new life, and black lawyers, both in litigative and legislative capacities, were in large part responsible for this rebirth. For it was, in essence, a legal position that lent weight to the protest movement of the time. The emotional commitment of many persons, and the moral leadership of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., gave the right timbre of drama, but the basic complaints were drawn from the obvious though invidious misapplication of pre-existing constitutional laws. In an article by Burke Marshall, published in 1965 in the *Virginia Law Review*, the legal aspects of the Civil Rights Movement are discussed in close detail. Marshall writes that

they [the protestors, demonstrators, and so forth] acted at all times with careful legal advice, under a claim of right under the federal constitution to do what they did. . . . To put it another way, the action taken by the members of the protest movement merely asserted legal rights guaranteed by the federal constitution, but denied to them by unconstitutional, and therefore unlawful, local police action.<sup>33</sup>

At no time in American history did lawyers have so clear a mandate for their craft, their talents, and their actions. The black lawyer, having prepared, argued, and "won" the great majority of the civil rights cases, began to move toward his rightful place of prestige and respect.

Despite this slow but definite trend toward coalition among black lawyers individually, their causes generally, and the legal system as a whole, there remains a stubborn resistance against the

32. Executive Order 8802, issued by President Roosevelt, 1941.

33. Burke Marshall, "The Protest Movement and the Law," *Virginia Law Review* 51, no. 785 (1965), p. 795.

black legal community's launching itself into the larger, influential stream of the legal profession. The Negro Lawyer Project at Howard University Law School, which conducted a comprehensive study of black lawyers—published in the *Howard Law Journal* (Winter 1971)—found that “there is a strong need among black lawyers for personal independence. This appears to be another factor in the high percentage of black lawyers who practice alone. This need for personal independence proves costly.”<sup>34</sup> The cost referred to is that most black lawyers are solo practitioners, and solo practices provide the least income and exposure of all other forms of legal practice.

This spirit of independence derives from several sources, one of which is the social conscience claimed by many young black lawyers, and possibly from the cultivation of such a social sense by many law schools. The resort to solo practices may also be seen as a defense mechanism resulting from the lack of opportunities and affirmative exclusion from large established law firms or corporations.

Whatever the reasons, statistical data agree that black lawyers do not or cannot integrate the overall legal system to the degree that may be necessary or desirable. In a study of midwestern law firms, conducted by Harry T. Edwards and published in the *Michigan Law Review* (August 1971), it was shown that black associate members were only 1.2 percent and that black partners were only 0.08 percent of the total firm population surveyed.<sup>35</sup> These figures are disheartening when one realizes that in the Midwest the black population is the second largest in the

country (21 percent), and as Professor Edwards writes, “The percentage of blacks employed by large firms surveyed is still *well below* the percentage of black lawyers in the total attorney population, in the region.”<sup>36</sup> These figures are, however, far more encouraging than what is available from the South, where 52 percent of the nation's black people live.<sup>37</sup> According to the *Howard Law Journal*, 73 percent of black southern lawyers are solo practitioners, 18 percent are partners in firms, and 7 percent are associates.<sup>38</sup> As the author of the article, Professor Shuman, writes: “The lack of black partners in law firms must not only indicate the failure of blacks to form partnerships, but also the inaccessibility of partnership status in white firms.”<sup>39</sup> Professor Edwards confirms this statement by writing:

Of 50 Northern law schools and 40 Southern law schools we contacted, none reported that Southern law firms were recruiting blacks. The Southern law schools, including Howard, reported that neither white nor black Southern law firms actively recruit on their campuses.<sup>40</sup>

The current law school rhetoric about “wanting to return to the community” may be more connected with the lack of any other opportunities for black lawyers than with an overriding social consciousness. Insofar as civil rights are concerned, it appears that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund is the source from which a large amount of present-day litigation originates, and although a majority of black lawyers contribute time to this and other civil rights organizations,<sup>41</sup> it is not within

36. *Ibid.*, p. 1428.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 1423.

38. Shuman, “Black Lawyers Study,” p. 304.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

40. Edwards, “New Role for the Black Law Graduate,” p. 1428.

41. Shuman, “Black Lawyers Study,” p. 240.

34. Shuman, “Black Lawyers Study,” p. 238.

35. Harry T. Edwards, “A New Role for the Black Law Graduate—A Reality or an Illusion?” *Michigan Law Review* 69, no. 8 (August 1971), p. 1438.

the limited means or the realm of private solo practice to take on the often complex, costly, and time-consuming cases.

Therefore, whatever social needs there are that require attention and litigation, they are less likely to be adequately met by a lone practitioner. He—or she—cannot assuage his conscience, fulfill his financial needs, or assume his rightful place within the legal community and profession by insisting on a defensive independence or being forced to practice independently by the firms of this nation. As I have said earlier, it is an appalling disservice to a student to hold out the view that the height he or she is supposed to reach is that of a sort of legalistic social worker.

It has been estimated that 30,000 black lawyers need to appear from out of somewhere in order to meet the immediate needs of the black community. The question of integration or segregation to the contrary, since the majority of black lawyers' clients are black,<sup>42</sup> it would seem that the need is specific and not simply a reflection of the need for more lawyers generally. The figures for the current academic year, 1972-73, are incomplete, but for 1971-72, there were 3,732 black Americans enrolled in law schools across the country. This figure, coupled with the dearth of black lawyers in firms, businesses, or other legal arms, indicates two pressing needs: recruitment of blacks not only by law schools, but also by law firms. The talent available appears to be underused, and the potential talent appears to be untapped.

With respect to the future of the National Bar Association, and the ex-

tent to which it represents the National Black Bar, conversations with strong supporters of the NBA, like William Thompson, Edward Bell, Donald Hollowell, Billy Jones, James Cobb, and Orzo Wells, seem to support the concluding lines of an article by Revius O. Ortique, Jr., in the April/May issue of *Judicature*:

The National Bar Association has a special significance, if only as an institution supporting the aspirations of black lawyers. But it is much more. It furnishes scholarships to students who could not otherwise afford a legal education. It assists with meaningful litigation resulting in significant changes in the status of black Americans. It contributes to the preservation of democracy by guaranteeing that the Constitution means what it says, and that the unfulfilled dreams of the sacrificed dead, and generations of deprived, are clothed in the fabric of a present realization of liberty, freedom and justice, with dignity for all of our people. Even more the N.B.A. is the soul of the black community, where the body is wracked with frustration and discontent. Hopefully it is the vehicle by which injustice is overcome.

The N.B.A. dissolve? No, not yet!<sup>43</sup>

The long history of black lawyers in America points up a trend of legal integration, punctuated by segregation, and an apparent return to integration. The trend must be encouraged to continue its momentum not only forward, but inward and upward. It is in the best interest of the entire American bar and this nation that the black lawyer is accorded every courtesy and prestige and afforded every opportunity now taken for granted by his non-black counterpart.

43. Revius O. Ortique, Jr., "The National Bar Association—Not just an Option!" *Judicature* 53, no. 9 (April-May 1970), p. 394.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

# Legal Education for Blacks

By KELLIS E. PARKER AND BETTY J. STEBMAN

**ABSTRACT:** The need for additional black lawyers should be obvious to all. No attempt will be made here to rehearse the arguments that were made in the early sixties regarding the desirability of minority recruitment programs. Rather, this article attempts to depict the past and present experiences of black law students. Their story in legal education is viewed in the natural history of matriculation in a law school. Thus, admissions, financial aid, attrition, bar examinations, and placement are among the topics discussed. Additional data are included on the organizations extant which have made and are continuing to make it possible for enough blacks to participate in legal education to make this article possible.

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*Betty J. Stebman was associated with the United Negro College Fund from its founding in 1943 until she left in 1969. She then joined the staff of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and is responsible for developing an existing law scholarship and legal internship program of the organization into a new corporation: The Earl Warren Legal Training Program, Inc. She is now engaged in raising the funds to implement that program.*

The authors wish to express their appreciation to the four deans of the predominantly black law schools for their cooperation in supplying the data on enrollment analyses used in this article. Also, they are grateful to Elaine R. Jones, assistant counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, for providing the information on litigation relating to bar examinations.

THE trilogy of law, educational opportunity, and Negroes has played a melodramatic role throughout the history of the United States. The professional lawyer will recognize immediately the phrase "legal education" as appertaining to the instruction and training of prospective lawyers in the methodology, procedure, and substance of law and law practice.

Initially, the law schools admitted only the few black intellectual stalwarts who had the determination and the desire to break out of the cycle of unequal educational opportunity. The first black was graduated from law school in 1869,<sup>1</sup> and the first meaningful progress in admitting blacks to law schools occurred in 1969. It took exactly one century for the law schools to become convinced of the existence of a sufficient pool of qualified blacks from which to draw their spring of black students.

#### THE MONOPOLY OF TRAINING BY APPRENTICESHIP

Early American lawyers received their training as apprentices in law offices by reading law under the tutelage of a practitioner. A clear picture of the number of black lawyers during this period cannot be drawn from the available data. Some historians report, however, that there were a few lawyers among the free Negroes found in the North.<sup>2</sup> These black lawyers undoubtedly received their training in the offices of white lawyers.

Few blacks received a formal education during the pre-Civil War period. Statutes enacted by the slaveholding

states prohibited whites from educating blacks. Indeed, as late as 1853, a white woman in Virginia was sentenced to jail for teaching free black children to read and write. Slavery in the South and racial discrimination in the North produced a sad statistic: 95 percent of the black population could neither read nor write in 1863. When the Thirteenth Amendment loosened the shackles of bondage, the emancipated blacks demanded educational opportunity in their trek toward freedom. Slavery had "fathered an intense desire to rise out of their condition by means of education."<sup>3</sup>

#### THE DOMINANCE OF HOWARD LAW SCHOOL

The first effort to attract blacks to the legal profession was launched by Howard University. The university for freedmen opened a law school on January 6, 1869. The first Dean, John Mercer Langston, a graduate of Oberlin College and of its Theological Seminary, had also become a distinguished member of the bar after reading law.

Howard University had a virtual monopoly on the production of black lawyers. By 1900 it had trained 328 of the 728 black lawyers in the nation. Throughout its history, Howard has graduated more than a few men and women who have distinguished themselves at the bar, on the bench, and on law faculties. In fact, Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall—the first black member of the U.S. Supreme Court—numerous judges, and the majority of black law professors teaching at America's law schools today are graduates of Howard.

1. George Lewis Ruffin was graduated from Harvard Law School in 1869.

2. Leon F. Litwack, *North of Slavery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 178, 179.

3. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880* (New York: World Publishing Company, fifth printing, 1968), p. 638.

One of the 1872 graduates, Charlotte E. Ray, daughter of Reverend Charles B. Ray, an active black abolitionist, was the first woman, either black or white, to graduate from a law school in the United States. She was also, the first woman admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.<sup>4</sup> From 1871 to 1972 inclusive, Howard has graduated 2,348 lawyers, most of them black.

#### THE EMERGENCE OF SEPARATE LAW SCHOOLS FOR BLACKS

It is not surprising that the first sustained attack on segregated education came through the law, against law schools, and was planned and executed by black lawyers at Howard University. In 1935 the late Charles H. Houston, then vice-dean of Howard Law School, and Thurgood Marshall, who had recently been graduated from Howard Law School, prosecuted a mandamus action on behalf of Donald Murray, a 1934 black graduate of Amherst College, to compel the University of Maryland Law School to permit him to enroll.<sup>5</sup> They won the suit, and Murray entered the University of Maryland Law School; he was graduated in 1938. In reaction to this suit and to the developing legal strategy to eliminate segregation in higher education, black law schools were hastily opened by southern states at Lincoln University in St. Louis, Missouri; at North Carolina College in Durham, North Carolina; at Texas Southern University in Houston, Texas; at Southern University in Scotlandville, Louisiana; at South Carolina A & M College in Orangeburg, South Carolina; and at Florida A & M in

Tallahassee, Florida. Total enrollment at these six law schools in 1950 was 113. By then the total number of black lawyers in the United States had inched up to 1,450.

During the lifetime of these predominantly black state law schools, they and Howard University trained the overwhelming majority of black lawyers. Today, only three of those original predominantly black state law schools remain: North Carolina Central University, Texas Southern University, and Southern University. They and Howard have a current enrollment of 1,146 students.<sup>6</sup>

To keep their own law schools entirely white, those southern states without black law schools awarded out-of-state scholarships to black students seeking legal education. But through a series of law suits brought by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, with Thurgood Marshall at the helm, black citizens won the right to attend predominantly white schools of law in the South.<sup>7</sup> Yet, it would be several school generations hence before recognition of the seriousness of the shortage of black lawyers would fully penetrate the minds of the legal community.

6. The commitment to integration of these four law schools is evident from their enrollment analyses: North Carolina Central State reports 28.57 percent white students; Texas Southern, 10 percent; Southern, 20 percent; and Howard, 13 percent.

7. *Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada*, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); *Sipuel v. Board of Regents University of Oklahoma*, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); *Sweatt v. Painter*, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents*, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); *McKissick v. Carmichael*, 187 F. 2nd 949 (4th Cir. 1951); *Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University*, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950). The entire history of these cases is discussed in Jack Greenberg, *Race Relations and American Law* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1959).

4. See generally Rayford W. Logan, *Howard University: The First One Hundred Years, 1867-1967* (New York: New York University Press, 1969).

5. *Pearson v. Murray*, 168 Md. 478, 182 A 590 (1936).

### THE EXPANSION OF LEGAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY

With the historic decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954,<sup>8</sup> change was inevitable. It started slowly and gathered momentum in the early 1960s. By the time Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Committee on Racial Discrimination was able to state that "no Association school reports denying admission to any applicant on the ground of race or color."<sup>9</sup>

By the mid-1960's individual law schools and their collective conscience, the AALS, had recognized that it was not enough merely to remove restrictions, at least where the real objective was to increase the number of minority group lawyers in the profession. Belatedly, the American legal community, the law schools, the bar associations, and the law firms developed programs to attract minority group members to the study and practice of law in large numbers.<sup>10</sup>

Meaningful action was finally beginning, and the search for black law students grew frantic. Perhaps it was a sense of guilt over their passive role in regard to the dearth of black lawyers that moved some law schools to make extraordinary financial offers to attract black college seniors.

Although no completely accurate figures are available, Harvard Law School

8. *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a penetrating colloquy on the role of the Supreme Court in effectuating equal educational opportunity, see Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," *Harvard Law Review* 73 (1959), p. 1; Alexander Bickel, *The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1962).

9. *AALS Proceedings* (1964), Part I, Reports of Committees, p. 159.

10. *AALS Proceedings* (1970), sec. II, p. 10.

in 1965 estimated, ". . . it appears that there are no more than 700 Negroes among the 65,000 men and women who are studying law in the United States."<sup>11</sup>

The most dramatic rise in enrollment has come within the past four years:

1968-69 . . 1,254 black students<sup>12</sup>

1969-70 . . 2,154 black students<sup>13</sup>

1970-71 . . . . . no figures available

1971-72 . . 3,744 black students<sup>14</sup>

1972-73 . . 4,423 black students<sup>15</sup>

Black law students in 1972 account for 4.3 percent of the total law school enrollment—still a long way from equaling the 12 percent estimated as the percentage of blacks in the population.

### THE COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY

It soon became obvious that increasing the numbers of black students in law schools was only part of the problem. The quality and number of black practicing lawyers would be determined by what the law schools and others associated with them were willing to do to overcome a history of apathy toward the problem. As early as 1964 the report of the AALS Committee on Racial Discrimination had found that, "although there are notable exceptions, the picture is the same everywhere—low aptitude scores plus academic records that were usually spotty at best and were made in substandard colleges."<sup>16</sup> Admission policy began to tighten, and experiments were undertaken to design programs that would strengthen the black student's ability to cope with the rigors of law school.

11. L. A. Toepfer, "Harvard Special Summer Program" (1965).

12. *AALS Newsletter*, 68-3, p. 2.

13. *AALS Newsletter*, 70-2, p. 3.

14. Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New Jersey, 1971-72.

15. *Ibid.*, 1972-73.

16. See note 9.

During 1967 and 1968, the Office of Economic Opportunity sponsored a series of meetings of leading educators to discuss the shortage and problems of minority law students. Those meetings led to the formation of the Council on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO), which was chartered in 1968. Its sponsors were the Association of American Law Schools, the American Bar Association, the National Bar Association, and the Law School Admissions Test Council. Its by-laws outline its general purpose: "... to expand and enhance the opportunity to study and practice law for members of disadvantaged groups—chiefly Negroes, American Indians, and Ibero-Americans—and thus help to remedy the present imbalance of these disadvantaged groups in the legal profession of the United States."<sup>17</sup> Pre-law summer institutes became CLEO's principal vehicle to achieve its objectives.

The first four CLEO institutes were held in 1968 with 160 students enrolled. The number of institutes and attending students has varied from year to year. Officials of CLEO report that 207 of their alumni were enrolled in seventy-four law schools in 1972, and 355 of those who have participated in CLEO institutes have been graduated from law schools. The officials estimate that at least 55 percent of the institute's participants are black. Approximately twenty law schools have conducted institutes, singly or in consortia, similar to the CLEO summer institutes.

The Council on Legal Education Opportunity also provides financial assistance to those who successfully complete the work of the institutes and who are admitted to law school. Living stipends of \$1,500 a year for three years were guaranteed to the post-senior

alumni of the 1968 CLEO programs. The amount has varied in succeeding years. The law schools admitting these students also provide support with at least tuition and fees, usually by grant or waiver, but sometimes through loans.

#### CURRENT ISSUES

##### *Admissions*

Usual standards of admission to law schools have undergone considerable change in the few years since minority enrollment has become a factor. Generally, admissions committees are tending to place less weight on Law School Aptitude Test scores and grade point averages and are seeking rather to identify promise instead of performance.

A study made by the Academy for Educational Development in 1971 found:

More and more admission offices are establishing "Minority Admissions Committees" to review "special" *vs* "regular" student applicants. Since, once enrolled, this difference virtually always evaporates, one wonders if any purpose is served by such outmoded classifications. Certainly it is resented by minority group students.

One of the most encouraging findings of the Academy study is that "happily, the general quality of minority applicants, particularly blacks, is going up. . . ." It adds, however,

. . . but the national distribution thereof is still skewed by concentrated recruitment of the ablest candidates at the top 10 to 20 schools. . . . The historic admissions controversy still abides. It is this: Preferential treatment requires a philosophical decision of whether or not to artificially accelerate the improvement of the minority group status—whether equal opportunity or equal achievement is to be the dominant consideration.<sup>18</sup>

18. "Legal Education Advancement Planning—An Introductory Study of Minority Law Student Development Potentials," W. Homer Turner, Study Director. Study commissioned

17. Nancy Fulop, "1969 CLEO Reports: A Summary," *University of Toledo Law Review* (1970).



The question of the constitutionality of preferential admissions has been raised by persons who had serious doubts about the efficacy of special admission standards for blacks. Private debates between law school administrators and law professors reached boiling-point intensity two years ago when the question received public exposure in the law reviews. Apparently, those forces desiring to expand the opportunities for blacks by adopting special screening and evaluation standards for black applicants were victorious. Yet, the decision by a Washington trial court, that the University of Washington discriminated against a white applicant by specially admitting blacks with lower "paper" credentials, generated more than a little concern.<sup>19</sup> Rumors of a court-ordered retreat from the special admissions business spread across the country. Generally, however, the impact of the Washington case was confined to conversation and rumors. A moratorium on the admission of blacks neither was mandated nor eventuated from the Washington case. Indeed, an appellate court in Washington recently reversed the decision.<sup>20</sup>

The debate over preferential admissions may well be moot. Now that more blacks are graduating from college with traditionally acceptable credentials, the paper gap between black and white entrants is closing.

#### *Financial assistance*

The major obstacle to increasing the number of black students in law schools

is the students' inability to finance the cost of professional legal training. Undoubtedly, there is now a commitment on the part of most law schools to right the wrongs of the past. Ironically, however, lack of sufficient funds to pay for legal education may abort further progress.

A pervasive federal program designed to provide financial aid to disadvantaged minority law students is essential. The cost of legal education is beyond the present potential of funds that are likely to come from the private sector. Although foundations can be expected to continue some support, their interest is not usually in maintenance programs. They see themselves as providers of seed money for innovative projects. Indeed, some of the larger foundations merit considerable credit for their pioneering grants which eased the transition from barest tokenism to the beginning of meaningful enrollment of black students in law school.<sup>21</sup> Many of the law schools are also making heroic efforts to carry part of the load. Alumni are pressed for special contributions to help offset tuition costs and fees. Loan and grant programs are stretched to the limit. But when the school has done all it can, the black student is generally still short of his basic needs to get through three years of law study. Summer jobs can help; work-study programs are useful; and part-time work is often essential in order to survive. Nonlegal work during the school year, however, often adds an unbearable load upon the student who is struggling to complete law school, particularly if he enters with academic handicaps. Many students face the choice of trying to succeed in school without enough to live on or of dropping out.

21. The American Bar Endowment, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Field Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

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by the Law Students Civil Rights Research Council from the Academy for Educational Development (1971).

19. *Marco De Funis, Jr., et al. v. Charles E. Odegaard et al.*, appealed from Superior Court, State of Washington to Supreme Court, State of Washington. Decision favoring the university rendered in 1973.

20. *Ibid.*

The federal government, in a guaranteed loan program, is cooperating with designated state agencies, private non-profit agencies, and participating lenders to enable students to borrow to help pay their educational costs while attending school. State or private agencies make loans to students, and the federal government assists with the interest payments on the loans. Students may borrow a maximum of \$7,500. Repayment of principal and interest begins immediately after the student leaves school and must be completed within five to ten years.<sup>22</sup>

Many black students who enter law school are already heavily burdened with the loans which helped them through college. Additional loans, which can sometimes offer the only possibility for completing the financial package to enable a student to enter law school, can also severely handicap the black lawyer starting practice. His earning options are limited, since discrimination continues to keep all but a few out of the big law firms and corporations. The road is hard for the single practitioner; those who wish to devote themselves to pro bono publico work, where income is always low, cannot afford to do so with heavy loan repayment commitments.

No one can completely account for the way in which legal education for black students is being financed today. One of the components may well be a growing awareness on the part of some state legislatures of the need to increase allocations for their state-supported law schools to accommodate expanding minority enrollments. Any attempt to list the programs designed to help black law students would be incomplete. However, mention of some of the more substantial programs can indicate the limited availability of financial assistance.

22. The Higher Education Resources and Assistance Act, 20 U.S.C. sec. 1078 (b)(1)(A) (1972).

*The Council on Legal Education Opportunity.* The CLEO program provides a living expense stipend for its institute alumni if they attend law school. Since CLEO is mainly federally financed, uncertainty is a constant. At the time of this writing, CLEO expects to benefit from the 1972 Higher Education Act Amendments which provide some limited assistance to "persons of ability from disadvantaged backgrounds, as determined by the Commissioner, undertaking graduate or professional study."<sup>23</sup> Congress has not yet appropriated the funds, however.

*The Earl Warren Legal Training Program, Inc.*<sup>24</sup> A relatively new and unique national effort in the private sector, the Earl Warren Legal Training Program, Inc. was developed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund as successor to its legal education program, which has been awarding law scholarships since 1964. A recent study reveals that the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund had supported over 550 black law students before it organized the new corporation. The Program attempts to provide scholarship aid to three hundred black law students each year and to continue this aid throughout the three years of law school. It also provides for a postgraduate year of internship under the supervision of attorneys at Legal Defense Fund offices for a selected group of law graduates who desire to practice where there are either no black lawyers or scarcely any to serve large black communities. Upon completion of the postgraduate year, interns receive a three-

23. The Higher Education Resources and Assistance Act, 20 U.S.C. sec. 1134 n (a)(2) (1972).

24. The Earl Warren Legal Training Program, Inc., 10 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10019. Incorporated New York, April 5, 1971. Received tax exemption December 28, 1971.

year diminishing subsidy to enable them to take indigent clients while they build a paying practice. The intern is also provided with a law library, some office furniture and equipment, and assistance in moving to the location of practice. Supervision by Legal Defense Fund attorneys continues throughout the three-year subsidy period.

During the past eight years, the Legal Defense Fund placed in the South and Southwest, where the shortage is greatest, over forty black men and women graduates of its internship program. These lawyers are most often the only ones for hundreds of miles who are highly trained in human rights law as well as in all other areas of the law.

The Earl Warren Legal Training Program reports that in the 1972-73 academic year it awarded 353 scholarships to black law students: 125 to first-year students, 122 to those in their second year, and 106 to third-year students. It has a current class of 12 postgraduate interns in Legal Defense Fund offices. Its funds are raised mainly from foundations and corporations across the country.

*Other financial aid programs.* Two known local private programs, Legal Opportunities Scholarship Program in Chicago, Illinois, and the Ohio Law Opportunity Fund, in Columbus, Ohio, provided limited funds for some minority group students to attend law schools in those two states. The Martin Luther King, Jr., Fellowship of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation provides about twelve fellowships in law to black veterans for not more than two academic years.

Some individual law schools and consortia of law schools, local bar associations, firms, and business groups provide financial assistance and special programs for minority group and disadvantaged students. Other known private aid programs provide guaranteed loans.

With the best of intentions, it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to mobilize private funds to meet the non-loan needs of all the potential black law students who should be admitted to law schools. It remains to be seen how the problem will be met. The squeeze is already being felt by the law schools.

#### *Recruitment and student organizations*

As is to be expected, there is inter-institutional competition for the best students being graduated from both predominantly black and predominantly white colleges. Some of the law schools have vigorous recruiting programs in the South. The CLEO program also attracts many black candidates for law study.

The Law Students Civil Rights Research Council (LSCRRC)<sup>25</sup> is increasingly effective in providing student participation in recruitment. For the past two years, the Council's southern office has coordinated efforts to recruit greater numbers of black students for southern law schools. Black and white students, members of LSCRRC, meet with undergraduates in schools across the South. They advise on how to apply to law school and where to look for scholarship aid, and they discuss the law's potential for improving the lot of minorities. Additionally, many LSCRRC members assist in the orientation of entering black law students. They advise on study habits, course selection, and testing. There is some tutoring of freshmen by second- and third-year students. The Council also has a summer intern program which provides work opportunities in social action areas with private practitioners, grass-roots community groups, and major civil rights, civil liberties, and poverty law organizations. The thrust of

25. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, 22 East 40th Street, New York, New York 10016. Founded in 1963.

the summer internship program is to build a cadre of southern black lawyers.

The Black American Law Students Association (BALSA)<sup>26</sup> was founded at New York University Law School in 1967 for the purposes of articulating and promoting the needs and goals of black law students, fostering and encouraging an attitude of professional competence, bringing legal training to bear upon the legal and nonlegal problems afflicting the black community, and encouraging a greater commitment by black lawyers and law students toward the needs of the black community. BALSA provides each black freshman with a black upperclassman to act as his or her adviser during the first year; arranges for practice examinations in cooperation with professors; advises black students of part-time, summer, and permanent law employment opportunities; lobbies for greater numbers of black faculty members; does volunteer work with the National Conference of Black Lawyers; is active in the political campaigns of black candidates for public office; and attempts to increase the enrollment of black law students and to assist them in obtaining sufficient financial aid. Chapters of BALSA are also planning projects involving research and drafting of briefs for prisoners, as well as providing legal and extra-legal representation for welfare recipients before various administrative agencies. BALSA claims to represent 100 percent of all black law students through its 110 chapters.

#### *Attrition*

No reliable statistics on the attrition rate of black law students are available. The 1971 study of the Academy for Educational Development states, "The

best available facts show that the rate for all students is about eight or nine percent, while that for black students is around twelve percent for academic failure."<sup>27</sup> The study further reports that the rate for "all causes" is well above 20 percent for black law students. Nowhere is discipline reported to be a factor for withdrawal.

"All causes" include financial burdens which become too onerous, and identity and other emotional problems. "Environmental and personal problems . . . have something like a 50-50 causative role in dropout cases."<sup>28</sup>

Integrating law faculties and administrative staff may well be one important way to address nonacademic attrition of black students. Such integration, however, should not be for the purpose of creating a second track for black students within the school. The advantages of integration accrue to the total institution.

#### *Black law professors*

The first full-time black law school faculty member to serve at a predominantly white law school was William R. Ming, who taught at the University of Chicago from 1946 to 1950. By 1963, only four blacks had held full-time faculty positions in white law schools. Today, approximately one hundred black faculty members teach at the 148 accredited law schools. Fifty of these teach at the 4 predominantly black accredited law schools. There is today one black dean of a predominantly white law school.<sup>29</sup>

#### *Bar examinations*

Having overcome all the hurdles and completed law school, the law graduate must then pass the bar examination for

26. Black American Law Students Association, 5-11 University Place, New York, New York 10003. Founded in 1967 at New York University.

27. See note 18.

28. Ibid.

29. Ronald R. Davenport, Dean, Duquesne University School of Law.

his license to practice. With respect to black candidates for admission to the bar, the bar examination raises many of the same questions black students have confronted throughout their educational careers. Several states are notorious for their failure of black applicants for bar admission. In Georgia, all fifty-one blacks who took the July 1972 bar examination failed. The passing rate for white candidates was 54 percent. As a result of similar experiences in other states, a legion of law suits has been filed challenging the validity of bar examinations that have a disproportionately high failure rate among blacks.

Bar examinations are being assailed in the following states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.<sup>30</sup> Some of these states provide no right to review examination papers, no appeal of a failing grade, and

no information regarding performance on particular parts of an examination. New Mexico, Maryland, and Virginia may require candidates to return to law school for a specified number of subject hours. In sum, this litigation challenges the validity of the entire bar examination process.

The 1972 bar examination results in the states mentioned above may indicate that legal education and the legal profession are entering the throes of a major crisis. Black law students who have weathered the academic storms of accredited colleges and law schools are failing the bar examinations of some states at incredible rates. Where does the responsibility lie? Is the mass failure of blacks a fair measure of their ability and preparation? Are the test scores indicative of the law school's failure adequately to educate black students? Do these results manifest racially discriminatory tests and test procedures? It is difficult to believe that, in the absence of racial discrimination, the performance of black law students in the bar examinations would differ considerably from their performance in law schools. It is also inconceivable that black law graduates would perform as a group differently in some states than black law students perform in others. Why is it that black law graduates perform as well on the bar examinations in some states as white candidates, yet black graduates with similar academic records from the same law schools universally fail the examinations of other states? Answers to these questions must be found immediately. The largest class of black students to be graduated from law schools is scheduled to face the bar this summer.

### Placement

Historically, the black lawyer in the large law firm or the giant corporation

30. Alabama—*Alabama Black Lawyers Association et al. v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar et al.* C.P. No. 3809-N (Md. Ala. Oct. 31, 1972); Arizona—*Murry v. Supreme Court State of Arizona et al.* C.A. No. 71-692 (Dec. 1971); California—*Espinoza et al. v. The Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California et al.* No. 22, 928 (S.C. Calif. June 20, 1972); Connecticut—*Reese v. Nair et al.* Sup. Ct. New Haven Cty. (Oct. 26, 1972); Georgia—*Perry et al. v. Sell* C.A. No. 17688 (Jan. 15, 1973); Maryland—*Pettit et al. v. Gingerich et al.* No. 72-964K (Md. Oct. 1972); Mississippi—filed Feb. 1973, no case name yet; New Mexico—*Alarid et al. v. New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners*, adverse ruling Dec. 1, 1972, cert. filed March 1, 1973; Ohio—*Lewis et al. v. Hartsock* C.A. No. 73-16 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 1973); South Carolina—*Richardson et al. v. State Board of Law Examiners* C.A. No. 72-1219 (Oct. 16, 1972); Tennessee—*Belmont v. Board of Law Examiners* (S.C. Tenn., July, 1972); Virginia—*Lee et al. v. Kuyendall et al.* No. 505-72-R (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 1972); Delaware—No black lawyer has passed the Delaware bar examination since 1957. There are only three black practicing attorneys in the state. All are over 40 years of age.

has been a *rara avis*. The dearth of black applicants, long used as the reason for not hiring them, is no longer valid as increasing numbers of black graduates emerge from the law schools. With rare exceptions, black lawyers in the past have shied away from applying to these two major sources of employment, knowing in advance that they would not be hired. The black law graduate has traditionally sought employment in government agencies or in legal service programs, or has chosen the route of the private practitioner in a neighborhood setting. Today, some among the new breed of black lawyers are beginning to knock on sacrosanct doors. It is becoming more difficult to keep those doors permanently closed to the able young black men and women who have graduated from the nation's leading law schools.

How many black students elect to try for a job in a prestige law firm or a corporation? The affirmative answer is not known, but we know something of the negative side from a Michigan survey made in 1971 of black second- and third-year law students.<sup>31</sup> This survey revealed that over 50 percent of the 1971 graduating seniors were going into those traditional areas of practice open to blacks—for example, Justice Department, Public Defender offices, Legal Aid offices. An additional 25 percent of graduating seniors were entering into private practice with community or civil rights firms. No graduating seniors were going into corporate practice, judicial clerkships, prestige law firms, banks, brokerage firms or regulatory agencies.

The black law graduate today faces a dilemma: should he respond to the urgings of those who ask him to serve poor blacks who urgently need him, or

should he seek to enter the establishment with the hope that he can exercise some influence in eradicating its racial prejudices?

According to Professor Harry T. Edwards:

Opening the world of the lawyer in the boardroom to the Black input, the Black perspective, and the Black goal is one essential way in which the pith of racial disease may be extirpated from society. Hordes of programs and legions of lawyers directed at effect (e.g., government processes, criminal arrests and convictions, drugs, slum landlordism, divorce, exclusionary unionism, poor schools) can only serve to temporize with the real problem.<sup>32</sup>

Professor Edwards may be right in his judgment about temporizing; but, does the black lawyer turn his back on the "effects" of racial disease? "Providing legal services for the poor is a necessary and important task to be discharged by the entire profession as a fundamental duty and responsibility of the calling."<sup>33</sup> And, indeed, we are seeing more able young white lawyers insisting upon some meaningful public interest work before agreeing to join a prestige firm. Yet, for many young black lawyers, the longing to use their legal training for the benefit of those who suffer most from racism and poverty is too strong to be denied.

The arguments are potent on both sides. The young lawyer, however, must be given a free choice. If he is forced to limit his professional career to neighborhood practice or practice with legal services programs because the more remunerative areas of the law are closed to him, he will at the very least, be bitter.

#### FUTURE OUTLOOK

The challenge of the future is to expand the number of black lawyers

31. Harry T. Edwards, "A New Role for the Black Law Graduate—A Reality or An Illusion," *Michigan Law Review* 69 (1971), pp. 1407, 1429.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 1417–1418.

33. *Ibid.*

from the present 1 percent to 12 percent of the lawyer population. Such an effort will require the unqualified commitment of all law schools; new and increased sources of financial aid, both private and public; a change in bar examination procedures; and a substantial increase in the employment opportunities for black lawyers.

The threshold responsibility lies with the law schools. The legal academy has demonstrated its ability to undertake the beginnings of change during the past few years of growth in the black law student population; yet an even greater effort is required.

Law schools may also bear the ultimate obligation to resolve the roadblock problem caused by mass failures of blacks on bar examinations. The Association of American Law Schools should take the responsibility of convening a conference which would include the Na-

tional Conference of Bar Examiners, as well as other groups pivotally concerned, to discuss the issue and begin to devise remedies.

The American Bar Association, the National Bar Association, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the National Conference of Black Lawyers should combine their resources and wisdom to develop placement opportunities for black law school graduates. The postgraduate internship section of the Earl Warren Legal Training Program is a model which could be more widely employed to smooth the transition from law school to law practice.

None of these private efforts will succeed in satisfying the demands of the future, however, without the continuing and ever more vigorous support of the federal government in providing the means to advance legal education opportunities for blacks.

# Black People and the Tyranny of American Law

By HAYWOOD BURNS

**ABSTRACT:** The American legal system has not managed to escape the racism that permeates American life. Both historically and contemporaneously, the law has been the vehicle by which the generalized racism in the society has been made particular and converted in policies and standards of social control. Notwithstanding many countervailing experiences, many black Americans see their dominant experience with the law as that of the law's victim. Present efforts at using the law as an instrument of social change in order to relieve this victimization are encumbered by a lack of black direction of and control over the resources, policy, and personnel ostensibly organized to combat racism. The tyranny of a racist legal structure and the powerlessness of blacks in the face of white hegemony over most of the major legal institutions—public and private—which have been established to attempt to eradicate white racism, must both be answered by the reassertion by the black bar and the black community of their interests in shaping the decisions which so profoundly affect their lives. If leadership of this character articulates black priorities from the perspective of the community centrally affected, then all willing elements of the society can contribute usefully to the attainment of the goals of freedom with dignity for all.

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IN classical theories of democracy, the laws are supposed to reflect "the will of the people"—or at least of the majority. From the point of view of black people in this country, American law has been all too successful in this regard; for, in a country permeated by white racism,<sup>1</sup> the legal system has been and continues to be racist in character. More than a century ago, in analyzing democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville warned of the "tyranny of the majority," pointing out that in the absence of safeguards for the protection of minority rights, American democracy becomes just another form of tyranny.<sup>2</sup> Tocqueville might have gone further and pointed out that in a majority racist society what obtains these circumstances is a racist tyranny over the racial minority. For American blacks, too often the safeguards either do not exist, or are not applied. Too often blacks have known the law only as a sword, and not as a shield.

There have, of course, been myriad countervailing experiences with the law, where it has been used as an instrument of constructive social change to the benefit of blacks—more so in the most recent past than throughout our history.<sup>3</sup> However, the dominant experience has been one in which the law acted as the vehicle by which the generalized racism in the society was made particular and converted into standards and policies of subjugation and social control. Most white Americans tend to view the historic role of the law in this country as that of a tool for the

expansion of liberty, and they are largely correct as to themselves—especially if they are not poor (which most are not). However, etched deep in the collective consciousness of American blacks is the role that the law has played in their oppression. It is a present perception which comports with both the historical and contemporary reality.

## THE PAST

### *Slavery*

The institution of American chattel slavery is unique in the experience of human kind—unique in its brutality, unique in its drive to degrade and depersonalize those persons enslaved.<sup>4</sup> The American slave system relied heavily upon the American legal system for the creation and the perpetuation of the institution of American chattel slavery. This is not to say that the law itself was responsible for bringing slavery into existence. It was, to a large extent, recognizing as de jure a de facto situation that had been developing for some time. What is true, though, is that the law played a critical role in the institutionalization of American slavery, defining, sanctioning, and ossifying it, and protecting its presence upon the American landscape for centuries.

It is not often recalled that in the early seventeenth century, during the days of the first settlements in this country, there was at first no clearly defined status of "slave." White Europeans and black Africans existed side by side in various stages of unfreedom. Some form of bondage was a very common experience, and there was considerable confusion over and imprecision about the use of the term "slave." It certainly was not synonymous and inter-

1. See *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam, 1968), p. 10.

2. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1841; reprint ed., New York: Vintage, 1945), p. 269.

3. See William H. Hastie, "Toward an Equalitarian Legal Order: 1930-1950," *THE ANNALS* (May 1973), pp. 18-31.

4. See Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York: Random House, 1956).

changeable with the word "Negro"—as it later grew to be. Black persons sometimes served a term of years and were then to be released from service and even in some instances to own or hold other blacks in servitude.<sup>5</sup>

Increasingly, however, throughout the seventeenth century the situations of the blacks in bondage and the whites in bondage diverged: the plight of the white steadily improved and that of the black became more debased. It was the law that was responsible for the crucial developments in this whole process, which by century's end had defined the perimeters of a slave system and had permanently locked the black, by reason of his blackness, on the inside. This was accomplished by white men who, sitting in Colonial legislatures, passed laws making bondage for *blacks* (1) a lifetime condition and (2) a hereditary condition.<sup>6</sup> Thus the law not only fastened onto the captive African for all of his days, but it marked as well the unborn, condemning not an individual or a generation, but an entire people to the night of slavery.

### *Nation-building*

With a revolution for liberty and the birth of a new nation, the so-called founding fathers were presented with a prime opportunity to resolve in favor of freedom the contradictions of a nation which was established in the inter-

est of liberty, yet everywhere kept men and women enslaved. After much debate, the opportunity was missed. Slavery was to be a part of the new America. Apparently, even the more progressive of the founding fathers, those with scruples against slavery, were unprepared to tamper with so much private property and unable to accept fully the notion of blacks being their equals.<sup>7</sup> Blacks were, at this point in time—as they would be many times thereafter—the victims of an American pragmatism that bartered and compromised their lives away in a process from which they had been totally excluded—sacrificed to the exigencies of certain white imperatives. Black school children of today must still look at the Constitution of 1789 and see enshrined in our fundamental law, the guaranteed continuation of the slave trade,<sup>8</sup> the required return of fugitive slaves,<sup>9</sup> and the counting of enslaved, disfranchised blacks as three-fifths persons for purposes of political representation.<sup>10</sup>

### *Pre-Civil War*

It was the law, through the slave codes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which governed in oppressive detail the lives of millions of black slaves. The slave codes, by their terms, denied a legal personality to blacks, barring them from bringing law suits or testifying against a white person. Through elaborate statutory schemes, the slave codes regulated the movement of blacks, denied any family relationship, and applied criminal sanctions according to a different and harsher

5. See Winthrop D. Jordan, *White over Black* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), p. 74; Paul C. Palmer, "Servant into Slave: The Evolution of the Legal Status of the Negro Laborer in Colonial Virginia," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 65 (1966), pp. 355-70.

6. See Jordan, *White over Black*, pp. 44-98; Assembly Proceedings, September 1664, *Liber WH & L*, 28-29, Maryland Archives, I, 533-34, as quoted in *Civil Rights and the American Negro*, Albert P. Blaustein and Robert L. Zangrando, eds. (New York: Trident, 1968), p. 9.

7. See Staughton Lynd, "Slavery and the Founding Fathers," in *Black History*, Melvin Drimmer, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 115-31.

8. U.S. Constitution, article I, section 9.

9. U.S. Constitution, article IV, section 2.

10. U.S. Constitution, article I, section 2.

standard than applied to whites.<sup>11</sup> The law confirmed and guaranteed the debased situation of the slave, and the entire legal apparatus was ultimately reinforced by the Taney dictum, in the *Dred Scott* case, that the Negro "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."<sup>12</sup>

Neither was the oppressive role of the law in this period entirely a regional phenomenon. North of the Mason-Dixon line it was the law which relegated so-called free blacks to an inferior status, barring blacks from certain types of employment, banning them from within the borders of certain territories, requiring segregated schools, and withholding from blacks the franchise.<sup>13</sup>

#### *Post-Civil War*

A northern victory in the Civil War and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were not sufficient to arrest this process completely; for immediately after the Civil War whites turned to the law once again hoping to duplicate in so far as was possible, the vertical white-black relationship that existed prior to emancipation. The wholesale passage of black codes was designed to keep blacks: close to the land, away from

certain types of occupations, away from white women, and subservient.<sup>14</sup> In fact, without an identifying date, it is often difficult to tell a post-Civil War black code from a pre-Civil War slave code.

After Reconstruction the law was once again a major white weapon for wrenching rights from the hands of blacks, destroying the many black gains that had been made during that period. It was the law which launched the strange career of Jim Crow, codifying the customs and usages of segregation and giving them universal application in the southern states.<sup>15</sup> It was the law—aided by the extra-legal, though community sanctioned, force of lynch law—which disfranchised hundreds of thousands of blacks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, stripping from black people the hard won black political power. The grandfather clause, the literacy test, and the poll tax were all legal devices designed to block black people from the polls. It was in this period, as well, that an increasingly conservative Supreme Court cut back on the breadth of the Civil War Amendments, giving them an increasingly narrow interpretation to the detriment of black people, a trend that finally culminated in acceptance as the law

11. For cases and statutes in this area see William Goodell, *The American Slave Code* (1853; reprint ed., New York: New American Library, 1969); George M. Stroud, *A Sketch of the Laws Relating to Slavery in the Several States of the United States of America*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Henry Longstreth, 1856); Helen Catterall, *Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926-37). See also Pauli Murray, "Roots of the Racial Crisis: Prologue to Policy" (J.S.D. thesis, Yale University, 1965).

12. *Scott v. Sanford*, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

13. See Leon Litwack, *North of Slavery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); *Roberts v. City of Boston*, 59 Mass. (Cush.) 198 (1849).

14. See, for example, An act to establish and regulate the domestic relations of persons of color, and to amend the law in relation to paupers and vagrancy, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 1864-1865, pp. 291-304, quoted in Blaustein and Zangrando, *Civil Rights*, pp. 218-25; see also W. E. B. Dubois, *Black Reconstruction in America* (London: Cass and Co., 1964), pp. 196-97, 331, 351; John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom, A History of Negro Americans*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 187-90, 303, 327.

15. See Blaustein and Zangrando, *Civil Rights*, pp. 283-88, 294-321; C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 67-109.

of the land of the *Plessy v. Ferguson* "separate, but equal" pronouncement.<sup>16</sup> The citadel of legally established and sanctioned apartheid remained largely inviolate throughout most of the twentieth century, until the major legal assaults of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*<sup>17</sup> in 1954 and the Civil Rights Act of 1957<sup>18</sup>—the first federal civil rights legislation in the country since Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875.<sup>19</sup>

### THE PRESENT

The numerous successful legal attacks upon segregation have not solved the problem of racism and the law for black people today. Racism is still part and parcel of the daily reality of the functioning of the justice system. Black lawyers, plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses are still subjected to the overtly racist attitudes, actions, and comments of an overwhelmingly white justice system. Black people are likewise affronted by a legal system that so often works against them and too seldom works for them, when they have been victimized and the state should be under an obligation to prosecute the white perpetrators of the wrong.

At one point in our history the law reserved exclusively for white men the right to sit on juries.<sup>20</sup> Though jury statutes no longer state this exclusion, blacks are still systematically excluded from juries through unfair procedures for compiling prospective jury rolls and through racial use of the peremptory challenge by the prosecutor. As a result, legions of black men and women

are continually having their liberty and property taken away and their lives put in jeopardy by juries from which their peers have been systematically excluded.<sup>21</sup>

In the nineteenth century there were legal provisions that prevented blacks from bringing law suits against whites, or from testifying when white interests were involved. Though this situation no longer legally obtains, it is the common experience of black litigants that judges and juries are often likely to outweigh the testimony of several black witnesses with the testimony of one white one; that in a personal injury case the leg or arm of a white litigant is valued more highly than that of a black one.<sup>22</sup>

In the past, in some statutes different penalties were set out for whites and blacks for the same offense. Though this is no longer the case, sentencing patterns, when taken as a whole, often reveal a significant disparity between sentences meted out to blacks and whites for the same offense.<sup>23</sup> One of the most egregious areas in this regard is in death sentences, in particular, death sentences for interracial sex crimes. Sexual mutilation was at one time the statutory penalty reserved almost exclusively for blacks and Indians for interracial sex crimes.<sup>24</sup> In modern times it seems to have been the death penalty. Since the 1930s, 455 persons have been executed for rape in this country. Four hundred five of these

21. See *Swain v. Alabama*, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Charles Morgan, "Segregated Justice," in *Southern Justice*, Leon Freidman, ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1965); note, "Fair Jury Selection Procedures," *Yale Law Journal* 75 (1965), p. 322.

22. See Morgan, note 21 above, p. 157.

23. Marvin Wolfgang and Bernard Cohen, *Crime and Race: Conceptions and Misconceptions* (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1970), p. 81.

24. Jordan, *White over Black*, p. 155.

16. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

18. 71 Stat. 634 (1957).

19. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).

20. See *Strauder v. West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).

persons have been black.<sup>25</sup> In other areas of law related to sentencing, where great amounts of discretion are involved—such as commutation of sentences—overall patterns of disparity of treatment can also be discerned.<sup>26</sup>

Quite apart from any direct or explicit considerations, the law, by reason of its structure—its procedural rules and substantive doctrines—operates to the disadvantage of the poor and minority person. This structural inequality brings about a type of institutional subordination<sup>27</sup> based on class and caste—class, because so much of this institutional unfairness is related to the amount of money a person has; caste, because such a vastly disproportionate number of the poor in this country are also members of the nation's racial minorities.

A prime example can be seen in the operation of the money bail system, which jails one group of citizens for weeks, months, and sometimes years before trial, while another group goes free. Both are equally presumed innocent; money is the only discriminating factor. As a result, the country's jails are packed to overflowing with the nation's poor—with red, brown, black, and yellow men and women showing up in greatly disproportionate numbers.<sup>28</sup>

25. U.S. Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics: Capital Punishment, 1930–1968 (1969), p. 10.

26. Wolfgang and Cohen, *Crime and Race*, p. 85.

27. Institutional subordination is the placing or keeping of persons in a position or status of inferiority by means of attitudes, actions, or institutional structures which do not use color itself as the subordinating mechanism, but instead use other mechanisms indirectly related to color. This definition is derived from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights study, "Racism in America and How to Combat It" (1970), p. 6.

28. See National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, "Bail in the United States" (1964); Caleb Foote, "The Coming Constitu-

These problems of institutional subordination along racial lines due to the law's structural inequality are not, however, limited to matters of criminal justice. There is structural inequality in the owner-biased landlord-tenant law<sup>29</sup> and creditor bias in the commercial law.<sup>30</sup> In administrative law as measured by the standard of due process required, there is often less respect and protection for the matters of concern to poor and minority citizens than that accorded major commercial and property interests.<sup>31</sup> Further, in the previous century black people were barred from certain states and territories by law. Today, large-acre zoning laws effectively put certain geographical areas off-limits to blacks.<sup>32</sup> In addition, the law continues to be used as a tool for depriving black people of effective political participation through the exercise of the franchise, for example, where "at-large" systems of voting can be used to assure that a black minority will never be in a position in the particular locale in question to elect a political representative of its own choosing.<sup>33</sup>

### *Political repression*

Black people are, as well, increasingly victimized by the growing political uses

tional Crisis in Bail," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 113 (1965), p. 959.

29. See Emily Goodman, *The Tenant Survival Book* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972); Project on Social Welfare Law, Housing for the Poor, Rights and Remedies (New York: New York University School of Law, 1967).

30. See *The Law and the Low Income Consumer*, Carol Hecht Katz, ed. (New York: New York University School of Law, 1968).

31. See Charles Reich, "The New Property," *Yale Law Journal* 73 (1964), p. 733.

32. See John D. Johnston, Jr., "Land Use Control," *Annual Survey of American Law* 49 (1970).

33. See, for example, *Chavis v. Whitcomb*, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969); *Petersburg v. U.S.*, — U.S. — (March 5, 1973).

of the law against the unpopular and the politically controversial, as the law is used for a tool of political repression in the service of racism, and in opposition to the legitimate aspirations of the black community for change. Political uses of the law certainly are not directed exclusively at black community activists, but since members of the black community make up such a large part of the cutting edge of the movement for social change in this country, the black community takes a large part of the brunt of the abuses of state power. Contemporary concern in the black community focuses upon the passage of new legislation that can be used as an instrument of repression; for example, preventive detention, "no-knock," and "stop and frisk" legislation, while not racially directed in its terms, is seen to pose a decided threat to the freedom of blacks. The Interstate Riot Act, or so-called Rap Brown Act,<sup>34</sup> which, in effect, makes certain thoughts criminal if one happens to be thinking them while crossing a state line, is a ready weapon to attack politically active black spokesmen. Legislation that limits grand jury immunity and, in effect, compels grand jury testimony upon pain of imprisonment, flies in the face of traditional notions concerning the privilege against self-incrimination.<sup>35</sup> It is part of a much larger phenomenon which supports governmental use of the grand jury process to suppress and inhibit political activism—a phenomenon of special moment to the black community at a time when it is attempting to coalesce and organize its efforts to secure change.

The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court apparently looks with favor upon such practices,<sup>36</sup> coupled with what is

perceived as a more generalized trend in Supreme Court decisions toward the erosion of fundamental rights, is another source of distress for black people.

Wholly apart from statutes or appellate decisions, it is the day-to-day administration of the law—particularly, the criminal justice system—which shapes the attitudes of black people about the law. There is concern about the street-level abuse—verbal, psychological, and physical—attendant upon the enforcement of the law in black communities. The para-military aspect of law enforcement has taken on an even more decided emphasis in recent times with police resorting to some of the latest technological advances in equipment and weaponry, greatly aided by grants under the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to patrol and control black communities. The harshness of the developments are exacerbated by the rampant police corruption and the selective enforcement of the law witnessed by minority persons in their communities.<sup>37</sup>

Of late, the violence of officialdom has gone beyond unprovoked police attacks upon the headquarters and offices of political activists or upon the persons of political activists as they come to court, to the murders at Kent State, Jackson State, South Carolina State (Orangeburg), Southern University, Attica, Chicago (Fred Hampton and Mark Clark), and elsewhere.

Police practices in dealing with black political spokesmen give black people further cause for pause and further support the view that the law continues to be an instrument of racism and repression where they are concerned. There

34. 18 U.S.C. 2101, 2102.

35. 18 U.S.C. 6002–6003.

36. See *Kastigar v. U.S.*, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

37. See Paul Chevigny, *Police Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1969); Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures, *Commission Report 1972* (New York City's Knapp Commission).

is the questionable manner in which informants are being employed. All too often they are either unsound individuals, or persons with serious charges or possible long sentencing facing them, who are told to produce evidence under circumstances that invite entrapment. There is, as well, the use of the *agent provocateur*, the person who infiltrates political groups and instigates activity that may subject the members and leadership of the group to arrest and imprisonment. This unsavory police practice has been used against black political activists to the overall detriment of the image of the police and the law in the mind of much of black America.<sup>38</sup>

These practices must be seen against a backdrop of increased police surveillance of private citizens in many sectors of life—but especially political activity. The amassing of dossiers and keeping of data banks on persons quite unrelated to criminal activity has served both to anger and to chill those who seek to exercise First Amendment rights.

Electronic surveillance or “bugging,” to the level of wholesale invasions of privacy and encroachments upon fundamental rights, is a source of deep concern for a people who for centuries had their lives constantly monitored and governed in minutest detail. In recent years the federal government had even gone so far as to maintain that it could conduct electronic surveillance in certain kinds of cases involving domestic security without first having to obtain judicial approval. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, was unanimous in its view that the government had no authority to contravene our fundamental liberties.<sup>39</sup>

38. See Paul Chevigny, *Cops and Rebels* (New York: Pantheon, 1972).

39. *U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Eastern District of Michigan*, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Fear of the law as an instrument of repression on the part of a racial group that has experienced the law in this role is enhanced when the government blithely ignores constitutional safeguards to accomplish what it may view as a superior political purpose. The mass arrest of hundreds of persons during the Washington, D.C., May Day activity without any semblance of “probable cause” raised just such a specter.

The money bail system is inequitable in its normal operation, making pretrial liberty depend on the size of a person’s wallet. The inequity of the system is compounded in political cases, however, by the extremes to which the state goes in demanding exorbitant amounts of money as a condition of pretrial release. Often these amounts seem to bear no relationship to the likelihood of appearance at trial, but are, in fact, a species of political ransom.

The frequent charge of conspiracy in cases involving political activists is viewed as another example of political use of the law. Conspiracy has long been a charge to which the state would resort in attacking the controversial and/or politically disfavored defendant. The rules of evidence become much more elastic under such a charge, and no substantive crime need be proven. The amorphous nature of the law of conspiracy makes it a useful prosecutorial device. Angela Davis, Bobby Seale, Erika Huggins, the Panther Twenty-one, the Chicago Seven, the Harrisburg Eight: all were faced with conspiracy charges—though none was convicted.

A further difficulty with the law that faces blacks in modern times is the harassment of those who would plead their cause. Increasingly, lawyers—black and white—who have taken on

the defense of black activists have themselves become the subject of official sanctions—facing contempt, bar discipline, or even criminal charges. This has happened to the degree that part of the struggle of black people with American law today is to protect their protectors.

The inequities and failings of the legal system, as far as black people are concerned, are capped by the barbarity and racism of a punishment system that is itself a crime. The warehousing of human beings that goes on in our nation's prisons is a well-documented national disgrace, which, once again, falls with disproportionate severity upon minority group prisoners—especially those who would organize in an effort to change their lot and end the crime of punishment.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, from the sidewalk to the big house, the ugly specter of legal racism still stalks today's American black man and woman.

#### STRUCTURE OF THE PROFESSION

The law's racism—past and present—has been a substantial obstacle to black advance in this country. Despite this fact, the legal system still carries with it the possibilities of positive change in the direction of remedying many of the deprivations black people face in America. Offensive civil actions, criminal defense of activists working for change, and the test case all have their merit. As long as the law is regarded as only a component in a much larger change process, and not a panacea, it is evident that it is much too valuable a tool for black people to abandon at this point in time—if ever.

What is ironic, but perhaps not surprising, is that not only are black peo-

ple afflicted by the legacy of a legal structure permeated with racism, but much of the structure of the institutional apparatuses that have grown up to attack this racism operates in ways inimical to black interests. At one point in time, black people played a major role in shaping and carrying out the legal strategies addressed to the problems of their own liberation. Under the guidance and direction of such legal giants as Charles Houston, William Hastie, Thurgood Marshall, James Nabrit, Jr., and others, and with the intellectual support of the Howard Law School, great civil rights advances through the law were plotted and carried out.<sup>41</sup> However, the situation of black leadership in the legal arena in the definition and solution of the major problems of black society in white America no longer obtains.

Of course, racism is a problem that affects all who live in America—black or white. All have a stake in its eradication—including those of its beneficiaries who would hate to see it go. However, to say that all are victimized by racism is not to say that all are victimized by it equally or in the same way. Blacks, as the chief direct victims, should have a critical say in the way in which their victimizers and victimization are to be addressed. In the presence of the villainous white racism, fair-minded persons should respect black people sufficiently to permit them to define their problems and lead in shaping the solutions. This is a crucial aspect of black's empowerment, self-determination, and decolonization. It is, as well, rightfully a part of white people's liberation—liberation from paternalism, from patronizing, from dictating to blacks what black problems

40. See Karl Menninger, *The Crime of Punishment* (New York: Viking, 1968); *Black Law Journal* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1971).

41. See Robert L. Carter, "The Black Lawyer," *Humanist* (September-October 1969), pp. 12, 13.



are and how they are to be solved. It is not an excuse for white abdication of responsibility or inaction in these areas. In the past, great contributions by lawyers of all races have been made to the legal struggle against racism. History has seen to it that there are very few black lawyers at the bar.<sup>42</sup> A major portion of the legal assault upon racism has been and will continue to be carried on by white attorneys—which is entirely appropriate, since white racism is all our problem. Close cooperation and close working relationships between the white and black bar in these areas certainly are indicated. However, representatives of the white bar need to relinquish their hold on the claim to control and direct black people's destinies, and be prepared to accept black leadership on matters of social policy where black people are primarily affected.

Today, most of the major decisions concerning legal strategies designed to address the issues having widest impact upon black America are made in institutions—private and public—that are not under black direction or control and which lack sufficient black input from either the black bar or the black community. The major financing of legal efforts on issues of critical importance to the black community goes to these institutions, for, despite the burgeoning efforts of black people at organization and self-help and the ever increasing number of well-credentialed blacks interested in applying legal skills in the service of their communities, foundations and other philanthropic sources continue to fund in their own image.

42. Though black people make up well over 11 percent of the overall population, there are only about 3,845 black lawyers in the country comprising about 1½ percent of the bar. See Christine and Leroy Clark, "The Black Lawyer," *Black Enterprise* (February 1973), p. 15.

The result of this set of circumstances is that choices are made of the greatest moment to the black community—concerning what issues are important, what is their priority, what political activists are worthy of defense, what political activists are not, where will the millions of dollars of private and public funds be allocated, and so forth—without the assistance of the legally trained persons from the community most affected, or without the ability of members of those communities to exercise much control over these decisions which so deeply affect their lives.

One of the most serious, if not the ultimate, of indignities is the tyranny of those who control the gathering and dissemination of the written and spoken word concerning the black situation. Even there the majority group would have black people submit themselves to the will and the power of those non-blacks who control. For example, not only are black people disadvantaged by a white racist legal structure and hindered in their efforts to correct this situation by a white-dominated civil rights legal establishment, but the interpretation of their situation is given over to persons from outside the group centrally involved. They cannot tell their own story without having it screened through white interpreters. This is not to negate the right of white writers and editors to write and prepare publications on blacks; nor is it to disparage personally the white individuals, often persons of great ability, who follow this course. It is only to say that in the 1970s, in the presence of so many fine, trained, and talented black legal personages equipped by training and sensitivity to address and interpret the black situation, it is a great affront to the black bar and the black community, and the product of the grossest racial myopia, when those responsible for gen-

erating major commentaries on black people and their legal situation ignore and pass over all black scholars, writers, and practitioners in the decision of who will structure, guide, and control the content and nature of that publication. The audacity involved is overwhelming.

The lesson from the exercise of so much white power—in the legal system and in the legal profession—is that black people, the black bar, and the black law schools must reassert their right of leadership and their right to maximize control over the decisions af-

fecting the lives of the black community. They must fashion an independent thrust based on a black perspective and on black priorities. All who wish to join in and contribute to the effort should be welcomed, for it is only in the pooling of all available resources that any real hope of eradicating racism lies. This can be the first step in the forging of a new majority, which will avoid the pitfalls of operating in a manner that perpetuates the very evils sought for elimination.

*Sic semper tyrannis.*

# Law and Race in Britain

By LOUIS F. CLAIBORNE

**ABSTRACT:** Race relations in Britain present a special challenge for two principal reasons. First, although actual contact between the races within the British Isles is very recent and the official policy at home has been nondiscriminatory for two centuries, the race attitudes of the British people were molded long ago—by English involvement in the slave trade and slavery in America and, more immediately, by the long experience of Empire in India, the West Indies, and Africa. Second, the present colored population of Britain—about two million—consists almost entirely of new immigrants from former colonies who have been arriving in relatively large numbers in a short span. Many have unrealistic expectations, and they stand out as jarring strangers in a uniquely settled and homogeneous society. The result has been massive discrimination in the private sector, which a conservative legal tradition was reluctant to tackle by law—except by way of controlling further immigration. Nevertheless, Britain enacted anti-discrimination legislation rather quickly, dealing with places of public resort in 1965 and the rest, very comprehensively, in 1968. The problem is that the law has no teeth; in the main, enforcement is attempted by persuasion, rather than coercion. This does not work, even in Britain.

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LAW and race has a jarring sound to most British ears. In traditional academic circles it is viewed as a non-subject; the legal and judicial professions, with only the rarest exceptions, deem it most unfortunate that the law should be called upon to risk itself in such an arena; all but the most extreme politicians prefer to avoid the subject; and the general public accepts only reluctantly, if at all, the intrusion of law into what it is thought to be the basically private area of prejudices and preferences. Nor are such attitudes really surprising in a country which—unlike America—is not cursed with the heavy weight of centuries of black slavery and discrimination sanctioned by law; where the colored population is relatively small—less than 4 percent of the total; and where the people deem themselves tolerant, nonviolent, basically just, and fair-minded.

In this situation, one may wonder why the British resorted to law at all to deal with race discrimination. One can take it on faith that it was imperatively necessary, for, in this country, legislation is invoked only in extreme situations and usually long after the need has been fully demonstrated.

#### EARLY ANTI-COLORED PREJUDICE

Why did not all go well when, in the '50s and '60s, substantial groups from the West Indies, from Africa, and from the Indian subcontinent began to arrive? The principal answer is that, although largely dormant, anti-colored prejudice in Britain was very widespread before the races met on common soil. This may seem odd, since actual contact between the races within the British Isles is, for most of the white population, a very recent experience. But the fact is that, while the occasion to act on it is new, the attitude of the

white Englishman toward the darker stranger was molded long ago.

We can trace color prejudice in Britain very far back, indeed. It was the Venerable Bede—said to be the first "civilized Englishman"—who, in the eighth century, explained that the Ethiopian mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles became white-skinned upon being baptized. We do not know whether that worthy cleric thought a black Christian an unseemly sight or merely whitened the African to indicate the marvelous dispensation of Divine Grace. Either way, this is obvious racism. Nor was it a personal quirk. Some eight centuries later it was the popular Elizabeth I who expelled the "blackamoors" from her realm; and, shortly after, we have dramatic evidence of contemporary color prejudice in Shakespeare's plays, from *Titus Andronicus* and *The Merchant of Venice* to *Othello*.

There followed more than two centuries of black slavery and slave trading. Even before Britain had colonies of her own in the New World, British adventurers engaged in the trade, and soon the British outstripped the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the Dutch. A few years later, British capitalists were financing British merchants who were selling blacks as slaves to British colonists in North and Central America and in the Caribbean. During the same period, there was the domination and exploitation, albeit without slavery, of India and parts of the East Indies. The importance of that history for current race attitudes, on both sides of the color line, is difficult to exaggerate.

To be sure, the impact was, and is, greater on the American side of the ocean. Indeed, in Britain, black slavery was held legally unenforceable in 1772. But too much has been made of that famous judgment of Lord Mansfield. First, it did not appreciably change the

conditions of the African in this country—some twenty thousand in London alone—much less the way he was regarded. One need only notice how the Chief Justice himself worded his decree of emancipation in favor of Somersett: "The black must be discharged." The British slave trade was not ended, nor was slavery itself ended in the British colonies, where the law of England was deemed inoperative in this respect.

Although the history of Britain was measurably affected by the slave trade and slave labor in her American possessions, especially the Caribbean, and many a then-prominent English family—including the Royal Family—was enriched, and many a now-prominent family owes its position to that profitable exploitation, it may be that, for some time, these realities did not seem to touch the ordinary Britisher at home and therefore contributed little to his color prejudices. Needless to say, it was different on the other side of the color line: no ordinary black man in the British colonies could stand aloof, unaware of how he was being treated and regarded by his British masters. And *his* descendants remember, whether the Englishman does or not. At all events, the fact of color and the notion of white superiority over colored "natives" were brought home to the British consciousness during the long Victorian era.

The requirements of the widening and deepening empire—over black and brown people throughout the world—eventually involved the whole British nation. First, more people actually served in India, Africa, the West Indies, and the East Indies. Then there were dramatic events—"atrocities" as seen from home—which every Britisher heard about, drawing the "proper" conclusions: the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the Jamaican Revolt of 1865, the "mas-

sacre" of Khartoum in 1885, the Boxer Rebellion of 1899. And, finally, every schoolchild was taught his own "superiority" over black and brown peoples who lived in all the pink-shaded areas of the globe under the Union Jack; inevitably, that creed was part of his history, his geography, his literature.

In short, the British white population has been well conditioned to view colored people as distinctly lesser—especially those who only yesterday were "natives" ruled by Britain and presumptively unable to manage their own affairs. Although most had had no occasion to act out their prejudice, and many would have denied it, there can be no question that a racist climate obtained in the United Kingdom before the postwar wave of colored immigration. It was not the racism of America, fed by three centuries of official and visible slavery and discrimination. In Britain itself there was no race anger and no hatred, and law at least had remained neutral for a very long time. Yet, consciously or not, the host population was predisposed to look down on the dark strangers when they arrived in numbers in the 1950s. And it was wholly unreal not to expect long-nurtured attitudes to find expression in active discrimination against the newcomers.

#### RECENT IMMIGRANTS

Color prejudice alone would have produced substantial discrimination. But it is unquestionably an aggravating factor that colored people in Britain are, for the most part, very recent *immigrants*, arriving in relatively large numbers in a short span, from very remote places—India, Africa, the West Indies. While viewed by the host population for some purposes as a single objectionable "alien wedge," the coloreds are in fact many widely differing groups of

people, often having nothing in common with each other before their migration to Britain. Besides the total gulf between Africans and Indians, there are within the two large groups a dozen obvious distinctions, whether ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or of national allegiance. Strangers to each other, some are more strangers here than others, and there are wide differences in their image of Britain, their expectations on arrival, and their intentions.

This disparity of the groups that make up the colored population is one dimension of the British race problem that is wholly unlike the American one. But equally important is the subjective view of their hosts. Surprisingly few British—at least at first—distinguished, or could distinguish, between the immigrants from three continents: The Indian, the African, and the West Indian were all lumped together as "coloureds." The differences between them were less obvious than their common darkness and origin as natives of former colonies who, only yesterday, were not thought fit to govern themselves: This was no doubt, in large measure, because the dark strangers made a jarring sight—and noise and smell—in a relatively tranquil island whose population, basically homogeneous for centuries, had quite accustomed itself to its own familiar patterns. One does not look too closely at an outsider who can be labeled such at a glance.

In an important sense, the colored in Britain today are intruding foreigners, so viewed by their hosts and, in the end, by themselves. And, because of their color, they are not only immediately identifiable as aliens, but also as immigrants from recently emancipated colonies. This very much complicates the British race-relations picture. Among other things, it raises issues that cannot seriously arise in America—

where blacks are bona fide natives. What have they come for? Only to take and give nothing in return? For how long? If they want to be treated like Englishmen, why shouldn't they be expected to shed their foreign ways? Why must we welcome this disagreeable—or simply unfamiliar—horde? Why not close the gates to further entry? Why not encourage them to return whence they came? The existence of these questions affects attitudes and it suggests a dilemma for the law: in Britain, legal intervention does not necessarily mean law for the protection of the colored minority; it can also mean restrictive immigration law or repatriation law, or even dispersal law.

Finally, some aspects of the British character—otherwise delightful—do not help smooth race relations. The unique combination of geography and history which permitted an island both to resist invasion and dominate much of the world has produced an extraordinary cultural and ethnic continuum, and a pride of race, that binds the British and tends to exclude foreigners. But there is another side. In part because so much is held in common, because tradition and accepted conventions produce substantial conformity in public life, the Britisher is very jealous of his right to be an individual, even an eccentric, with respect to his private affairs, and he is quite self-assured about it. This has two faces, both unhelpful for race relations. On the one hand, the right of privacy means that many things are no one else's business—neither the neighbor's nor the government's. And this tends to include race prejudice and, within bounds, resulting discrimination. But, at the same time, precisely because private opinions are every person's right, one is free to speak one's mind, to bare one's prejudices and preferences, without fear of public censure. The

result has been a marked amount of candid talk about colored people, which the potentially restraining influence of public disapprobation barely curbs.

#### DISCRIMINATION

The upshot, when the test came, was substantial discrimination—in employment, in housing, in public places. Of course, the situation never remotely approached the American or South African or Rhodesian precedents. The critical difference is that, at home, law—immigration legislation aside—has not itself discriminated along racial lines or, indeed, supported private discrimination. In Britain, the colored man has suffered no legal disabilities; he has not been denied the franchise or equal treatment in the courts; he has not been segregated in state schools or in public buildings. Nor is it really conceivable that the British should ever resort to such devices within their Island—whatever they may have done elsewhere and are now doing in Rhodesia. Nevertheless, just beyond the immediate realm of government, the colored man encountered severe discrimination.

#### *Immigration barrier enacted, 1962*

At first, in the mid-1950s, very few took note or admitted that discrimination existed. And certainly no one in responsibility, in Westminster or Whitehall, thought it necessary to *do* anything. Nor was the discrimination very visible, except in a few areas, for the entire colored population of the United Kingdom then numbered little more than a hundred thousand. The Notting Hill riots of 1958 produced a shock but were soon dismissed as an aberration. As numbers increased sharply, however, alarm spread that the country would be overrun with dark faces. And so, instead

of an anti-discrimination law, the government, in 1962, enacted an immigration barrier to halt the "flood."

The extent of this flood was grossly exaggerated in some quarters, and it is probable that the agitation for erecting a barrier increased the inward flow, many believing that they must get in before the gates were shut. But the fact remains that Britain was faced with a unique situation: a relatively small island, with a fairly high density of population, 99.44 percent pure white British, offering unrestricted entry to potential millions of black and brown people in the four corners of the world who, whether citizens of independent nations or not, were entitled to come to the motherland because they were also subjects of the Queen. However unreal, the prospect was too frightening to be endured indefinitely.

The new immigration law was not openly racist. Indeed, except for the Irish, it subjected to control every potential immigrant from the Commonwealth, white or colored, who was not born in Britain or who did not hold a United Kingdom passport. But it was plain that the purpose of the legislation was to curtail colored immigration. The law was not draconian, however. Admission was subjected to governmental control through a "work voucher" system, and the faucet could be turned on or off as circumstances suggested. Of course, those who had already entered could stay on, and, significantly, their dependants could join them.

#### RACE RELATIONS ACT, 1965

Optimists had hoped that once the fear of an unchecked flood of colored immigrants had been set at rest by the 1962 legislation, race relations would improve. But it was not to be. By 1964 the colored population of Britain

was about three-quarters of a million, and the existence of substantial discrimination was impossible to deny. Now the government acted—very promptly by American standards, precipitously according to British tradition, but very timidly as well. The first government-sponsored anti-discrimination law was proposed, and it was enacted as the Race Relations Act, 1965.

All things considered, it was surprising that any such legislation was proposed, much less enacted. Certainly, the executive and legislative branches had not been given a lead by the judiciary, as in the United States. Nor was it consistent with the orthodox British political tradition to resort so quickly to legislation to deal with a problem which, to many, did not appear very aggravated. Indeed, the pressure for the law was slight: there had been no organized demonstrations, marches, nor sit-ins, much less any obvious threat of violence. And, finally, it was very much against the grain to interfere by law in this delicate area of private preferences. But, if the conservative tradition was overridden, it was in a very limited way. The first race law was not a bold measure.

The new enactment covered three areas: "places of public resort," the transfer of tenancies, and incitement to racial hatred: The last provision enacted a sort of group defamation law, with criminal sanctions—which presumably would not pass the constitutional test in the United States. There have been half a dozen prosecutions under the law, two of them against Black Power leaders. While the provision is credited with curbing the most virulent racist outpourings, it has probably done more harm than good to race relations, if only because, on the colored side, it is seen—whatever the truth—as an effort to muzzle outspoken critics of the

status quo and because it has never been invoked against the public statements of Mr. Enoch Powell.

The provision which reaches the racially restrictive transfer of tenancies strikes American ears oddly because it covers only assignment of leases and subleases, not sales or even the original leasing. On the other hand, because of the great number of leasehold properties in Britain, especially London, it presumably tackled a real problem. What was aimed at was not so much the express racial covenant in a lease, as the situation in which the landlord, having reserved the right to veto a subtenant, used his veto to impose a color bar. British law had long required that power to be exercised "reasonably"; the 1965 Act merely enacted that refusing to allow the tenant to assign the lease, or to sublease, to a colored person because of his color would be deemed "unreasonable." But no sanction is attached: just as with *Shelley v. Kraemer*, the racial restriction was henceforth unenforceable, but no penalty was imposed for attempting it, or succeeding with an ignorant or complaisant tenant.

#### *Places of public resort*

The two provisions just discussed still survive, albeit now of doubtful utility—the latter because it is largely superseded by the housing section of the 1968 Act. The main thrust of the Race Relations Act of 1965, however, is to be found in the first section, dealing with places of public resort. Although this provision was entirely repealed and superseded by the far broader 1968 Act, it remains of interest because of the unusual enforcement procedure selected and because, as a starting point, it reveals the very different situation in Britain.

Because Britain, unlike America, had no discriminatory legal structure to dis-



mantle, it was not necessary to begin by passing legislation enforcing the right to vote, the right to equal justice, the right to the same public education. So one could focus immediately on private discrimination. Looking only to that problem, it was natural to first tackle public places and public transport; that is, natural because discrimination in this area was the most obvious offense and the easiest to remedy—albeit, in the end, it may have mattered less than unequal opportunities to obtain housing and jobs.

While the 1965 law—besides the transfer of tenancies—reached only “places of public resort,” that coverage was more comprehensive than the public accommodations section of our 1964 Civil Rights Act. Common carriers by land, water, and air—already reached in the United States by court decisions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Interstate Commerce Act—were expressly included. Unembarrassed by considerations of federalism, the British law reached all establishments generally open to the public without exception, whether they provided lodging, food, entertainment, or recreation. And, significantly, bars and pubs were not omitted—as they are in our law unless food is served. Finally, for good measure, all governmentally operated public accommodations were brought under the law—compare Titles III and VI of our 1964 Act.

Less straightforward, however, was the enforcement scheme. Initially, the government bill provided criminal penalties only—a modest fine not to exceed one hundred pounds. But an unlikely coalition of progressive reformers and reluctant Conservatives succeeded in changing the remedy. For different reasons, both advocated conciliation rather than punishment or even coercion. One Conservative front bencher

probably spoke for most of his countrymen when he deplored the attempt “to import the taint of criminality into this aspect of our affairs.” The result was probably the most reluctant enforcement mechanism that could be devised by the mind of man.

#### *Race Relations Board*

A Race Relations Board with local “conciliation” committees was created as the exclusive agency to deal with claims of discrimination. No investigation could proceed unless an aggrieved individual complained in writing. And, then, neither the Board nor its committees had any compulsive powers, whether to summon witnesses, subpoena documents, require answers to interrogatories, or issue orders. They were simply to “use their best endeavours . . . to secure a settlement of any differences” between “the parties concerned.” If these efforts failed and the Board was persuaded that the charged violation had not only occurred, but that it amounted to a “course of conduct”—presumably what American law calls a pattern or practice—and that it was likely to continue, it would report the matter to the attorney general. He, in turn, was authorized, if he thought fit, to institute judicial proceedings. In the end, if the court was satisfied that the defendant was engaging in a discriminatory practice and would persist unless enjoined, it might issue a “don’t do it again” injunction—nothing more.

Thus, the philosophy of the law was to resolve claims of discrimination—in the area of public transport and public accommodations—by amicable persuasion, not coercion. The issue would not surface at all unless the victim made formal complaint. If he deemed that worthwhile—albeit he would never receive damages—he must address himself to the appropriate “conciliation

committee." The victim could not go to court, or to the attorney general, or even to the Race Relations Board. Indeed, the courts were so well screened against such troublesome cases that in three years under the 1965 Act no case ever reached them.

No one is sure how well the Race Relations Act of 1965 worked in its very limited sphere. After all, there had never been segregation in public transport or a firm color bar in places of public accommodation. While instances of discrimination in pubs continued—and still continue—it seems the law was generally effective—just as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 met relatively little resistance. But, more and more, it became clear that massive discrimination was unabated—perhaps it increased—in the critical areas of employment and housing, and also with respect to the provision of services. The law had not altered the prevailing climate of prejudice; it had not educated the public; there were no perceptible secondary effects.

#### A NEW IMMIGRATION LAW AND ENOCH POWELL

The case for a wider ban on discrimination was plain and was made still plainer by two events of 1968. The first was the panic enactment of a new immigration law in response to the sudden exodus of the so called "Asians" from Kenya; that is, people of Indian descent, originally brought into East Africa by the British, as they had been earlier to the West Indies. For the first time, full-fledged British citizens lost their right to enter Britain unless they, their parents, or grandparents had been born or naturalized within the British Isles. The intended—and transparent—effect was obvious: most white "colonials" would be exempted; most colored "natives" would be barred.

That a Labour government put forward such legislation indicates how strong the color prejudice at home was.

The other barometer of racism in the country was the emergence of Enoch Powell on the issue in the spring of 1968. Although he was dismissed from the Shadow Cabinet for a notorious speech in April, Mr. Powell was clearly speaking a popular view. He no doubt influenced the public mood. But "Powellism" was a very strong movement only because it revealed the existing feelings of a very substantial part of the British population.

#### RACE RELATIONS ACT, 1968

In this climate, while a broader anti-discrimination law was all the more necessary, it remains extraordinary that any law came so quickly. This is not the place to recall the story behind the Race Relations Act of 1968. But it must be said that it emerged in consequence of an extremely well organized campaign by dedicated people, who prepared their case with unparalleled thoroughness and pursued the cause with unflagging zeal. Even so, the successful enactment of the law was a kind of miracle, overriding all the usual obstacles that radical reform encounters in Britain: optimists who believe the problem is being exaggerated and that it will go away in time; pessimists of the Right—numerous and prominent—who believe legislation cannot change human nature; pessimists of the Left—a relatively uninfluential breed—who believe bourgeois law cannot affect economic realities; laissez-faire libertarians who believe that law ought not intrude; and conservatives who believe that all sudden change is dangerous, especially when it is ahead of public opinion. The occasions when these forces stand aside are very rare in British politics; it is a shame that full advantage of this un-

usual opportunity was not taken to frame a stronger law.

On the side of coverage, it is true, there is little to fault. Unlike recent American law, the British Act reaches all commercial transactions—sales of all goods, whether retail or wholesale, and the provision of all services, from those of the barber to those of the barrister. Employment is well covered in all aspects, specifically including hiring, firing, promotion, and conditions of work. There was a delayed timetable which, for two years, exempted employers with no more than twenty-five employees—a very large category in Britain—and, for a further two years, exempted employers with no more than ten employees. But both periods have elapsed. Two somewhat jarring provisions remain, however: the first exempts the merchant navy, it being deemed impossible to compel white seamen to share sleeping, eating, or sanitary facilities with darker shipmates; the second reverses the American “benign quota” idea by allowing an employer to discriminate against colored applicants when his object is to establish or preserve a “reasonable” racial “balance.”

A separate section of the Act appropriately focuses on trade unions and professional associations, barring both discrimination in admission to membership and unequal treatment afterwards. There is also a housing section, which in all essential respects copies the American legislation of the same year—including the so-called Mrs. Murphy’s exemption (somewhat narrower in the British law) and the exemption for private sales or leases transacted without recourse to either advertisement or the services of a real estate agent. But the British Act, unlike ours, is not limited to residential accommodations; it also covers the sale and rental of business premises.

Finally, the 1968 law contains a very useful provision which has no counterpart in the United States: a blanket prohibition on racially discriminatory advertisements, regardless of whether the substantive discrimination would be permitted by the law. Thus, for instance, a Mrs. Murphy, while free to apply the color bar, is forbidden to publish her policy, whether by a newspaper notice or a sign in her window.

#### MODEST ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

On the face of it, then, Britain—in two short steps—has apparently overtaken the United States in dealing with race discrimination by legislation. But, alas, all is not what it seems. For when we look at what are labeled the enforcement provisions, the new British law is seen to be a very modest effort. Indeed, while coverage has been very generously expanded, the mechanisms for implementing the 1968 Act are much the same as in the 1965 legislation.

#### *Reconstituted Race Relations Board*

A new body emerges: the Community Relations Commission. But this is not meant to be an agency for enforcing the law: it is, rather, an official liaison committee for coordinating voluntary efforts at reducing racial tensions. The job of implementing the law is entirely delegated—some say relegated—to a reconstituted Race Relations Board. This time the attorney general is omitted—except presumably to defend a government department accused of violating the law—and government, as such, has no role to play. The Board is enlarged, but not its powers. It remains wholly impotent; it can *require* nothing: not that questions be answered, that people appear, that documents be furnished, that reports be submitted, that records be kept. And, of course, it still can issue no orders. Nor can the victim

go anywhere else for redress: he is not to go troubling the courts on his own, or the government either.

The Board itself, it is true, may invoke the courts. But it is then no more than an ordinary plaintiff: the courts do not enforce the Board's decision, nor do they even accord special weight to the agency finding of violation. Indeed, the Board is at a disadvantage compared to the private petitioner. It cannot apply to the judicial arm until it has first exhausted efforts at amicable conciliation, by which time the victim may well have preferred a compromise or simply withdrawn. And the Board is conscious that its role is to avoid, not encourage, the open confrontation which adversary litigation represents.

Lastly, when finally appealed to, the courts are unusually restricted in this area. The 1968 Act—unlike the earlier legislation—does permit an award of damages, but only actual loss incurred, normally a nominal sum. An injunction against the discriminator is possible only if it is shown that the violation in suit is neither the first nor likely to be the last. Even then, the court may only order the defendant not to do it again; he cannot be directed to hire or reinstate the victim of employment discrimination, or to offer the dwelling to the victim of housing discrimination.

This scheme is no accident. It was the deliberate policy of those who framed the Race Relations Act to eschew compulsory enforcement in favor of conciliation, to avoid public confrontation in favor of private cooperation. The hope, of course, was that by using quiet persuasion, one would not risk hardening attitudes, exacerbating prejudice, drawing battling lines. Conceivably, such a soft technique might have worked in Britain—with its very much smaller colored minority and far

more law-abiding majority population. But, alas, no one seriously claims success.

#### RACE RELATIONS AND ATTITUDES TODAY

Certainly, race prejudice and tension between the races in much of the United Kingdom remain substantial, if, indeed, they have not increased. This is not to say that overt discrimination has not been touched. On the contrary, while active discrimination against the colored population is still substantial—especially in the area of employment and to a lesser extent in housing—much has been done to curb the most blatant manifestations. But, as American experience sufficiently shows, a lessening in the volume, or degree, of discrimination does not immediately, or necessarily, produce a corresponding improvement in race relations or race attitudes. Which is not to say that law is an ineffective tool; rather, that prejudice dies hard and does not respond to token measures.

Several factors have combined to make the British invocation of law in race relations less than wholly successful. First, there has been a continuing increase in the colored population of Britain—now probably two million—and its heavy concentration in limited industrial areas. This has produced uncomfortable overcrowding for the immigrants and fears for the white population. Despite a consistently favorable overall balance of migration—more people leave Britain than come into it each year—there is a persistent feeling that the highly visible dark strangers are overcrowding the Island, or, at least, that they are “blackening” this “green and pleasant land.” The governmental response of tinkering with the immigration laws—intended to pacify white fears—has given an unfortunate message

to both communities: to the whites, that they are right to view too many dark faces as a "menace"; to the colored, that they are somehow undesirable. And so, the official policy of the Race Relations Act is undermined by the more recent and equally official teaching of the immigration laws.

Another aspect of the matter—and one that becomes of increasing importance—is the growing impatience of the colored community with its predicament. Whereas the original immigrants, especially the Asians, were inclined to be grateful for the relative improvement of their circumstances and willing to suffer some discrimination silently, the second generation is not so easily satisfied. Younger and native-born, these people see discrimination more quickly—often where there is none—and accept it less philosophically. And, to some extent at least, greater demands and more militant grievances produce a less benevolent response on the part of the host community. When to this is added a period of substantial unemployment, creating greater competition—real or imagined—and a general climate of economic malaise, it is not remarkable that interracial tensions have increased—quite independently of the level of actual discrimination.

#### *Limited impact*

But there are also more directly legal causes. One failure of the anti-discrimination law itself is that, on its face, it reaches only that conduct which is intentionally racially discriminatory. It does not challenge those laws, rules, practices which—however innocently meant—hit the colored population hardest. A sufficient example is the prevalent system for allocating public housing—a much more substantial segment of total housing in Britain than in the United States—which gives priority,

among applicants of equal need, to those who have been long residents in the area and/or have earned time on the waiting list—a rule which obviously disadvantages the newcomer. (Compare *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618 [1969].) Nor does the British law deal with the effects of past discrimination—in employment, for instance. Of course, that problem is very much less in the United Kingdom, but there is still measurable disadvantage to those whose right to equal treatment begins after the race—for a job or a promotion—is over.

Nor is there, in Britain, any basis for hoping that the courts will give a generous construction to the Race Relations Act, thereby extending its impact. On the contrary, the cases to date—about a dozen in all—reveal a literal, even grudging, approach to the Act. Thus, in one case in which the Race Relations Board found employment discrimination, the county court concluded otherwise on evidence, accepted by the judge, that the Pakistani complainant was told the job was filled while an Englishman, applying an hour later, was invited for an interview. So also, two temporarily successful efforts to push outward the boundaries of coverage ultimately failed before the House of Lords. One involved the claim by a Polish citizen that the refusal to consider him for public housing, because he was not a British subject, violated the Act's ban on discrimination on the ground of national origins. In a more recent instance the Lords reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal that a pseudo-private club was subject to the law. The immediate importance of the cases aside, these rulings hold little promise for creative interpretation of the law.

#### *Poor enforcement scheme*

In the end, however, the principal reason for the relative ineffectiveness

of the Race Relations Act is the defective enforcement scheme. The law is simply not taken very seriously on either side of the color line. Without teeth, it neither deters the discriminator nor satisfies the victim. The Race Relations Board is, more and more, losing the confidence of the colored community—largely because it is seen as impotent. Because the remedies are not worth seeking and because the Board—quite unfairly—is thought to be in league with a hostile majority; the volume of complaints decreases annually. And, otherwise, government appears wholly

disinterested. Indeed, it seems unwilling even to debate the modest amendments to the law which the Board has recently asked for.

The upshot is a deteriorating situation. No one dares to predict the future of race relations in Britain with confidence. But it would be wholly wrong, if the worst should happen, to conclude that law can do nothing for better race relations. For, in truth, Britain has never really tried law in this area. There is good reason to believe that more law would help to control a still manageable problem.

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### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

IRVING L. JANIS. *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Pp. iii, 276. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. \$4.50.

"Groupthink" is Irving Janis' Orwellism to describe the process by which individuals are propelled toward consensual mistakes by peer-group influences. Janis is specifically concerned with determining the forms of "groupthink" in and demonstrating its pernicious impact upon U.S. foreign policy decision-making.

Janis develops his thesis through a series of case-studies of "fiascoes" in U.S. foreign policy: the Bay of Pigs expedition of 1961, MacArthur's Korean War offensive which triggered Chinese intervention, the Japanese attack on undefended Pearl Harbor, and America escalation in the Vietnam war. As counterpoint, he examines two other foreign policy decisions: the Cuban missile crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, in which "groupthink" was mitigated and its effects overridden. Each is presented as a distinct historical study, with descriptions of the context and major participants, focusing on the relationships among the latter as the decision evolves. In each, the author takes into account

other explanations of the decision process and attempts to show how the "groupthink" hypothesis supplements or conflicts with them. In a concluding section, Janis indicates the generality of the "groupthink" phenomenon and suggests possible obstacles to its influence.

To summarize Janis' conclusions from these case-studies, "groupthink" takes essentially two forms: positive beliefs about the decision-group itself and the protection of these beliefs against internal or external dissidence. In turn, these convictions led to relatively rapid agreement on action—Bay of Pigs—or inaction—Pearl Harbor. To the extent that disagreement existed within the group, it was confined to a narrow range of alternatives concerned with implementation (the form of escalation in Vietnam). The means to counter "groupthink" emerge as the antithesis of its premises, practiced—as Janis notes—by the same *dramatis personae*. In an atmosphere less governed by preconceptions, critical evaluation could occur, and—implicit in Janis' arguments—potential failure could become success.

Overall, the book constitutes a welcome addition to the growing effort to look at decision-making in American foreign policy from perspectives other than the traditional ones of diplomatic history and inter-

national politics. Janis is far from the first to bring a psychological framework to bear, and his prescription of leaderless groups with devil's advocates may be less practicable than he surmises and less closely tied to good foreign policy decisions. Nonetheless, in lively style, he makes persuasive argument for the importance of "group-think" as a factor in foreign policy-making.

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W. W. ROSTOW. *The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History*. Pp. 739. New York: Macmillan, 1972. \$12.50.

Unless one has had supernatural foresight, and believes his intellectual opponents have been foes out of malice and perversity, one need not take this large combination of memoir and analysis too much to heart. Rostow is not responsible for present India-Pakistan relations. He was not the sole architect of the Alliance for Progress in Latin America. We cannot fault him for the Bay of Pigs, or Vietnam, or a dozen other problems in domestic and foreign areas. Yet he prepared memoranda on all of these matters, and some of his thought-patterns undoubtedly entered into the thoughts of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson.

Those of us who are further removed than Rostow from critical governmental meetings and decision can only wonder at the resolution and aplomb of such advisors, who offer counsel not only of large military and economic moment, but on national tempers everywhere; on the personal psychology of a Khrushchev, a Nkrumah, a Sadat, and on the national policy required to stave off depressions and win wars. Rostow has the right to a hearing on his own accomplishments as he sees them:

My crusade for development aid in the 1950s added, perhaps, a distinctive strand to the work of many hands in that direction; my crusade with Kennedy in late 1960 and early 1961 for wage-price guideposts and my talk with Walter Reuther in June 1961 may have helped tip the balance of Kennedy's policy in that direction; my deeply rooted views about

regionalism in relation to the long-run American position in the world scene may have strengthened Johnson's strong personal instinct to move in this direction in 1966-1969. And there were, I guess, other more or less definable contributions (p. xviii).

Certainly others in addition to Rostow contributed views on "military hardware" and "salami tactics"—the latter refers to the Soviet program, seen as bent on slicing off pieces of such strategic terrain as Berlin and Suez to dishearten our policy-makers. Nevertheless, it all but daunts one to read such a memorandum as Rostow's of March 2, 1961, informing us that "if we all work hard"—a favorite phrase of his—it should be possible for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, India, The Philippines, Taiwan, Turkey, Greece, "and possibly Egypt, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq," to have attained self-sustaining growth by 1970. It is rude to push hindsight too hard at prophecy, but Rostow has pressed the memorandum upon us, and without diffidence.


The truth is that his is a frame of mind which can rationalize all situations. Thus, he offers a list of Kennedy's achievements (pp. 641-42) which should be more sobering than inspiring, but are evidently intended to be the latter. Administration intentions were certainly of the best; but, for example, as Rostow notes: "The trouble with our Cuban operation was and remains that it was mounted on simple ideological grounds." This explains much of not only his own thinking, but that of such of his colleagues as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Theodore Sorenson. They had too little sense of their limitations. With respect to the Bay of Pigs, there were literally scores of experts within the United States who knew, not conjecturally but absolutely, what material conditions in Cuba had to be grasped and controlled. They were not asked, and they could not contribute. We need large perspectives. We need phrase-makers and theoreticians. But we cannot afford to take them as seriously as they take themselves.

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
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
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J. ROTBLAT. *Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conferences*. Pp. xix, 399. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1972. \$12.50.

The Pugwash Movement may be said to have come of age with the holding of its twenty-first conference in Sinaia, Roumania in August, 1971. The movement was then only fourteen years old, the first conference have been held in Pugwash, a small fishing village in Nova Scotia, in 1957.

Pugwash is a self-selected, unofficial, international association of scientists and scholars whose aim is "to ensure that mankind will not destroy itself." This statement of mission, formulated by its dedicated secretary-general, Professor J. Rotblat, to whom we are indebted for this volume, properly reflects the origins of the movement in the anxieties engendered among many scientists regarding the consequences of man's invention of nuclear weapons. In fact, the movement's inspiration came from Bertrand Russell, who, as early as 1945, drew attention to the destructive power of nuclear weapons, both actual and potential, and urged genuine cooperative efforts among Western and Soviet Scientists to achieve an effective system of international controls. Professor Rotblat's emphasis on saving mankind from self-destruction is still the focal point of Pugwash, although, as the topics discussed at Sinaia indicate, the problems of environmental pollution, population growth, and the economic and technical progress of developing countries have joined security, weaponry, and disarmament on the agenda for survival.

Despite the subtitle, this book is the stuff of which history is made, rather than history itself. It sets forth a chronicle of events and activities with little effort at analysis or assessment. Chapters on the birth, organization, and programs of Pugwash are followed by succinct summaries of each of the twenty-one conferences. The names, nationalities, and fields of study of the participants are identified (over 600 from more than sixty countries, with nearly

half from the physical sciences and slightly over a quarter from the social sciences) and lists are provided of observers, scientific staff, science writers and students who attended the conferences. Basic facts are also presented regarding sixteen Pugwash symposia. Well prepared name and subject matter indexes greatly enhance the volume as a reference work.

Without impugning the worthwhileness of Pugwash, one must suggest a couple of caveats. Undoubtedly there is value in exploring and exploiting the informal, unofficial channels and patterns of communication (the *officieux* rather than *officiel*, as the French say), but one should not assume that the informal approach is necessarily more effective than the formal one. The ultimate locus of power remains with the formally designated official. The very ability of Pugwash conferences to convene, for example, is dependent on the official granting of visas, travel permits and similar official acts. Only governments can sign non-proliferation treaties or SALT agreements.

Secondly, in the absence of historical or sociological perspective, one tends to take at face value the self-images of a group or organization. Self-images are functionally significant even if, or, sometimes, especially if they are distortions of reality. Scientists view themselves as rational, supra-national creatures who approach social as well as scientific problems with the analytical tools of logic and reason. This is the profession of faith among Pugwashites. Yet, many Pugwash debates are engaged along ideological, political, or national rather than scientific or rational lines. One must bear in mind, as Joseph Haberer recently observed in *Science*, that "the internationalism of science tends to be shallow."

Publication of this volume comes at a time when popular disenchantment with the scientific community is increasing, according to a fall, 1972 Harris Poll. There is, indeed, evidence of a growing anti-science movement, of which the most prominent exponent is, perhaps, Theodore Roszak. It is hoped that as the modest, but real

accomplishments of Pugwash become better known this trend toward disillusionment with science will be reversed.

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### LAW AND GOVERNMENT

JONATHAN D. CASPER. *Lawyers Before the Warren Court: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 1957-66*. Pp. xi, 221. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972. \$9.50.

The author sent questionnaires to more than two hundred lawyers who handled civil liberties and civil rights cases before the Supreme Court in the period, 1957-66. He was interested in how they got involved in the litigation and in their motivations and goals. The primary materials for the study were derived from interviews with eighty-two of the lawyers.

The first three chapters lay the groundwork for the study, including an explanation of the methodology employed and the concepts used. He also provides an overview of the important litigation involving these lawyers in the areas of loyalty-security, criminal justice, reapportionment, and civil rights. The author then proceeds to digest and order his data and to speculate.

He classifies the lawyers into three categories on the basis of the clientele served and devotes a chapter to each. One is the advocate, usually unconcerned with the principles of a case and motivated almost wholly simply to win the case for the client. Advocates predominated in criminal justice cases and were traditionalist in legal philosophy, the lawyer who "sees the law primarily as a mechanism for resolving disputes in society . . ." (p. 85).

Second is the group advocate, the lawyer attached to the interests of a particular ideological, racial, or political group. They dominated in handling litigation in the early phases of loyalty-security conflicts, in reapportionment, and in civil rights. They

were the most numerous of the lawyers probed and were reformers in legal philosophy, viewing "the law as a mechanism for promoting social change and protecting democracy . . ." (pp. 85-86).

Finally, are the civil libertarians whose main goal is to vindicate principles deemed beneficial to all of society. Almost all had attachments to the American Civil Liberties Union and were reformers in legal ideology.

The writer probes the motivations and goals of each type in detail, explores the implications of his findings for judicial policy-making, and speculates about trends. In his view, for instance, the group advocate "may be the wave of the future in the legal profession dealing with civil liberties and civil rights at the appellate level" (p. 163). This development is a consequence of the increasing "politicization of litigation" (p. 196), the greater reliance upon courts for resolving issues of public policy, and the institutionalization of advocates through such agencies as public defender offices.

The writing style is clear, though somewhat pedantic. The author provides plenty of cues as to where the analysis is going and reminds us frequently of where we have been. The lay reader is not likely to be baffled by the book, but he may find it dull. The book is for specialized audiences, for lawyers who want to learn more about themselves, and for law and other students generally concerned with the judicial process and the Supreme Court. They would be rewarded by a careful, scholarly, often provocative analysis of a neglected subject.

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HAROLD W. CHASE. *Federal Judges: The Appointing Process*. Pp. xiii, 240. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. \$10.00.

Chase's book is a straightforward analysis—unencumbered by specialized jargon or a fully articulated conceptual framework—of who got appointed and how, to district and appellate judgeships during

the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

The chapter on the Kennedy organization for identifying and processing eligibles is the most rewarding. Fortunately, Chase, a professor at the University of Minnesota, was able to set up shop for two months in late 1962 in an office at Justice located between those of two of the four Kennedy aides most deeply involved in the selection process. There are also separate informative chapters on the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, and a summary chapter with recommendations.

Chase weaves together three types of data. His Kennedy administration case study is a competent, reasonably dispassionate analysis of the process seen from an executive perspective. Secondly, he makes extensive use of simple informative tables comparing Truman through Johnson selections on such factors as percent appointed with previous judicial experience, recess appointments, age, ABA ratings, and so on. Chase also interviewed over 200 randomly selected lawyers with federal courtroom experience, 30 from each of 7 states. Unfortunately, this last was reduced to just a few broad generalizations, though it is obvious that this grass-roots sampling helped shape his evaluation particularly of selection process limitations.

Given Chase's Augustinian view of human nature, it is not surprising that he is skeptical about the possibility of finding agreement on who should make "the very best" judges; rather, he concentrates on the proximate goal of how the present system, which has produced remarkably similar results through four administrations, might be modified to reduce the number of "mediocres," a number he attributes primarily to inexorable advancing old age, the penchant of the ABA Committee for corporate trial lawyers, and the pervasiveness of the largely implicit criterion which puts a premium of years of faithful toil in the party vineyards.

In attempting to lessen the number of "mediocres" this latter factor tends to encourage, Chase comes up with a provoca-

tive suggestion, namely, that political scientists at least explore the implications of lodging judicial selection below the Supreme Court itself (p. 205), a shift constitutionally permissible if Congress, acting under Article III, reclassified lower court judges as "inferior Officers." Not a likely development, but one that merits serious consideration if only for the different perspective it brings to bear on assessing the conventional verities.

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KURT LANG. *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War: A Review of the Literature with Annotated Bibliography*. Pp. 337. Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1972. \$17.50.

Andreski, in his new work *Social Science as Sorcery* (Andre Deutsch, London), contends that most of the work of the social sciences is "quantified trivialities." It is this reviewer's contention that though he outlines some necessary criticisms of useless jargon in the social science field, redundancy, and small scale empiricism, he overlooks the long range of accumulative effort of the work of thousands of scholars. One can only read Lang's new work to understand the collective effort of many who have come to study the impact of military institutions, civil-military relationships, and the phenomena of war.

Professor Kurt Lang's *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War* is a resource book that follows in the tradition of other major works that have thoroughly reviewed the literature for a specific field. When one scans the 1,325 references, it is an arduous task similar to the efforts of Berleson and Steiner in their book, *Human Behavior*. The reader should be impressed not only by the effort to put this book together, but by its logical structure. Simply, Lang in his introduction discusses the scope of review and presents a terse overview of the literature. Part 1 (review of the literature) is composed of five chapters (chapters 2-6) dealing with military insti-

tutions, civil-military relations, and war. Part 2 contains a six-chapter annotated bibliography following roughly the same outline as part 1. The remaining portion of the book includes an author, title, and subject index.

Of importance to the reader should be the review of the literature. The first three chapters deal with the military as a personal occupation and the military structure and functions. Lang covers such subtopics as professionalism, career mobility, and ideology. He likens both U.S. and Soviet military to "... a religious order, its members dedicated themselves to render service, not to God, but to the Nation" (p. 47). Lang examines data that analyze the armed services as a major formal organization. He focuses on adult socialization, internal cohesion, and normative systems. He uncovers information on class systems in the military as well as recruitment problems.

Chapter five, "Civil-Military Relations," looks not only at the interdependence of corporate military systems in the United States but in Western Europe, and among developing nations. Lang's review looks at the military's impact on the political culture, their expertise on technology, and the military's effect on foreign relations. In terms of the area of power relationships, Lang leans on balance toward a "pluralist" approach rejecting the observations of C. Wright Mills and others concerning military control in America. He does, however, note sources that see the interservice rivalries as less divisive than competing civilian groups so that the military can provide a united front, and thus have more power. He also discusses types of military take-overs of civilian governments.

Chapter six, "War and Warfare," outlines the functions of war and the objectives of warring nations. Lang notes, in an era of world nuclear destruction, the dominance of conventional warfare.

There is so much more. One may be especially interested in the annotated bibliography on civil-military relations. Lang notes the cut-off date for his review was the first six months of 1970. In looking over the 300 sources in this area, the re-

viewer found some information that may have been overlooked, such as Melvin's "Pentagon Capitalism," articles from the Canadian Peace Research Institute, and works from the *Monthly Review* and the *American Marxist Press*. However, in the main, the work appears complete.

Being too complimentary at the expense of credibility is troublesome, but Lang's *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War* appears to be a valuable resource book. It is especially helpful to those who want to conduct research in this important area. Lang's effort must be praised.

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JOHN LUSKIN. *Lippmann, Liberty, and the Press*. Pp. vi, 273. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1972. \$7.95.

For more than half a century one of the country's more influential commentators about political and other social issues, through his press columns and his books, Walter Lippmann has never been the subject of a full-scale personal and public biography. Lippmann, who rarely emphasized his private life in public utterances, has certainly not encouraged such a full biographical venture; forty boxes of his personal papers in the Yale Library are still closed to research.

John Lusk of the University of Alabama offers a new intellectual biography of Lippmann, with the advantages of a longer span of time and greater detail, stressing the problems of human liberty and the ways governments and the news media should deal with them. His major sources for extensive analysis are Lippmann's articles and books and the reactions of others to them. The sequence is primarily chronological with substantively integrated chapters running from "Harvard, Socialism, and Bohemia" to "The Credibility Gap, and Goodbye to Washington."

Read by American presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Nixon, Lippmann has

written in a straightforward, often hard-hitting style in which he has consistently practiced a credo of civility. By 1968 (p. 236), "The United States had become 'by far the most violently disordered' of the world's advanced nations," Lippmann remarked sadly. "And so I would say to my fellow liberals: 'do not shirk the imperative priority of the restoration of security. Do not leave the task of dealing with violence to those who do not believe in the liberal and compassionate reforms of our society.'"

Lippmann also had a flair for independence. Luskin provides (p. 238) a summary of modern examples:

In the 1930's to the dismay of his old friends and in defiance of the intellectual fashion, he condemned Stalinism and the New Deal. In the late 1940's he opposed the Truman-Acheson hard line against Communist expansion. In the 1950's he sinned against the liberal establishment by supporting Eisenhower, though he won partial redemption by attacking Senator Joseph McCarthy and the brinkmanship of John Foster Dulles. In the 1960's and earlier he was cool toward enforced desegregation of the schools and total obedience to the one-man, one-vote rule. He admired John Kennedy though he did not regard Kennedy's accomplishments as President highly. He respected Lyndon Johnson and grew to distrust him. He distrusted Richard Nixon and came to support him.

Luskin's ably researched book is now the most nearly complete treatment of Lippmann's career. Older books have merit and some additional detail, notably David Elliott Weingast, *Walter Lippmann: A Study in Personal Journalism* (Rutgers, 1949; Greenwood Press reprint, 1970); Marquis Childs and James Reston, eds., *Walter Lippmann and His Times* (Harcourt, Brace, 1959), appraisals by a dozen associates upon his seventieth birthday; and the more philosophical approach in Charles Wellborn, *Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philosophy* (Louisiana State, 1969). Charles Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925* (Oxford, 1961) is important for the early period. Clinton

Rossiter and James Lare, eds., *The Essential Lippmann* (Random House, 1963) is a judicious selection from the Lippmann writings, affording insights in style, subtlety, and range that no existing critique does.

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PAUL L. ROSEN. *The Supreme Court and Social Science*. Pp. 260. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1972. \$9.50.

In times of stress and rapid change, when many persons look to the courts to make needed reforms, it is especially important to understand how the courts apply knowledge about social conditions and customs in articulating constitutional law. For if the facts they interpret are mistaken or misunderstood, then the constitutional rights and liberties they attempt to extend or preserve will have been built upon insufficient foundations and their law-making will be resisted or discredited. Professor Rosen considers the pressures exerted on the Supreme Court to expand civil rights by tracing the court's use of social science knowledge, by exploring the limitations inherent in its use, and by suggesting some areas of public law which might be improved by its systematic application.

He shows that the first successful use of social science data was employed by Louis Brandeis and then was championed by various legal scholars who urged the courts and the law schools to test the validity of legal rules by their social effects. Of course this was blasphemous doctrine to many and the use of the work of social scientists was not and has not been readily accepted by either a majority of courts or by a majority of the bar. Perhaps their resistance can be suggested at least by observing that most judges and lawyers do not care about the impact of legal rules and hence are not convinced that the deliberate use of the social sciences would make their essential function of narrowing the gap of ambiguity in the meaning of legal principles any easier or less fallible. Many judges are convinced that the use of

these "sciences" would make courts less judicial and more political than they ought to be.

Professor Rosen examines these assertions and concludes that much of the disagreement about the consequences of using social science data is compounded by an inability or an unwillingness to keep in mind that interpretations of social customs and beliefs are not prescriptions for social reform, although they could mistakenly be used that way. He contends that a public law court must decide for itself what values and norms the constitution embodies and that the answers will not be found in social science. He thinks that there will always be controversy about the decisions the Supreme Court makes, but that it is better to exchange opinions for facts when expounding the constitution.

He argues, too, that if such a view were widely held among the legal profession, then social science knowledge could be used to reassess the factual assumptions that have served as justifications for limiting the rights of persons in schools, hospitals, prisons and the armed forces.

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PETER W. SPERLICH. *Conflict and Harmony in Human Affairs: A Study of Cross-Pressures and Political Behavior*. Pp. vii, 256. Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1971. \$8.95.

This study is an attempt, both interesting and successful, to throw new light on one of the most pervasive of human behaviors: conflict. Using as a point of departure the widely known and accepted "voting studies" (Lazarsfeld et al., *The People's Choice*, Berelson et al., *Voting*, and Campbell et al., *The American Voter*), Sperlich reexamines the cross-pressure model that has gained wide acceptance from these and related studies. The accepted principle was that conflict, as represented by cross-pressure, is uncomfortable and is escaped by decisional delay, by avoidance, or by withdrawal. Thus, in this

area as well as in others, conflict (cross-pressure) has become widely conceptualized as negative, harmony (consistency) as positive. Sperlich's reexamination demonstrates the need for revision of the cross-pressure model and raises questions about the present state of homeostatic theory as it is currently recognized and expressed in the various social sciences.

From a very refined analysis of voting data, Sperlich develops his revised model of cross-pressures, in condensed form below:

- (1) (a) A given tension level may provide comfort or discomfort, depending on the tension requirements of the individual at the time. . . .
- (b) A change in tension level may be experienced as pleasure or pain, depending on the direction of the change in respect to the tension requirements of the organism at the time. . . .
- (2) (a) Maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain are important, but not the sole aims of human striving.
- (b) The more dominant in any given situation the aims and motives of ego and conscience, the less will behavior be guided by organismic [id] demands for pleasure and gratification. . . .

*Conflict and Harmony in Human Affairs* may itself be a tension-increasing factor to most political scientists who have made unwarranted generalizations from the voting studies and also those who, as citizens, have reacted to the excesses of conflict among nations and exploitation of powerless minorities. Agreeing that the optimum tension-level is not zero, this reviewer found the book very valuable in its findings, stimulating and persuasive in its conclusions, and somewhat incomplete as to its application to conflict-resolution processes among groups and nations. Sperlich touches on this when, in the final chapter, he attempts to relate his theories to democratic politics and social conflict. The problem here is the common one of using research findings based on the observed behavior of individuals to explain (justify) the action of groups and societies.



There is little doubt in this reviewer's mind that social scientists have been remiss in observing the potential in a positive role for interpersonal tensions. In appendix material, the author adds to the evidence that this is so, by reviewing the biases in literature on consistency, equilibrium, tension-reduction, and systems theories.

This is a book that deserves to be read by all political scientists who think about the role of conflict in human affairs.

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FRANK STACEY. *The British Ombudsman*. Pp. x, 851. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. \$13.00.

From the middle 1950s until late in 1968 there were published an increasing number of articles, reports, and books on the *Ombudsman* and one could learn almost daily of public proposals as well as of actual adoptions of the Ombudsman institution by some government or other. Mr. Stacey's book is a description and analysis of the campaign which led up to the decision by the Wilson government to set up a parliamentary commissioner—the official title, but as Stacey says, nearly everyone uses the Swedish term *ombudsman*—a study of the drafting of the Bill, and an evaluation of the parliamentary commissioner in his first four years in office.

This is a very useful work. It is interesting, but not very helpful to those Americans who had tried to induce Congress to create a national ombudsman office during the same period. During the year when the British parliamentary commissioner began operations, at the request of the editor of *THE ANNALS*, I served as special editor of the issue on "The Ombudsman or Citizen's Defender: A Modern Institution" (*Annals*, May 1968). My colleagues, all experts in the developments of the institution, as well as authoritative reporters on the experience of certain countries, as well as levels of government in creating and maintaining the ombudsman institution, or trying to get one established, recounted its

history in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, the United States, and various other countries. Readers of this journal need not be reminded of the contribution of Professors Hurwitz, Sawyer, Anderson, Rowatt, Gelhorn, Abraham, Davis and others to the revival of interest in the ombudsman institution. My American colleagues, whether concerned with our own experiences on several levels, or with European, Mediterranean and Third World developments, revealed that in every country there were political scientists, jurists, and specialists in administrative law who wanted the reform; and others, mostly politicians, tried, often successfully, to oppose the adoption of the measure, or to limit the jurisdiction and procedures of the ombudsman office.

A close study of Stacey's book may help us to understand why the British were successful in getting a national ombudsman office—parliamentary commissioner—established and we were not.

Also, it might throw some light on why so many other nations, on the national, intermediate, and local levels, have adopted the ombudsman institution or made some similar change in institutions or procedures for defending the citizen against administrative wrongs. If we take the last point first, we learn in publications by Stanley Anderson (Berkeley, 1969) and by Bernard Frank—*Administrative Law Review*, April, 1970, and "Report of the ABA section on Administrative Law," April 15, 1971—that by the summer of 1971, there were national ombudsmen officials in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Guyana, Tanzania, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and Maritius. There were also military ombudsmen in Norway and West Germany. Further, that national Ombudsman proposals were under consideration in seventeen countries—Australia to Vietnam—some now in effect. Four of these were called "ombudsman-like." On the intermediate (provincial) level, there are Ombudsman systems in four Canadian provinces, in two American states—Hawaii and Nebraska—and four if we include Oregon and Iowa. Legislation has been proposed in thirty-six states. Also, some

kind of ombudsman has been set up in about twenty-five city or other local units.

Why has the ombudsman idea spread all over the world during the past decade? First, there has always been some pretense of empowering the sovereign, whether monarch or procurator, or Chancellor, to hear appeals from citizens aggrieved by administrative wrongs, even though access to the leader might be denied by the oligarchy. Next, the fact that the past decade—or fifteen years—has been an age of tension and protest, the demands for some systematic redress of grievances have multiplied. The extensive literature on the ombudsman system and the activity of such notable administrators as Hurwitz, Bexelius, Sir Guy Powles and others, mostly Scandinavian and Anglo-American, have given direction to the demand. It is noteworthy that among the converts to the ombudsman—or censor—institution are many new Third World states.

Why did the American government resist the demand for enacting a national Ombudsman law? Here Stacey can help us. The British political structure, with its highly esteemed committee system—the Franks' Report, the Whyatt Report, the Justice group, and others—and its highly regarded scholar-politicians—Robson, Lawson, Shawcross, and Crossman—to name but a few—could effectively initiate the debate. Then, although the Macmillan government was cold to the idea, the Wilson labor group, in opposition until it became established as government after October 1964, was committed to the Ombudsman proposal. There was some debate in the House of Lords. But in Britain, legislative power is concentrated in the Commons. In a unitary state, with a responsible government, and with a loyal opposition which is open to reason, it is possible to get the J.O. (Justitieombudsman) system adopted.

In the past, the American government has been able to reorganize its constitutional structure in several ways and has been able to initiate and improve practices by legislation: Regulation of Economic Activities (1887), Social Security (from the New Deal days up to the 1960s); and

the adoption of a reformed budget procedure (1921). In these cases, powerful leaders were able to overcome the "balance of power" between the executive and legislative branches. Congressman Reuss' efforts to get an Ombudsman bill passed had no support from either the leaders of his own party or from the president. Furthermore, unlike the situation in Britain during the 1960s, we had such a multitude of committees and commissions making "reports" that the responsible leaders in Washington were unaware of what they were doing or indifferent. And the public, deluged with reports, could only respond to those which were very dramatic, such as defense proposals, or recommendations to eliminate the disabilities under which ethnic minority groups labored.

If the next president, to be chosen in 1972, finds that he has a working majority in Congress, he may be able to profit by the Stacey analysis of the British debate, and his evaluation of the work of the British parliamentary commissioner. It would be easy to find men to serve on a committee to help draw up a bill with proper attention to the qualifications and terms of the incumbent; the jurisdiction of the office—whether or not it would include local and state governments—also military; police; hospital and other activities. Also, judging by reports other than Stacey's, we could learn the views of experts as to whether there should be regional offices and how much access those with grievances would have to the proper ombudsman official.

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#### AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

ROBERT H. CHILICOTE, ed. *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil*. Pp. xvi, 302. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$12.00.

Nomothetic (comparative) inquiry undeniably is invaluable for promoting

understanding in the social sciences. Unfortunately, this collection of individually interesting essays consists solely of limited histories of disparate phenomena, contains no linkages between case studies either within Angola or Brazil—primarily Northeast Brazil—and does not attempt to compare patterns of violence, protest and resistance in those states. Indeed, whether accurate or not, Marvin Harris' contribution denies the existence of more than superficial comparisons between colonialism and imperialism in Portuguese Africa and Brazil. Certainly the valuable histories presented of the incidence and impact of the slave trade upon donor and recipient states and upon the economies of Angola and Brazil do not pretend to overcome this superficiality.

Examples of protest and resistance presented do not constitute a pattern. Mostly they are tactics in localized power struggles, in conflict between specific haves and have-nots and often in struggles to dominate limited geography between rival provincial elites. Violence is properly professed to be a significant study topic but proof offered to show the potential for violence among alienated and oppressed populations is anecdotal rather than systemic. Socializing sanctions for violence in Brazil may be a useful conclusion, but examples in Angola of primarily gradualist non-violent protests are not considered a function of socialization. As fascinating as the numerous references are to messianic movements coupled both with violent and non-violent protests, analyses of them are not generalized in terms of their influences upon behavior or even as actual patterns of behavior. Varied examples appear to support the hypothesis that charismatic leadership is a key to a religious movement's efficacy as a form of political resistance, although this possible link between case studies in each country is not explored.

Ronald Chilcote's conclusion, while providing good bibliographic sources, contains only a listing of incidences of protest and resistance by categories in each of the two states separately and does not attempt to articulate themes vital for comparative analysis. These are implicit and explicit

assumptions both in Chilcote's introduction and conclusion and in several of the case histories concerning the underlying role of international capitalism as the basic cause for localized material conditions degenerating to the point where limited resistance becomes a distinct possibility. Yet these assumptions are not developed as being more than one of sundry independent variables, such as socialization. To prove again that Portuguese colonialism did not constitute a civilizing influence simply is not a contribution to the nomothetic approach.

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HERBERT GOLDHAMER. *The Foreign Powers in Latin American*. Pp. xiv, 321. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$10.00.

This excellent book, a Rand Corporation Research Study, floodlights a hitherto neglected area of Latin American affairs—the contemporary role of the major foreign powers in the Hemisphere. Using a comparative approach in every chapter, the author canvasses the political, economic, and cultural activities of the United States, the Western European countries, the Soviet Union, and Japan in Latin America from three perspectives: what their respective interests and objectives are, what means they have employed, and what successes and setbacks they have experienced in pursuing their goals. From time to time he also refers to the Latin American involvements of Canada, Israel, South Africa, and other states.

Part I—"Interests"—discusses the foreign powers' claims to territory and to fishing rights, their differing perceptions of the relevance of Latin America to their own national-security interests, the variety of their economic involvements, and their respective political objectives in the Hemisphere. Part 2—"Instruments"—shows how the United States and the nonhemispheric nations have attempted to promote or protect their interests and achieve their objectives through such instrumentalities

as cultural programs, economic aid, military assistance, and diplomacy. Part 3—"Results and Interpretations"—provides a country-by-country evaluation of how well the foreign powers have achieved their objectives in Latin America, especially since 1961. The final chapter is given over to the author's reflections on what the foreign powers' experiences in Latin America reveal concerning the uncertainties and risks of dealing with nations whose political cultures differ markedly from one's own—reflections especially pertinent in the context of "developed" nations attempting to aid or influence "developing" nations.

As this brief outline may suggest, the study is well designed and remarkably comprehensive. Rich in detail, it contains information derived from a wide variety of primary and secondary sources in English, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian, and German. Yet the weight of scholarship is never oppressive: Mr. Goldhamer's style is lucid and engaging. Moreover, his approach is objective and his generalizations and conclusions are well reasoned, balanced, and sensible. In summary, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America* is an unusually illuminating study. It makes a valuable contribution not only to our understanding of Latin American affairs but also to our knowledge of international relations.

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J. S. LA FONTAINE. *City Politics: A Study of Leopoldville, 1962-63*. Pp. 247. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970. \$13.50.

According to the author the focus of *City Politics* in Leopoldville is on "structural principles rather than on the flow of events." The result is an almost total lack of analysis and an overemphasis on cataloguing facts. Those already familiar with the facts have little to learn from this study; there is the most uncomfortable feeling that everything vital and alive in Leopoldville is ignored and that the author has chosen not to grapple with any theo-

retical or analytical issues. A skeleton of politics in Leopoldville is presented, but the guts of politics is yet to be examined.

The author discusses, in a straightforward descriptive way, the physical setting of the city, the population structure and its growth, and the machinery of urban government. In discussing the economic framework of the city we learn only that elites are a minority of the city's population. We learn nothing about actual economic structures, nothing about income distribution, nothing about income gaps, nothing about changing structures, and incredibly, while unemployment is mentioned, no hard data is presented. There is a chapter on "friendship" but there is no discussion or real analysis of social networks in the city. There is no feeling for dynamics, no indication of what remains the same and what changes in this rapidly growing and exciting city in the early 1960s when the Congo was the scene of so much international concern and intrigue.

On p. 214 we are told that "21 of the nation's elite have had careers in Leopoldville." We are not told which 21 qualify for this status, we are not told on which criteria it is determined whether or not an individual belongs to "the elite," and we are not told which 21 of which group or how many or who composes the totality of the elite universe. Presumably this information was gleaned from the 96 interviews we are told were successfully completed by 69 students sent out to conduct a social survey.

Near the end of the book several themes are mentioned which, if developed, would provide interesting analyses. The author concludes that political leaders in the Congo are concerned with exhibiting large followings in order to be able to effectively bargain with...the author sayeth not with whom. It is asserted that values and interests which mobilize followings are many and varied and that they represent economic, tribal and regional interests or utilize loyalties which stem from both modern and traditional forms of social relationships. It would have been nice to have some concrete information about these processes. In a well written conclu-

sion, which unfortunately sounds as though it were written for the book which should have been written rather than for the one which was written, we are told that "generals like Mobutu possessed considerable power." Finish—there is no elaboration.

Sadly, this book may prove interesting for a rather minimal amount of information it gives on Leopoldville ten years ago, but not much of this information seems to this reviewer to be particularly vital or unavailable elsewhere, and because the city has not been static most of this information is now irrelevant.

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LOWRY NELSON. *Cuba: The Measure of a Revolution*. Pp. vii, 242. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. \$10.00.

The title of this book is deceptive: it is neither an objective measured account nor a measured judgment of the revolution. Rather it is a crude one-sided polemic which rehashes many old arguments previously set forth by anti-Castro critics. Data is selectively drawn; undocumented exilé rumors are uncritically presented. The author did not set foot on the Island to examine first hand many of the allegations that are presented by the refugees he interviewed in Miami (though he made an attempt to obtain a visa, one wonders whether his jaundiced view toward the Revolution and his scholarly base at the notorious anti-Castro Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami influenced the Cuban decision). Lowry's claim that "objective research is not possible under the Communist government" is contradicted by his subsequent assertion that he used Cuban publications and statistics. A substantial number of scholarly books and articles—far more objective than Lowry's—have been written by researchers who traveled to Cuba from Harvard, Stanford, MIT, Cambridge, Sussex, as well as other high quality institutions, which belie the Miami based professor's claims.

Lowry's misuse of aggregate statistics to bolster his image of pre-revolutionary Cuba is fascinating. For example, he argues that "while most hospitals were located in the urban centers, and above all in Havana, the overall ratio of beds to population could not be considered seriously inadequate". Lowry's off-hand remark about the concentration of facilities in Havana under-cuts his discussion: it was the uneven social development between rural and urban areas that is the point in dispute. Furthermore, given the gross inequalities within Havana prior to the revolution, Lowry's failure to break-down the data to determine availability of services for different classes makes his discussion meaningless.

In most rural areas of Cuba there were little or no medical facilities and therefore there were few reliable means of reporting or counting illnesses and deaths. It was precisely with the advent of the Cuban revolution that hospitals and clinics were built in many areas to provide services, and many diseases were reported for the first time. Hence while conditions vastly improved so did the reportage of illnesses; thus the statistics showed an increase in diseases. This statistical increase, artifact of improved conditions, is obvious to any professional researcher. Instead Lowry, relying on data from Batista days, claims that the field observations by United Nations observers and dispassionate scholars concerning vast health improvements for the Cubans are all wrong; Lowry argues that there was "a significant deterioration [in general health] in the years immediately after 1958." Even a check with the refugee data published by Fagen and others, on their study of the class composition of the exiles clearly shows that rural and urban workers are vastly under-represented, suggesting that social conditions may have deteriorated for the privileged classes but certainly not for the vast majority of the poor.

The efforts to re-organize the Cuban educational system along the lines of a modern developing society is criticized because of government intervention in the university; one suspects that if these government

induced changes had not taken place the author would have chastized the Cuban revolution for failing to change. The same can be said about Lowry's other criticisms regarding the liberalized divorce laws, increased mobility of women, and so forth: to a "devil" theorist of the Revolution—like Lowry—the Cubans are damned if they change, and damned if they do not.

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MAXWELL OWUSU. *Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana*. Pp. xx, 364. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1970. \$11.50.

Although the scope of this book is great, covering the period from the seventeenth century to the 1966 *coup*, the bulk of it concentrates on the years 1951 to 1966. Here Owusu attempts to illuminate the politics of Ghana from the particular case of Swedru, an Agona town of rapidly increasing size and importance in the central region of the country. But first he examines the origins of Agona, its political and military structure, its internal dissensions, and its responses to economic change in the colonial period. He makes many useful corrections to previous interpretations of oral evidence. In Swedru itself he is concerned principally with the local origins of and responses to nationalist politics during decolonization: the reactions of the traditional authorities, of the local council set up under the Local Government Act of 1951, and of the various local foci of political activity. In the same context he illustrates the development of the Convention People's Party from a radicalizing breakaway nationalist party, through its position as a decolonizing heritor, to the single party of a one-party state.

Owusu is anxious to tear away the "mystifying" elements of political analysis, David Apter's "consummatory objects" of and "charismatic leadership" in political activity, and to demonstrate that political motivations are basically economic at the

crudest personal level. The book constitutes a Ghanaian's highly critical approach to the CPP period, an attempt to bring political science firmly to earth, and finally a prescriptive call to personal and class sacrifice in future political development in Ghana. It is a splendid quarry for information on Ghanaian local politics, a case study in political patronage and political disenchantment.

But does it all convince? Firstly, in a study of local politics, traditional response and national integration, Swedru is perhaps untypical. It is too close to the coast and to the center of affairs, but above all it is too heterogeneous, experiencing migration on such a scale that by 1960 the original Agona population comprised only 19.8 percent of the population of the town.

Secondly, though few would dispute his contention that socio-economic change is the fundamental prerequisite of socio-political development, the primacy he attaches to individual economic motive is much more arguable. He denies Apter's "charismatic leadership," yet he writes of "identifying emotionally with the CPP." Moreover, his notion of "symbolic-expressive" attachment is not too far removed from Apter's religious impulse. And throughout he provides tantalising leads which he fails to follow up, perhaps because they run counter to his case: the propensity of those who have migrated to return home almost every weekend to fulfil kinship obligations (compare van Velsen on the lakeshore Tonga of Malawi), the preference of unemployed youths to stay at home rather than search for work, and most interesting of all, the emergence in Swedru of sects and separatist churches since 1960, from the moment when the CPP began to deny alternative political outlets, and perhaps began to fail to satisfy the religious impulse.

At the end of his introduction to the book, David Apter poses the question: how will Busia fare with his instrumental rather than consummatory politics, with his notable lack of charismatic powers? The fall of Busia and the re-establishment of military rule sooner perhaps than either Apter

or Owusu expected possibly gives us an answer.

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### ASIA

HARVEY A. AVERCH, JOHN E. KOEHLER, and FRANK H. DENTON. *The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines*. Pp. vii, 234. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. \$8.00.

EDUARDO LACHICA. *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt*. Pp. 331. New York: Praeger, 1971. \$15.00.

The Huks . . . are now in such generally reduced numbers that they cannot conceivably pose another threat to the central government (Lachica, p. 5).

In our estimate, the HMB [Huks] . . . are not currently a great threat to the government (Averch, Koehler, and Denton, p. 150).

I have proclaimed martial law. . . . I, as your duly elected president, used this power . . . to protect the Republic . . . , which is endangered by the peril of violent overthrow of the duly constituted government . . . (President Ferdinand Marcos, September 23, 1972).

President Marcos of the Philippines proclaimed nation-wide martial law on September 23, 1972. At the same time he suspended the operations of all newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations; he arrested scores of Filipinos, including some of the most important opposition politicians, the publisher of the leading Manila daily, one of the Philippines' best known columnists, and many others whose names have not been revealed; he nationalized some of the major utility companies; and he began a rule by decree involving some fundamental and sweeping changes, including the sacking of numerous government employees. Although the president later made it known that he intended to wipe out corruption, economic inequality, and many other social ills, his initial rationale for takeover was the increasing

threat posed by Communist forces operating in and around Manila and in the Muslim south.

The books reviewed here take two entirely different approaches to arrive at essentially the same conclusions—at least so far as the communist threat is concerned—and these conclusions give no hints to the reader of the later action taken by President Marcos. To oversimplify, both studies find that organized dissidence is localized—confined largely to a relatively small area north of Manila—factionalized—bandits, ideologists, and war-lords have spent as much time fighting each other as fighting the government—and, like most of Philippine politics, highly personalized. Eduardo Lachica, a journalist writing for the *Philippines Herald*, began research on his book as a member of a *Herald* team of reporters commissioned to do a study of the Huks. Thus, *The Huks* essentially is a piece of high-quality journalism: perceptive, detailed, and sensitive, but largely descriptive. The Averch and others study was even more a team effort, but the three authors (two economists and a population analyst, all of the RAND Corporation at the time) are steeped in contemporary quantitative theory and methodology. Thus, *The Matrix of Policy* is a social-science study—methodologically sophisticated, quantitative, and analytical, but often insensitive to the fine nuances of Philippine life. Both books will appeal largely to specialists, though to specialists of different ilks. Social scientists without particular Philippine interests will probably find the Lachica volume almost hopelessly detailed and perhaps even boring; Philippine specialists—particularly those not in the behavioral tradition—will probably find *The Matrix of Policy* somewhat glib, sometimes superficial, and occasionally simply misleading. Both studies are valuable, but both kinds of criticism are justified.

Lachica seeks to chronicle the origins, growth, and—he argues—decay of the Huk movement from the importation of socialists and communist doctrine in the 1920s to the factional schisms and attempted governmental reforms of 1968–70. The *Herald* team did a superb job of collecting

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In this book, the author of *City Life in Japan* and *Education in Tokugawa Japan* questions the theory that all industrial societies inevitably evolve into a common pattern. Dore uses the comparison between the English and Japanese factory systems to prove his point and comes up with some fascinating theories of his own.

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valuable information, but their very success makes *The Huks* difficult reading for all but the committed Philippine specialists. It is unfortunate that the author did not devote more attention to summaries and analyses of his material, for he has left much to the initiative of the reader himself. However, it must also be noted that the volume was not intended for a vast readership—Praeger Special Studies are short-run monographs intended for limited audiences. We therefore must quibble less with an author who imposes such a burden on his reader, just as it might not be appropriate to object to the techniques that are used to produce such books, even when the reader must tolerate some faulty reproduction, sloppy editing, and an inflated price. In short, *The Huks* is most useful for a rather small circle of scholars, journalists, and government officials; and those of us with a keen interest in the subject are in the debt of Eduardo Lachica and others at the *Philippines Herald* for the careful digging they have done into the politics of Huklandia.

*The Matrix of Policy* is more ambitious, and my quibbles are more serious. The authors are concerned with more than communist dissidence, though this is a major topic—indeed they have made it their task to analyze the basic patterns, themes, and problems of Philippine politics and the Philippine economy. Much that is presented is highly provocative because it represents a reinterpretation of much of modern Philippine history. In general, the message throughout the study is that the situation is not nearly as bad as it is often reported to be. The authors feel that crises have been overplayed by a free and often irresponsible press; that much of the drastic increase in crime can be attributed to earlier reporting errors; that violence is largely a Manila-centered problem; that the Huks are more a terrorist band than a social protest movement; and that the economy, stronger than is often recognized, “lurches” only because of periodic political demands on the country’s limited resources.

This study is both provoking and frustrating for the informed reader, for sometimes it seems that the data presented could just as easily support conclusions other

than those reached by the authors. To take a single example, consider the case of the “lurching economy” (chapter 5). The conclusion, in brief, is that financial crises are inevitable because of heavy pre-election spending and that the economy lurches as it moves from pre-election deficits to post-election recoveries. Table 47 (p. 101) shows net receipts and changes in net receipts for all years from 1957 to 1968, and, as the authors point out, in the six non-election years the change is positive, while in the five election years it is negative. Thus, they conclude that the economy lurches because of election year fiscal excesses, and Fisher’s exact test demonstrates that the relationship between elections and changes in net receipts is significant at the .002 level.

All of this is interesting, but the data presented seem to carry a different and more significant message, which was not considered by the authors. Rather than stopping with the simple conclusion that there were six positive and five negative years, and that these were related to elections, why not ask how much recovery was made after each election-year spending orgy, and what was the total effect of these cyclical lurches? An examination of the RAND data suggests at least one reason why President Marcos chose to declare martial law. While changes in net receipts may have been positive in off-years, overall the Philippine economy—at least as measured by net receipts—was sliding downhill at a precipitous and accelerating rate.

One must agree with both studies that communist dissidence alone was probably not sufficiently threatening to warrant the drastic action later taken by President Marcos. However, the situation in the Philippines on the eve of the declaration of martial law was probably considerably more serious than one might conclude after completing *The Huks* and *The Matrix of Policy*. The economy was lurching downward; while violence remained confined largely to Manila, Manila is the epicenter of Philippine life, and if order were to break down in Manila it would have a profound impact on the entire country; the political situation had worsened greatly in

the Muslim south in 1972; and devastating floods in central Luzon in the summer left damage far beyond the resources of a wasteful administration. Much of this was not the concern of Eduardo Lachica, and several of these complicating factors could not have been foreseen by the RAND authors. However, for whatever reasons, and with the advantage of hindsight, it is apparent that the general optimism of both studies was not justified.

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MARY C. CARRAS. *The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra*. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972. Pp. xiv, 297. \$19.50.

In this study of the determinants of factional politics in four districts of Maharashtra state, Professor Carras seeks to explain the political behavior of "the members of two groups constituting factional alignments within the Congress Party in each Zilla Parishad [or District Council]" (p. 5). Nowhere, however, does she examine and define the concept of "faction," so widely debated in the literature of Indian politics. It is given operational form only in the distinction between "Rebels" and "Loyalists"—a dichotomy based solely on whether an individual Congressman voted for or against the official Congress slate of nominees offered for consideration in the District Council Congress Party caucus. The criterion for the existence and designation of "factions" is the division made on a specific political act (pp. 6-7). No consideration is given as to whether this division in fact represents a distinction between two behaviorally coherent groups. Following from this, there is no discussion of the form and style of interpersonal organization, critical to an understanding of factional politics.

Factionalism in Maharashtra, Carras argues, is the product of conflict over the Congress economic philosophy of "mixed enterprise." Political divisions "are ultimately based on economic factors" (p. 58).

The Loyalists are characterized by "a preference for private, individual forms of economic enterprise," while the Rebels have a "preference for collective forms" and are associated with cooperative institutions (pp. 185-186).

An impressive battery of statistical techniques is marshalled to support the argument, but the argument rests on the very dubious assumptions that "Loyalists" and "Rebels" do constitute coherent factions and that they can be explained by reference to a single economic determinant. The data reveal considerable differences in the character of each "faction" among the four districts, and nothing suggests that either Loyalists or Rebels act in concert at the all-district level (or, for that matter, except in that critical caucus vote, even at the district level). Indeed, comparison seems especially limited because, we are told, the nature of the involvement in cooperatives varies from district to district. "Although Rebels were generally involved in the cooperative authority structure, there were no significant indicators in the final analysis . . . which demonstrates this" (p. 181). Furthermore, "apparent contradictions" of data are recognized, but are never fully come to terms with—such as the characterization of the Rebel's environment as "urban" and at the same time more isolated than the Loyalists' constituencies. The blurred profile of the Rebels in Akola District is especially troublesome.

However statistically sophisticated, the study is theoretically thin and does little to advance our understanding of factional conflict.

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ROGER FISHER. *Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs: A Working Approach to Peace*. Pp. vii, 166. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. \$6.95.

ABDULLAH SCHLEIFER. *The Fall of Jerusalem*. Pp. 247. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. \$7.50.

Abdullah Schleifer and Roger Fisher, both long time observers of the Arab-Israel conflict, have widely divergent views.

Schliefer is not only an active partisan of the Arab cause, but has been intimately involved; as a resident in Arab Jerusalem, as a correspondent for the Arab press, and as a convert to Islam from Judaism. These credentials entitle him, not only to speak out on behalf of those whose cause he has adopted, but to freely criticize the many shortcomings he has observed at first hand. Not only does Schleifer differ from Fisher in his political analysis of the conflict, but in his view of the West. He sees Israel as the ally, if not the tool, of Western, especially American, imperialism in the Middle East. Consequently, unlike Fisher, he is neither optimistic nor enthusiastic about an Arab-Israeli peace settlement in the near future.

Although Schleifer's small volume is called *The Fall of Jerusalem*, it deals with the conflict in a broad perspective of time and space, thus the title is deceptive. Only a relatively small part deals with the actual fall of the Arab town. And indeed, it is those few chapters in which he relates his own personal experiences prior to, during, and after the fall that are most valuable. The author's description of the half hearted attempts to rally the population and stimulate enthusiasm for the approaching war with Israel; the tragic, semi-comic war mobilization of Jordanian officials; the bravery of individuals and the collapse of the Jordanian armed forces during the battle; and the depth of shock and despair which shook the community after its collapse are vivid and valuable accounts of the human aspects of this story.

Aside from a few interpretations derived from secondary sources, there is little new in Schleifer's account of the conflict, its background history, or its political context. He is an ardent supporter of the Palestinian commando movement whose statements of objectives and accomplishments he has accepted uncritically. Would that he had applied the same criteria to his evaluation of the commando movement that he has applied to Arab governments. More important, had he related more of his own personal observations about Arab Jerusalem, the war and its aftermath this book would

have been a much better contribution to the already great profusion of writing on the subject.

Roger Fisher is a more dispassionate observer. A Harvard law professor long involved in conflict resolution, he has attempted to apply his skills to the Arab-Israel conflict. Fisher begins from the premise that Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians all have rights and have committed wrongs. Although his proposals have aroused the ire of both Israeli and Arab partisans, he approaches the conflict as a true mediator. The basis of settlement which he offers is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, termination of belligerency, and establishment of a just and lasting peace. Unlike Schleifer, Fisher believes that the Arab states and the Palestinians must recognize Israel. And he accepts the necessary role of the United States and the Soviet Union as participants in a solution. The new emphasis is on full recognition of the Palestinian Arabs as a party to the conflict, a recognition not acknowledged in Resolution 242.

*Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs*, is a concrete set of proposals in the form of letters which Fischer suggests as possible exchanges among the various parties. Rather than delving into history or its rights and wrongs, the letters begin from the present offering specific things which each party might undertake toward achieving peace. In addition to the items enumerated in the Security Council Resolution, such as free passage through international waterways, demilitarized zones, and a just settlement of the refugee problem, Fisher also suggests agreements on matters such as West Bank economic development, extracting petroleum from the Sinai, and of course, most importantly, full involvement of the Palestinians as a party in the conflict, thus rectifying the major weakness and omission of Resolution 242.

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STEPHEN FITZGERALD. *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy 1949-1970*. Pp. 268. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972. \$19.50.

The findings of this excellent study will come as a distinct surprise to anyone interested in China who has not given more than passing thought to the policy of the People's Republic of China toward the overseas Chinese, especially those in Southeast Asia where most of them live.

The facile assumption has been that Peking would continue the *jus sanguinis* policy of the Nationalist Government, namely, that every Chinese is and always will be Chinese, loyal to China, and subject to its jurisdiction. From this it followed that every Chinese is, at least secretly, proud of the accomplishments of Peking—which is doubtless true enough. Furthermore, it has been assumed that an undetermined percentage of overseas Chinese would cooperate willingly with the foreign policy objectives of China and the rest would be susceptible to persuasion and pressure, probably on relatives still in China, the domestic overseas Chinese—in brief that Peking had at its disposal an internal subversive group in Southeast Asia which opportunely could threaten the governments in power. It should be added that these governments found it useful to encourage such fears in the pursuit of Western, meaning largely American, largesse.

Fitzgerald convincingly demonstrates that such has not been and is not the case. Peking initially may have thought that it could be, but it discovered as its policy toward the overseas Chinese evolved slowly that the facts of the matter made any such possibility quite untenable. In the first place, Peking found that the overseas Chinese could not be manipulated; increasingly they were identifying themselves with the countries where they lived. The few hundred thousands who returned to China, in addition, did not adapt well to the new order and constituted a source of friction.

Remittances from overseas Chinese in the early years were a valuable source of foreign exchange. The remittances, how-

ever, tended to decrease, and then became less important as foreign trade channels opened up.

The ideological factor was perhaps the most important. Under the old doctrine, the overseas Chinese in effect were colonies—an embarrassing fact to the new order which made so much of the need to end colonialism. One could not have it both ways.

In other words, the overseas Chinese were more trouble than they were worth. Inevitably a policy of decolonialization developed. The overseas Chinese who decide to stay where they are should become good citizens of those countries; and forget about China. For many reasons the process of disengagement is not quite as simple as that and awkward problems will continue for a long time; but the eventual intent is clear. For those interested in proving that China is aggressive, Fitzgerald has provided another and valuable piece of evidence that the reality of Chinese foreign policy may be quite different from that which the conventional wisdom has proclaimed.

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DONALD C. HELLMANN. *Japan and East Asia: The New International Order*. Pp. ix, 243. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$8.00.

ALBERT AXELBANK. *Black Star Over Japan: Rising Forces of Militarism*. Pp. ix, 240. New York: Hill and Wang, 1972. \$7.95.

Those who have read George Kennan's article, "After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy in the 1970s," in *Foreign Affairs* for October 1972 could profitably read these two books. Conversely, those who read these books would do well to read, or re-read, the Kennan article. Since Japan and the United States are natural allies in the Far East, Kennan writes, it is a vital interest of both nations, as expressed in the existing Japanese-American security treaty, to assure that "the immense industrial potential of the Japanese archipelago

does not become associated . . . with the vast manpower of mainland China or the formidable military potential of the Soviet Union."

Contrary to Kennan's confident assumption that Japan and the United States will maintain for the foreseeable future their mutually beneficial relationship of the past twenty years, Messrs. Hellmann and Axelbank believe that to all intents and purposes the Japanese-American alliance has already come unstuck. They base their rather startling conclusion on Japan's broadened East Asian involvement, the Sino-Soviet split, China's development of nuclear weapons, America's policy of disengagement from Asia, and the implications of Washington's surprise moves toward accommodation with Peking and Moscow. Powerful internal and external pressures engendered by these happenings, they contend, leave Japan no choice but to break away from the United States protective embrace and to plunge into international power politics on her own, a course that involves constitutional revision, a conventional military buildup, and nuclear weapons production.

Though both books, published after President Nixon's trips to China and the Soviet Union but before Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Peking, prophesy Japan's shift to *Realpolitik*, their approaches to the subject are entirely different. Albert Axelbank, a journalist residing in Tokyo, deals with surface evidence pointing to the revival of militarism: growing influence of Japan's military-industrial complex; acts of fanatics like the late Yukio Mishima; exhortations of such extreme rightists as former Prime Minister Nobuske Kishi, former Justice Minister Okinori Kaya, and Minister of International Trade and Industry Yasuhiro Nakasone; a pattern of attacks on the new democratic thinking; plots of influential members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to amend the no-war constitution. His sympathies obviously lie with the pacifist Japanese intellectuals, but he fears that they are fighting a losing battle. His gloomy outlook is best summarized in the concluding words of his book: ". . . Japanese suspicions and res-

ervations about the value of the security treaty with the United States are steadily rising. There is the belief that the momentum to a nuclear stance by Japan has already begun."

Donald C. Hellmann, a University of Washington political science professor, writes of East Asian ferment like a seasoned military intelligence analyst. He doubts "that an international power of the magnitude of Japan can remain wholly aloof from *Realpolitik* while progressively more engaged in East Asia. Unless peace breaks out in the region," he says, "once Japan is fully engaged in competitive power politics in Asia, some form of nuclear as well as augmented conventional armament seems inevitable." The excellence of his work reflects the depth of his research; and, as might be expected, his analysis of Japan's situation in terms of East Asian problems, relations with the United States, and the local political scene is more discerning than Axelbank's. Outstanding is his discussion of domestic politics in Chapter 3.

These timely books may not give enough weight to the *sine qua non* of Japan's continuing prosperity and to the enduring strength of the realistic Japanese-American alliance, but they leave no doubt that the direction in which Japan appears to be drifting should engage the closest attention of responsible Japanese and Americans.

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JOHN A. LARKIN. *The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province*. Pp. 358. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$13.50.

Most students of contemporary Philippine affairs regard Central Luzon—particularly Pampanga province—as a hotbed of agrarian unrest. The stereotype is not unwarranted. In the 1920s deteriorating social conditions throughout the region generated radical, if ephemeral, tenant unions. Ten years later Pampanga gave birth to peasant socialism under the creative leadership of Pedro Abad Santos. With the Pacific War and Japanese Occupation the

province spawned Hukbalahap (People's Anti-Japanese Army) squadrons which were to challenge seriously both the conquerors and local elitists during and after the conflict. Inevitably, the turbulent sequence produced general impressions that Pampanga yielded rice and rebels in comparable quantities. Professor Larkin's carefully researched and cleanly written study shatters this bit of conventional wisdom.

Much of the book's originality stems from Larkin's novel approach to Philippine history. Instead of surveying rustic events from the customary vantage points in Manila, he shifted to more revealing rural perspectives. He also focused on the complex social, economic, and political alterations experienced by inhabitants of one important province over three and a half centuries. The results of this analysis-in-depth clearly demonstrates a need for systematic local histories not only in other distinct regions of the Philippines but on comparable areas throughout Southeast Asia.

In large part, the volume revolves around the evolution of Pampanga's elite. Larkin painstakingly traces the origins and development of the province's first citizens, or *principalia*, from 1561 to 1921. His treatment of the intricate theme falls into three sections: (1) 1571 to 1820, (2) 1820 to 1896, and (3) 1896 to 1921. The ever-increasing brevity of the periods under investigation reveals the accelerating process of change experienced by Capampangan-speaking residents of Central Luzon. Amazingly, however, gentry and peasantry alike made graceful adjustments to radically new circumstances and retained generally healthy relationships through the first two decades of the twentieth century. Comparative social harmony rather than discord, consequently, prevailed in Pampanga.

The province's era of tranquility came to an abrupt end after World War I. Larkin avoids descriptive involvement in the mounting turmoil that set in after 1921, but he successfully explains its origins. Dangerous tensions grew from a breakdown of the traditional symbiosis between *principales* and villagers. Physical and social separation came with the new economic

and political arrangements superimposed on the Philippines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Suspicion and class animosities replaced trust and mutual assistance. Abandoned by their traditional leaders, Pampanga's alienated peasantry looked elsewhere for guidance. By 1922, the stage for civil strife had been set. Others have suggested such an interpretation. Larkin's disciplined treatment, however, proves it. If the best inquiries into the past provide insights on the present, *The Pampangans* must be classified as a prime example of historical craftsmanship.

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CHIN-TUNG LIANG. *General Stilwell in China, 1942-1944: The Full Story*. Pp. xviii, 321. Jamaica, N.Y.: St. John's University Press, 1972. \$6.95.

This book is another contribution to the perennial controversy over the American role in China during World War II and, by implication, responsibility for the ultimate Communist takeover. Given unprecedented access to the official archives of the Nationalist government, the author relies heavily on these materials as well as printed official and unofficial sources to produce a work originally published in Chinese in Taipei, where it was awarded the Sun Yat-sen medal.

When the United States formally entered the war, China had been fighting the Japanese invader since 1937, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek believed that his government was entitled to an equal voice in the councils directing Allied activity. Quickly disabused of this belief by the Anglo-American agreement on a Europe first strategy, by the denial of membership in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and subsequently by not being invited to participate in meetings of heads of state, the Generalissimo persisted in his efforts to support the common war effort. The appointment of General Stilwell and the promise of substantial military and material aid seemed to indicate full scale collaboration, but American

and British obstructionism prevented an effective prosecution of the war against Japan, weakened the Nationalist government, and promoted the interests of the Chinese Communist regime. China was not only treated as a second class ally but, as a theater, was given a low priority in the scale of world conflict. Stilwell, in spite of his experience, did not understand the Chinese; as a strategist he was incompetent; and as Chiang's Chief of Staff he was insubordinate.

The United States simply did not understand that, "China was confronted by two different enemies: externally, the Japanese; internally, the Communists" (p. 230). The latter were supported by the "Davies-Service group," foreign service officers who produced voluminous reports critical of the Nationalist government and extolling the virtues of the "agrarian reformers." The Washington authorities, and especially General George C. Marshall, were influenced by the political assessments of these officials and the distorted versions of the military situation produced by Stilwell. Roosevelt, anxious to keep China in the war, made gestures to appease the Generalissimo by insisting that he not be treated as the head of a minor nation and by striving to induce Britain and Russia to include China as a partner in proclamations. But as American strategists lost interest in China as a major factor in the war against Japan and found the Soviet Union more useful, even the President ceased to uphold the Chinese cause.

Given the author's premises and point of view, it might be difficult to quarrel with him over the issues. One could argue, however, that just as he accuses the United States of a narrow view of the Chinese problem, so does he overlook the world problem that confronted the president. To allocate resources in the most effective way to prosecute this global struggle would have taxed the gods, and Churchill, Stalin, and Hitler were among the formidable antagonists who faced Roosevelt in military and diplomatic efforts. One might also fault the author on certain specifics, such as his table of reports and proposals filed by American authorities. In paraphrasing a

report from Davies of July 24, 1943, and citing *Foreign Relations*, 1943 (China), he says: "The feud between the Kuomintang and Communists has been long and deep-seated. If both are barred from external aid, the National Government will be overthrown" (p. 199). The document cited reads: "If Chiang and the Communists were to fight a civil war without external aid to either side there is little question that, unless it had by then been rendered impotent by the exhaustion of the prolonged war against Japan and by the centrifugal tendencies referred to above, the Central Government by sheer weight of arms would be able to crush the Communists" (p. 263). From a technical standpoint, there is considerable repetition, although in a foreword we are told that this is customary in Chinese writings, and numerous typographical errors mar the text and the footnotes.

This work presents a well known thesis, but the evidence from the *Tachi Archives*, often quoted at great length, provides a version of events somewhat different from the familiar accounts. While the book falls far short of its subtitle, it does add to our understanding of this complex episode.

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WILLIAM J. POMEROY, ed. *Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism*. Pp. 336. New York: International, 1968. No price.

William J. Pomeroy is to be congratulated for a very provocative, informative, and useful volume on "armed struggles for liberation and for socialism" from Karl Marx to the present. Pomeroy, author of three other books on related subjects and a volume of poetry, was a prominent figure in the revolutionary *Hukbalahap* movement in the Philippines for many years until his exile in the United States.

This excellent first-hand collection is designed "... to make clear Marxist-Leninist principles and attitudes in regard to armed struggle ... how they have emerged in the course of over a century of extremely



varied circumstances, and . . . how, in the light of new experiences, they may be used to define the issues of controversy that have arisen out of contemporary armed struggles" (p. 11).

Pomeroy further clarifies the significance of his thesis as follows:

At the present stage of history, with the revolutionary forces in society bringing about the change from capitalism to socialism, guerrilla warfare, as well as all forms of mass struggle, has had its character shaped by Marxist thought, by the ideas and methods of organization brought to it by the Communist movement. The awe-inspiring readiness and ability of peasants and workers, especially in underdeveloped countries, to stand up to the mightiest of military powers and to prevail is most frequently due to the types of revolutionary organization introduced among politicalized mass movements by a leadership with a working class ideology, with the clear-cut goal of replacing a brutal predatory imperialist system with the humanism of socialism (p. 10).

In order to document and analyze his thesis, Pomeroy organized his book into two major parts. Part 1 deals with historical background, consisting mostly of essays by Marx, Engels and Lenin ranging from the art of insurrection, barricade tactics, force theory, to national wars against imperialism. In part 2, "Contemporary Theory and Practice," Pomeroy includes articles on armed struggles in different parts of the world: Soviet Union, Europe, China, South-east Asia, Africa, Latin-America, and the United States. Most of the contributors know first-hand their subject matter because they had been at one time or another involved in these struggles in various capacities. For example, Josip Broz Tito writes on particular phases of the Yugoslav liberation struggle; Mao Tse-Tung discusses the military dilemma and the fundamental character of China's revolutionary war, while Ho-Chi Minh offers a set of directions to organize the Vietnam propaganda unit for national liberation. Other prominent authors include Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ernesto Che Guevarra, Fidel Castro and Henry Winston of the United States.

The editor states clearly the limitations of the volume. This collection, according

to him, is neither a history of guerrilla warfare nor of revolutions. It does not formulate codes, principles or theories of guerrilla warfare. It does not claim to cover all the revolutionary armed struggles in history or even those of post World War II vintage.

The essays are uneven in quality and style. For example, Pomeroy includes only one essay on the United States as compared to Latin America. He has consistently used the traditional jargons of the extreme left, such as, "brutal," "imperialist," and so forth, which gives the reader the impression of high subjectivity and emotionalism in Pomeroy's introductory essays, though this is perhaps understandable in the light of the editor's emotional and intellectual involvements in armed struggle in the Philippines. The book could have been made more interesting by including more photographic illustrations of decisive and significant events described in the book.

These criticisms, however, are minor compared to the significant contribution of William J. Pomeroy to the growing body of sources and resources on guerrilla warfare and Marxism. Serious scholars of past and current society, economy, and polity will undoubtedly welcome this timely and controversial book.

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BHABANI SEN GUPTA. *Communism in Indian Politics*. Pp. 455. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. \$15.00.

Professor Sen Gupta here analyzes the split in the Communist Party of India occurring in 1964 when radical elements broke away to form the CPI-Marxist. This event—and more peripherally the second split of 1969 resulting in the establishment of the Maoist Party or CPI-Marxist-Leninist—are examined in the context of a larger and more fundamental question: the interaction between Indian communism and the Indian political system and culture. Sen Gupta challenges the thesis which traces this crisis in Indian communism primarily

to the Sino-Soviet split. It is in domestic factors instead that he finds a more suitable explanation.

The seeds of conflict were sown early in the history of Indian communism when the CPI's radicalism was manifested largely in its anti-colonial tenets, while its leaders retained a conservative outlook on domestic social and political issues. This conservatism was reflected in the party's middle class structure and more significantly in the CPI's decision in the 1940s to work within the parliamentary system. This was the first major step toward the "nationalization" of Indian communism. But even then it raised divisive questions. These eventually evolved into crucial issues of strategy and tactics which shattered the party into organizations of the right (CPI), left (CPI-ML) and center (CPI-M). The issue on which Communists split in 1964 was whether to work within the system so as to bring about gradual change, or whether to use Parliament only with a view to breaking the system and bringing about revolutionary change. The CPI proceeded to "elevate the parliamentary line . . . to the strategic level" while the Marxists insisted on making only tactical use of Parliament. Many other differences between these two Communist parties are catalogued regarding: social bases; the question of legitimate classes to be recognized as allies or partners in the revolutionary struggle; attitudes to Congress; questions of foreign policy.

It is in the political system and the political culture within which it operates that we must look for clues regarding the direction and speed of the Communist movement's development. The author calls to our attention what he considers relevant features of the Indian society and polity in this respect. Among them are (1) the "three political universes" of the village, state and nation, among which communication is hampered by linguistic barriers; (2) the problem of expanding and deepening the bases of power in order to compete with the broad-based Congress Party; (3) the tug-of-war between regional, caste and national forces, to which the Communist movement is not immune. These and re-

lated problems are illustrated in case studies of West Bengal and Kerala, the two principal strongholds of the Communists.

In the last third of the book, Sen Gupta undertakes an analysis of the "objective" and "subjective" conditions of violent revolution in India, examining these in the context of Marxist and Maoist party failures in Andhra Pradesh (Srikakulam) and West Bengal (Naxalbari), respectively, and against the broad landscape of the Indian polity featuring a still dominant Congress Party and multi-faceted problems of development.

It is difficult to argue with Professor Sen Gupta's contention which rejects the thesis attributing the CPI split to external factors exclusively. But by the same token, one cannot accept the reverse which is suggested by implication. For he himself reminds us that the parent party sought practical and ideological guidance from an external source—Moscow—and it is equally clear from the author's own exposition that the CPI-M derived ideological inspiration from the Chinese Communist Party, although on specific issues it retained an independent judgment. More significantly, we cannot ignore the fact that differences over revolutionary strategy and tactics which divided the Russians and the Chinese were almost precisely paralleled in the CPI split. The very time at which this division occurred, that is, shortly after the Sino-Soviet split, compels us to consider the causal or correlative links between the two events.

Unquestionably, however, we have in Sen Gupta's work a very useful addition to existing works on Indian communism in that it provides another perspective to our study of Indian communism. Unlike other writings on this subject, it examines this political movement within the context of Indian politics and culture.

Essentially, this is an analysis of factionalism in the CPI and the Indian communist movement in general. The method is historical, the style impressionistic and the tone is often explicitly or implicitly prescriptive. Professor Sen Gupta brings together a good deal of valuable information from Indian communist sources which

is useful for purposes of reference. However, the lack of a bibliography is a serious drawback. Also, the work is not as thoroughly documented as other basic works on communism, particularly those by John Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India* and by Overstreet & Windmiller, *Communism in India*, both of which are cited quite often by the author. Actually, he relies somewhat heavily on such sources as the *Economic and Political Weekly* and other secondary works for some of his facts and for many of his ideas. Moreover, the objectivity of some sources is questionable. For example, in analyzing the conditions for peasant unrest—which he considers ripe (chap. 8)—he relies on data about protests derived from Indian communist sources which could conceivably include exaggerations. Not that non-communist sources are unbiased, but reasonable accuracy may be ensured by checking various accounts.

A similar flaw is evident in the author's bias in favor of the CPI-M which emerges gradually but with clarity. It is most concretely manifested in a kind of editorializing by quotation marks—or lack thereof—together with usually unfavorable contrasts between the Marxists on the one hand, and the Congress, CPI or CPI-ML on the other.

The author appears desirous of revolutionary change and views the evolving conditions as increasingly promising for a peasant-and-worker uprising, if led by the CPI-M. It is paradoxical, however, that his vision of an Indian communist state resembles in important aspects the present Congress regime. He envisages a federal type of organization with considerable autonomy for state units "within the framework of a *working* discipline." He also recognizes the problem of dealing with regional cultures whose impact on Indian communism is viewed as inevitable. Thus he anticipates that the strategy and tactics of Indian communism will have to be arrived at by a "consensus of several Communisms." Finally, he seems resigned to the prospect of communists opting "for mild and moderate doses of compulsion and coercion."

Apart from these thoughts, he seems to

have given only cursory acknowledgment to the problems accompanying a communist regime. His main concern has been the strategy and tactics of bringing about revolution. This being the case, it is unfortunate that he does not discuss or even allude—as he does to other leftist revolutionary regimes or movements—to the Chilean model of revolution and government.

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HAN SUYIN. *The Morning Deluge: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893-1945*. Pp. xiv, 571. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1972. \$12.95.

EDWARD E. RICE. *Mao's Way*. Pp. ix, 596. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$12.95.

Both books are a synthesis of Mao Tse-tung's life-story and the development of the Chinese Communist Party. Yet they present two pictures of Mao. Han Suyin's Mao Tse-tung—"Mao Tsetung" in her book—is a super-man (in contradiction to her manifest aim not to see Mao in this light) while Edward Rice's Mao is a skillful politician with common human fallibilities. Furthermore, Han Suyin's book is supposed to be the first of a trilogy on Mao and this first volume carries us as far as the end of the Korean War. But the book by Rice runs the gamut from the birth of Mao to the sudden change in Sino-American relationship in 1971 and one marvels at Rice's excellent scholarship and erudition in handling such a complex history so well.

However, no interested scholar and layman can take the book by Han Suyin seriously, for it is an extremely partisan book designed to deify Mao Tse-tung. Her portrayal of Mao's childhood is a combination of Mao's autobiographical account (as told to Edgar Snow in *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1938) and her own unabashed embellishments so as to present Mao as a "born leader." But the most partisan part of Han Suyin's book deals with the history and personalities of the

Chinese Communist Party, especially on the relationship between early Communist leaders like Chen Tu-hsiu, Chu Chiu-pai, Li Li-san and Communist International. Her account of these early leaders and the Communist Party is based exclusively on the distortions and falsifications by the histories written either in Moscow—designed to extricate Stalin from his misguidance of the Chinese Communist Party by using Chen Tu-hsiu as a scapegoat—or those written in China under Mao's rule. Similar distortions and falsifications are used by Han Suyin on contemporary Chinese Communist leaders like Liu Shao-chi and Peng Teh-huai for they have been purged during the so-called Cultural Revolution. Both are presented by Han Suyin—always without documentation—as traitors ever since they joined the Communist Party and Miss Han feels no need to explain why both men once occupied supreme civil and military positions in China. One now wonders how Han Suyin will deal with the case of Lin Piao who is praised in her work but had been purged after the completion of the book.

Han Suyin claims that her sources "include not only the usual representative material published concerning China but also numerous personal interviews and talks . . ." but this claim is so distant from the fact as to be patently false. She never once makes reference to scholarly works by Stuart Schram, Benjamin Schwarz, Conrad Brandt and Robert North in her account of the development of the Chinese Communist Party. Her so-called interviews were apparently conducted with the help of interpreters—throughout her book she never cites a single Chinese work. Furthermore she uses interviews primarily to make incriminating remarks about Mao's opponents, especially Liu Shao-chi. Her account of the Korean War—according to her, the Korean War was caused by a joint attack on North Korea by the United States and South Korea—is based entirely on *Again Korea* by Wilfred Burchett (New York, 1968) and *The Hidden History of the Korean War* by I. F. Stone (New York, 1969). This is undoubtedly one of the most—one is inclined to say the most—

distorted books on the life of Mao Tse-tung and the development of the Chinese Communist Party.

In contrast to Han Suyin's unabashed partisanship, Edward Rice has written a highly scholarly and eminently readable book about Mao and his leadership. In the first eight chapters which are but one fourth of the book, Rice manages to cover not only the development of Mao from a strong-willed child to a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945 but also the relevant aspects of modern Chinese history, from the last days of the Manchu dynasty, through the chaotic warlord era after 1911 to the civil war between the Communists and Chinese Nationalists after 1945. Rice handles these complex and interlocked events with consummate skill; the result is a lucid, perceptive and often witty account of Mao and the age in which he was born.

The most significant contribution that this book has made is a year-by-year description and analysis of domestic Chinese politics after the Communist takeover in 1949. It is here that Rice combines his first-hand knowledge about China which he accumulated over the years as the United States Consulate General in Hong Kong with his extensive reading of other scholarly works on China. The result is the most detailed analysis of actions of leaders and their policy-making ever accomplished by any other scholar so far. The issues that Rice discussed comprised all major domestic and foreign affairs such as industrialization, policy toward intellectuals, land reform and collectivization, the Great Leap, the origin and development of Sino-Soviet dispute over global strategy and finally the Cultural Revolution. While other works deal with major policy changes, Rice goes a step further; he discusses the actual interchanges among top leaders in China over these policies.

The bulk of the book is taken up by a vivid account of the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution. Rice relies on an enormous amount of primary and secondary sources to describe in a systematic and chronological fashion the contending groups in this upheaval in China. Though Rice

has broken no new ground in the explanation of this movement, his account is the most comprehensively documented. One wonders if there will be any work to rival this except, perhaps, the archives of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

But no study about contemporary China can be total because of the distance between China and the world beyond, the nature of the Communist political system and the gross deficiency in China's own information gathering and disseminating system. Rice's is no exception. Thus despite his pointing out the interchanges among major party leaders on major domestic issues before the Cultural Revolution, the role of Chou En-lai in these interchanges is left out, obviously for lack of information. Shrouded in mystery also is the possible motivation of leaders other than Mao, either in their resistance or capitulation to Mao's dictates. For example, according to Rice, the former chief of staff of China, Lo Jui-ching, resisted Mao's "guerrilla approach" to army-building because of Lo's professional orientation which, in turn, is due to Lo's being the chief of the Public Security Bureau in China for a long time. But this is not convincing, for there is no compelling reason to associate a career in the secret police with a strong professional outlook in army building. The truth of the matter is that all we have is background and objective information about these major leaders. We can only make inferences from these objective indicators about these leaders' subjective orientation at risk.

Finally, scholars with a macro-analysis bent might criticize Rice for his not putting his informational analysis in a larger framework such as China's development into a modern, nation-state and the role that Mao and the Chinese Communist Party play in this process. In other words, the reader may ask: what do all these ruthless and, sometimes, not so ruthless uses of power by Mao mean to China as a nation?

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R. K. VASIL. *Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia*. Pp. vii, 338. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. \$13.50.

Dr. Vasil has produced an excellent study of the politics of Malaya—since 1963, West Malaysia—from World War II until 1967 and has added a brief postscript to extend his analysis beyond the communal riots of 1969. His study attempts to explain how and why political parties, which were initially committed to non-communalism, inevitably evolved into non-Malay communal parties.

Dr. Vasil attributes this repeated pattern to: (1) the consensus among Malays on their rights to and on the imperative necessity of political and cultural hegemony, (2) their resulting unwillingness, in significant numbers, to support any political party which impugns this claim, (3) the success of the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) in maintaining its dominant position within the Alliance Party, and (4) the acquiescence of the non-Malay members of the Alliance, particularly the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), to Malay political and cultural pre-eminence. The result has been the inability of the non-Malay components of the Alliance to express the growing aspirations of non-Malays for political and linguistic equality and their failure, therefore, to command the electoral allegiance of the majority of their constituencies. This has enabled other nominally non-communal parties to bid successfully for their electoral support. Because they are unable to attract Malay support, the non-communal parties either atrophy or eventually become political spokesmen for non-Malays and are perceived by Malays, despite their non-communal doctrine, as communal parties.

The author's thorough and detailed research and analysis of relevant public documents, supplemented by numerous interviews, conclusively demonstrates this pattern. It is a mechanism, however, which he deplors, because he fears that communally structured politics will inhibit the process of consensual political integration and retard the development of a national

consciousness. This he believes is essential to the normal functioning of a modern nation-state in which communal solidarities are supposed to decline in salience and to be superseded by cross-cutting ideological economic and social interests.

While concurring with Dr. Vasil's empirical findings, this reviewer, in his recently published study, *Administration and Development in Malaysia: Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972.) draws an alternative model of political development for a communally divided society. Where identities and solidarities follow communal lines, this reviewer argues for the legitimacy of political structures that incorporate these realities. The tasks of political leadership in this case are not to promote an unnatural integration, but to manage the inevitable competition and conflict among communal groups for fair shares of the economic, political, and social rewards that governments can control. This has been the theory and the practice of the Malaysian Alliance which has balanced Chinese economic superiority and Malay political and cultural predominance without foreclosing the participation of members of either community in the sphere dominated by the other. Despite severe strains, frustrations, and occasional breakdowns, the Alliance elites have done a tolerable job of maintaining that conflict prone political system by a roughly equitable distribution of benefits among the main communal groups. Though there remain unresolved economic grievances among Malays, it would be interesting to speculate what would have happened had Malaysia's political leadership either attempted to promote integration by eliminating the communal structuring of politics or accorded linguistic and political equality to non-Malays while Malays remained economically and technologically unequipped to participate competitively in modern economic roles.

Dr. Vasil's study raises the fundamental question of what patterns of political structuring and what processes of conflict regulation are suited to the Belgians, Northern Irelands, Yugoslavias, Malaysias,

Guayanas, Lebanons, Nigerias, Canadas, Kenyas, and other communally divided societies of the modern world.

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P. J. VATIKIOTIS. *Conflict in the Middle East*. Pp. xvi, 224. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972. Distributed by Rowman & Littlefield, New York. \$10.00.

The Middle East is a kaleidoscopic complex of individuals, groups, classes, and societies all interacting in a bewildering array of political activity. In an attempt to analyze and to clarify the political processes of this crucial area of the world, P. J. Vatikiotis utilizes a theoretical approach that combines realism with a special sensitivity to historical forces. The resultant study convincingly documents the inordinate and subtle complexity of Middle Eastern society and politics.

The basic thesis of this most recent Vatikiotis study can be summarized as follows. The fundamental political reality of the Islamic world in general, and Arab politics in particular, is the situation of omnipresent tension and competition. This "conflict-generating nature" of Arab politics has always resulted in divisions and cleavages that cut across these societies in all directions. Geographic, kinship, class, ethnic, occupational, religious, and ideological divisions crisscross one another in a way that renders political integration a virtual impossibility. The lack of political community is further reflected in the factionalism and personalism that permeate Islamic systems. The persistence of these patterns has been such that they transcend ideological commitments and considerations. One significant conclusion resulting from this is that the basic socio-political relationships in the Middle East continue to resist radical or revolutionary change.

From this conflict-oriented perspective, Professor Vatikiotis proceeds to examine closely the mesh between the internal and international relations of the Middle East. The internal divisions tend to attract ex-

ternal intervention while the international political environment in turn directly influences the domestic configurations of cohesion and cleavage. This reciprocal relationship which marks the intranational, intraregional, and international political scene only serves to reinforce the conflictual and dissentious character of power and authority relations in the Middle East.

The above view of Middle Eastern political processes represents a fundamentally sound and perceptive account. The presentation of the position, however, suffers due to the fact that the major hypotheses are neither systematically discussed nor clearly related one to another. Too much of this book is devoted to brief and unsatisfactory historical description of events better presented many times elsewhere. Despite this reservation, *Conflict in the Middle East* provides a cold hard look at the realities of Middle Eastern political life by cutting through the window dressing of ideological pronouncements and emotional polemics. Although the final picture is not a particularly pleasant one, it does portray accurately the complexities of power, authority, interest, and change in this vitally important area of the world. We need much more analysis of this genre.

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W. E. WILLMOTT, ed. *Economic Organization in Chinese Society*. Pp. 461. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1972. \$16.50.

This symposium—the third volume in a Stanford series—contains thirteen studies on the sociology of industrial production in various types of Chinese communities, historical and contemporary, on the Mainland, in Taiwan, and in Hong Kong. This was the topic of a conference in Quebec in 1969 sponsored by the Committee on Contemporary China and the American Council of Learned Societies. Two other papers from this conference have been published elsewhere (Christopher Howe on labor in Shanghai 1949–57 in John Lewis's *The City in Communist China*, and Carl Riskin on

management ideology in contemporary China in the *China Quarterly*, April–June 1971). There were two or three others, and four prominent American Modernsinologists as discussants; so there was an effective convergence of economic, anthropological, historical, and sociological approaches. The result—presented here as edited by Professor Willmott of Vancouver—is, however, an extensive array of evidence, rather than a marshalling of conclusions; offered merely as a “beginning” in the “hope . . . to encourage . . . [and] inspire,” recognizing particularly that field surveys cannot be conducted in Communist China, and even printed information is lacking there on some crucial subjects such as handicraft industries (p. vi).

Professor Metzger, of the University of California in San Diego, studies the Salt Monopoly in one area in 1740–1840 and suggests that the system worked better than is generally imagined, despite the notorious totalitarianism and bureaucratism of the State, because the operators possessed *kanch'ing*—an expression meaning rapport, empathy or social savior-faire. The really basic Chinese motto, from antiquity through to the present post-Kissinger period, is certainly “*yu ban-fa*”—which may be translated in the characteristic pidgin English as “can do.” Susan Jones of Stanford studies the famous Ningpo bankers in 1750–1880 and notes the same feature; which is common to Chinese everywhere, “Ningpo more far” (as the old Treaty Port pidgin had it, meaning way out in the remotest places) as instanced also in the paper by Barbara E. Ward of Cambridge, England on a present-day factory in Hong Kong. The latter does, however, also stress what is equally important to remember, that this is an empathy and viability in groups or cliques among the Chinese: in that factory in Hong Kong there were northerners and southerners, and the latter extruded the former.

Professor Sun of Pennsylvania State University closely examines the silk industry from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. In the earlier period merchants played a key role, but in the nineteenth century the national market was

saturated, the government tried to introduce qualitative improvements—in vain, since it was unable to go beyond traditional methods and piecemeal approaches. Professor Dietrich of Portland Maine follows with a study of the cotton industry in the early part of the same period, aptly opening with the comment that “two people can describe the same glass of beer as half full or half empty” (p. 109). From an *ex post* twentieth century viewpoint, China was virtually “empty” of machine technology. But it was half-full of traditional techniques, with a notable traditional organization: of which he gives useful Needham-type instances. “The structure of [this] industry was neither simple nor inherently inflexible” (p. 135).

Mark Elvin of Glasgow philosophises more widely on the “high-level equilibrium trap” (p. 136) fallen into by the pre-modern Chinese textile industries. “Science declined in China” after about the fourteenth century “at the same time as practical invention [declined].” This can be largely—but not fully—explained by the economic theory of secular stagnation at a high level after a plateau is reached. The spirit of Chinese life—Elvin avers—as shown in its arts, became “introspective” (p. 139). There was no proper response to the challenges of new technical opportunities. Only an unjustly curt summary can be attempted here of this deeply reasoned paper—which is more technically an essay in economics than the other contributions—but Mr. Elvin closes with emphasis mainly on macroeconomic difficulties: such as “low farm productivity per capita and very high productivity per acre.” This formula—and “the great size of the economy,” with standardization stifling what could be creative innovations in its sectors or localities (p. 172)—still states the crux for today’s China. Professor Myers of Miami looks at Chinese agriculture in the twentieth century, with reference to measurements of market-dependence, borrowing-patterns and many other interesting indicators, both econometrically and from the standpoint of social psychology. With one short break, he finds, the process was one of the commercialization of agriculture under a “mild

secular inflation” (p. 191) of farm-prices and improving terms of trade for the peasant.

The sections that follow consist of contemporary case-studies. Professor Pasternak of New York City University analyzes the sociology of irrigation in two coastal-plain villages in Taiwan in the 1960s, with some focus on the question whether irrigation-works, which demand cooperation but also carry the seeds of new rivalries, foster the joint or the nuclear type of family. Mr. Crissman of Cornell deals with marketing in the same part of Taiwan—if anyone wants to do fieldwork on American social scientists, one of the biggest outdoor concentrations of them is to be found in Southwest Taiwan—in scalogrammatic terms, countering prevalent assumptions about the patterning of market areas. He prefers (p. 259) the “gravitational or attraction model” demonstrated by the area he very interestingly describes. Professor Olsen of Stanford turns to the economic value-judgments of business families in Taipei, which he studies scientifically, to conclude convincingly that “it has probably always been the case in Chinese society” everywhere that “of the economic values that are transmitted through family socialization, those concerning government and its relation to business activity and profit are the most salient . . . competition and accommodation between entrepreneurial and bureaucratic subcultures is certainly one of the most significant aspects of traditional Chinese society” (p. 293). There is much evidence in this volume suggesting that this dialectic between rendering unto Caesar and unto the Ancestors is still the struggle in China, on the Mainland as overseas, though Professor Olsen finds significant “differentiations” arising in the various overseas communities.

Professor de Klopper of Cornell examines present-day business relationships in yet another town in Taiwan, finding similar linkages in terms of *hsin-yung* (repute, credit-rating and the like)—another complex system balancing individualistic and communal pressures. Professor Silin of New York bears out much of the foregoing with evidence from a Hong Kong municipal



vegetable-market. Professor Pelzel of Harvard-Yenching brings us at last to the contemporary Mainland, with an examination of the economic management of a farming Production Brigade not far from Hong Kong: only to find, there too, similar psycho-cultural forces at work in an equally complex though outwardly antithetical system. Five percent or more of the area was in private plots—and a much higher proportion of the commune members' efforts and care—a good fifty percent of the output was more or less freely marketed, and about twenty percent of the income was also private, coming from permitted "side-line" activities; these figures are quite typical of the whole country, and no smaller than the ratios in the "revisionist" Soviet Union. Against this the State policy and administration waged an elaborate and variegated "struggle"; bringing broad progress, but always the general result was "compromise" (pp. 387-414). Such is the powerful dialectic, far more intricate and fundamental than most Occidentals are aware, that has continued for centuries and still applies today, in all Chinese communities. This substantial volume gives much evidence on all this; and shows how much is still to be done in the study of Chinese society.

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### EUROPE

PAUL AVRICH. *Russian Rebels, 1600-1800*. Pp. vi, 309. New York: Schocken Books, 1972. \$10.00.

Avrich's new book is an excellent description of Russian social rebellions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Based on secondary material, the book incorporates the latest Soviet research on the origins and fate of the rebellions led by Bolotnikov, Razin, Bulavin and Puga-

chev. The result is a book useful to students and the general public.

Avrich adopts for this book a standpoint that is comparatively recent. The rebellions were primitive rebellions, largely "spontaneous," inspired by deprivation and aiming at anarchism. The rebels wished to stop the development of the state by returning to a time when the bureaucracy, serfdom and a highly organized army and tax system did not exist. Comparing their present misery to an imagined bliss under a good Tsar, they rose in the name of the Tsar. The rebels who joined Bolotnikov were gentry and city dwellers as well as peasants and Cossacks. By the time of Razin's rebellion, sixty years later, the gentry had become partisans of the monarch. The leaders of the rebellions were soldiers and, except for Bolotnikov, came from established Cossack families. There were regional as well as class rebellions: the southern border areas rose against the loyal or subservient center as the dissatisfied "naked" newcomers to the border regions rose against the propertied Cossacks who were in the pay of the monarch. The lower clergy, and by the time of Pugachev, the Old Believers, were supporters of rebellion. But the rebellions failed and the Cossacks lost even more of their independence.

Avrich emphasizes the continuity between the millennial hopes of the primitive rebels and the rebels of the twentieth century in Russia. Only by destroying or curbing these hopes were the Bolsheviks able to gain mastery over the violence. Although he notes the importance to the rebels of the myth of the good Tsar, Avrich does not emphasize this key element of the rebel ideology. The myth supplied legitimacy to the rebellion, justifying resistance to the state in the name of both tradition and right. In other words, the rebels may indeed have been anarchistic, as their opponents and Avrich agree. But they concealed this goal from themselves with this myth.

Avrich's excellent study should effectively counter the belief that the Russians

passively accepted serfdom. His book supplies evidence that the defense of tradition was ineffective against the innovating state and its powerful army.

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PETER BROCK. *Pacifism in Europe to 1914*. Pp. 556. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$17.50. Paperbound, \$8.75.

Through his trilogy of *Radical Pacifists in Antebellum America*, *Pioneers of the Peaceable Kingdom*, and his latest volume *Pacifism in Europe to 1914*, to be discussed here, Professor Brock has become a recognized authority on pacifism in our Western civilization. In *Pacifism in Europe*, Brock traces its long history from anti-militarism in the early Christian church via medieval sectarian pacifism as practiced by the Check Brethren, the early Anabaptists, the Polish Anti-Trinitarian, the Dutch and German Mennonites and the British Quakers to the Non-Quakers in the nineteenth century and to the later German Mennonites and to the Russian Tolstoyans.

This volume is an engaging and vigorous analysis and scrutiny of the modes and processes of religious pacifism and gives a thorough insight into the complex sectarian history of the past two thousand years in countless supporting reflections.

We are aware that wars and revolutions have never solved any basic problems but have created many new ones. Therefore, it should be expected that the proletarian masses in particular, which have never profited *à la longue* from wars, should have pressed their emotional resentment against useless death in wars through organized power. And yet, pacifism never became a mass movement. On the contrary, it has always decayed as a kind of utopian social radicalism and is practiced merely by an intellectual group of conscientious objectors in emphasis of personal responsibility for the dignity of man, through the practice of civil disobedience.

Brock undoubtedly will delight academic historians. However, because he adheres to the strict departmentalization of academic research, Brock as a historian has omitted comments of great interest to sociologists, economists, psychologists, political scientists and social philosophers. These social scientists do not overvalue the significance of sectarian beliefs which after all, as Brock correctly observes, are mere symbols of social alienation in contrast to socially accepted dogmas of religious denominations which generally do not press for pacifism.

Therefore, missing are philosophical approaches by Plato and Aristotle, by B. F. Skinner, Aldous Huxley, Joseph Wood Crutch, and especially the recent publication *Jose Ortega y Gasset, Philosopher of European Unity* by Harold C. Raleigh, 1971, to name just a few.

Missing also is the artistic approach to pacifism in Europe by, for instance, the graphic artist Kaethe Kollwitz, or its novelized treatment by the Austrian Bertha von Suttner's *Nie Wieder Krieg*, which earned her a Nobel prize. These could have been discussed in the chapter "Conclusion" to make the book more appealing to non-historians.

Maybe the much maligned technological evolution from man-power to machine-power in wars and the mere existence of nuclear weaponry will make large wars less probable, provided wise economic cooperation among the five world powers through a necessary balance of power will establish at least peace in our times.

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G. E. M. DE STE. CROIX. *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*. Pp. 444. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. \$17.50.

The great war between the Athenian and Spartan alliances, the tragic culmination of the political history of fifth century Greece, retains the same compelling interest and continuous importance which Thucydides felt when he chose it as the subject of his "eternal manual of statesmen." As is true

for World War I, which it resembles in so many respects, the question of the war guilt for the Peloponnesian war has been the subject of a long and unresolved controversy. Much recent historiography has portrayed democratic, imperialistic Athens as the aggressor, forcing war upon a reluctant Sparta. In a thoughtful and provocative re-examination. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Fellow of New College, Oxford, argues that the Spartans and their allies must bear both the immediate and the ultimate responsibility for the war.

Eschewing a detailed narrative, the author concentrates on a discussion of selected problems, the solution to which offers the key to the origins of the war. In an introductory chapter, de Ste. Croix argues for the fundamental credibility and impartiality of Thucydides' narrative. He proceeds to a convincing demonstration that Thucydides distinguished between "the truest explanation of the war"—Spartan fear of Athens—and "the openly expressed grounds for war," particularly the Athenian clashes with Corinth over Corcyra and Potidaea and the complaints of Megara against Athens. The immediate background is treated in a short chapter on the Corcyraean and Potidaean affairs and by a lengthy reexamination of the Athenian decree excluding Megarians from the civic center of Athens and from the harbors of the empire.

The text is completed by three extremely valuable chapters on Spartan and Corinthian foreign policy and their relations with Athens from the earliest period to the outbreak of war in 431 B.C. De Ste. Croix sees Spartan foreign and domestic policy as fundamentally determined by its position as master of the Helots, fellow Greeks reduced to state serfs, toiling their land in total subjection to their Spartan lords. The famous Spartan way of life resulted from the need to maintain strict internal discipline and harmony so that a united body of Spartans could dominate the Helots. In constant fear of an invasion by a superior army, which could provoke a Helot revolt, the Spartans forged the Peloponnesian League, gaining the necessary allies to prevent or crush any such uprising.

Sparta, to continue de Ste. Croix's argument, could therefore not permit any Greek state to become powerful enough to threaten its hegemony. A party at Sparta saw the volatile and aggressive Athenian democracy as such a danger. Using the Corinthian threat to secede from the Peloponnesian League unless Sparta acted against Athens, this party of hawks persuaded the majority of Spartans to commence a war which the Athenians and Pericles their leader did not want and had sought scrupulously to avoid. Forcefully rejecting economic causes, de Ste. Croix follows Thucydides in viewing man's unchanging desire to conquer and to rule as the fundamental cause of this and every war in antiquity.

This is a book for the professional ancient historian. Although forty-seven appendices treat questions of detail, the text remains largely a series of lengthy, technical arguments, often dependent on the reader's comprehension of the Greek text. The book is far too long, poorly organized, and repetitious. Despite these flaws, de Ste. Croix has written not only the most profound large scale treatment of the origins of the Peloponnesian War but also one of the most provocative and important contributions to Greek political history published in recent years.

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DONALD L. FOLEY. *Governing the London Region: Reorganization and Planning in the 1960s*. Pp. xiv, 223. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. \$8.50.

Professor Foley's book is the first of a projected series on many of the metropolitan regions of the world. The series is intended to provide a comparative treatment of the study of the government of large urban agglomerations, perhaps the most difficult of the administrative problems of our time. The investigation, however, does seem to be largely an American venture, observed mainly through American eyes and expounded chiefly for an American readership.

In spite of this justifiable approach the book is quite intelligible to British readers. It is well-written, lucidly argued and presented, and admirably organised. It provides a useful summary of the discussion over the last decade for the re-fashioning of British local government outlining the Redcliffe-Maud proposals for England and the Wheatley report on Scotland; but, above all, explaining the implementation of the Herbert Commission's recommendations for the Greater London area. By the London Government Act of 1963 the old London County Council, composed of 28 metropolitan boroughs and the City, was merged with a much larger geographic area around it. Its size was increased from 116 to 616 square miles and its population from nearly four million to nearly eight million. The Greater London Council which came into effect, as a result of these changes, on April 1, 1965, embraced ninety-two former local authorities. The new body is a two-tier authority with one hundred councillors at the top and underneath thirty-two much larger London boroughs plus the City of London.

Professor Foley makes some interesting comparisons between American and British planning and decision-making in the field of local government. Because in Britain there is a tradition of responsible elite leadership and a citizenry which expects to be led and which trusts its leaders, reform instituted by the central government is much easier to execute. There has been in Britain no history of grass roots democracy so that initiatives from the center, aimed at rationalization and the amalgamation of local authorities into larger units, meet with little opposition. In the United States, on the other hand, the assumption that change must come from below and be sanctioned through majorities in referenda makes it difficult even to begin the very necessary task of strengthening the hierarchical elements in American government.

Although these conclusions show considerable perception they are not based on research. The book is not an attempt to penetrate deeply into the actual experience of politics and decision-making such as can be found in Enid Wistrich, *Local Govern-*

*ment Reorganisation: the First Years of Camden*, but it is a helpful and stimulating summary of the main proposals of the 1960s, useful for undergraduates studying British central and local government.

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JOHN O. IATRIDES. *Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist "Second Round," 1944-45*. Pp. xiv, 288. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$11.50.

There exist some worthwhile studies in English which treat the past activities of the Greek Communist Party (KKE). The works by McNeill, Woodhouse, Xydis, Stavrianos and Kousoulas, among others, undertook to fill gaps in the literature. Due to a dearth of documentary evidence, however, there were phases of communist strategy that these previous books could not cover in as much detail as one might wish to have. One of these particularly interesting periods was after the German occupation army withdrew from Athens, when in December 1944 fighting erupted between forces of the Greek left—ELAS—and the right—EDES.

The reason this struggle is called the "Second Round" was that almost exactly one year before, the communist guerrilla army began its first full-scale assault on its rivals in the northern area of Epirus. In February of 1944, the "First Round" revolt officially ended with the Plaka Agreement between the leaders of ELAS and EDES. But skirmishes continued and it was clear that the communists were "biding their time, waiting for the right moment to launch the Second Round" (p. 44). This book by Professor Iatrides, therefore, is an effort to analyze the twelve bloody weeks of the winter of 1944-1945 and to show how they paved the way for the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949—the third and final round of the Greek communist effort to seize power by force.

The Iatrides book is not a pioneering probe into the subject, but it is the best that has been produced so far. What the author does crisply and thoroughly is to

trace the long range causes of the revolt and then sum up the direct reasons for the upheaval. Thus, we are informed that the Second Round dramatized the ills of war-time Greece, torn as it was amongst the ambitions of politicians of every ideological coloration. King George II, exiled in Cairo, found that he was to become the hapless victim of the big power intrigues perpetrated by the British, the Russians and even by the Americans. Unable to shake off the stigma which fell on him because of his endorsement of the dictatorial fascist regime of General Metaxas, the King's return was challenged by the leftists who demanded that a plebiscite first be held. The country's political system was consequently bankrupt and the king's inability to assert himself created the vacuum that the extremists sought to fill. Nothing in Greek history seems to be uncomplicated, but Professor Iatrides does a valiant job to unravel the dynamics which surrounded the second clash between the left and right wings in mainland Greece.

Perhaps because it could be the only method, the book runs a straight chronological course giving almost diary-like accounts of the critical period. The author extensively uses the personal papers of the then American Ambassador MacVeagh, and seems to base most of his conclusions on that which impressed Washington's emissary "on the scene." Most of the new documentary data appears to have come from United States State Department records, which have been declassified in recent years. What the record does show is that the United States, while ostensibly following a policy of non-involvement in the Balkans, was surprisingly well-informed. Moreover, the clandestine OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was most active in the machinations that heretofore were thought to be strictly British. Official Greek sources on the period are probably sketchy or self-serving, and quite likely many of the surviving British documents are under fifty and one hundred year bans in the Public Records Office. Greek Communist materials are usually of questionable authenticity, and it is to the author's credit that he did not rely to any great extent on the

propaganda tracts which purport to tell the story of the post-war struggle.

One shortcoming of the book is the author's seeming indifference to the role played by Greek trade unionism in the Second Round, as well as how the communists exploited the labor movement in general. The communist-controlled Workers' National Liberation Front (EEAM) is mentioned only one time by name (p. 22). Yet two immediate causes of the revolt are attributed to the workers: first, the proposed general strike called by the National Liberation Front (EAM) alerted the authorities that trouble was brewing, and second, the successful efforts of EAM's "auxiliary organizations" in mobilizing the working classes set the stage for the bloody demonstrations of that Sunday in 1944 (p. 187). While the EEAM does not appear to receive the publicity it deserves in most of the books covering the period, it was possibly the most successful element of the Greek resistance movement and the communists get the credit for the organizational work. It was indeed the wartime successes of the EEAM which enabled the communists to gain control of the Greek labor movement after the German occupation.

To understand a country that is still recoiling from the memories of communist brutality during the three rounds of the 1940s, one would profit from reading Professor Iatrides' scholarly, though far from callous treatment of the revolt of 1944. It is not impossible for a Greek to deny his own passions when discussing his native country's politics, and the author has overcome probable temptation in order to produce a clear and unfanatical account of a notable event in the modern tragedy of Greece.

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PETER C. LUDZ. *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany*. Pp. 509. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972. \$15.

The intra-German detente has produced a mounting interest among foreign observers in what was once known as "the Soviet Zone," "the other Germany," or the "so-called" German Democratic Republic. Now

that the GDR has gained legitimacy, the pejorative terms are being dropped and more objective studies are being produced by Western scholars.

Among the most prolific of such scholars is Peter C. Ludz, Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bielefeld and Visiting Senior Lecturer at Columbia University. This volume, a translation of *Parteielite im Wandel*, published in 1968, has already become a classic in the Federal Republic, and is an important contribution to the scanty number of books, especially in English, dealing with the GDR. While the present volume is an abbreviated and revised version of the German one, it was not updated. Thus, the material concentrates on the Socialist Unity Party (SED) under the chairmanship of Walter Ulbricht. However, as few significant changes have been made since 1971 by his successor, Erich Honecker, the findings and conclusions are as relevant now as before.

The author focuses his attention on the decision-making groups of the SED—the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Central Committee Secretariat—within the broader framework of a dynamic and changing social and economic setting, and a less mobile political system. Ludz contends that the GDR society has evolved from a totalitarian to an authoritarian stage which is reflected in the attitudes of the SED leadership groups. These groups are split internally between the “strategic clique,” the chief orthodox and dogma-infused power holders, and the “institutionalized counter elite,” the party experts and revisionist ideologists. Although one may quarrel with this specific jargon, the labels do reflect a constant intraparty clash between the forces of immobilism and change—a clash reflected in many other communist systems.

The first part of the study is devoted to a theoretical frame of reference, including an explication of the elite research strategy. The bulk of the study deals with the trends of continuity and change in the SED. The author examines first the organization of the party, focusing on ways in which the decision-making groups have adopted a “consultative authoritarian” posture de-

signed to meet the needs of the new economic system. Then he investigates at length the social composition of the SED leadership bodies in the period from 1954 to 1963, in which he notes a process of professionalization, rejuvenation and incipient independence of the state apparatus from the party. Finally, he dissects the ideological system, concentrating on the roots of “institutionalized revisionism,” and the systems theory with its transformation into Marxist organizational theory. Useful appendices of the party elites complete this painstaking and pioneering study.

May the volume be the forerunner of other scholarly appraisals of a state which plays an important role in the communist world and which will become more important in the international arena.

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ROBERT H. MCNEAL. *Bride of the Revolution: Krupskaya and Lenin*. Pp. 326. Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1972. \$10.00.

Professor McNeal has written a biography of a most unremarkable woman. It is highly probable that had she not been the wife of Lenin, her name would have been relegated to a footnote. Her gifts were few; she possessed a pedestrian mind and an austere personality. While she was capable of much hard and useful work, often serving as the manager of party funds and as something of an executive secretary to the revolutionary apparatus, she did not have the intellectual or political capacities that characterized her husband and his associates. Perhaps her one somewhat original contribution was her contribution to the evolution of a Marxist theory of education but even this was shallow.

The elevation of Nadezhda Krupskaya to what, in retrospect, is an important historical role is a consequence of the near deification of her husband in present Soviet life. She herself was a major contributor to the development of the Lenin cult although the author notes that the public display of his remains was highly distasteful to her.

Given the fact that Krupskaya's fame rests upon her role as the wife of Lenin, this volume never resolves the basic question of the nature of the marriage of this revolutionary pair and it may be that it cannot be resolved. Both Lenin and Krupskaya appear to have accepted roles concerning love and marriage based upon models in the writings of Turgenev, Chernyshevsky, and Tolstoy, which ignored the sexual character of love and marriage and raised it to the level of idealism and abstraction. The courtship of this famous couple reflected all the tenderness and sensitivity of a half-hearted negotiation for a corporate merger. The author, moreover, notes that the pair often slept apart, Nadezhda sharing a room with her mother. Lenin's liason with Inessa Armand, a woman quite different from Krupskaya, suggests both that Lenin was sufficiently human to lapse in his devotion to so ascetic and ideal as that drawn by Turgenev in his short story *Andrei Kolosov*, and that Nadezhda was true enough to her principles to bear his transgressions with austere fortitude. There is, nevertheless, every indication that Krupskaya intensely loved her husband, but that this love was characterized more by reverential devotion than by passion.

Their marriage was in fact a revolutionary partnership, but an unequal one. From the time they first met in 1894 down to the struggle for party supremacy that preceded Lenin's death, Lenin was Krupskaya's political mentor. When critical situations developed and events moved rapidly, Krupskaya tended to lag behind and to "deviate" from her husband's position. She, for example, had some difficulties adjusting to Lenin's position in the April Theses concerning Russia's participation in the war, and the author suggests that as a consequence Lenin neutralized her position in the party secretariat. One surmises that it rarely if ever occurred to Lenin to discuss problems relating to theory or tactics with his wife and that she was as often caught by a change in the position of the party as were the rank and file members.

Professor McNeal writes easily and with a touch of good humor. Occasionally, he

becomes too colloquial, particularly in the use of the word "pretty" when he means "very" or "fairly." The volume is somewhat underdocumented, leaving the reader at times to speculate on the source of a particular observation. This shortcoming may, in part, be a consequence of the relatively limited number of sources available, which has the additional effect of leaving great gaps to be filled by the author's own speculations. These latter are often original and penetrating, but speculations nevertheless. Professor McNeal's easy style and his frequently acute insights provide lively reading, but the work adds little new knowledge. The Soviet accordance to Lenin of the attributes of a deity has precluded the release of any extant materials shedding more light on the marriage of Lenin and Krupskaya, and what Professor McNeal has given us may be all we will ever know.

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RUTH PIKE. *Aristocrats and Traders: Sevillian Society in the Sixteenth Century*. Pp. vii, 243. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. \$10.50.

The work begins with a careful study of population trends insofar as these can be calculated on the basis of ecclesiastical censuses. Professor Pike concludes that Seville numbered about 55 thousand in 1534, and over 100 thousand in the 1580s, an estimate which is somewhat higher than that of Vicens and Nadal (45 thousand for 1530 and 90 thousand for 1590) and substantially lower than that of Dominguez Ortiz (60 thousand in 1530 and a possible 150 thousand for 1590). The most valuable portion of the book is a study of the commercial and professional elite, a group of *converso* and commoner families who start often as artisan-tradesmen and who become investors in the American trade, high municipal and church officials, doctors, notaries and lawyers. The author does not try to establish what proportion of these occupational groups were "converso" as

against (Old Christian) "commoner," but most of her specific examples are of *converso* families, and her evidence suggests that more of these entered trade, the clergy, and medicine than became lawyers or notaries.

She states in the preface that she is challenging two frequent assumptions: "the Spaniards' lack of aptitude for trade and the total abandonment of commercial endeavors by ennobled merchants in favor of an aristocratic life based on land and rents." But if the greater number of families for which she has evidence turn out to be *conversos*, then her information does not bear closely on her stated thesis. The late Américo Castro and his disciples argued that in medieval Spain the "caste" of Jews provided by far the ablest and most enterprising financiers, business managers, doctors, and court officials; and that increasingly after the pogroms of 1391 the newly converted Jews (*conversos*) performed these same functions, together with supplying leading clergy, both secular and regular. The present book would appear to provide further evidence of this general thesis, and does not prove anything one way or the other about the specific, or proportional, economic role of the Old Christians.

Professor Pike has also studied the working classes, the *morisco* colony, the *Lumpenproletariat* and the underworld of Seville. Due to the paucity of documentary evidence these chapters are inevitably briefer and more general than the chapter on the commercial-professional elite. But in the work as a whole she has done scholars an immense service by employing both critically and imaginatively the available archival and literary sources concerning sixteenth century Seville.

GABRIEL JACKSON

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DENNIS CLARK PIRAGES. *Modernization and Political-Tension Management: A Socialist Society in Perspective: Case Study of Poland*. Pp. v, 260. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$16.50.

Z. ANTHONY KRUSZEWSKI. *The Oder-Neisse Boundary and Poland's Modernization: The Socioeconomic and Political Impact*. Pp. vii, 245. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$16.50.

Dr. Pirages' study on modernization in Poland is both "helpful" and "useful," as Professor Triska points out in his Foreword. The effects of industrialization of Polish society are discussed here at length and supported with abundant documentation. The author has done a fine job in portraying the "Polish dilemma," as he calls it, in a lively and important manner. This reviewer was particularly impressed by the meticulous documentation, both in terms of footnotes, as well as an elaborate bibliography. It is clear that Dr. Pirages has taken full advantage both of the path-breaking general theoretical literature on political modernization in our field, represented by such authors as Almond, Huntington, Johnson and Pye, as well as of the highly specialized literature on Polish politics *per se* found in the writings of Bromke, Szczepanski and Wiatr. The overall theoretical perspective emerges with force and clarity.

The author offers interesting facets in giving the profile of a "managed" Polish society. This book is indeed a must for students of Eastern European politics.

While Praeger should be commended for publishing a highly specialized theoretical study like that of Professor Pirages, this reviewer regrets the rather mediocre printing job done on this book; it is an electric offset production rather than regular printing.

Dr. Kruszewski's interesting study entitled *The Oder-Neisse Boundary and Poland's Modernization* is an important complement to the Polish work reviewed above. Its special timeliness is further enhanced by Chancellor Willy Brandt's highly successful *Ostpolitik*, which, in effect, legalized and perpetuated the post-World War II boundaries of Central Europe as they have *de facto* existed since 1945. To this reviewer, the introductory chapter dealing with post-war population migrations, demographic elements and the fluctuating eco-



nomic structure of the area have seemed to be the most important. Numerous statistical tables, as up-to-date as late 1969, support the author's geopolitical findings. A useful appendix, including such items as the treaty between the Republic of Poland and the German Democratic Republic, as well as the treaty between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany, further add to the current value of this volume. A fine bibliography including both general works, like Robert Dahl's writings, as well as specialized Polish studies, further helps to secure a permanent spot for Dr. Kruszewski's study.

The reviewer, as above, again objects to the unsatisfactory electric offset production of this work. Praeger's "Special Studies In International Politics and Public Affairs" deserve a better and more permanent format than these two books have received. The high price of the two volumes is not an accurate reflection of the inexpensive production job. Still, both books are to be included on a permanent book-shelf of leading works on Eastern European politics.

ANDREW GYORGY

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THADDEUS WITTLIN. *Commissar: The Life and Death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria*. Pp. 566. New York: Macmillan, 1972. \$12.95.

This biography is truly a labor of hate. Beria, as the last in the succession of Stalin's top internal security men, was perhaps the least attractive of an unpleasant lot. Nobody, inside or outside the Soviet Union, has a good word to say about him nowadays, and Thaddeus Wittlin is no exception. If there was a human being behind the monster he does not seek to find him, except in so far as cruelty, greed, lust and duplicity are human traits: his hero was born a monster and remains one until his timely death. The story is instructive in showing how in Stalin's Russia a man could make his way to high office and irresponsible power over the corpses of friends and comrades. Beria found it use-

ful to be consistently on Stalin's side, anticipating the changes of mind which spelled doom for so many, and often intriguing to bring about their fall from grace. The old man might have caught up with him in time, but there was not enough time.

This bulky life history of Beria is fascinating and easy to read but, at the same time, unsatisfying. The author simply puts his pen to paper and lets it run in a smooth and flowing narrative through his subject's boyhood, education, wartime experience, and career as a super-cop. He provides astonishing detail on what Beria saw, felt, thought and said, and on the scenes of his exploits, all in a most colorful prose, and all without any discussion of sources or advice to the reader on where this so precise, and sometimes so astounding, information came from. Needless to say, the NKVD (Soviet secret police organization) archives have not been thrown open to scholars. How authoritative can a biography of Beria be without such sources? It is apparent from the text and from the extensive bibliography at the back of the book that the author made good use of the published revelations of Orlov, Agabekov, Krivitsky, and other defectors, that he talked with persons who took refuge in the West, and that he gleaned a good deal of interesting information from official pronouncements and from secondary works. But how can one judge, in the absence of specific citations, how much imagination he has used to bridge the gaps between one fact and another?

The books starts dramatically with the last act, Beria's death, presented in three different versions, plus some comments by Khrushchev on the subject. Any one of the versions may be true or false, and the author leaves the choice open. Perhaps it does not make much difference, since in each case Beria is done in by his colleagues at the top of the Soviet political hierarchy, and nobody doubts that salient fact, whatever may be the details of how the deed was done. Enough is known, as well, about his part in liquidating the many Old Bolsheviks and thousands of innocent people who stood in his or Stalin's way. Thus, Wittlin's black portrait cannot be far from

the truth. But many readers will still wonder about alternative versions of all the other episodes described in the book, such as Beria's activities as agent and double agent before the Bolshevik victory, the murder of Kirov, the betrayal of Ordzhonikidze, the purge of Slansky in Czechoslovakia, and the "doctors' plot." Some would also appreciate having a better explanation of the why of Beria's special brand of evil, rather than having it merely assumed from the start.

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### UNITED STATES

M. THOMAS BAILEY. *Reconstruction in Indian Territory: A Study of Avarice, Discrimination, and Opportunism*. Pp. 225. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1972. \$11.50.

An oft-quoted truism suggests that we remember pleasure and forget pain. Though not always true, it does seem an appropriate statement when one views the American historians' approach to the period 1861-1877. For over a century, succeeding generations have been literally buried under an avalanche of Civil War materials, while studies of the much longer Reconstruction period have dribbled forth periodically. Possibly this is because Americans take pleasure in the heroism of the Civil War, and, as Dr. Bailey suggests, are revolted by the "avarice, discrimination, and opportunism" obvious in the years that followed. Because of the paucity of objective reading material on the Reconstruction era, especially in the West, it is pleasing to find a historian who has devoted years to a topic too long neglected.

This volume began as a doctoral dissertation at Oklahoma State University. It includes an analysis of the plight of the so-called Five Civilized tribes (Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles) from the cessation of hostilities to

the end of Reconstruction. The author suggests that the volume is designed for ready reference and collateral reading. I suspect she is correct, and that is unfortunate: it could have been so much more. She has a thoroughly engrossing topic with many intriguing social, cultural, economic, and political themes running throughout. She could have produced a significant and thought-provoking volume, if she had developed them fully. But she was content to limit her horizon and only outlined problems faced by five tribes rather than analyzing, comparing, or relating them to the fuller American picture. She raises a question and promptly races along to another without offering answers for contemplation. For example, why were blacks in Indian territory segregated and denied educational opportunities when Indians themselves faced constant discrimination? Was the Creek Constitution of 1867 an acceptable document or not? Ohland Morton thought so; Angie Debo thought not. What does Dr. Bailey think? If the author had set her sights higher and had used the dissertation as a means through which to launch a thorough study of Reconstruction in Indian territory, this volume would be of real significance. As it stands, it is basically good and interesting ground-breaking history, but that is all. It should whet the appetite of other Indian or Reconstruction scholars and inspire them to undertake in-depth studies of the problems she uncovered. And when they do, they should find a publisher that does not insist, as I suspect the Kennikat Press did, that all footnotes be eliminated. Footnotes may raise the publishing costs, but they all needed tools to strengthen, to explain, and to verify the text.

Despite its shortcomings, Dr. Bailey is to be congratulated for addressing herself to an important and neglected topic. She writes well and displays admirable objectivity. Without hammering at the point, she shows that her subtitle was appropriate for the study.

ARTHUR H. DEROSIER, JR.

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NORTH CALLAHAN. *George Washington, Soldier and Man*. Pp. xiii, 295. New York: William Morrow, 1972. \$7.95.

Scholars will not take this book seriously, and the non-specialist readers to whom it is addressed will probably find it unsatisfying. Professor Callahan, author of four respectable previous volumes on the American Revolution—two on the Tories and military biographies of Henry Knox and Daniel Morgan—here presents a superficial history of the war from General Washington's perspective. Having done the story so often before, Callahan has it straight: the "scholarship" appears to be "impeccable," just as his publisher insists. On either end of the war Callahan has appended the briefest and most unimaginative summaries of Washington's pre- and postwar experiences; thus the book is presented as an "adequate" single-volume "biography." Observation—and the business—of the bicentennial of Independence has begun early.

Both scholars and devotees of "popular" history will be most disappointed, however, with Callahan's utter failure as a biographer. If the book has much influence, it will likely set back understanding of Washington the man at least fifteen years—to the era when Marcus Cunliffe complained that Washington had become an inanimate "monument." Callahan seldom bothers with more than sketchy portraiture, and his best efforts are trite rhapsodies to that "majestic" (his favorite adjective) tall man on the majestic white horse.

Nor does Callahan write very well. The war narrative is wooden, often awkward, even bored. And coming from a teacher, former newsman, and the author of six earlier books, Callahan's mixed adjectives and malapropisms are unforgivable. P. C. L'Enfant is "lower ranking but affable." Benjamin Lincoln is "corpulent but loyal." The terrifying mutiny of Anthony Wayne's troops, climaxing in the occupation of Knox's artillery park and the killing of one of his guards, caused Knox "consternation." Of Washington's generals: "Their strength was in their stout hearts rather than in their heads," despite their having gained "their knowledge of warfare . . . from reading books."

The "number of librarians" who supposedly urged Callahan to fill a "need" for a good one-volume study of Washington and the war (see back fly leaf) must have missed the acclaim accorded James Thomas Flexner's *George Washington and the American Revolution* (1967). Flexner is a fine biographer and writer, too.

JACK TEMPLE KIRBY

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WILLIAM HENRY CHAFE. *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1970*. Pp. 351. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$7.95.

In the recent surge of literature about women, there has been more emotion than reason, more anger than logic. Happily, Chafe's *The American Woman* is an exception. Here is a book which, though it does not hide its distress at prevailing inequality, concentrates its energy on searching for the sources of its persistence. Chafe's conclusions are no more than platitudes, but the data he provides constitute an extraordinarily useful synthesis of material about the twentieth-century woman.

Underlying this book is the explicit assumption that sexual inequality rests on the allocation of different social roles to men and women. Where necessity—wartime emergency, for example—demands new roles for women, prevailing ideology alters to accommodate new social needs. But, argues Chafe, until the late sixties, there seemed to be no fundamental attempt to change a social structure which assigned to men the task of breadwinning and to women that of keeping house. Chafe sees in the demands of the contemporary women's movement hopeful signs that women can finally emerge from the home. An impressive array of evidence bolsters this thesis. Comprehensive statistics reveal changes in labor force participation for women. Conscious of class differences, Chafe treats women who work in industry and those who work in the professions separately. He offers necessary correctives to widely held misconceptions. Despite conventional myths

that women workers could not be organized into unions, Chafe lays the blame for lack of organization at the door of a hostile American Federation of Labor. Too, there is abundant data here to bury the contention that women made significant economic and political gains before 1940. Largely because proportionately little attention is given to the post World War II period, Chafe is less persuasive when he argues that the 1940s were a turning point for women. The treatment of other areas, too, is uneven. There is fascinating but skimpy material on changes in women's colleges and magazines in the 1920s. While the 1930s, with all that happened to the family then, is sloughed over, the war years are colored in vivid hues.

In the end, however, this book must rest on the information it provides. Chafe never examines his assumptions critically, and those familiar with women's history must ultimately reject them, not as unsound, but as insufficient. Roles, which as Chafe points out, derive from the social division of labor, are dependent on the mode of production. And the mode of production is surrounded by, and creates its own pervasive ideology which holds men as well as women in its grasp, and which is responsible for the perpetuation of the family. To argue that men and women have different social roles in our society is to ask what function those roles serve in the perpetuation of particular socio-economic systems. Failing to ask that question, the book offers us a limited vision. Until we begin to answer it, we will understand neither past changes in women's roles, nor the prognosis for equality in the future.

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JOHN J. GARGAN and JAMES G. COKE, eds.  
*Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio*. Pp. vi, 388. Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1972. \$10.00.

This book focuses upon several facets of Ohio state government, including tax and fiscal policy, legislative performance, selection of appellate judges, higher education policy, urban problems, and constitutional revision. These subjects are covered in eleven separate studies by several political scientists in Ohio universities.

Will those who live outside of Ohio find the book of interest? With few exceptions, prior to the mid-1960s knowledge about state government consisted of a series of case studies about topics in individual states. Then a series of studies in a "comparative state politics" framework appeared. These studies applied common units of analysis to a variety of states and lifted knowledge above the confines of individual state boundaries.

The studies in this book, paradoxically, are both a part of the comparative tradition, and yet are set apart from it. Like that literature, the studies in this book are marked by intense concern with measurement and quantification of data. These studies are generally done well. At the same time, there is little effort in any of them to relate with prior studies or with similar situations in other states. In other words, there is a preoccupation with the situation in Ohio with respect to each of the topics covered.

Still those who live outside of Ohio may find much in the book that is worthwhile. The studies generate a vast amount of data on a variety of topics. The information is more detailed than that available for many states. Thus those who are interested in state fiscal policies, or criteria to measure legislative performance, or state policies regarding urban areas, and so on, will find interesting information in these studies. But, with the exception of the appellate judge selection study, readers will have to make inferences and generalizations relative to other states themselves.

Citizens of Ohio, on the other hand, should find the studies interesting and pertinent. And, unlike their counterparts in many other states, they will have at their fingertips a variety of interesting topics re-

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lated to their state government. The most glaring deficiency from this perspective is the paucity of information about the Ohio executive.

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ROBERT E. GILBERT. *Television and Presidential Politics: The In-Depth Story of How Television Has Changed Presidential Politics*. Pp. 335. North Quincy, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing House, 1972. \$9.75.

This is a difficult book to review. In a way the author, Robert S. Gilbert, has written two books, one successful and one not so successful.

The weaker sections of the book could have been consolidated into a fairly interesting article. In these chapters, primarily the introductory ones, Gilbert presents the fruits of his research. His findings, if obvious, are interesting. Television time costs money and this gives the richest party or candidate an advantage. This same cost factor tends to strengthen the two party system and weaken third parties. The fact that television records a presidential candidate's words for a nightly national news broadcast has tended to discourage the regional and local campaign promises which were characteristic of earlier campaigns.

Gilbert's conclusions about the effects of television are interesting and his arguments are persuasive, but he makes his points too often and he supports them with too many examples. These chapters read a great deal like a dissertation. This sort of scholarship has its place, but the results seldom make for satisfying reading. And this portion of the book is in this sense not satisfactory.

The second section of the book is much better written and more interesting. The author gives us a quick tour through each of the recent presidential elections. He reviews the role television played in every campaign since 1952. His discussion of the Nixon-Kennedy debates is particularly interesting. He makes a strong case for Congress making such debates possible in the future while at the same time explaining

the crucial role which television coverage of the event played in Kennedy's ultimate victory.

Gilbert also discusses skillfully the questionable role which television played at the Chicago convention in 1968. He points out the oft forgotten fact that there is considerable evidence that television newsmen staged some of the violent street scenes. Gilbert also criticizes the networks for making it appear that the worst of the violence went on for hours when it actually lasted about thirty minutes.

On balance this is a valuable book. It fairly evaluates the benefits and burdens television has brought to presidential politics. Were it not for the awkward introductory chapters the book would be an unmitigated success.

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ANDREW M. GREELEY. *That Most Distressful Nation: The Taming of the American Irish*. Pp. vii, 281. Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle Books, 1972. \$7.95.

Greeley's principal thesis is that Irish Catholics, after "a half-millennium of strife and misery," fled to this country in consequence of the 1840s famine and then—a century later—"have finally proved to the WASPs that they could become respectable. But they paid a price: they are no longer Irish." He attributes the resulting success and dullness to an Irish-American version of momism. "The Irish mother encourages underachievement, in order that she may continue to dominate [her children]." She is the "primary agent of this seduction of respectability." When it is not the mothers, it is the "clergy, who, in their turn, are dominated by their mothers and housekeepers."

In terms of this thesis and others he correlates with it, Greeley as a priest turned academic sociologist and opinion surveyor reports on remnants of Irish Catholic heritage in church and family, in drinking patterns, in politics, and in inter-ethnic relations. He recounts, somewhat nostalgically, the changes that have swept

his own old Chicago South Side Irish neighborhood, especially since the death of Studs Lonigan. He sees in those trends toward financial security, and thus "respectability," the reasons why the Irish-American novelist now appears to be a person of the past. "The Irish could be dreamers, mystics, prophets, pragmatists, and occasionally even saints when no other alternative was available," but now other alternatives are wide open to them, even the presidency. For all his gloom, however, Greeley eschews ethnic self-hatred: "It's a terrible thing to be Irish until you consider the alternatives!"

Apparently as an ecumenical afterthought, Greeley does mention here and there that there were Irish-American immigrants who were not Roman Catholic. He mentions it as curious that the Irish Dissenters in this country called themselves "Irish" until the influx of "Famine Irish" after 1848 prompted them to call themselves "Scots-Irish." Actually, the Irish Dissenter refugees from the famines of the 1640s and 1740s—each proportionately more disastrous than the horrible famine of the 1840s—were overwhelmingly of the same deprived peasant types as the Irish Catholics. Arthur Young, whose *Tour of Ireland, 1776-1779* Greeley quotes in another connection, repeatedly refers to the emigrating Irish Dissenters and characterizes them as "in general . . . idle, loose, disorderly people." Approximately half of our Irish stock in this country are descended from Irish Dissenters—Presbyterian, Methodist, and Quaker in particular. Their tribulations and their disappearance had many points in common with the experiences of the later Irish Roman Catholics.

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE

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LOUIS R. HARLAN. *Booker T. Washington: The Making of a Black Leader, 1856-1901*. Pp. xi, 379. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$10.95.

Professor Louis R. Harlan of the University of Maryland has been arduously labor-

ing for some years in the effort to compile and publish the papers of Booker T. Washington. The publication of the first two volumes of the projected fifteen of the papers by the University of Illinois Press has been considerably enhanced by this work, the first volume of two of by far and away the best biography of the black leader to date. Harlan's complete mastery of the sources has enabled him to write a study acutely aware of the nuances and ambiguities of Washington's personality. The first volume of the biography takes Washington from his birth as a slave in western Virginia down to his dinner with President Roosevelt at the White House, an event that raised the hackles of many white Southerners but which symbolized Washington's acceptance by the political establishment as the spokesman for black interests and as the main power broker within the ranks of black Republicans.

Harlan displays considerable empathy for Washington as a complex figure, hungry for power, whose aspirations for his people were inextricably intertwined with personal motives of status and psychological fulfillment. The author emphasizes that the simple dismissal of Washington by many present-day black militants as an "Uncle Tom" is a somewhat misleading stereotype of a figure confronted with the almost superhuman task of achieving self-identity in a world in which blacks were considered subhuman if considered at all. Washington relied heavily on white models for his psychological development, beginning with General Lewis Ruffner whose wife taught him middle class standards of cleanliness and decorum in Malden, West Virginia, and General Samuel Chapman Armstrong, the president of Hampton Institute and without a doubt the single most significant influence in Washington's life. Harlan indicates that at a later date William H. Baldwin, the industrialist, and even President Roosevelt represented father figures to the black leader. Washington cast about for the proper vehicle of success for some years in his early manhood, at different times contemplating the law and even the clergy. He flirted with politics for a time until he realized that blacks openly participating in



Southern politics were increasingly a thing of the past in the post-Reconstruction South. He would later return to politics as a figure behind the scenes, a string puller whose advice made or broke many black political aspirants.

Education proved to be Washington's forte and the road to his success. He came to espouse a segregated system of industrial and agricultural education at Tuskegee Institute, eschewing the emphasis on the liberal arts found at other black colleges and found unrealistic by the pragmatic Washington. His ideas on education were deeply influenced by the subtly racist theories of General Armstrong who felt that the black man and woman were not really fitted for the professions. These ideas were confirmed by the hardheaded and often hard-hearted capitalists to whom Washington appealed for money for his endeavors. Tuskegee Institute became therefore a citadel of practicality and middle class values with none of the so-called frills of education. It also became, in Harlan's words, Washington's "plantation," a virtual dictatorship closely controlled and scrutinized by the educator in every respect. The grip maintained by Washington on Tuskegee was later extended over the entire black community in America, resulting in the creation of the formidable "Tuskegee Machine" that controlled black politics for some years before World War I.

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JULIAN F. JAFFE. *Crusade Against Radicalism: New York during the Red Scare, 1914-1924*. Pp. viii, 265. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1972. \$12.50.

Persons interested in social movements and extremist mass behavior will find in this well-documented book a vivid account of the events that constituted the famous Red Scare during and immediately after World War I. In the opening chapter Jaffe, a teacher of history, describes the principal radical organizations existing in New York

State at the time—the Socialist Party, the Industrial Workers of the World, the Communist Party, and a few labor unions that were under attack by rightist groups. During the War these and other groups publicly protested the economic conditions of the workers, and some of them expressed vigorously their opposition to the War. Their condemnation of the War, especially, led to charges that they were giving aid and comfort to the enemy and were therefore public enemies themselves. The few acts of physical violence, such as bombing, did much to focus attention on the organizations that had denounced the war and the capitalist system.

But the end of the War did not mark the end of opposition to the radicals, whether socialists who generally advocated reform, not revolution, or the IWW (Industrial Workers of the World) members and anarchists who were more extremist in their philosophy and actions. Even labor unions, especially those whose members were mainly recent immigrants from eastern or central Europe, were tarred with the same brush of radicalism, as were many liberal leaders such as lawyers and churchmen.

The author describes in detail the events, major and minor, that characterized the postwar hysteria in New York State. There were charges that numerous school teachers were advocating revolution and were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the government. Several teachers were dismissed, although there was scant evidence that they had advocated revolution in the classroom. The Lusk Committee, appointed by the legislature to investigate radicalism, swept with a wide broom, charging many persons, liberal and radical alike, with revolutionary conspiracy. The Palmer raids, engineered by Attorney General Palmer, were carried out against various groups, including labor unions; mass arrests were made, and the right of peaceful assemblage was curtailed. Perhaps the high point of the crusade against radicals was the unseating of five socialist members of the State Legislature, an action that stirred up considerable opposition among prominent editors, scholars, and leaders in public affairs.

The author shows how the hysteria spread to include not only members of private organizations such as so-called patriotic societies, the American Legion, and the Ku Klux Klan, but also government officials on the judicial, executive, and legislative levels. But by 1924, the anti-radical hysteria had subsided. Perhaps a lesson that one might derive from this excellent treatise is that "coming events [may] cast their shadows before them." Certain trends on the American scene suggest that comparable trouble may lie ahead.

The author makes no pretension at developing a theory of rightist movements, nor does he completely conceal his personal feelings about the episode. In the concluding chapter, however, he attempts to pinpoint some of the reasons for the rise and decline of the movement.

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JOSEPH P. LASH. *Eleanor: The Years Alone*. Pp. 368. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972. \$9.95.

This second volume of Mr. Lash's absorbing biography of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his wife is of particular interest against the background of current revisionist historical writing. Mrs. Roosevelt had been to a degree seduced by the communist propaganda and tactics of the thirties, disillusioned by her own experience and that of young friends like Lash, and then gradually brought round to hope for good post war relations with the Soviet Union—and even a measure of trust that the Russians and the Americans could collaborate to make the United Nations succeed. Revisionist doctrine would have had her hold fast at that point in her intellectual and political growth. But Stalin's return to a hard anti-democratic, anti-Western line and her bitter experience with Vishinsky and others in the early days of the UN made her what Lash calls a "reluctant cold warrior."

She continued to distrust the Truman administration's re-emphasis on military preparedness, preferring always to approach international problems on assump-

tions of friendliness and common concern for peace. But she came to see wisdom in Secretary George Marshall's firmness, and she thought Truman was right to defend Korea. She feared for the future of a world with unchecked development of nuclear weapons and strongly supported Baruch and Acheson in the first American efforts to bring them under United Nations control. Firsthand experience, as a delegate to the UN Assembly year after year, persuaded her that while some in the American administration were extremists not desirous of accommodation with the Soviet Union, the great burden of blame for failure lay not with the United States but with the Communists.

Mr. Lash effectively recreates the atmosphere of those early Cold War years with judicious excerpts from Mrs. Roosevelt's letters and, especially, from those of Marshall, Acheson, and the president himself. The campaign of 1948 was a political watershed—with the New Dealers trying to dump Truman by means of an Eisenhower candidacy, with the left-liberals rallying to Henry Wallace, and the Southern Bourbons making the first concerted effort, in the Thurmond candidacy, to hold back the progress of civil rights, and Governor Dewey appealing to the middle Americans of those days while the president emerged as a courageous champion of the "little guys," white and black alike. Mrs. Roosevelt stood by Truman, at first without enthusiasm. But she was fooled neither by the mawkish sentimentality of Wallace's "do-good" approach to what she knew as evil, nor by the equally illusory notion that General Eisenhower was a liberal white knight.

Eleanor Roosevelt became in the years after her husband's death a world figure in her own right, but not really a major world, or even American, influence. The battles she fought—from forging a Declaration of Rights for mankind and securing United States commitment to it to securing the rights of blacks and other minorities, from eliminating the power of the Catholic bishops in secular affairs, to reforming the Democratic Party in New York or putting a new liberalism in the White House with

Adlai-Stevenson—none were decisively victorious battles and some were decisively lost. But after deep initial scepticism, even active opposition, she came to admire John Kennedy as President and when she died, November 7, 1962, there were encouraging signs that some of the biggest civil rights battles were being won. The ultimate significance of her life—as she would surely have agreed—was that the struggle is always worth the effort.

*Eleanor: The Years Alone* is a better book than *Eleanor and Franklin*, perhaps because Mr. Lash could concentrate on one remarkable human being, whom he knew well, and perhaps also because he has a less familiar yet more immediately valuable story to tell. One could wish that the careful documentation were explicit as to where papers cited may be found. Most, of course, are at Hyde Park, but not all.

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JERRE MANGIONE. *The Dream and the Deal: The Federal Writers Project, 1935-1943*. Pp. 416. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1972. \$12.50.

Jerre Mangione's history of the Federal Writers' Project makes an important contribution to our understanding of a long-neglected part of the New Deal, the Works Progress Administration's Federal Arts Project. Organized chronologically and interspersed with lively vignettes, the book deals with a host of problems associated with this unprecedented enterprise: the question of censorship; difficulties of collective creativity; trying relationships with state WPA administrators, especially those with close ties to strong political machines; difficulties with the Left involving numerous strikes and rivalries among various factions; and constant harping of critics in the public and Congress.

A basic problem which Mangione frequently touches upon but never articulates systematically was the conflict between a professional orientation with primary emphasis on production of first-rate literature, and a social service approach which stressed

hiring those in need who made the smallest pretensions to literary ability. While the latter approach dominated, the problem resulted in publications of uneven quality, and projects undertaken by unqualified members in some states, while in others there were not enough jobs for qualified writers in need. Despite the problems, Mangione concludes that the Writers' Project succeeded in both directions. Among the more than four hundred publications were many invaluable works: particularly notable were the American Guide Series and *These Are Our Lives*, spoken autobiographies of Southern blacks and whites. Simultaneously the Project supported a number of writers who would make substantial contributions to American culture as well as thousands of more ordinary people whose work gave them dignity and economic sustenance.

For several reasons, the book falls short of the author's claim to "the comprehensive story" of the Writers' Project. While he mentions dozens of libraries and archives and has an extensive bibliography, there are no footnotes, and sources of specific information remain unclear. Moreover, it does not appear from the bibliography that he systematically searched the Project's records in the National Archives or the Roosevelt collections at Hyde Park. Substantively, this reviewer wished that he had tackled some questions which would deepen our understanding of the Project and the New Deal in general, especially FDR's relationship to the Project and its place among his priorities. Finally, Mangione's view that the War killed the Federal Arts Project is unacceptable to most historians who attribute the faltering of the New Deal to reasons mostly unrelated to developments in Europe.

These objections do not outweigh the positive contributions of the book. Mangione's experience as National Coordinating Editor of the Writers' Project gives us an inside view of the participants, their hopes, problems, struggles and accomplishments, and a sharp sense of the mood of the times. Of special significance is the author's resourcefulness in tapping the memories of seventy former participants with oral his-

tory interviews. The book will be a mandatory source for those seeking to understand the history of the thirties and for those interested in the general question of the possibilities and limitations of government-supported culture; moreover, Mangione's wit and style should make reading the book a treat for scholars and lay persons alike.

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SAMUEL McSEVENEY. *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896*. Pp. xvi, 333. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$9.75.

For two decades American political historians have devoted considerable talent to demonstrating the inadequacy of Progressive history which postulated that economic interests were the principle forces that shaped the pursuit and use of political power in America. Now scholars have begun to shift from dismantling the Progressive synthesis which cast such a powerful spell on the historical imagination for two generations to reconstructing the political history of the United States, not by ignoring economic forces, but by understanding their complexity as well as the importance of ethno-cultural forces. This book, an intensive study of voting behavior in three northeastern states—New York, New Jersey and Connecticut—is an important contribution to that reconstruction.

Through quantitative study of voting data, McSeveney has attempted to explain the dynamics of electoral behavior in the region during the 1890s. In that decade the long stalemate of the 1870s and 1880s, during which neither the Republican or Democratic parties enjoyed a majority, ended. "Fundamentally," McSeveney argues, "... politics during the pre-1893 period was cultural politics, involving old-stock Americans and 'old' immigrant groups" who were locked in conflict with new immigrants with their clashing values and interests. The Democratic party's victory in 1892 seemed the harbinger of a long term shift in the

party's favor owing to the steady growth of urban and immigrant voting blocs with Democratic proclivities. The depression that engulfed the country in 1893, however, loosened traditional party moorings, causing enough Democrats to switch to make the Republicans the majority party for the next thirty years.

McSeveney accounts for these changes in the northeast through several compelling lines of analysis. First, hard times made many voters more inclined to vote according to their perceptions of economic interests and less bound by ethno-cultural voting traditions. This worked to the disadvantage of the Democrats, since as the party in power when the depression struck, it received the blame, especially since President Cleveland's remedies did not work. McSeveney explains why the Republican promise to restore prosperity by raising the tariff appealed to many urban and rural voters in the northeast. Second, he analyzes how the long depression disastrously split the Democratic party from the national level down to the local level. When eastern Democrats, following Cleveland, resisted demands for inflation by the southern and western wing of the party, they lost control, but they also sealed Bryan's defeat by bolting. The Nebraskan's free silver platform and evangelical style did not appeal to many of the voting groups the Democrats traditionally counted on in the east.

In four data-filled chapters, McSeveney examines elections in the three northeastern states between 1893-1895, showing that ethno-cultural issues such as temperance, public aid to parochial schools, gambling, and Sunday closing, pitted Irish Catholics, German Lutherans and anti-Evangelical WASPS against old-stock pietists threatened by urbanization, secularism, and the influx of foreign-born. McSeveney then demonstrates that as the depression deepened, Democratic fortunes sagged as ethno-cultural issues gave way to pocket-book concerns. Democratic defeats in 1894 and 1895 at the state and local level were only a preview of worse to come in 1896. Shrewdly, Republican politicians tried to restrain the pietists within their ranks clam-

oring for moral "reform," sensing that many traditionally Democratic groups were ready to switch. Bryan helped for his free silver nostrum and evangelical rhetoric may have turned on farmers in Georgia and Kansas, but repelled voters in Brooklyn and Jersey City.

This book joins a growing series of quantitative studies of nineteenth century American politics. It is strengthened by a discussion of national political developments that provides a framework for fitting in the detailed analysis of state politics. McSeveney, however, has not solved the formidable organizational problems of presenting in a readable and interesting manner political developments in three states among which he constantly shifts back and forth. The detail, moreover, often overwhelms the reader with a mass of names, places, and election returns. Much of the documentation belongs in the footnotes or in appendices. Nor has McSeveney found a graceful, lively way to report his findings. Yet despite these problems, this book joins the select company of monographs that are significantly contributing towards the reconstruction of American political history.

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GEORGE E. MOWRY. *Another Look at the Twentieth-century South*. Pp. vii, 90. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. \$4.95.

In these three essays, originally presented as "The Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in Southern History," George E. Mowry takes on the most complex and important themes in southern society—race, class, and conservatism. Though eloquent and stimulating, these brief essays generally advance arguments which are either unconvincing or familiar.

The first essay examines from a "comparative viewpoint" the notion of southern distinctiveness. Noting that southern historians have usually emphasized the "singularity" of the South, Mowry seeks out the South's points of "similarity" with another region, the western Middle West.

Comparing topography, demography, social attitudes, and folk ways, he finds that "up until World War II, at least, the South and the western Middle West were alike in many significant ways" (p. 31). An inter-regional perspective is a useful corrective to assumptions of southern exceptionalism, but Mowry erases important differences of degree. The Middle West's allegiance to one-partyism, for instance, never approached the South's cult of the Democratic Party. And, despite this survey of regional similarity, Mowry is not prepared to deny southern singularity. In the preface, he declares that by abstracting the Negro from the comparison he has proven the Negro's centrality to the entirety of southern history. But deletion is not proof of centrality. That argument is worth making, but it requires a less oblique approach.

The other two essays examine the "paradox" of southern conservatism. After analyzing the voting records of three southern senators—John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina, and James F. Byrnes of South Carolina—the author concludes that rarely "in all political history" have "so-called conservatives and reactionaries so consistently voted for radical and reform measures over as long a period . . ." (p. 46). To resolve the paradox he argues that in return for permission from the national Democratic Party to maintain existing race and class relations in the South, the South's governing elite supported liberal reforms. Revisiting U. B. Phillips' well-known thesis, Mowry suggests that the central theme of the twentieth-century South has been the conviction that it shall be and remain "an upper-class white man's country" (p. 85). Mowry's conclusion is attractive, but his explanation of southern political behavior is not persuasive. That southern support for New Freedom and New Deal reforms was coerced is doubtful. Southerners, by virtue of their domination of the Democratic Party, did not need to make trade-offs to defend their regional interests. More likely, southerners supported national reform legislation because of its essentially conservative character, and thus, in that sense, modern southern political behavior

tells us as much about American liberalism as it does about southern conservatism.

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DAVID J. O'BRIEN. *The Renewal of American Catholicism*. Pp. 302. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. \$7.95.

THOMAS O'BRIEN HANLEY. *The American Revolution and Religion*. Pp. 260. Washington, D.C.: Consortium Press, The Catholic University of America Press, 1971. \$13.95.

*The Renewal of American Catholicism* is a broad gauged history-cum-assessment of the Catholic Church and of Catholics in the American experience. The author, probably wisely, eschews a chronological pattern as unsuitable to his more important purpose, namely, an evaluation of American Catholicism. Nonetheless the study includes a good deal of historical fact, often given fresh meaning through analysis. Well informed and well written, O'Brien's book has value judgments about the Church, past imperfect, present, and future indefinite, that are hardly calculated to please all points of view. Indeed, the author's own point of view surfaces consistently. Having stated his approval of the open church—"hanging loose" and "doing one's thing"—are prescriptions found in the final chapter called appropriately "New Directions for American Catholicism"—it is from these and similar attitudes that some readers may dissent, or at the very least may be puzzled by their inclusion.

Though O'Brien offers the opinion that the age of heroes may well be past, his own heroes, John XXIII and John F. Kennedy, consistently influence his outlook. Not that he sees these men, especially Kennedy, with an uncritical eye. The passages on Kennedy, Catholics and politics are among the best in the book, largely because JFK is treated with calm detachment. Other portions of the overall analysis, however, betray the author's sentimental regard for his heroes. For some this will recommend *The Renewal of American Catholicism*, for others it will seem the more flawed, and

for still others it will merely attest to the timeliness and also the ephemerality of what O'Brien has to offer beyond a history of American Catholicism. Certainly this is a book which could have been written only during the Vietnam War, because of that war, and in protest against it as well. This is not to say that the author's judgments are not fair, but to suggest that he has exercised a high degree of selectivity with regard to many aspects of contemporary America and contemporary Catholicism.

One troubling side to this book is that it strikes one as an in-group discussion. For a reader not fully familiar with American Catholic history the name-dropping can be as irritating as it may have been intended to be erudite. No doubt, O'Brien has cast a wide net. But he is unable to distinguish between those worth quoting and others whose lack of historical importance or contemporary stature reduces the effect of so much quotation to supportive rhetoric. But the quotations are well documented in chapter notes which along with a suitable index makes the book as usable as it is readable.

In contrast, *The American Revolution and Religion* deals with rather specific changes in religious conditions and the religious atmosphere in Maryland in the years 1770-1800. The author's thesis is a novel one, likely to be classified as revisionist history. He contends that the American Revolution, by disturbing the privileged position of the Anglican Church in Maryland, brought an end to the confinement of religion; in turn, this produced a condition of religious toleration in which atmosphere the Christian faith was free to thrive through a variety of denominations. This much has been widely acknowledged. But Hanley goes on to argue that, after the Revolution in Maryland at least, "religious vitality which historians have not previously noted will appear." His conclusion is that "a Christian state replaced a confessional state." Underlying this thesis is the assumption that the Anglican Church in Maryland was moribund before the Revolution, that there existed then a "union of

church and state but not a union of Christianity and society." The Revolution, however, had such a stimulating effect on the practice of religion that there was a general improvement in religious life. Such conclusions, as is pointed out, can rely only on "depth research on regions [which] is essential."

The research upon which the study rests is undoubtedly "depth research." The book has grown out of Hanley's doctoral dissertation (Georgetown, 1961) and exhibits both the merits and the deficiencies of that genre of historical writing. On the plus side the book reveals an expert use of fairly complex research materials as well as a thorough knowledge of Maryland in the eighteenth century. Unfortunately the writing is not of the same quality, as it tends to verbal overkill. A greater economy of words may well have helped to sharpen the author's thesis.

And it is with the thesis that readers may quarrel. The book is in the American tradition of searching for a usable past. As Hanley states, "the values of the current historian and the people of the period themselves affect the appraisal of religious growth" attempted in the study. He is critical of earlier writers like J. Franklin Jameson no less than W. W. Sweet and Nelson R. Burr because, writing in a different era, they failed to interpolate latter-day views of the Christian community into their works. The book is a celebration of a pluralistic society which was achieved in Maryland before 1800, even though to the people of that time such an idea would have been anachronistic. By reading contemporary values into a past era the integrity of the past tends to disappear. As the British American historian, J. R. Pole, has observed "time is the element with which many American historians have the greatest difficulty in coming to terms."

Another difficulty is that the study, concentrating on Maryland, leaves one to wonder whether its experience was typical or exceptional. If, as Hanley states in his preface, he hopes that his methodology will be applied to other regions so that in another half century a full account of religion and the revolution will have become avail-

able, he seems to fail to realize that in another fifty years future historians, utilizing their then current values, may assess the past differently. Such are the uncertainties of instrumentalism in the writing of history.

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ROBERT J. PARKS. *Democracy's Railroads: Public Enterprise in Jacksonian Michigan*. Pp. 253. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press. \$12.50.

Professor Parks has produced the kind of study that is specially needed at the present stage of development in research methods and techniques. The New Economic History is currently attracting as many of our able younger scholars as to diminish interest in the traditionally painstaking work that may yield equally valid results.

Early canals and railroads in the eastern United States were chiefly private ventures, though largely assisted by public aid. Michigan, however, as well as some other mid-western states, undertook to build and operate these facilities as public works under the complete ownership and control of state governments. Professor Parks traces the experience of Michigan in detail against a broad background of political, cultural, and international economic developments, from 1825 to 1846.

The program in Michigan was unique to the extent that it was the only one initiated and guided by Democratic politicians. This fact, however, seems to have made less difference than Goodrich inferred (p. 87). Opposition to international improvements could be an occasional election issue; but the Whigs were not seriously concerned to slow the pace of progress. Sectional rivalry was too strong a force to leave room for popular support of any very conservative position. One of the most striking findings of this study is that Michigan's major railroads were sound business ventures, and that their sale to private interests in 1846 was the consequence of political corruption that had led to state bankruptcy. This conclusion will doubtless be disputed, but I

find the author's position generally convincing.

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GEORGE P. RAWICK. *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography*, vol. 1, *From Sundown to Sunup; The Making of the Black Community*. Pp. 208. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1972. \$10.00.

This book is the introductory volume of a projected eighteen volume reprint publication of the WPA slave narrative collection, consisting of interviews with ex-slaves in the 1930s, and the Fisk University slave narrative collection, compiled from interviews with former slaves in the 1920s. The narratives are to be reprinted in their entirety, free of the obtrusive editing which has characterized earlier published reproductions of selected material from these collections.

In stressing the role of the slave as subject and actor rather than as victim and object, Rawick provides a very useful framework from which to analyze the narratives as well as the slave experience. His central thesis is that a viable and partly autonomous slave community developed in North America, cemented by an ever evolving culture which comprised an amalgam of psychological and behavioral characteristics and patterns derived in varying degrees from the African past, the physical and social environment of the American South, and the general capacity of human beings living under adverse conditions to nevertheless find positive meaning in their existence. Rawick supports his thesis with citations from slave narratives, insights from sociological and psychological theories, and some common sense observations.

According to Rawick, the slave community came into being and functioned most effectively through the interaction of slaves with one another during those times in their daily lives when they were least subject to the surveillance and direct control of the master class, that is, from sundown to

sunup and on weekends. During this period they were able to develop institutions and patterns of thought and behavior that enabled them to resist dehumanization and to carve out for themselves, within a restrictive environment, an area of physical, psychological, and spiritual autonomy.

Evidence of the existence of a strong slave community and culture, says Rawick, can be found in slave religion, a fusion of African forms and cosmologies with compatible Euro-Christian counterparts and shaped and expressed in terms of the slaves' existential experiences; in the varied nature of slave families, more stable and viable and less matriarchical than leading scholars of the Black family have led us to believe; in the subtle patterns of resistance to slavery that arose out of the slave's view of the world as expressed in his oral literature—folk tales and sacred and secular songs; and in those forms of overt resistance, particularly those which required the cooperation of many slaves, such as the underground railroad and the aid rendered by slaves to Yankee soldiers in the South during the Civil War which frequently required a sophisticated communications network among slaves extending from plantation to plantation and from state to state.

Rawick's observations represent a categorical rejection of two major scholarly views of the slave—(1) that he lived in a state of cultural chaos stemming from the almost complete obliteration of his African culture and from his confused and incomplete grasp of the American culture (Kenneth Stampp) and (2) that his personality was almost exclusively the product of his assigned role and of the pervasive and absolute authority of the master (Stanley Elkins).

While rejecting traditional scholarship on these two points, Rawick nevertheless accepts two other equally doubtful traditional conclusions. In light of recent research on slavery and racism in Latin America, his implication that a more virulent form of racism emerged from the protestant, capitalistic societies of England and Holland than from the Catholic, pre-capitalistic, semifederal societies of Spain and Portugal is questionable. Equally challengeable, but



a subject that awaits diligent research effort, is his acceptance of the undocumented assumption that southern white women "repressed their . . . sexuality" in the face of a system which placed them on a pedestal as a result of white male exploitation of slave women. Such a conclusion calls for drawing a distinction between white women of the planter class and the great majority who were not in that category, and the presentation of evidence beyond casual statement that even the former were sexually repressed. White female jealousy of some slave women is not sufficient proof for such an assumption.

Rawick's deficiencies lie then, in some of his conclusions about the origin of racism in the European world and its impact upon white society in America, admittedly controversial subjects. His strength is in his analysis of the slave community and culture. He thus joins a growing community of scholars who are advancing the study of slavery from the perspective of the slave, treating the slave as subject rather than simply as manipulated object and victim.

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ISRAEL RUBIN. *Satmar: An Island in the City*. Pp. x, 272. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972. \$8.95.

The Hasidic movement originated in the eighteenth century as a religious response to the oppressive conditions experienced by ghettoized Jews in Eastern Europe. Its purpose, as Martin Buber has put it, is to "make manifest the reflection of the divine, the sparks of God that glimmer in all beings and all things." This daily goal, the very meaning of Hasidic behavior, is pursued not only by adhering faithfully to the numerous prescriptions of the Torah, to Torah-true Judaism, but by suffusing those commandments with "joy-bringing significance." In this strictly religious sense, in wanting "nothing but the joy of God," Hasidim have found a way of living pietistically and joyously "in the world as it is, in life as it is, in every hour of life in this world, as that hour is." However, given

"the fires of temptation," the task of leading a pious life is endlessly demanding, so much so that a religious helper and principal decision-maker is needed. Thus, each Hasidic sect follows the directions of a charismatic rebbe or zaddik, an ultra-orthodox rabbi who is revered by his flock because he is considered "a righteous man."

After the holocaust of 1940-45, surviving remnants of Hasidic communities reorganized their congregations in new lands, chiefly in Israel and the United States. One of these groups, the Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, is the subject of a comprehensive and informative book by sociologist Israel Rubin. By contrast with the loose collection of social and economic materials in Solomon Poll's pioneering work on *The Hasidic Community of Williamsburg* (1962), the data in *Satmar* are the product of an impressive participant-observation study. Whereas Poll's work refers indiscriminately to all Hasidim in Williamsburg as a single community. Rubin's study concentrates on the dominant sect in a neighborhood which is shared with other Hasidim. The commonality of Satmar and the other groups, in addition to their generalized allegiance to the basic principles of the movement, is their East Hungarian origin. Nonetheless, each group is not only an entity unto itself—in keeping with the decentralized tradition of Hasidism—but is sometimes at odds with one or more of the others. In reference to the state of Israel, for example, Satmarers are almost alone in the tenacity of their opposition to political Zionism. Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum, the Satmar rebbe who is now in his mid-eighties, has argued for more than fifty years—the holocaust notwithstanding—that the reemergence of Israel must await the coming of the Messiah.

Rubin's book, it seems to me, is an important contribution to the literature on cultural pluralism in America. By focusing on the internal structure of an exclusive sect—a group more insular than the more intellectualized Lubavicher Hasidim in another part of the borough—he provides an illuminating description and analysis of how an ultra-orthodox and exotic congregation

uses religious, educational, and familial controls to resist assimilation into both the mainstream of the larger Jewish community in New York and the cosmopolitan environment of the city as such. At the same time, his study indicates that "an island in the city" is faced repeatedly with various socio-cultural strains which threaten the on-going existence of a cohesive and separatist community. Signs of change, at the fringes if not at the core, are evident in several institutional areas, for instance, in the education of females and in the structure of family roles.

The "double-edged problem of control and change" is the major theme of Rubin's work. One such problem, for example, is the discrepancy between family-based economic needs—aggravated, in part, by the large conjugal families which reflect the Hasidic proscription on birth control—and the group-imposed educational restrictions which limit the individual's occupational opportunities, particularly in a sophisticated urban economy. Satmar youngsters attend Satmar schools in which religious education is paramount, are not permitted to attend other schools or public lectures, to watch television, to use the public library, or to seek a college career. The group-wide dilemma, of course, is how to shield the new generation from secular influences and yet give them the wherewithal to earn an income commensurate with family responsibilities. One consequence, perhaps the vital one, is the increasing entry into the employment market on the part of Satmar mothers. Among women whose youngest child is six, 52 percent are in the labor force.

When one considers the Satmarer tendency to marry at an early age, typically at eighteen and always by parental arrangement, one can imagine the economic burden which is encountered by Satmar males, save perhaps for the most qualified Torah scholars who are selected to serve the religious needs of the community. Moreover, the problem is magnified by "the multiple factors that encourage high spending," such as the expense of parochial education for many children, the high cost of meticulously supervised kosher food, the cost of

special garments, of numerous religious articles, of in-group charity appeals which are difficult to ignore. Overall, one may ask, with Rubin, "how does Satmar manage to control its members and prevent them from seeking less burdensome ways of life?" For an answer, albeit a cautious one, the reader is referred to Rubin's fascinating book.

My own view, an outsider's view which has been shaped partially by Max Lipschitz's work on the Gurer Hasidim, *The Faith of a Hasid* (1967), is that "the Hasidic schools of Gur and Lubavitch, which have already had some experience in living compatibly within the modern society of the United States and Israel, must counteract the more zealous and conservative sects of Satmar, Belz, Leluv, and Kloizenburg. In order to reach the broad Jewish public, Hassidism will have to forfeit some of its less acceptable external trappings, so that it may win active endorsement of its more essential qualities."

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ALFRED STEINBERG. *The Bosses*. Pp. 379.  
New York: Macmillan, 1972. \$8.95.

Six political "bosses" whose major activities centered between World Wars I and II are the primary actors in this book: Frank Hague, Jersey City; James M. Curley, Boston; Edward H. Crump, Memphis; Eugene Talmage, Georgia; Huey P. Long, Louisiana; and Thomas H. Pendergast, Kansas City. A chapter is devoted to each.

The author presents each of these men through a series of anecdotal events, which are heavily-storied cases against them, almost from the beginning of their lives. He ridicules them whenever possible. But the facts presented are enough to make a believer in representative government wince again and again.

Steinberg's selections of incidents in these capsule surveys show the route of the bosses to political success and failure. Major involvement in corruption and the ruthlessness of their supporters are well known, but unfortunately these are inter-

woven with some acceptable practices in political affairs. It is not evil to try to get public employees to attend rallies or convince them to vote for this or that candidate. Regrettable, too, are the author's unkind commentaries about some of those who obtained boss support for public office. He describes Woodrow Wilson as "horse-faced" and "long-toothed." And Charles Edison as the "almost deaf" son of the great inventor. These characteristics, even if true, do not appear to have had bearing on good or bad deeds.

But the book is a valuable summary of how the American political process worked on these occasions. Although the reader will have to cull from the countless incidents, in order to categorize boss methods, some emerge even though they do not apply alike to all six of them: good mental equipment; an inflated ego; if power has been abused and reported, divert attention by charging your opponents with something worse; if reform groups appear strong, come out for honesty and integrity in government; be loyal to your supporters and subordinates as long as they serve you; get as many followers as you can; reward yourself for the possible lean days; and make friends with your enemies when they win over you.

These men were products of their times and places. They represent an American institution, hopefully gone, which could not have survived as long as it did without much unbought popular support. All of these individuals held public office during their careers even though Steinberg asserts that only four were "office-holding bosses."

It would have been helpful had another chapter been written, to give a critique of the fundamentals of bossism. And the general reader and those of the academic community should wish that the author had cited some of the sources used.

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BRUCE E. STEINER. *Samuel Seabury, 1729-1796: A Study in the High Church Tradition*. Pp. xiii, 508. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1971. \$13.50.

Any biographer of Samuel Seabury has set himself a monumental task, since to recount the life and work of the first Episcopal Bishop of Connecticut requires the careful intricating of social, political, economic and ecclesiastical forces. With more than a usual amount of care and patience Mr. Steiner has woven the tapestry of Seabury's life with no particular effort to make the dull colorful, yet allowing his figure to emerge to full stature from amidst historical complexities to which only the trained eye is sensitive. Seabury's life provides an excellent platform from which to survey much of the eighteenth century, not only in America, but in England and Scotland. The relations of loyalist Churchmen in America, not only to the New England Standing Order, but to English divines and to non-juring Scottish bishops, provide rich opportunities for the researcher.

Seabury's biographer is at an immediate disadvantage since little is known of his childhood and student years, and the work suffers from a ponderous start. It gains momentum, though, with Seabury's pre-Revolutionary pamphleteering as "A Farmer" and his appeals to the economic self-interests of agrarians. To this must be added his constant harassment by Patriots, his rather disappointing early years as an Episcopal rector, and especially his tireless involvement in lobbying for an American episcopate to stabilize a struggling church. Steiner recounts with precision and detail the turmoil of bringing to reality a bishop on American soil, in the face not only of the Standing Order's opposition, but also low church Episcopalians' somewhat indifferent to church polity. The delicacies of issues and personalities are only complicated by Seabury's Scottish elevation to the episcopacy in 1784, and his conciliatory spirit, his powerful presence, his fervent Evangelical preaching and his administrative capacities proved insufficient to overcome sectional and liturgical differences.

If the time of writing denominational histories is over, perhaps the time of denominational biographies is upon us. However, we are still left with the more integrative task of discerning the role of religion in American history and developing

a theologically informed historiography of American religious life and thought, to which works such as that under review here make an important but partial contribution.

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### SOCIOLOGY

CLIFFORD ADELMAN. *Generations: A Collage of Youthcult*. Pp. 321. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$7.95.

RUBEM A. ALVES. *Tomorrow's Child: Imagination, Creativity, and the Rebirth of Culture*. Pp. 210. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. \$6.95.

Both of these books deal with the counterculture and both give prescriptions for change. But while the first author views the counterculture as a basically negative regression to a nonrational level of existence, the second finds in it the beginnings of a revolt which holds out the possibility of radical change in our present society to be accomplished through faith and imagination.

Of the two treatments Clifford Adelman's is certainly the more entertaining, if for no other reason than his collection of interviews and statements by members of the youth cult. Mr. Adelman discusses three groups born between 1939 and 1954 and their progressive degeneration. Beginning with the alternatives of destruction or abandonment as seen in the counter-politics and counterculture movements, he traces the general disintegration of these two movements into a rhetoric of words ending in nihilism, the wasted efforts of the various communes, or, at best, the small craft businesses. The general dissatisfaction with the establishment has ended, not in a creative anarchy, but in a nihilism of meaningless efforts and expressions. In distinction to counterpolitics, which is outward or community oriented, the counterculture is basically inward or self-directed. The leaders

inspire many imitators and finally commercialization through the media, which transforms elitist jargon into a commonality of expressions which, by the third generation, reflects no common goal. The children of 1954 are seen by Adelman as cut off from any form of creative effort, because the tools necessary for imaginative undertakings have been denied to them through a general countercultural condemnation of the perceptual and communication skills used by the establishment. With nothing more than hollow rhetoric and slogans, instead of concert language skills, the necessary initiative to attempt serious imaginative undertakings is also lost. Rather than to a creative future springing from original cultural and political efforts, Adelman looks forward to an ever deepening despair of mediocrity with the continued confusion between freedom and creative anarchy—a sort of nihilism which may well call forth right-wing totalitarianism. The counterculture finds itself cut off from the main stream of culture with no way to alter it but destruction and self-destruction. Adelman suggests that it is not toward a greening of America that we are headed "but toward a massive brown-out." In the final section of his book he examines the role played by the university, with its often too permissive and, at the same time, too impersonal actions. While he presents no real alternative to the present youth situation, he does make three brief suggestions to recapture the youth movement without stifling the initial imaginative revolt that lay at its origin. Academia should be prepared for a period in which students will wander in and out of the institutions, at times taking course work, then disappearing and only later returning to take up their formal education. There may need to be way stations between the university and the world of everyday work; such small groupings could easily enough find their directors and teachers from the many professors and graduate students now in a tight market situation. Finally the best of the teachers and the youth movement leaders should come together in a joint effort to restructure the university. How these three suggestions will change the trend Adelman

sees in the youth movement is never made quite clear nor, one would suspect, could it be made so.

Mr. Alves, on the other hand, sees the counterculture and counterpolitical movements to be a first sign of the coming overthrow of a power-expansion society. The realists are typed as those who accept the power of money, war, and science—in other words, those who see and accept the present state of affairs. In contrast to this is the utopian mentality which wants to clear away the present commitment to infinite growth and to transform mankind by replacing the logic of facts with that “of the heart.” Few would disagree with Mr. Alves’ view that the present commitment to overproduction and economic growth at all costs is unsatisfactory for the future, but this initial agreement is far short of a faith in or a sympathy for the confused love or hope which he proposes as an alternative. Possibly Mr. Alves has mistaken cynicism for realism and can find no way out except to speak in vague terms of utopianism.

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LEONARD W. DOOB. *Patterning of Time*. Pp. xiv, 472. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971. \$15.00.

Ironically, it takes a great deal of time to read this book. The earliest chapters present difficulties that could give some readers the impression that such time is not well spent. But first impressions can be misleading. The book uses concepts of time to organize a vast array of penetrating insights into the characteristics of human beings, their behavior, their interactions, their social structures, traditions, goals, norms, and development.

The fourteen chapters are grouped into three parts. Part I, “Processes,” deals with temporal motives, temporal perspectives, and temporal judgments (and judgments of judgments). It takes up almost half the book. Part 2, “Functioning,” includes chapters that deal with the acquisition of tem-

poral norms in the socialization process, with deviations from normal temporal perceptions, judgments, and behavior—such as, due to drugs, crime, mental disorders, ageing; the significance of time in group activities; the many ramifications of gratification-deferment, and so forth. Part 3, “Manipulation,” contains chapters on the arts and on social change. In chapters 2–8, fifty-one general principles are presented and elaborated upon, and evidence for them is marshalled from an extensive research literature. These principles plus ten hypotheses from the social change chapter are also collected in an index at the end of the book. The extent of the research upon which Doob has drawn is indicated by the 889 item bibliography, though some non-research publications are also listed, such as Laurence Sterne’s *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy*, and a book by the president of Zambia. The concluding paragraph of Doob’s final chapter is a selection from Ecclesiastes.

Doob’s prose is often difficult. The difficulty is partly due, of course, to the technical nature of his subject, but unlike some technical literature, the reader’s indulgence is not automatically invited by the obvious requirements of quantification, or the need to use manipulable symbols, operational definitions, and graphic devices. One example will suffice to show the verbal thickets confronting the reader. Principle 6.2: “The stronger the duration-dependent drive accompanying an interim temporal motive concerning the pending portion of an interval, the greater the timing acceleration when that drive involves the interval’s ending, and the greater the timing deceleration when it involves the interval’s continuation; the reverse is true when judgment is passed concerning the elapsed portion of an interval.” However, the reader who has persevered all the way to Chapter 6 and thus encounters this principle in context will have thereby demonstrated sufficient interest, determination, and comprehension that he will be neither offended nor baffled by such complex sentences.

Ten of the fourteen chapters have lengthy addenda. Some of these are dis-

cursive bits that Doob apparently deemed too digressive for inclusion in the main text. Others are more or less detailed adumbrations of research findings. In Chapter 7, for example, there is an addendum that is both amusing and enlightening, entitled "Watching the Pot Never Boil." More representative is one on "The Relative Accuracy of Sense Modalities." Collectively, these addenda suggest that Doob's multidimensional conceptual analysis of time in human affairs was incompressible into the ordinary linearity of time as expressed in the one-dimensional flow of language. Even the addenda were not enough, for Doob also inserted an "Epilogue" at the close of Chapter 7. In it there is a sentence frankly warning that "only a reader with infinite patience will wish to read this paragraph. . . ."

The book is wide-ranging. It has much to offer that will fully justify the time invested in reading, re-reading, and re-thinking its content. It should be useful to a wide assortment of specialists: clinical, industrial and social psychologists, sociologists, social and cultural anthropologists, criminologists, historians, economists, political scientists, serious journalists, poets, philosophers, theologians. Anyone seeking new insights into the plight of the world today can profit from *Patterning of Time*. There is brilliant illumination here for the concerned world citizen seeking to understand contagious activism, creeping fatalism, or the orgiastic trends in the manners and morals of many societies.

The pervasive significance of time in human interactions (always subject to coordination) fully justifies the monumental effort it took to assemble this book. Humans not only experience presents, they also remember pasts, and anticipate futures. Their pasts influence their present behavior. Their anticipations can result in interventions or in renunciations. We are living in an era when dilemmas of intervention and renunciation have become acute. Doob has performed a great service in helping us understand the capacity of human beings not only to think of their own futures but of future generations. His timely treatise

also helps us to understand man's reluctance to exercise these capacities.

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HERBERT FINGARETTE. *The Meaning of Criminal Insanity*. Pp. 271. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972. \$10.00.

We have witnessed in the past decade a revolution which has been centered in part upon both destruction and re-examination of traditions and values concerning every aspect of human behavior. Much of it has been transient and characterized by uncommonly loose thinking. Concealed by the sensationalism of the mass media have been the efforts of serious workers in all areas of the social sciences and the law to reassess the concepts of the past in the light of contemporary knowledge. Of particular interest in these chaotic times is the work of philosophers who are applying rules of logic and dialectic upon specific social issues in order to determine their meaning. The ordering process imposed by these men is of crucial importance because our respective fields of discipline are in such disarray.

Mr. Fingarette has bravely chosen an area which sits squarely within two professions undergoing major upheavals, that is, psychiatry and law. Criminal insanity as a concept contains the contradictions, myths and ignorance besetting the two fields. It is precisely because of this circumstance that Professor Fingarette is eminently fitted to do the necessary task. His earlier works in both these fields has concerned itself with the ambiguity of the concept of responsibility, a major problem in this volume.

His line of attack is an interesting one. After demolishing the validity of the concept of mental disease as it is used by both lawyers and psychiatrists, he affirms the intuitional consensus of the term. Following Szasz, he rejects the psychicalistic model on which mental disease is based and points out that psychiatrists have merely substi-

tuted technical language in the place of every day language but in both instances teleology is equally present. The term, mental disease, is replaced by psychosis, insanity or schizophrenia. In all instances the purpose is to provide a versimilitude of sense in the place of no sense. The "disease" model disintegrates as Fingarette exposes the concealed ancient issue of the free will and determinism argument that is contained in the concept. Was the crime caused by forces over which the perpetrator had no control? Once making it clear that psychiatry seeks primarily to make the unintelligible intelligible, Fingarette moves over to the dilemma posed by these problems for the guardians of justice.

The law has been preoccupied with the issue of responsibility and whether the person had knowledge of what it was he was doing. Here, too, ambiguity exists. Questions persist regarding the meaning of knowledge, namely, is it cognition? How much knowledge, and so forth? Other questions concerned with knowledge of right and wrong are equally ambiguous. Fingarette cuts cleanly through the confusion and offers the single crucial determinant of rationality as the litmus test. He suggests that the irrationality of a child provides a model of evaluation. Criminal insanity is therefore defined as an incapacity to act rationally.

The book contains both an excellent and wide range of footnotes which enrich the text. The development of the argument is nicely done. Max Weber's definition of rational behavior would have been a capstone for Fingarette's thesis, but otherwise the argument is clear and complete. It is most refreshing to have read a lucid analysis of the ambiguities of language.

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MICHAEL H. FRISCH. *Town Into City, Springfield, Massachusetts, and the Meaning of Community, 1840-1880*. Pp. ix, 301. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. \$10.00.

In this book Michael Frisch attempts to find a middle way between a conception of urban history that utilizes a theoretical and macroanalytic framework to explain urbanization and the more usual historical approach of examining specific situations without reference to a generalized pattern. He seeks to elucidate the process of urbanization by reference to the "city-building processes" in Springfield, Massachusetts from 1840-1880. His theme is the changing nature of community—during these years Springfield shifted from a community with a "strong and meaningful personal reality" to one with a weaker sense of personal association but a stronger sense of interest group interdependence. "Community," says Frisch, "was changing from an informal, direct sensation to a formal, perceived abstraction" (p. 247).

The author finds the evidence for this transformation in the fabric of Springfield's history. Three chapters, for instance, detail how the Civil War altered the city's economy, physical structure, and demography, as well as influencing the populace to take a more "collective pride" in its accomplishments. During the war, in several urban problem areas such as education, water supply, and property improvements, the notion of a public rather than a private interest began to emerge. This concept of the public interest expanded during the postwar years, according to Frisch, as the municipal government broadened its functions and its planning horizons. The decision of Springfield's Board of Water Commissioners to draw the city's water supply from a seven mile distant reservoir rather than from nearby rivers is given as an example of the city's sophistication in defining "social needs" and "understanding environmental problems." While the crisis generated by the depression of 1873 caused a questioning of many public expenditures and a rethinking of policy in regard to welfare and public health, by 1880 the city had resumed its expansion. At this point, holds the author, it had also completed the transition from town into city.

While readers will find Frisch's work conceptually exciting, they will also ques-

tion its empirical soundness. The evidence he cites to illustrate community change often lacks substance. Aside from analyzing the changing composition of the Board of Alderman, he makes no attempt to systematically examine those who held other leadership positions in the city or the linkages between them. What changes, if any, were there in the membership of informal and formal organizations? (In this regard, see the important article by Walter S. Glazer, "Participation and Power: Voluntary Associations and the Functional Organization of Cincinnati in 1840," *Historical Methods Newsletter* (September, 1972, v, 151-168.) Who were the most prominent boosters and what were their affiliations? In addition, the absence of any attempt to estimate mobility rates for different social groups is difficult to understand in a study that examines the changing nature of community. "Community" for whom, one might ask?

One of Frisch's most interesting chapters is that in which he utilizes the approach of Kevin Lynch's *The Image of the City* to examine how physical change reflected Springfield's development of a modern city-image. Here, in viewing physical artifacts, our perception is clear. In other parts of the book, however, no discrimination is made between actor and observer, and it is unclear from whose perspective we are viewing the recorded community changes. As a result, the language often seems lifted from the booster literature: "By 1869 the awed community discovered the quiet growth of wholesaling to be little short of phenomenal" (p. 69). The author has made an ambitious attempt to furnish a conceptual framework for urban historians who wish to thread their way between the macroanalytic approach and that approach which avoids conceptualization altogether. Unfortunately, his limitations in analysis and methodology have restricted the utility of his model.

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LEONARD GOODWIN. *Do the Poor Want to Work? A Social-Psychological Study of Work Orientations*. Pp. 178. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972. \$2.50. Paperbound.

This book, although published after nearly a decade of research on poverty is, nevertheless, a timely and groundbreaking empirical study. That this is the case reflects both the continuing public debate on these issues, as well as the enormous tasks involved in utilizing social science methods to test policy-relevant questions. Dr. Goodwin has chosen a fundamental, although surprisingly simple, research question and has successfully applied sophisticated social science methods in seeking the answer.

The sample consists of more than four thousand interviews, including long and short-term welfare mothers and their sons (778), male and female WIN (Work Incentive Program) trainees (1,439), nonpoor urban white residents (525) and nonpoor urban black residents (1,500). From an interview schedule containing more than 130 items concerning goals, attitudes, beliefs and intentions relating to work, nine different measures of work orientation are developed. These measures are life aspirations, the work ethic, lack of confidence in ability to succeed in the work world, acceptability of quasi-illegal activities, acceptability of welfare, work beyond need for money, train to improve earning ability if poor, job discrimination, and intention to work if on welfare.

The main part of the book presents the mean scores of these work orientations for each group as well as correlations between selected work of orientations. The results are unambiguous and clearly support the following conclusion of the author:

Poor people—males and females, blacks and whites, youths and adults—identify their self-esteem with work as strongly as do the nonpoor. They express as much willingness to take job training if unable to earn a living and to work even if they were to have an adequate income. . . . This study reveals no differences between poor and nonpoor when it comes to life goals and wanting to work (p. 112).

A detailed analysis of the WIN trainees



shows, however, that an experience of failure in finding work does lead to a greater acceptability of welfare as a source of income.

In spite of the thoroughness of this study there will be those who will persist in holding to the notion that the poor have little desire for work. This study cannot, and does not, claim to provide a final and definitive answer to this important question. The sample is not representative of all the poor in the United States; interviews were carried out only in cities and there is some indication that adult men, especially white adult men, are not fully sampled. In spite of elaborate controls for response bias, some readers will remain convinced that the findings can simply be explained by a propensity to overstate the desire for work among the poor. These methodological quibbles illustrate the difficulties and frustrations of doing social science research in policy-sensitive areas. As impressive and important as this study is, it is not likely to convince national, state and local administrators and politicians who seem to be *a priori* committed to a policy of forcing the welfare poor to work, a policy based upon assumptions which are directly refuted in this study.

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CHAUNCY D. HARRIS. *Cities of the Soviet Union: Studies in Their Functions, Size, Density, and Growth*. Pp. xxviii, 484. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970. \$9.95.

Chauncy Harris is an eminent geographer who, shortly after World War II, started to specialize on the geography of the Soviet Union. He has several works on the economic and urban geography of that country to his credit. He has maintained close contacts with his Soviet colleagues and has published in their journals. The present volume is befittingly dedicated to three urban geographers who have done a great deal to advance the field in their country, the Soviet Union.

The book being reviewed here is an excellent study of its kind. Although Harris

spent only three months in the Soviet Union collecting census and other data on the cities of the country from various sources, the combination of Harris' ingenious and skillful use of these data and his general expertise has produced this first-rate monograph. The scope of the study is wide, yet the analyses have considerable depth. The book has ninety-six figures and maps, thirty-four tables, a glossary of terms, and nine chapters on a review of the Soviet urban literature; functional classification of 304 large Soviet cities; principal component analysis of the characteristics of 1,247 towns and cities; analyses of the size relations, central places, and the hierarchy of cities; density of urban settlements and urban population potentials; the growth of cities; and summary and conclusions. The volume contains a detailed index and an excellent selected bibliography of fifty-seven pages. Extensive tables of population data for the towns and cities on which this study is based, as well as additional maps and a gazetteer, are available separately as a special issue of *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, vol. 11, no. 5 (May, 1970) from the American Geographical Society of New York.

In 1969, the Soviet Union had 209 cities of more than 100,000 population (around 1966, there were 206 such "cities" in the United States, 135 in Japan, 110 in India, and 103 in the People's Republic of China). The number of these cities has increased very rapidly during the Soviet period. In 1926 there were only 31 such cities in the Soviet Union. In 1926 only eighteen percent of the country's population was urban, but by 1969 the country had been transformed from a rural society to an urban-industrial society with fifty-six percent of the population classified as urban.

The urban population of Russia and the Soviet Union has grown regularly over the last century and a half, from 2.8 million in 1811 to 134 million in 1969. The rate of increase in this population generally increased from 1811 to 1867, 1867-1917, and 1917-1967 but with violent fluctuations in the last half century. Sharp losses occurred in 1917-1920, but the rate of increase from 1926-1939 was unmatched—eleven percent

in one year, 1938, alone—in the history of any other major country of the world, with the exception of Japan which experienced an even greater urban explosion in the 1945–1955 decade. Since 1950, however, the long-term trend of increasing rates of urban increase has been reversed in the Soviet Union.

Of the 304 large cities—50,000 or more population—in 1959, Harris found that nearly one-half could be classified as industrial cities, and of the 444 middle-sized cities with populations of 20,000–49,999, three-fourths were industrial. Small cities were found to be mainly non-industrial local centers. The overriding linkage of industrialization and urbanization that is present in the Soviet Union is evidenced by observing that of the gainfully employed in activities other than agriculture, “40 percent” are employed in industry in the U.S.S.R. “compared with 33 percent in the United States. The Soviet Union has by far the lowest percentage in trade: 8.6 percent compared with 21.2 percent in the United States, 23.1 percent in Japan, and 16.8 percent in India.”

Space limitations do not enable the reviewer to touch upon the other highlights of the study. This is a very meaty work and should be carefully studied by not only urban geographers, but, among others, should be examined by demographers, human ecologists, sociologists, economists, and Soviet specialists. The book, however, is neither racy, nor is it a literary delight.

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PETER C. LLOYD. *Classes, Crises and Coups: Themes in the Sociology of Developing Nations*. Pp. 224. London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1971. £ 2.95.

JAMES C. SCOTT. *Comparative Political Corruption*. Pp. 166. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. \$6.95.

These two excellent books demonstrate the value of a comparative perspective especially when it is freed from the confines of rigid evolutionary theories of stages, transitions and modernization. Both

remain close to the situations and historical elements of several societies. They present general ideas which give the reader necessary devices to grasp major currents without getting too far from the ambivalences and alternative opportunities which characterize action.

*Classes, Crises and Coups*, as the subtitle indicates, is an overview of some sociological concerns in the study of new and developing nations. The author is particularly interested in the changing patterns of social stratification and in the sources of political shifts. His vehicle is the analysis of three societies—India, tropical Africa, with special reference to Nigeria, and states in the northwestern portion of South America (Bolivia, Columbia, Peru.) He draws on the studies of these countries for his analysis, comparing and contrasting them in a variety of areas, Lloyd focuses on the urban and the rural forms of stratification, the structure of elites and the implications of these for protest movements and political change.

The author, a social anthropologist at the University of Sussex, maintains that his work makes the “individual the focus of our study” and in this way breaks with the prevalent institutional focus of most modernization theory. What this appears to mean is an attention to the concrete and the avoidance of evolutionary explanations. He sees change as creating new opportunities which may or may not be seized by the persons exposed to and experiencing it. Precisely because he eschews any global propositions, the book is not easily summarized. While he has little new to say about stratification in developing countries or about political change, the specific analyses of the countries are sensitive to the diversities and historical differences. The result is an excellent introduction to the sociology of developing nations.

James Scott's work on political corruption is much more theoretically assertive about a more narrowly defined subject matter. It is part of the publisher's Contemporary Comparative Politics series. In this volume Scott, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, has used historical as well as contemporary compari-

sons to great advantage. In two excellent chapters he compares early Stuart England with contemporary Thailand. In two other chapters he compares machine politics in the United States with political parties in Ghana under Nkrumah and in post-Independence India. Other chapters discuss a variety of modern nations as well. The book is organized around two somewhat distinct issues: corruption as a form of illegitimate influence on governmental administration and the political machine as a form of electoral influence.

Scott's use of structural-functional analysis is exceptionally able and imaginative. He moves back and forth between different historical periods and different societies in both bold and documented manner. Scott sees corruption as a form of influence which may be legitimized in some societies, as in the purchase of office in early Stuart England, and be necessitated by groups shut out of policy influence in other societies. The practices of local Chinese businessmen in a Thai-exclusive polity in Thailand become understandable as illegitimate means made necessary by exclusion from political decision-making. This viewpoint, however, has limits. It fails to recognize that persons and groups whose legitimate influence in political parties is considerable are also, by that channel of influence, more able to "corrupt." There is an opportunity structure to corruption as well as a set of alternatives. Access to policy-making does not exclude, and may even accentuate, access to corruption.

Scott's analysis of American machine politics and its demise compared to the instability of similar machine politics in developing nations is likely to be a major contribution to the field of American and comparative politics. Scott sees the machine as a device for achieving loyalty and integration among groups whose income, education and lack of group organization and consciousness limit their ideological and interest-group orientation to policy. In democratic electoral politics there is a premium on organizing supporters of local and/or national political parties through the means of material inducements—jobs, privileges, mediations, and so forth. Through-

out he insists that machine politics is conservative and prevents major structural changes. In the United States, a wealthier and better-educated electorate has spelt the rise of policy-oriented concerns and the consequent loss of the functions of the machine. Other considerations have been at work in developing nations which undermine parties attempting to base their support on the distribution of material inducements. Scott argues that chief among these is the weak institutionalization of electoral procedures. Resources are often low and the demands of supporters for rewards limits the activities of the elite for economic change toward development. At such times the eradication of electoral mechanisms is both possible and probable.

The argument is compelling yet there seems more that is needed to complete it. Some, such as Banfield, will argue that the machine has been a source of local power which enabled both government and change to occur within the great diversity of America. Heightened group consciousness may only produce stalemate, as some observers of current New York City maintain. Whether non-democratic governments can last long in new nations without a similar process of distribution of patronage requires a much more thorough analysis than Scott could do in such a short book. My criticisms, however, do not diminish the importance and value of this book.

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H. C. ERIK MIDELFORT. *Witch Hunting in Southwestern Germany, 1562-1684: The Social and Intellectual Foundations*. Pp. viii, 306. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1972. \$11.50.

History and anthropology often deal with the same subject matter; increasingly they share theories as well. The book under review is one of several recent studies by historians in which there is explicit use of concepts borrowed from social anthropology. In the present instance, an anthropological hypothesis concerning witchcraft beliefs is tested against data from seven-

teenth century German witch trials. The hypothesis, derived from the study of non-Western societies, states that beliefs about witches function to promote social solidarity by inhibiting deviant or anti-social behavior—people avoid such behavior for fear they will be accused of being witches.

In dealing with this hypothesis, Midelfort finds it necessary to distinguish between small trials and larger ones. Where only small trials occurred, and only a few people were executed, he accepts the interpretation that the belief system concerning witches may have contributed to social solidarity. However, during large witch hunts more emphasis was placed on torturing suspected witches until they identified other persons whom they had seen at the witches' sabbath. Widows and midwives were usually accused first, but as the trials continued accusations might be made against almost any member of the community, even magistrates and priests. Midelfort concludes that these large trials were entirely dysfunctional, creating suspicion, resentment and turmoil rather than social cohesion. In addition to considering a functionalist interpretation, Midelfort also considers a number of more traditional interpretations of the witch trials. He argues convincingly that explanations in terms of the greed of the magistrates or the psychopathology of the suspects do not adequately account for the trials.

The author devotes considerable attention to the dynamics of witch hunting. The larger witch trials usually occurred after a series of misfortunes, especially poor harvests or an outbreak of the plague. The trials were largely self-regulating, in the sense that once accusations began to reach the leaders of the community, or their wives, enthusiasm for finding witches began to wane. Midelfort interprets this as a "crisis of confidence" in the ability to correctly identify witches, but it seems often to have been simply an effort at self-preservation by those in power.

This is an excellent monograph. The author approaches his abundant data with a good sense of the problem, and he is willing to go outside his own discipline in search of effective analytic concepts. At

the same time he manifests the basic virtues of the historian: attention to detail and a refusal to overgeneralize.

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PAUL C. REINERT, S.J. *To Turn the Tide*. Pp. 111. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. \$3.50.

JOSEPH BEN-DAVID. *American Higher Education: Directions Old and New*. Pp. 137. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972. \$5.95.

In many ways these two publications present a study of contrasts: concern with the here and now versus a leisurely review of past history; a frantic viewing with alarm versus a detached pointing with benign pride; an in-depth analysis of a sudden and cancerous financial malady versus a broad description of the patient's health record for the past 100 years.

Paul C. Reinert, S.J., president of St. Louis University for the past twenty-four years, deals with the alarming financial crisis facing America's independent colleges and universities. He is candid and realistic when he admits: "As all of us in public and private higher education know too well too late, the pox that has befallen both our houses consists largely of uncontrollable developments whose dire effects could have been lessened had we managed our households differently" (p. 17). He ticks off these major developments:

(1) the boom building of the early 1960s weakened rather than strengthened the ability of higher education to meet the subsequent "heavy seas"; (2) inflation was the "strongest wind" in the economic storm that crested in 1968-69; (3) schools meanwhile were overcommitting themselves with responses to research help, wider services, expanded access, and "socially current" (he mercifully avoids the term relevant) programs; and (4) an economic slump presented higher education with the "worst of two worlds—recession and inflation."

After detailing the impact of these and related developments on private higher education, Reinert offers proposals for turning

the tide. First is a self-help strategy essentially designed to keep down costs, meet the cries for accountability, and increase the financial assistance contributed from private sources—including student tuition, alumni contributions, and corporate support. The second proposal—and a key one in Reinert's thinking—is the need for greater state assistance to all types of higher education. Finally, he acknowledges the imperative need for immediate federal aid but presumably only as a stop-gap measure because "the states should continue in their historic central role as determinants of how the post-secondary needs of citizens are met" (p. 71).

As meticulous and hard-nosed as Reinert's analysis is, one still cannot avoid the feeling that something is missing in this otherwise excellent little volume. There is a reluctance to face certain harsh realities. For example, he—and fellow members of Project SEARCH of the Association of American Colleges—recommend that there be a "uniform level of assistance" provided by all states. Considering the past history of uniform state legislation on such sundry issues as traffic safety, divorce laws, and welfare assistance, the prospects for uniformity in the area of support for higher education are remote to say the least. Similarly, the frequent admonitions to the effect that the financial problems facing the private sector of higher education should best be dealt with by a combination of private and state efforts is reminiscent of the Hoover administration position with respect to relief obligations in the early years of the great depression. But perhaps the most significant sin of omission in the Reinert analysis is an understandable reluctance to speak the unspeakable and challenge the unchallengeable. We live in an economic system that is largely the product of private enterprise with its concomitant emphasis on competition and survival of the fittest. However laudable the services provided by private higher institution as educational institutions, they are still not exempt from those economic forces that profoundly affect the larger society of which education is just a part. What is desperately needed in this and other anal-

yses of higher education is a bold, iconoclastic look at ways of restructuring our economic system so as to ameliorate the literally life-and-death power that it now exercises over our entire system of education.

The sub-title to Joseph Ben-David's *American Education: Directions Old and New* suggests that it may address itself to some badly needed frontier thinking. Unfortunately, it is about 99 percent old and 1 percent new. It purports to be a model of higher education in American society. It certainly provides the time dimension to the model and a modest amount of comparative analysis using largely western—especially British and German—systems for comparison. But it is the weakest in precisely the area in which Reinert's book is the strongest—in highlighting the desperate financial crisis which has emerged within the past five years or so. Ben-David instead has chosen to identify four areas as encompassing the major current crises and future challenges for higher education: finding alternatives to the politicization of campuses, achieving a better balance between teaching and research, renovating general education, and coping with the life style of the "intellectual Bohemian proletariat" on campus. Nothing radical, or even novel, is proposed as solutions to any of these problems.

As one reads this book it is difficult to get a fix on just whom it is addressed to. Much of the historical account is trite for even the most casual observer of American higher education. In writing about alumni involvement in higher education, for example, Ben-David solemnly says, "Some of the football matches become central yearly rituals for the university and for its current and former students. Preparation for these went on for weeks and resembled the preparation for important holidays" (p. 33). More substantively, he grossly over-generalizes when writing about liberal and general education and their impact on higher education. Under the sub-heading "retrenchment of liberal education," he writes, ". . . in the 1950s the general education movement came largely to an end, and

liberal education became increasingly de-emphasized" (p. 72-73). This statement may have validity if general education is narrowly defined and equated with the substance of the Harvard Report (as Ben-David does), but it does not make any sense when placed alongside the fact that significant programs in general education were very much alive and well in the 1950s on such disparate campuses as the University of Minnesota, Michigan State University, and Boston University. Such quarrels with the author's frequent sweeping generalizations occur repeatedly. In fact, it was not until the final two sentences of the book did a bit of interpretative writing appear with which there was no disagreement: "If there is a prophecy to redeem mankind by nonrational means, it has not yet become known. Until the time such a prophecy is promulgated, there is no reason to believe that the United States, or mankind in general, can afford de-emphasizing rational learning and research." Amen.

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EDWIN S. SHNEIDMAN, ed. *Death and the College Student*. Pp. ix, 207. New York: Behavioral Publications, 1972. \$9.95.

AVERY D. WEISMAN. *On Dying and Denying: A Psychiatric Study of Terminality*. Pp. ix, 247. New York: Behavioral Publications, 1972. \$9.95.

Much has been made in the intellectual commonwealth of Plato's idea that a philosopher must study death before he can gain access to the real world. It is certainly true that most of what we know about death has come to us from philosophers. Heidegger's definition of man as "being-toward-death" illustrates one conception of this central preoccupation. More recently, Castenada, the amanuensis of the Indian philosopher don Juan Matus, has stated that "death stands to your left" referring to the fact that the shadow-like presence of death is always with us. Somewhere or other, Freud has written that a belief in

personal immortality "forms the central kernel of the unconscious" and much of the father of psychoanalysis' more general work is related centrally or peripherally to issues of living and dying.

Such philosophic concerns which always seem to this reviewer to embody the comforting feeling of contemplative detachment now have become "scientificated" and immured in a new field winsomely called thanatology. Behavioral Publications, Inc. has put together a package consisting of the work of two of the country's foremost thanatologists—Edwin S. Shneidman and Avery D. Weisman.

Shneidman has edited a general series of term papers from a course he taught at Harvard on death and suicide. Weisman has been mining this new science for many years, and his approach is both authoritative and encyclopedic.

I must admit that I did not expect much from the student collection, but I found myself mightily impressed by what college youngsters write today about death and dying. Shneidman's book is a hodge podge of fiction, straight reporting, and book reviews, but the reader cannot help but be attracted to the spontaneity evidenced by these fine minds, and the whole thing ends up sounding like a kind of "rap session" with the brightest young people around anywhere. In fact, the scholarly introduction by the editor stands in stark contrast to the student writing, and perhaps here, we move closer to the real issue for discussion of death in fiction and philosophy seems to be easier to take than viewing death as a pedagogic specialty.

This is, of course, what Weisman has been doing these many years, and one recognizes and admires the adherence to rigid scientific standards, the emotional compassion of the author, and the comprehensiveness of his new effort. Still, if the reviewer can offer a personal note, death is no picnic and *On Death and Denying* makes sober reading. This is precisely the point Weisman makes, namely, that all of us find thoughts of death or relations with dying people so unpleasant that we refuse to straightforwardly accept death as the biological event it is. The author's assay of

the result of this *trompe l'oeil* is discouraging, and he strongly—and poetically—opts for open discussion with dying persons in his concluding statement: “we can enhance the meaning of being alive by touching the edge of a life that is slipping away.”

In sum, Shneidman's book presents an interesting study of adolescent reactions to death in the far-in-the-future mode, while Weisman makes us look at death as it occurs thousands of times each day in many and “divers” settings. Both books are well worth reading and Weisman's efforts particularly deserve the thanks of all physicians and behavioral scientists forced to deal with the dying patient.

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GERALD D. SUTTLES. *The Social Construction of Communities*. Pp. 278. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972. \$9.50.

The interplay between human societies and the physical space they occupy continues to be a source of deceptively difficult issues for social scientists. In his research and writing Gerald Suttles revives the perspectives of the early Chicago sociologists who focused on the social organization of the distinguishable residential areas of major cities like Chicago. The current volume is made up of nine newly published essays with two major concerns: 1) the bases for neighborhood cohesion and 2) implications for the understanding of human societies of recent books concerned with territoriality among animals.

Substantively, the most important contribution of the book is in its dramatization of the importance of fear in the definition of neighborhood. Suttles effectively argues that particularly in low income areas the neighborhood for an individual is the territory in which he feels safe. The emphasis on fear also provides a basis for understanding the extent to which those who share a residential area unify in opposition to interventions which might damage the neighborhood physically or socially. Suttles provides a useful counter to the sociological

literature which has concentrated on positive bases for neighborhood cohesion such as ethnicity, shared class interests, and convenience.

Two of the essays offer rich and interesting descriptive material. One deals with fumbling community development efforts involving middle and low income groups brought together in Chicago's Douglas Park area as a result of physical redevelopment. The second is concerned with the varying patterns of family life which prevail among the several ethnic groups which shared the low income residential area in which Suttles did field work for his dissertation.

Unfortunately, the contribution of the volume is limited greatly by Suttles' approach. For the most part Suttles writes in the manner of the grand social theorists. Characteristically he makes abstract, loosely stated assertions which he explains and defends largely through the force of his complex rhetoric. Instead of building his arguments on previous theory and empirical evidence, Suttles develops his ideas independently with only fleeting and after-the-fact references to the works of others. His distortions in summarizing other theories are often annoying. Merton, for example, is accused of proposing that crime always follows when legitimate access to commonly desired goals is blocked.

Suttles' inattention to the literature is unfortunate. His original ideas about the bases upon which neighborhoods are defined would have stood out more clearly if he had built on Suzanne Keller's *The Urban Neighborhood*, which offers an excellent literature review and synthesis in this area. In his critique of the writings which suggest that men are like other animals in responding with aggression to invasions of their territory, Suttles points to the role which cultural factors play in mediating the relationship between man and his physical environment. Suttles develops this point in a complex and often obscure fashion which would have been simpler and more effective if he had built on the general writings of anthropologists about the concept of culture.

In a concluding section concerned with policy implications, Suttles proposes that

local communities replace other interest groups as the units which compete for societal resources. It is suggested that direct federal aid to the residential configuration which make up large cities might bring this about. Suttles neither provides a compelling rationale for these proposals nor does he relate his policy recommendations to other proposals and experiments concerned with decentralizing city governments.

The book would have been more useful to students if the footnotes in which most of the citations of previous literature are located had been indexed or if a bibliography had been provided.

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GEOFFREY VICKERS. *Freedom in a Rocking Boat: Changing Values in a Changing Society*. Pp. 215. New York: Basic Books, 1972. \$6.95.

This group of short essays comes from a British author who has published four other volumes of papers on roughly similar topics since 1959. The author changed careers half way through his life. Leaving a solicitor's career for military service, he thereafter received various administrative and public service assignments in the British central government, has published numerous papers in management journals, and has appeared regularly at management courses and conferences. Like the earlier books of essays, this volume makes no explicit reference to his varied experience, but rather draws from a rich life to comment on contemporary social and economic problems in universal terms. Only the evolutionary point of view in the several essays suggests the historical sense appropriate to a man born before the turn of the century. In tone and content they somewhat parallel the collected papers of Mary Parker Follett, the individual pieces of which were directed to particular occasions but which always

had implications beyond them. Resembling in this respect both Elton Mayo and Follett, Vickers uses the ideal type of an organic community, able to handle differences and conflict while bound by communities of interest and outlook, as a standard for evaluating contemporary social disorganization. In essence the essays assert the capacity of reason to triumph over the disorder of a market economy, the unintended consequences of technology, and the loss of consensual outlook. They are properly contemporary in tone in dealing with this ancient theme: general systems theory, cybernetics, and communications theory are the unifying conceptions over a series of disparate topics. A societal point of view is urged as against the unreflecting individualism of nineteenth century optimists.

Specific attention is paid to current challenges to the legitimacy of authority in a variety of institutions; to the imbalance between the private and public sectors of economic decision making; to the problems of environmental degradation and to the inadequacy of the current institutions of international regulation to contain conflict. The prescriptions are not very detailed. There are suggestions that new roles must be created in which the claim to equality is combined with an extended sense of responsibility for general social outcomes; that the definition of economic considerations be expanded to a wider set of costs and benefits; that political institutions be reoriented around "liberal conflict" which recognizes both the existence of a political community and legitimate differences of interest. There is no detailed discussion of political processes or structures, but there are implications that change must begin with the creation of small-scale interacting networks.

The essays are interesting as a reflection of the way in which a humane and intelligent man uses for his own purposes some of the more accessible output of social scientists, including writers on biological systems and biological feedback mechanisms. Unlike Mary Parker Follett and Elton Mayo, however, there is no direct application of the themes considered to concrete situations, such as those of the work place.



Nor is there any indication, as there is in their work, of the particular experiences or studies which have made these general themes important organizing principles for the author. Ideas and their possible applications are sketched, rather than formulated in detail, indicating the occasional nature of the several papers.

These papers have limited value in extending the awareness of any person well read in the social sciences, particularly in organizational theory. Their value is more nearly in the implicit contribution they make to the sociology of knowledge. These are the ideas which an administrator and consultant of an intellectual temperament has brought to his work, as a starting point for analysis, as a legitimation of social recommendations, and as a contribution to the professional development of the audiences to whom he has lectured at conferences and seminars. The recurrent technocratic hopefulness of all such careers is there. It must be added that the author does have the capacity to provoke thought about very general social processes and relationships which are sometimes obscured by the jargon of more professional scholars.

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### ECONOMICS

PADMA DESAI. *Import Substitution in the Indian Economy, 1951-1963*. Pp. 137. Jawahar Nagar, Delhi: Hindustan, 1972. No price.

PADMA DESAI. *Tariff Protection and Industrialization: A Study of the Indian Tariff Commission at Work, 1946-1965*. Pp. 106. Jawahar Nagar, Delhi: Hindustan, 1970. \$5.00.

These two short monographs provide supplementary analysis and description for the longer and broader studies of the Indian import experience which recently have become available, for example, Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Padma Desai, *India, Plan-*

*ning for Industrialization, Industrialization and Trade Policies since 1951* (1970) and Jagdish N. Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan, *Exchange Control, Liberalization and Development: India* (1973). The first book includes analysis of alternative measures of import substitution, a description of growth in Indian manufacturing in 1951-1963, and alternative estimates of the degree of import substitution for 169 items in the same time period. The author concludes that the relative degree of import substitution which Indian manufacturing experienced is sensitive to the definition of import substitution utilized, but that import substitution clearly has proceeded most substantially for non-traditional consumer goods and that overall dependence on imports has increased substantially for materials, components and capital goods. For the general reader this study is of very limited interest because the analysis is quite limited and because much of the material has been presented elsewhere although the added details may be of interest for specialists in Indian foreign economic policy.

The second book includes a description of the mandates, the supposed criteria, and the actual criteria for the establishment of tariff rates by the Indian Tariff Commission in the 1946-1965 period and brief investigations of evidence of economies of scale and of changing competitiveness in protected industries. Thus the subtitle reflects the content of the book better than does the main title. The principal conclusion of this book is that economic criteria for determining the level and duration of protection were quite inadequate. The author also notes that for much of the period industrial licensing policies and quantitative import restrictions greatly limited actual or potential impacts of the Indian Tariff Commission (p. 105). Because all too often economists ignore the problems of policy implementation the description and limited analysis of the Commission might be of some general interest. However the observation reported in the penultimate sentence about the limited relevancy of the Commission for much of the period under study also implies that this book, like the first one, is of quite limited interest to all but

specialists in Indian foreign economic policy.

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GEORGE C. EADS. *The Local Service Airline Experiment*. Pp. xiii, 223. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972. \$7.95.

That cost overruns in American industry are not restricted to firms supplying products and services to the Defense Department is amply demonstrated in this study. Any government agency can sponsor cost overruns, and apparently the Civil Aeronautics Board has been doing it for some time. What is not clear is how much of the over \$1 billion spent by the CAB since World War II in subsidizing air service by local carriers to small communities not served by the trunk-lines consists of excessive costs. It may be considerable.

The author stresses the major reason for overruns as being poor policy and other decision rules developed and inconsistently applied by the CAB. For example, over an eleven year period, the CAB enforced its "use-it-or-lose-it" policy of minimal standards of traffic by cutting off service to only about two-thirds of the communities which failed to provide the minimum level of traffic. Poor policy making and application were aided by the—perhaps deliberately—poor management by the local air carriers, plus sporadic political interference by Congress. An example of the former was the fairly consistent practice of local carriers buying aircraft with excessive carrying capacity and high operating costs relative to need. An example of the latter included congressional legislation granting permanent certificates of operation to the local carriers.

The primary emphasis of the study is economic and it is an excellent economic history of short-haul air service as well as an exemplary economic analysis. Greater stress on the secondary reasons noted above for cost overruns would have immeasurably strengthened the study. Unfortunately also, six chapters of detailed analysis and multi-

tudinous events are not summarized in conclusions, preliminary to considering options for the future. Hence, the reader may have trouble linking the analysis to the options. Like the reviewer, he may accept them as being reasonable. Indeed, the CAB is already acting on one of the options, although not the one recommended by the author.

The author does bring the reader's attention to some interesting facts and problems. For example, more than half of all air travel is for business reasons, and to the extent that the CAB relied on internal subsidy for maintaining service, the effect was that businessmen flying the local carriers were being subsidized by "impoverished grandmothers" flying from New York to Los Angeles to visit their grandchildren. The author also indicates the need for integration of national policies towards different modes of transportation. He cites the substitution of the automobile for local air travel as the interstate highways brought small communities closer to airports in large cities. The trend seems not to have been especially evident to the Civil Aeronautics Board.

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BART S. FISHER. *The International Coffee Agreement: A Study in Coffee Diplomacy*. Pp. 310. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$17.50.

The book contains a considerable amount of useful information about international coffee agreements, the negotiations that led to them, and difficulties in their implementation. The author's main interest is in the area of politics and institutions rather than economics. Accordingly the texts of both International Coffee Agreements, that of 1962 and that of 1968, as well as detailed comments about these agreements occupy more than a half of the book's length. In addition, the reader learns about such matters as the soluble coffee controversy, negotiations linking export quotas to the world price of coffee, or the evolution of the view of American coffee importers and

processors on the need for stability in the coffee market.

Legal provisions and diplomatic exchanges enjoy precedence, as it behooves a book with the word Diplomacy in the subtitle. Yet the author's preoccupation with the process of negotiation and the form of the agreements makes him somewhat remiss in his treatment of the substance of negotiations, namely, economic stabilization schemes for coffee. The substance is dealt with briefly in the opening chapter on "The Coffee Problem" and in the closing one entitled "Whither the Agreement?" This is not a plea for changing every book into an exercise in economic analysis, far from it; but more discussion of economic problems involved would increase the significance of the diplomatic process described. This reviewer singles out the following missed opportunities:

- Enforcement of the provisions of coffee agreements is not only a matter of international law and politics, but also an exercise in controlling a grey market parallel to the official market (chap. 6).
- Price stability is at times so simplified by the author as to depend on the control of coffee supply through quotas (p. 34); a fuller account of the reasons for price stability or lack thereof would put more realism in the discussion of quotas.
- Except in Professor Frank's foreword there is little distinction made between countering short-term price and income fluctuations and manipulating the long-term trend of coffee prices.
- Oligopoly in the coffee market is often mentioned; but its nature and link with the high fixed cost of producing coffee remain unexplained; this makes the description of the coffee world market a little leaner than it could be otherwise.

Given its limitations, it is an informative book, but if the self-imposed restrictions were removed, we could have a significant contribution to the discussion of the coffee problem.

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GERALD GARVEY. *Energy, Ecology, Economy*. Pp. 235. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972. Paperbound, \$2.75.

This book is a responsible attempt to deal with the economic and ecological effects of the production of energy in the United States. Step by step, Garvey analyzes each aspect of energy production using quantitative evidence whenever possible. He traces the ecological effects of energy production in the areas of Appalachian coal mining, petroleum spills, air pollution, nuclear energy, and water pollution.

The first three chapters deal theoretically with resource use and misuse, placing emphasis upon the externalities associated with the production of energy. Garvey suggests that the current ecological crisis has its roots in the traditional resource exploitation in America. Our frontier culture, involving the reckless use of resources, has been carried forward to the twentieth century industrial economy. While America has enjoyed the positive externalities of energy production in the past, we have ignored its true cost by not including the negative externalities. Furthermore, we have wasted resources by depleting them with inefficient extractive methods and continue to waste energy by using inefficient methods in the consumption stage.

In the next five chapters, Garvey deals with specific areas of pollution. His approach involves a reasonable and pragmatic advocacy of the, "use of the environment's capacities to consume wastes up to the limits of the ecosystem's cycles, perhaps permitting some additional localized waste buildups so long as such accelerated degradation can be isolated from neighboring ecosystems." The generation of energy and its effluents should be altered to complement nature's absorptive or dilutive capacity. The recurrent theme of these chapters involves the redistribution of pollution costs through their internalization in the firm's cost structure.

Garvey states that slowing down economic growth would not be a solution for improving the energy order. The immediate ecological need is to redistribute energy-

associated wastes, not to reduce the level of production.

In the last chapter, Garvey suggests that the solution may involve a reshaping of our entire outlook on the matter of energy consumption. The laissez-faire approach in our earlier history has oriented the economy away from effective social control of the environment. Private interests have prevented environmental control. Almost all cases of ecological abuse stem from the unlimited use of property rights by private individuals. Judges and commissioners pass judgment based on the protection of existing vested property rights, not on the development of a long-range policy for the environment. If there is a successful case against a polluter, we redistribute costs remedially after the damage has occurred.

We have failed politically: "The existing fragmentation of governmental structure impedes coordinated policy-making. Worse, it tends to align public agencies with the special groupings in society. In this configuration, government becomes the veritable symbol of existing inequities, not a potential solution." For example, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Power Commission have divided authority resulting in the lack of a unified policy regarding nuclear energy, hydroelectric power, and the use of fossil fuels.

The ultimate solution, according to Garvey, involves the placement of pollution cost in the market system. Economic incentives would be the enforcement mechanism rather than punishment. A fee schedule could be evolved to regulate economically the discharge of residues. The fee would be paid by the polluter for the use of the environment. This would preserve individual choice and stimulate more efficient control technology through economic incentives. While much more could be done with specific solutions to the various environmental problems, the author has contributed a significant piece of work in a field that we have just begun to analyze.

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MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN. *The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union*. Pp. ix, 372. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1972. \$7.95.

It is sometimes assumed that the pollution of the air and of the water is a consequence of lack of planning, of the uncontrolled pursuit of profit, in short of the capitalist system. Marshall Goldman has performed a valuable service in demonstrating that in the largest of the Peoples' Democracies, in which almost every aspect of economic life is planned and controlled, pollution is as conspicuous as in the most laissez-faire country on earth. The Soviet Union is territorially the largest country in the world, with an area about three times that of the United States. Its resources in soil, forests and minerals are far greater than those of any other country. To some extent the very extent of these resources has encouraged a reckless attitude toward them. The harm which one factory, one building operation could do could not conceivably, it was supposed, affect them significantly.

Spoliation of the resources of the Soviet Union has been encouraged by the shortcomings of the Soviet Union itself. Land and the resources of the earth's surface belong to the state. There is no private ownership in land, and thus no one who can take the first steps to protect the land. The author cites the example of the use of the Black Sea beaches as concrete aggregate to the extent that the unprotected foreshore has been devoured by the sea, and resorts and hotels gravely threatened.

One is told that the profit motive is the driving force in the capitalist system, and that raw sewage and industrial pollutants are poured into rivers and lakes because it would cost money to dispose of them in any other way, and profits would thereby be diminished or taxes increased. The Soviet Union achieves the same result by different means. The plan calls for a given output, and the state rewards industrial units which exceed their norms. The industrial plant pits itself against the system and is under the same temptation as any capitalist enterprise to cut corners. There

is no lack of legislation to protect the environment. The individual or the company in a capitalist society can be made to adapt its processes to the current regulations, and there is no lack of individuals who will open proceedings. In the Soviet system it is not easy for the state to bring suit against itself and compel itself to desist from doing what it finds profitable to do. The consequence is that it appears to be more difficult to reduce pollution and to check the spoliation of the environment in a planned, communist society than it is in one in which the profit motive is held to prevail.

The author reviews the problems of atmospheric pollution in Moscow and other of the larger Russian cities and the pollution of the rivers. A grave problem has been the escape of oil into the Volga; passengers on river boats are, it is said, warned not to throw lighted matches overboard. Special emphasis is given to the problem of Lake Baikal, the largest body of fresh water on the face of the earth, now so polluted by sewage and the waste from lumber mills and cellulose factories that even the factories along its shore have difficulty in obtaining the clean water for which they came to these sites. The unique wild life of this region is irreparably damaged, and the damage to Lake Baikal has become so great that in 1971 the Central Committee of the Communist Party itself intervened to order the implementation of antipollution measures.

Gigantic projects of land reclamation, river diversion, and resource exploitation have always appealed to the Communist bosses. Stalin was himself obsessed by the desirability of undertakings such as the canalization of the Volga river, the construction of huge dams and even the diversion of whole river systems. Projects at present under way threaten to use up in irrigation all the water which normally makes its way to the Aral Sea, thus leading to the drying out of the latter. The level of the Caspian sea is falling, as a result of irrigation projects along its tributary rivers, to the point where vast ecological changes are taking place. The latest of such attempts to reshape the surface of the earth

is the diversion of the Arctic rivers so that their waters discharge southwards into the arid lands of Central Asia. The pollution of Lake Baikal or smog over Moscow might be said to concern only the Russians. If fresh water fails to reach the Arctic Ocean the ecological changes may affect much of the northern hemisphere. To this fact no regard is paid.

This well documented book brings together a vast amount of material, hitherto available only in Russian, as well as the observations of the author and the substance of his discussions with Soviet officials. It fills a gap in our literature and should be studied by all who are interested in either pollution or the Soviet Union. The book is marred only by the low quality of the maps which illustrate it.

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DAVID M. GORDON. *Theories of Poverty and Unemployment: Orthodox, Radical, and Dual Labor Market Perspectives*. Pp. vii, 177. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1972. \$8.50.

Mr. Gordon's book is an attempt at reconstruction of economic doctrine based on recent analyses of the ghetto economy. To introduce the book properly, it is necessary to review the materials and viewpoints on which it builds.

Michael Harrington has referred to the poor in America as those "left behind by technology." He could also have written that they have been left behind and ignored by economic theory—itself oriented to that mainstream technology and industrial organization. Macroeconomic theory, whether in neo-Keynesian or monetarist form, is essentially a rationale for policies that improve the position of employables. But employables (and those counted in the published unemployment figures) are a different population from the hard-core poor, whose lives are rarely touched by the varying intensities of macroeconomic policies on the standard models. The neoclassical theory of income distribution and human capital, a building block of microeconomic

reasoning and the rationale for a variety of labor-market and transfer policies, also fails tests of relevance to the position of the poor, as it seems to fail broader tests of relevance in a world of large industrial organizations and changing notions of work associations. Growth theory, the third major area of conventional economic theorizing, ostensibly claims to explain trends in the distribution of income, but, like the macroeconomic and microeconomic theory on which it is built, totally lacks relevance to the phenomenon of hard-core poverty. These assertions, which on the face of it seem extreme, can be easily checked by searching for references to poverty in the indices of any of the leading texts and treatises in these areas. In short, there is every reason to go along with Gordon in his working premise that the theory core of economics, as transmitted in the typical American university, has nothing to say about a most critical domestic problem, and in fact does not provide a framework in which the matter can be analyzed.

Despite these lacunae, the fact of poverty has been visible to others besides the poor, and since the late sixties, a number of economists (Gordon and this reviewer among them) have been searching for working models and a theoretical approach that can explain aspects, at least, of United States hard-core poverty. One line of attack that Gordon and others have followed focuses on the labor market, particularly the labor market in the urban ghetto. Views and findings stemming from this research include the following: the ghetto constitutes a marketplace distinct from that of the mainstream economy and its associated patterns of hiring, job performance and career development; interactions between the two markets are minimal, the employment patterns of the potentially-working poor are characterized by turnover and transience in actual jobs, hustling, in various forms, is an established and institutionalized activity, quantitatively as important as conventional economic activity, job compensation among the poor is imperfectly related to labor productivity and unrelated to career development.

These seemingly unexceptional statements build in a way that is subversive to standard theory. The split market phenomenon makes policies based on the presumption of sensitivity to neoclassical wage incentives irrelevant. In fact, the labor-market split evokes comparisons to conditions in less developed countries. In this sense, the United States is likened to a dual economy—noting that the proportion of the population in the modern industrial sector is an order of magnitude higher here—and the relevant policy approach becomes a form of development planning. The subversive aspect of work on the dual labor market, however, may be the empirical observation of a reversal of the usual marginal productivity to wage relationship. This finding touches on a kernel of faith in the neoclassical system. (Note the policy correlation of the reversal: raise the wages of the poor, and their work will exhibit comparable productivity.)

These subversive findings and the general failure of conventional doctrine within the poverty area suggest paradigm failure, and this is the springboard from which Gordon leaps. His book is instructive on the inadequacies of the neoclassical, human-capital paradigm, but I believe he was ill advised to build an entire book around the paradigm-conflict motif. The major part of the work consists of the search for competing paradigms to round out the exposition, and this results in a book that reads like the literature section of a dissertation, with all of the familiar artificiality. It may well be that dual-labor-market thinking will be an important component of a paradigm that will be effective in upsetting the neoclassical (new) world view; but it does not have the strength and scope at this time to stand on its own. Among other things which are lacking in the putative paradigm are mechanisms relating distribution to growth forces, a synthesis of macroeconomic and financial elements, and links to the theory of industrial organization and firm structure. These gaps override the strengths of the viewpoint, which lie primarily in an insightful integration of class attitudes and behaviors with economic patterns. The dis-

appointing thing is that Gordon is well aware that he is advancing his paradigm prematurely; in fact, he says so explicitly in the text. Why, then, does he waste his considerable powers in concocting a conflict, a conflict that, in effect, turns out to be no contest?

As the tone of this review should indicate, I am in total sympathy with the effort of subversion but disappointed in the outcome. In fact, it is not difficult to locate omitted materials that might have taken the book considerably further in the contest. Gordon does not attempt to forge links with Cambridge capital and distribution theory, despite the obvious strengths of the Cambridge attack on marginal productivity constructs. Other compatible viewpoints ignored in the book can be found in neo-Keynsian or Cambridge growth theory, and in specialist fields including planning, urban studies, relief and redistributive transfers. Gordon also cuts himself off from radical and Marxian positions. This is probably justifiable in the sense that old-line doctrine, focusing on exploitation of the poor, is irrelevant in a situation where the poor are unemployed and incapable of producing exploitable surplus. Nevertheless, there are current lines of radical inquiry, particularly in developmental economics, that are apposite; and one regrets the separation of viewpoints. The distinction, in fact, comes off as private and artificial, since both dual-labor-market and radical views developed side by side within the Union of Radical Political Economists.

In short, the Gordon book is an attempt to go it alone in a paradigm war without sufficient logistic support. The book does work as a survey introduction to the dualism literature. It is essentially correct in showing the need for reconstruction and incorporating the dual-labor-market findings in a central place. But the bulk of the book reads as a premature sorting out of materials and does not stand as persuasive polemics.

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RICHARD HELLMAN. *Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study*. Pp. xxv, 473. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$25.00.

This discussion of government competition in the electric power industry, based on intensive case studies, reflects a variety of things. First, we are reminded that in economics and in civil affairs changing tides of attention are directed to various economic issues. In the first decades of the twentieth century public utility issues drew a great deal of public and scholarly interest. After a marked decline in recent years, however, a revival of interest in public utility economics appears underway. Dr. Hellman's book is a part of that flow toward greater discussion of public utility issues.

Second, the book reminds us that at least on occasion the quality of discussion on a topic today may not be much different or better than it was in the past. The debates about alternative public strategies in controlling the electric utility industry which took place in the period 1900-20 go over much the same ground as discussion in the 1970s. Judging from the historical materials presented in this book, the alternatives proposed then are little different from the alternatives outlined today.

An indication of "the wisdom of the fathers" is apparent in Hellman's historical survey of public utility control. For example, the debates in 1907 have a modern ring to them—or the reverse may be true. The current discussion has a 1907 air about them! This suggests that we may be ready for some kinds of institutional innovations in social control of electric power.

Third, the author seeks to lift up for appraisal a traditional social control device which perhaps does not get extensive analysis today. Hellman evaluates government competition as an agency of control, with that competition extending even to what the author calls duplicative competition. By duplicative competition he means government power facilities operating in the market territory of private power companies.

An interesting piece of information pre-

sented in the book is that thirty-eight communities have government competition in electric power even to the point that consumers have a choice between which organization—public or private—will sell them electric power. It is the contention of the author that threatened or real government competition has been a strong force for lower rates and expansion of electric service, following Adam Smith's ancient dictum that "competition is the life of trade."

The author reports on scores of case studies of government competition ranging from the Tennessee Valley Authority to the power facility in Corning, Iowa as he attempts to evaluate the impact of government competition upon the rate and expansion policies of private electric power companies. The book can be recommended for those interested in public utility economics, though it suffers from being somewhat repetitive in places. It makes a contribution to both public utility specialists and to concerned consumers in its investigation of social control of the electric utility industry.

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MELCHIOR PALYI. *The Twilight of Gold, 1924-1936: Myths and Realities*. Pp. xxiv, 365. Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery, 1972. \$15.00.

This book is a legacy of the late Dr. Melchior Palyi—a history of the failure of the imitation gold standard or gold exchange standard constructed in the 1920s, and of the subsequent monetary upheavals during the depression. Perhaps, had he lived, the narrative might have been extended to include the story of the second failure—the gold-dollar exchange standard constructed at Bretton Woods in 1944 and ending (who can say for certain?) in August, 1971.

Such an extension was not to be. Although the bulk of the writing had been completed at the time of Dr. Palyi's death, necessary final editing and alterations were undertaken by Professors Donald L. Kemmerer (University of Illinois at Urbana)

and G. Carl Wiegand (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale). The latter has provided cogent and succinct introductions to the separate chapters which the casual reader, if he did not himself experience the period, will find particularly helpful.

Dr. Palyi not only observed, but also participated in, many of the international monetary events of the late twenties and early thirties as chief economist of the Deutschebank and as advisor to the Reichsbank and director of its Institute for Monetary Research. His accounts of the personalities and the behavior patterns of Montagu Norman, Benjamin Strong, Émile Moreau, Raymond Poincaré, and Hjalmar Schacht constitute more than mere historical research based on secondary sources. Yet the volume is not confined to personal memoirs; indeed, it is couched in a highly objective style, considering the author's personal involvement, thus reflecting his later years as a visiting professor and as a financial columnist for the *Chicago Tribune* and a frequent contributor to the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*.

Dr. Palyi held some very strong opinions about the efficacy of the orthodox international gold standard; together with his personal involvement there results an overall tone of "if only the wise decisions had been made," throughout the volume. This reviewer has also been a strong supporter of the gold standard and is, therefore, sympathetic to many, but certainly not all, of Dr. Palyi's views. To call Winston Churchill "a dilettante in financial matters" (p. 47), is much too kind; to lump Casellians, Keynesians and Friedmanites into a sort of homogeneous mass of monetarists is, at best, an oversimplification!

But full agreement with the author's views is unnecessary in order to enjoy the stimulation this book provides, or to discover or rediscover many unfamiliar sources particularly among the European writers cited, or, indeed, to find reason to shudder apprehensively at some of the obvious analogies to current monetary events.

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NATHAN ROSENBERG. *Technology and American Economic Growth*. Pp. 211. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. \$7.00. Paperbound, \$2.95.

This book is both important and engaging—a rarity in economic writings. In a field often polluted by technical jargon, this author presents physical evidence that is within common knowledge and gives whys and therefores that are both original and acceptable. The recital is as much social and cultural as it is economic in the strict sense. The book is itself an invention; a modern economic work that is relevant to life and public policy. Economic theorizing, and the inscrutable language of its practitioners, retreats in favor of open-eyed inspection of developments in mechanics and science. The chemical formula, complicated but in nature, prompts the economic formula, which thankfully is not of the devil but must occur to any thoughtful person of goodwill. A prime condition of economic growth is relegation of restrictions of the market. Unhappily, socially sponsored "research and development" has been too far confined to military purposes, but that is bound to be a passing phase.

Professor Rosenberg rightly refers to anticipations of contemporary awareness. The foresight of Hamilton, List, and the Careys, urging industrial progress for America, is in contrast to the strange case of Jefferson. Highly respectful of science and himself no mean innovator in both mechanics and politics Jefferson's recommendation of an agricultural society was a mistaken guess. One thinks, too, of the diligence of Alfred Marshall in visiting American factories for pointings to his economic principles. And, long before, there was Adam Smith and his immortal pin factory. A merit of the present author is that he does not spring surprises. Geography, advances in education, composition of the population, natural resources—and their depletion—have largely directed technological improvement. Nor does the author neglect the effects of technology on the people and their environment. Some of the progress in production has been purchased at high, and probably inevitable, social cost.

This is not, and does not pretend to be, an economic history of America, but it scrutinizes energies that have gone far to explain how this country has come to be. For leaders in undeveloped nations there are red lights as well as green; though this discussion is not directed to them, they will do well to ponder it before reaching their own conclusions.

BROADUS MITCHELL

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### ERRATUM

In the January 1973 issue of THE ANNALS, page 172, column 2, first paragraph, Republic of South Korea should read Republic of Korea.

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
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
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